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#### Existence precedes essence – there is no such thing as human nature and humans come into the world without a definition of the self.

**Sartre** (Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre was a French philosopher, playwright, novelist, screenwriter, political activist, biographer, and literary critic. He was one of the key figures in the philosophy of existentialism and phenomenology, and one of the leading figures in 20th-century French philosophy and Marxism., "Existentialism is a Humanism", <http://homepages.wmich.edu/~baldner/existentialism.pdf>) BHHS AK

Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. .... What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that [hu]man first of all exists, encounters [the]mself, surges up in the world – and defines [the]mself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He[they] will not be anything until later, and then [t]he[y] will be what [t]he[y] makes of [themselves] himself.

Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. [Hu]man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what [t]he[y] wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as he wills to be after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.

And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily exists – that [hu]man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. [Hu]man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower. Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by wishing or willing is a conscious decision taken – much more often than not – after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my will is probably a manifestation of a prior and more spontaneous decision.

#### The agent constructs meaning and normativity through its actions and decisions – external principles fail.

**Sartre 2** (Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre was a French philosopher, playwright, novelist, screenwriter, political activist, biographer, and literary critic. He was one of the key figures in the philosophy of existentialism and phenomenology, and one of the leading figures in 20th-century French philosophy and Marxism., No Date, "Existentialism is a Humanism", <http://homepages.wmich.edu/~baldner/existentialism.pdf>) BHHS AK

The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. .... For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism – man is free, [Hu]man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimize our behavior. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. – We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he [one] is thrown into this world he is [they are] responsible for everything [t]he[y] does. .... As an example by which you may the better understand this state of abandonment, I will refer to the case of a pupil of mine, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarreling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. His mother was living alone with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But he, at this moment, had the choice between going to England to join the Free French Forces or of staying near his mother and helping her to live. He fully realized that this woman lived only for him and that his disappearance – or perhaps his death – would plunge her into despair. He also realized that, concretely and in fact, every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would be sure of effect in the sense of aiding her to live, whereas anything he did in order to go and fight would be an ambiguous action which might vanish like water into sand and serve no purpose. .... Consequently, he found himself confronted by two very different modes of action; the one concrete, immediate, but directed towards only one individual; and the other an action addressed to an end infinitely greater, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, he was hesitating between two kinds of morality; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. He had to choose between those two. What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbor, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. .... If values are uncertain, if they are still too abstract to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, nothing remains but to trust in our instincts. That is what this young man tried to do; and when I saw him he said, “In the end, it is feeling that counts; the direction in which it is really pushing me is the one I ought to choose. If I feel that I love my mother enough to sacrifice everything else for her – my will to be avenged, all my longings for action and adventure then I stay with her. If, on the contrary, I feel that my love for her is not enough, I go.” But how does one estimate the strength of a feeling? The value of his feeling for his mother was determined precisely by the fact that he was standing by her. I may say that I love a certain friend enough to sacrifice such or such a sum of money for him, but I cannot prove that unless I have done it. I may say, “I love my mother enough to remain with her,” if actually I have remained with her. I can only estimate the strength of this affection if I have performed an action by which it is defined and ratified. But if I then appeal to this affection to justify my action, I find myself drawn into a vicious circle. In other words, feeling is formed by the deeds that one does; therefore I cannot consult it as a guide to action. And that is to say that I can neither seek within myself for an authentic impulse to action, nor can I expect, from some ethic, formulae that will enable me to act. You may say that the youth did, at least, go to a professor to ask for advice. But if you seek counsel – from a priest, for example you have selected that priest; and at bottom you already knew, more or less, what he would advise.

