# 1AC Harvard R2

### 1AC – Framing

#### I value morality.

#### Ethics are split between the deontic and the aretaic. Deontic theories refer to a moral code to determine the obligation of subjects, while aretaic theories ask what kind of subjects people should be. By developing good moral character, good actions will naturally follow.

Gryz 11 Jarek Gryz, Professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14, 493–501. November 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9258-3.

There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. This function consists in providing answers to questions like: What am I (morally) required to do? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. They are expressed by means of such terms as: ‘right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’, etc. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action (or an actor). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. Terms used for evaluations include: ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments.

#### Prefer the aretaic model:

#### 1 – It provides a richer vocabulary to evaluate actions extending beyond goodness and badness.

Gryz 2 Jarek Gryz, Professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14, 493–501. November 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9258-3.

The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. Goodness and badness come in degrees, hence we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’; we lack similar terms for deontically evaluated actions. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; an all-or- nothing choice, implied by the use of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on only one quantum quality.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary. For example, by saying that something is praiseworthy we imply that it deserves approval or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems just impossible. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. If our task is just to substitute every particular deontic evaluation with an aretaic one, there are no logical reasons that would make it impossible (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, attractive ethical theories seem to be much better off than the imperative ones.

#### Outweighs – Moral theories need to have the most explanatory power over the rightness of an action to guide choices.

#### 2 – The deontic collapses to the aretaic –

#### A] Performatively – Engaging in ethics concedes to the authority of becoming a better person, otherwise we would have no reason to act ethically.

#### B] If subjects were conditioned properly, they would independently take the right actions, which hijacks deontic theories.

#### C] Regress – We can always ask why we follow a deontic rule but the answer will be in trying to achieve an aretaic property.

#### 3 – Motivation – The aretaic allows subjects to understand the nature behind their actions instead of aimlessly following an ethical theory by making the choice they think is correct. The deontic fails to be motivational.

Cox 12 Damian Cox, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bond University. “Judgment, Deliberation, and the Self-effacement of Moral Theory.” Journal of Value Inquiry. 2012. <https://philpapers.org/rec/COXJDA>.

Derek Parﬁt introduced the term ‘‘self-effacement’’ to describe the case in which proponents of a moral theory direct moral agents not to believe the theory.1 The term has since been used in a variety of ways. Glen Pettigrove uses the term to refer to moral theories that ‘‘cannot serve as a person’s motive when she acts.’’2 Joel Martinez applies the term to moral theories whose application requires agents to act from considerations other than the considerations that make an action right.3 Whereas Parﬁt frames self-effacement in terms of the beliefs of moral agents, Pettigrove frames it in terms of motives for action and Martinez in terms of reasons for action. Self-effacement can also be framed in terms of moral deliberation. On this construal, a theory is self-effacing if it entails that it is sometimes wrong to use the theory in moral deliberation. A theory is deliberatively self-effacing if and only if it implies a rejection of any direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. The phenomenon of deliberative self-effacement is pervasive and highly signiﬁcant. For example, utilitarian judgment of deliberation performed in directly utilitarian terms tends to be harsh. Working through expected utility calculations is normally a sub-optimal way of morally deliberating, even for individuals who are good at calculating. By utilitarian lights, this makes it a morally wrong way of deliberating. Utilitarians have long recognized this feature of utilitarian deliberation and the most popular response has been to reject any direct connection between moral deliberation and judgment of right action. This is the position that Bentham takes. Writing about deliberation in terms of the hedonic calculus, Bentham says: ‘‘It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.’’4 By ‘‘moral judgment,’’ Bentham means moral deliberation, so in this passage he is denying a need to apply his theory of right action directly when deciding how to act. Bentham does not do so, but other utilitarians develop indirect forms of utilitarianism in which utilitarian judgment of rightness is carefully separated from processes of moral deliberation.5 According to indirect utilitarians, deliberation in general ought to proceed on grounds that, given the condition and circumstances of deliberators, produce the best outcomes over the long haul. Direct utilitarian calculation will only occasionally constitute such grounds. Indirect utilitarianism is a deliberatively self-effacing theory and its plausibility depends upon the plausibility of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. Deliberative self-effacement crops up in unexpected places. For example, Bernard Williams argued that reasoning explicit in the works of Kant would lead a person to entertain one thought too many in cases where motives of love ought to predominate.6 Williams thought that this demonstrated the hollowness of the account that Kant advances. One way to interpret his objection to the account advanced by Kant is as a charge of self-effacement. A proper understanding of obligations of love requires that a person not act on them by explicitly consulting them. To do so would be to have one thought too many. The account advanced by Kant, therefore, is self-effacing. Followers of Kant ought to recommend against a direct deployment of an account of right action in moral deliberation along the lines of what Kant proposes. Followers of Kant have a ready response, however, and this is to embrace the possibility of self-effacement. It is at root the same as the response offered by indirect utilitarians. What makes an action right according to Kant ought to be distinguished from his view of how a person ought to deliberate about what to do. Love brings with it obligations, but these are not always obligations to deliberate about the obligations of love and act accordingly. The problem Williams uncovered is not with accounts of moral judgment along the lines of what Kant proposed, anchored as they are in respect for the rational nature of persons, but with the implicit assumption of a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. If we assume that the terms of moral deliberation must be the terms of moral judgment, we arrive at an implausible account of moral deliberation in contexts of love. The key to solving the problem Williams introduced, therefore, is to ﬁnd a coherent and plausible way of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment.

