### A person wearing glasses Description automatically generated with medium confidence

### 1

#### THIS IS UNIQUELY BAD FOR SMALL SCHOOLS – they have organizations like debate drills that can prep out tiny non topical affs like this but small schools are uniquely screwed out of actual LARP engagement - negate

#### Interp – space mining isn’t appropriation – its not permanent and OST consensus.

Hofmann and Bergamasco 19 [Mahulena Hofmann (SES Chair in Space, SatCom and Media Law at the University of Luxembourg) and Federico Bergamasco (PhD Researcher in aviation, telecommunication and space law University of Luxembourg). “Space resources activities from the perspective of sustainability: legal aspects”. Global Sustainability. 9 December 2019. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DF153F4A77970AC9E12444EC2B001F8A/S2059479819000279a.pdf/div-class-title-space-resources-activities-from-the-perspective-of-sustainability-legal-aspects-div.pdf> //Xu]

However, the purpose of space mining activities is considered to be neither any ‘appropriation’ of parts of outer space nor of space resources in situ. Instead, the sole aim of any such activities is their extraction, use and commercialization, without any territorial demands or titles as to the celestial bodies (or parts thereof) concerned (Mizushima et al., 2017). The argument, which sees in the use or exploitation of a space mineral by one subject a limitation of the same right of another subject, is difficult to contest by other means than analogy with space exploration. As has been recognized by the drafters of the OST in its Articles IX and XII, a purely scientific project in one area of outer space could de facto prevent research at the same site by a subject from another State. To avoid such situations, the Treaty pre-envisages a system of international consultations aimed at avoiding any harmful interference with operations.

#### OST is the standard for space law.

Wikipedia No Date [Wikipedia. “Outer Space Treaty.” No Date. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outer_Space_Treaty> //Xu]

The Outer Space Treaty, formally the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a multilateral treaty that forms the basis of international space law. Negotiated and drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, it was opened for signature in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on 27 January 1967, entering into force on 10 October 1967. As of February 2021, 111 countries are parties to the treaty—including all major spacefaring nations—and another 23 are signatories.[1][5][note 1]

#### So many authors agree –

#### Appropriation refers to sovereign claims of land, not using or extracting resources- proven by OST’s guidelines, nation’s interpretations, and prior property regimes

Wrench 19 [Wrench, John. 2019. “Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty Is Ready for Asteroid Mining Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty Is Ready for Asteroid Mining,” n.d. <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2546&context=jil>.] WL

It is unlikely, however, that the non-appropriation principle is an absolute ban on the ownership of resources extracted in outer space. An interpretation of Article II supporting a blanket ban on resource ownership is unwarranted by the text of the OST and illfounded on account of the international community’s common practices. Scholars have noted that the international community has never questioned whether scientific samples harvested from celestial bodies belong to the extracting nation.60 Furthermore, space-faring members of the international community rejected the Moon Treaty precisely because it prohibited all forms of ownership in resources extracted from celestial bodies.61 The space-faring nations’ support for the OST, coupled with their rejection of an alternative set of rules governing extracted resources, is at the very least an indication of what those nations believe the non-appropriation principle to stand for. It is equally improbable that the international community drafted the non-appropriation principle to be merely idealistic rhetoric. The OST leaves no room for interpretations to squirm out from under its ban on sovereign claims of land.62 The following section illustrates, however, that the distinction between sovereign ownership of land, and the vestment of property rights in resources extracted from that land, is nothing new. Although the OST does not provide a comprehensive guideline for resource extraction in outer space, its foundational logic provides a workable distinction between ownership and use. This part explores three property regimes developed under the same fundamental constraints as the non-appropriation principle: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the Antarctica Treaty System, and the prior appropriation doctrine as applied in United States water law.63 Under each regime, parties may establish some form of ownership in extracted resources despite being restricted from claiming sovereignty over the underlying land. Each section includes a brief discussion of the property regime’s history, its major traits and their relationship to the overarching characteristics of the non-appropriation principle. This part further describes how each property regime fits within the non-appropriation principle’s prohibition on claims to land, while prohibiting waste, separating land ownership from rights to extracted resources, enforcing liability for destruction or damage, and establishing a simple regulatory system to manage claims.

