### 1

#### Interp: If the affirmative defends anything other than “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust”, they must provide a counter solvency advocate.

#### Violation

#### Prefer

#### 1. Limits – there are infinite things you could which pushes you to uncontestable arguments. Even if your interp, the only way to verify if it’s fair is proof of counter-arguments.

#### 2. Shiftiness- CSA conceptualizes what their advocacy is and how it’s implemented. Ambiguous affs we don’t know about can’t delink if they delineate these things.

#### 3. Research – Forces the aff to go to the other side of the library and contest their own view points and encourages more in-depth answers since I can find responses.

#### Fairness – a) you conceded the judge will fairly evaluate your argument b) its constitutive to debate as competitive activity that requires objective evaluation

#### Education – a) it’s the only reason why schools fund debate b) it’s the only portable impact to debate

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DOD – a) it’s the only way to may up for time spent on theory b) it’s the only way to deter future abuse

#### No RVI’s- a) logic – you shouldn’t win for being fair b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement c) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory

### 2

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted c) the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates

#### Ethics must begin apriori –

#### [A] Apriori Aposteriori Paradox – big bang proves our theory true – independent of material conditions there was some existence which necessitates objective truth absent material reality.

#### [B] Action theory – infinite division logically concludes from empiricism. i.e If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention unifies these actions. If we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral.

#### [C] Constitutive Authority – reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### [D] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer the standard:

#### [1] Performativity – freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### [2] Consequences fail: [A] They only judge actions after they occur, which fails action guidance [B] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. Probability doesn’t solve because 1) Probability is improvable, as it relies on inductive knowledge, but induction from past events can’t lead to deduction of future events and 2) Probability assumes causation, we can’t assume every act was actually the cause of tangible outcomes [C] If you’re held responsible for things other than an intention ethics aren’t binding because there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral as you are permitting just action. [D] There’s no objective arbiter to evaluate consequences [E] You can’t aggregate consequences, happiness and sadness are immutable – ten headaches don’t make a migraine

#### [3] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. All frameworks are functionally topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified: prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

### Offense

#### [1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### [2] To own yourself and use your own freedom is to be able to interact with external objects. Anything else makes you unable to exercise your own freedom on other things and creates a contradiction in conception.

