

#### Aff… lets make a trade, you have a choice – you can solve this math equation and read the answer in the 1ar and ill conceded permissibility and presumption affirms



#### If you solve this one I’ll concede terminal defense to my last shell

### Hard Math Problems That Went Viral in 2018

#### If you solve this one both of us get 30 speaks



### 1

#### Interpretation – debaters must have a wiki with contract information specific to the debater who is debating

#### Violation – their school isn’t on the wiki, see screenshot, u can check urself

Graphical user interface, text, application, Word

Description automatically generated

#### [1] Safety – having a wiki is key to understand any accessibility concerns like trigger warnings or potentially sensitive topics. Absent a wiki there’s no way to tell – not having contact information makes it worse because there’s no way to verify it preround which kills 1NC strat construction. Inclusion is a voter – you can’t debate if you can’t participate – also means I can’t contact you preround.

#### [2] Disclosure is good – open sourcing and disclosing round reports are a good thing because it levels the playing field – big schools have flows and docs but small schools won’t have access to such resources without things like open source – you don’t do that and our norm necessitates that everyone discloses everything – I didn’t get the aff 30 minutes before the round which means err neg on offense. Fairness is a voter since debate is a game and we’re both here to win.

#### [1] DTD on 1nc theory and disclosure – a) disclosure cannot be drop the argument because it would just drop you because you’re the norm b) deterrence

#### No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

### 2

#### The aff burden is to prove that the resolutional statement is logical, and the reciprocal neg burden is to prove that the resolutional statement is illogical.

#### Prefer:

#### 1. Text – Oxford Dictionary defines ought as “used to indicate something that is probable.”

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought> //Massa

#### Ought is “used to express logical consequence” as defined by Merriam-Webster

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>) //Massa

#### 2. Debatability – a) my interp means debates focus on empirics about squo trends rather than irresolvable abstract principles that’ve been argued for years b) Moral oughts cannot guide action due to the is/ought fallacy – we cannot derive moral obligations from what happens in the real world

#### 3. Neg definition choice – The aff should have defined ought in the 1ac as their value, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read a new definition – kills 1NC strategy since I premised my engagement on a lack of your definition.

**Negate:**

#### 1] Inherency – either a) the aff is non-inherent and you vote neg on presumption or b) it is and it isn’t going to happen.

#### 2] Motion is impossible – [a] To go anywhere, you must go halfway first, and then you must go half of the remaining distance, and half of the remaining distance, and so forth to infinity – thus, motion is impossible because it necessitates traversing an infinite number of spaces in a finite amount of time.

#### 3] Them running the aff proves it negates – they haven’t read any timeframe weighing which means they had to justify that the paln would happen.

### 3

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – [a] the resolution indicates the aff has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation [b] Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### Ethics must begin a priori:

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which concedes its authority and equally proves agency as constitutive

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer the standard: [a] freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the neg arguments/standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others [b] Frameworks are topicality interps of the word ought so they should be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since huge evidence files aren’t required.

### Offense

#### [1] Strikes fail to fulfill duty

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

Kantian Ethics Kantian ethics suggest that actions are morally permissible based on **whether it fulfils a person's duty** (Banks, 2006). To further the concept of duty, Kantian ethics held the notion of Categorical Imperatives which is believed to determine the morality of duties as it enforces and commands adherence, complicity and application. The Categorical Imperatives consist of three formulas. Once such a formula is to "act only on the maximum whereby at the same time you can will that it become a universal law" (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). Through this perspective, Kant held that persons are to engage in actions that they are willing to allow others to engage in as well without conditions and exceptions. Applying this formula to the ethicality of social workers **participating in labor strike** demonstrations, it becomes evident that such an action is **not morally permissible or executing its duty**. Arguably, as much as social workers are trained professionals and rendering services that are crucial to the functioning and well-being of society, they remain ordinary citizens who also at some point will **require crucial services**. Examples of these crucial services that may cause significant harm because of its absence due to labor strike action are **medical personnel, suicide watch centers, mental health care professionals, law enforcement, court systems**, municipal service delivery, etc. With these services not available, social workers will experience suffering, frustration, unhappiness, harm as the clients will do with their absence from the office. To this regard, participating and demonstrating labor strike action is not adhering to duty or morally permissible.

#### [2] Uses others as a mere means to an end

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

A further formula of the Categorical Imperative is "so, act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other context, never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself' (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. Participating in a labor-strike demonstration/action is **a direct violation of this** categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society **is used to duly and unduly influence the bargaining process for better working conditions**. In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of clients and society **is not seen as crucial** **and as an 'end'**, but rather used to demonstrate the undeniable need for the skills and expertise of social workers. Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

### 4

#### Interpretation: Debaters must send all of the text in their speech document as font size 13 or larger before they begin the speech in which they read the document.

