### 1

#### Through the reading of books and images we build a constructive view of health and proper social posture due to an illusion of nature projected onto us by an illusory idea of purity. Focus on disease and health is an illusion of lived experience where our projected capacity of how we should live makes us determine the course of action due to our genetic risk where we project ideas of purity onto material images of ourselves and others.

Pender 18

Kelly Pender. (2018). Being at Genetic Risk : Toward a Rhetoric of Care. Penn State University Press. Pages 43 to 45. // js69

Kelly Happe frames her 2013 book, The Material Gene: Gender, Race, and Heredity After the Human Genome Project with a very provocative question: “How do **we think of** heredity and **disease** not as recalcitrant material realities discovered by researchers and physicians but **as contingent manifestations of** the lived social experience of worlds?” (2). Her aim, which this question makes clear, is to cut the Gordian knot, as Latour would put it. We can understand heredity and disease either in terms of nature, that is, as “recalcitrant material realities,” or in terms of culture, that is, as “**the lived experience of social worlds**,” but not in terms of both. Th us, we must choose, and in choosing we must **purify one from the other**. According to Latour, **this act** of purifi cation **is the hallmark of modernity** (Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 10–11). It constantly creates hybrids or quasi- objects—things that are not ontologically pure, not reducible to either the human realm or the nonhuman realm—and then assigns itself the task of **purifying** them, of either “bracketing all **dogma** and occult properties to arrive **at a theory of nature** in **itself**, or by turning a skeptical glance toward all scientific claims so as to view them as the surface eff ects of human political and linguistic convention” (Harman, Towards Speculative Realism 76). What **struck** me about Happe’s question the fi rst time I read it is the implication that engaging in this form of purifi cation would mean going **against** the grain, as though the audience would have to be won over to an unfamiliar way of thinking. Indeed, my second reaction to the question was to pose another: How can we think of heredity and **disease as** something other than cultural **constructions**? What resources do we have within the social sciences and humanities for understanding the reality of heredity and disease without sliding ba ck into a kind of naïve realism **that would enact** the very same form of purifi cation, only in the opposite direction? T h e point of the next chapter is to answer that question. The point of this chapter is to demonstrate that we need to. **The constructivist paradigm** has dominated scholarship on risk in the social sciences and humanities for decades, **exposing the human motives** and discursive forces operating **behind** the **illusion of nature**. And there’s no question that this has been an important undertaking, especially **in** the case of **genetic risk**, where the specter of genetic determinism always looms.  As long as we view genetic risk as a construction, and, as long as we continually reveal how that construction works, then we have some measure of **protection against** the very dangerous **idea that our health can** be **reduce**d to the function of our genes. As history has shown us this idea comes **with a** very high **price** tag. But at this point—a point when there are good reasons for rejecting the idea that contemporary genetic medicine is simply the newest incarnation **of eugenics**  —I believe that a continued comm itment to constructivism comes with a cost as well. This cost is the subject of Latour’s “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?: From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” the well- known 2004 essay where he indicts the modern cr itical stance for its ceaseless repetition of a set of constructivist moves that has not only failed to achieve the amelioration it aimed for but has also pr evented us from revising our critical approaches to better suit present challenges (231). Th e specifi c problem for Latour is that constructivism has just two ways of dealing with hybrid objects. On the one hand, it locates them at the “fairy position,” which is **used by social scientists** engaged in a kind of anti- fetishism; the aim here “is **to show** that what the **naïve believers** are doing with objects is simply **a projection** **of** their **wishes onto** a **material entity** that does nothing at all by itself” (237). In other words, no matter what idol some group believes in —god, sports, art, and so forth—the aim is to show that its power is not innate but rather comes from them, from society. On the other hand, there’s the “fact position,” which corresponds most closely with the kinds of constructivist criti ques I’ll discuss in this chapter. Here the critic shows the naïve believers that while they might think they are free, they are actually acted on by unforeseen forces, which the critic explains by marshaling whichever “pet facts” she prefers to work with (238). These facts can come from any number of sources—economics, neurobiology, critical theory, wherever. What matters is that their “origin, fabrication, [and] mode of development” go unquestioned while the criti c uses them to demonstrate that the believer’s freedom is an illusion (238). Often animated by a hermeneutics of suspicion, this kind of critique pivots ar ound an appearance/reality distinction that puts the critic in the role of de coder and debunker. Together Latour sees these two positions, fairy and fact, as a ki nd of critical double blow. As soon as the fi rst position **gives** the **believers** some **faith in** “their own **projective capacity**,” the critic hits them with a “second upperc ut,” humiliating them by demonstrating that no matter what they think, “their behavior is entirely determined by the action of powerful causalities coming from an objective reality they don’t see, but that you, yes you, the never sleeping critic, alone can see” (239). No matter how these blows are administered, the outcome is the same: science and society are purifi ed from one another and anyone caught believing in the reality of an object is determined to be incredibly naïve (Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 6). Admittedly, Latour’s punching metaphor is a bit hyperbolic, and I am not suggesting that critics of genetic risk are out to humiliate the “naïve believers.” Yet I think Latour’s point still has a great deal of merit, especially in the case of genetic risk, which is about as hybrid an object as any that science and society have ever produced. Yet when we operate within a constructivist paradigm, our job is to ignore this hybridity, turning a skeptical eye not only toward science but also toward those who trust science and believe that there is something real about genetic risk. More often than not, this means that **their discourses**—and the medical and scientifi c discourses they draw on—**are** interpreted as indices and/or sources of ideological mystifi cation, that is, **evidence of** how they’ve been manipulated and **how they**, wittingly or not, **are manipulating others**. Taking on the role of debunker, we then attempt to explain how they have been tricked, presumably on the assumption that they would choose diff erently if they knew diff erently. As I intimated in the introduction, however, this assumption is fraught with problems, not the least of which is its inability to account for the fact that individuals can recognize a behavior as ideological and yet continue participating in it anyway. Thus, with Latour, I would argue that it is time to retool, time, that is, **to cultivate** ways of critically engaging the **ethics, politics, and rhetorics** of the new genetics that aim to do something other than enlighten the naïve believers. This, of course, is what I hope to achieve through a rhetoric of care.

#### Racism is a product of class exploitation --- NOT human nature

Selfa 10 (Lance Selfa, is a frequent contributor to the ISR, and writes a column on U.S. politics in Socialist Worker newspaper. He is the author of The Democrats: A Critical History “The roots of racism” October 21, 2010. http://socialistworker.org/2010/10/21/the-roots-of-racism) //JHorn

