**1AC – Rawlsian Metacognition**

**Framework:**

**Prefer the Philosophy of Mind – because a) infallible – prescriptive claims start from descriptive characteristics of the subject since there must be a universal component of all moral agents that makes it so norms apply to all of them. The mind is that descriptive premise that grounds prescriptive norms b) performativity – argumentation presupposes a cognitive basis for warrants and logic, so cognition is a gateway issue.**

**The meta-ethic is metacognition.**

**Broad ethical questions demand rigorous ethical answers. It is insufficient to merely think about ethical problems, instead, we must rationally reflect on our own thinking process. However, a moral problem-solver must also be willing to problem-solve. Cognitive reflection unlocks an agent’s potentiality and exposes their willingness and capacity to confront ethical dilemmas.**

**Jacobson**, Rae, and Child Mind Institute (**N.D.**). “Metacognition: How Thinking About Thinking Can Help Kids.” *Child Mind Institute*, childmind.org/article/how-metacognition-can-help-kids/. //Massa

“**Metacognitive thinking teaches us about ourselves**,” says Tamara Rosier, a learning coach who specializes in metacognitive techniques. “Thinking about our thinking creates perspective — perspective that leaves room for change.” She gives an example: “**Instead of saying, ‘Math tests make me anxious,’ we’re asking ourselves, ‘What is it about math tests that makes me feel anxious and what can I do to change that?**’ ” **Kids who are taught to think of themselves as being “good” or “bad” at a particular task can have a fixed mindset that makes them passive in approaching a challenge:** either they can do it or they can’t, but they aren’t likely to think they can change that outcome. **Teaching kids to become more metacognitive helps them move from a mindset that leaves little room for change to a mindset which promotes self-awareness and resilience.** [Help for kids with learning issues]. Helping your child learn to work through difficult situations (or [homework](https://childmind.org/article/strategies-to-make-homework-go-more-smoothly/) assignments, as the case may be) without becoming overwhelmed or giving up is especially valuable for kids with [learning issues](https://childmind.org/topics/concerns/learning/) who may need to come up with different strategies than other students in the class. For example:

**Prefer:**

**1. Internal Motivation – ethics must be internally motivating unless there would be no reason to abide by principles. Only metacognition explains why an agent ought to care since reflecting isn’t altruistic, instead intrinsically betters the agent.**

**2. Epistemology – In order for a theory or statement to be true we must not only know that it is correct, but also know why it is justified in being correct. Questioning these foundations are the only way to avoid misguided ethics since if the initial strand of thought is flawed, every other conclusion you draw from it is equally as invalid.**

**Part 2: The Thought Experiment –**

**First is cognition as is: sociological constructs of difference place arbitrary obstacles in place of the good. Institutions are swayed to favor self-fulfilling choices on the grounds that they meet their arbitrary needs.**

**Scanlon**, Thomas M. “Rawls' Theory of Justice.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 121, no. 5, 1973, p. 1020., doi:10.2307/3311280. //Massa

From the fact that the **parties** in Rawls' Original Position **suppose that as members of a society they will choose** their own plan of life, and hence also determine **their own conception of the good,** **it should not be thought that they suppose themselves to be independent of social forces which will in large part shape and influence the choices they make.** **It would be idle to deny that such influences exist**, and irrational to object to all such influences as interfering with one's liberty. **But it is still reasonable to prefer some institutions to others on grounds of the conditions they provide for rationally forming a conception of one's good.** **Obviously one may reasonably object, simply on grounds of efficiency, to institutions which place arbitrary obstacles and difficulties in the way of individuals' attempts to get a clear view of the alternatives open to them, of their own potentialities, and of what they and others can expect from various courses of action.** A more difficult case is presented by the fact that **some features of institutions will not merely be random inferences but can be seen clearly to favor certain choices and to discourage others**, and to do this not by just enlarging people's views or by approaching "ideal conditions" thereby favoring "the correct answer," but rather **by skewing the evidence available or by restricting the alternatives likely to be considered, or by affecting people's deliberations in other more subtle and indirect ways.** Systematic interference of this kind might be the result of relatively fixed impersonal features of institutional arrangements. Alternatively, certain individuals may be charged with overseeing and maintaining these influences through censorship or other devices.