#### Semantics o/w –

#### a] Precision – they can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation because there is no stasis point

#### b] Jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the authority to vote aff if it wasn’t legitimate

#### Vote for predictable limits – their aff explodes the object of the resolution to include random space activities from tourism to research to satellite surveillance – that allows them to cherry-pick the best aff with no neg ground – also kills predictable advocacies which decks prepared engagement.

#### Fairness – a) its constitutive to debate as competitive activity that requires objective evaluation

#### Education – a) it’s the only reason why schools fund debate

#### No RVIs –

#### a) good theory debaters will bait out theory and always win o/ws on norming

#### b) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair

#### c) chilling effect – people are disincentivized from reading theory out of fear of losing on an RVI

#### d) Norming - if rvi I can’t concede counter interp if I’m wrong which means I have to advocate for bad norms

#### Use competing interps on T – A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical B] reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

### 2

#### Justifying util is an independent voter –

#### 1. Util can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until we’ve evaluated the states of affairs they’ve produced since it’s based on the outcome of the action. Probability doesn’t solve because that just allows for moral error and freezes action while attempting to calculate the perfect decision.

#### 2. Util justifies death good – the absence of pleasure is not bad since there is no life to calculate its lossed value and experience its absence but the lack of pain is actively good even if that good cannot be enjoyed by anyone because it would still have net value.

#### Two Impacts:

#### [2] They read morally repugnant arguments. Thus the alternative is to negate, to ensure that debate remains a space safe for all – the judge has a proximal obligation to ensure inaccessible practices don’t proliferate. Accessibility is a voting issue since all aff arguments presuppose that people feel safe in this space to respond to them.

### 3

#### Ethics must begin apriori –

#### [A] Apriori Aposteriori Paradox – big bang proves our theory true – independent of material conditions there was some existence which necessitates objective truth absent material reality.

#### [B] Action theory – infinite division logically concludes from empiricism. i.e If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention unifies these actions. If we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral.

#### [C] Constitutive Authority – reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### [D] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer the standard:

#### [1] Performativity – freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

### Offense

#### [1] To own yourself and use your own freedom is to be able to interact with external objects. Anything else makes you unable to exercise your own freedom on other things and creates a contradiction in conception.