Feser 2, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is. An alternative, soft-line approach could acknowledge that the initial acquirer who abuses a monopoly over a water hole (or any similar crucial resource) does commit an injustice against those who are disad- vantaged, but such an approach could still hold that the acquirer never- theless has not committed an injustice in acquisition —his acquisition was, as I have said, neither just nor unjust. Nor does he fail to own what he has acquired; he still cannot be said to have stolen the water from anyone. Rather, his injustice is an unjust use of what he owns, on a par with the unjust use I make of my self-owned fist when I wield it, unprovoked, to bop you on your self-owned nose. In what sense does the water-hole owner use his water unjustly, though? He doesn’t try to drown anyone in it, after all— indeed, the whole problem is that he won’t let anybody near it! Eric Mack gives us the answer we need in what he has put forward as the “self-ownership proviso” (SOP).28 This is a proviso not (as the Lock- ean proviso is) on the initial acquisition of property, but rather on how one can use his property in a way that respects others’ self-ownership rights. It is motivated by consideration of the fact that the talents, abilities, capac- ities, energies, etc., that a person rightfully possesses as a self-owner are inherently “world-interactive”; that is, it is of their very essence that they are directed toward the extra-personal environment.29 Your capacity to use your hand, for instance, is just a capacity to grasp and manipulate external objects; thus, what you own in owning your hand is something essentially grasping and manipulating.30 Now if someone were to cut off your hand or invasively keep you from using it (by tying your arm against your body or holding it behind your back), he would obviously be violating your self-ownership rights. But there are, Mack suggests, other, noninvasive ways in which those rights might be violated. If, to use an example of Mack’s, I effectively nullify your ability to use your hand by creating a device that causes anything you reach for to be propelled beyond your grasp, making it impossible for you ever to grasp or manip- ulate anything, I have violated your right to your hand as much as if I had cut it off or tied it down. I have, in any case, prevented your right to your hand from being anything more than a formal right, one that is practically useless. In the interests of guaranteeing respect for substantive, robust rights of self-ownership, then, “[t]he SOP requires that persons not deploy their legitimate holdings, i.e., their extra-personal property, in ways that severely, albeit noninvasively, disable any person’s world-interactive powers.” 31 The SOP follows, in Mack’s view, from the thesis of self-ownership itself; or, at any rate, the considerations that would lead anyone to accept that thesis should also, in his view, lead one to accept the proviso.32 A brief summary of a few of Mack’s thought experiments should suffice to give a sense of why this is so.33 In what Mack calls the Adam’s Island example, Adam acquires a previously uninhabited island and later refuses a shipwrecked Zelda permission to come ashore, as a result of which she remains struggling at sea (and presumably drowns). In the Paternalist Caging example, instead of drowning, Zelda becomes caught offshore in a cage Adam has constructed for catching large sea mammals, and, rather than releasing her, Adam keeps her in the cage and feeds her regularly. In the Knuckle-Scraper Barrier example, Zelda falls asleep on some unowned ground, whereupon a gang of oafish louts encircles her and, using their bodies and arms as barriers, refuses to let her out of the circle (accusing her of assault if she touches them in order to climb over or break through). In the Disabling Property Barrier example, instead of a human barrier, Adam constructs a plastic shield over and around the unowned plot of ground upon which Zelda sleeps, accusing her of trespassing upon his property when she awakens and tries to escape by breaking through the plastic. And in the (similarly named) Disabling Property Barriers example, seem to suggest an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of natural function, and though this by no means troubles me, it might not be what Mack himself has in mind (nor, of course, is it something every philosopher is going to sympathize with). Mack’s view nevertheless seems to require something like this conception. And something like it —enough like it to do the job Mack needs to be done, anyway—is arguably to be found in Larry Wright’s well- known reconstruction, in modern Darwinian terms, of the traditional notion of natural function. See Larry Wright, “Functions,” Philosophical Review 82, no. 2 (1973): 139–68. Adam, instead of enclosing Zelda in a plastic barrier, encloses in plastic barriers every external object that Zelda would otherwise be able to use — thus, in effect, enclosing her in a larger, all-encompassing plastic barrier of a more eccentric shape. In all of these cases, Mack says, although Zelda’s formal rights of self-ownership have not been violated—no one has invaded the area enclosed by the surface of her skin —her rights over her self-owned powers, and in particular her ability to exercise those powers, have nevertheless been nullified. But a plausible self-ownership- based theory surely cannot allow for this. It cannot, for instance, allow the innocent Zelda justly to be imprisoned in any of the ways described! If Mack is right, then it seems we have, in the SOP, grounds for holding that a water-hole monopolist would indeed be committing an injustice against anyone he refuses water to, or to whom he charges exorbitant prices for access. The injustice would be a straightforward violation of a person’s rights to self-ownership, a case of nullifying a person’s self- owned powers in a way analogous to Adam’s or the knuckle-scrapers’ nullification of Zelda’s self-owned powers. It would not be an injustice in initial acquisition, however. The water-hole monopolist still owns the water hole as much as he ever did; he just cannot use it in a way that violates other individuals’ self-ownership rights (either by drowning them in it or by nullifying their self-owned powers by denying them access to it when there is no alternative way for them to gain access to the water necessary for the use of their self-owned powers). Is Mack right? The hard-liner might dig in his heels and insist that none of Mack’s examples amount to self-ownership-violating injustices; instead, they are merely subtle but straightforward property rights violations