Fortunately, racism isn't part of human nature. The best evidence for this assertion is the fact that racism has not always existed. Racism is a particular form of oppression. It stems from discrimination against a group of people based on the idea that some inherited characteristic, such as skin color, makes them inferior to their oppressors. Yet the concepts of "race" and "racism" are modern inventions. They arose and became part of the dominant ideology of society in the context of the African slave trade at the dawn of capitalism in the 1500s and 1600s. Although it is a commonplace for academics and opponents of socialism to claim that Karl Marx ignored racism, Marx in fact described the processes that created modern racism. His explanation of the rise of capitalism placed the African slave trade, the European extermination of indigenous people in the Americas and colonialism at its heart. In Capital, Marx writes: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of the continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black skins are all things that characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. Marx connected his explanation of the role of the slave trade in the rise of capitalism to the social relations that produced racism against Africans. In Wage Labor and Capital, written 12 years before the American Civil War, he explains: What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It only becomes capital in certain relations. Torn away from these conditions, it is as little capital as gold by itself is money, or as sugar is the price of sugar. In this passage, Marx shows no prejudice to Blacks ("a man of the black race," "a Negro is a Negro"), but he mocks society's equation of "Black" and "slave" ("one explanation is as good as another"). He shows how the economic and social relations of emerging capitalism thrust Blacks into slavery ("he only becomes a slave in certain relations"), which produce the dominant ideology that equates being African with being a slave. These fragments of Marx's writing give us a good start in understanding the Marxist explanation of the origins of racism. As the Trinidadian historian of slavery Eric Williams put it: "Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery." And, one should add, the consequence of modern slavery at the dawn of capitalism. While slavery existed as an economic system for thousands of years before the conquest of America, racism as we understand it today did not exist. From time immemorial? The classical empires of Greece and Rome were based on slave labor. But ancient slavery was not viewed in racial terms. Slaves were most often captives in wars or conquered peoples. If we understand white people as originating in what is today Europe, then most slaves in ancient Greece and Rome were white. Roman law made slaves the property of their owners, while maintaining a "formal lack of interest in the slave's ethnic or racial provenance," wrote Robin Blackburn in The Making of New World Slavery. Over the years, slave manumission produced a mixed population of slave and free in Roman-ruled areas, in which all came to be seen as "Romans." The Greeks drew a sharper line between Greeks and "barbarians," those subject to slavery. Again, this was not viewed in racial or ethnic terms, as the socialist historian of the Haitian Revolution, C.L.R. James, explained: [H]istorically, it is pretty well proved now that the ancient Greeks and Romans knew nothing about race. They had another standard--civilized and barbarian--and you could have white skin and be a barbarian, and you could be black and civilized. More importantly, encounters in the ancient world between the Mediterranean world and Black Africans did not produce an upsurge of racism against Africans. In Before Color Prejudice, Howard University classics professor Frank Snowden documented innumerable accounts of interaction between the Greco-Roman and Egyptian civilizations and the Kush, Nubian, and Ethiopian kingdoms of Africa. He found substantial evidence of integration of Black Africans in the occupational hierarchies of the ancient Mediterranean empires and Black-white intermarriage. Black and mixed race gods appeared in Mediterranean art, and at least one Roman emperor, Septimius Severus, was an African. Between the 10th and 16th centuries, the chief source of slaves in Western Europe was Eastern Europe. In fact, the word "slave" comes from the word "Slav," the people of Eastern Europe. This outline doesn't mean to suggest a "pre-capitalist" Golden Age of racial tolerance, least of all in the slave societies of antiquity. Empires viewed themselves as centers of the universe and looked on foreigners as inferiors. Ancient Greece and Rome fought wars of conquest against peoples they presumed to be less advanced. Religious scholars interpreted the Hebrew Bible's "curse of Ham" from the story of Noah to condemn Africans to slavery. Cultural and religious associations of the color white with light and angels and the color black with darkness and evil persisted. But none of these cultural or ideological factors explain the rise of New World slavery or the "modern" notions of racism that developed from it. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The African slave trade The slave trade lasted for a little more than 400 years, from the mid-1400s, when the Portuguese made their first voyages down the African coast, to the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888. Slave traders took as many as 12 million Africans by force to work on the plantations in South America, the Caribbean and North America. About 13 percent of slaves (1.5 million) died during the Middle Passage--the trip by boat from Africa to the New World. The African slave trade--involving African slave merchants, European slavers and New World planters in the traffic in human cargo--represented the greatest forced population transfer ever. The charge that Africans "sold their own people" into slavery has become a standard canard against "politically correct" history that condemns the European role in the African slave trade. The first encounters of the Spanish and Portuguese, and later the English, with African kingdoms revolved around trade in goods. Only after the Europeans established New World plantations requiring huge labor gangs did the slave trade begin. African kings and chiefs did indeed sell into slavery captives in wars or members of other communities. Sometimes, they concluded alliances with Europeans to support them in wars, with captives from their enemies being handed over to the Europeans as booty. The demands of the plantation economies pushed "demand" for slaves. Supply did not create its own demand. In any event, it remains unseemly to attempt to absolve the European slavers by reference to their African partners in crime. As historian Basil Davidson rightly argues about African chiefs' complicity in the slave trade: "In this, they were no less 'moral' than the Europeans who had instigated the trade and bought the captives." Onboard, Africans were restricted in their movements so that they wouldn't combine to mutiny on the ship. In many slave ships, slaves were chained down, stacked like firewood with less than a foot between them. On the plantations, slaves were subjected to a regimen of 18-hour workdays. All members of slave families were set to work. Since the New World tobacco and sugar plantations operated nearly like factories, men, women and children were assigned tasks, from the fields to the processing mills. Slaves were denied any rights. Throughout the colonies in the Caribbean to North America, laws were passed establishing a variety of common practices: Slaves were forbidden to carry weapons, they could marry only with the owner's permission, and their families could be broken up. They were forbidden to own property. Masters allowed slaves to cultivate vegetables and chickens, so the master wouldn't have to attend to their food needs. But they were forbidden even to sell for profit the products of their own gardens. Some colonies encouraged religious instruction among slaves, but all of them made clear that a slave's conversion to Christianity didn't change their status as slaves. Other colonies discouraged religious instruction, especially when it became clear to the planters that church meetings were one of the chief ways that slaves planned conspiracies and revolts. It goes without saying that slaves had no political or civil rights, with no right to an education, to serve on juries, to vote or to run for public office. The planters instituted barbaric regimes of repression to prevent any slave revolts. Slave catchers using tracker dogs would hunt down any slaves who tried to escape the plantation. The penalties for any form of slave resistance were extreme and deadly. One description of the penalties slaves faced in Barbados reports that rebellious slaves would be punished by "nailing them down on the ground with crooked sticks on every Limb, and then applying the Fire by degrees from Feet and Hands, burning them gradually up to the Head, whereby their pains are extravagant." Barbados planters could claim a reimbursement from the government of 25 pounds per slave executed. The African slave trade helped to shape a wide variety of societies from modern Argentina to Canada. These differed in their use of slaves, the harshness of the regime imposed on slaves, and the degree of mixing of the races that custom and law permitted. But none of these became as virulently racist--insisting on racial separation and a strict color bar--as the English North American colonies that became the United States. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Unfree labor in the North American colonies Notwithstanding the horrible conditions that African slaves endured, it is important to underscore that when European powers began carving up the New World between them, African slaves were not part of their calculations. When we think of slavery today, we think of it primarily from the point of view of its relationship to racism. But planters in the 17th and 18th centuries looked at it primarily as a means to produce profits. Slavery was a method of organizing labor to produce sugar, tobacco and cotton. It was not, first and foremost, a system for producing white supremacy. How did slavery in the U.S. (and the rest of the New World) become the breeding ground for racism? For much of the first century of colonization in what became the United States, the majority of slaves and other "unfree laborers" were white. The term "unfree" draws the distinction between slavery and servitude and "free wage labor" that is the norm in capitalism. One of the historic gains of capitalism for workers is that workers are "free" to sell their ability to labor to whatever employer will give them the best deal. Of course, this kind of freedom is limited at best. Unless they are independently wealthy, workers aren't free to decide not to work. They're free to work or starve. Once they do work, they can quit one employer and go to work for another. But the hallmark of systems like slavery and indentured servitude was that slaves or servants were "bound over" to a particular employer for a period of time, or for life in the case of slaves. The decision to work for another master wasn't the slave's or the servant's. It was the master's, who could sell slaves for money or other commodities like livestock, lumber or machinery. The North American colonies started predominantly as private business enterprises in the early 1600s. Unlike the Spanish, whose conquests of Mexico and Peru in the 1500s produced fabulous gold and silver riches for Spain, settlers in places like the colonies that became Maryland, Rhode Island, and Virginia made money through agriculture. In addition to sheer survival, the settlers' chief aim was to obtain a labor force that could produce the large amounts of indigo, tobacco, sugar and other crops that would be sold back to England. From 1607, when Jamestown was founded in Virginia to about 1685, the primary source of agricultural labor in English North America came from white indentured servants. The colonists first attempted to press the indigenous population into labor. But the Indians refused to be become servants to the English. Indians resisted being forced to work, and they escaped into the surrounding area, which, after all, they knew far better than the English. One after another, the English colonies turned to a policy of driving out the Indians. The colonists then turned to white servants. Indentured servants were predominantly young white men--usually English or Irish--who were required to work for a planter master for some fixed term of four to seven years. The servants received room and board on the plantation but no pay. And they could not quit and work for another planter. They had to serve their term, after which they might be able to acquire some land and to start a farm for themselves. They became servants in several ways. Some were prisoners, convicted of petty crimes in Britain, or convicted of being troublemakers in Britain's first colony, Ireland. Many were kidnapped off the streets of Liverpool or Manchester, and put on ships to the New World. Some voluntarily became servants, hoping to start farms after they fulfilled their obligations to their masters. For most of the 1600s, the planters tried to get by with a predominantly white, but multiracial workforce. But as the 17th century wore on, colonial leaders became increasingly frustrated with white servant labor. For one thing, they faced the problem of constantly having to recruit labor as servants' terms expired. Second, after servants finished their contracts and decided to set up their farms, they could become competitors to their former masters. And finally, the planters didn't like the servants' "insolence." The mid-1600s were a time of revolution in England, when ideas of individual freedom were challenging the old hierarchies based on royalty. The colonial planters tended to be royalists, but their servants tended to assert their "rights as Englishmen" to better food, clothing and time off. Most laborers in the colonies supported the servants. As the century progressed, the costs of servant labor increased. Planters started to petition the colonial boards and assemblies to allow the large-scale importation of African slaves. Black slaves worked on plantations in small numbers throughout the 1600s. But until the end of the 1600s, it cost planters more to buy slaves than to buy white servants. Blacks lived in the colonies in a variety of statuses--some were free, some were slaves, some were servants. The law in Virginia didn't establish the condition of lifetime, perpetual slavery or even recognize African servants as a group different from white servants until 1661. Blacks could serve on juries, own property and exercise other rights. Northampton County, Virginia, recognized interracial marriages and, in one case, assigned a free Black couple to act as foster parents for an abandoned white child. There were even a few examples of Black freemen who owned white servants. Free Blacks in North Carolina had voting rights. In the 1600s, the Chesapeake society of eastern Virginia had a multiracial character, according to historian Betty Wood: There is persuasive evidence dating from the 1620s through the 1680s that there were those of European descent in the Chesapeake who were prepared to identify and cooperate with people of African descent. These affinities were forged in the world of plantation work. On many plantations, Europeans and West Africans labored side by side in the tobacco fields, performing exactly the same types and amounts of work; they lived and ate together in shared housing; they socialized together; and sometimes they slept together. The planters' economic calculations played a part in the colonies' decision to move toward full-scale slave labor. By the end of the 17th century, the price of white indentured servants outstripped the price of African slaves. A planter could buy an African slave for life for the same price that he could purchase a white servant for 10 years. As Eric Williams explained: Here, then, is the origin of Negro slavery. The reason was economic, not racial; it had to do not with the color of the laborer, but the cheapness of the labor. [The planter] would have gone to the moon, if necessary, for labor. Africa was nearer than the moon, nearer too than the more populous countries of India and China. But their turn would soon come. Planters' fear of a multiracial uprising also pushed them towards racial slavery. Because a rigid racial division of labor didn't exist in the 17th century colonies, many conspiracies involving Black slaves and white indentured servants were hatched and foiled. We know about them today because of court proceedings that punished the runaways after their capture. As historians T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes point out, "These cases reveal only extreme actions, desperate attempts to escape, but for every group of runaways who came before the courts, there were doubtless many more poor whites and blacks who cooperated in smaller, less daring ways on the plantation." The largest of these conspiracies developed into Bacon's Rebellion, an uprising that threw terror into the hearts of the Virginia Tidewater planters in 1676. Several hundred farmers, servants and slaves initiated a protest to press the colonial government to seize Indian land for distribution. The conflict spilled over into demands for tax relief and resentment of the Jamestown establishment. Planter Nathaniel Bacon helped organize an army of whites and Blacks that sacked Jamestown and forced the governor to flee. The rebel army held out for eight months before the Crown managed to defeat and disarm it. Bacon's Rebellion was a turning point. After it ended, the Tidewater planters moved in two directions: first, they offered concessions to the white freemen, lifting taxes and extending to them the vote; and second, they moved to full-scale racial slavery. Fifteen years earlier, the Burgesses had recognized the condition of slavery for life and placed Africans in a different category as white servants. But the law had little practical effect. "Until slavery became systematic, there was no need for a systematic slave code. And slavery could not become systematic so long as an African slave for life cost twice as much as an English servant for a five-year term," wrote historian Barbara Jeanne Fields. Both of those circumstances changed in the immediate aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion. In the entire 17th century, the planters imported about 20,000 African slaves. The majority of them were brought to North American colonies in the 24 years after Bacon's Rebellion. In 1664, the Maryland legislature passed a law determining who would be considered slaves on the basis of the condition of their father--whether their father was slave or free. It soon became clear, however, that establishing paternity was difficult, but that establishing who was a person's mother was definite. So the planters changed the law to establish slave status on the basis of the mother's condition. Now white slaveholders who fathered children by slave women would be guaranteed their offspring as slaves. And the law included penalties for "free" women who slept with slaves. But what's most interesting about this law is that it doesn't really speak in racial terms. It attempts to preserve the property rights of slaveholders and establish barriers between slave and free which were to become hardened into racial divisions over the next few years. Taking the Maryland law as an example, Fields made this important point: Historians can actually observe colonial Americans in the act of preparing the ground for race without foreknowledge of what would later arise on the foundation they were laying. [T]he purpose of the experiment is clear: to prevent the erosion of slaveowners' property rights that would result if the offspring of free white women impregnated by slave men were entitled to freedom. The language of the preamble to the law makes clear that the point was not yet race. Race does not explain the law. Rather, the law shows society in the act of inventing race. After establishing that African slaves would cultivate major cash crops of the North American colonies, the planters then moved to establish the institutions and ideas that would uphold white supremacy. Most unfree labor became Black labor. Laws and ideas intended to underscore the subhuman status of Black people--in a word, the ideology of racism and white supremacy--emerged full-blown over the next generation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "All men are created equal" Within a few decades, the ideology of white supremacy was fully developed. Some of the greatest minds of the day--such as Scottish philosopher David Hume and Thomas Jefferson, the man who wrote the Declaration of Independence--wrote treatises alleging Black inferiority. The ideology of white supremacy based on the natural inferiority of Blacks, even allegations that Blacks were subhuman, strengthened throughout the 18th century. This was the way that the leading intellectual figures of the time reconciled the ideals of the 1776 American Revolution with slavery. The American Revolution of 1776 and later the French Revolution of 1789 popularized the ideas of liberty and the rights of all human beings. The Declaration of Independence asserts that "all men are created equal" and possess certain "unalienable rights"--rights that can't be taken away--of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." As the first major bourgeois revolution, the American Revolution sought to establish the rights of the new capitalist class against the old feudal monarchy. It started with the resentment of the American merchant class that wanted to break free from British restrictions on its trade. But its challenge to British tyranny also gave expression to a whole range of ideas that expanded the concept of "liberty" from being just about trade to include ideas of human rights, democracy, and civil liberties. It legitimized an assault on slavery as an offense to liberty. Some of the leading American revolutionaries, such as Thomas Paine and Benjamin Franklin, endorsed abolition. Slaves and free Blacks also pointed to the ideals of the revolution to call for abolishing slavery. But because the revolution aimed to establish the rule of capital in America, and because a lot of capitalists and planters made a lot of money from slavery, the revolution compromised with slavery. The Declaration initially contained a condemnation of King George for allowing the slave trade, but Jefferson dropped it following protests from representatives from Georgia and the Carolinas. How could the founding fathers of the U.S.--most of whom owned slaves themselves--reconcile the ideals of liberty for which they were fighting with the existence of a system that represented the exact negation of liberty? The ideology of white supremacy fit the bill. We know today that "all men" didn't include women, Indians or most whites. But to rule Black slaves out of the blessings of liberty, the leading head-fixers of the time argued that Blacks weren't really "men," they were a lower order of being. Jefferson's Notes from Virginia, meant to be a scientific catalogue of the flora and fauna of Virginia, uses arguments that anticipate the "scientific racism" of the 1800s and 1900s. With few exceptions, no major institution--such as the universities, the churches or the newspapers of the time--raised criticisms of white supremacy or of slavery. In fact, they helped pioneer religious and academic justifications for slavery and Black inferiority. As C.L.R. James put it, "[T]he conception of dividing people by race begins with the slave trade. This thing was so shocking, so opposed to all the conceptions of society which religion and philosophers had, that the only justification by which humanity could face it was to divide people into races and decide that the Africans were an inferior race." White supremacy wasn't only used to justify slavery. It was also used to keep in line the two-thirds of Southern whites who weren't slaveholders. Unlike the French colony of St. Domingue or the British colony of Barbados, where Blacks vastly outnumbered whites, Blacks were a minority in the slave South. A tiny minority of slave-holding whites, who controlled the governments and economies of the Deep South states, ruled over a population that was roughly two-thirds white farmers and workers and one-third Black slaves. The slaveholders' ideology of racism and white supremacy helped to divide the working population, tying poor whites to the slaveholders. Slavery afforded poor white farmers what Fields called a "social space" whereby they preserved an illusory "independence" based on debt and subsistence farming, while the rich planters continued to dominate Southern politics and society. "A caste system as well as a form of labor," historian James M. McPherson wrote, "slavery elevated all whites to the ruling caste and thereby reduced the potential for class conflict." The great abolitionist Frederick Douglass understood this dynamic: The hostility between the whites and blacks of the South is easily explained. It has its root and sap in the relation of slavery, and was incited on both sides by the cunning of the slave masters. Those masters secured their ascendancy over both the poor whites and the Blacks by putting enmity between them. They divided both to conquer each. [Slaveholders denounced emancipation as] tending to put the white working man on an equality with Blacks, and by this means, they succeed in drawing off the minds of the poor whites from the real fact, that by the rich slave-master, they are already regarded as but a single remove from equality with the slave