Feser 2, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is. An alternative, soft-line approach could acknowledge that the initial acquirer who abuses a monopoly over a water hole (or any similar crucial resource) does commit an injustice against those who are disad- vantaged, but such an approach could still hold that the acquirer never- theless has not committed an injustice in acquisition —his acquisition was, as I have said, neither just nor unjust. Nor does he fail to own what he has acquired; he still cannot be said to have stolen the water from anyone. Rather, his injustice is an unjust use of what he owns, on a par with the unjust use I make of my self-owned fist when I wield it, unprovoked, to bop you on your self-owned nose. In what sense does the water-hole owner use his water unjustly, though? He doesn’t try to drown anyone in it, after all— indeed, the whole problem is that he won’t let anybody near it! Eric Mack gives us the answer we need in what he has put forward as the “self-ownership proviso” (SOP).28 This is a proviso not (as the Lock- ean proviso is) on the initial acquisition of property, but rather on how one can use his property in a way that respects others’ self-ownership rights. It is motivated by consideration of the fact that the talents, abilities, capac- ities, energies, etc., that a person rightfully possesses as a self-owner are inherently “world-interactive”; that is, it is of their very essence that they are directed toward the extra-personal environment.29 Your capacity to use your hand, for instance, is just a capacity to grasp and manipulate external objects; thus, what you own in owning your hand is something essentially grasping and manipulating.30 Now if someone were to cut off your hand or invasively keep you from using it (by tying your arm against your body or holding it behind your back), he would obviously be violating your self-ownership rights. But there are, Mack suggests, other, noninvasive ways in which those rights might be violated. If, to use an example of Mack’s, I effectively nullify your ability to use your hand by creating a device that causes anything you reach for to be propelled beyond your grasp, making it impossible for you ever to grasp or manip- ulate anything, I have violated your right to your hand as much as if I had cut it off or tied it down. I have, in any case, prevented your right to your hand from being anything more than a formal right, one that is practically useless. In the interests of guaranteeing respect for substantive, robust rights of self-ownership, then, “[t]he SOP requires that persons not deploy their legitimate holdings, i.e., their extra-personal property, in ways that severely, albeit noninvasively, disable any person’s world-interactive powers.” 31 The SOP follows, in Mack’s view, from the thesis of self-ownership itself; or, at any rate, the considerations that would lead anyone to accept that thesis should also, in his view, lead one to accept the proviso.32 A brief summary of a few of Mack’s thought experiments should suffice to give a sense of why this is so.33 In what Mack calls the Adam’s Island example, Adam acquires a previously uninhabited island and later refuses a shipwrecked Zelda permission to come ashore, as a result of which she remains struggling at sea (and presumably drowns). In the Paternalist Caging example, instead of drowning, Zelda becomes caught offshore in a cage Adam has constructed for catching large sea mammals, and, rather than releasing her, Adam keeps her in the cage and feeds her regularly. In the Knuckle-Scraper Barrier example, Zelda falls asleep on some unowned ground, whereupon a gang of oafish louts encircles her and, using their bodies and arms as barriers, refuses to let her out of the circle (accusing her of assault if she touches them in order to climb over or break through). In the Disabling Property Barrier example, instead of a human barrier, Adam constructs a plastic shield over and around the unowned plot of ground upon which Zelda sleeps, accusing her of trespassing upon his property when she awakens and tries to escape by breaking through the plastic. And in the (similarly named) Disabling Property Barriers example, seem to suggest an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of natural function, and though this by no means troubles me, it might not be what Mack himself has in mind (nor, of course, is it something every philosopher is going to sympathize with). Mack’s view nevertheless seems to require something like this conception. And something like it —enough like it to do the job Mack needs to be done, anyway—is arguably to be found in Larry Wright’s well- known reconstruction, in modern Darwinian terms, of the traditional notion of natural function. See Larry Wright, “Functions,” Philosophical Review 82, no. 2 (1973): 139–68. Adam, instead of enclosing Zelda in a plastic barrier, encloses in plastic barriers every external object that Zelda would otherwise be able to use — thus, in effect, enclosing her in a larger, all-encompassing plastic barrier of a more eccentric shape. In all of these cases, Mack says, although Zelda’s formal rights of self-ownership have not been violated—no one has invaded the area enclosed by the surface of her skin —her rights over her self-owned powers, and in particular her ability to exercise those powers, have nevertheless been nullified. But a plausible self-ownership- based theory surely cannot allow for this. It cannot, for instance, allow the innocent Zelda justly to be imprisoned in any of the ways described! If Mack is right, then it seems we have, in the SOP, grounds for holding that a water-hole monopolist would indeed be committing an injustice against anyone he refuses water to, or to whom he charges exorbitant prices for access. The injustice would be a straightforward violation of a person’s rights to self-ownership, a case of nullifying a person’s self- owned powers in a way analogous to Adam’s or the knuckle-scrapers’ nullification of Zelda’s self-owned powers. It would not be an injustice in initial acquisition, however. The water-hole monopolist still owns the water hole as much as he ever did; he just cannot use it in a way that violates other individuals’ self-ownership rights (either by drowning them in it or by nullifying their self-owned powers by denying them access to it when there is no alternative way for them to gain access to the water necessary for the use of their self-owned powers). Is Mack right? The hard-liner might dig in his heels and insist that none of Mack’s examples amount to self-ownership-violating injustices; instead, they are merely subtle but straightforward property rights violations