or cases of moral failings of various other sorts (cruelty, selfishness, etc.). The Adam’s Island case, for starters, is roughly analogous to the example of the water-hole monopolist, so that it arguably cannot give any non-question- begging support to the SOP, if the SOP is then supposed to show that the water-hole example involves an injustice. The Disabling Property Barriers case might also be viewed as unable to provide any non-question-begging support, since Adam’s encasing everything in plastic might plausibly be interpreted as his acquiring everything, in which case we are back to a water-hole-type monopoly example. The Knuckle-Scraper Barrier and Dis- abling Property Barrier examples might be explained by saying that in falling asleep on the unowned plot of land, Zelda in effect has come (at least temporarily) to acquire it, and (by virtue of walking) to acquire also the path she took to get to it, so that the knuckle-scrapers and Adam violate her property rights (not her self-ownership rights) in not allowing her to escape. The Paternalist Caging example can perhaps be explained by arguing that in building the cage, Adam has acquired the water route leading to it, so that in swimming this route (and thus getting caught in the cage) Zelda has violated his property rights and, therefore, can justly be caged. Accordingly, the hard-liner might insist, we can explain all of these examples in a hard-line way and thus avoid commitment to the SOP. Such a hard-line response would be ingenious (well, maybe), but still, I think, ultimately doomed to failure. Can the Paternalist Caging example, to start with, plausibly be explained away in the manner that I have suggested? Does Adam commit no injustice against Zelda even if he never lets her out? It will not do to write this off merely as a case of excessive punishment (explaining the injustice of which would presumably not require commitment to the SOP). For suppose Adam says, after a mere five minutes of confinement, “I’m no longer punishing you; you’ve paid your debt and are free to go, as far as I’m concerned. But I’m not going to bother exerting the effort to let you out. I never forced you to get in the cage, after all —you did it on your own —and you have no right to the use of my self-owned cage-opening powers to fix your mistake! So teleport out, if you can. Or get someone else —if you can find someone —to let you out.” Adam would be neither violating Zelda’s rights to external property nor excessively punishing her in this case; nor would he be invasively vio- lating her self-ownership rights. But wouldn’t he still be committing an injustice, however noninvasively? Don’t we need something like the SOP to explain why this is so? The barrier examples, for their part, do not require Zelda’s walking and falling asleep on virgin territory, which thus (arguably) becomes her prop- erty. We can, to appeal to the sort of science-fiction scenario beloved of philosophers, imagine instead a bizarre chance disruption of the structure of space-time that teleports Zelda into Adam’s plastic shell or into the midst of the knuckle-scrapers. There is no question now of their violating her property rights; yet don’t they still commit an injustice by nullifying her self-owned powers in refusing to allow her to exit? Consider a parallel example concerning property ownership itself. If your prized $50,000 copy of Captain America Comics number 1, due to another rupture in space-time or just to a particularly strong wind that blows it out of your hands and through my window, suddenly appears on the floor of my living room, do I have the right to refuse to bring it back out to you or to allow you to come in and get it? Suppose I attempt to justify my refusal by saying, “I won’t touch it, and you’re free to have it back if you can arrange another space-time rupture or gust of wind. But I refuse to exert my self-owned powers to bring it out to you, or to allow you on my property to get it. I never asked for it to appear in my living room, after all!” Would anyone accept this justification? Doesn’t your property right in the comic book require me to give it back to you? The hard-liner might suggest that this example transports the SOP advocate out of the frying pan and into the fire. For if the SOP is true, wouldn’t we also have to commit ourselves to a “property-ownership proviso” (POP) that requires us not to nullify anyone’s ability to use his external private property in a way consistent with its “world-interactive powers”? If I build a miniature submarine in my garage, and you have the only swimming pool within one thousand miles, must you allow me the use of your pool lest you nullify my ability to use the sub? If (to take an example of Cohen’s cited by Mack) I own a corkscrew, must I be provided with wine bottles to open lest the corkscrew sadly fail to fulfill its full potential?34 Mack’s response to this line of thought seems basically to amount to a bit of backpedaling on the claim that his proviso really follows from the notion of self-ownership per se —so as to avoid the conclusion that a (rather unlibertarian and presumably redistributionist) POP would also, in par- allel fashion, follow from the concept of property ownership. His response seems, instead, to emphasize the idea that the considerations favoring self-ownership also favor, via an independent line of reasoning, the SOP.35 In my view, however, a better response would be one that took note of some relevant disanalogies between property in oneself and property in external things. Note first that the self-owned world-interactive powers, the possible use of which the SOP is intended to guarantee, are possessed by a living being who is undergoing development, which involves passing through various stages; therefore, these powers are ones that flourish with use and atrophy or even disappear with disuse.36 To nullify these powers even for a limited time, then, is (very often at least) not merely temporarily to inconvenience their owner, but, rather, to bring about a permanent reduc- tion or even disablement of these powers. By contrast, a submarine (or a corkscrew) retains its powers even when left indefinitely in a garage (or a drawer). This difference in the effect that nullification has on self-owned powers versus extra-personal property plausibly justifies a difference in our judgments concerning the acceptability, from the point of view of justice, of such nullification in the two cases; that is, it justifies adoption of the SOP but not of the POP.37 Second, there is an element of choice (and in particular, of voluntary acquisition) where extra-personal property is concerned that is morally relevant here.

