## 1

#### Hedge -

#### 1. 1AR theory is drop the argument – a) 2ar collapse means the 1ar can read multiple shells and collapse on any one of them to win – the 2n can’t put 3 min of sufficient responses on every one of them b) Rectifies the skew since the 2n can’t go for the argument anyway which means the 2ar doesn’t have to answer the cause of the abuse.

#### 2. Evaluate 1AR theory through an in-round abuse model – a) it’s impossible for the 1ar to set norms since the 2ar responses to the 2nr will always be enough to win risk of offense on the shell which means the debate is too short to set the better norm absent a 3nr b) AC theory norms allow true norm setting since you can establish them prior to my violation – 1ar theory proves it’s read for the purpose of strategy rather than actual norm setting.

#### 3. Give the neg an RVI on 1ar theory – that’s key to checking frivolous 1ar theory since it will only read legitimate shells if it can lose on an RVI. Checking friv theory is key to substantive education since it preserves the requirement for substance.

## 2

#### The only substance that exists is the will to power – the metaphysical search for truth is impossible and destroys the subject’s ability to flourish in the face of the reality of a chaotic world with no external sources of meaning. Thus the ROTB is to embrace existential subjectivity.

Grimm 77 (Ruediger Hermann, art historian and Goethe scholar, *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge*, ed. M. Montinari, W. Miiller-Lauter & H. Wenzel, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pg. 30-33 //Scopa/RECUT bxnk)

Western logic he purpose of furthering our own power. Thus Nietzsche can say Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art voand metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40• One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists in an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order : there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language indeed, our whole conceptual scheme is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? . • . die Annahme des seienden ist nothig, um denken und schliessen zu konnen : die Logik handhabt our Formeln fiir Gleichbleibendes deshalb ware diese Annahme noch ohne Beweiskraft fiir die Reali tat : ,,das Seiende" gehort zu unserer Optik48• This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity even if it is a necessary assumption is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr iiber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozess setzt fortwahrendes /nterpretieren voraus42• Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for tn lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Der Werth fiir das Leben entscheidet zuletzt43. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power. In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory the unknown is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is : the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised. However, " darin driickt sich eine gedriickte Seele aus, voller MIBtrauen und schlimmer Erfahrung . . . 44." The demand that reality and truth be stable, reliable, predictable, and conveniently at our disposal is a symptom of weakness. The glossing over of the chaotic, contradictory, changing aspect of reality is the sign of a will to power which must reduce the conflict and competition in the world to a minimum. Yet resistance and competition are the very factors which enable any particular power-constellation to express itself and grow in power. As we saw earlier, the will to power can only express itself by meeting resistance, and any interpretation of reality which attempts to minimize these factors is profoundly anti-life (since life is will to power). Furthermore, a person embodying a strong and vigorous will to power will "interpret" the "threatening" aspect of the world the chaos, ambiguity, contradiction, danger, etc. as stimuli, which continually offer [them] a high degree of resistance which [they] must meet and overcome if [they are] to survive and grow. Rather than negate change and make the world predictable, a "strong" person would, according to Nietzsche, welcome the threat and challenge of a constantly changing world. Referring to those who require a world as changeless as possible in order to survive, Nietzsche says . . . (eine umgekehrte Art Mensch wiirde diesen Wechsel zum Reiz rechnen) Eine mit Kraft iiberladene und spielende Art W esen wiirde gerade die Aff ekte, die Unvernunft und den Wechsel in eudamonistischem Sinne gutheissen, sammt ihren Consequenzen, Gefahr, Contrast, Zu-Grunde-gehn usw-45. A large part of the intellectual energy of the West has been spent in trying to discover "facts," "laws of nature," etc., all of which are conceived to be "truths" and which, therefore, do not change. For Nietzsche, this conceptualization of our experience is tantamount to a "mummification" : when an experience is conceptualized, it is wrenched from the everchanging stream of becoming which is the world. By turning our experiences into facts, concepts, truths, statistics, etc. we "kill" them, rob them of their immediacy and vitality and embalm them, thus transforming them into the convenient bits of knowledge which furnish our comfortable, predictable, smug existences46• Der Mensch sucht ,,die Wahrheit" : eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht tiiuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt, eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet : Widerspruch, Tauschung, Wechsel Ursachen des Leidens l47 For Nietzsche, this whole tendency to negate change which is so intimately connected with the presupposition that "truth" always means "unchanging, eternal truth," is a symptom of decadence, a symptom of the weakening and disruption of the will to power. This outlook says, in effect, "This far shall you go, and this much shall you learn, but no more than this . . . . " In the absence of any fixed and ultimate standard for truth, of course, this outlook is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. Yet it is not a question here of rightness or wrongness, but a question of power. More specifically, it is a matter of vital power. "Der Werth fur das Leben entscheidet zuletzt48." Nietzsche's conclusion is that this static world interpretation has a negative, depressing effect on a person's vital energies (will to power). It constricts growth, it sets limits and hampers the self-assertion of the will to power. The strong individual, whom Nietzsche so much admires, flourishes only in an environment of change, ambiguity, contradiction, and danger. The chaotic and threatening aspect of the world is a stimulus for such individuals, demanding that they constantly grow and increase their power, or perish49• It demands that they constantly exceed their previous limits, realize their creative potential and surpass it, become more than they were. In the absence of any stability in the world, the strong individual who can flourish in such an environment is radically free from any constraint, radically free to create. It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion : Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf . . .0 0