#### Violation: They don’t

#### Prefer:

#### ~1~ Evidence Ethics – Shrinking font encourages miscutting evidence because it makes reading lines in the evidence that weren’t read in their speech really hard. Additionally, even if there’s no intentional miscutting, having the ability to read every line in the evidence is important to fully comprehend its meaning and understand context, so making any part of the evidence inaccessible is an effort to prevent in-depth engagement with nuanced warrants of evidence – kills my ability to prep and engage the aff. Drop them – my interp indicts every argument they make since they could have lied about it so there’s no drop the arg – also uniquely key to deterrence since it discourages them from ever wanting to make ev small again, setting norms. You can’t be reasonable on evidence ethics – either their interp allows for it or it

#### To pre-empt the CI, arbitrary counterinterps like "font 7 is big enough" are self-serving and infinitely regressive – the fact that they tried to hide any amount of evidence is bad.

### 5

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must have a unified solvency advocate for their plan text.

#### Violation: they don’t have a unified solvency advocate for their advocacy – the evidence just says it might result in low productivity.

#### Standards:

#### ~1~ Topic Lit – Allowing them to tack on extra planks means they can create Frankenstein Affs that aren’t in the topic literature. That kills predictability and also kills the negative’s ability to prep because no author writes critically about their aff because it does not exist in the lit. Key to fairness because I cannot engage in the first place if the affirmative is unpredictable. Key to education because I cannot read any of my negative prep which harms engagement.

#### ~2~ We don’t hurt creativity – there is already a plethora of interesting and well-supported Affs on this topic like contact tracing, green infrastructure, and more. They need to show that there is a unique benefit to homemade affs that aren’t grounded in the literature. You actively destroy by allowing debaters to be lazy and make up stuff.

### 6

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa  
But justice**,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which** must not wait**.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a **just** decision is **always** required immediately**, "right away."** It cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions**,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision**,** as such, **always** remains a **finite** moment of urgency and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it **always** marks **the** interruption of **the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive** deliberation that precedes it**,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule.** Not of the absence of rules and knowledge but of a reinstitution of rules which by definition is not preceded by any knowledge or by any guarantee as such. If we were to trust in a massive and decisive distinction between performative and constative – a problem I can’t get involved in here – we would have to attribute this irreducibility of precipitate urgency, at the bottom this irreducibility of thoughtlessness and unconsciousness, however intelligent it may be, to the performative structure of speech act and acts in general as acts of justice or law, whether they be performatives that institute something or derived performatives supposing anterior conventions. A constative can be juste (right), in the sense of justesse, never in the sense of justice, except by founding itself on conventions and so on other anterior performatives, buried or not, it always maintains within itself some irruptive violence, it no longer responds to the demands of theoretical rationality. Since every constative utterance itself relies, at least implicitly, on a performative structure (“I tell you that, I speak to you, I address myself to you to tell you that this is true, that things are like this, I promise you or renew my promise to you to make a sentence and to sign what I say when I say that, tell you, or try to tell you the truth,” and so forth), the dimension of justesse or truth of the theoretico-constatie utterances (in all domains, particularly in the deoman of the theory of law) always thus presupposes the dimension of justice of the performative utterances, that is to say their essential precipitation, which never proceeds without a certain dissymmetry and some quality of violence. That’s how I would be tempted to understand the proposition of Levinas, who, in a whole other language and following an entirely different discursive procedure, declares that “La Verite suppose la justice” (“Truth supposes justice”) (“Verite et justice, in Totalite et infini 3, p. 62). Dangerously parodying the French idiom, we could end up saying: “La justice, y a qu’ca de vrai.” This is not without consequence, needless to say, for the status, if we still can call it that, of truth.

#### External world skep is true.

Neta 14, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, 2014, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, if you **do** have hands, then you are not **merely** a brain floating in a vat **of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But how could you know **that** you are not **such a brain? If you were such a brain,** everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would (by hypothesis) have **all** the same sensory experiences that you’re having **right** now. Since your empirical knowledge of the world around you must **somehow** be based upon **your** sensory experiences**, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

#### Even if it was possible to form sufficient reasons, those reasons are epistemically bankrupt in terms of their truth value because of the Gettier problem.

Chapman 18, Andrew. “The Gettier Problem.” 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 25 July 2018, 1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem //Massa  
First, the thought is that a person must believe something to in order to know it. It would seem contradictory to claim that Max knows, but that Max doesn’t believe, that his tennis racquet is in the closet. Second, it would seem contradictory to claim to Max knows that his tennis racquet is in the closet while his racquet is actually back at the court. Max might believe that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might believe that he knows that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these cases would we say that Max knows where his racquet is, since what he believes is false. Finally, it seems as though Max needs some justification, evidence, or good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet in order for him to know that it is.3 Suppose that Max has no good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet. If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he serendipitously gets things right, it seems as though Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and hence, does not have knowledge.4