#### Thus, self-ownership justifies the appropriation of property – our freedom necessitates being able to set and pursue external things as our ends, including exercising our rights on mining. Restricting this arbitrarily limits our freedom which is unjust.

Feser 3, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

V. Some Implications If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop-erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified —we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, [they] has mixed [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, [they] has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his own- ership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with exist- ing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case what- soever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of prop- erty just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

#### [3] Private entities utilize their own property and resources to fund and conduct space exploration which means – Prohibition of it is a violation of a) Their ability to use their own property (like their rocketships or fuel) to set their ends in space and b). Their freedom to explore unknown horizons such as space.

#### [4] Negs get Contention Choice- It’s key to robust philosophy debates rather than arbitrary contention debates which o/w since phil is unique to LD. It also prevents splitting the debate allowing for in depth clash and 2ar judge psychology spins on the contention level which is key fairness and level playing field

### 3

#### Counterplan Text: States ought to ban nuclear weapons – the counterplans competes through net benefits

#### The CP solves disarms nukes - this card also explains implementation method and takes out circumvention.

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* This card also explains the scope of durable fiat

An important consideration is that nuclear disarmament policies will not guarantee any success as long as the states possessing these weapons are not engaged. To get them on board, it may be important to recognize that nuclear weapons have both a humanitarian dimension and a security dimension. It will be a difficult balancing act to combine these two in the same policy. Nevertheless, in order to effectively achieve **the** global elimination of nuclear weapons, it is crucial that the states possessing the weapons should participate in measures to that end, otherwise these measures would be mainly symbolic. Even if one argues that such symbolic measures will increase the pressure on nuclear weapon states to disarm, one may question if such pressure is really contributing to the elimination of nuclear weapons or is only creating a fragmentation of international support for existing nuclear taboos as established in the NPT. Nevertheless, it should be noted as well that only five of the current nine nuclear weapon states are a member state of the NPT (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China). The other four (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) are not. One could argue that many of the policy steps being discussed within the Humanitarian Initiative could be applicable to all states, regardless of membership of the NPT or any other treaty. Yet, confidence in and an ongoing commitment to the current multilatera system of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, especially but not exclusively embodied by the NPT and CD, can be reinforced by the demonstrated implementation of concrete nuclear disarmament measures by the current nuclear weapon states. Constructive diplomacy has always proven to be the best method to increase international security and stability. The menu of choice below consists of 16 steps. The policy options described are of course all interconnected. Moreover, the order in which they are described is not static; although the aim is to start with the least drastic step and to end with the most radical option, combinations of measures could certainly be thought of. It is not necessary that every step should follow the previous one; parallel and simultaneous steps are also certainly possible. 1. Relying on existing disarmament fora The simplest policy option for any state involved is, of course, doing nothing new. This means sticking to the traditional disarmament efforts within the NPT and CD, trying to solve the deadlock on disarmament currently perceived by many member states within these fora themselves. Without doubting the importance of the NPT and CD, it is debatable whether this option is in itself the most effective one. Considering the many states and NGOs asking for increased disarmament efforts, one could question whether the option to stick to traditional fora and methods is enough. The discomfort concerning the pace of nuclear disarmament must be dealt with in a positive way to channel this energy into the right direction – doing nothing new may harm the massive support for existing non-proliferation and disarmament arrangements even more than looking for extra steps towards disarmament measures. Nevertheless, the five nuclear weapon states within the NPT appear to prefer this path, convinced that the NPT and CD are the best fora to negotiate on further disarmament. These negotiations could be combined with their own self-designated ‘P5 Process’ in which the five nuclear weapon states within the NPT discuss the issue among themselves. There have also been meetings of the so-called ‘P5 Plus Group’, but even this group, with the non-NPT nuclear weapon states India and Pakistan on board, still misses the participation of Israel and North Korea, who are considered to have nuclear weapons as well. Without any hesitation, it is positive that these states discuss disarmament efforts with each other, although this does not mean that more inclusive discussions, with the non-nuclear weapon states and the nuclear weapon states which are not party to the NPT being included as well, should be sidelined as counter-productive. Nevertheless, the P5 Process, or preferably an extended P5 Plus Process, could certainly be helpful in discussing more far-reaching policy options as will discussed in the options below. 2. Increased transparency measures While non-nuclear weapon states are obliged under the NPT to provide full transparency on their nuclear activities (if any), the nuclear weapon states are not. Their nuclear weapons programmes are generally dealt with as top secret. This entails that any discussion about nuclear weapons, including the issue of nuclear disarmament, is to some extent always speculative. From this perspective, further transparency in the form of (public) reporting by the nuclear weapon states on their nuclear weapons inventories and policies, as well as their fissile material stockpiles, would be helpful in enhancing informed debate and increased confidence between states. Such transparency measures could be implemented unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally by (any of) the nuclear weapon states. 