#### The alternative is a refusal of the affs capitalist logic. We defend their racial discourse but not the disease discourse.

#### The world is chaotic and contingent. The 1AC’s ethical framing and valuation is admirable and good, but their call to action undermines it and fails. The chaotic nature of the world will always upend specific end goals which cause melancholy and hopelessness, only process-based and ethics-oriented focus solves.

Andrews 18 (Bernard, Head of Philosophy and Research Lead at Caxton College in Valencia, PhD in Philosophy from University of Southampton “How can a teacher of students with SEMHD unhide moral value? (A Wittgenstein-influenced perspective)”, <https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/422160/1/Bernard_Andrews_PhD_thesis_final_copy.pdf>) CC

The Thought of Death. It gives me a melancholy happiness to live in the midst of this confusion of streets, of necessities, of voices: how much enjoyment, impatience and desire, how much thirsty life and drunkenness of life comes to light here every moment! And yet it will soon be so still for all these shouting, lively, life- loving people! How everyone’s shadow, his gloomy travelling companion stands behind him! It is always as in the last moment before the departure of an emigrant- ship: people have more than ever to say to one another, the hour presses, the ocean with its lonely silence waits impatiently behind all the noise-so greedy, so certain of its prey! Or as Riesman (1954, p.485) puts it: ‘The imminence of death serves to sweep away the inessential preoccupations for those who do not flee from the thought of death into triviality.’ In the film Troy (Peterson, 2004) Achilles makes a similar point to Breseis, enlightening her as to why her comforting certainty in the gods robs her of the aesthetic and triumphant reality: I’ll tell you a secret. Something they don’t teach you in your temple. The Gods envy us. They envy us because we’re mortal, because any moment might be our last. Everything is more beautiful because we’re doomed. You will never be lovelier than you are now. We will never be here again. (Peterson, 2004) If such rarity is valuable, then nothing is as valuable as a one-off. And all of our experiences are oneoffs, never to be repeated. Unfortunately, we often hide this fact from ourselves. As can be seen in the descriptions above, there is something existentially terrifying associated with the notion of absolute value, not only is it most easily recognised in the context of one’s own death, but the notion of all our experiences being one-offs also renders us somewhat powerless. Our ability to predict, and therefore control our lives, depends upon things according with rules and patterns, upon us being certain about things, upon things and experiences being the same and not different. To recognise the absolute or moral value of our experiences is to recognise their contingency. ‘But how are we to cope with uncertainty, with the unknown?’ Were I in an argument in the pub, I could imagine making a good case for this being the question that defines the human condition. The most ancient epics from around the world have this as their central theme. What is interesting about so many of the ancient stories is that they offer no comfort in this regard. Whilst the cosmology of Genesis, for example, describes chaos as overcome by God and that everything has its place, the story of Job describes God berating the central character for believing that he could understand the mind of God. The gods of ancient Greece also often appear capricious and unpredictable. But this represents the reality of our lives. We do not know the mind of God, for all we know he does play dice. To combat the discomfort of living in a chaotic and contingent world, other writers have conceived of God as omnibenevolent. This is not without problems. The most obvious, yet less serious issue is that this seems to contradict our experience of an unjust world. And whilst much of the religious language has fallen out of everyday use, this superficially comforting belief that the world is necessary and ordered rather than contingent and chaotic is at the base of many peoples’ cosmological outlooks. Einstein said, in the quotation alluded to above, that ‘God doesn’t play dice with the world’ 26 The philosophical investigation and review of the literature (Hermanns 1983, p.58). And compare the chaotic vision of unpredictable gods using the world as their plaything with this by Jean-Pierre Laplace (1902): We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. (p.4) This kind of vision is mistaken. The world is fundamentally chaotic. We have no access to rules that describe how it all works. There is no such certainty. But more importantly, it is this very fact that allows us to see the moral or absolute value in the world. Tejedor (2011) argues that this is what Wittgenstein was driving at in the Tractatus. She suggests that it was the realisation that there was no necessity, has, in and of itself, a fundamental ethical dimension for Wittgenstein: ‘…for to recognise the essential contingency of reality and of ourselves as facts is to undergo a profound ethical transformation’ (p.102). When we view nature as acting in an orderly fashion, according to laws and principles, we then adopt an instrumental attitude towards reality: ‘it emerges when we come to regard facts as means to be used to achieve our particular ends’ (p.102). Or again, she writes: … the idea that is possible to use facts as means to satisfy our ends involves the illusory belief that we can exert genuine control over reality. This instrumental attitude to reality results from a lack of clarity as to its essentially contingent status: it arises from the misguided sense that we can (necessarily) cause the world to be different. (p.103) Although the self as a metaphysical notion appears to have a privileged ethical place, this is a conceptual confusion. Thus, the aim of ethical action cannot be to effect change in the world. One might therefore be tempted to conclude that the ethical aim is to produce change in oneself, in one’s thoughts and ideas. One might be tempted to adopt a Platonic view where the body is seen as the prison of the soul, something from which we need to escape. However, according to Wittgenstein, this contingency is not merely limited to facts outside our own minds. As he states in the Lecture on Ethics: ‘A state of mind, so far as we mean by that, a fact which we can describe, is in no ethical sense good or bad.’ Just as no fact about the external world is any more valuable than any other, neither is any fact about our minds – any desire we have, any thought or feeling is all of equal value. Tejedor (2011) explains that ‘This sense of wonder arises in connection to all facts: physical facts… but also mental facts… desires, beliefs, wishes, and, more broadly minds…’ (p.103) Some may be unduly disheartened by this notion, and conclude that, given that we can have no necessary control over either our world nor our mind, that there is no point to anything and we may as How can a teacher of students with SEMHD unhide Moral value? 27 well just give up. But to think this is a misunderstanding. Firstly, if the facts about one’s states of mind are also contingent, then one has no choice as to whether one gives up on life anyway, but more importantly, to believe that one can conclude that a lack of control renders life depressingly meaningless is itself the result of believing in a necessity that is not there. There is no necessary connection between feeling a sense of control and feeling that life is meaningful. The sentence ‘life has no meaning’ seems to suggest to us that, if life does have a meaning, we ought to be able to identify what that meaning is. It sounds like a lack of something, and therefore we go about in search of something that completes it. However, we could equally view a sense of meaninglessness as something additional – i.e. ‘I wish my despair would go away’. To feel that life is meaningful is simply to not question whether life is meaningful – i.e. to be absorbed in life. If we are viewing life clearly and recognising the contingency of the facts that make it up, even this sense of despair takes on an absolute value. The tendency to separate the mind from the body (or the physical world) like this stems from another misunderstanding that arises as a result of Cartesian scepticism. Descartes’ (1996) and other such sceptical arguments effectively draw a line between the mind and the external world. In ordinary life, we assume what we perceive to be real; we assume that our idea of the world (what we perceive) is the same as the actual or real world. However, sceptical arguments call this into question. For example, if we put a pencil in water, we may perceive it as bent; if we are on drugs, we might hallucinate and see all kinds of things that are not there (as defended in Ayer 1940); from a particular angle, a table might look trapezoid, whereas we know that it is really rectangular; when we look at the moon, we know that there is a time-lag between the light leaving the moon and arriving at our eyes, thus, we do not perceive the moon directly (as defended in Russell 1997). Thus, we have an apparent contradiction between what we perceive (the ideas in our mind), and what is real (the external world). All sceptical arguments have a similar form (where p is something that has been perceived): 1. According to my mind p 2. According to the external world not-p 3. 1 and 2 contradict each other, so both 1 and 2 cannot be true – there is doubt. This argument is then generalised from that particular case: if it is true in this case that I might be on drugs, how am I to know that I am not on drugs in all other cases? The global scepticism of Descartes seems to suggest something mystical about minds - something unknown and hidden, almost something sacred. However, this dichotomy is clearly not applicable in all cases: firstly, why should there be a general rule that we can apply to all cases? Just because I am unsure about what is real in one situation, does not imply any necessity for me to doubt in another. Secondly, even if there is a contradiction, why must it be solved? Why should the facts of my mind not contradict the facts of the world? Why need there be any kind of connection here? It is enough to simply say that a pencil appears bent when it is in water. There is no mystery here at all. It is also enough to say, ‘I genuinely thought you were a dragon, but it was just the drugs I’d taken.’ This dichotomy is an illusion. To view the world clearly, and recognise its contingency requires that we do not give notions of one’s self any more value than any other facts, but we are fooled by our false assumptions. One such false assumption is that a noun must denote a thing - so to what does the first-person pronoun ‘I’ refer? We don’t use [‘I’] because we recognise a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, ‘Cogito, ergo sum’. – ‘Is there then no mind but only a body?’ Answer: The word ‘mind’ has meaning, i.e. it has a use in our language; but saying this doesn’t yet say what kind of use we make of it. (Wittgenstein 1991b, p.69) When we say, ‘I have a toothache’, we do not mean ‘my mind has a toothache’. The similarity between sentences like, ‘I have a pain’ and ‘I have a bag’ makes it appear as if, in each sentence, there are two objects connected in some way. But you cannot borrow my pain. Similarly, we frequently fail to notice, what Hacker (2007, p.5) calls, the asymmetry inherent in our psychological language: Psychological predicates typically display first/third-person asymmetry. The characteristic first-person present tense use … does not rest on introspection conceived as inner sense; nor does it rest on observation of one’s own behaviour. It is groundless. The third-person use, by contrast, rests on what the subject says and does. Bellucci (2013) compares the sentences, ‘I am in pain’, with ‘he is in pain’. Obviously both have very similar surface grammar, but when we look at how the sentences are used, we can see a clear difference: ‘The third-person statement that “he is in pain” derives from the indirect observation of his behaviour, whereas the first- person statement that “I am in pain” does not. The latter does not describe; it rather expresses my sensation.’ (p.9). Or again, consider the following: A. ‘I am lying when I say I’m incapable of writing well; I just can’t be bothered to try.’ B. ‘He is lying when he says he is incapable of writing well; he just can’t be bothered to try’ The two sentences mean entirely different things. The first one is an admission, the second is, at best, a summary of some observations, and as such it ought to be possible to back it up with details; at worst, it is an assignation of blame. Sentence A cannot be an observation. An observation implies a description, that there is a thing to be described. Similarly, we can often end up wrongly reifying the object of such sentences. Consider how it is perfectly reasonable to say, ‘he is unconscious’, but ‘I am unconscious’ has no use, except perhaps as a joke. But ‘if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of “object and designation” the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.’ (Wittgenstein 1968, §293). What appeared to be an observation becomes like a signpost to a city that is impossible to get to, and to which no-one has ever been. It points in a direction, but not the direction of something; that to which it points is irrelevant. This is the difference between an observation, or a description, and an expression. In his early notebooks and in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein frequently discusses the self, will or I as referencing a very particular kind of concept, because often they do not refer to anything at all in the world: 5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world. 5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. (Wittgenstein 2001, §§5.632-5.633) In his notebooks he writes, ‘The I is not an object’ (1998, p.80). Wittgenstein’s understanding of ‘the world’ here was that which limits the meaning of the propositions we use. The self, in the sense used here, cannot be part of this world since it is that which is limited by the world. Take for example the phrase ‘I know what I think’. If we are simply expressing our incredulity that someone is questioning us, then this sentence is perfectly meaningful, but if we believe we are in some way an observer of our own thoughts, we have been bewitched by language. I cannot be both the observer and the observed. Such sentences give rise to dualism. Equally, ‘I am in pain’ – cannot mean ‘there is a subject, I, to which the pain is occurring’; the purpose of the sentence is not to identify the subject, as if we are in doubt as to whose pain it is! It is simply an assertion concerning me. Our self is manifest in our use of language; it is not pointed to by language. Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can acknowledge the self in a nonpsychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’. (§5.641) And again: The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that it is in language alone that I reach understanding. (§5.62) 2.13 How we express our recognition of moral value Recognition of absolute value cannot be said it can only be shown. In this way, there is no distinction between understanding and responding. We can equate this state of recognising the contingency and thus the absolute value of all of our experiences with Weil’s (1951, pp.111-2) notion of paying attention: Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty and ready to be penetrated by the object. It means holding in our minds, within reach of this thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with it, the diverse knowledge we have acquired which we are forced to make use of. Our thought should be in relation to all particular and already formulated thoughts as a man on a mountain who, as he looks forward, sees also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many forests and plains. Above all our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its naked truth the object which is to penetrate it. One may be tempted to conceive of paying attention as merely the prelude to acting ethically, to perceive that there are a number of steps involved: 1. We pay attention to the world and view it clearly. 2. We receive the correct information about the world 3. We process this information and make a decision about how best to act 4. We act. However, again, as Yoda (2017) points out, this causal picture again implies some kind of mind-body dualism. The ethical act and the ethical perspective are one and the same thing. Paying attention is active not a passive. Yoda elucidates this using Weil’s notion of Reading. He uses the following quotation from Weil (1990) to illustrate: Two women each receive a letter, announcing to each that her son is dead. The first, upon just glancing at the paper, faints, and until her death, her eyes, her mouth, her movements will never again be as they were. The second woman remains the same: her expression, her attitude does not change; she cannot read…. It is not the sensation but the meaning which has grabbed hold of the first woman, reaching directly, brutally, into her mind, without her participation, as sensations grab hold of us. Everything happens as if the pain resided in the letter and sprang up from it into the reader’s face. As for the sensations themselves, such as the colour of the paper or of the ink, they don’t even appear. What is presented to the sight is the pain itself. (p.297-298) If we read something and we understand it, then we also respond to it. ‘If I hate someone, there is not him on one side, my hatred on the other; when he approaches me something hateful approaches me.’ (Weil 1990, p.299) One might be tempted to separate the understanding and the response because one imagines cases where one pauses for a moment before acting, but if I pause in response to a question, that pause is part of my response, part of how I paid attention. To recognise this, one only needs to imagine how disconcerting it might be if one asks one’s boy/girlfriend to marry them and received a pause before their ‘yes’. ‘In Weil’s picture, we read and respond with our entire being’ (Yoda 2017, p.7). Thus, since the understanding and the response are one and the same thing, the initial distinction between moral value as A) a principle or rule according to which somebody acts, or aspires to act and B) a judgement of what is important in life was a bit misleading. If we recognise the absolute value of the world, then we also recognise our obligations. There are no steps here. Imagine being handed a vase and told that it is thousands of years old. One does not have to work out how to behave with it. If one understands the phrase, ‘it is thousands of years old’, then one immediately recognises how one has to behave with it. If one hands it to a child and says, ‘be careful! It is thousands of years old!’ It is perhaps more the case that one is defining thousands of years old in terms of care than justifying the use of the imperative. However, there is a difference here between understanding the meaning of a word in the sense of its dictionary definition, and understanding the use of a sentence. Even if one understands the dictionary definition of a sentence, one will not know how to respond unless someone understands how they are being used. Since moving to Spain, I have found an unusual difficulty in understanding certain people. I frequently panic and do not understand the most basic things that they say. However, I realised that the problem was not that I did not understand the words that they are saying, but I did not understand why they were saying them. The reality was that they are making a special effort to speak very simply to me, so they would say things like, ‘Look! There’s a white car!’ I would translate the words to myself, but assume that I must have got it wrong because I could not, for the life of me, understand why anyone would say something like that to me. I felt as if I were missing something, some fact of grammar that would suddenly illuminate the meaning, which was completely hidden from me. Once I understood that they were simply so keen to converse with me that they were saying incredibly simple things, i.e. once I understood what they were trying to do with the words, I was able to learn appropriate responses that showed I understood, and we have been able to move on. However, there is no calculation to be done, and nor does one have to consult with a rule. The obligation is imbedded in the situation; it is what is seen, what is understood. However, one does not and cannot communicate the absolute value of something through sentences. I can communicate the relative value of the vase by discussing its age, the amount that it may be sold for, its relative rarity. However, I have no means of communicating the absolute value of something through words; it would be impossible to do such a thing because everything has precisely the same value: If for instance … we read the description of a murder with all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition. The murder will be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a stone. Certainly the reading of this description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they heard of it, but there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics. (Wittgenstein et al. 1993, p.39-40) Instead, absolute value can only be shown, demonstrated through our actions: ‘But an ethical sentence is a personal action. Not a statement of fact. Like an exclamation of admiration.’ (Wittgenstein, 2000, Tagebuch aus dem Koder 183, p.76, 31.05.06, translated in Christensen, 2004, p.125). We do not choose the ethical in the sense of picking one thing over another (since all facts are valued the same) but we betray our attitude towards the world in the manner in which we act. ‘Or rather, it is something that can only be chosen by actually acting in a way that expresses this particular ethical outlook’ (Christensen, 2004, p.125). McGinn (2001) suggests that throughout Wittgenstein’s work, there is an attempt to establish ‘an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order’ (Wittgenstein 1967, §132). That ‘order’, McGinn (2001, p.33) believes, consists in Wittgenstein tracing the boundaries of language, to express a particular way of looking at this distinction between saying and showing:

#### The quest to reinvent our debate curriculum holds the promise of a new more democratic future. However, the only way forward is to nourish a radically collective imagination that challenges the biopolitics of neoliberalism. That must start with a rejection of their disdain for the state because a successful curriculum inquiry demands the reconstitution our democratic commons.

Bourassa 11—Professor of educational psychology & foundations at the University of North-Western Iowa and a PhD in Education, Culture, & Society at the University of Utah [Gregory N., “Rethinking the Curricular Imagination: Curriculum and Biopolitics in the Age of Neoliberalism,” *Curriculum Inquiry*, Vol. 41, Issue 1, p. 5-16, Jan 2011, Emory Libraries]

INTRODUCTION: CURRICULUM INQUIRY IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM

One of the more difficult and pressing challenges confronting curriculum inquiry today relates to the increasing enclosure and privatization of the public sphere. Public schools, often exalted and thought to be among the most resilient spaces of the common, are now incredibly fragile, on the brink of being fully besieged by the onslaught of neoliberalism ([De Lissovoy, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b12); [Saltman, 2007](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b48)). While this practice of enclosure is not necessarily new, as market forces have long been encroaching the spaces of public schooling ([Du Bois, 1918](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b17); [Dewey, 1930](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b16)), the emergence of neoliberalism in the last thirty years marks a particularly insidious turn. The novelty of neoliberalism resides not only in that it has become normalized and even celebrated, but also in that the far-reaching tentacles of neoliberalism assume pedagogical dimensions.[1](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en1) At the same time, the unapologetic posturing of neoliberalism ([Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) offers curriculum theorists the contours of a common target that has not always been so easily recognizable in attempts to chart the flows and logics of capital. From this, we might gather that the current configuration of neoliberalism, like that of public schooling, precariously occupies a liminal status between that of inordinate durability and immanent vulnerability.