#### Outweighs – A non-motivational theory would be arbitrary and its normative value wouldn’t matter insofar as subjects aren’t forced to follow it.

#### 4 – The deontic fails –

#### A] It’s impossible for a moral law to take into account every possible situation so there will be inevitable cases where rules fail.

#### B] It doesn’t take into account cultural differences in norms. Moral laws are socially constructed and dependent on their conditions which means they are subjective and fail. Virtue solves by allowing subjects to determine and weigh between their virtues.

#### Next, only the virtue paradigm is consistent with the aretaic. Instead of assigning normative claims, it focuses on developing subjects to make them virtuous.

Reader 2k Soran Reader, Lecturer in Philosophy at Durham University and editor of The Philosophy of Need. “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalisms, Reasons and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3, 341–364. December 2000. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009923402877>.

Virtue is a free disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions. Virtue ethics claims that what is to count[s] as a good action or what is a good outcome is conceptually dependent on claims about the virtue of an agent. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself, virtue ethicists instead explore the concrete dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from already virtuous agents. They hold that the key to moral rationality is found in moral education. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent ? the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These beginner-agents learn from the experienced, wise moral agent by copying by mimicking in their actions the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things, going on to do the same, then going on to do the same in new ways, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of the phronimos which can explain or justify it (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learning of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-followers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it. The burden of proof now rests with those who want to resist the idea that ethics is, at bottom, a way of doing things (specifically, living a good human life), and want to find a more fundamental notion than the practi cal skill that the virtuous person has. We approach this problem after Wittgenstein: he argued that 'rules' or 'interpretations' cannot be fundamental in our rationality, but that an actual way of going on comes first.17 McDowell (1979) first applied this insight to moral philosophy; its import has yet fully to be appreciated.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting virtue. Impact calculus – Consequences are irrelevant – Virtues aren’t end goods like pleasure or pain – It’s not about how long you live but rather how you live.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1 – Subject Transformation – Virtue ethics are key to fight racism by accounting for particularities in relationships and encouraging transformation of character.

O’Connell 14 [O’Connell, Maureen. “After White Supremacy? The Viability of Virtue Ethics for Racial Justice.” Journal of Moral Theology. Published 2014] SHS ZS