3. Confidence-building measures An important problem of the current discontent regarding nuclear disarmament efforts is a lack of confidence by many state and non-state actors in the sincerity of nuclear weapon states to effectively work towards a further reduction of the threat of nuclear weapons – threats of use as well as accidents. A first step to increase confidence could be measures to minimize the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. The initiative for this kind of measure should come from the nuclear weapon states – unilaterally or in cooperation with each other. The main focus should be increasing the predictability of states’ behaviour regarding the use of nuclear weapons, thus preventing misperceptions leading to inadvertent nuclear escalation.2 Various examples of confidence-building measures could be thought of. Developing and the sharing of guidelines and principles, as well as verification and accountability instruments regarding decreasing the risks of accidents with and/or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons could be effective measures to increase confidence. The same holds true for sharing best practices and lessons learned on risk reduction regarding the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Information sharing on nuclear postures and procedures could also increase confidence. Guarantees or standardization regarding decision making and judgement processes on the use of nuclear weapons could add to confidence in the prevention of misuse and accidents as well; decision makers on the use of nuclear weapons must, for example, have enough time and information tools for prudent judgement so as to resolve potential misperceptions and to receive vital pieces of information. Only if nuclear weapon states are able to show other states that they are serious in this kind of risk-reducing 2 Wolfgang Ischinger, Steven Pifer and Andrei Zagorski, Confidence Building Measures Are Now Needed More Than Ever, European Leadership Network, 30 June 2014. measures could confidence be increased as a first step towards a further reduction and elimination efforts. 4. Preparing measures for disarmament verification An important step preceding actual nuclear disarmament is discussing how, at any moment, it will be accomplished. A disarmament process can only be successful if it is irreversible, verifiable and transparent. Currently, a coalition of both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states is discussing this issue within the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). This partnership, led by the United States, is aimed at developing (technical) solutions for monitoring and verifying potential future nuclear disarmament efforts. It would be helpful if this initiative would be able to come up with practical recommendations in the short term. Increasing the inclusiveness of the partnership would be helpful as well; in the end, verification mechanisms could be developed that will be supported by all states. From this perspective, cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may be helpful as well. 5. Reduced role of nuclear weapons in security policies As long as nuclear weapon states retain an important role for nuclear weapons in their security policies, including doctrines and postures, they do not demonstrate much priority for the elimination of these weapons. As a first step to increase the credibility of their NPT obligations of nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon states could reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. By doing so, they will demonstrate that they are sincere in both decreasing their importance as well the risks of (inadvertent) use. This policy measure could be implemented unilaterally or in coordination with other nuclear weapon states. 6. De-alerting nuclear weapons Especially the United States and Russia have nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles that are on high alert and ready to be launched within only a few minutes. France and the United Kingdom also keep some of their nuclear weapons on alert, although at lower readiness levels than the United States and Russia. As far as is known, the other nuclear weapon states have no nuclear weapons on alert status.3 The very little time that decision makers in these states have to judge whether or not to use the nuclear weapons significantly increases the risk of inadvertent use. In the past, several cases have become public in which such inadvertent use – because of miscommunications, misperceptions, or technical errors – brought the world close to nuclear warfare with catastrophic results.4 To reduce the risks of the inadvertent use of high alert nuclear weapons, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures could be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear forces. Reducing the alert status of nuclear weapons could be achieved through a phased approach, and should preferably be verified (at least by other nuclear weapon states de-alerting their weapons as well). This measure would decrease the risk of inadvertent use to some extent as well as demonstrate a commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. 3 Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie, Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2012. 4 For examples of cases, see: Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas and Sasan Aghlani, Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, Chatham House Report, April 2014, pp. 7-23. An extra option within a process of de-alerting could be programming all nuclear missiles on alert to a default target in the middle of any ocean. This would give decision makers some more response time in (perceived) crisis situations, because the weapons should be retargeted before being used. Moreover, this would limit the risk of nuclear weapons accidently being used against real targets. According to some sources, the United States has already implemented such a default ocean targeting.5 7. Improved ‘No First Use’ guarantees and security guarantees Some nuclear weapon states have declared that they will use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack, while others do not exclude ‘first use’. Unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures could be taken to increase the confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used by a state before it is attacked by such weapons itself. Nuclear weapon states could develop nuclear doctrines clearly stating the No First Use principle, and establish protocols to guarantee this principle in their command and control procedures. A No-First-Use Treaty or No-First-Use Convention is a possibility as well, but currently this does not seem to be realistic.6 Closely linked to No First Use guarantees are security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. It would be a positive sign if such assurances would be extended by all nuclear weapon states, publicly giving an absolute guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons to threaten or attack any nonnuclear weapon state.7 8. Banning nuclear weapons tests Already in 1996 the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature. Since then many states have signed and ratified the treaty. However, the Treaty has not so far entered into force, because the required signatures and/or ratifications by various states are lacking, especially (but not exclusively) the nuclear weapon states of China, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States.8 It would be an important positive signal if those states would sign and/or ratify the CTBT as well. Even though the entry into force of the treaty will not depend on only one or a few of these states, their membership would demonstrate to the international community that they acknowledge the need for a ban on nuclear test explosions. Supporting a ban on nuclear weapons testing to some extent shows the willingness to end the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons as well, even though digitally simulated tests are always still possible. As long as the CTBT cannot enter into force, states could unilaterally decide to stop testing and/or to declare a moratorium on nuclear test explosions; currently all nuclear weapon states have already done so, except for North Korea. 7 On the importance of clear language in this regard, see: Michael S. Gerson, ‘No First Use. The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy’, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7-47. 8 Situation of 23 January 2016, according to CTBTO figures. 