**Stock AC**

**Framework**

**Pleasure is an intrinsic good.**

**Moen ’16** – (Ole Martin, PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy @ University of Oslo, "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267). Modified for glang

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels,** and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask what her**~~is~~ **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail.

**1 – Death first – the best quantifiable way to measure pain because it is immoral to compare suffering.  
  
2 – World Trade Organization uses util all the time  
WTO’ [No Date]** https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/wto\_dg\_stat\_e.htm

The World Trade Organization — **the WTO** — is the international organization whose **primary purpose** is to open **trade for the benefit of ALL** .

**C1: Accessibility**

**Current IPP systems are damaging to developing countries – 3 links  
OXFAM 21’** Oxfam is a global organization working to end the injustice of poverty. Oxfam provides grants and technical support to local organizations around the world. Together with these partners, they support long-term solutions that help poor communities grow nutritious food, access land and clean water, and obtain decent work and fair wages.

**1. Loopholes allow IPs to break out of conventional rules – uniquely bad in developing countries and hinders innovation**

**(A)Patent linkage prohibits a country**’s drug regulatory authority **from approving a medicine if there is any patent—even a frivolous one—in effect.** It requires regulatory officials to police patents in addition to their core work of evaluating the safety and efficacy of medicines.   
**(B)Patent extension provisions allow companies to seek extensions of the 20-year patent term to compensate for administrative delays** by patent offices and drug regulatory authorities. (Such **delays** are **inevitable in developing countries**, **where** these **offices are chronically underfunded** and are facing increasing numbers of patent applications**.)**[**(C)Data exclusivity**](https://policy-practice.oxfamamerica.org/work/trade/data-exclusivity)creates a monopoly that is separate from patents by **prohibiting** a **country**’s drug regulatory authority **from approving a generic medicine** **based on the clinical trial data provided by the originator company.**

**2. Generic Competition is better – IPPs interfere.**

**Extensive patent protection for new medicines** **delays** the onset of **generic competition**. And because generic competition is the **only proven method of reducing medicine prices in a sustainable way**, such **high levels of IPP** are **extremely damaging to public health.** Thanks to the cost savings from **use of generics**, PEPFAR (the President’s Emergency Plan **for AIDS Relief**) has successfully initiated **treatment for** more than **three million people worldwide**, and **saved $380 million in 2010 alone.**

**3. See Peru: IPP makes medicine inaccessible, current system makes it worse**

**Peru** is a low- to middle-income country with **high levels of poverty and inequality** and with a **high burden of** chronic and noncommunicable **diseases that require medicines** over the **long term**. Prices for **patented medicines to treat cancer**, for example, are **unaffordable for households** and have exhausted most of the government’s resources available to pay for treatments **under the public health system.** A 2010 study by a Peruvian government entity (the Director General of Medicines, Supply and Drugs, or DIGEMID) revealed this stark reality: the **monthly cost of one key patented medicine needed to treat head and neck cancer is equivalent to 880 times the daily minimum wage in Peru, an amount that would take a worker more than two years to earn, without a single day off.**

**Studies prove – IP is damaging to accessibility**

**Since** the introduction of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (**TRIPS**) in 1995, there has been considerable concern that **poor access to essential medicines in developing countries** would be **exacerbated** because strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) leads to **monopoly of pharmaceutical markets** and **delayed entry of lower-cost generic drugs**. However, despite extensive research and disputes regarding this issue, there are few empirical studies on the topic. In this study, we investigated the effect of IPR on access to medicines and catastrophic expenditure for medicines, using data from World Health Surveys 2002-2003. The index of patent rights developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) was used to measure the IPR protection level of each country. Estimates were adjusted for individual and country characteristics. In the results of multilevel logistic regression analyses, **higher level of IPR significantly increased the likelihood of nonaccess to prescribed medicines even after controlling for individual socioeconomic status and national characteristics associated with access to medicines**. This study's finding on the negative impact of IPR on access to medicines calls for the implementation of more active policy at the supra-national level to improve access in low- and middle-income countries.