or cases of moral failings of various other sorts (cruelty, selfishness, etc.). The Adam’s Island case, for starters, is roughly analogous to the example of the water-hole monopolist, so that it arguably cannot give any non-question- begging support to the SOP, if the SOP is then supposed to show that the water-hole example involves an injustice. The Disabling Property Barriers case might also be viewed as unable to provide any non-question-begging support, since Adam’s encasing everything in plastic might plausibly be interpreted as his acquiring everything, in which case we are back to a water-hole-type monopoly example. The Knuckle-Scraper Barrier and Dis- abling Property Barrier examples might be explained by saying that in falling asleep on the unowned plot of land, Zelda in effect has come (at least temporarily) to acquire it, and (by virtue of walking) to acquire also the path she took to get to it, so that the knuckle-scrapers and Adam violate her property rights (not her self-ownership rights) in not allowing her to escape. The Paternalist Caging example can perhaps be explained by arguing that in building the cage, Adam has acquired the water route leading to it, so that in swimming this route (and thus getting caught in the cage) Zelda has violated his property rights and, therefore, can justly be caged. Accordingly, the hard-liner might insist, we can explain all of these examples in a hard-line way and thus avoid commitment to the SOP. Such a hard-line response would be ingenious (well, maybe), but still, I think, ultimately doomed to failure. Can the Paternalist Caging example, to start with, plausibly be explained away in the manner that I have suggested? Does Adam commit no injustice against Zelda even if he never lets her out? It will not do to write this off merely as a case of excessive punishment (explaining the injustice of which would presumably not require commitment to the SOP). For suppose Adam says, after a mere five minutes of confinement, “I’m no longer punishing you; you’ve paid your debt and are free to go, as far as I’m concerned. But I’m not going to bother exerting the effort to let you out. I never forced you to get in the cage, after all —you did it on your own —and you have no right to the use of my self-owned cage-opening powers to fix your mistake! So teleport out, if you can. Or get someone else —if you can find someone —to let you out.” Adam would be neither violating Zelda’s rights to external property nor excessively punishing her in this case; nor would he be invasively vio- lating her self-ownership rights. But wouldn’t he still be committing an injustice, however noninvasively? Don’t we need something like the SOP to explain why this is so? The barrier examples, for their part, do not require Zelda’s walking and falling asleep on virgin territory, which thus (arguably) becomes her prop- erty. We can, to appeal to the sort of science-fiction scenario beloved of philosophers, imagine instead a bizarre chance disruption of the structure of space-time that teleports Zelda into Adam’s plastic shell or into the midst of the knuckle-scrapers. There is no question now of their violating her property rights; yet don’t they still commit an injustice by nullifying her self-owned powers in refusing to allow her to exit? Consider a parallel example concerning property ownership itself. If your prized $50,000 copy of Captain America Comics number 1, due to another rupture in space-time or just to a particularly strong wind that blows it out of your hands and through my window, suddenly appears on the floor of my living room, do I have the right to refuse to bring it back out to you or to allow you to come in and get it? Suppose I attempt to justify my refusal by saying, “I won’t touch it, and you’re free to have it back if you can arrange another space-time rupture or gust of wind. But I refuse to exert my self-owned powers to bring it out to you, or to allow you on my property to get it. I never asked for it to appear in my living room, after all!” Would anyone accept this justification? Doesn’t your property right in the comic book require me to give it back to you? The hard-liner might suggest that this example transports the SOP advocate out of the frying pan and into the fire. For if the SOP is true, wouldn’t we also have to commit ourselves to a “property-ownership proviso” (POP) that requires us not to nullify anyone’s ability to use his external private property in a way consistent with its “world-interactive powers”? If I build a miniature submarine in my garage, and you have the only swimming pool within one thousand miles, must you allow me the use of your pool lest you nullify my ability to use the sub? If (to take an example of Cohen’s cited by Mack) I own a corkscrew, must I be provided with wine bottles to open lest the corkscrew sadly fail to fulfill its full potential?34 Mack’s response to this line of thought seems basically to amount to a bit of backpedaling on the claim that his proviso really follows from the notion of self-ownership per se —so as to avoid the conclusion that a (rather unlibertarian and presumably redistributionist) POP would also, in par- allel fashion, follow from the concept of property ownership. His response seems, instead, to emphasize the idea that the considerations favoring self-ownership also favor, via an independent line of reasoning, the SOP.35 In my view, however, a better response would be one that took note of some relevant disanalogies between property in oneself and property in external things. Note first that the self-owned world-interactive powers, the possible use of which the SOP is intended to guarantee, are possessed by a living being who is undergoing development, which involves passing through various stages; therefore, these powers are ones that flourish with use and atrophy or even disappear with disuse.36 To nullify these powers even for a limited time, then, is (very often at least) not merely temporarily to inconvenience their owner, but, rather, to bring about a permanent reduc- tion or even disablement of these powers. By contrast, a submarine (or a corkscrew) retains its powers even when left indefinitely in a garage (or a drawer). This difference in the effect that nullification has on self-owned powers versus extra-personal property plausibly justifies a difference in our judgments concerning the acceptability, from the point of view of justice, of such nullification in the two cases; that is, it justifies adoption of the SOP but not of the POP.37 Second, there is an element of choice (and in particular, of voluntary acquisition) where extra-personal property is concerned that is morally relevant here.