As a white Christian ethicist and protagonist in the scenes above, I wonder whether virtue ethics as it is understood and practiced in Catholic moral theology serves as a viable moral method for examin- ing and responding to these racial events. There are many reasons to think that would be the case. To begin, **virtue ethics** generally **aims for moral** **development in personal or intrapersonal spheres**,2 which are also **the spaces where racism** in our post-civil rights era **has re- treated and remains firmly entrenched** as evidenced in the first sce- nario. **Virtue ethics is** also **attentive to the material** **or concrete par- ticularities of agents** and contexts, **and** therefore **invites** **attuned per- ception to** the more **subtle dimensions of human moral action** such as intention and emotive reasoning, as well as the fitting or appropriate response in light of the underlying relationships of a given situation.3 **This would make it helpful in combating racism in its more covert** contemporary **forms** such as internalized **dispositions of superiority** (operative in the first scenario), **situations where stereotypes are like- ly to occlude actual facts** (the second scenario), o**r situations where one’s place in the racial hierarchy is likely to determine how one re- lates to others** (the third scenario). Finally, **virtue ethics encourages ongoing and future-oriented transformation** through a process of striving toward a vision of what one hopes to become, whether as an individual or as a community, operative in the second and third sce- narios.4 Americans were recently reminded of the indispensability of virtue ethics for racial justice as we marked the 50th Anniversary of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, recalling a prophet- ic imperative to judge people on their character rather than the color of their skin and recommitting ourselves to making dreams of racial equality a reality.

### 1AC – Offense

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle: Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. PICs affirm since they don’t disprove my general thesis – “Birds fly” is true even if “penguins fly” is false.

#### Now affirm:

#### 1 – Hubris – To take control and appropriate space is to believe that you are above nature itself, which is arrogance.

Sparrow 99 (Robert Sparrow, Professor at Monash University; At the highest level of description my research interests are political philosophy and applied ethics; I am interested in philosophical arguments with real-world implications. More specifically, I am working in or have worked in: political philosophy, bioethics, environmental ethics, media ethics; just war theory; and the ethics of science and technology., 1999, accessed on 12-12-2021, Environmental Ethics 21, " Robert Sparrow, The ethics of terraforming - PhilPapers", https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)[bracketed for gen lang]//phs st //recut