**Impact: Lack of medicine due to IPPs has devastating consequences – Effects Millions  
WHO 17’**Nearly **2 billion people** have **no access to basic medicines**, causing a cascade of **preventable misery and suffering.** Since the landmark agreement on the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHO and its partners have launched a number of initiatives that are making market forces serve the poor. The WHO prequalification programme is now firmly established as a mechanism for improving access to safe, effective and quality-assured products. WHO has struggled to improve access to medicines throughout its nearly 70-year history, and rightly so. Good health is impossible without access to pharmaceutical products. Universal health coverage depends on the availability of quality-assured affordable health technologies in sufficient quantities. **Lack of access to medicines causes** a cascade of **misery and suffering**, from **no relief** **for** the **excruciating pain** of a **child’s earache**, to women who **bleed to death during childbirth**, to **deaths from diseases that are easily** and inexpensively prevented or **cured**. Lack of **access to medicines** is one **inequality** that can be **measured by** a starkly visible yardstick: **numbers of preventable deaths**. Efforts to improve access to medicines are driven by a compelling ethical imperative. People **should not be denied access** to life-saving or health-promoting interventions **for unfair reasons**, **including** those with **economic or social causes**. **Millions of** yearly **childhood deaths** from diseases **that** **could have been prevented or cured by existing medical products** would be unthinkable in a fair and just world.

**C2: Pandemics**

**Pandemics cause immense amount of pain and suffering   
Hadhav 21’** epidemiologist and risk modeler who is currently CEO of Metabiota. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK525302/>

**Pandemics** can **cause significant, widespread increases in morbidity and mortality** and have disproportionately higher mortality impacts on LMICs. Pandemics can **cause economic damage** through multiple channels, including short-term **fiscal shocks and longer-term** negative shocks **to economic growth**. Individual **behavioral changes**, such as **fear-induced aversion to workplaces** and other public gathering places, are a primary cause of **negative shocks to economic growth** during pandemics. Some pandemic mitigation measures can cause significant social and economic disruption. In **countries with** weak institutions and legacies of **political instability**, pandemics can **increase [in] political stresses and tensions.** In these contexts, outbreak response measures such as quarantines have **sparked violence and tension between states and citizens.**

**When it comes to vaccines, developing countries are left out which hurts everyone – See Covid  
Harman 21’** <https://theconversation.com/profiles/sophie-harman-137760> Sophie [Harman] is Professor of International Politics and a BAFTA-nominated film producer. Sophie’s teaching and research draws on her extensive fieldwork experience in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and the global health and international political economy hubs of Geneva, Washington DC and New York.