#### Each subject’s radical freedom encompasses and is responsible for others’ self creation as well – only existentialism bridges the gap to a universal good without being transcendent

**Manzi 13** (Yvonne Manzi, 1-23-2013, accessed on 11-6-2020, E-International Relations, "Jean-Paul Sartre: Existential “Freedom” and the Political", <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/23/jean-paul-sartre-existential-freedom-and-the-political/>) BHHS AK

Having acknowledged Sartre’s focus on subjectivity, and having noted that his focus is entirely on the individual and the ‘wrongness’ of the imposition of outside values upon the individual, one wonders how it is possible for society to continue and for a community to maintain itself. In Existentialism and Humanism,[25] Sartre seems to introduce a vague idea of community. “In willing freedom we discover that it depends entirely upon the freedom of others” and he adds that “I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim” (2007, 62). This seems to allow the idea that therefore humans will act in solidarity with each other in spite of a lack of transcendental[26] values. In Being and Nothingness he explains this further and states that we have a responsibility towards our freedom and the freedom of others. By responsibility, he means “consciousness of being the incontestable author of an event or of an object” (1943, 553). Because an individual is absolutely free, when he makes a choice he becomes that choice and that choice becomes him. The changes he makes in the world because of that choice also become him. In Sartre’s words, “what happens to me happens through me”[27] and as a for-itself, I must “wholly assume the situation with the proud consciousness of being the author of it” (Ibid, 554). An example of this is war – if I am born into a war, I am born into a situation and this situation is what I am. I then have to make choices which I am wholly responsible for. If I choose to fight in the war as opposed to desertion or suicide, I have chosen to continue this war, and this war becomes mine.[28] This is what Sartre means when he claims that humans are responsible for both their own and others’ freedom.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with existential freedom. Impact calc: because normativity is generated internally, agents must have the freedom to self-create unimpeded – promotion of self-creation is good and the opposite isn’t. Prefer:

**[1] Performativity – only freedom is constitutive to human subjecthood and any moral theory because the act of adopting an ethical framework or developing and making arguments presupposes the ability to radically choose.**

#### [2] Motivation – people are internally motivated to follow an existentialist theory – which means they will understand the basis behind their actions compared to other transcendent principles.

#### De Beauvoir 1 [Simon de Beauvoir. “The Ethics of Ambiguity.” Lyle stuart Inc. 1948. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. https://irishsecure.com/books/The%20ETHICS%20OF%20AMBIGUITY.pdf] SHS ZS/AK recut

The first implication of such an attitude is that the genuine [hu]man will not agree to recognize any foreign absolute. When a man projects into an ideal heaven that impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself that is called God, it is because he wishes the regard of this existing Being to change his existence into being; but if he agrees not to be in order to exist genuinely, he will abandon the dream of an inhuman objectivity. He will understand that it is not a matter of being right in the eyes of a God, but of being right in his [one’s] own eyes. Renouncing the thought of seeking the guarantee for his existence outside of [oneself] himself, he [one] will also refuse to believe in unconditioned values which would set themselves up athwart his freedom like things. Value is this lacking-being of which freedom makes itself a lack; and it is because the latter makes itself a lack that value appears. It is desire which creates the desirable, and the project which sets up the end. It is human existence which makes values spring up in the world on the basis of which it win be able to judge the enterprise in which it will be engaged. But first it locates itself beyond any pessimism, as beyond any optimism, for the fact of its original springing forth is a pure contingency. Before existence there is no more reason to exist than not to exist. The lack of existence can not be evaluated since it is the fact on the basis of which all evaluation is defined. It can not be compared to anything for there is nothing outside of it to serve as a term of comparison. This rejection of any extrinsic justification also confirm the rejection of an original pessimism which we posited at the beginning. Since it is unjustifiable from without, to declare from without that it is unjustifiable is not to condemn it. And the truth is that outside of existence there is nobody. Man exists. For him [human] it is not a question of wondering whether his presence in the world is useful, whether life is worth the trouble of being lived. These questions make no sense. It is a matter of knowing whether [t]he[y] wants to live and under what conditions.

