# 1NC vs LHP AB

### 1

#### The ROTB is to vote for the best account of desire. Debate is structured around the fantasy of progress, dispelling negative signifiers of deviance which results in error replication. Representations preclude the aff – as analysts, we must refuse the construction of the 1AC which avoids serial policy failure and means they can’t weigh case.

Fotaki, Marianna. (Organization Studies Group @ Manchester Business School). “Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction.” June 15, 2010. Sage, 713-716. LHP SG

**While policy makers express societal fantasies projected onto them by their constituencies, various professional groups or patient advocates are in their own ways involved in the construction of unattainable ideals, as they too pursue and legitimize their specific projects.** The role of fantasy in relation to patient choice seems obvious, but can this be generalized across all policy making processes in relation to health or other areas of public policy making? The answer is an unequivocal yes. **The fantasmatic structuration of public policy making is revealed in the difficulty of accepting the limitations that are intrinsic to human predicament and ‘to give up the dream of being all, of living forever, of narcissistic omnipotence and of living in the world that never frustrates our desires’** (Moi, 2004: 869).Health and social care is about dealing with the finitude of our physical bodies. Yet these concerns are no less relevant to the education system, for example, which is unconsciously preoccupied with ensuring the survival of future generations (see Obholzer, 1994) or economic development and the idea of ‘progress’ more generally, all of which enact omnipotent fantasies of the limitless possibilities in their own distinct ways. Being a part of the symbolic order, which is structured in lack and loss, these imaginary pursuits cannot be easily (if at all) translated into workable policy objectives. But where does this all leave policy makers and how can they purposefully integrate Lacanian and Kleinian insights by bringing them to bear on policy formation and implementation? A legitimate question is: if policies are about societal fantasies that cannot be fulfilled, would this not mean that all policies are bound to fail? More fundamentally, aren’t policies meant to address real issues rather than fantasmatic pursuits that cannot be realized? These are important questions as public policies are first and foremost about addressing issues that most of us care about, and a great deal of effort goes into their design and articulation. Therefore, I would not wish to suggest that policies are not about engaging with real problems. In contrast, my proposition is that socially constructed objects of fantasy are stirred up successfully only when policies concern issues that matter. Such is the case of patient choice for example. Yet **if policy-making is not to remain locked in searching for unattainable fantasms** (of choice for all), **originating in the imaginary reflections of the illusory self, we would have to recognize them for what they are. If**, on the other hand, **we carry on mis-taking them for reality, they will continue to mirror the misrecognized vision of ourselves and our society. The unique strength of psychoanalytic thought is that it demonstrates the injustice towards the other and alienation of the subject whenever we cling to impossible fantasies originating in the imaginary** (Leeb, 2008). **The emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis** on the other hand, **lies in its power to highlight** (and dispel) **the imaginary nature of the subjective drive for unity, certainty and stability which underpins various societal projects.** But **psychoanalysis does not only warn us about the consequences of mistaking the infinite desires of the psyche with the finitude of human bodies.** More crucially **it acknowledges the productive role of fantasy, and of its failure, in the social arena.