#### Universalizability and practical reason presume an “ideal” version of the world independent of human experience that is epistemically inaccessible.

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As Clark notes (1990: 99–100), Nietzsche claims that “‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing in itself’ . . . involve a contradictio in adjecto [a contradiction in terms]” and he exhorts us to “free ourselves from the seduction of words” (BGE: 16). But this merely states the conclusion of an argument that has yet to be made. What might that argument be? Poellner (1995: 79–111) offers a plausible reconstruction, drawing on both published and Nachlass writings. According to Poellner, the crux of Nietzsche’s argument against the intelligibility of things-in-themselves comes to this: [W]hat an object is, its ‘whatness’ or essence, is something that can only be established, indeed only contentfully conceived, from some determinate perspective or point of view (or sets of perspectives or points of view). . . . What is designated by [the] term [“perspective”] in this context is simply the determinate manner in which the object appears in perception or conception. For example, if I visually imagine a building, I imagine it from some point of view (or successively, from several). . . . [U]nlike certain other characteristics of the mental representation of some object, we cannot “discount” the perspectival, and thus subject-implying, character of it without the representation ceasing to represent anything in a contentful manner. It is because we cannot do this that every contentful conception of an object involves subjectimplying (perspectival) characteristics. . . . Nietzsche includes in the perspectival, subject-implying character of an object the aspect of it under which it always (necessarily) is of some degree of “concern” [or “interest”] to a subject, so that, for him, it is meaningless to speak of a really existing object that is of no concern to any subject. (1995: 83–5)19 A noumenal world, however, would be a world of objects seen from no perspective at all, a world characterized without any reference to human concerns. Therefore, granting Nietzsche’s argument (as reconstructed by Poellner) about the necessary conditions for conceiving of objects, it follows that there can be no noumenal objects, i.e., no thingsin-themselves.

#### Ressentiment produces a powerless subject incapable of acting and internalizes a hatred for the self that is unendurably painful.

**Brown 93** Brown, Wendy. “Wounded Attachments.” *Political Theory*, vol. 21, no. 3, 1993, pp. 390–410. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/191795. Accessed 9 Mar. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795.%20Accessed%209%20Mar.%202020). //Scopa

Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what **Nietzsche terms ressentiment, the moralizing revenge of the powerless, "the triumph of the weak** as weak."17 This incitement to **ressentiment inheres** in two related **constitutive paradoxes of liberalism**. There is a paradox between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, **which produces failure** turned to recrimination **by the subordinated and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful."** There is one between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality. This latter paradox stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences, on the one hand, and the suppression of them, on the other, and offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored within-included-in the terms of universalism. Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on how the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds **ressentiment as welfare-state liberalism-attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged."** Conversely, a strong com- mitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds **ressentiment expressed as neoconservative antistatism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth**. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their **situatedness within power**, their **production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production** that **casts the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself** in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must find either a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame on which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For **every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering**, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering-in short, some living thing upon **which he can on some pretext or other, vent his affects**, actually or in effigy ... This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengeful- ness, and the like: **a desire to deaden pain by means of affects** ... to deaden, **by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness** at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.18 **Ressentiment** in this context **is a triple achievement: it produces an affect** (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt, it produces **a culprit respon- sible** for the hurt, **and** it produces **a site of revenge to displace the hurt** (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's terms, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable."

#### The alternative is to affirm a will to power. Self-affirming internalism is necessary to overcome external domination that perpetuates oppression.

Newman ‘06, (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, 2006 AD: 7/8/09) //Scopa//RECUT BXNK

Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power **-- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche**.[[56]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn56) This is **to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.** To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification. We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, **a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose**.