#### Thus, self-ownership justifies the appropriation of property – our freedom necessitates being able to set and pursue external things as our ends, including exercising our rights on mining. Restricting this arbitrarily limits our freedom which is unjust.

Feser 3, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

V. Some Implications If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop-erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified —we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, [they] has mixed [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, [they] has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his own- ership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with exist- ing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case what- soever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of prop- erty just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

#### Private entities utilize their own property and resources to fund and conduct space exploration which means – Prohibition of it is a violation of a) Their ability to use their own property (like their rocketships or fuel) to set their ends in space and b). Their freedom to explore unknown horizons such as space.

#### [2] Space appropriation and exploration originates from private companies such as Space X and Blue Origin. Preventing such is a restriction on the ability of companies to set and pursue their ends and these companies gain contracts with the government for projects which turns promise breaking offense.

#### [3] Negs get Contention Choice- It’s key to robust philosophy debates rather than arbitrary contention debates which o/w since phil is unique to LD. It also prevents splitting the debate allowing for in depth clash and 2ar judge psychology spins on the contention level which is key fairness and level playing field

### 4

#### The aff embodies a political ontology driven by the security of the nation state. This makes their impacts inevitable and cyclical, perpetuating conflict.

Burke ‘13 – Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, 2013 (“Security cosmopolitanism,” *Critical Studies on Security* (Vol. 1, No. 1, 13–28) Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Tandfonline)//Jia

