### 1

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution –

#### [1] Textuality – “Affirm” means “assert as valid” and “negate” means “deny the … truth of.”[[1]](#footnote-1) Text comes first – A) Controls the internal link to fairness since it’s the basis of things like predictability and prep. B) Key to jurisdiction since the judge can only endorse what is within their burden. C) Even if another role of the ballot is better for debate, that is not a reason it ought to be the role of the ballot, just a reason we ought to discuss it.

#### [2] Necessity – All statements assert implicit truth value i.e. if I say “I smell violets” that is the same as saying “It is true that I smell violets.” 2 impacts –

#### [A] Double bind—either they assert the truth value of their indicts to truth testing meaning they implicitly accept truth testing as a paradigm or they don’t assert the truth value of their indicts which means that they are false and truth testing is true anyways.

#### [B] Even if we’re losing on the framework debate, their framework is going to collapse to truth testing anyways.

#### [3] Constituvism- Truth Testing is the only constitutive feature of debate – if affirm and negate means to prove true and deny the truth of then that means it must be constitutively truth testing

Nardin 92 Terry Nardin, “International Ethics and International Law”. Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 19-30, published by Cambridge University Press. The first thing to observe in considering this objection is that the purposes of a practice are not necessarily the same as the purposes either of those who designed or of those who participate in it. From the standpoint of an umpire supervising a particular game of chess, the paramount consideration governing the play is that it should be in conformity with the rules of chess. If a player makes an illegal move, arguing that it will result in a more intellectually challenging game, the proper response is to ignore the argument and prohibit the move. In other words, the kinds of reasons that are valid within the game are different from those that might be considered by chess federation officials contemplating changes in the rules of the game. From the internal perspective of the player or the umpire, the authority of the rules is absolute Players or umpires may disagree about the interpretation or proper application of the rules, but they may not take the position that a valid, authoritative rule should be set aside. It is also important to distinguish between the intentions that may be embedded in a rule or system of rules and the consequences of observing that rule or participating in the system.

#### Constitutive aims are important in that they are non-optional

Katsafanas 11 [Paul. (2011), “Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83: 620–660.]

So what’s special about constitutive aims? The constitutive aim’s standard of success differs from these other standards in that it is [are] intrinsic to the activity in question. You can play a chess game without aiming to enjoy it, and a chess game is not necessarily defective if not enjoyed. But you can’t play a chess game without aiming to achieve checkmate, so a chess game is necessarily defective if it does not achieve checkmate. Thus, the interesting feature of constitutive aims is that they generate intrinsic standards of success. Put differently, they generate non-optional standards of success. So the important point about constitutive aims is just this: if action has a constitutive aim, then that aim will be present in every instance of action. Thus, it will give us a non- optional standard of assessment for action, a standard that applies merely in virtue of the fact that something is an action.15

### 2

#### Permissibility and presumption negate –

#### [1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[2]](#footnote-2) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – a) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and b) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### [2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### [3] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### Skep is true and negates –

#### 1] Infinite regress – In order to believe in a fact, you need knowledge of other facts to justify your belief in that fact, but the same applies to those facts, which means knowledge is infinitely regressive – epistemic skep.

#### 2] Motivation double bind – either a) your framework isn’t motivational and it doesn’t guide action so obligations can’t be generated or b) morality is motivational and people will do what is says no matter what so it’s just descriptive of action, not providing an obligation.

#### 3] Morality is circular – The framework starts from the premise of upholding morality. Your framework then defines what constitutes morality. That’s a double bind because either a) your framework is circular because by defining morality you are changing the burden of what your framework must be in the first place or b) morality is an undefinable concept which means normative obligations cannot be generated.

#### 4] Paradoxes –

#### A] Good Samaritan- In order to say I want to fix X problem, you must say that you want X problem to exist, since it requires the problem to exist to solve, which makes a moral attempt inherently immoral. This also means affirming negates because you need the resolution to not have happened in order to have an obligation.

#### B] Meno’s- In order to discover something, it must already be known – this makes the quest for knowledge incomprehensible and impossible.

#### C] Rule following – there in nothing inherent in a rule that mandates a certain interpretation – for example, there in nothing inherent in an arrow about showing direction. That means we can’t set moral rules because those rules need rules to interpret them – the moral rule they set is infinitely regressive.

#### D] Derrida’s – a moral action must be immediate because waiting allows for injustice to occur, however in acting early we suspend our cognitive deliberation and thus lack the ability to make a fully informed, just decision. Thus, striving for morality is inherently immoral and obligations are contradictory.

### 3

#### Thir mobility of identity parallels a mobility in truth; our relation to ethics constantly changes – this necessitates experimentation with our moral norms and their particularities.

Jun and Smith 11 [Nathan Jun (Ph.D., Philosophy and Literature, Purdue University; M.A., Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania) and Daniel W. Smith (Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University and one of the world's leading commentators on Deleuze. He has translated his work, edited collections and written numerous articles on Deleuze). “Deleuze and Ethics.” 2011. Edinburgh University Press. JStor.] MK

