# 1NC

### 1NC – Intuitions NC

#### The meta-ethic is non-naturalism. Goodness cannot be reduced to an empirical property –

#### 1 – Naturalistic fallacy – Examples of goodness fail to define the ultimate good.

Moore 03 G.E. Moore. “Principia Ethica.” 1903. http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/.

Good, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word. The most important sense of definition is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense good has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. It is one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms of reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined. That there must be an indefinite number of such terms is obvious, on reflection; since we cannot define anything except by an analysis, which, when carried as far as it will go, refers us to something, which is simply different from anything else, and which by that ultimate difference explains the peculiarity of the whole which we are defining: for every whole contains some parts which are common to other wholes also. There is, therefore, no intrinsic difficulty in the contention that good denotes a simple and indefinable quality. There are many other instances of such qualities. Consider yellow, for example. We may try to define it, by describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. But a moment’s reflection is sufficient to shew that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we perceive. Indeed, we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colours. The most we can be entitled to say of those vibrations is that they are what corresponds in space to the yellow which we actually perceive. Yet a mistake of this simple kind has commonly been made about good. It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not other, but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the naturalistic fallacy and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.

#### 2 – Open Question argument – Let x be a natural property like pleasure. If x is analytically equivalent to goodness, then asking “is x good” becomes “is good good” which means either A) Naturalistic frameworks create a meaningless tautology of “good is good” or B) x is not the same as goodness so non-naturalism is true.

#### Only intuitions are consistent with non-naturalism.

Lacewing No Date Michael Lacewing, Director of Research and Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London. “Moral non-naturalism.” No date. <https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3-euw1-ap-pe-ws4-cws-documents.ri-prod/9781138690394/moralphilosophy/moral_non-naturalism.docx>.

If moral properties are not natural properties, then how do we discover them? How do we know what is good? In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill claims that we cannot prove what is good or not. To prove a claim is to deduce it from some other claim that we have already established. Moore agrees. But unlike Mill, he does not think that we can argue inductively from evidence either. All we can do is consider the truth of the claim, such as ‘pleasure is good’, itself. Moore calls such claims ‘intuitions’.

What does this mean? The claim that some truths can be known by rational ‘intuition’ is made by rationalism. But what is a moral intuition, and how can we tell if it is true? Moore leaves these questions open: ‘when I call such propositions Intuitions, I mean merely to assert that they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as to the manner or origin of our cognition of them’. However, he has already said more than this. He has argued that these claims are not analytically true. And he has argued that we cannot know them through empirical investigation. So they must be some variety of synthetic a priori knowledge. He claims that we can know propositions about what is good to be true (or false) by considering the proposition itself. Intuitions are ‘self-evident’ propositions.

A self-evident judgement rests on the ‘evidence’ of its own plausibility, which is grasped directly. This doesn’t necessarily mean that everyone can immediately see that it is true. ‘Self-evident’ is not the same as ‘obvious’. Our ability to make a self-evident judgement needs to develop first, and we need to consider the issue very carefully and clearly. Because moral intuitions are not known through the senses, the self-evidence of a moral intuition will be more like the self-evidence of a necessary truth, such as mathematics or claims about what is logically possible, than the self-evidence of a perceptual truth, such as the claim that there is a table in front of me.

So, intuitionism does not need to claim that we have a faculty of intuition that ‘detects’ whether something is good or not, a bit like a supernatural sense. Intuitionism is simply a form of ethical non-naturalism that claims that some of our moral judgements are synthetic yet self-evident.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with intuitionism. Prefer additionally –

#### 1 – Performativity – The process of justifying frameworks concedes the validity of intuitionism since we only adopt a framework if it is consistent with our intuitions. I.e. We reject skep because it isn’t consistent with intuitions about acting properly.

#### 2 – Infinite Regress – I can infinitely question why I should follow a particular syllogistic premise of your framework which ultimately ends with agent’s intuition to decide whether a framework is legitimate and avoid skep.

#### 3 – Rule-Following Paradox – Following any rule requires another rule to determine how to follow the original rule. However, this is infinitely regressive because we will also need a rule to determine which rule define rules and so on. Intuitionism solves since it simply points to things that are intuitively thought of as good avoiding the need for extra rules.

#### 4 – TJFs –

#### A] Critical thinking – Intuitions merely require the use of arguments for initial intellectual appearances which forces debaters to actually engage in the process of the framework as they think of how to respond to it, proves strongest internal link to phil ed.

#### B] Small schools – Util debates reward debaters with more resources like coaches and backfiles – structural abuse outweighs – it rewards debaters because of factors outside of their control. Mines solves since it only requires analytic arguments which prevents the advantage.

