### 1

#### The standard is maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. The role of the ballot is to evaluate the consequences of the aff.

#### 1 – Moral purity is tautological—material focus is key

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### 2 – All impacts collapse back to pleasure – their framing is impact justified.

Moen ’16 – (Ole Martin, PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy @ University of Oslo, "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267). Modified for glang

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask what her~~is~~ end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail.

#### 3 – Death first – their framework assumes perfect rationality but agents can’t deliberate on ethics if they fear for their bodily security – proves my offense turns and outweighs theirs.

#### 4 – No education or spillover – no debate round has ever influenced policy and voting aff definitely doesn’t make a difference – debate should be about learning accurate policy simulation – it’s the only portable skill.

#### Hold them to the line in CX – they said if we win our framing mechanism with our offense we win the debate.

### 2

#### US-China interdependence strong now from tech, academia, and scientific research but it can go downhill.

Hass 8/12 [Ryan Hass (Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center The Michael H. Armacost Chair Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies Nonresident Fellow, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School), 8-12-2021, "The “new normal” in US-China relations: Hardening competition and deep interdependence," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/12/the-new-normal-in-us-china-relations-hardening-competition-and-deep-interdependence/> // belle (recut)]

The intensification of U.S.-China competition has captured significant attention in recent years. American attitudes toward China have become more negative during this period, as anger has built over disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing’s trampling of Hong Kong’s autonomy, human rights violations in Xinjiang, and job losses to China.

Amidst this focus on great power competition, two broader trends in the U.S.-China relationship have commanded relatively less attention. The first has been the widening gap in America’s and China’s overall national power relative to every other country in the world. The second has been the continuing thick interdependence between the United States and China, even amidst their growing rivalry. Even on economic issues, where rhetoric and actions around decoupling command the most attention, trade and investment data continue to point stubbornly in the direction of deep interdependence. These trends will impact how competition is conducted between the U.S. and China in the coming years.

SEPARATING FROM THE PACK

As America’s unipolarity in the international system has waned, there has been renewed focus on the role of major powers in the international system, including the European Union, Russia, India, and Japan. Each of these powers has a major population and substantial economic weight or military heft, but as my Brookings colleague Bruce Jones has observed, none have all. Only the United States and China possess all these attributes.

The U.S. and China are likely to continue amassing disproportionate weight in the international system going forward. Their growing role in the global economy is fueled largely by both countries’ technology sectors. These two countries have unique traits. These include world-class research expertise, deep capital pools, data abundance, and highly competitive innovation ecosystems. Both are benefitting disproportionately from a clustering effect around technology hubs. For example, of the roughly 4,500 artificial intelligence-involved companies in the world, about half operate in the U.S. and one-third operate in China. According to a widely cited study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the U.S. and China are set to capture 70% of the $15.7 trillion windfall that AI is expected to add to the global economy by 2030.

The United States and China have been reinvesting their economic gains to varying degrees into research and development for new and emerging technologies that will continue to propel them forward. While it is not foregone that the U.S. and China will remain at the frontier of innovation indefinitely, it also is not clear which other countries might displace them or on what timeline. Overall, China’s economy likely will cool in the coming years relative to its blistering pace of growth in recent decades, but it is not likely to collapse.

DEEP INTERDEPENDENCE

At the same time, bilateral competition between the United States and China also is intensifying. Even so, rising bilateral friction has not – at least not yet – undone the deep interdependencies that have built up between the two powers over decades.

In the economic realm, trade and investment ties remain significant, even as both countries continue to take steps to limit vulnerabilities from the other. For example, Chinese regulators have been asserting greater control over when and where Chinese companies raise capital; Beijing’s recent probe of ride-hailing app Didi Chuxing provides but the latest example. China’s top leaders have been emphasizing the need for greater technology “self-sufficiency” and have been pouring billions of dollars of state capital into this drive. Meanwhile, U.S. officials have been seeking to limit American investments from going to Chinese companies linked to the military or surveillance sectors. The Security and Exchange Commission’s scrutiny of initial public offerings for Chinese companies and its focus on ensuring Chinese companies meet American accounting standards could result in some currently listed Chinese companies being removed from U.S. exchanges. Both countries have sought to disentangle supply chains around sensitive technologies with national security, and in the American case, human rights dimensions. U.S. officials have sought to raise awareness of the risks for American firms of doing business in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

Even so, U.S.-China trade and investment ties remain robust. In 2020, China was America’s largest goods trading partner, third largest export market, and largest source of imports. Exports to China supported an estimated 1.2 million jobs in the United States in 2019. Most U.S. companies operating in China report being committed to the China market for the long term.