We will **never end** the death and destruction of **COVID-19 until** we get real about **vaccine equity**. In a month of high-level meetings from the G7 to the World Health Assembly, we have seen a lot of rhetoric from the global north, and a lot of frustration and urgency from the global south, but still no substantial changes on how to get the world vaccinated. Vaccines offer an incredible opportunity for science to outpace the virus, but now we are seeing the **virus outpace our outdated politics. Around**[**0.8% of**](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html)**all COVID vaccines distributed in the world have gone to poor countries**. **Most** of the 1.65 billion doses of **vaccines administered** have been **in rich countries**. We know that this is a problem. **Global coverage** of the vaccine **is imperative to prevent death and disease from COVID-19 and to help stop new variants**. Unless we sort out this imbalance the threat of COVID-19 will never go away. As we argue in [BMJ Global Health](https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/6/e006504), we can address this imbalance through a call for vaccine justice. We need to **move past outdated charitable models of poor countries depending on rich countries for their leftovers**. Instead, we need to develop manufacturing and distribution capacity throughout the world to get vaccines to where they are needed and fast. We believe in experts. We believe knowledge must inform decisions. To start, the international community needs to stop pushing charitable models of sharing leftover vaccines and Covax. **Sharing leftovers is unsustainable and dependent on the whim of individual countries,** often coming too little, too late. [Pledges at the G7](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-57461640) are all very well, but these are already too late and mask the substantial problem of **vaccine nationalism and hoarding. Covax**, the initiative set up to **avoid vaccine nationalism and hoarding, was doomed to failure** from the outset. It was created to ensure every country in the world has access to doses for 20% of its population in 2021, regardless of ability to pay.Covax has been lauded as an [effective model that delivers](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/fair-allocation-mechanism-for-covid-19-vaccines-through-the-covax-facility). However, it is already running into three **major problems**. The first is perhaps the most obvious: doses for 20% of a population this year will never be enough to build up immunity to COVID-19 quickly enough. The second is **supply**. **India** is the **main supplier of vaccines to Covax**. India’s introduction of **vaccine export restrictions** to help deal with its devastating outbreak is **limiting supply to Covax.** The third is perhaps more predictable – a **significant funding shortfall**.**Charitable models** like Covax are **always under-funded**. If they are under-funded in the short term, there is little hope for their medium and long-term funding. We have seen this time and again with financing initiatives from Make Poverty History to the health-related Millennium Development Goals. Institutions will always be going cap in hand to **states** who will **never fully pay up.** A lot of rhetoric from the global north. Hollie Adams/EPA**.** Covax has become a [political dead cat](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/covax-why-biden-s-billions-won-t-fix-covid-vaccine-n1258816) in global health. For every accusation on vaccine hoarding or lack of support for sharing intellectual property, states use Covax as evidence that they are committed to vaccinating the world. **Covax is used as an** example of good intentions, while simultaneously as an **excuse for** **blocking the transfer of technology and passing of intellectual property waivers in the** World Trade Organization **(WTO).** Low and middle-income countries are on to this. This is why they are pushing for the waiver and suspicious of efforts towards a new international pandemic preparedness treaty. Such states accept the charity from Covax as the only offer on the table but know the way out of their situation would be to make vaccines themselves. It doesn’t have to be this way**. States must be empowered to produce their own vaccines** and draw from previous knowledge of effective community vaccination campaigns and mobilisation to stimulate uptake. The **role of the international community must be to facilitate technology transfer**, vaccine production capacity in-country, and the development of in-country immunisation campaigns. Anything else is just a distraction. **Defenders of intellectual property** **suggest** low and middle-income **countries lack the capacity to develop vaccines**. This smacks of discrimination as to what is seen to be possible in poor countries.If such defenders truly believe this to be the case: put your money where your mouth is and help build capacity. **Low** and middle-**income countries can produce vaccines through technology transfer** and investment from high-income countries, and through working with vaccine supply experts, such as Covax, to negotiate complex supply chains. Complex, yes. Impossible, no.Pharmaceutical companies can be compensated by additional public funds. Their investment does not have to be out of pocket. Given that state funding was fundamental in stimulating research and development of COVID-19 vaccines, state funding can likewise be used to incentivise technology transfer. As the head of IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, [said](https://healthpolicy-watch.news/global-leaders-call-for-50-billion-investment/): “Vaccine policy is economic policy,” and thus investment in vaccines are good investments for states given the threat of COVID-19 to the global economy.A year ago, no one thought it would be possible to have safe and delivered vaccines for COVID-19. Public finance, private innovation, and scientific endeavour combined to show what could be possible. Let’s stop talking charity and start getting real about what will end this pandemic.

**New Pandemics are deadlier and faster are coming – IPPs leave developing countries vulnerable**

**Antonelli 20** Ashley Fuoco Antonelli 5-15-2020<https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2020/05/15/weekly-line> "Weekly line: Why deadly disease outbreaks could become more common—even after Covid-19" (Associate Editor — American Health Line)