**Second is the meta-cognitive reorientation: the solution is the original position, where inclinations and aspirations do not affect the good, instead, parties become neutral arbitrators.**

**Rawls**, John. “A Theory of Justice.” **2009**, doi:10.2307/j.ctvkjb25m. //Massa

One should not be misled, then, by the somewhat unusual conditions which characterize the original position. **The idea here is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice**, and therefore on these principles themselves. **Thus it seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles.** It also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one's own case. **We should insure further that particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons' conceptions of their good do not affect the principles adopted.** The aim is to rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. **For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might find it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle.** **To represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in which everyone is deprived of this sort of information.** One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices. In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way. This concept should cause no difficulty if we keep in mind the constraints on arguments that it is meant to express. At any time we can enter the original position, so to speak, simply by following a certain procedure, namely, by arguing for principles of justice in accordance with these restrictions. **It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles**; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. Systems of ends are not ranked in value; and each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon whatever principles are adopted. Together with the veil of ignorance, these conditions define the principles of justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies ....

**Thus, the standard is consistency with principles chosen in the Original Position. Prefer –**

1. **Value Pluralism – Moral theories face the problem of agreement, where even the most correct ethic can be endlessly deliberated. Encompassing all perspectives into a calculation adheres to a plurality of beliefs and forces inter-perspectivism. Only conceding to the nature of disagreement can be the basis for agreement.**
2. **The Egoistic Problem – we can always ask why we ought to care about other people. Only an egalitarian and reciprocal ethic can reconcile the problem of a self-interested subject since any individual could reasonably be put in any position under the veil which means individuals must care about others as a precondition to caring about themselves.**

**Impact Calc:**

**Non-ideal conditions demand real changes in thought – Rawlsian ethics means shared conceptions of justice.**

Tommie **Shelby 2**, Race and Ethnicity, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1697 (**2004**). Available at: <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/15> //Massa

Now it might be argued that Rawls's exclusive reliance on ideas that are implicit in our public political culture actually supports Mills's contention that contractarian liberal political philosophy implicitly endorses the view that non-whites are sub-persons and thus not due equal justice. After all, many of the "founding fathers" of our democratic institutions and many of the authors of canonical founding texts in the democratic tradition (including the framers of the U.S. Constitution) had racist views, were apologists for slavery, held slaves themselves, or advocated the resettlement of black Americans to Africa or elsewhere outside the United States.30 Moreover, at the founding of these institutions and the publication of these historical documents, many, if not most, citizens of would-be democratic regimes would have interpreted the core elements of their public political culture as excluding non-whites (and white women) from the status of equal citizenship. Yet, Rawls does not enjoin us to interpret our public culture from the standpoint of its founders, as if the object of our inquiry were to discern their conception of justice. Rather, he argues that**, in our ambition to arrive at a shared political conception of justice, wethose of us currently seeking clarification about what justice requires for a democratic society-should interpret the fundamental ideas and principles latent in our public political culture from our own standpoint**, i.e., "**here and now**."'" The hypocritical and racist interpretations of the democratic tradition by some of the founders of our democratic institutions must be ignored given the primary aim of political liberalism, "to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental political questions."32 A political conception of justice that rested on such perverse interpretations of our democratic ideals could not possibly be reasonably acceptable to non-white citizens, and thus could not form a public basis of justification.

## 1AC—Plan

#### Plan: The appropriation of outer space through asteroid mining by private entities should be banned.

#### We’ll defend normal means as the signatories of the OST adding an optional protocol under Article II.

Tronchetti 7[Fabio Tronchetti is a professor at the International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 2007, <https://iislweb.org/docs/Diederiks2007.pdf>, 12-15-2021 amrita]