C. Ewing famously suggested that to value something, to treat it as good, is to treat it as something “we ought to welcome, [to] rejoice in if it exists, [to] seek to produce if it does not exist . . . to approve its attainment, count its loss a deprivation, hope for and not dread its coming if this is likely, [and] avoid what hinders its production” (Ewing 1947: 149). It is worth noting at the outset that Deleuze isn’t as interested in the question of “what is good” or “what is valuable” as he is in the capacity of human beings to value things (or, if you like, to “create values”). **Every human being is both a product of a unique and complicated multiplicity of forces, including** the inward-directed forces of **self-creation**, as well as a producer of **difference, change, movement, and transformation**. These are the processes – which collectively, fol- lowing Deleuze, we can simply call “life” or “being alive” – through which human beings experience value. Life, understood in this sense, is what interests Deleuze. There is little doubt that Deleuze values life – or, rather, that Deleuzian philosophy regards life as valuable, i.e., as something that is in some sense worthy of being valued. On the other hand, could life or anything else be “intrinsically good” in a Deleuzian universe, if by this we mean that the value of life obtains independently of its relations to other things, or that life is somehow worthy of being valued on its own account, etc.? For Deleuze, after all, it would not make sense to speak of life, or anything else, in this way, since by its very nature life is relational and dynamic. Thus if life is worthy of being protected, pursued, promoted, etc., it cannot be because of traditional distinctions between intrinsic and instrumental value. **Deleuze’s valorization of “difference”** and scorn of “representation” surely **hint at,** if they do not altogether reveal, a solution to this issue. Time and again Deleuze, like Nietzsche, emphasizes **the importance of loving and affirming life. It is likewise clear that this “Leben-liebe” is both a condition and a consequence of creativity, experimentation, the pursuit of the new and the different.** To the extent that representation and its social incarnations are opposed to life, they are condemnable, marked by “indignity.” This strongly suggests that for Deleuze, again, life is loveable, valuable, and good; that it is worthy of being protected and promoted; that whatever is contrary to it is worthy of disapproba- tion and opposition. At the same time, however, we must recall that **the life of which he speaks is something virtual,** and **there is no guarantee that its actualizations will be af rmative and active. Of course, this is simply one more reason why Deleuze emphasizes experimentation**, on the one hand, and eternal vigilance, on the other. **Our experiments may lead to positive transformations, they may lead to madness, they may lead to death. What starts out as a reckless and beautiful affirmation of life can result in a death camp. It is not enough, therefore, to experiment and create; one must be mindful of**, and responsible for, **one’s creations**. The process requires an eternal revolution against life-denial wherever and however it arises – eternal because without a telos, and without a telos because life-denial as such can never be completely stopped. It can only be contained or, better, outrun. Whatever goodness is created along the way, Deleuze thinks, will always be provisional, tentative, and contingent, but this is hardly a reason not to create it. **Deleuzian value theory, then, aspires to be an eternal revolution against representation which is itself an eternal process of creation and transformation, an eternal practice of freedom. The good or ethical life is both a goal as well as the in nite network of possibilities** we travel in its pursuit. Ethics traces the multiple locations at which means and ends overlap or blur together, the multiple sites at which our desires become immanent to their concrete actualizations, the multiple spaces within which the concrete realizations of our desire become immanent to those desires. For Deleuze, such sites and spaces are constantly shifting into and out of focus, moving into and out of existence. Concrete moral and political goals sought as an end are constituted by our seeking them. Thus the process of seeking freedom or justice is a process of eternal movement, change, becoming, possibility, and novelty which simul- taneously demands eternal vigilance, and endurance. There is neither certainty nor respite at any point. There are no stable identities, no tran- scendent truths, no representations or images. There are only the vari- able and reciprocal and immanent processes of creation and possibility themselves. Deleuze thinks **every human being is the product of a unique and complicated multiplicity of forces. Consequently only individuals are in a position to discover, through processes of experimentation, what is valuable in their lives, what they ought to pursue and avoid, etc., in a particular set of circumstances**. Only through the process of pursu- ing alternative practices can one begin to discover the manifold possi- bilities of life. **Deleuze’s explicitly rejects the idea that there is any sort of “natural” hierarchy of values among individuals**. As he notes time and again in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, **the authority of oppressive assemblages is always justified by assuming that certain peoples’ values are**, in some sense, **weightier than those of others**, and it is precisely the function of normativity to conceal the arbitrary and arti cial nature of this assumption under the guise of universalizability and transcendence. **The process of creating value therefore requires an eternal revolution against the forces of repression** wherever and however they arise. It lacks any kind of telos or end goal, since there is always a micro-fascism lurking at the heart of every system of personal value-construction which can, and often will, reterritorialize and overcode that system. Again, **such a micro-fascism is every bit as instrumental in producing value as, say, the desire for freedom**. It is not the case, therefore, that **we ought to oppose what is anti-life, but rather that we must if we are to ever achieve value at all**. The fact that **the discovery of value is always provisional, tentative, and contingent** is hardly a reason not to pursue it. In the end, **there may be no ultimate means by which to distinguish one way of living from another, but it is precisely our inability to secure such a means which necessitates an ongoing commitment to ethical life.** As I suggested earlier, **traditional ethical philosophy suffers from approaching ethics the wrong way round.** The maneuver seems to be as follows:

#### The standard is embracing an ethics of particular experimentation. Defined as recognizing there’s no set norm that we follow in all situations and test different maxims to see which are life affirming.

#### Vote neg:

**The AC is an absolute principle; it claims there cannot be any instance in which the state shouldn’t recognize an unconditional right to strike, which ignores the possibility of alternate circumstances we can’t respond to until we respond ad hoc. A universal statement like the resolution can’t have universal truth; its truth is contextual, which contradicts the principles of experimentation.**

### Case

#### The time argument deleuze 68 card is bad

#### Doesn’t describe the specific qualities or features time bears that makes it fracture the subject

#### That triggers permissibility – if subject fractures throughout time u can’t create normative ethic bc u presuppose itll hold true regardless of temporal/spatial changes

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirm>, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)