Given the hubris and arrogance of neoliberalism, we are now better armored with the vocabularies and conceptual understandings needed to both defend and rethink the institution of public schooling in our current juncture. For curriculum inquiry, this means reclaiming, and more accurately, reinventing, the educational experience. As [William Pinar (2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)) notes:

In its interest in and commitment to the study of educational experience, curriculum theory is critical of contemporary school “reform.” Indeed, “educational experience” seems precisely what politicians do not want, as they insist we focus on test scores, the “bottom line.” By linking the curriculum to student performance on standardized examinations, politicians have, in effect, taken control of what is to be taught: the curriculum. Examination-driven curricula demote teachers from scholars and intellectuals to technicians in service to the state. The cultivation of self-reflexive, interdisciplinary erudition and intellectuality disappears. Rationalized as “accountability,” political socialization replaces education. (pp. 2–3)

Although Pinar is highlighting some of the most saliently corrosive school practices, his stress on the enclosure of the educational experience does not translate into acquiescence to market forces. In fact, it could be argued that the circumstances for absolute democracy have never been more possible ([Hardt & Negri, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b33)).[2](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en2) In the face of perpetual reform, high-stakes testing, mechanical pedagogy, scripted curricula, and punitive disciplinary practices, curriculum inquiry is immediately thrust into a limit-situation in which a new horizon of possibilities is unveiled ([Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22)). In other words, these realities are not “the impassable boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin” (Alvaro Vieira Pinto, quoted in [Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22), p. 99). With this, the task of curriculum inquiry is to collectively imagine fields of possibility ([Appadurai, 1996](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b3)), working from the occupied, yet generative, confines of a “cramped space” ([Deleuze & Guattari, 1986](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b13), p. 17). At the same time, such calls for an unleashed curricular imagination must be tempered with the humility of a diligent yet playful social imagination that recognizes that problems are always beginning anew and altering in both form and appearance ([de Certeau, 1984](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b11)). Thus in curriculum inquiry's quest to reinvent public schooling as a beacon of possibility and promise for a new democratic future, the only way to proceed is to nourish a radically collective imagination and embrace the inextinguishable spirit of struggle ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15); [Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b29); [Pinar, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)).

SKETCHING A FRAMEWORK OF BIOPOLITICS

With the task of unfurling the curricular imagination I shall explore the recent writings of two educational theorists, Henry Giroux and Tyson Lewis, in hope of uncovering the potential insights they may provide for the field of curriculum inquiry. Of primary importance for an engagement with these writings is a theoretical framework of biopower and biopolitics which Giroux and Lewis both employ. In The History of Sexuality, and in his lectures at the College of France in spring 1976, [Michel Foucault (1990, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b20)) characterized a new regime of power. To describe a more complex account of contemporary power configurations that in many ways exceed and even bridge the regimes of sovereignty and disciplinary force, Foucault outlined the concept of biopower. Traditionally the power of the sovereign has been thought to be implicated within a juridical and contractual model of dominance that is marked by the capacity to take life, while disciplinary power has been characterized by the effective organization and discipline of the soul ([Foucault, 1977](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b19)). Whereas previous disciplinary powers aimed for the control of individuals at the level of the body, this new nondisciplinary form of power—biopower—aims to control the biological developments of life not through discipline but through processes of regularization and sites of equilibrium. In other words, whereas disciplinary power acts on individual bodies through training, surveillance and forms of punishment, biopower acts on “man-as-species,” achieving control over living beings, relations, and domains of the (re)production of life ([Foucault, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21), p. 243). Biopower, then, intervenes in all social, cultural, economic, and environmental aspects of life.

Despite its orientation as a technology of rule or Power (as in potere and pouvoir)[3](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en3) and its continuing reliance on sovereign force, biopower attempts to conceal these modalities as it purports to be primarily concerned with the (re)production and protection of life forms. In [Foucault's (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21)) account, biopower appears as a technology of security—not at the level of the individual, but of species—that endeavors to establish an equilibrium or homeostasis. As an apparatus of security, biopower shields those it protects—the “well born” or “Eugenia,” according to [Antonio Negri (2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b44))—from internal and external threats, or inferior species that may contaminate, so to speak, the dominant species (p. 193). Accordingly, biopower is invested in the overall health and security of the population and achieves its aim of homeostasis through techniques of regularization and invariably mechanisms of exclusion and containment. In this vein, biopower engages in subtle forms of eugenics and social engineering in the name of biological security.

To put it boldly, biopower attempts to mediate, control, capture, and administer all aspects of life. It is a power that becomes embedded, dispersed, and regularized throughout society and its populations. Biopolitics, then, is essentially the political struggle over life and death, and as we will see in the writings of Giroux and Lewis, the struggle to produce certain forms of life. While [Giorgio Agamben (1998](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b1)) along with [Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b32)) are the most prominent writers exploring biopolitics in the wake of Foucault, their respective readings are very different. Whereas Agamben posits a negative biopolitics that takes on the form of a thanatopolitics predisposed toward certain forms of death, Hardt and Negri embrace an affirmative view of biopolitics that is oriented toward the production of social and political forms of life ([Esposito, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b18)). Picking up on these intonations, the writings of [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)), and similarly those of [Lewis (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b37)), point curriculum theorists to two very important questions. [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) asks whether public schooling is facilitating democracy and accompanying forms of life or surrendering to a biopolitics of neoliberalism that renders disposable those populations marginalized by race and class. As for [Lewis (2009b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b40)), readers are pushed to consider whether we can imagine and embrace a new theory of affirmative biopolitics and education conducive to collective political life, or succumb to necroschooling, “a form of education that is more concerned with abandonment than with social investment, protection, etc.” (p. 33). The framing of these questions are not only biopolitical in nature, but they strike at the very heart of curriculum inquiry and the task of reinventing the educational experience ([Pinar, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)).

In my engagement with Giroux and Lewis, I shall suggest that biopolitics warrants the attention of curriculum inquiry in at least two significant ways: it not only offers a viable template for understanding the convergence of neoliberalism with the logics of White supremacy ([Bonilla-Silva, 2001](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b7)) and a war on the poor, but it also calls into question the very institution of schooling and thus the efficacy and integrity of reform. The former is an essential diagnostic tool for registering the relationships between schooling and the broader sites of culture, politics, and economics ([Apple, 1979](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b4); [Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22)), while the latter represents the praxis and unfolding of a “generative theme” that will open possibilities to “surmount the limit-situations” confronting curriculum inquiry ([Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22), p. 103). Hence a focus on biopolitics pushes the curricular imagination in productive ways, offering a new orientation to expand and imagine curriculum in a new key ([Pinar & Irwin, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b46)).

In what follows I shall first focus on [Giroux's (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) Youth in a Suspect Society: Democracy or Disposability? before engaging some of the writings of Lewis. By way of conclusion, I will offer an analysis that attempts to bridge their projects and further draw out the implications for curriculum inquiry.

DEMOCRACY OR DISPOSABILITY?

In addition to providing significant contributions to the field of curriculum theory, the writings of [Henry Giroux (1981a](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b25); [Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b28); [Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b29); [Giroux & Purpel, 1983](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b30)) have always posed grave challenges to the ways in which we conceptualize the curricular relations between power and knowledge, social contexts, and school practices. As such, a serious examination of [Giroux's (1981b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b26)) work leads us to approach curriculum with the recognition that it is inextricably bound to broader social contexts of cultural and political struggle. For Giroux, such contexts are never reduced, abstracted, or divorced from an ever-complex array of school practices that materially impact students on a daily basis. Always charting the domains of public pedagogy, Giroux's writings offer curriculum theorists extraordinary insights into how contestations of power shape and organize not only official school curricula or hidden curricula, but all aspects of social life ([Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b28)). And now, perhaps more than ever, the writings of Giroux summon the curricular imagination to respond to a unique constellation of challenges that threaten to foreclose the educational experience along with the remaining possibilities for a democratic future.

Youth in a Suspect Society marks a continuation of Giroux's recent interests in the resurgence of authoritarianism, market-based logics of disposability, and a biopolitics of neoliberalism. The convergence of these concepts, for Giroux, is accompanied by a fundamental shift from an imperfect social state to a ruthless market state. This shift, from “state sovereignty” to “market sovereignty” is characterized by a disinvestment in the public sphere. In this configuration, anything pertaining to the public is not only neglected but also met with great disdain. As an economic logic, neoliberalism invades the public sphere, invalidating and enclosing that which cannot be filtered through a market rationality. Here, neoliberalism meets biopolitics in that politics distances itself from social governance—withdrawing from a commitment to protect its citizens—and increasingly resorts to governing populations through the economic reign of the market. In this cruel landscape that Giroux calls the biopolitics of neoliberalism, the social state ceases to exist only to be replaced by a corporate state that is intent on warding off democratic sensibilities and enclosing the few spheres of the public that remain.

Giroux's conceptual mapping of a biopolitics of neoliberalism contains yet another important element. Excluded from social and political life, those populations marginalized by class and race are reduced from the status of citizens to waste, or in [Agamben's (1998](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b1)) terms, from bios (social and political life) to zoē (life without quality). Rendered disposable under a biopolitics of neoliberalism, marginalized populations are vulnerable to Agamben's formulation of biopolitics as thanatopolitics. Giroux, rightfully taking Agamben's biopolitics seriously in this instance, draws here from [Achille Mbembe (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b42)), who argues that “vast populations are subject to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40). In short, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability ushers in forms of social death, rendering populations expendable, without support, protection, or compassion. In Giroux's account, such a biopolitical order abandons populations under the guise that they represent the refuse of a neoliberal economic regime. This epitomizes, for Giroux, a complete violation of ethical responsibility and obligation to youth and the democratic future to come.

With the breaking of the social contract, in the U.S. context, the state is transformed from a “weakened welfare state into an increasingly powerful racialized warfare state” ([Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27), p. 71). Embedded within this shift, what emerges is a powerful concoction of a racial state, a punishing state, and a carceral state, in which disposable populations constitute a threat that must be contained. Hence, prisons become the primary disciplinary apparatuses that regulate and govern disposable populations. According to [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)), “The institution of the prison is at the ideological center of the biopolitics of the punishing state dutifully inscribing its presence into the political and cultural landscape of everyday life” (p. 83). In this important passage, we can begin to see how the site of schooling comes to function as an appendage for the carceral state. In fact, as [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) asserts, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability is able to forcefully “collapse the distinctions between crime and social problems, prison and school, and race and disposability, while constructing spaces that subject minority youth and others rendered redundant to a form of punitive control, if not social death” (p. 80). As a result of this blurring of boundaries, apartheid schools—those schools “in which 99 to 100 percent of students are nonwhite” ([Kozol, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b36), p. 18)—come to closely resemble prisons, or at the very least, enclaves of intellectual, social and political containment ([De Lissovoy, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b12); [Devine 1996](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b14); [Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)). Too often, such sites jettison the educational lives and futures of those students within their purview.

It is here where the real insight of Giroux's text takes shape and productively aggravates the curricular imagination by exposing the broken promises of public schooling. While many have similarly pointed to the eroding investment in the futures of working-class youth of color ([Kozol, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b36); [Valenzuela, 1999](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b51)), Giroux is able to outline the contours of a viable theory—a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability—that provides a new analytic for understanding the form and content of teacher education in relation to broader social patterns. There are at least two points of interest here worth noting. First, [Foucault (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21)) insisted that modern racism is a “mechanism that allows biopower to work. So racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power” (p. 258). Despite this, few theorists focusing on biopolitics endeavor to interrogate how “racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower” ([Foucault, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21), p. 258). Youth in a Suspect Society not only attempts to make explicit the links between biopower and schooling, but it achieves in beginning to demonstrate how the warehousing of Black and Brown children in lockdown schools—along with the production of educational and social death—performs a principle function of biopower. The importance of making these conceptual links between biopower and racial domination, and subsequently Giroux's connection of this theory to material outcomes cannot be understated.