#### [3] Abstract theories fail because we cannot guide actions without understanding the particular circumstance of every agent. Benhabib

[Benhabib, Seyla. "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory." Praxis International. 1986. Pg. 38-60. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9780203705841-52/generalized-concrete-kohlberg-gilligan-controversy-moral-theory-diana-tietjens-meyers] SHS ZS

**It is no longer plausible to maintain that** such **a standpoint can[not] universalize adequately**. Kohlberg views the veil of ignorance not only as exemplifying reversibility but universalizability as well. This is the idea that “we must be willing to live with our judgment or decision when we trade places with others in the situation being judged” (Kohlberg, 1981: 197). But the question is, which situation? Can **moral situations [can’t] be individuated independently of our knowledge of the agents involved in these situations, of [and] their histories, attitudes, characters, and desires**? Can I describe a situation as one of arrogance or hurt pride without knowing something about you as a concrete other? Can I know how to distinguish between a breach of confidence and a harmless slip of the tongue, without knowing your history and your character? **Moral situations, like moral emotions and attitudes, can only be individuated if they are evaluated in light of our knowledge of the history of the agents involved in them**. While every procedure of universalizability presupposes that “like cases ought to be treated alike” or that I should act in such a way that I should also be willing that all others in a like situation act like me, **the most difficult aspect of any such procedure is to know what constitutes a “like” situation or what it would mean for another to be exactly in a situation like mine**. Such a process of reasoning, to be at all viable, must involve[s] the viewpoint of the concrete other, for situations, to paraphrase Stanley Cavell, do not come like “envelopes and golden finches,” ready for definition and description, “nor like apples ripe for grading.”29 When we morally disagree, for example, we do not only disagree about the principles involved; very often we disagree because what I see as a lack of generosity on your part you construe as your legitimate right not to do something; we disagree because what you see as jealousy on my part I view as my desire to have more of your attention. **Universalistic moral theory[ies] neglects such everyday, interactional morality and assumes that the public standpoint of justice, and our quasi-public personalities as right-bearing individuals, are the center of moral theory**. Kohlberg emphasizes the dimension of ideal role-taking or taking the viewpoint of the other in moral judgment. Because he defines the other as the generalized other, however, he perpetrates one of the fundamental errors of Kantian moral theory. **Kant’s error was to assume that** I, **as a pure rational agent reasoning for [themself]** myself, could reach a conclusion that would be **acceptable for all at all times and places**.31 In Kantian moral theory, moral agents are like geometricians in different rooms who, reasoning alone for themselves, all arrive at the same solution to a problem. Following Habermas, I want to name this the “monological” model of moral reasoning. Insofar as he interprets ideal role-taking in the light of Rawls’s concept of a “veil of ignorance,” Kohlberg as well sees the silent thought process of a single self who inaginatively puts himself in the position of the other as the most adequate form of moral judgment. I conclude that **a definition of the self that is restricted to the standpoint of the generalized other becomes incoherent and cannot individuate among selves**. Without assuming the standpoint of the concrete other, **no coherent universalizability test can be carried out, for we lack the necessary epistemic information to judge my moral situation to be “like” or “unlike” yours.**

#### [4] Internal power – existentialism provides the best framework for overcoming domination that allows us to affirm the power we hold within ourselves.

**Newman ‘06**, (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, 2006 AD: 7/8/09) <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-anarchism-and-the-politics-of-ressentiment> SHS ZS

**Rather than having an external enemy** -- **like the State** -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, **we must work on ourselves**. As political subjects **we must** **overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power**. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. **To affirm eternal return is to** acknowledge and indeed **positively affirm the** continual **'return' of same life** with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, **eternal return refers to power**. **We must acknowledge** and affirm the 'return' of **power,** the fact that it **will always be with us**. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. **We must affirm a will to power** -- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche.[56] This is **to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'**. To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an **overcoming** of **the essentialist identities** and categories **that limit us**. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification. **We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power**, **and produce through this denial**, a Manichean **politics of absolute opposition** that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose.

#### Thus, the advocacy: Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I’m willing to spec what you want as long as I don’t abandon my maxim.