The ontology underpinning security cosmopolitanism necessitates a profound transformation of the national security ontology that precedes and frustrates it. While acknowledging the significance of states – as core actors and potential means of security, as structures of democratic governance, and as (one) of the legal foundations of international order and law – such an ontology understands human existence as irreversibly global in nature. When multiple and often anonymous human actions collectively produce such profound changes to the biosphere and climate that many now term ours a new geological era – the ‘Anthropocene’ – national borders lose their claim to define and enclose human existence, and humanity must be thought in non-anthropocentric terms (Ganguly and Jenkins 2011; Alberts 2011). Through interlocking historical, social, and systemic processes – imperialism, world war, decolonization, capitalism, cold war, globalization, migration, terrorism, nuclear strategy, intervention, and environmental degradation – human beings have effectively unified their life and death process on a planetary scale and extended it to other species and life forms. This event needs to be reflected in a transformation of the historically dominant ontological narrative of insecurity – the narrative of its origins, sources, nature, and necessity. In the traditional (and still dominant) narrative, security emerges from insecurity through the creation of a distinctive political form and subjectivity – that of the nationstate and its corporeal manifestation, sovereignty, the ‘body-politic’. As argued by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the origins of national security lie in a temporal narrative that traces the emergence of the sovereign state (the ‘Commonwealth’) from an originary ‘state of nature’: a realm of perpetual insecurity and conflict in which a natural equality ‘and Right of every man to everything’ remains governed by no rule or jurisdiction that could stabilize or order it; it resembles then a ‘time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man’ and there ‘can be no security to any man of living out the time which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live’ (Hobbes 1985; Esposito 2008; Burke 2007, 36–41). As Roberto Esposito explains, an ‘immunitary mechanism begins to operate’ in this narrative, because ‘if life is abandoned to its internal powers, [and] its natural dynamics, human life is destined to self-destruct’. An all-powerful sovereign – the paradoxical embodiment and governor of the body-politic – then functions to ‘immunize’ the body-politic against the potential of its own disorder and preserve the life that threatens it. This biopolitical life is not the degraded ‘bare life’ of Giorgio Agamben’s theory – which certainly remains an ever-present possibility for the subjects and objects of sovereign power – but a rich vision of life that Hobbes describes in De Cive as ‘happiness’ and in Leviathan as all ‘the benefit and good’ of ‘lawful industry’ and knowledge; a life, in short, enabled, protected, and transformed by modernity (Esposito 2008; Burke 2007, 37–38). Furthermore, as international relations grow in complexity and danger, and an international law based on the sovereign equality of peoples organized into states becomes normatively dominant with the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence of the post-World War II national security state, the Hobbesian imaginary mutates: the nation-state comes to be thought of as a contained and vital body that must be immunized, or secured, against threats that come from without as well from within. This national body has integrity, sovereignty, borders – and international society, as Hedley Bull explained, comprises such ontologically separate body-politics linked together by a spiderweb of international law, strategic balances, and mutual interests. There is no common humanity, merely an anarchical society of states regulated by a minimal set of agreed rules (Bull 2002, 82). National enclosure becomes paired with anarchic balancing, strategic cooperation, and Realpolitik: this is the ontology that structures and animates dominant state approaches to both national and collective security, across the entirety of the security agenda. In security cosmopolitanism, there can be no successful immunization of the national body against insecurities that come from outside. Such immunization failure can be understood in two ways. First, the very constitution of the state and the national body can be a source of threat – to ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities, dissidents, indigenous peoples, the poor, and women – who become targets of exclusion, marginalization, discipline, violence, and repression. Masculinist and totalizing metaphors of state and community as body then mobilize their own violence, seeking to homogenize and exclude those designated as the other – the virus or cancer – of the state. Such policies generate both severe human insecurity and transnational insecurities in the form of refugees, the transmission of conflict, or the internationalization of struggle – the Palestinians being a powerful case in point. Second, dominant patterns of insecurity and threat – whether one thinks in terms of their causes, scope, or effects – develop within and across borders in ways that render containment models of national security inadequate, and are in fact exacerbated by the perseverance of such models. The atmosphere has no borders, and climate change – which will have dramatic effects on human security from environmental disruptions, degradation, disease vectors, climate-affected conflict, and ‘natural’ disasters such as hurricanes and storm surges – arises as a totality out of millions of often anonymous daily actions in industry, agriculture, government, and individual life. While action at the state and government level is obviously crucial, attempts to partition legal responsibility along national lines have done little more than create paralyzing international disputes and no agreement on a global treaty framework to reduce emissions and arrest climate change. The antagonistic structure and ontology of international society here presents a profound obstacle to cosmopolitan ends: the result is what writers such as Esposito and Jacques Derrida have called ‘autoimmunization’, an immune response that threatens to destroy the social body rather than protect it (Esposito 2008, xiii–xix, 2011; Derrida 2005; Borradori 2003, 100–102). Nuclear weapons present a similar dilemma dating to the beginning of the post-war national security state: national efforts to seek security through nuclear threats soon became a threat to humanity as such, creating a global community of fate through escalating insecurity dynamics that could never be tamed or stabilized. In this way the nuclear balance of terror becomes the ultimate autoimmunization, as deterrence is forced by time compression and uncertainty to exist at the edge of pre-emption and thus of irreversible disaster, threatening to eliminate those it aims to defend. Similarly transnational Islamist terrorism operates, propagandizes, and recruits across borders, and violent and exceptionalist responses produce new autoimmunization processes that undermine multiculturalism and the democratic rule of law and drive new forms of radicalization and terror (Burke 2009, 2008, 2007, 4–13). Hence in security cosmopolitanism the founding narrative of security changes: insecurity does not arise before or external to a state that (in the classical narrative) acts as a double guarantee of both security and modernity, but arises out of that very modernity as a function of its histories, choices, powers, relations, and systems. It is not the enemy in possession of nuclear or conventional weapons that is the fundamental source of insecurity, but the weapons system itself; not the forced migrant or the massive storm creating insecurity for the nation-state, but the human interaction with the climate system; not the terrorist en route to an attack, but a historical system of injustice, geopolitics, and ideology around violence that enables terrorism as a normative choice and a social phenomenon. Similar arguments can be made about hunger and food insecurity, global health inequality, asylum seekers, transnational crime, weapons proliferation, and more. As Simon Dalby writes of climate change, its ‘irony’ is that ‘the threat is self-imposed; we are the makers of our own misfortunes’. This generates profound responsibilities toward peoples most vulnerable to climate disruptions and undermines ‘distinctions between nature and culture, human and environment’ such that ‘the global scale we now live in’ must be conceptualized as a ‘social nature’ (2009, 2, 6). While security cosmopolitanism does not deny that there are event-based sites and sources of insecurity, it argues that they can neither be fully understood nor ameliorated in their irruptive, symptomatic forms. Event-based threats – the insecurities of the moment – are epiphenomena of larger scale structures and systems. Insecurities arise as events out of multidimensional, interdependent, and often anonymous processes; out of complex articulations of agency, determination, and accident stretching far into a multilayered past and a future with multiple potentials. Against such a background, national governments can potentially be a valuable means of security, but will not be able to contain their communities within a prophylactic cocoon of safety in an insecure world; to secure nations, states must ensure that the world is secured. In sum, the potential for insecurity is immanent to political power, social organization, and cultural, industrial, and military activity under the conditions of modernity on this earth, not external to them.