ARTICLE II OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY: A MATTER OF DEBATE The legal content of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is one of the most debated and analysed topic in the field of space law. Indeed, several interpretations have been put forward to explain the meaning of its provisions. Article II states that: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”. **The text of Article II represents** the final point of a process, formally initiated with Resolution 1721, aimed at conferring to outer space the status of res communis omnium, namely a thing open for the **free exploration** and use by all States **without the possibility of being appropriated**. By prohibiting the possibility of making territorial claims over outer space or any part thereof based on use or occupation, Article II **makes clear that** the customary procedures of **i**nternational **law allowing** subjects to obtain **sovereignty rights over un-owed lands**, namely discovery, occupatio and effective possession, **do not apply to** outer **space.** This prohibition was considered by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty the best guarantee for preserving outer space for peaceful activities only and for stimulating the exploration and use of the space environment in the name of all mankind. What has been the object of controversy among legal scholars is the question of whether both States and private individuals are subjected to the provisions of Article II. Indeed, **while Article II forbids** expressis verbis the national **appropriation by** claims of **sovereignty**, by means of use and occupation or other means of outer space, **it does not** make **a**ny explicit **mention** **to** its **private** appropriation. Relying on this consideration, some authors have argued that the private appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies is allowed. For instance, in 1968 Gorove wrote: “Thus, at present an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or private association or an international organisation could lawfully appropriate any parts of outer space…”6 . The same argument is used today by the enterprises selling extraterrestrial acres. They base their claim to the Moon and other celestial bodies on the consideration that Article II does not explicitly forbid private individuals and enterprises to claim, exploit or appropriate the celestial bodies for profit7 . However, it must be said, that nowadays there is a general consensus on the fact that **both national appropriation and private** property rights **are denied** under the Outer Space Treaty. Several way of reasoning have been advanced to support this view. Sters and Tennen affirm that the argument that Article II does not apply to private entities since they are not expressly mentioned fails for the reason that they do not need to be explicitly listed in Article II to be fully subject to the non-appropriation principle8 . **Private entities are allowed to carry out** space **activities but**, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they **must be authorized** to conduct such activities **by the** appropriate **State** of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that prohibited activity. Jenks argues that “States bear international responsibility for national activities in space; it follows that what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer”9 . It has been also suggested that **the prohibition of national** appropriation **implies prohibition of private** appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former10. In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, be in the form of a State or some other recognised entity. In outer space, however, this practice of State endorsement is forbidden. Should a State recognise or protect the territorial acquisitions of any of its subjects, this would constitute a form of national appropriation in violation of Article II. Moreover, it is possible to use some historical elements to support the argument that both the acquisition of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights are forbidden by the words of Article II. During the negotiations of the Outer Space Treaty, the Delegate of Belgium affirmed that his delegation “had taken note of the interpretation of the non-appropriation advanced by several delegations-apparently without contradiction-as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law”11. The French Delegate stated that: “…there was reason to be satisfied that three basic principles were affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space…”12. The fact that the accessions to the Outer Space Treaty were not accompanied by reservations or interpretations of the meaning of Article II, it is an evidence of the fact that this issue was considered to be settled during the negotiation phase. Thus, summing up, we may say that **prohibition of appropriation of outer space** and its parts is a rule which **is valid for both private and public entity**. The theory that private operators are not subject to this rule represents a myth that is not supported by any valid legal argument. Moreover, it can be also added that if any subject was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a colonial competition in outer space and to create the conditions and premises for an exploration and use of outer space carried out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed. Therefore, **the need to protect the non-appropriative nature o**f outer **space emerges** in all its relevance.

## Offense

#### There are two conditions of just decisions – therefore, filter offense through the difference principle.

**Lamont**, Julian **and Favor**, Christi, "Distributive Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter **2017** Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/justice-distributive/>.//Massa

The most widely discussed theory of distributive justice in the past four decades has been that proposed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice, (Rawls 1971), and Political Liberalism, (Rawls 1993). Rawls proposes the following **two principles of justice:**

**1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which** scheme **is compatible with the same scheme for all**; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.

**2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.** (Rawls 1993, pp. 5–6. The principles are numbered as they were in Rawls’ original A Theory of Justice.)

Where the rules may conflict in practice, Rawls says that Principle (1) has lexical priority over Principle (2), and Principle (2a) has lexical priority over (2b). As a consequence of the priority rules, Rawls’ principles do not permit sacrifices to basic liberties in order to generate greater equality of opportunity or a higher level of material goods, even for the worst off. While it is possible to think of Principle (1) as governing the distribution of liberties, it is not commonly considered a principle of distributive justice given that it is not governing the distribution of economic goods per se. Equality of opportunity is discussed in the next section. In this section, the primary focus will be on (2b), known as the Difference Principle. **The main moral motivation for the Difference Principle is similar to that for strict equality: equal respect for persons.** Indeed, since **the only material inequalities the Difference Principle permits are those that raise the level of the least advantaged in the society**, it materially collapses to a form of strict equality under empirical conditions where differences in income have no effect on the work incentive of people (and hence, no tendency to increase growth). The overwhelming economic opinion though is that in the foreseeable future the possibility of earning greater income will bring forth greater productive effort. This will increase the total wealth of the economy and, under the Difference Principle, the wealth of the least advantaged. Opinion divides on the size of the inequalities which would, as a matter of empirical fact, be allowed by the Difference Principle, and on how much better off the least advantaged would be under the Difference Principle than under a strict equality principle. Rawls’ principle, however, gives fairly clear guidance on what type of arguments will count as justifications for inequality. **Rawls is not opposed in principle to a system of strict equality per se; his concern is about the absolute position of the least advantaged group rather than their relative position.** If a system of strict equality maximizes the absolute position of the least advantaged in society, then the Difference Principle advocates strict equality. **If it is possible to raise the absolute position of the least advantaged further by having some inequalities of income and wealth, then the Difference Principle prescribes inequality up to that point** where the absolute position of the least advantaged can no longer be raised.