Second, employing the theory of a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability, Giroux highlights the broken promises of public schooling in terms that refocus what is at stake for curriculum inquiry. Beyond the myopic rhetoric of accountability and standards, it is absolute democracy ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15); [Hardt & Negri, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b33)) and its unfolding futurity that is in jeopardy. Put differently, a biopolitical reading of curriculum insists that the production and reproduction of certain forms of life are at the very center of the educational experience. Thus, no longer can prevailing conceptions of curriculum fail to locate the ideological underpinnings of school practices, allowing the relationship between schooling and economic, political, and cultural imperatives to remain veiled. In other words, curriculum inquiry must strive to locate and disrupt the commensurability between these prevailing imperatives, their broader political projects and the mandates they impose on curriculum. With the aid of Giroux's biopolitical framework, the curricular imagination must conceive of the educational experience not as a formula to be consumed or constructed for calculable instrumentality, but rather as a vital resource for galvanizing a robust social imagination capable of collectively negotiating and perpetually reconstructing democratic life ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15)). The writings of Tyson Lewis, which I will now turn to, are especially crucial for this task.

CONFRONTING NECROSCHOOLING: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF BIOPOLITICAL SCHOOLING

In what might initially strike some as a dizzying array of scholarship—ranging from aesthetics to utopian theories of education—the vast intellectual production of Tyson Lewis, I argue, is indispensable for any project of rethinking the educational experience. Lewis is, in my mind, the central figure writing about biopolitics and schooling today. His gallant efforts to piece together the biopolitical writings of Foucault, Agamben, and Hardt and Negri have led him to rethink the strengths and inadequacies of educational thinkers such as John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Ivan Illich. More importantly, Lewis’s writings exemplify a commitment to reimagining the space of the school in a biopolitical context. For example, whereas Giroux’s (2009) text serves predominately as a diagnostic tool for curriculum inquiry, the writings of Lewis (2007) propel the curricular imagination by not only confronting the logics of modern schooling, but by imaginatively mapping an alternative theory of biopolitical education. I will confine my analysis to three of Lewis’s recent essays, all of which explore biopolitics and schooling, and as I shall suggest, bear a particular importance for curriculum inquiry.

The first essay, “Defining the Political Ontology of the Classroom: Toward a Multitudinous Education” (Lewis, 2008), critiques Hardt and Negri’s (2004) theorizing of the multitude—an internally different and insurgent global force that opposes the sovereignty of the new global form of rule, Empire. Lewis rightfully points out that Hardt and Negri not only utterly lack theory of education, but they completely fail to acknowledge youth as agents of the multitude. The major shortcomings of this model offer, for Lewis, an opening to imagine a theory of education that retains the spirit of the multitude and its oppositional dimensions. Highlighting¶ the various aims of modern schooling in its corrupt capacity as a people-building project, Lewis (2008) endeavors to reconceptualize schools as spaces of biopolitical production in which subjectivities oriented toward “democracy in its ontological form” are cultivated (pp. 255–256). Rather than administering populations, such schools would be sites of democratic engagement and struggle.

Such a view of schooling is, for the most part, quite compatible with Pinar’s (2004) take on the educational experience. Both of their formulations are articulated against the backdrop of neoliberalism’s enclosure of the form and contleggent of schooling. To this, Lewis (2008) calls for a mode of schooling for the multitude that “ceases to be predetermined by standards (no¶ matter how flexible) and becomes a flexible, open-ended tool responsive to the needs and¶ immediate interests of the multitude to increase the general intellect and the power to act” (p. 256). This way of thinking about biopolitics and curriculum as a temporal and spatial act of unfolding shifts the focus of schools in such a way that the “experiences of children are not to be alienated from the curriculum but rather integrated into the classroom through shared, biopolitical group work that involves the reconstitution of the common” (p. 257). While the project of reinventing common spaces in schools is essential, such a task also encounters major obstacles in a neoliberal context. The problem arises in that the economic and political imperatives of neoliberalism reduce spaces of cooperation and collectivity to the “colonial category of wastelands,” given that such spaces do not promote capitalism (Shiva, 2005, p. 25). In this sense, such spaces are simultaneously rendered discardable and threatening. There is a wild, overflowing, and inexhaustible power in the common (Hardt & Negri, 2009), and capital’s preoccupation with enclosing “wastelands” is a testament to this power. Clearly, curriculum inquiry must struggle with the biopolitical task of reinventing and nurturing the common, which in turn produces democratic subjectivities. Pg. 5-11

#### The alt doesn’t exclude race --- historical materialism by its very nature engages in distinct and complex understandings of different forms of oppression and its origin. The alt is by no means a prescription that all oppression is experienced in the same way --- just that class forms the basis for all oppression.

McLaren, Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, ‘4

(Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)

We have argued that it is virtually impossible to conceptualize class without attending to the forms and contents of difference, but we insist that this does not imply that class struggle is now outdated by the politics of difference. As Jameson (1998, p. 136) notes, we are now in the midst of returning to the ‘most fundamental form of class struggle’ in light of current global conditions. Today's climate suggests that class struggle is ‘not yet a thing of the past’ and that those who seek to undermine its centrality are not only ‘morally callous’ and ‘seriously out of touch with reality’ but also largely blind to the ‘needs of the large mass of people who are barely surviving capital's newly-honed mechanisms of globalized greed’ (Harvey, 1998, pp. 7–9). In our view, a more comprehensive and politically useful understanding of the contemporary historical juncture necessitates foregrounding class analysis and the primacy of the working class as the fundamental agent of change.8 This does not render as ‘secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race, ethnicity, etc. as is routinely charged by post-Marxists. It is often assumed that foregrounding capitalist social relations necessarily undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’ and/or trivializes struggles against racism, etc., in favor of an abstractly defined class-based politics typically identified as ‘white.’ Yet, such formulations rest on a bizarre but generally unspoken logic that assumes that racial and ethnic ‘minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class. This stance is patently absurd since the concept of the ‘working class’ is undoubtedly comprised of men and women of different races, ethnicities, etc. (Mitter, 1997). A good deal of post-Marxist critique is subtly racist (not to mention essentialist) insofar as it implies that ‘people of color’ could not possibly be concerned with issues beyond those related to their ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ ‘difference.’ This posits ‘people of color’ as single-minded, one-dimensional caricatures and assumes that their working lives are less crucial to their self-understanding (and survival) than is the case with their ‘white male’ counterparts.9 It also ignores ‘the fact that class is an ineradicable dimension of everybody's lives’ (Gimenez, 2001, p. 2) and that social oppression is much more than tangentially linked to class background and the exploitative relations of production. On this topic, Meyerson (2000) is worth quoting at length: Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One of course is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not render women and people of color ‘secondary.’ This view assumes that ‘working class’ means white—this division between a white working class and all the others, whose identity (along with a corresponding social theory to explain that identity) is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid …[T]he primacy of class means … that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so that the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender, and class oppression. Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not. The cohesiveness of this position suggests that forms of exploitation and oppression are related internally to the extent that they are located in the same totality—one which is currently defined by capitalist class rule. Capitalism is an overarching totality that is, unfortunately, becoming increasingly invisible in post-Marxist ‘discursive’ narratives that valorize ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct. For example, E. San Juan (2003) argues that race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. He further notes that the capitalist mode of production has articulated ‘race’ with class in a peculiar way. He too is worth a substantial quotation: While the stagnation of rural life imposed a racial or castelike rigidity to the peasantry, the rapid accumulation of wealth through the ever more intensifying exploitation of labor by capital could not so easily ‘racialize’ the wage-workers of a particular nation, given the alienability of labor-power—unless certain physical or cultural characteristics can be utilized to divide the workers or render one group an outcast or pariah removed from the domain of ‘free labor.’ In the capitalist development of U.S. society, African, Mexican, and Asian bodies—more precisely, their labor power and its reproductive efficacy—were colonized and racialized; hence the idea of ‘internal colonialism’ retains explanatory validity. ‘Race’ is thus constructed out of raw materials furnished by class relations, the history of class conflicts, and the vicissitudes of colonial/capitalist expansion and the building of imperial hegemony. It is dialectically accented and operationalized not just to differentiate the price of wage labor within and outside the territory of the metropolitan power, but also to reproduce relations of domination–subordination invested with an aura of naturality and fatality. The refunctioning of physical or cultural traits as ideological and political signifiers of class identity reifies social relations. Such ‘racial’ markers enter the field of the alienated labor process, concealing the artificial nature of meanings and norms, and essentializing or naturalizing historical traditions and values which are contingent on mutable circumstances. For San Juan, racism and nationalism are modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history. He argues that racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy. He maintains, rightly in our view, that racial or ethnic group solidarity is given ‘meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these “racial” solidarities’. It is remarkable, in our opinion, that so much of contemporary social theory has largely abandoned the problems of labor, capitalist exploitation, and class analysis at a time when capitalism is becoming more universal, more ruthless and more deadly. The metaphor of a contemporary ‘tower of Babel’ seems appropriate here—academics striking radical poses in the seminar rooms while remaining oblivious to the possibility that their seemingly radical discursive maneuvers do nothing to further the struggles ‘against oppression and exploitation which continue to be real, material, and not merely “discursive” problems of the contemporary world’ (Dirlik, 1997, p. 176). Harvey (1998, pp. 29–31) indicts the new academic entrepreneurs, the ‘masters of theory-in-and-for-itself’ whose ‘discourse radicalism’ has deftly side-stepped ‘the enduring conundrums of class struggle’ and who have, against a ‘sobering background of cheapened discourse and opportunistic politics,’ been ‘stripped of their self-advertised radicalism.’ For years, they ‘contested socialism,’ ridiculed Marxists, and promoted ‘their own alternative theories of liberatory politics’ but now they have largely been ‘reduced to the role of supplicants in the most degraded form of pluralist politics imaginable.’ As they pursue the politics of difference, the ‘class war rages unabated’ and they seem ‘either unwilling or unable to focus on the unprecedented economic carnage occurring around the globe.’ Harvey's searing criticism suggests that post-Marxists have been busy fiddling while Rome burns and his comments echo those made by Marx (1978, p. 149) in his critique of the Young Hegelians who were, ‘in spite of their allegedly “world-shattering” statements, the staunchest conservatives.’ Marx lamented that the Young Hegelians were simply fighting ‘phrases’ and that they failed to acknowledge that in offering only counter-phrases, they were in no way ‘combating the real existing world’ but merely combating the phrases of the world. Taking a cue from Marx and substituting ‘phrases’ with ‘discourses’ or ‘resignifications’ we would contend that the practitioners of difference politics who operate within exaggerated culturalist frameworks that privilege the realm of representation as the primary arena of political struggle question some discourses of power while legitimating others. Moreover, because they lack a class perspective, their gestures of radicalism are belied by their own class positions.10 As Ahmad (1997a, p. 104) notes: One may speak of any number of disorientations and even oppressions, but one cultivates all kinds of politeness and indirection about the structure of capitalist class relations in which those oppressions are embedded. To speak of any of that directly and simply is to be ‘vulgar.’ In this climate of Aesopian languages it is absolutely essential to reiterate that most things are a matter of class. That kind of statement is … surprising only in a culture like that of the North American university … But it is precisely in that kind of culture that people need to hear such obvious truths. Ahmad's provocative observations imply that substantive analyses of the carnage wrought by ‘globalized’ class exploitation have, for the most part, been marginalized by the kind of radicalism that has been instituted among the academic Left in North America. He further suggests that while various post-Marxists have invited us to join their euphoric celebrations honoring the decentering of capitalism, the abandonment of class politics, and the decline of metanarratives (particularly those of Marxism and socialism), they have failed to see that the most ‘meta of all metanarratives of the past three centuries, the- creeping annexation of the globe for the dominance of capital over laboring humanity has met, during those same decades, with stunning success’ (Ahmad, 1997b, p. 364). As such, Ahmad invites us to ask anew, the proverbial question: What, then, must be done? To this question we offer no simple theoretical, pedagogical or political prescriptions. Yet we would argue that if social change is the aim, progressive educators and theorists must cease displacing class analysis with the politics of difference.