#### Spec -

#### [1] Enforcement is through International Framework Agreements but it’s irrelevant under the fw.

#### [2] Definition of unconditional right to strike:

NLRB 85 [National Labor Relations Board; “Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: Volume 1,” Jan 1985; <https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA__v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA__v4xwC&rdot=1>] Justin

\*\*Edited for gendered language

As for the so-called absolute or unconditional right to strike—there are no absolute rights that do not have their corresponding responsibilities. Under our American Anglo-Saxon system, each individual is entitled to the maximum of freedom, provided however (and this provision is of first importance), his [their] freedom has due regard for the rights and freedoms of others. The very safeguard of our freedoms is the recognition of this fundamental principle. I take issue very definitely with the suggestion that there is an absolute and unconditional right to concerted action (which after all is what the strike is) which endangers the health and welfare of our people in order to attain a selfish end.

### Offense

#### [1] Granting workers the right to strike and speak their voice is intrinsically good because the intentions behind a strike are to prevent employers from locking workers into concrete working conditions that workers are controlled by

**Walsh 21** (Dylan Walsh, 6-21-2021, MIT Sloan, "A new survey takes the pulse of worker voice in America | MIT Sloan", <https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/a-new-survey-takes-pulse-worker-voice-america>) BHHS AK

Understanding how well workers think their voice is heard has implications well beyond academia. Absence of voice, said Kochan, has contributed to the deterioration of wages and working conditions for U.S. workers [means], as they are unable to engage in the conversations that affect wages and working conditions. There is also a significant cost to organizations: If a company cannot hear what its workers have to say, then it cannot benefit from their ideas for innovation and improvement. Most significant, though, is the cost of frustration among those who feel they are voiceless — one of the leading contributors Kochan sees to today’s political divisions. To understand present-day worker voice, Kochan and his coauthors [surveyed nearly 4,000 adults of working age](http://iwer.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/worker-voice-paper-1_16_18_tablesintext12pt.pdf) (18 or older). They measured both how much voice workers felt they have with regard to workplace issues, as well as how much voice they felt they ought to have. The difference between these two represented a “voice gap.” Though the survey delivered a broad range of findings on how people feel about their influence in the workplace, three results stood out. First was the size of the voice gap, particularly around working conditions and compensation, where up to 60 percent of workers surveyed experienced a difference between their expectation and their reality. Second, there was a surprising uptick in workers who expressed interest in joining a union. The prior two surveys from 1977 and 1995 showed that roughly one-third of workers would join a union if given the chance. The new survey revealed that just shy of 50 percent of non-union workers would join if given the opportunity. “To me this signals that workers want something to fill the void in worker voice,” Kochan said. “Exactly what they expect unions to do is an open question.” Third: though Kochan has seen a growth in public discussion about new forms of worker voice other than unionization, very few workers actually demonstrated experience with or knowledge of these new forms. This difference in what he’d heard and what he saw ties into the second phase of the project. With the help of students at MIT Sloan, Kochan is compiling case studies to explore the variety of new forms of worker voice that are taking shape that combine creative uses of technology with “the human touch,” as the students put it. [OUR Walmart](https://www.united4respect.org/), an independent employee organization, for instance, is starting to use artificial intelligence to inform workers at Walmart and other firms of their rights. Coworker.org helps baristas at Starbucks [petition for operational and workplace improvements](https://home.coworker.org/starbucks/) across their entire network of stores. And lobster fishers in Maine [formed a cooperative](https://www.lobster207.com/about/) to buy, sell, and market their products. Regardless of how workers end up expressing their voice, Kochan said it’s imperative we do something about the gap people experience between the voice they feel they should have and the voice they feel they do have. “When this gap starts to close, you should see a more productive workplace and, I think, a workplace where workers feel treated more fairly. It creates a much more positive work environment and, over time, wages and benefits improve for average workers,” he said. “Those are the directions we need to go as society.”