** In so doing**, psychoanalysis presents us with a way of bridging fantasy with reality in our social and political endeavors. The incorporation of psychoanalytic insights**, I have suggested, as a necessary means for rethinking health policy making, is not meant to supplant economic and political explanations of social and organizational life. Instead it **is offered to elucidate the co-existence and subtle interplay between psychic mechanisms and calculating rationality that policy makers**, politicians, professionals and users of services **rely on** to make their decisions. Both theories of Lacanian and Kleinian **psychoanalysis** drawn upon in this article **imply the necessity of recognizing underlying imaginary dynamics as a starting point in the journey towards realistic policy-making. To do so we need firstly to accept the imaginary structuration of the desire to attain the unattainable. This recognition will lead to an** acknowledgement and **acceptance of the intrinsic instability and conflicting nature of the policy-making process**, overcoming the splits between policy design and implementation. In addition to political and financial constraints, policies are simultaneously driven (and limited) by the ambiguity and non-unified subjectivity of those who design them and the users/beneficiaries who are themselves split, enigmatic and multi-dimensional subjects. Such a policy, which is reflective of its context and of itself, would not easily be drawn into seeking simplistic ‘solutions’ reflecting the fantasies of the ego. It would also not become the mirror showing our deepest socially sanctioned desires/fantasies, that we are then encouraged to enact mindlessly.As I have shown, the rhetorical pronouncements of ‘Choice for All’ for example, stand for an injunction to exercise and enjoy (choice) even if it involves the experience of being ill or cared for. The call for the recognition of the fantasmatic structuration of the policy process does not however suggest a blank slate authorization of policies designed without thought as to how they can (not) be implemented in a complex multi-organization such as the National Health Service. As I have argued, **when policies are conceived at ‘a distance’ from** organizational **reality, they** cannot relate to patient requirements and **cannot be translated into** organizational **realities**. This brings me to my second and more important point, about the necessity of re-considering policy-making processes, as an inclusive process involving those who are concerned with policy implementation: health professionals, and users of services. **By engaging users and providers in decision-making and the co-production of services as self-aware subjects rather than as constituencies whose fantasies can be manipulated, there might be a possibility to break through the cycle of policy repetition and blame apportioning.** More importantly, **reconciling failure as an opportunity that keeps desire alive rather than an outcome to be avoided might create an opening for more realistic policy formation.** This in itself is a depressing process as **one must also give up the idealized objects, accepting the impossibility of ever attaining them.** Yet only by accepting the necessity of Samuel Beckett’s injunction to: **‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’** (Beckett, 1983: 7) may the process of un-encumbering oneself from the ideals that bind our ego begin.A participative policy making process that bridges fantasy and reality is a first step in such a direction. It would foster an engagement of self-aware subjects accepting the burden of their subjectivity and taking responsibility for their ontological predicament without surrendering to it, rather than a responsibilization of individual users of services or professionals. By re-considering the very idea of policy as grounded in an imaginary projection of a soon to be perfect world, we would have to learn to stop demanding such perfection of our politicians, and they would have to stop believing that they could deliver it. The comprehensive interpretation of policy-making at a societal level and through the lens of organizational defences suggested in this article might contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations of developing patients’ autonomy, beyond normalizing the ‘management of expectations’. It will alsochallenge a linear model of policy-making and policy analysis, which separates design from its implementation, showing it to be inadequate. But for this to happen, **the unconscious motivations that create and undo policies will have to be appreciated. Taking into account the inevitability of fantasy in policy-making and the inevitability of its failure, may not free us once and for all from the tyranny of imaginary pursuits. It might, however, enable a journey towards the discovery of new ways of desiring, engaging and being in organizations and society.**