#### Capitalism is the root cause of everything and you started from the wrong place – listing violence isn’t going to get it done – we need to start with a methodology that links violences to capitalism and calls for unified organization against it

Sell ‘15 (Hannah, Socialist Party of England and Wales, sister party of Socialist Alternative, “IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST OPPRESSION” http://www.socialistalternative.org/2015/11/02/identity-politics-struggle-oppression/)

Over recent years there has been a growth in support for what can broadly be described as ‘identity politics’ among many mainly young people who are rightly angry about and radicalised by, their experience of sexism, racism, homophobia, prejudice against disabled people and other forms of oppression. In one sense, identity politics is an inevitable part of the political awakening of many members of oppressed groups within society. Recognising that you are oppressed, and that you can fight against your oppression through a common struggle with others who share the same oppression, is a vital first step. However, the history of struggle against oppression shows that, on the basis of experience, those participating tend to go beyond identity politics as they recognise the root cause of their oppression lies in the structure of society. The highest point of the vast rebellion against racism in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, was reached by the Black Panthers, who were founded in 1966 with the magnificent concept: “We do not fight racism with racism. We fight racism with solidarity. We do not fight exploitative capitalism with black capitalism. We fight capitalism with basic socialism”. Today, both the #BlackLivesMatter rebellion and the movement for $15 Now are the first stages of a new mass uprising against poverty and racism in the US. However, the pushing back of consciousness globally over the decades following the collapse of Stalinism in the late 1980s and the capitalist triumphalism that accompanied it, mean that the new movements did not begin where the Panthers left off, with a socialist outlook. Nonetheless, there is a growing anti-capitalist mood among young people in the US, which is a first step to drawing socialist conclusions. At the same time, identity politics is many activists’ starting point. While those involved in struggle may see this mainly as a means to fight back, the form of identity politics that has emanated from the universities and has dominated over recent decades concentrates overwhelmingly on discussing personal experience of oppression rather than trying to find the means to end it. This includes all the strands of identity politics that have become more prominent in recent years, such as intersectionality and privilege theory. In Britain these concepts remain little known in wider society but have become commonplace in, for example, university feminist societies. Intersectionalists argue that different oppressions ‘intersect’. Indeed, they do: a black working-class woman is triply oppressed, for example. But intersectionalists often see their role as cataloguing and describing oppressions and their intersections rather than abolishing them. Supporters of ‘privilege theory’ are best known for telling people to ‘check their privilege’ during (often online) debates. The founder of privilege theory, Peggy McIntosh, argued that a white, upper-class, heterosexual man, for example, is carrying around an ‘invisible knapsack’ full of unearned privileges. The argument goes that power is not concentrated in the hands of one class, or in the state, but is spread throughout society and therefore exists in all social and interpersonal relationships. Privilege theory states that every individual is part of a multiplicity of oppressive relationships. It concentrates overwhelmingly on exhortations to individuals to change, to check their privilege. But it is not possible to eliminate either oppressions or privileges merely by exhorting individuals to change their behaviour. In fact, in many countries there have been significant improvements in social attitudes to different forms of oppression in recent decades, but they have not resulted in the ending of the oppressions concerned. Racism ingrained In Britain, for example, while racist prejudices are still widespread, crude racist ideas are far less socially acceptable than they were 30 years ago. This has come about for a number of reasons, above all the determination and increased confidence of black and Asian people to fight discrimination and racism. Another important factor was the widespread involvement of black and Asian workers in the trade unions in a common struggle alongside white workers. Both of these factors helped to foster a strong feeling among a large section of the white population, especially youth, that racism is wrong and should be combated. Nonetheless, racism remains deeply ingrained in British society. The police are up to 28 times more likely to stop and search you if you are black or Asian. The gap between average pay for white workers and those from ethnic minorities has actually increased over recent years despite an improvement in social attitudes. Over half of young black men are unemployed, more than double the unemployment rate for young white men. In the US the situation is even starker. While deep-rooted racism remains there has also been an improvement in social attitudes. There has been the development of a black middle class and even a small black elite. Both processes are reflected in the election of a black man as US president. The vast majority of the black population, however, remain among the poorest and most oppressed in society, facing violent state repression. One hundred and thirty five African Americans were killed by the police in the first half of 2015 alone. Racism does not just stem from individual prejudices but from something more fundamental: the nature of capitalism as it has actually developed. Malcolm X correctly declared that, “you can’t have capitalism without racism”. Capitalism, as Karl Marx famously said, came into being “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt”. (Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 31) He was referring, particularly, to the role of slavery in the accumulation of capital. With slavery came the development of all kinds of pseudo-scientific racist theories designed to justify the enslavement of African peoples. Racist ideas were then adapted to justify the colonial oppression of large parts of the world. Capitalism was forced to abandon direct colonial rule as a result of the magnificent revolutionary movements that took place against it. Economic exploitation, however, is more brutal than ever. Two hundred and fifty years ago the gap between the richest and poorest countries was around five to one. Today it is 400 to one. Racism is used to justify this vast gulf and also that black workers are usually among the poorest and most oppressed sections of the working class even in the ‘rich’ countries. Women’s oppression Similarly, blatant sexism is no longer acceptable in the way it would have been in the past, particularly in the economically advanced capitalist countries. Women have won greater rights in recent decades. There are different factors that have led to this, including the development of improved and widely available contraception. However, many of these gains can be traced back to the growing confidence of women as a result of many more women working rather than being isolated in the home. Nonetheless, women continue to be oppressed. This oppression stems, not merely from the attitudes of men, but from the role of women and the family in capitalist and earlier class societies. Most of us think of ‘the family’ as the individuals who make up our own family, who are often the people who are closest to us. Historically, however, the family as an institution has also acted within class societies as an agent of social control with the father as ‘head of the household’ having responsibility for disciplining women and children. While this concept has been weakened in the modern era by the growing confidence of women, it is far from eliminated. The idea remains deeply ingrained that women are possessions of men and that we need to be loyal and obedient to our partners, and that violence and coercion are acceptable means for men to achieve that, both towards ‘their’ women and ‘their’ children. It is no longer socially acceptable to openly state that women are the possessions of men, yet these ideas were enshrined in law until relatively recently. Marital rape only became illegal in Britain in 1991, Spain in 1992, and Germany in 1997. While no longer legal or openly acceptable, marital rape is still widespread and rarely punished. It is estimated that in Britain only 15% of all rapes are reported to the police, and only 7% of those result in conviction. According to the UN, of all the women killed globally in 2012 almost half were killed by their partners or family members. In contrast, only 6% of killings with male victims were committed by intimate partners or family members. At the same time, women continue to bear the brunt of domestic responsibilities despite increasingly also going out to work. In many cases women are still, as the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky put it, the ‘slaves of slaves’. While in Britain, for example, most studies show men accepting that they should do an equal amount of domestic chores as women, there is still a considerable gap between intentions and reality. One survey showed that on average women did 17 hours a week of domestic chores (excluding childcare) whereas men did less than six. It is true, therefore, that men get some gain from women’s disproportionate bearing of the domestic burden, in having a few more hours leisure time. The main gain, however, is for capitalism. By putting the main burden of domestic life, the bringing up of the next generation (from which the future workforce is drawn), and caring for the sick and elderly on women, they are removed from the responsibility of society as a whole. Power concentrated in the capitalist class To suggest that power is not concentrated in one class is to completely misunderstand the nature of capitalism. Today, wealth and power is concentrated in fewer hands – the owners of the major banks and corporations – even than when Marx was writing. According to Oxfam, the richest 85 people on earth – a double-decker bus full – have as much wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population. The richest 85 include five women and one African, although white men predominate. Their role in society, however, does not stem primarily from their colour or gender but that they are part of a tiny super-wealthy ruling elite. The world’s 100 biggest companies now control 70% of global trade. Even if their boards of directors included many more black people or women it would not make any material difference to the exploitation suffered by the working class and poor worldwide, not least black women. Look at South Africa, where the incorporation of a tiny minority of blacks into the capitalist class has made no difference to the dire poverty suffered by the majority. And capitalism is increasingly incapable of taking society forward. Many of the rights partially taken for granted by previous generations in Europe, like a relatively secure job, home and pension, are now things of the past. To say that social relations in modern society are capitalist relations is not to take an ‘economic determinist’ view of society: arguing that every aspect of the ‘superstructure’ of society – the state, politics, culture, social attitudes and so on – are rigidly determined by the character of the economy. On the contrary, there is an inter-relationship between the two. At the same time, politics and social attitudes reflect not only the current character of capitalism but also remnants of the past and – particularly in mass struggles of the working class and the oppressed – the seeds of a potential better future. Nonetheless, it is clear that as long as we live in a capitalist society, where wealth and power rests with the tiny elite who own and control industry, science and technology, then the superstructure of that society will also ultimately reflect and act in the interests of that ruling elite. No amount of demanding that people ‘check their privilege’ will eliminate social attitudes generated and sustained by capitalism. While determined mass struggle can force capitalism to adapt to a certain extent – as has been the case with LGBT rights, equal pay legislation and other measures – permanent and deep-rooted change, particularly where it threatens the functioning of capitalism, will only be achieved by the socialist transformation of society. The horrific bureaucratic degeneration and then collapse of the Soviet Union have obscured the importance of the Russian revolution in giving a glimpse of what socialism would mean for those suffering oppression. In Russia in 1917 the working class led a movement of the oppressed which successfully overthrew capitalism for the first, and so far, the only time. Russia’s extreme poverty and the isolation of the new workers’ state led to its degeneration. Nonetheless, in the early days it gave a glimpse of how a new society could overcome oppressions that had existed for millennia. In ‘backward’ Russia, legal changes were introduced very quickly which were many decades ahead of any capitalist country. These included universal suffrage, civil marriage and divorce when requested by either partner, equal pay, paid maternity leave, the