#### That affirms – subjects only gain authenticity through work in which they can make their own choices and have power over what they do. Working solely according to the desires of an employer generates inauthenticity and hinders self-creation

**MacMillan et al. 12** (Scott MacMillan, Anthony Yue, and Albert Mills, September 2012, accessed on 6-24-2021, , "Both How and Why: Considering Existentialism as a Philosophy of Work and Management", <https://booksc.org/book/37843629/d0a16e>) BHHS AK

Sartre stresses the importance of being “conscious” of our choices as consciousness is freedom, the necessary prerequisite for authenticity. The opposite is to live in “bad faith” or “inauthentically” where people live unconsciously, not accepting their freedom. “We say indifferently of a person that he shows signs of bad faith or that he lies to himself… [we] shall willingly grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself, on condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general” (Sartre, 1956: 48). For example, a person may stay in work in which they are not happy but never even know or acknowledge that it is the source of their unhappiness. Heidegger says that we “fall” (fallenness) into inauthenticity and become what is expected of us in the “public arena” and behave according to the norms and rules of society. We escape from our true selves into a public life that is untrue or false. Heidegger’s view of inauthenticity is similar to Sartre’s living in bad faith. Yalom (1980: 378) states that “the human being’s ‘universal conflict’ is that one strives to be an individual, and yet being an individual requires that one endure a frightening isolation.” As a result of these feelings of isolation and loneliness, people may take comfort with other people and become negatively dependent on them, resulting in the loss of their individuation. “The contrast between authenticity and inauthenticity is for some synonymous with the contrast between good faith and bad faith, between being true to yourself and betraying yourself, between being sincere and insincere, between being a ‘phony’, or a ‘fake’, or a ‘poser’, and being ‘real’ or, again, ‘authentic’” (Feldman and Hazlett, no date: 1). However, bad faith is difficult to avoid as authenticity is a dynamic state of existence (Yue, 2009a; 2009b) and meaning for the individual will change over time as human existence is necessarily contingent. each man lives in the midst of contingency, that even the knownness of day-to-day living is, in a sense, but a phantasy [sic], a wish more than an actuality, I do not know, I cannot know enough to be safe, to be secure, to predict with complete confidence from one moment to the next. Contingency means that what will become actual is contingent upon many influences, many variables, so many that they may well be infinite in number. The fact of contingency means that I never can predict with complete assurance. The experience of contingency means that I live with anxiety. (Bugental, 1965: 22) 3 5 S COTT M A C M ILLAN , A NTHONY R. Y U E AND A LBERT J. M ILLS P HILOSOPHY O F M ANAGEMENT , V OLUME 11, N UMBER 3, 2012 Since individual existence is only temporary and little of life can be predicted with certainty, the future self is a mystery to the individual and contingent on unknown factors; and this, therefore, results in a state of anxiety. “Contingency flows away from us on every side as though our every act were a stone dropped in a pond. Our smallest acts, our most casual choices, have the potential of reaching to any point in their consequences. We can never imagine all the possible permutations and ramifications of our doing and not doing” (Bugental, 1965: 297). To exist contingently means that what may be meaningful at one point in time to a person may have no meaning at a different point in time. Bugental (1965: 40) states that “Man lives in contingency… [He] can and does take action that affects his awareness and experience… [and] takes such action without ultimate guide posts of universal values or built-in instincts… in constant relation with his fellows while yet being separate from them.” Despite efforts to live authentically, it is difficult for most people as many events may be out of their control. Therefore, slipping into ‘bad faith’ is always a potential danger, shadowing every person’s existence. For example, an occupation may be meaningful for many years for an individual but later in life hold little interest besides the salary; unfortunately, a typical situation for many people (Grierson, 2007; Hollis, 1993). Each day people are faced with a variety of choices and possibilities, many of which they are fearful of, since the results could be positive or negative. Man finds himself in “a world he never made,” a world of infinite possibility. In this world man is constantly confronted with choices for which he must always be less than adequately prepared. Thus man is constantly faced with uncertainty, with contingency, with the possibility that his choices may fail to bring him the results he intends. That failure may range from the simplest disappointment to a fatal misstep, from being late to a pleasant evening’s recreation to being killed as he walks across his normally