U.S. investment firms have been increasing their positions in China, following a global trend. BlackRock, J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley have all increased their exposure in China, matching similar efforts by UBS, Nomura Holdings, Credit Suisse, and AXA. The Rhodium Group estimates that U.S. investors held $1.1 trillion in equities issued by Chinese companies, and that there was as much as $3.3 trillion in U.S.-China two-way equity and bond holdings at the end of 2020.

One leg of the U.S.-China economic relationship that has atrophied in recent years has been China’s flow of investment into the United States. This has largely been a product of tightened capital controls in China, growing Chinese government scrutiny of its companies’ offshore investments, and enhanced U.S. screening of Chinese investments for national security concerns.

Another area of U.S.-China interdependence has been knowledge production. As U.S.-China technology expert Matt Sheehan has observed, “With the rise of Chinese talent and capital, the exchange of technological know-how between the United States and China now takes place among private businesses and between individuals.” Leading technology companies in both countries have been building research centers in the other. Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent have all opened research centers in the United States, just as Apple, Microsoft, Tesla, and other major American technology companies rely upon engineering talent in China.

In science collaboration, The Nature Index ranks the joint research between the two countries as the world’s most academically fertile. U.S.-China scientific collaboration grew by more than 10% each year on average between 2015 and 2019. Even following the global spread of COVID-19, American and Chinese experts collaborated more during the past year than over the previous five years combined. This has led to over 100 co-authored articles in leading scientific journals and frequent joint appearances in science-focused workshops and webinars.

China also is the largest source of international students in the United States. In the 2019-20 year, there were over 370,000 Chinese students in the U.S., representing 34% of international students in colleges and universities. Up until now, many of the top Chinese students have stayed in the United States following graduation and contributed to America’s scientific, technological, and economic development. It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue.

COMPETITIVE INTERDEPENDENCE

The scale of American and Chinese interests implicated will likely induce sobriety over time in Washington and Beijing as to how the relationship is managed. The U.S. policy focus for the foreseeable future is not likely to be seeking to “defeat” China or compel the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party. Rather, the focus will be on taking steps at home and with partners abroad to strengthen America’s long-term competitiveness vis-à-vis China. At the same time, American leaders will continue to push their Chinese counterparts to improve the treatment of their citizens. Such efforts are definitional to America’s self-identity as a champion of values.

The dense webs formed by trade, financial, scientific, and academic links between the United States and China will make it difficult for one side to inflict harm on the other without hurting itself in the process. As Joe Nye has written, “America can decouple security risks like Huawei from its 5G telecommunications network, but trying to curtail all trade with China would be too costly. And even if breaking apart economic interdependence were possible, we cannot decouple the ecological interdependence that obeys the laws of biology and physics, not politics.”

President Joe Biden likely will use the challenges posed by China as a spur for his domestic resilience agenda. He is not an ideologue, though, and is unlikely to limit his own flexibility by painting the world with permanent black and white dividing lines. The Biden team knows it will be harder to realize progress on serious global challenges like climate change, pandemics, and inclusive global economic recovery without pragmatic dealings with non-democratic states.

Major near-term improvements to the U.S.-China relationship are unlikely, barring an unexpected moderation in Beijing’s behavior. At the same time, the relationship is also unlikely to tip into outright hostility, barring an unforeseen dramatic event, such as a Chinese act of aggression against an American security partner.

U.S.-China relations are going to be hard-nosed and tense. Neither side is likely to offer concessions in service of smoother relations. At the same time, the balance of interests on both sides likely will control hostile impulses, placing the relationship in a state of hardening competition that coexists alongside a mutual awareness that both sides will be impacted — for good or ill — by their capacity to address common challenges.

#### The plan rolls back trade agreement promising to stop Chinese IP violations – brings in the US.

Shape 2/19 [Steven M. Shape; registered patent attorney and electrical engineer who has represented preeminent technology companies in complex, high-stakes Intellectual Property litigation; 2-19-2021, "IP Law Looms Large Over U.S.-China Relations," No Publication, [https://www.mondaq.com/trademark/1038030/ip-law-looms-large-over-us-china-relations //](https://www.mondaq.com/trademark/1038030/ip-law-looms-large-over-us-china-relations%20//) belle (recut)]

The U.S. and China were indisputably the two largest parties in the global trade war that consumed much of the last several years. Particularly between early 2018 and late 2019, it seemed as if one could hardly go a week, if that, without hearing something about tariffs, exports, imports, steel, soybeans, then-President Donald Trump, President Xi Jinping and the like. Accusations regarding violations of Intellectual Property law were among the biggest flashpoints, and ultimately, China announced new regulations concerning IP protection in November 2019 as a conciliatory move.

Nearly 14 months later, newly inaugurated President Joe Biden has yet to fully clarify his administration's stance toward China. However, it is inevitable that IP rights and their preservation will factor into negotiations between the two economic giants.

