# 1NC

### 1

#### The ontological nature of the subject is self-determining – there is no inherent meaning to the world and freedom is the only choice for subject formation. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who cultivates existential subjectivity.

**Moore 67** Asher. “Existential Phenomenology.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 27, no. 3, 1967, pp. 408–414. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/2106066.//Scopa](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106066.//Scopa).

**A human being is not a universal structure** or a set of universal structures. Whatever may be true of other things, the identity of human persons is not defined by Leibniz' principle. **A human being is unique, unrepeatable, and entirely particular.** Or rather, since of course human beings may participate in or illustrate common structures, let us say that whether or not a particular person illustrates a certain structure is always a question of fact, to be determined by consulting him, never a question about man, to be settled by essential insight into man-ness, or a question about men, to be settled by inductive inference from other men. A human being who lacked all common structures would doubtless be literally incommunicado, but he would still be himself. **What a human being is, in the sense of what universals he exemplifies, does not determine, but is determined by, who he is. A human being is free, and his life is not necessary but contingent. There are no patterns or laws to which a human being's life must con- form, no channels it must follow.** A particular life may be in large part, or even entirely, necessitated - habitual, predictable, compulsive. But whether this is so or not is a contingent matter. **As it is contingent that there is something rather than nothing, so a thing is necessary only if it happens to be. A person can be un-free, but whether he is lies within the scope of his freedom.** The neurotic is genuinely compelled, but in the end the only way for him to stop being compelled is to stop. **Existential psychoanalysis may succeed in uncovering an individual's basic project, but there can be no guarantee of success, since some of as may have no basic project. It lies within a human being's freedom to choose chaos**: in some sense, dissociation is exactly that choice. Since there is nothing which a human being must inevitably be, or become, or do, one must wait to see what he will do, wait to see what will happen. **Temporality is a timeless structure but human life is not timeless, but open to a future**. It will be objected that we have misunderstood the nature of those structures which universally and necessarily characterize human existence by mistakenly identifying them with the sort of universal structure which constitutes the determinate nature of a thing, determinig what the thing is. **A human being is not a what but a who**. The structures involved in being a human being are therefore not what a human being is; they do not make up his nature. **A human being is not determinate, but self-determining**. He will have been what he chooses to be. But the fact that human beings do not embody the same structures as things, or embody them in the same way, does not mean that human beings embody no structures. On the contrary, they embody those structures which apply to a free who, those structures which are conditions of the possibility of a free life. **These structures are ontological, not ontic; they are not categories or essences, but existentials.** Furthermore, it will be pointed out, we have throughout our own discussion freely availed ourselves of exactly such structures. A human being, we said, is not a universal or a set of universals, because he is a unique individual. But what does that mean if not that human existence universally and necessarily' involves the existential structures of individuality, and uniqueness, and everything implicated in them? After all, particularity is a universal structure. **Similarly, in the sense of the term necessary which is applicable to things, human acts are not necessary, but contingent, since human existence is free. Nonetheless, it is a necessary truth that human existence is free.** Man is condemned to freedom. And it is a necessary truth that freedom is just the sort of thing it is. That we ourselves, **in the act of denying that universal and necessary structures can be ascribed to human beings, ascribed to them the structures of freedom and individuality, was no avoidable slip, but illustrates the fact that without such structures nothing at all can be said about human existence**, even that it is human existence. It is these structures, it is contended, which are open to, and open only to, phenomenological insight.

#### The aff’s form of identity politics surrenders itself to the phantasmic idea of the perfect image of whiteness that never existed and necessarily trades off with structural capitalist critiques of the root cause of violence by placing its liberation potential in the hands of the very social system that generated that violence.