right to abortion and the legalisation of homosexuality. Oppressed nationalities were given the genuine right to self-determination. Measures were taken to encourage nationalities and cultures oppressed under tsarism, including the development of a written form of some languages for the first time. Of course, legal or formal measures do not in themselves end oppression. Decades after the passing of equal pay legislation in Britain, for example, women still earn an average of £5,000 a year less than men. Addressing women’s oppression in the Soviet Union, Trotsky described how legal equality was a step forward but actual equality in social relations required a far more “deep-going plough”, capable of providing real economic equality and lifting the domestic burden from women, and transforming social attitudes ingrained over millennia. A whole number of measures began to be introduced in the aftermath of the Russian revolution (including free childcare, communal restaurants and public laundries) which, while never fully implemented due to the degeneration of the Soviet Union, gave a glimpse of how the domestic burden could be lifted. That, in turn, could have laid the foundations for the building of a society based on women’s equality. Many intersectionalists put very little emphasis on campaigning for economic and practical measures to lift the burden on women, instead concentrating overwhelmingly on social attitudes, and trying to create spaces within society that are free of oppression. Yet freeing women from the heavy load of being the carers, cooks and cleaners for the whole of society is an essential prerequisite for ending women’s oppression. Twenty-first century capitalism, far from taking steps towards this, is driving in the opposite direction. Austerity affects women severely. It includes huge cuts in public services that partially lifted some of the responsibilities that fall on women. David Cameron’s big society could be summed up as demanding that women compensate for the cuts to health, child and elderly care by taking the burden on themselves. This is a demonstration that under capitalism, even where oppressed groups make gains, they are never guaranteed to be permanent. This also applies to the devastating, sometimes life-threatening, consequences of austerity for disabled people. Combating prejudice Pointing out the need for fundamental change in society does not in any way downgrade the importance of combating oppressive and reactionary ideas and practices while we live in this society, including within the workers’ movement. However, this will by necessity be a constant battle. Intersectionalists call for ‘safe spaces’ with zero tolerance for anything considered an oppressive view. But it is utopian to try and create a safe space which is sealed off from the society in which we all live and are affected by. Turning inwards in order to concentrate on doing so – rather than turning out to build a movement capable of winning real change – is doomed to frustration and failure. Far from creating safe spaces, this can often lead to an undemocratic environment, where the individuals dominant in a particular ‘space’ assert that they feel oppressed by ideas and opinions they disagree with. There is also a dangerous tendency to suggest that the value of someone’s contribution to a discussion should be based primarily on what oppressions they as an individual suffer from. This is completely false. Britain’s first and only female prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, undoubtedly suffered individual oppression as a woman, but the neo-liberal programme she drove through was completely against the interests of working-class women. Recently, Jeremy Corbyn, the new left leader of the Labour Party, has been attacked supposedly for not having enough women in his shadow cabinet, although his front bench is the first that has been majority women. More women voted for Corbyn than for the other right-wing candidates (two of whom were women) in the leadership election because he stood against austerity. Had he chosen a pro-austerity woman as shadow chancellor rather than the left MP, John McDonnell, most of the women who voted for him would have correctly been deeply disappointed. The issue of safe spaces also relates to intersectionalists’ views on gender: that the concept of two genders is a social construct and, in reality, gender is more like a spectrum. Emphasis is often put on supporting transgender people and all those who rebel against societal gender constraints. This includes some who do not identify as either male or female but as ‘gender-non-conforming’. This reflects a positive rejection of current gender relations and homophobia by a growing number of young people. Socialists, of course, support the democratic right of individuals to define both their own gender and sexuality. However, while there is radicalisation among an important layer on this issue, that does not mean it is possible to create, as some intersectionalists attempt, spaces within capitalist society completely free from societal pressures regarding gender. Capitalism shapes the outlook of all of us from the time we are born, with all of the distortions of the human personality that creates. This includes how we are expected to behave appropriately for our given gender. It is not possible to fully escape this; in this society capitalist gender roles are an objective reality. Even rejecting capitalist gender norms means reacting to, and therefore being affected by, those norms. It is not possible to prescribe exactly how human relations, including the role of gender, would flower in the future when freed from the rigid straitjackets imposed by capitalism. The role of the working class The crucial issue for anyone determined to end oppression, therefore, is how to end capitalism and begin to build a world that is free of oppression: a ‘safe space’ for all. Today, just as when Marx described the working class as the ‘grave digger of capitalism’, it is the key force on the planet capable of ridding us of this bankrupt system. Both privilege theory and intersectionality would list social class – what they would describe as ‘classism’ – as one form of oppression. However, it features as one item on a list and is often discussed in terms of the prejudice people face because of having a working-class accent or postcode. The centrality of class in the structure of society is not recognised. The basic idea that a Nigerian worker would have more in common with a worker in Britain or the US than they would with Aliko Dangote, the only African to make it on to the list of the richest 85 on the planet, would not be understood. The fact that it is the working class that is ultimately responsible for the creation of the capitalists’ profits and that by collective action it is capable of bringing capitalist society to a halt is discounted as outmoded. Yet the working class is not ‘disappearing’. In fact, it is potentially stronger today than it was at the time of the Russian Revolution. Many countries where workers were a tiny minority of society a century ago now have large and powerful working classes. In the economically advanced countries, like Britain, deindustrialisation has meant that the industrial working class is much smaller. However, there still remain groups of workers with enormous power to bring society a halt when they strike – anyone who lives in London and witnessed the recent London Underground strikes knows that. Deindustrialisation has not led to young people becoming ‘middle class’, but has forced them into low paid, temporary work, often in the service sector. At the same time, large sections of the population – including teachers and civil servants – who would have previously considered themselves middle class have been driven down into the ranks of the working class in their living conditions and social outlook. The history of the 20th century repeatedly demonstrated the preparedness of working-class people to fight for socialism. However, it also demonstrated that the capitalist class does all it can to cling to power, not least by attempting to divide and rule by turning different sections of the working class against each other. In recent years, there has been increasing radicalisation and struggle globally, including revolutionary movements. Out of these, largely unsuccessful, struggles conclusions will begin to be drawn about what is necessary to change society. That requires a mass revolutionary movement, bringing together different sections of the working class – with different experiences and outlooks – in a mass party with a clear programme and a determined and accountable leadership. Such a party would not be a model of a new society, but a tool to bring it about. Nonetheless, it is crucial that such a mass party would include in its ranks all of the most oppressed sections of the working class and that it is a vibrant and democratic force in which all participants feel able to express their views. Its programme, as was the case with the Bolsheviks in Russia, has to fight for the rights not just of the working class in general but also for different specifically oppressed groups. Undoubtedly, such a movement would also win the support of wide sections of the middle class and even individuals from the capitalist class who saw the need for a break with capitalism. This would particularly include those who suffer oppression under capitalism and who recognise that the only way to end homophobia, racism or women’s oppression is to join the struggle for a new society. Struggle itself unifies It would be ludicrous and deplorable to argue that those fighting their particular oppression should hold back and ‘wait’ for a unified struggle of the whole working class. Mass struggle is a thousand times more effective than exhortations to individuals to change their attitudes in winning social progress. It is always the case that a movement has a greater chance of success if it is able to reach out to other sections of the working class, and that therefore it is important that the programme put forward by a particular movement attempts to do this. However, that is in no way to suggest that any group should artificially delaying fighting back until they, for example, convince more white or male workers of their cause. Nonetheless, to permanently end racism in the US, for instance, will require ending capitalism and will therefore have to involve a struggle uniting different sections of the working class – black, Hispanic, Asian and white. This is a practical question. The African American population, who suffer the worst police racism, are 13% of the population and will not be able to win alone. The capitalist class will try to increase divisions between different sections of the oppressed, particularly at times of heightened struggle. The oppressed need to increase their strength by trying to maximise unity. The $15 Now movement in the US, and the election of Socialist Alternative member Kshama Sawant in Seattle, give a glimpse of the growing possibilities in the US to build a united workers’ movement. Achieving unity does not mean downplaying the importance of combating the specific oppressions different groups in society face. On the contrary, it is vital that socialists campaign for the workers’ movement to fight to take up every aspect of oppression. The Socialist Party has a proud history of doing this – for example, spearheading the Campaign Against Domestic Violence in the 1990s which was central to getting the trade unions to take the issue up. Intersectionality on university campuses in Britain has had a tendency to turn campus feminist societies inwards, focusing on a fruitless attempt to grade degrees of oppression rather than fighting to end it. However, many of those initially attracted to these ideas are searching for a way to change society and will quickly come up against the limits of identity politics in all its forms. One small indication of this is the popularity among young people of the film Pride, which tells the true story of Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners (LGSM). LGSM recognised the common ground between their struggle against the Tories and that of the 1984/85 miners’ strike. Their attempt to support the miners was not without difficulties – with prejudices on both sides – but ultimately forged a real unity. LGSM understood that a victory for the miners would have been a massive defeat for Thatcher, the Tories and the capitalist class – and that was in the interests of LGBT people. They never once responded to white, straight miners, who were often initially homophobic, by telling them to ‘check their privilege’. One result of their heroic efforts was big parts of the workers’ movement wholeheartedly taking up the struggle for LGBT liberation, including National Union of Mineworkers lodges from across the country leading the 1985 Pride demonstration. The miners’ strike was a major event in the class struggle in Britain, but it will be dwarfed by events that will take place in the future against the background of a crisis-ridden capitalism trying to drive the living standards of the majority into the dirt. For some intersectionalists it will require witnessing the power of the working class in action in order for them to draw the conclusion that the route to ending their specific oppression is not as part of fragmented separate groupings but by throwing their lot in with the class struggle. However, growing numbers of young people, particularly when they become active in concrete struggles, are already being attracted to socialist ideas as the only way to achieve real liberation for all humanity.