#### The ROB is to reject security discourse – the alt is to reject the aff – if we win their starting point is based in the violent logic of security – they can’t weigh their endpoint, the acceptance allows and manifests violence – vote neg to reject security rhetoric.

**Burke 2** [Anthony, Lecturer in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Univ of New South Wales, “Aporias of Security,” Alternatives 27.1, jstor, GDI-ALG]//Jia

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many of the tools are already available – and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired – which creates an important space for dissent, critique and refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing.79 This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault’s challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who what are so much as to refuse what we are.80 Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalising and individualising blackmail and promise, it is at these levels we too can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The ﬁrst asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socio-economic implications. Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels: that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and which in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship, which thinks difference not on the basis of the Same, but on the basis of a dialogue with the Other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for what Gatens calls a ‘debate and engagement with the other’s law and the other’s ethics’ – an encounter which involves a transformation of the self rather than the other.81 (The potentials and limits of these models of ethics are explored in more detail in Chapter 3, where I critically analyse the political possibilities offered by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber.) In short, while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on ‘ourselves’ – a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an Other that never returns to the Same. It is to imagine a world in which alternative possibilities of society, justice and existence are free to develop, independent of sovereign ontologies and their animating forms of geopolitical control, desire and violence. It is to ask if there can be a world or a security after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

#### Independantly, Environmental apocalypticism leads to social paralysis and eco-authoritarianism turning case

#### De-politicization – framing environmental destruction as an apocalyptic event and an imminent crisis causes individuals to feel they cant do anything or solve the problem – turns case

#### Eco-Authoritarianism – their framing that the affirmative is the “final solution” to solving the environment coupled with their apocalyptic rhetoric justifies inhumanist authoritarian actions by the government to ensure environmental protection