IV. THE SIN OF HUBRIS The other vice which terraforming might involve us in is the sin of hubris. Hubris is a vice, discussed in classical Greek literature and mythology, which is popularly thought to involve excessive pride before the gods.'9 It occurs when humans willfully ignore their limits and seek to become like gods.2° Hubris is traditionally punished by disaster. The excess of pride is the undoing of those who possess it and they are put in their place, usually roughly. The paradigmatic example of hubris can be found in the legend of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun in the attempt to reach heaven and lost his son as a result.21 Planetary engineering strikes me as a good candidate for the sort of project which would demonstrate hubris. We would be playing god. This sentiment is never far from the literature. The rhetoric of terraforming is quite self-consciously a rhetoric of transformation and transcendence. Terraforming is not just another project. It is a project that would make us world makers .22 It would mark the next stage of human destiny and the beginning of the conquest of space. But what about someone who denies that there are any limits on human activity? Someone who holds that there are no gods, no one to challenge, and that human beings can and should forge a glorious destiny? It is obviously unsatisfactory to rely on theistic claims about the proper place of humanity. For the argument to be convincing in modern circumstances, we must be able to give a non-theistic account of hubris. There are two strategies we may pursue to develop such an account. The first and the easiest is to focus on the character and phenomenology of the vice of hubris. To do so, we must provide a description of hubris as an attitude and show that the project of terraforming is both the result of and a source of such attitudes. As noted above, the proponents of terraforming often seem to demon-strate an attitude which is a good prima-facie candidate for hubris. Classically, hubris involves glorying in one's own powers, a false optimism about them, and a haste to put them to the test. A lack of self-knowledge and self-reflection is also characteristic of hubris, as is a dismissive attitude toward both critics and past failures. All of these traits are sometimes evidenced in the discussion of terraforming. The project attracts interest simply because it is so dramatic and because of the proof it could provide of the supremacy of human spirit and engineering skill. This enthusiasm for terraforming looks particularly damning in the light of past technological disasters on Earth. There is little self-reflection going on in the debate about terraforming, which is largely a technical debate about feasibility and methods and which allows little room for questions about why we would want to engage in such a project.23 Thus, the attitudes surrounding and driving terraforming seem to fit the phenom- enology of hubris. But this strategy will not, I suspect, prove effective against an entirely serious (including morally serious) and reflective advocate of terra- forming who denies that any of the above attitudes are involved and who challenges the conservative and parochial consequences of the critique. Although the attitudes described above are all, as a matter of contingent fact, demon- strated by current advocates of terraforming, it remains to be argued that they are always likely to be so. In order to meet objections of this type, we need to try to show that the sin of hubris involves a reference to certain sorts of projects. The above attitudes are all part of the burning desire to transgress our limits. We need to give some account of our limits and to show that terraforming is outside of them. The second strategy is thus to try to formulate a (non-theistic) account of humanity's place in the cosmos and of appropriate limits to human activities, in order to show that projects which transgress these demonstrate hubris.24 It is important to understand that this argument is an attempt to show that seeking to transcend certain limits demonstrates hubris; and is therefore wrong, rather than an attempt to show why seeking to transcend certain limits is wrong, and therefore demonstrates hubris. It is intended to remain within an agent-based framework. We need an account of our limits in order to better show when people are trying to overcome them. Nevertheless, the fact that trying to do so is wrong is solely a function of whether it demonstrates hubris or not, which also depends on any other number of things.25 How do we distinguish these limits? Again it seems to me that there are two ways we might seek some guide to the limits of proper human action. The first moves indirectly toward an account of our limits by fodusing on the nature of our actions and by arguing that certain features are characteristic of projects which seek to transcend our proper limits. There is often a significant relation between our actions and the projects they are part of. In the case of hubris, acts of hubris are usually large, dramatic, and unprecedented acts. They are usually punished by disaster. The pride and the fall go hand in hand. The possibility of disaster, then, of failure which would bring us low, operates as a sign of hubris. Terraforrning certainly involves the possibility of catastrophic failure. Given the scale of the project and the amount of energy involved, failures are likely to be disastrous. Instead of a habitable planet, we may produce .one with a poisonous atmosphere or without water or lashed by continual typhoons. Indeed, given the amount of resources and human effort which would need to be dedicated to terraforming, anything other than complete success would be a disaster. Note that it is the possibility of disaster rather than its probability which is important here. I am not arguing that the risks are too great or that the costs of failure are too high. Instead, the possibility of a catastrophic failure which would reveal our ambitions as arrogant and futile acts as an indication that the project is one which oversteps the limits of our wisdom and abilities. Second, we might attempt more directly to flesh out the idea of our own proper human place. We could try to gain a sense of possible limits to the ambitions which are appropriate to human beings. When considering terraforming, because the limit we are considering here is the physical limit of being confined to a single planet, it seems fair to invoke the metaphor of our proper place in a spatial sense. However, this metaphor can also be understood more generally to pose the question of our proper place in the scheme of things or the limits of the sphere of human activity.26 To say that some location or area is our proper place is not an empty thought. It implies a certain relation of appropriateness in our presence there. A proper place is one in which one can flourish without too much of a struggle. It is one that we can live in and sustain. It is a place in which one fits and does not appear uncomfortable or out of place. It is prima facie implausible'to suggest that Mars is our proper place. The vast amount of effort required for us to sustain a presence there, even to the point of entirely transforming the planet, indicates that it is not a natural environment for us. Our presence there would be analogous to that of a penguin in the Sahara or a rabbit underwater. If we have to wear space suits to visit and to completely remodel it in order to stay, then it's simply not our place. Another way to try to understand our proper place is by relating •it to the idea of a home. It seems natural to say of most creatures, at least as individuals and perhaps as species, that they have a home. This is a place which nurtures them, in which they grow up, reproduce and which offers them some semblance of safety. It is difficult to say of human beings collectively, who have colonized all reaches of the globe, where our homeis. But "Earth" looks like a plausible answer. Planets seem to have a certain status as possible homes for creatures because of their nature as whole systems on which life can evolve. The relation between the idea of a home and the idea of our proper place that I am suggesting is an ethical one. Our proper place is at home until we have shown that we are mature enough to leave it. Whether or not people are ready to leave home depends on how well they live at home and how they look after that home. On this test, the human species does not look well qualified to start moving out to other planets. We must show that we are capable of looking after our current home before we could claim to have any place on another. For the moment, at least, our proper place is on Earth and the desire to colonize other planets is indicative of hubris.

#### 2 – Forms – Commodifying nature strips value away from our form – The correct way to respond to nature is to conform to it instead of restructuring it to fit us. Space colonization is just a method to conquer more parts of nature.