quiet, residential street. (Bugental, 1965: 74) This dilemma highlights the challenge for the individual as he or she lives, as it is not enough to choose what one’s authentic work is at a particular point in time. Instead, the search for authentic existence is never-ending as people move along the continuum of their life, continually ‘interpreting’ the world around them, thus creating themselves, while at the same time needing to make sense of unforeseen events, e.g. the recent financial crisis. On an abstract level we know that we are a ‘different’ person in our fifties than we were in our thirties; however, this difference is not an abstraction, it is the condition of the continually constituting self over time. The mid-life period seems to be, for some at least, a time of increased awareness and could be interpreted as an awakening to the signs of ‘bad faith’, for example, asking “Is this all?” or “Is this what I want to being doing with my life”? This questioning can be viewed as evidence of a gap or incongruence between ‘real’ life and ‘authentic’ life. “How many of us, arriving at mid-life or later, having done all the ‘right’ things, having served the expectations of our family and our tribe, feel so little at home in 3 6 B OTH H O W AND W H Y : C ONSIDERING E XISTENTIALISM A S A P HILOSOPHY O F W ORK AND M ANAGEMENT P HILOSOPHY O F M ANAGEMENT , V OLUME 11, N UMBER 3, 2012 our lives” (Hollis, 2008: 55)? If the individual feels his or her work is no longer or perhaps never was an authentic choice, then it is not surprising for him or her to experience anxiety and depression (Grierson, 2007; Hollis, 1993). Therefore, existentialism provides a way to understand how the individual chooses and experiences his or her work, including how this may change over time. Likewise, the act of managing others may be carefully examined through an existentialist lens. Contingency and Choice Ultimately, the most significant contingent factor of all is death, the end of our ‘human’ existence. Death’s significance, for the existentialist, is that the recognition of it causes ‘anguish’, as death ends all possibilities for the individual and rarely does a person know when their death will occur (Tillich, 1952). For Heidegger, death is what gives meaning to life: (1) the knowledge of death helps to shape life; (2) the awareness of impending death gives freedom of action; and (3) death forces us to focus on time as it puts an end to possibility (Heidegger, 1967). He emphasises that freedom of choice is dependent on death as it is the recognition of one’s mortality that gives meaning to choices (Heidegger, 1967). Heidegger states, “it is only in full… awareness of our own mortality that life can take on any purposive meaning” (Stokes, 2002: 151). The importance of death goes far beyond just its inevitability. The awareness of time passing and death’s inevitability reinforces the need for people to make choices and not to ‘put off’ life as many people may be inclined to do, not recognising that time is ticking away on their mortality each day. Solomon (1974: xiii) notes that “a threat of imminent death – or even a passing thought of our mortality – is sufficient to wrench us out of our current involvements – even if but for a moment – and force us to look at our lives.” Unfortunately, what this means practically is that people may stay with work that they do not like while they plan for the day they retire to really enjoy life. However, this assumes that death (or ill health) will not come unexpectedly before retirement. Death is “the one fact of my life which is not relative but absolute, and my awareness of this gives my existence and what I do each hour an absolute quality” (May, 1959a: 49). Ultimately, the fact that we know that we will cease to exist (as we know it, anyhow) provides freedom to choose our life. “Death is potentially (as awareness and meditation) an incentive to dedicate oneself to what matters, to ignore the trivial and to start living an authentic life” (Tomer and Eliason, 2008a: 11). Because we fear death, we also seek security with our self, with our Being – we wish to know ‘who’ we are, but in the seeking of ‘security’, we begin to live in bad faith, as we give up on possibilities of existence. “In most adults the balance is tipped toward security, largely by situating the self in the world in such a way as to avoid basic threats to the self ” (Douglas, 1984: 94). From an existential point of view, all security is an illusion, as it is impossible to maintain since we eventually must give up security when we face death, our non-existence. Additionally, the timing of death is a mystery as it can come at any time, appearing gradually in our old age or thrust upon us 3 7 S COTT M A C M ILLAN , A NTHONY R. Y U E AND A LBERT J. M ILLS P HILOSOPHY O F M ANAGEMENT , V OLUME 11, N UMBER 3, 2012 suddenly and unexpectedly. This gives greater significance to all of the choices we will make regarding work in the course of our lives. For many people, the choice of work is a major decision of life, as they assume, quite rightly, that it is a choice that will significantly affect the quality and hence meaningfulness of their life. However, since we are alienated, or isolated from the external