**Brown 93** Brown, Wendy. “Wounded Attachments.” *Political Theory*, vol. 21, no. 3, 1993, pp. 390–410. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/191795. Accessed 9 Mar. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795.%20Accessed%209%20Mar.%202020). //Scopa

In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized ident hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call **identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values**. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, **identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation**, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-**but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure**. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that **identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment**-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. **This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice** other than class **but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject**-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-**as objects of desire**. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. **They necessarily** rather than incidentally **abjure a critique of class power and class norms** precisely **because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence**. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, commodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking. If there is one class that is politically articulated in late modem U.S. life, it is that which gives itself the name of the "middle class." This is the "class" that represents the normalization rather than the politicization of capitalism, the denial of capitalism's power effects in ordering social life, the represen- tation of the ideal of capitalism to provide the good life for all. Poised between the rich and the poor, feeling itself to be protected from the encroachments of neither, **the phantasmatic middle class signifies the natural and the good between the decadent or the corrupt, on the one side, and the aberrant or the decaying, on the other**. Middle class identity is a conservative identity in the sense that **it semiotically recurs to a phantasmatic past, an idyllic and uncorrupted historical moment** (implicitly located around 1955) **when life was good-housing was affordable, men supported families on single in- comes, and drugs were confined to urban ghettos**. But it is not a reactionary identity in the sense of reacting to an insurgent politicized identity from below. Rather, **it embodies the ideal to which nonclass identities refer for proof of their exclusion or injury:** homosexuals who lack the protection of marriage, guarantees of child custody or job security, and freedom from harassment; single women who are strained and impoverished by trying to raise children and hold paid jobs simultaneously; people of color dispropor- tionately affected by unemployment, punishing urban housing costs, inade- quate health care programs, and disproportionately subjected to unwarranted harassment and violence, figured as criminals, ignored by cab drivers. The point is not that these privations are trivial but that **without recourse to a white masculine middle class ideal, politicized identities would forfeit a good deal of their claims to injury and exclusion, their claims to the political signifi- cance of their difference**. If they thus require this ideal for the potency and poignancy of their political claims, we might ask to what extent a critique of capitalism is foreclosed by the current configuration of oppositional politics and not simply by the "loss of the socialist alternative" or the ostensible "triumph of liberalism" in the global order. To what extent do **identity politics require a standard internal to existing society against which to pitch their claims, a standard that not only preserves capitalism from critique but sustains the invisibility and inarticulateness of class**, not accidentally, but endemically? Could we have stumbled on one reason why class is invariably named but rarely theorized or developed in the multiculturalist mantra, "race, class, gender, sexuality?”

#### Their view of history as alive in this room formulating subjectivity is the pinnacle of slave morality that breeds ressentiment and the attachment to the white civil society that generated the violence against their identity and dooms the subject to a repressed existence at the will of the master.