#### Anticapitalist struggles attempt to remove the limits of capitalism to reach a utopian society in which the forces of production experience no constraints - the impact is lashouts and it just reproduces capitalism.

McGowan 16 - Todd McGowan is an Associate Professor of English at the University of Vermont, 2016 [“Capitalism and Desire: The Psychic Cost of Free Markets”, Columbia Press New York, pages 19-34] rpg

When Marx discusses the contradictions of capitalism, he is really describing the system as one of true infinitude. This becomes evident in the middle of the third volume of Capital, where he makes a famous proclamation about the limits of capitalism. He says, “The true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself.” The project of infinitely expanding the forces of production encounters the barrier of capital’s need to become profitable. A bit later, Marx contrasts capitalist means with the capitalist end, noting that “the means—the unrestricted development of the social forces of production—comes into persistent conflict with the restricted end, the valorization of the existing capital.” The limit is not external to capitalism but the product of its own striving to transcend every limit. In the capitalist universe the logic of the bad infinite leads the system directly to the true infinite, and this infinite spells its failure. Marx is able to see this but then goes awry when he tries to imagine communism in response to this contradiction. The problem with Marx’s conception of communist society derives from his investment in the capitalist bad infinite. In other words, Marx would have been a better revolutionary if he had remained a Hegelian. The revolution, as Marx sees it, would unleash the forces of production without any restriction at all from the mode of production, from capital’s need for self-valorization. This image of a future of unrestricted production jettisons the limit altogether. Instead of continually surpassing their limit (which is what occurs under capitalism), the forces of production would experience no limit at all. They would continue to grow unabated in concert with the growth of desire. Marx’s image of a society without a limit errs not just due to its fantasmatic nature, as many critics claim. The problem with this vision of the future is that it is not fantasmatic enough. In an actual fantasy the subject does not just envision the complete evanescence of the limit and untrammeled access to the object. Instead, the fantasy introduces an external limit where none exists, thereby enabling the subject to enjoy the object through this barrier. Fantasy focuses on the loss of the object and then shows its reacquisition, but the loss has primacy, which is why only the last few minutes of Hollywood fantasies are devoted to the object’s reacquisition. By completely eliminating the barrier when it comes to imagining the economy of the future, Marx betrays his own critique of capitalism and the communist fantasy of escaping it. Here Marx’s analysis undergoes a shocking change: he compellingly identifies how capitalism stumbles on the true infinite while pursuing the bad infinite of endless progress, but then he theorizes communism as the perfect realization of the bad infinite when he proclaims that communism will remove all restraints on the forces of production. It is commonplace to laud Marx as a critic of capitalism and criticize him as a prophet of communism, but in this passage from the third volume of Capital the reason for this discrepancy becomes clear. The true infinite simply drops out of the analysis. This departure from Hegel right at the point of Hegel’s key insight creates a chasm between Marx’s analysis of capitalism and his image of the communist future. The one benefits from the conception of the true infinite while the other is handicapped by its absence. The failure to sustain the idea of the true infinite leads Marx to misrepresent the nature of the dialectical shift that would occur with the transition from capitalism to communism. For Marx, communism will solve the contradiction between the forces of production and the means of production in capitalism—and thus allow for unfettered productivity. Hegel never conceives of dialectical transitions in this way. The transition or Aufhebung does not involve an elimination of the limit that haunts the prior structure, as it does for Marx. Instead, it involves a recognition that the limit is internal to the structure rather than external. Aufhebung requires, in other words, a recognition that the limit is not a contingent barrier but a necessary obstacle constituted through the structure’s own logical requirements. To take an example from The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel insists that stoicism as a philosophy runs aground on its own internal obstacle. Stoicism preaches a retreat from the external world into the serenity of the self, but at the same time, it requires the hostile external world from which the stoic can execute a retreat. Th e unconscious focus of the stoic is on the external world that the stoic claims to disdain. The dialectical move out of stoicism, for Hegel, involves making the unconscious focus on the external world qua obstacle into the basis of a new philosophy— skepticism. The skeptic doesn’t retreat from the external world but calls its reality into question. In this way, the obstacle undergoes a dramatic transformation and becomes the center of the new philosophy. If we follow Hegel’s line of thought about change, then we must rethink the relationship to the obstacle or limit that capitalism establishes. It cannot simply be a question of dispensing with this limit altogether. To try to do so is to fall into the capitalist trap, as Marx himself does, despite—or perhaps because of—his fervent anticapitalism. Capitalism demands the notion of the natural world as an external limit that it will constantly work to overcome, but it cannot integrate any limit as internal to its own functioning. This is what Hegel’s dialectic would demand. His version of communism or socialism would thus be significantly different from Marx’s. Marx, as everyone who reads him knows, offers very little description of the nature of communist society. The most famous of these moments occurs in The German Ideology, when he and Engels pause during their opening diatribe against Ludwig Feuerbach to offer their vision of the postrevolutionary future. In their brief account of communist society, they portray a world in which limits do not exist. They claim that one will be able “to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.” Marx and Engels provide a description of how socialist society would strip away fixed social identity. The problem with this image of the future is its resemblance to the capitalist present. Today, economic necessity forces many workers to be newspaper carriers in the morning, convenience store clerks in the afternoon, and janitors in the evening. Though this is a parody of what Marx imagines, it does suggest that the overcoming of fixed identity is not necessarily an anticapitalist development. Fixed identity is yet another limit that capitalism itself aims to overcome and does.

**At the level of form, radical demands are an affective investment which robs agency, cede the political, and reaffirms state authority.**

Lundberg ’12 (Chris, comm studies prof at UNC, Lacan in Public)

The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a po liti cal practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level of the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics **to retreat from the “politics of policy** and public **debate**.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal of ten makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to po liti cal purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the **content** of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: “demand in itself . . . is demand of a presence or of an absence . . . pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied.”46

#### Fantasy productions are not neutral models of risk but collusions between capital and state that prevent the change they’ll talk about. The neg rejects this model of beautifying space policy.

**Ormrod 11 -** “Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space” by James S Ormrod School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, Falmer BN1 9PH, Sussex, England; e-mail: j.s.ormrod@brighton.ac.uk Received 17 August 2011; in revised form 19 September 2012 [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1068/d16511] // ahs emi