#### People under the veil would decide against asteroid mining: It violates the difference principle. a) it is inherently unreachable to some b) It exacerbates inequality without helping the least well off

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subject to significant market demand, it seems unlikely that they would (or could) spoil in any relevant sense. So if asteroid mining fails to meet one of Locke’s criteria for just appropriation, it must be the no worsening condition. How might this be? At the moment, asteroid mining is something that 1s even remotely possible only for very wealthy corporations. Planetary Resources, for example, is backed by a number of the richest and most risk-tolerant people on our planet. And it needs to be, because the opportunity presented by asteroid mining is only available to those who can make the astronomical initial capital investment. The fact that this initial investment is so large makes space prospecting prohibitively expensive for most people, and so means that they will not even have the opportunity to be part of the appropriation process. Competition for mineable resources, if any there be, will be between only a few very wealthy groups, and these groups will have a natural incentive to extract the mineable resources to the point that future mining operations could not be profitable (that is, not leave enough for others) before others can join in. We could prevent this by introducing regulations that, for example, limit the amount that prospectors may extract. Without such special regulation, rationally self-interested prospectors will have be incentivised to take as much as they can, leaving as little as possible for others, thus violating the no worsenin¢ criterion.This, it seems to me, is too quick. The mere fact of unequal access to markets does not, on its face, imply that resources will necessarily be extracted to the point that not enough remains to make mining economically profitable for others, though certainly there would be economic incentive to extract as much as possible as rapidly as possible. So while it may be an over-reach to say that socio-economic stratification of access to natural resources wil/ result in space prospectors not leaving enough and as good for others, this is certainly a serious risk of an unregulated system of asteroid mining. While this risk might not even be realised, the mere fact that a practice exposes people to risk suffices to ground a decisive objection to unregulated asteroid mining. Why might someone accept that the risk of violating one of the criteria, rather than violation itself, suffices to ground an argument against the practice? Consider an analogy with Russian roulette. When one aims the gun at the other’s head and pulls the trigger, s/he [they] is [are] exposing the other to risk. If the target was unlucky, and there was in fact a bullet in the chamber, then certainly the person who pulled the trigger has done something wrong. They have killed a person for no good reason. But what about the other five possible outcomes, when no bullet was in the chamber and no harm was actually done? It seems clear that even these cases are wrong, simply because the person was exposed to serious risk of being wronged. It is not obvious that the fact that access to asteroids depends heavily on one’s pre-existing wealth will necessarily result in the violation of any of Locke’s criteria. This fact does imply, however, that without regulation, those who are not currently wealthy enough to mine asteroids themselves, or even to join a group that is sufficiently wealthy to do so, are at risk of there not being enough left for them. As in the case of Russian roulette, exposure to serious risk of being wronged is itself a kind of wrong, and so ought to be prohibited. Because asteroid mining exposes the insufficiently wealthy masses to the risk of being left with no opportunity to enrich themselves through space prospecting, asteroid mining ought to be prohibited. The Egalitarian Argument similarly claims that unregulated asteroid mining would exacerbate already problematic levels of economic inequality. Asteroid mining represents the possibility of expanding one’s own wealth significantly, but, as discussed, this possibility is only available to those who are already extremely wealthy. Without regulation, like taxes on mining operations to pay for public services that improve the lot of the worse off in society, the practice of asteroid mining threatens to further concentrate wealth in the hands of the very few. Such unequal concentration of wealth is objectionable for many reasons. First, because a human’s self-esteem is sensitive to his/her relative worth with respect to others, inequality actually undermines this important part of human well-being. Self-esteem, the conviction that one is worthy of respect, is an important part of living any good human life. By improving the lot of the wealthiest, even without reducing the absolute well-being of the worst off, unregulated space mining would actually worsen the lives of the poorest by widening the income gap and thus diminishing their sense of relative worth. Second, such inequality fails Rawls’s original position test. Rawls (2005, pp. 72-80) argues that practices that introduce inequalities can only be justified by the fact that they benefit the worst off better than any available alterative version of that practice. However, unregulated asteroid mining appears only to stand to benefit those wealthy few who can engage in it. It does not benefit the worst off. Because inequality is morally objectionable, and because asteroid mining introduces and exacerbates inequality, asteroid mining ought to be prohibited.