A look back at the proposed reforms (and their effects)

Reports from CNN at the time claimed that China's prospective IP law reforms focused on making the penalties for IP infringement more strict. It would also put the government's increasingly modernized tech infrastructure to use in the discovery and prosecution of such crimes.

Beyond that, the proposal carried few specifics. Although it is unclear whether Beijing's gambit worked as the deciding factor for Washington, it certainly did not fail. The two nations agreed in principle on "Phase One" of a new trade agreement December 12, 2019, per The Washington Post, and formalized the deal about a month later. The U.S. pledged not to impose further tariffs and roll back existing import taxes in return for China's IP reforms and agreement to buy American goods.

In the 14 months that followed, so much changed. COVID-19's devastating impact on human life and the global economy made it difficult to gauge the positive effects of the tariff relief or IP reform. A report by the South China Morning Post found that China did not meet its import goal for 2020, with some analysts concluding the Phase One target was unrealistic.

On the IP front, a Hong Kong news provider noted that Beijing had drafted some specific guidance to protect pharmaceutical patents, trade secrets and copyrights, but it was unclear how well they were being implemented. Additionally, a January 2021 report by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) found that Chinese policies which offered subsidies for certain trademark and patent applications helped motivate a glut of fraudulent and bad-faith filings in the last few years.

The bigger picture of China's IP law

A casual observer or someone just learning of this issue might assume that until recently, China had little or no IP laws on the books. Of course, that is not true. However, there are many factors at play complicating the matter of Chinese IP protection policies.

As noted in Harvard Business Review, China is quite strict in certain aspects of IP protection: Beijing allows (and encourages) all businesses to impose non-compete agreements to help protect trade secrets and other IP assets. In addition, according to the National Law Review, two new measures were passed in 2020 specifically to combat bad-faith trademark applications, in addition to the other new guidelines being imposed by the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) in accordance with the Phase One agreement.

All that said, it would be inaccurate to describe Chinese IP law as thoroughly protective for either domestic or foreign innovators. Along with the aforementioned trademark and patent subsidies, considerable controversy stems from "forced technology transfer" policies. According to the University of Oxford's Business Law Blog, foreign companies looking to do business in China must turn over their technology to local firms or be denied the right to operate within China. This effectively means turning over the blueprints (literal or otherwise) to such technology - which is all but equivalent to surrendering the IP. It creates considerable opportunities for infringement, fraud and corruption. Also, in disputes with foreign firms, some local IP courts still markedly favor domestic organizations.

Chinese government representatives often resent such accusations of bias or corruption. In their view, the deals represent friendly agreements between businesses, and courts' decisions are not politically motivated. While Oxford noted that FTT guidelines are not as pervasive now as they were a few years ago, they have yet to disappear altogether.

The Biden approach: Not dissimilar, but multilateral

If the new U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen, is to be believed, the Biden administration will not tolerate any signs of lapses in China's IP protections.

"We need to take on China's abusive, unfair and illegal practices," Yellen said to the Senate Finance Committee at her confirmation hearings. As reported by Bloomberg, she added,

"[China has] been stealing intellectual property and engaging practices that give it an unfair technological advantage, including forced technology transfers. And these . are practices that we're prepared to use the full array of tools to address."

Biden had expressed similar sentiments during a December interview with The New York Times. However, he also said that they would work with ally nations to "develop a coherent strategy" for addressing cases of IP infringement and other issues - a stance Yellen echoed before the Senate - instead of taking China on in a unilateral and bellicose manner. This more nuanced approach could yield greater cooperation from Beijing and help repair U.S.-China trade relations, but we will likely not know one way or the other for some time.

As we saw with the trade war, conflicts between the U.S. and China can quickly escalate and have ripple effects throughout the world. It would thus be wise for all organizations doing business in China to keep themselves abreast of the country's evolving IP regulations and work with a reliable IP services provider to help establish strong protection for their intangible assets.

#### Stable US-China relations key to engagement in dialogue about nuclear activity preventing nuclear war.

CSIS ’13 [CSIS (CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change), March 2013, " Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations a way forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf> // belle (recut)]

The United States has long seen China as a central factor in its strategy in Asia. Since the 1970s, U.S. policy has sought to encourage China’s economic reforms and development and to integrate China into the existing international political and economic order. While hopeful that China will develop into a constructive stakeholder, the United States and much of the Asia-Pacific region share continuing concerns about some aspects of China’s behavior that, it is feared, could undermine regional stability and U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Unfortunately, significant sources of tension and disagreement between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and China, on the other, remain. These sources of discord could, in the worst case, lead to conflict. Needless to say, a large-scale conventional war between the United States and China would be incredibly dangerous and likely tremendously damaging. Nuclear war between the two would be devastating for all involved. Even though a conventional war between the two nations currently seems unlikely and nuclear war even more so, the possibility that war could break out, posing dramatic dangers and damage, clearly indicates that active steps should be taken to avoid conflict and successfully manage U.S.-China nuclear dynamics.