9. Reduction or removal of forward deployed nuclear weapons As far as is known, one nuclear weapon state, the United States, has some of its tactical nuclear weapons deployed in other NATO states in Western Europe – so-called ‘forward deployment’. Although, technically speaking, this forward deployment possibly cannot be labelled as illegal under NPT obligations (the weapons are not transferred but remain in possession and under the control of the US), it certainly is against the spirit of the treaty. Moreover, the greater the number of locations where nuclear weapons are stored, the more risks there are of accidents and inadvertent use. Measures to reduce or eliminate the number of forward deployed nuclear weapons – which ideally would consist of cooperative action by the US, NATO and the actual host countries – would be a symbolically important step towards further nuclear disarmament. Considering the increasing tensions between NATO and Russia in the past few years, one could question whether NATO is currently ready for this step. However, even starting serious deliberations within NATO on such measures would already be an important signal of a serious willingness to work on further nuclear reduction and disarmament. 10. Reduction of or ending deployment in border regions Nuclear weapons deployed in border regions between (potential) adversaries may contribute to increased tensions. Especially in the case of relatively low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, one may speculate that the threshold of use could be considered somewhat lower compared to strategic nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons deployed further away from borders. The risk of use, inadvertent use (for example, in case local military commanders may decide on use in crisis situations), or accidents may be higher.9 Specific border areas where (as far as is known) tactical nuclear weapons are currently deployed are at the borders between India and Pakistan and between Russian and NATO territory (including forward deployed US nuclear weapons as described in the previous step). Unilateral or bilateral steps to end the deployment of (tactical) nuclear weapons in border regions may decrease the risks of accidents or (inadvertent) use as well as demonstrate a willingness to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. 11. Banning the production of fissile materials Discussions on achieving a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) have stalled within the CD for many years already. Such a treaty would ban the production of fissile materials which can be used to build nuclear weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium). Some states even favour a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) which would also limit existing stockpiles of fissile materials.10 As one of the steps towards nuclear disarmament it would be helpful if negotiations on such a treaty would be given new impetus in a constructive way. Although an FMCT, or even an FMT, will not directly bring about nuclear disarmament, it will at least be helpful in building confidence that states with fissile material production facilities will not further increase their nuclear weapons resources. As long as negotiations towards such a treaty will not be successful, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral initiatives could be launched to make a start in limiting and/or 9 Shashank Joshi, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: De’ja’ Vu?’, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2013, pp. 159-172. 10 A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Understanding the Critical Issues, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2010. halting the production of fissile materials. Facilities used for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons could be dismantled or converted, and existing stockpiles of fissile materials could also be converted to materials which are useful for peaceful purposes only (for example, by ‘down blending’ highly enriched uranium). Such measures, especially if transparency and verification mechanisms are included, could be an important step in building confidence that nuclear weapon states are serious about limiting their nuclear weapon programmes.11 12. Moratorium on nuclear weapons modernisation Various nuclear weapon states are currently modernizing their nuclear weapons arsenal or are suspected of doing so.12 Although one may contend that in some cases it is merely maintenance rather than modernisation, or a modernisation that is aimed at increasing the security of the weapons (which few would oppose), in various cases it seems like modernisation to make nuclear weapons more effective within the context of national security policies. It is difficult not to consider such modernisation efforts as contradictory to any disarmament pledge. To demonstrate their sincerity regarding nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon states could – via unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures – end or forego efforts to modernize their nuclear weapons (preferably including ending and foregoing the development of new missions for their nuclear weapons). This could result in a moratorium on nuclear weapons modernisation. Ideally, any kind of verification arrangements should be included in such measures to ensure confidence in such a moratorium. 13. Reduction of (deployed) nuclear weapons numbers Considering nuclear disarmament as a phased process, starting with a reduction and ending with the elimination of nuclear weapons, accelerating the reduction phase is an important step towards the ultimate aim of ‘global zero’. Unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures in which nuclear weapon states reduce the number of their nuclear weapons are thus essential steps. Any reduction of nuclear weapons would contribute to decreasing the risks of them being used (on purpose or by accident) and would increase the confidence in commitments towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons in the long term. Some nuclear weapon states may contend that the United States and Russia should make a start with their nuclear weapons stockpile reduction, since they currently possess some 93% of the global number of nuclear weapons.13 However, this does not necessarily exclude reduction measures by other states as well – states have even eliminated their nuclear weapons without taking such figures into account (in the case of South Africa). Some nuclear weapon states use the principle of ‘strict sufficiency’, meaning something like maintaining their arsenal of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level with regard to their perceived strategic context.14 This may sound interesting in theory, but how this lowest possible level 13 According to the most accurate estimates: ‘World nuclear forces, January 2015’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 14 Jenny Nielsen and Marianne Hanson, The European Union and the humanitarian initiative in the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, NonProliferation Papers No. 41, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, December 2014, p. 13. should be measured in practice is hard to define. Although an actual reduction through the dismantlement of nuclear weapons would be the most optimal decision in this context, a preliminary step of only reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons may also be considered as a first step. Although this would not be disarmament in itself, only removing some of the nuclear weapons from deployment into storage, it reduces the risk of these weapons being used in the short term and could at least be considered as a confidence-building measure. Settings to accomplish any steps on this topic could be, for example, the P5 Process or the P5 Plus Process, as well as bilateral dialogue like past arms reduction negotiations between the United States and Russia. During the last few years, however, little to no progress has been made in such processes.