#### outweighs under nonideal theory– correcting injustices requires a principle that is the greatest benefit to the least well off;

#### Capitalism is bad – Rawlsian ethics condemns it, we don’t like private entities doing anything. Quish 18

Ed Quish (is a doctoral student in political theory at Cornell University), 8-22-2018, "John Rawls, Socialist?," Jacobin, <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/08/john-rawls-reticent-socialist-review-theory-of-justice/>, //hzheng

When Rawls wrote A Theory of Justice, after the legislative achievements of the Civil Rights Movement and toward the tail end of the postwar boom, he was hopeful that liberal democracy was progressing on a basically just, egalitarian path. But by the mid 1990s, he worried that liberal democracy was in decline. Edmundson quotes one of Rawls’s former students, the philosopher Joshua Cohen: “[Rawls’s] hopefulness has been shaken by the world. His feelings have soured.” While other liberals celebrated the end of history, Rawls was troubled by how private funding of elections allowed organized wealth to dominate the political process. Political liberties — like running for office, using free speech and association to affect legislation, and voting in fair elections — might be formally granted to all, but if the power of wealth superseded the power of ordinary people in determining political outcomes, these rights would not have “fair value” for all citizens. In Edmundson’s telling, the imperative to ensure fair value for all citizens’ political liberties was the central issue that drove him toward socialism. In the Restatement Rawls emphasized a longstanding aspect of his general theory, now called its “central organizing idea”: the notion of society as a fair system of social cooperation. While Milton Friedman viewed society as “akin to a game or lottery which everyone agrees to enter with the anticipation of winning a jackpot prize,” Rawls viewed society as a cooperative endeavor that should benefit everyone. For Rawls, social cooperation operates in tandem with a just legal order, itself upheld by a democratic state that all citizens have a fair chance to influence. But if the wealthy dominate the political system, the result is class domination rather than popular sovereignty — submission to commands rather than cooperation according to rules. A few decades earlier, Rawls had thought that welfare-state capitalism could approximate his ideal of a just society. After the damage wrought by the Reagan Revolution, he concluded that it could not. In his mature writings, Rawls argued that welfare-state capitalism’s central flaw is that it “permits a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of production.” This kind of control allows the few to “enact a system of law and property ensuring their dominant position, not only in politics, but throughout the economy.” While welfare-state capitalism’s commitment to redistribution implied “some concern” for equality of opportunity, the fact that it permits concentrations of power that corrode democracy not only means that it fails to protect political liberty: it “rejects the fair value of political liberties.” At the end of his career, Edmundson argues, Rawls was a socialist.

**Private appropriation obscure obligations of the public**

Skibba 18- Skibba, Ramin. “Mining in Space Could Lead to Conflicts on Earth - Facts so Romantic.” Nautilus, 2 May 2018, https://nautil.us/blog/-mining-in-space-could-lead-to-conflicts-on-earth. VS

But it’s not clear that a pact between the commercial space mining industry and NASA would align with the public’s interest. NASA’s increasing collaboration with space mining companies could distort and divert efforts previously focused on space exploration and basic research, and discourage public interest and engagement in astronomy.

For example, Seager advocated for space mining at a science writing conference I attended in 2015. She’s part of a motley group of advisors for Planetary Resources, including the movie director James Cameron, a lawyer for a prominent Washington D.C. firm, and Dante Lauretta, another astronomer whom I respect. Seager seems to believe that encouraging private space mining will lead to more investments and technological innovation that would enable more scientific research. In a 2012 interview with The Atlantic, for instance, she said, “The bottom line is that NASA is not working the best that it could for space science right now, and so in order for people like me to succeed with my own research goals, the commercial space industry needs to be able to succeed independently of government contracts.”

But if the U.S. and U.S.-based companies lay claim to the richest and most easily accessible prospecting sites, not allowing other companies and nations to share in the wealth, economic and political relations could be damaged. That’s why this seems to be a dangerous path for space explorers. Once you’re on board with the commercial space industry, then you as a researcher must accept, if not support, everything that comes with it. Seager and a few other researchers may be willing to take this risk, but what about the rest of the space science community? Moreover, to succeed, these businesses will seek profitable missions, while science, exploration, and discovery—goals that stimulate public interest—will inevitably have lower priority. (Other commercial spaceflight companies, like Elon Musk’s SpaceX, do generate public interest, but they’re not directly involved in mining asteroids.) NASA may have its shortcomings, but at least its missions and research goals answer to the public. It’s not exactly a welcome thought to imagine more and more of our presence and activity in space being ceded, with NASA’s help, to private industry.