While the new coronavirus pandemic suddenly took the world by storm, the truth is public health experts for years have warned that a virus similar to the new coronavirus would cause the next pandemic—and they say deadly infectious disease outbreaks could become more common. Infectious disease experts are always on the lookout for the next pandemic, and in a report published two years ago, researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health predicted that the pathogen most likely to cause the next pandemic would be a virus similar to the common cold. Specifically, the researchers predicted that the pathogen at fault for the next pandemic would be: A microbe for which people have not yet developed immunities, meaning that a large portion of the human population would be susceptible to infection; Contagious during the so-called "incubation period"—the time when people are infected with a pathogen but are not yet showing symptoms of the infection or are showing only mild symptoms; and Resistant to any known prevention or treatment methods. The researchers also concluded that such a pathogen would have a "low but significant" fatality rate, meaning the pathogen wouldn't kill human hosts fast enough to inhibit its spread. As **Amesh Adalja**—a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, who led the report—told Live Science's Rachael Rettner at the time, "**It just has to make a lot of people sick" to disrupt society**. The researchers said RNA viruses—which include the common cold, influenza, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (or SARS, which is caused by a type of coronavirus)—fit that bill. And even though we had a good bit of experience dealing with common RNA viruses like the flu, Adalja at the time told Rettner that there were "a whole host of viral families that get very little attention when it comes to pandemic preparedness." Not even two years later, the new coronavirus, which causes Covid-19, emerged and quickly spread throughout the world, reaching pandemic status in just a few months. To date, officials have reported more than 4.4 million cases of Covid-19 and 302,160 deaths tied to the new coronavirus globally. In the United States, the number of reported Covid-19 cases has reached more than 1.4 million and the number of reported deaths tied to the new coronavirus has risen to nearly 86,000 in just over three months. Although public health experts had warned about the likelihood of a respiratory-borne RNA virus causing the next global pandemic, many say the world was largely unprepared to handle this type of infectious disease outbreak. And as concerning as that revelation may be on its own, **perhaps even more worrisome is that public health experts predict life-threatening infectious disease outbreaks are likely to become more common—meaning we could be susceptible to another pandemic in the future**. Why experts think deadly infectious disease outbreaks could become more common As the Los Angeles Times's Joshua Emerson Smith notes, infectious disease experts for more than ten years now have noted that "[o]utbreaks of dangerous new diseases with the potential to become pandemics have been on the rise—from HIV to swine flu to SARS to Ebola." For instance, a report published in Nature in 2008 found that **the number of emerging infectious disease events that occurred in the 1990s was more than three times higher than it was in the 1940s**. Many experts believe the recent increase in infectious disease outbreaks is tied to human behaviors that disrupt the environment, "such as **deforestation and poaching**," which have led "to increased contact between highly mobile, urbanized human populations and wild animals," Emerson Smith writes. In the 2008 report, for example, researchers noted that about 60% of 355 emerging infectious disease events that occurred over a 50-year period could be largely linked to wild animals, livestock, and, to a lesser extent, pets. Now, researchers believe the new coronavirus first jumped to humans from animals at a wildlife market in Wuhan, China. Along those same lines, some experts have argued that global climate change has driven an increase in infectious diseases—and could continue to do so. A federally mandated report released by the U.S. Global Change Research Program in 2018 warned that warmer temperatures could expand the geographic range covered by disease-carrying insects and pests, which could result in more Americans being exposed to ticks carrying Lyme disease and mosquitos carrying the dengue, West Nile, and Zika viruses. And experts now say continued warming in global temperatures, deforestation, and other environmentally disruptive behaviors have broadened that risk by bringing more people into contact with disease-carrying animals. Further, experts note that infectious diseases today are able to spread much faster and farther than they could decades ago because of increasing globalization and travel. While some have suggested the Covid-19 pandemic could stifle that trend, others argue globalization is likely to continue—meaning so could infectious diseases' far spread.

**C3: Innovation**

**Strong Patents Threaten Innovation Due to Cost  
Wiens 21**, (Jason Wiens is policy director in Entrepreneurship for the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, where he leads the Foundation’s strategy to reduce barriers to entrepreneurship by improving public policy. He oversees a national grant portfolio of advocacy projects that educate policymakers about how government can support entrepreneurship and directs the Kauffman-led Start Us Up coalition. His views on entrepreneurship policy have been published in The Wall Street Journal, Roll Call, The Hill, Washington Monthly, and VentureBeat, 8-25-2021, "How Intellectual Property Can Help or Hinder Innovation," https://www.kauffman.org/resources/entrepreneurship-policy-digest/how-intellectual-property-can-help-or-hinder-innovation/, accessed 9-1-2021)

The Dangers of **Too-Strong** Patents Expansive **patent rights make successive innovati[on]**ve activity **more costly.**  **Having to seek permission from all** related **patent holders bids up the cost** of innovation.  **Overly strong patent rights disproportionately benefit large firms.** Larger firms **[they] are more likely to use patents to entrench their position in the market**, as opposed to small- and medium-sized firms that are more likely to use patents to accumulate revenue and enhance their reputation.  When patent rights are stronger, firms with intellectual assets are emboldened to threaten other inventors with litigation. For example, NPEs often discourage innovation by more productive innovators.  Seeking a Goldilocks Approach  When intellectual property rights are too strong or too weak, they reduce the incentives for innovation.