#### They don’t get a perm ---

#### 1) They haven’t read an advocacy statement – the permutation is aff conditionality because they can shift what it means to vote affirmative in the 2AC – that clarification makes it impossible for the negative to generate unique offense and is a reason to reject the permutation

#### 2) The aff has had infinite prep time to formulate their 1AC–they should be able to defend it on its own – they also speak first and last which means that structural aff bias is sufficient offense for them

#### 3) The negative gets no ground if the aff gets a perm – we are stuck defending the status quo which everyone agrees is bad – that is not a productive discussion for this academic space

#### 4) Even if they win the aff and the alt aren’t mutually exclusive --- that isn’t a reason to vote aff, the alt is a performance --- we have performed and introduced a class-based analysis of race

### Case

#### Policy debate isn’t a distraction, it allows in depth education on topic literature contest their roj roj is vote for better debater

#### Rob is to solve the root cause

#### Cap is better than racial cap – race only because a qualifier because of cap, so it is a symptom not the theory of power itself.

#### Before the writing of the constitution Black men owned white slaves in the colonies – race isn’t the root cause

#### Turn case – their actor of the WTO doesn’t recognize racialized territories such as Palestine, this means they link back

#### Cap inevitable

#### Probs just a refusal of the affs capitalist logic or smth like that

#### K affs r bad – you should prioritize real world impacts

#### The K isn’t real world Bc racial cap would never be followed and the state would shut its movements down (Basically a cede the political DA)

#### Disease unlikely to kill or if it does it is far in the future (so a reversability/ timeframe arg)

### Root cause deep

#### History proves racism isn’t human nature. Our 1NC Selfa evidence says Ancient Europeans had African deities, emperors, and interracial marriages. Encounters with Africans did not produce racism --- most ancient slaves were *actually* white.

#### African slavery was purely economic: Selfa says indentured servants became too expensive --- planters had to recruit new servants who then became their competitors after contracts expired. Enslaving whites would have jeopardized recruitment from Europe to the colonies. Planters attempted to enslave natives first but they resisted and escaped. Early European and African servants were treated exactly the same --- Black freemen owned white slaves and had equal rights to white freemen.

#### Fear of multiracial uprising led to racial slavery --- to protect their wealth, planters propagated white supremacy to divide workers and tie poor whites to slaveholders– that’s Selfa.

#### Slavery was entirely a labor relation --- brutality was only a mechanism to suppress black political life and justify denial of equal rights. 30,000 Irish immigrants died constructing New Basin because slave labor was too economically valuable for such work – that’s Reed