# Apple valley r6 1nc

## 1

#### Permissibility and presumption negate:

#### [1] Resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove a proactive obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation

#### [2] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### [3] Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### Moral internalism is true:

#### [1] Disagreement – Externalist theories fail to explain why some agents have the differing motivation for actions – internalism solves by showing how agents’ motivations are dictated by internal desires. Markovitz

[Markovits 14, Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROCJMM Oxford University Press, 2014.//Scopa] SHS ZS

Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. **We should not assume** that **some of us have** special **epistemic access to what matters**, **especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment**. **It’s better to start from the assumption**, as internalism does, **that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit** – **and correct this assumption** only **by appealing to standards that are** as **uncontroversial** as possible. **According to externalism** about reasons, **what matters normatively** – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – **does not depend in** any fundamental way on **what** in fact **matters to us** – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. **Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters**, **and some** of us **are “wrongly” motivated**. **But externalists** can **offer no explanation for this supposed difference** in how well we respond to reasons – **no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones** – **that doesn’t** itself **appeal to the views about what matters** that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) **A comparison to the epistemic case** helps **bring out what is unsatisfactory** in the externalist position. **We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than** to **others** **despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right** in their beliefs about a certain topic. **Chicken-sexing is a popular example** of this among philosophers. **We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens.** But in the case of chicken-sexing, **we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right**. **Externalism seems to tell[s] us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others**, but **without providing the independent means of determining** which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).

#### [2] Motivation – A. Externalist ethics collapse to internalism because agents will only follow external demands if they are consistent with their internal account of the good. For instance, citizens only follow the law insofar as its consistent with their internal beliefs, even when external value structures are being placed upon them.

#### Next, every agent takes their ability to act on their ethical system as instrumentally valuable. Only self interest bridges relativism to provide a universal principle.

**Moore** Margaret Moore, Queens University professor in the Political Studies department, cross-appointed (as a courtesy) in Philosophy, Reviewed Work(s): Morals by Agreement. by David Gauthier, Noûs, Vol. 25, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), pp. 707-714 ///AHS PB /BHHS AK recut

On Gauthier's view, morality is a sub-set of self-interest (he calls it preference-fulfillment), which is instrumentally necessary, not absolutely, but given features of the human situation which are almost certain to ob- tain. By taking as his starting-point the agent's subjective motivational set, whatever its content, Gauthier can claim that the requirements of morality escape none who fall under its ambit, for each person necessarily acts on his or her desires and aims. If Gauthier's project is successful, he will have refuted the moral skeptic: by demonstrating that morality is self-interestedly rational, he can claim that the principles are justified and that they apply to everyone. He does not need to presuppose a feeling such as sympathy to explain moral action, or appeal to a process of moral education and socialization within communities which shape the individual's desires and beliefs in accordance with a specific moral conception. Gauthier's agents simply maximize their utility and in the process find that they need to co-operate with others and that the dynamics of co- operation make it rational in self-interested terms to constrain their utility- maximization. By considering in this way the principles and constraints which it would be rational for co-operating self-interested agents to adopt, Gautheir claims to be able to deduce a system of moral constraints and Principles.

#### This entails a system of mutual self restraint: Contracts are the only standard capable of generating normativity since each agent rationally chooses to protect their self-interest by entering the contract.

**Gauthier** [David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998], ///AHS PB /BHHS AK recut

I shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better**. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person ’ s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations,** each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one**,** of course**,** can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may representsuch a practiceas capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreementis the basis of morality**.** Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable**.** Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others**.** We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone.This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone ’ s preferences**.** The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person ’ s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else**.** Thus, each person ’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns**. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one.** Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarianism. Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Both debaters debate to win the round but we are still restricted by agreed on constraints like 4 mins of prep, speech times, etc. Their very performance justifies the NC framework and proves the AC collapses to the NC

#### Negate:

#### [1] Strikes inhibit the ability to create contracts, create power imbalances, and violate individual contracts.

Levine 1, Peter. "The Libertarian Critique of Labor Unions." Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 21.4 (2001): 17-24. (Peter Levine is the Associate Dean for Research and Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship & Public Affairs in Tufts University’s Jonathan Tisch College of Civic Life. He has secondary appointments in the Tufts Philosophy Department and the Tufts Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute. He was the founding deputy director (2001-6) and then the second director (2006-15) of Tisch College’s CIRCLE, The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, which he continues to oversee as an associate dean.) JG

Libertarians strongly defend freedom of choice and association. Thus, when workers choose to act collectively, negotiate together, or voluntarily walk off the job, libertarians have no reasonable complaint--even if other people are harmed--because they support the right to make and exit voluntary partnerships. But unions gain strength **by overriding private rights.** They routinely block anyone from working **under a non-union contract**, and they prevent employers from making offers--even advantageous ones--to individual workers unless the union is informed and consents. Unions declare strikes and establish picket lines to prevent **customers and workers** from **entering company property**; they may **fine employees who cross these lines.** They also extract fees from all workers who are covered by their contracts. Although covered workers may avoid paying for certain union functions (such as lobbying) that are not germane to contract issues, they must pay for strikes and other activities that some of them oppose. The great libertarian theorist Friedrich Hayek concluded that unions “are the one institution where government has signally failed in its first task, that of preventing coercion of men by other men--and by coercion I do not mean primarily the coercion of employers but the coercion of workers by their fellow workers.” Hayek may have been thinking mainly of corrupt and unaccountable union leaders. But even a completely democratic union sometimes supplants private rights. As libertarians like Morgan O. Reynolds point out, majorities within a union are able to ignore minorities’ preferences.

#### [2] Employees and companies have agreed-upon contracts that are broken in a strike since workers are not upholding their end of it – this is intrinsically bad under the framework and violates the principle of mutual self-restraint

**[3] No aff offense –**

**a] even if some strikes are legal they are still by definition contradicting their side of the contract which is exactly what the fw condemns**