**IPP Doesn’t achieve its goal of increasing innovation, but rather reduces it**

**Reichman 09**

[**https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060777/**](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060777/)

If it remains true that a country cannot play in the knowledge economy without suitable intellectual property rights (IPRs),[22](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060777/#FN23) experience in many OECD countries is demonstrating that badly configured, unbalanced, over-protectionist IP regimes gradually stifle innovation by making inputs to future innovation too costly and too cumbersome to sustain over time.[23](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060777/#FN24) Such regimes also enable large corporations that are sometimes slothful innovators to accumulate pools of cross-licensed patents that create barriers to entry for the truly innovativesmall- and medium-sized firms.[24](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3060777/#FN25) Properly designed IPRs do, however, protect innovative small- and medium-sized firms from the predatory practices of their larger competitors.

**Impact: The lack of innovations hinders the progress of society and destroys the possibility of a better future.** Lee 2018 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154

Innovation has been the main task of humans throughout history ([Lee, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0145)). To survive and improve the quality of life, continuous innovation efforts have been imperative. All major revolutionary waves of human history – agricultural, industrial, information, and now convergence – are all about innovation for creating new and better value ([Lee, Olson, & Trimi, 2012](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0140)). Political leaders exhort the importance of innovation for social justice and a better quality living environment for the citizens. Global executives stress the importance of continuous innovation for new products/services and ventures for customers, yet 94 percent expressed dissatisfaction with their innovation performance ([Christiansen, Hall, Dillon & Duncan, 2016](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0255)). Managers of non-profit organizations pursue innovation to challenge the social ills of the economic divide, digital divide, and goal divide ([Lee, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0145)). The purpose of innovation is much more profound than just creating greater customer value, better competitive advantage of firms, and an environment for better quality of life. The ultimate goal of innovation should be the creation of a better future. The “small i” for innovation is for an individual, organization, society, or country. However, the “Large I” should be innovation for creating a smart future.

The benefits of innovation may accrue to individuals, groups of people, communities, industries, societies, nations, regions, and the world. What is common to all these entities is that they all pursue innovation for better preparation of the future ([Canton, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0035), [Drucker, 1985](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0070)). However, innovation should not be for passively being future smart by preparing to meet the uncertain future by being predictive, adaptive, and agile. Instead, innovation should be for more aggressively active in creating a smart future that provides more opportunities for a better quality of life.

The term “smart” has been used widely nowadays, for example, smartphones, smart cars, smart homes, smart infrastructure, smart cities, smart countries, and the like. The term “smart” represents the concept of hope and aspiration that depends on a person's perspective. The smart state depends on the given condition, environment, culture, and the person's value system. Nevertheless, the general concept of a smart future should mean a living environment which is much better than the current state of affairs.

The smart future should be where innovation would help develop intelligent solutions to complex problems to secure a humane environment ([Streitz, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154" \l "bib0220)). In such a smart future, people can more freely pursue opportunities to learn and grow, be engaged in good relationships, be happy with the community and work place, and also have a comfortable and healthy life style with adequate financial resources ([Gallup-Healthways, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0085)). Creating such a smart future requires much more than just smart gadgets, advanced technologies, convergence strategies, and government support. It requires a fabric of soft innovations that can nurture an aspirational future such as social justice, rule of law, transparency, accountability, cohesive collective wisdom of people, and shared visions and goals ([Kramer and Pfitzer, 2016](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0270), [Porter and Kramer, 2011](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2444569X16300154#bib0280)).

**Method**

**The role of the ballot is to *evaluate the consequences of the affirmative’s policy proposal*.**

**Scenario analysis builds portable skills of critical thinking, creativity, and planning.**

**Barma et al. ’16 [Barma, Naazneen (Naazneen H. Barma is Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School), Durbin, Brent (Brent Durbin is Associate Professor of Government at Smith College), Lorber, Eric (Eric Lorber is an adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security), and Whitlark, Rachel (Rachel Whitlark is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology). “’Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science.” *International Studies Perspectives*, Volume 17, Number 2, pgs. 1-19, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/48304/Barma\_using\_scenarios\_in\_political\_science\_isp\_2015.pdf.]**

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.

**Policy debates empower students to activism. Apolitical narratives become coopted by institutions.**

**Coverstone ’05 Coverstone, Alan (Alan Coverstone is a debate coach at Wake Forest University). “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact.” Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact, 17 November 2005.**

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy ~~disables~~ [prevents] action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention