# Apple valley octos 1ac

### Framework

#### Moral internalism is true:

#### [1] Epistemology – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point.

**Markovits 14**. [Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROCJMM Oxford University Press, 2014.//Scopa] BHHS AK

Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are “wrongly” motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tell[s] us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).

#### [2] Regress – a priori knowledge is merely an acceptance of an individual’s conception of rationality which means anything external collapses. Macintyre 81.

[Macintyre 81, Alasdair Macintyre, https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268035044/after-virtue/ After Virtue, 1981] SHS ZS

The most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which an agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view [S]ince every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given. ‘Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles. If [I] the enquirer still goes on ask ing ‘But why should I live like that?’ then there is no further answer to give him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, [we have already] said everything that could be included in the further answer.’ (Hare 1952, p. 69). The terminus of justification is thus always, on this view, a not further to be justified choice, a choice unguided by criteria. Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them.

#### [3] Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic – there would be no disagreement otherwise.

#### [4] Open question - Goodness cannot be a property of an object because it would make moral claims tautological.

#### Pidgen 07 (Pigden, Charles. “Russell’s Moral Philosophy.” SEP. 2007.) //Scopa

#### For any naturalistic or metaphysical ‘X’, if ‘good’ meant ‘X’, then (i) ‘X things are good’ would be a barren tautology, equivalent to (ii) ‘X things are X’ or (iii) ‘Good things are good’. (1.2) For any naturalistic or metaphysical ‘X’, if (i) ‘X things are good’ were a barren tautology, it would not provide a reason for action (i.e. a reason to promote X-ness). (1.3) So for any naturalistic or metaphysical ‘X’, either (i) ‘X things are good’ does not provide a reason for action (i.e. a reason to promote X-ness), or ‘good’ does not mean ‘X’.

#### Next, every agent takes their ability to act on their ethical system as instrumentally valuable. Only self interest bridges relativism to provide a universal principle.

**Moore** [Margaret Moore, Queens University professor in the Political Studies department, cross-appointed (as a courtesy) in Philosophy, Reviewed Work(s): Morals by Agreement. by David Gauthier, Noûs, Vol. 25, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), pp. 707-714 ///AHS PB] BHHS AK

On Gauthier's view, morality is a sub-set of self-interest (he calls it preference-fulfillment), which is instrumentally necessary, not absolutely, but given features of the human situation which are almost certain to ob- tain. By taking as his starting-point the agent's subjective motivational set, whatever its content, Gauthier can claim that the requirements of morality escape none who fall under its ambit, for each person necessarily acts on his or her desires and aims. If Gauthier's project is successful, he will have refuted the moral skeptic: by demonstrating that morality is self-interestedly rational, he can claim that the principles are justified and that they apply to everyone. He does not need to presuppose a feeling such as sympathy to explain moral action, or appeal to a process of moral education and socialization within communities which shape the individual's desires and beliefs in accordance with a specific moral conception. Gauthier's agents simply maximize their utility and in the process find that they need to co-operate with others and that the dynamics of co- operation make it rational in self-interested terms to constrain their utility- maximization. By considering in this way the principles and constraints which it would be rational for co-operating self-interested agents to adopt, Gautheir claims to be able to deduce a system of moral constraints and Principles.

#### This entails a system of mutual self restraint: Contracts are the only standard capable of generating normativity since each agent rationally chooses to protect their self-interest by entering the contract.

**Gauthier** [David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998 ///AHS PB] BHHS AK recut

I shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better**. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person ’ s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations,** each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one**,** of course**,** can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may representsuch a practiceas capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreementis the basis of morality**.** Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable**.** Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others**.** We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone.This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone ’ s preferences**.** The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person ’ s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else**.** Thus, each person ’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns**. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one.** Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents

**Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarianism. Impact calc – consequences are irrelevant - fair, mutually beneficial contracts are good under the framework. Prefer additionally:**

#### [1] Actor specificity – states are not moral entities but derive authority from the contracts that allows them to constrain action. This outweighs - states aren’t bound by moral obligations, but they are by their contracts to other entities.

#### [2] Both debaters debate to win the round but we are still restricted by agreed on constraints like 4 mins of prep, speech times, etc. Their very performance justifies the AC framework and proves the NC collapses

**[3] Reason - Only my framework answers the question “why be moral”, since agents have a reason to restrain their conflict due to self-interest rather than some non-existent external principle**

**[4] Consequentialism fails – A] Induction fails – 1. saying that induction works relies on induction itself because it assumes that past trends will continue, which means it’s circular and unjustified 2. It assumes specific causes of past consequences which can’t be verified as the actual cause B] Butterfly effect - every action has infinite stemming consequences so it is impossible to evaluate an action based off them; one government policy could end up causing nuclear war in a million years.**

#### [5] Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad which means their fw or k doesn’t exclude contracts but we also need to care about other frameworks.

**[6] Ethics and normativity before ontology and epistemology – ethics normatively justify the inherent nature of “goodness” that allows us to know what a good role of the ballot could be – we function as an epistemic prerequisite as anything else is impact justified which a) begs the question as to why we should adopt their role of the ballot and b) means we function on the basis of unjustified assumptions – although things may seem true or good, we should always make sure from the normative level to ensure we verify the truth value of every complexity in their epistemology claims.**

#### Thus the advocacy: Resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines. I’m willing to spec what you want as long as I don’t abandon my maxim. CPs and PICs don’t negate – I defend the resolution as a general principle and they don’t disprove my general thesis.

### Offense

#### [1] Because some inequality is inevitable, ideal solutions can only be found by abstracting away into a hypothetical bargaining situation.

David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, ///AHS PB

What a rational person would agree to in existing circumstances depends in large part on her negotiating position vis-à-vis her fellows. But her negotiating position is significantly affected by the existing social institutions, and so by the currently accepted moral practices embodied in those institutions. Thus, although agreement may well yield practices differing from those embodied in existing social institutions, yet it will be influenced by those practices, which are not themselves the product of rational agreement. And this must call the rationality of the agreed practices into question. The arbitrariness of existing practices must infect any agreement whose terms are significantly affected by them. Although rational agreement is in itself a source of stability, yet this stability is undermined by the arbitrariness of the circumstances in which it takes place. To escape this arbitrariness, rational persons will revert from actual to hypothetical agreement, considering what practices they would have agreed to from an initial position not structured by existing institutions and the practices they embody. The content of a hypothetical agreement is determined by an appeal to the equal rationality of persons. Rational persons will voluntarily accept an agreement only insofar as they perceive it to be equally advantageous to each. To be sure, each would be happy to accept an agreement more advantageous to herself than to her fellows, but since no one will accept an agreement perceived to be less advantageous, agents whose rationality is a matter of common knowledge will recognize the futility of aiming at or holding out for more, and minimize their bargaining costs by coordinating at the point of equal advantage. Now the extent of advantage is determined in a twofold way. First, there is advantage internal to an agreement. In this respect**,** the expectation of equal advantage is assured by procedural fairness. The step from existing moral practices to those resulting from actual agreement takes rational persons to a procedurally fair situation, in which each perceives the agreed practices to be ones that it is equally rational for all to accept, given the circumstances in which agreement is reached. But those circumstances themselves may be called into question insofar as they are perceived to be arbitrary – the result, in part, of compliance with constraining practices that do not themselves ensure the expectation of equal advantage, and so do not reflect the equal rationality of the complying parties. To neutralize this arbitrary element, moral practices to be fully acceptable must be conceived as constituting a possible outcome of a hypothetical agreement under circumstances that are unaffected by social institutions that themselves lack full acceptability**.** Equal rationality demands consideration of external circumstances as well as internal procedures.

#### That affirms – 1) Because employees are dependent upon their employer, employees are subject to a severe power imbalance that constitutes coercion.

Budd and Scoville 05, John W. Budd and James G. Scoville "The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations.", p.70, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES, Cornell University Press, October 15, 2005 [http://jbudd.csom.umn.edu/RESEARCH/hrirethics.htm] AHS//NPR Accessed 10/23/21

**The overwhelming number of people need to work to survive**, at least for a large portion of their live. There is a sense in which people are forced to work. **When an assailant says, “Your wallet or your life,**” you technically have a choice. However, for many **this situation is the paradigm of coercion.** How close is the analogy between the assailant and **the requirements of the employer**? Admittedly, in good times the balance of power shifts somewhat, but in hard times the balance of power is with the employer. Most people have to take the terms of employment a they get them (Manning 2003). Someone wanting employment does not negotiate about whether or not to be tested for drugs, for example. If drug testing is the company policy, you either submit to the test or forfeit the job. **If you want a job, you agree to employment** at **will and to layoffs** if management believes that they are necessary. **Survival for yourself and any dependents requires it.** As with the assailant, you technically have a choice, but **most employees argue they have little choice about multiple important terms of employment.** A Kantian, in common with the pluralist school of industrial relations, maintains that **the imbalance between employer and employee ought to be addressed.** Otherwise, industrial relations rests on an unethical foundation.