### 4

#### The aff embodies a political ontology driven by the security of the nation state. This makes their impacts inevitable and cyclical, perpetuating conflict.

Burke ‘13 – Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, 2013 (“Security cosmopolitanism,” *Critical Studies on Security* (Vol. 1, No. 1, 13–28) Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Tandfonline)//Jia

The ontology underpinning security cosmopolitanism necessitates a profound transformation of the national security ontology that precedes and frustrates it. While acknowledging the significance of states – as core actors and potential means of security, as structures of democratic governance, and as (one) of the legal foundations of international order and law – such an ontology understands human existence as irreversibly global in nature. When multiple and often anonymous human actions collectively produce such profound changes to the biosphere and climate that many now term ours a new geological era – the ‘Anthropocene’ – national borders lose their claim to define and enclose human existence, and humanity must be thought in non-anthropocentric terms (Ganguly and Jenkins 2011; Alberts 2011). Through interlocking historical, social, and systemic processes – imperialism, world war, decolonization, capitalism, cold war, globalization, migration, terrorism, nuclear strategy, intervention, and environmental degradation – human beings have effectively unified their life and death process on a planetary scale and extended it to other species and life forms. This event needs to be reflected in a transformation of the historically dominant ontological narrative of insecurity – the narrative of its origins, sources, nature, and necessity. In the traditional (and still dominant) narrative, security emerges from insecurity through the creation of a distinctive political form and subjectivity – that of the nationstate and its corporeal manifestation, sovereignty, the ‘body-politic’. As argued by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the origins of national security lie in a temporal narrative that traces the emergence of the sovereign state (the ‘Commonwealth’) from an originary ‘state of nature’: a realm of perpetual insecurity and conflict in which a natural equality ‘and Right of every man to everything’ remains governed by no rule or jurisdiction that could stabilize or order it; it resembles then a ‘time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man’ and there ‘can be no security to any man of living out the time which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live’ (Hobbes 1985; Esposito 2008; Burke 2007, 36–41). As Roberto Esposito explains, an ‘immunitary mechanism begins to operate’ in this narrative, because ‘if life is abandoned to its internal powers, [and] its natural dynamics, human life is destined to self-destruct’. An all-powerful sovereign – the paradoxical embodiment and governor of the body-politic – then functions to ‘immunize’ the body-politic against the potential of its own disorder and preserve the life that threatens it. This biopolitical life is not the degraded ‘bare life’ of Giorgio Agamben’s theory – which certainly remains an ever-present possibility for the subjects and objects of sovereign power – but a rich vision of life that Hobbes describes in De Cive as ‘happiness’ and in Leviathan as all ‘the benefit and good’ of ‘lawful industry’ and knowledge; a life, in short, enabled, protected, and transformed by modernity (Esposito 2008; Burke 2007, 37–38). Furthermore, as international relations grow in complexity and danger, and an international law based on the sovereign equality of peoples organized into states becomes normatively dominant with the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence of the post-World War II national security state, the Hobbesian imaginary mutates: the nation-state comes to be thought of as a contained and vital body that must be immunized, or secured, against threats that come from without as well from within. This national body has integrity, sovereignty, borders – and international society, as Hedley Bull explained, comprises such ontologically separate body-politics linked together by a spiderweb of international law, strategic balances, and mutual interests. There is no common humanity, merely an anarchical society of states regulated by a minimal set of agreed rules (Bull 2002, 82). National enclosure becomes paired with anarchic balancing, strategic cooperation, and Realpolitik: this is the ontology that structures and animates dominant state approaches to both national and collective security, across the entirety of the security agenda. In security cosmopolitanism, there can be no successful immunization of the national body against insecurities that come from outside. Such immunization failure can be understood in two ways. First, the very constitution of the state and the national body can be a source of threat – to ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities, dissidents, indigenous peoples, the poor, and women – who become targets of exclusion, marginalization, discipline, violence, and repression. Masculinist and totalizing metaphors of state and community as body then mobilize their own violence, seeking to homogenize and exclude those designated as the other – the virus or cancer – of the state. Such policies generate both severe human insecurity and transnational insecurities in the form of refugees, the transmission of conflict, or the internationalization of struggle – the Palestinians being a powerful case in point. Second, dominant patterns of insecurity and threat – whether one thinks in terms of their causes, scope, or effects – develop within and across borders in ways that render containment models of national security inadequate, and are in fact exacerbated by the perseverance of such models. The atmosphere has no borders, and climate change – which will have dramatic effects on human security from environmental disruptions, degradation, disease vectors, climate-affected conflict, and ‘natural’ disasters such as hurricanes and storm surges – arises as a totality out of millions of often anonymous daily actions in industry, agriculture, government, and individual life. While action at the state and government level is obviously crucial, attempts to partition legal responsibility along national lines have done little more than create paralyzing international disputes and no agreement on a global treaty framework to reduce emissions and arrest climate change. The antagonistic structure and ontology of international society here presents a profound obstacle to cosmopolitan ends: the result is what writers such as Esposito and Jacques Derrida have called ‘autoimmunization’, an immune response that threatens to destroy the social body rather than protect it (Esposito 2008, xiii–xix, 2011; Derrida 2005; Borradori 2003, 100–102). Nuclear weapons present a similar dilemma dating to the beginning of the post-war national security state: national efforts to seek security through nuclear threats soon became a threat to humanity as such, creating a global community of fate through escalating insecurity dynamics that could never be tamed or stabilized. In this way the nuclear balance of terror becomes the ultimate autoimmunization, as deterrence is forced by time compression and uncertainty to exist at the edge of pre-emption and thus of irreversible disaster, threatening to eliminate those it aims to defend. Similarly transnational Islamist terrorism operates, propagandizes, and recruits across borders, and violent and exceptionalist responses produce new autoimmunization processes that undermine multiculturalism and the democratic rule of law and drive new forms of radicalization and terror (Burke 2009, 2008, 2007, 4–13). Hence in security cosmopolitanism the founding narrative of security changes: insecurity does not arise before or external to a state that (in the classical narrative) acts as a double guarantee of both security and modernity, but arises out of that very modernity as a function of its histories, choices, powers, relations, and systems. It is not the enemy in possession of nuclear or conventional weapons that is the fundamental source of insecurity, but the weapons system itself; not the forced migrant or the massive storm creating insecurity for the nation-state, but the human interaction with the climate system; not the terrorist en route to an attack, but a historical system of injustice, geopolitics, and ideology around violence that enables terrorism as a normative choice and a social phenomenon. Similar arguments can be made about hunger and food insecurity, global health inequality, asylum seekers, transnational crime, weapons proliferation, and more. As Simon Dalby writes of climate change, its ‘irony’ is that ‘the threat is self-imposed; we are the makers of our own misfortunes’. This generates profound responsibilities toward peoples most vulnerable to climate disruptions and undermines ‘distinctions between nature and culture, human and environment’ such that ‘the global scale we now live in’ must be conceptualized as a ‘social nature’ (2009, 2, 6). While security cosmopolitanism does not deny that there are event-based sites and sources of insecurity, it argues that they can neither be fully understood nor ameliorated in their irruptive, symptomatic forms. Event-based threats – the insecurities of the moment – are epiphenomena of larger scale structures and systems. Insecurities arise as events out of multidimensional, interdependent, and often anonymous processes; out of complex articulations of agency, determination, and accident stretching far into a multilayered past and a future with multiple potentials. Against such a background, national governments can potentially be a valuable means of security, but will not be able to contain their communities within a prophylactic cocoon of safety in an insecure world; to secure nations, states must ensure that the world is secured. In sum, the potential for insecurity is immanent to political power, social organization, and cultural, industrial, and military activity under the conditions of modernity on this earth, not external to them.