#### I contend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is a priori intuitive. Now negate –

#### 1 – Psychology – Humans have intuition to either respect property rights or cede property for development.

APS 10 Association for Psychological Science, global scientific home of more than 25,000 leading psychological science researchers, practitioners, teachers, and students across all continents. “An Intuitive Sense of Property.” August 17, 2010. [www.psychologicalscience.org/news/were-only-human/an-intuitive-sense-of-property.html](http://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/were-only-human/an-intuitive-sense-of-property.html).

Americans like to own their homes, and the rules and conventions for ownership are generally well understood. So it’s easy to forget that in many corners of the globe the rules are more ambiguous–and more open to challenge. Indeed, there are an estimated one billion squatters in the world today–people who, mostly out of necessity, are living on property they do not own and cannot afford.

Squatters rarely have a voice, but in a few industrialized cities where they do, their claims are usually founded on the idea of improvement. If an owner abandons or neglects a property, shouldn’t another human being be allowed to take shelter, invest sweat equity in making it a home, and lay some claim to it? In other words, does hard work improving a property convey some right to occupancy, even ownership?

New research suggests that our moral judgments about property ownership may be an intuitive process–one more fundamental than society’s laws and regulations. Psychological scientist Patricia Kanngiesser and colleagues at the University of Bristol, UK, studied three and four-year-old children (as well as adults) to see how children think about private property before they come under the influence of adult rules. Previous research had shown that very young children tend to honor the rights of the first owner as a default position–as long as they are given no compelling reason to think differently. But the scientists wanted to see if creative labor is such a compelling reason–that is, if improving property trumps the original ownership rights.

To test this idea in the lab, they used a form of property that children might realistically “own”–clay animals. Both the experimenter and the subjects were given title to a set of clay cookie-cutter animals, each set different: blue ducks, for example, or red butterflies. Then each of them “borrowed” and worked on one of the other’s animals, using cookie cutters to transform the clay into something new–an elephant, for example. Or, alternatively, they simply held the animal for a bit, or snipped off a small piece of clay with a knife. The idea was to compare mere possession with two levels of creative labor, to see if any of these affected views of ownership.

And they did, in some interesting ways. As reported on-line this week in the journal Psychological Science, all of the subjects–children and adults–were much more likely to transfer ownership of the property to a second person if that person showed some industry in changing the property. And the more work, the greater the entitlement: That is, transforming the animal into a new animal was more significant than just snipping off some clay, which was more significant than merely holding the animal. Even if they transformed a duck into a different kind of duck, that was sufficient for entitlement, though changing a duck into an elephant conveyed somewhat more in the way of ownership rights. In other words, it was work that mattered most; creativity was important but secondary.

But here’s the really interesting part: These views of ownership and labor were much more common in the preschool children than in the adults. Adults were much more likely to give priority to the original owner–and much less likely to value labor and creativity. In that sense, adults appear to have outgrown their intuitive belief in squatters’ rights, replacing this sensibility with formal laws and regulations.

#### 2 – Polls – More people think private companies should be involved.

Backus 19 Fred Backus, Manager of surveys at CBS News and former deputy survey manager for the NYT. “Most Americans think NASA and private companies should have role in space program.” CBS News. July 15, 2019. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-think-nasa-and-private-companies-should-have-role-in-space-program/>.

* Poll conducted by telephone June 13-16, 2019 among a random sample of 1,201 adults nationwide
* Poll used a random digit dial methodology

Most Americans think the U.S. space program contributes scientific advances, pride and patriotism to the country, and increasing numbers think we are not spending enough on it. However, a majority of Americans also think that both the government and private sector should be involved in space exploration.

Americans are divided on whether the U.S. is still the world leader in space exploration — and whether it is even important that the U.S. be the world leader.

The public sees benefits in the U.S. space program in terms of scientific advances and national pride. Seventy-nine percent of Americans say the space program contributes at least some to advances that all Americans can use. And 73% say the U.S. space program makes at least some contribution to America's pride and patriotism, including 39% who say it does so a lot.

Graphical user interface

Description automatically generated

Americans see a role for both the public and private sectors. Most — 70% — think both NASA and private companies should be involved in space exploration.

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

Thirty-one percent of Americans feel the U.S. spends the right amount on space. Though still less than a third of all Americans who say so, more Americans feel we are spending too little on space exploration than felt that way 10 years ago (16%) and 20 years ago (15%), around the 30th anniversary of the moon landing.

A picture containing shape

Description automatically generated

Younger Americans are particularly likely to say we are spending too little on space. Thirty-eight percent of Americans under thirty think we are spending too little, compared to 29% of Americans age 30 and older.

# Case