#### The right to unionize and strike corrects this power imbalance by ensuring an opportunity for organization and collective bargaining.

Bowie 99, Norman E., professor emeritus at the University of Minnesota “Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective” Wiley Blackwell. [https://b-ok.cc/book/2885756/a063b7] AHS//NPR

Accessed 10/24/21

Although I emphasize meaningful work as a means to gain respect and grow as a human being by exercising one’s talents, Ciulla reminds me that there is much in the work environment that undermines negative freedom (freedom from coercion), and that the decision to work itself requires a giving up of freedom in some respects. This latter point does not overly concern me because all choice forecloses other choices. Moreover, **having a job provides income, and income expands choices because it opens up possibilities**. **This is especially true when one has an adequate wage, and that is why I have emphasized the role that an adequate wage plays in meaningful work**. Of course, Ciulla is well aware of all this and in her analysis she points out that **for the unskilled their range of options is extremely limited, that the demise of unions has given much more power to manage- ment, and that there is a correlation between higher-paying jobs and the amount of freedom one has**. All these points are well taken. I especially agree with Ciulla that **unions provide a means for enhancing employee freedom**. In this case I practiced what I now preach. I am a former president of the AAUP union at the University of Delaware. I also point out that the United States is the most anti-union country in the G-20. **Unionization is considered a human right by the United Nations**. **Obviously unions provide an opportunity for participation**, and I think Ciulla and I agree that **participation schemes are one way to limit coercion**. In response to trends over the past twenty years, in this edition of Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective I pay more attention to adequate pay for the middle class, issues of inequality, and economic mobility. However, none of this requires a revision in my original account of meaningful work.

#### 2. The National Labor Relations Act explicitly defends the right to strike

National Labor Relations Board ND, National Labor Relations Board is comprised of a team of professionals who work to assure fair labor practices and workplace democracy nationwide, [https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/nlra-and-the-right-to-strike] Accessed 10/25/21 AHS//NPR

The Right to Strike. Section 7 of the Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. It is clear from a reading of these two provisions that: the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also places limitations and qualifications on the exercise of that right. Lawful and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers. The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay. Strikes for a lawful object. Employees who strike for a lawful object fall into two classes: economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Both classes continue as employees, but unfair labor practice strikers have greater rights of reinstatement to their jobs. Economic strikers defined. If the object of a strike is to obtain from the employer some economic concession such as higher wages, shorter hours, or better working conditions, the striking employees are called economic strikers. They retain their status as employees and cannot be discharged, but they can be replaced by their employer. If the employer has hired bona fide permanent replacements who are filling the jobs of the economic strikers when the strikers apply unconditionally to go back to work, the strikers are not entitled to reinstatement at that time. However, if the strikers do not obtain regular and substantially equivalent employment, they are entitled to be recalled to jobs for which they are qualified when openings in such jobs occur if they, or their bargaining representative, have made an unconditional request for their reinstatement. Unfair labor practice strikers defined. Employees who strike to protest an unfair labor practice committed by their employer are called unfair labor practice strikers. Such strikers can be neither discharged nor permanently replaced. When the strike ends, unfair labor practice strikers, absent serious misconduct on their part, are entitled to have their jobs back even if employees hired to do their work have to be discharged. If the Board finds that economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers who have made an unconditional request for reinstatement have been unlawfully denied reinstatement by their employer, the Board may award such strikers backpay starting at the time they should have been reinstated.

### Underview

#### [1] Aff Theory – a] the aff gets it because otherwise the 1NC could engage in unchecked, infinite abuse which outweighs anything else, b] it’s drop the debater because the 2AR is too short to win a shell AND substance so theory can only check abuse for the aff if it’s a win condition, c] no neg RVI because otherwise they could dump in the 2n for 6 minutes and get away with anything by sheer brute force, d) competing interps because you have 6 minutes to respond to my 1ar arguments so you should have to prove a better model e) Aff theory first – it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time.

#### [2] Permissibility affirms:

#### [A] Dictionary.com defines “ought”: as a verb “used to express justice, moral rightness, or the like” and “wrong” as “not in accordance with what is morally right or good” – proving something isn’t wrong means it’s right.