#### The ROB is to reject security discourse – the alt is to reject the aff – if we win their starting point is based in the violent logic of security – they can’t weigh their endpoint, the acceptance allows and manifests violence – vote neg to reject security rhetoric.

**Burke 2** [Anthony, Lecturer in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Univ of New South Wales, “Aporias of Security,” Alternatives 27.1, jstor, GDI-ALG]//Jia

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many of the tools are already available – and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired – which creates an important space for dissent, critique and refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing.79 This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault’s challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who what are so much as to refuse what we are.80 Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalising and individualising blackmail and promise, it is at these levels we too can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The ﬁrst asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socio-economic implications. Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels: that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and which in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship, which thinks difference not on the basis of the Same, but on the basis of a dialogue with the Other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for what Gatens calls a ‘debate and engagement with the other’s law and the other’s ethics’ – an encounter which involves a transformation of the self rather than the other.81 (The potentials and limits of these models of ethics are explored in more detail in Chapter 3, where I critically analyse the political possibilities offered by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber.) In short, while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on ‘ourselves’ – a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an Other that never returns to the Same. It is to imagine a world in which alternative possibilities of society, justice and existence are free to develop, independent of sovereign ontologies and their animating forms of geopolitical control, desire and violence. It is to ask if there can be a world or a security after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

### 1NC – OV

#### Hedonism means that only pleasure is irrelevant – reject impacts that are based on pain.

#### 1] They have no justification for why pain is morally relevant. Blum is about dopamine chemicals in neocortices but they have no empirically analysis for why pain is part of the human biology

#### 2] Proves their framework negates since there is zero risk of something being immoral. Even if they win that actions that cause pleasure are just, they don’t have any synthetically derived truths about why pain or anything else is unjust.