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But contemporary politicized identity's desire is not only shaped by the extent to which **the sovereign will of the liberal subject**, articulated ever more nakedly by disciplinary individuation and capitalist disinternments, is dom- inated by late twentieth-century configurations of political and economic powers. It **is shaped as well by the contemporary problematic of history itself, by the** late modern **rupture of history as a narrative, history as ended because it has lost its end, a rupture that paradoxically produces an immeasurable heaviness to history**. As the grim experience of reading Discipline nad Punish makes clear, there is a sense in which **the gravitational force of history is multiplied at precisely the moment that history's narrative coherence** and objectivist foundation **is refuted. As the problematic of power in history is resituated** from subject positioning **to subject formation, power is seen to operate spatially**, infiltrationally, "microphysically" **rather than only tempo- rally;** it is also seen **to permeate and construct every heretofore designated "interior" space in social orders and** in **subjects**. As the erosion of historical metanarratives takes with them both laws of history and the futurity such laws purported to assure, the presumed continuity of history is replaced with a sense of its violent, contingent, and ubiquitousforce. **History becomes that which has weight but no trajectory, mass but no coherence**, force but no direction; it is war without ends or end. Thus the extent to which "dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living" is today unparalleled even as history itself disintegrates as coherent category or practice. **We know ourselves to be saturated by history, we feel the extraor- dinary force of its determinations; we are also steeped in a discourse of its insignificance**, and above all, we know that history will no longer (always already did not) act as our redeemer. I raise the question of history because in thinking about late moder politicized identity's structuring by ressentiment, I have thus far focused on its foundation in the sufferings of a subordinated sovereign subject. But Nietzsche's account of **the logic of ressentiment is** also **tethered to that feature of the will that is stricken by history, that rails against time itself, that cannot "will backwards," that cannot exert its power over the past**-either as a specific set of events or as time itself: Willing liberates but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? **'It was'-that is the name of the will's** gnashing of teeth and **most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he** is an angry spectator of all that is past.... He **cannot break time** and time's covetousness, that is the will's loneliest melancholy.27 Although Nietzsche appears here to be speaking of the will as such, Zarathustra's own relationship to the will as a "redeemer of history" makes clear that this "angry spectatorship" can with great difficulty be reworked as a perverse kind of mastery, a mastery that triumphs over the past by reducing its power, by remaking the present against the terms of the past-in short, by a project of self-transformation that arrays itself against its own genealogical consciousness. In contrast with the human ruin he sees everywhere around him-"fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents"-**it is Zarathustra's own capacity to discern and to make a future that spares him from** a rancorous sensibility, from **crushing disappointment in the liberatory promise of his will**: The now and the past on earth-alas, my friends, that is what I find most unendurable; and I should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which much come. **A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future-and alas, also as it were, a cripple at this bridge**: all this is Zarathustra.28 Nietzsche here discerns both **the necessity and** the near **impossibility**-the extraordinary and fragile achievement-**of formulating oneself as a creator of the future and a bridge to the future in order to appease the otherwise inevitable rancor of the will against time, in order to redeem the past by lifting the weight of it, by reducing the scope of its determinations**. "And how could I bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and redeemer of accidents?"29 Of course, Zarathustra's exceptionality in what he is willing to confront and bear, in his capacities to overcome in order to create, is Nietzsche's device for revealing us to ourselves. **The ordinary will, steeped in the economy of slave morality, devises means** "to get rid of his melancholy and to mock his dungeon" **that reiterate the cause of the melancholy, that continually reinfect the narcissistic wound to its capaciousness inflicted by the past**. "Alas," says Nietzsche, "every prisoner becomes a fool; and the imprisoned will redeems himself foolishly."30 From **this foolish redemption**-foolish because it **does not resolve the will's rancor but only makes a world in its image**-is born the wrath of revenge: 'that which was' is the name of the stone [the will] cannot move. **And so** he moves stones out of wrath and displeasure, and **he wreaks revenge on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does**. Thus the will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to go backwards. This ... is what **revenge is**: the will's ill will against time and its 'it was.' Revenge as a "reaction," **a substitute for the capacity to act, produces identity** as both **bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present** that embodies that history. The will that "took to hurting" in its own impotence against its past becomes (in the form of an identity whose very existence is due to heightened consciousness of the immovability of its "it was," its history of subordination) a will that makes not only a psychological but a political practice of revenge, a practice that reiterates the existence of an identity whose present past is one of insistently unredeemable injury. This past cannot be redeemed unless the identity ceases to be invested. cannot cease to be invested in it without giving up its identity as such, thus giving up its economy of avenging and at the same time perpetuating its hurt-"when he then stills the pain of the wound, he at the same time reinfects the wound."32 **In its** emergence as a **protest against marginalization or subordination, politicized identity** thus **becomes attached to its own exclusion both because it is premised on this exclusion** for its very existence as identity **and because the formation of identity at the site of exclusion**, as exclusion, augments or "**alters the direction of the suffering"** entailed in subordination or marginalization **by finding a site of blame** for it. **But in so doing, it installs its pain over its unredeemed history in the very foundation of its political claim**, in its demand for recognition as identity. **In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past, as a past of injury**, a past as a hurt will, and locating a "reason" for the "unendurable pain" of social powerlessness in the present, **it converts this reasoning into** an ethicizing politics, **a politics of recrimination that** seeks to avenge the hurt even while it **reaffirms it**, discursively codifies it. **Politicized identity thus enunciates itself**, makes claims for itself, **only by** entrenching, dramatizing, and **inscribing its pain in politics and can hold out no future-for itself** or others-**that triumphs over this pain. The loss of historical direction**, and with it the loss **of futurity** characteristic of the late modern age, **is thus homologically refigured in the structure of desire of the dominant political expression of the age-identity politics**. In the same way, the generalized political impotence produced by the ubiquitous yet discontinuous networks of late modern political and economic power is reiterated in the investments of late modern democracy's primary oppositional political formations.