#### [B] Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water.

#### [C] If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it.

#### [D] Permissibility is sufficient to prove an “ought” statement under the framework of sufficient reason.

#### Hanser[[1]](#footnote-1)

An agent who has insufficient reason for doing what he does need not on that account be acting morally impermissibly. So let us say that an agent acts morally permissibly if and only if his [their] action embodies a practical inference whose premises’ justifying force, if any, is not successfully undermined or defeated by any moral considerations. Let us call such practical inferences “permissible.” An agent acts permissibly, then, if and only if his action embodies a permissible practical inference.6 (For the sake of simplicity I shall sometimes, in what follows, revert to the preliminary formulation of the view, omitting the qualification about moral considerations.) Returning to the observation with which this section began, we can see that the inferential account easily explains why permissibility judgments cannot have mere occurrences as their objects. The power to act is a rational power: it is the power to do things for reasons. According to the inferential account, acting permissibly is a matter of not going astray (in a certain way) in one’s exercise of this power. It is a matter, roughly speaking, of basing one’s practical conclusions on adequate reasons. Adverbial permissibility judgments thus evaluate actions qua exercises of agency and not merely qua physical occurrences. What of actions performed for no reason, assuming for the moment that such actions are possible? We can think of an agent who acts for no reason as drawing [draws] a practical conclusion on the basis of no premises at all. If there is a moral reason for him not to act as he does, then the (nonexistent) justifying force of his premises is defeated by a moral consideration, and so he acts impermissibly. If there are no moral reasons for him [them] not to act as he does, then the (nonexistent) justifying force of his [their] premises is not defeated by any moral considerations, and so he [they] acts permissibly. Even if there are actions performed for no reason, then, this needn’t be seen as a fatal blow to the inferential account. A few further clarifications are in order before we move on. An agent may pursue multiple, independent ends in performing a single action, and even when he has but one final end, some of his means to that end will themselves function as subordinate ends. The practical inference embodied by an action, then, should be taken to encompass a complex inferential chain, not just a single inferential step. Furthermore, even when an agent does explicitly rehearse a chain of inferential steps prior to acting, he does not typically rehearse the inference embodied by his action all the way down to its ultimate conclusion. Suppose an agent explicitly reasons, “I can w by xing; so let me x; I can x by fing; so let me f.” If fing is something he already knows how to do, this is where his reasoning will stop. But when it comes to acting, he won’t “just” f. He’ll f in some particular way—with his right hand, say, and with a certain amount of force. Most likely, the agent will be unable fully to conceptualize his manner of fing. He will be able to specify it only demonstratively—his ultimate conclusion, were he explicitly to think it, would be something like, “so I’ll f like this” (as he moves his right hand in a certain way). The conclusion of the practical inference must be taken to include more than the mere “so let me f” if the inferential account of permissibility is to be plausible. Suppose an agent consciously reasons, “I can protect the baby from the cold draft by closing this door; so let me close this door.” He then closes the door quite forcefully—forcefully enough to awaken the baby. Assuming that he could easily have closed the door quietly, it is arguable that he acted impermissibly. The inferential account would be unable to capture this if the inference embodied by his action were to encompass no more than what the agent explicitly thought, for there was no reason why he shouldn’t close the door. What he had a decisive reason not to do was close the door so forcefully. The inferential account of permissibility must not be confused with the superficially similar view that an agent acts permissibly if and only if he acts from a morally admirable motive, such as universal benevolence or respect for the moral law. The inferential account does not even imply that an agent acts impermissibly if he acts from a morally discreditable motive, such as malice or greed. What matters is not the moral status of the agent’s reason for acting, considered on its own, but the justificatory relation between that reason and that for which it is a reason. What matters is whether the agent’s reason for acting is sufficient to justify him in doing what he does. Suppose an agent rescues a drowning swimmer because he expects a reward. He may not act virtuously, and his action may lack moral worth, but he acts permissibly. A more admirable reason for saving the swimmer’s life was available, and a more admirable agent would have availed himself of it, but the agent’s actual reason nonetheless provided him with sufficient justification for doing what he did. Finally, note that the inferential account makes a purely formal claim, in the following sense: while it links the notion of acting permissibly to that of an agent’s acting for a reason sufficient to justify him in doing what he does, it says nothing substantive about what constitutes a successful justification. On this issue it is, I think, quite properly silen

#### E] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.

#### [3] Presumption affirms:

#### A] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.

#### B] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong.

1. Matthew Hanser, “Permissibility and Practical Inference” *Ethics* Vol. 115, No. 3, April 2005, pp. 447-449 http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/428457 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)