Significance and Objectives of U.S.-China Nuclear Relations

Maintaining stability in U.S.-China nuclear relations will be critical to the interests of the United States and those of its allies and security partners in the coming years. The Working Group judges that the nuclear dynamics between the United States and China are relatively stable at this time, primarily because both sides have or will soon have a nuclear deterrent of the size and scope they determine they need, and China appears committed to a relatively restrained posture oriented around a “lean and effective” nuclear force and its no-first-use policy. Yet the Working Group is concerned that the changing conventional military balance of power in the region, the current sources of tension and possible conflict, and the expansion of the quality and quantity of China’s nuclear arsenal raise serious questions about the future stability of U.S-China nuclear relations. The recommendations contained in this report are therefore focused on enhancing nuclear stabil- ity between the United States and China, primarily by advocating a series of both bilateral and unilat- eral policy and posture adjustments that would enhance crisis stability and arms race stability, while also laying the groundwork for future bilateral and multilateral nuclear engagement.

Because the current nuclear dynamics are broadly stabilizing and should be sustained, the Working Group recommends that U.S.-China nuclear relations be oriented toward sustaining these dynamics and avoiding decisions by either side that could erode stability. We therefore recommend a robust but realistically tailored program of engagement and dialogue on nuclear issues that reinforce China’s nuclear restraint and advance U.S. interests in stability, dialogue, transparency, and prog- ress toward arms control. The Working Group recognizes, however, the limited success attempts at dialogue and cooperation have thus far yielded. The Group’s recommendations are therefore de- signed to be ambitious but realistic, and are structured in such a way that, in the event that Beijing is unwilling to engage in earnest along the lines the Group advocates, the United States would be left with a powerful strategic capability and in the strong political position of having proffered a serious, fair-minded path forward in bilateral nuclear weapons relations that China had rebuffed.

The Working Group also recommends that the United States adopt a policy of accepting China’s possession of an assured second-strike nuclear capability, and thus avoid attempting to acquire the capability to negate China’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities. This judgment relies on the fundamental determination that the United States cannot realistically hope to deny China’s second-strike capability, that a failed attempt to deny it would be costly and counterproductive, and that Beijing’s possession of a reliable retaliatory capability promotes stability rather than detracts from it. In addition, this approach could reinforce China’s nuclear restraint. The Working Group is, however, divided on whether the United States should publicly and formally announce this acceptance.

The Working Group believes that some of the concepts associated with the idea of “strategic stability” provide an appropriate framework for U.S.-China engagement on nuclear weapons is- sues, although the specific meaning of the term is the subject of a long-running debate that has never been definitively settled. In order to gain the benefits of strategic stability, the Working Group believes that nuclear relations between the United States and China should emphasize two complementary approaches: crisis stability and arms race stability.

Stability can emerge between the United States and China if each fields forces that are capable of surviving a first strike and if each is able to credibly demonstrate to the other side that its cur- rent and future capabilities are not capable of denying the other side a viable strategic deterrent. As a result, fear of preemption and the need to launch weapons early become irrelevant, either as irri- tants in crisis or as dangers in conflict. In this way, the benefits of deterrence can be retained, while minimizing the chances of nuclear escalation and avoiding a competition in the development of offensive and defensive strategic arms that would intensify uncertainties for both sides.

Both sides could derive value from cooperation on nuclear weapons issues grounded in the stability concept. The United States worries about the composition of China’s nuclear force, China’s views on escalation and plans for nuclear use, and the future trajectory of China’s strategic posture. China, meanwhile, worries about the ability of the United States to deny it a second-strike capa- bility; the scope and sophistication of future U.S. nuclear, conventional prompt global strike, and missile defense programs; and U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge a condition of mutual vulner- ability between the two nations. A stability-grounded model could help address these anxiet- ies—on the U.S. side by providing greater insight into China’s current and future force structure and deeper insight into China’s ways of thinking about nuclear strategy, and on the Chinese side by providing similar insight into U.S. developments and a greater degree of assurance about U.S. acknowledgment of the survivability of the Chinese force. Concurrently, such an approach would have the added benefit of building confidence on both sides, thereby enhancing strategic trust more broadly. Finally, such a model could also provide a satisfactory way in which both nations could see something approximating their current force size, posture, and doctrine as satisfactory and compatible with stability.

#### US-China war escalates to nuclear use.

Talmadge 18, Caitlin [PoliSci PhD from MIT, Government BA from Harvard, Prof of Security Studies at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.] “Beijing’s Nuclear Option.” Foreign Affairs. October 15, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option> TG (recut)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

## Case