#### Ressentiment produces a powerless subject incapable of acting and internalizes a hatred for the self that is unendurably painful.

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Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what **Nietzsche terms ressentiment, the moralizing revenge of the powerless, "the triumph of the weak** as weak."17 This incitement to **ressentiment inheres** in two related **constitutive paradoxes of liberalism**. There is a paradox between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, **which produces failure** turned to recrimination **by the subordinated and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful."** There is one between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality. This latter paradox stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences, on the one hand, and the suppression of them, on the other, and offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored within-included-in the terms of universalism. Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on how the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds **ressentiment as welfare-state liberalism-attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged."** Conversely, a strong com- mitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds **ressentiment expressed as neoconservative antistatism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth**. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their **situatedness within power**, their **production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production** that **casts the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself** in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must find either a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame on which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For **every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering**, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering-in short, some living thing upon **which he can on some pretext or other, vent his affects**, actually or in effigy ... This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengeful- ness, and the like: **a desire to deaden pain by means of affects** ... to deaden, **by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness** at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.18 **Ressentiment** in this context **is a triple achievement: it produces an affect** (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt, it produces **a culprit respon- sible** for the hurt, **and** it produces **a site of revenge to displace the hurt** (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's terms, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable."

#### **The alternative is to affirm a will to power. Self-affirming internalism is necessary to overcome external domination that perpetuates oppression.**

**Newman ‘06**, (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, 2006 AD: 7/8/09) //Scopa//RECUT BXNK

Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power **-- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche**.[[56]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn56) This is **to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.** To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification. We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, **a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose**.

### 2

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative debater must defend the desirability of a topical advocacy where the member states of the WTO ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### Resolved means a legislative policy.

**Words and Phrases 64,** Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. Definition of the word “**resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘**it was resolved by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “**to establish by law**”

#### Violation: c-x – don’t allow for cheaty I-meets – command F “intellectual property rights” or “WTO”

#### Vote neg –

#### [1] Text – Winning a definition means you don’t defend the resolution. That’s an a priori side constraint since the judge only has the jurisdiction to determine topical arguments, even if your model of debate is better. There are two impacts a) It’s an independent reason you drop them because they haven’t met their constitutive burden; that outweighs on bindingness since the judge doesn’t have the authority to change the rules once inside the practice and b) The aff is functionally neg ground which means I’m winning substance.

#### [2] Limits – Ex post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny. Err neg - their interp creates a race to the margins incentivizing affs to defend uncontestable statements like “2+2=4” or “racism is bad” and the lack of a stable mechanism means they can always revise their aff to de-link from the few generics that are responsive. Fairness first – debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary to produce any benefit from the activity. Fairness independently outweighs:

#### 1] Decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented – things like doing c-x, following speech times etc, prove This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### 2] Small Schools: prepping convoluted philosophies like the aff are possible for big schools and prep squads but make it impossible for under-resourced debaters to make diverse case negs for every aff – link turns their accessibility offense – procedural equity is a precondition to make the space a home to begin with.

#### [4] SSD – solves all their offense – if your aff is incompatible with the topic, read the aff on the neg – key to test convictions we hold as debaters – otherwise produces insular debates where we are never forced to confront our personal convictions which reproduces the violence the aff talks about so that important issues can’t be ignored.

Ci

Dtd

No RVIs

Reject impact turns

* Cross app fairness