world in which we are situated, we may be unduly susceptible to the influence of the herd (other people) when it comes to choosing work (Breisach, 1962; Heidegger, 1967; Pappenheim, 1959; Solomon, 1974). “Many people are like blind men feeling their way along in life only by means of touching a succession of other people” (May, 1953: 32). This alienation results in feelings of anxiety and dread which make it difficult to live the authentic or meaningful life. A person’s life consists of a number of components and, like various pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, they must fit together in order to translate into authentic existence. Using this perspective, work and the other areas of a life (for instance family, hobbies, athletics and spirituality) are not viewed as separate domains but merely as different components of the puzzle that is meaning. Viewing work and home life as totally separate implies that people can view each component separately and compartmentalise their life, which most research today shows is rarely the case (Cinamon, 2006; Eikhof, Warhurst and Haunschild, 2007; Haar, 2006; Huang, Hammer, Neal and Perrin, 2004; Judge, Ilies and Scott, 2006; Perrone, Webb and Blalock, 2005). As a person transitions from one phase of life to another, he or she may be moving towards authenticity or away from it. For example, people may be brought up to believe that having a certain career is a necessary part of living a meaningful life; however, after experiencing that career they realise that they do not feel ‘right’ in this life and regret their decision. The Experience of Work Through an existential lens, work is viewed as process or related experiences. Three experiences that stand out in the existential literature and that can be used in a philosophy of management are: (1) work as how chosen beliefs may be put into action (actioning beliefs); (2) work as interaction with other people (being-with-others); and most importantly (3) work as everydayness (MacMillan, 2009). ). First, for many people, work is an opportunity to experience their chosen ‘beliefs in action’, where they may ‘choose’ to action their beliefs and, by these experiences, attempt to fulfil inner desires and live authentically. The self (and meaning) is an outcome of action (Yalom, 1980) and work for many of us is the primary place where we can actualise our beliefs. For example, if we ‘choose’ to consider that making some sort of contribution to others is an important aspect of our authenticity, then work is an avenue where we may fulfil this belief, where we can ‘actualise’ the belief and thus ourselves. A person may choose to be a teacher as they believe strongly in educating young people or an artist if they value creativity. Second, almost all work includes an experience of people (the Other), i.e. ‘being-withothers’. Since the self is influenced by how others see us, the social aspect of work can be 3 8 B OTH H O W AND W H Y : C ONSIDERING E XISTENTIALISM A S A P HILOSOPHY O F W ORK AND M ANAGEMENT P HILOSOPHY O F M ANAGEMENT , V OLUME 11, N UMBER 3, 2012 very significant. The importance of the social component depends on the individual, i.e. the degree to which other people affect our sense of self and how much we enjoy being with others. Some prefer little interaction with others at work while some only enjoy work when they are around other people. Unfortunately, some people who value being-with-others may be in work that is solitary in nature, while others may be in the opposite situation. If this is the case, then the work is incongruent with what they value and will likely have a negative effect on the self. For many people, the social aspect of work is perhaps the most important one as it seems to provide a ‘connection’ and ‘belonging’ that most of us tend to seek out. The consequences of such have implications for an understanding of the dyadic relationship between the manager and the managed in the workplace.

### UV

#### 1] 1AR Theory – a] the aff gets it because otherwise the 1NC could engage in unchecked, infinite abuse which outweighs anything else, b] it’s drop the debater because the 2AR is too short to win a shell AND substance so theory can only check abuse for the aff if it’s a win condition, c] no neg RVI because otherwise they could dump on the shell for 6 minutes and get away with anything by sheer brute force, d) competing interps because you have 6 minutes to respond to my arguments so you should have to prove a better model e) Aff theory first – it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time.

**2] Permissibility affirms:**

**A] Dictionary.com defines “ought”: as a verb “used to express justice, moral rightness, or the like” and “wrong” as “not in accordance with what is morally right or good” – proving something isn’t wrong means it’s right.**

**B] Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water.**

**C] If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it.**

**[3] Presumption affirms:**

**A] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**B] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

**C] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong.**

**D] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.**