Lewis 43 (C.S. Lewis, Clive Staples Lewis was a British writer and lay theologian. He held academic positions in English literature at both Oxford University and Cambridge University., 1943, accessed on 12-12-2021, Samizdat.qc, "The Abolition of Man", http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/cosmos/philo/AbolitionofMan.pdf)[bracketed for gen lang]//phs st //recut

My point may be clearer to some if it is put in a different form. Nature is a word of varying meanings, which can best be understood if we consider its various opposites. The Natural is the opposite of the Artificial, the Civil, the Human, the Spiritual, and the Supernatural. The Artificial does not now concern us. If we take the rest of the list of opposites, however, I think we can get a rough idea of what [hu]men have meant by Nature and what it is they oppose to her. Nature seems to be the spatial and temporal, as distinct from what is less fully so or not so at all. She seems to be the world of quantity, as against the world of quality; of objects as against consciousness; of the bound, as against the wholly or partially autonomous; of that which knows no values as against that which both has and perceives value; of efficient causes (or, in some modern systems, of no causality at all) as against final causes. Now I take it that when we understand a thing analytically and then dominate and use it for our own convenience, we reduce it to the level of ‘Nature’ in the sense that we suspend our judgements of value about it, ignore its final cause (if any), and treat it in terms of quantity. This repression of elements in what would otherwise be our total reaction to it is sometimes very noticeable and even painful: something has to be overcome before we can cut up a dead [hu]man or a live animal in a dissecting room. These objects resist the movement of the mind whereby we thrust them into the world of mere Nature. But in other instances too, a similar price is exacted for our analytical knowledge and manipulative power, even if we have ceased to count it. We do not look at trees either as Dryads or as beautiful objects while we cut them into beams: the first man who did so may have felt the price keenly, and the bleeding trees in Virgil and Spenser may be faroff echoes of that primeval sense of impiety. The stars lost their divinity as astronomy developed, and the Dying God has no place in chemical agriculture. To many, no doubt, this process is simply the gradual discovery that the real world is different from what we expected, and the old opposition to Galileo or to ‘body-snatchers’ is simply obscurantism. But that is not the whole story. It is not the greatest of modern scientists who feel most sure that the object, stripped of its qualitative properties and reduced to mere quantity, is wholly real. Little scientists, and little unscientific followers of science, may think so. The great minds know very well that the object, so treated, is an artificial abstraction, that something of its reality has been lost. From this point of view the conquest of Nature appears in a new light. We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may ‘conquer’ them. We are always conquering Nature, because ‘Nature’ is the name for what we have, to some extent, conquered. The price of conquest is to treat a thing as mere Nature. Every conquest over Nature increases her domain. The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them: the soul does not become Nature till we can psychoanalyse her. The wresting of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things to Nature. As long as this process stops short of the final stage we may well hold that the gain outweighs the loss. But as soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed are one and the same. This is one of the many instances where to carry a principle to what seems its logical conclusion produces absurdity. It is like the famous Irishman who found that a certain kind of stove reduced his fuel bill by half and thence concluded that two stoves of the same kind would enable him to warm his house with no fuel at all. It is the magician’s bargain: give up our soul, get power in return. But once our souls, that is, ourselves, have been given up, the power thus conferred will not belong to us. We shall in fact be the slaves and puppets of that to which we have given our souls. It is in [hu]Man’s power to treat himself as a mere ‘natural object’ and his own judgements of value as raw material for scientific manipulation to alter at will. The objection to his doing so does not lie in the fact that this point of view (like one’s first day in a dissecting room) is painful and shocking till we grow used to it. The pain and the shock are at most a warning and a symptom. The real objection is that if man chooses to treat himself as raw material, raw material he will be: not raw material to be manipulated, as he fondly imagined, by himself, but by mere appetite, that is, mere Nature, in the person of his de-humanized Conditioners. We have been trying, like Lear, to have it both ways: to lay down our human prerogative and yet at the same time to retain it. It is impossible. Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have no motive but their own ‘natural’ impulses. Only the Tao provides a common human law of action which can over-arch rulers and ruled alike. A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery.

#### 3 – Greed – Everyone can use reason to access the form/conception of space so it’s incoherent to place property rights on something everyone technically has. Appropriating outer space prioritizes the interests of the private sector dominated by like billionaires over other agents which hinders human flourishing.