I have highlighted throughout that, where risks are not directly confronted and are uncertain, the operation of economic power becomes more important. One dimension to how power operates under these circumstances has recurred throughout the paper: the ability to create and manage fantasies about catastrophe. The more sophisticated the technologies used to rationalise risk become, the more significant what it cannot model becomes. Various approaches to psychoanalysis have examined how fantasy creates both what is feared (its ‘horrific’ dimension) and the pacifying solution that relieves this fear (its ‘beautific’ dimension). This is true of Kleinian psychoanalysis (eg, Klein, 1946, page 6), but particularly of contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has dealt with images of catastrophe specifically. This provides tools to explore in more depth Beck’s category of ‘things we are unwilling to know’. The Lacanian social theorist Slavoj Žižek (2008, page xii), for example, adds another category—‘unknown knowns’—to Donald Rumsfeld’s typology of knowledge. Žižek argues that when gaps appear in the symbolic order (in this case rationalising risk discourses) fantasy operates to conceal the true horror of the Lacanian Real; that which cannot be articulated. Žižek (2008, pages 5–6) provides the example of safety demonstrations on aeroplanes. These demonstrations do not serve to pacify our true fears about a crash landing, but to construct the horrific scenario. The true horror remains our inability to know how the crash scenario will play out. Precisely the same is true of NASA’s Environmental Impact Statements, which are known to be fabrications but are still preferred to uncertainty (the UN demands an impossible risk assessment that is probabilistic and geographically limited). Beyond world risk society? 741 The image of a collision cascade in orbit taking out global communications is also a fantasy, as are Haynes’s and McKay’s mutant bacteria. These fantasies each allow us to contemplate uncertainty. But each has a different effect, engineered and selected to function in the interests of those in power. Environmental Impact Assessments provide scenarios that legitimate State acquiescence to capital. They cover over not only science’s failings, but also those of the State and capital in turn. They function to draw activists into what Beck (1995, page 42) describes as “orgies of mathematics and science” that work to prevent a truly reflexive discussion of risk. Whilst informed activists engage with these scenarios as though they were rationalities (and, for example, demand to see more of the information on which they are based), less informed members of the public leave them to it. Collision cascade fantasies and solutions for them in the form of fantastic technologies also sustain a relationship between capital and the State in which disaster and solution must be conceived within the existing regime governing space activities. Not many people have direct economic interests in planetary engineering as yet, bar a marginal group of scientists. Desiring an impossible knowledge, these fantasies give scientists recourse to seek further funding (though more advanced modelling will make the unknown more, not less, terrifying), whilst at the same time making any politicisation of their work seem absurd. Meanwhile, the notion of planetary engineering itself functions as a fantasy sustaining our unsustainable relationship with the Earthly environment. Such fantasies are especially effective in immobilising public concern because of their remote setting in outer space. Space colonisation advocate Kraaft Ehricke (1972) referred to the development of outer space as the ‘benign industrial revolution’ precisely because it removed the negative consequences of industrial activity to a place where they no longer mattered. The same principle underpinned proposals to dump nuclear waste in outer space. Such a manoeuvre is a form of Beck’s “symbolic detoxification”, and the relationship between purity, exclusion, and avoidance has been tackled in the literature on risk (eg, Douglas, 1992; Joffe, 1999).

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive. Utopian ideals seek to achieve that which is impossible—our striving to reach enjoyment replicates the very thing we are trying to eliminate. Only by founding our politics upon recognition that our limitations provide the perfect source for endless enjoyment can we prevent the endless repetition of suffering.

McGowan ‘13 “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) Accessed on 7/25/19 AHS// emi

In light of this barrier, the formulation of a psychoanalytically informed political project demands that we dissociate politics from progress as it is usually conceived. We cannot escape progress, and yet the traditional conception of progress always runs aground. Th is paradox must become the foundation of any authentic psychoanalytic politics. It demands that rather than trying to progress toward overcoming the barrier that separates us from the good society, we begin to view identification with the barrier as the paradoxical aim of progress. The barrier to the good society — the social symptom — is at once the obstacle over which we continually stumble and the source of our enjoyment.32 Th e typical politics of the good aims at a future not inhibited by a limit that constrains the present. Th is future can take the form of a truly representative democracy, a socialist utopia, a society with a fair distribution of power and wealth, or even a fascist order that would expel those who embody the limit. But the good remains out of reach despite the various eff orts to reach it. The limit separating us from the good society is the very thing that constitutes the good society as such. Overcoming the limit shatters the idea of the good in the act of achieving it. In place of this pursuit, a psychoanalytic politics insists on identification with the limit rather than attempting to move beyond or eliminate it. If there is a conception of progress in this type of politics, it is progress toward the obstacle that bars us from the good rather than toward the good itself. Identification with the limit involves an embrace of the repetition of the drive because it is the obstacle or limit that is the point to which the drive returns. No one can be the perfect subject of the drive because the drive is what undermines all perfection. But it is nonetheless possible to change one’s experience within it. The fundamental wager of psychoanalysis — a wager that renders the idea of a psychoanalytic political project thinkable — is that repetition undergoes a radical transformation when one adopts a different attitude toward it. We may be condemned to repeat, but we aren’t condemned to repeat the same position relative to our repetition. By embracing repetition through identification with the obstacle to progress rather than trying to achieve the good by overcoming this obstacle, the subject or the social order changes its very nature. Instead of being the burden that one seeks to escape, repetition becomes the essence of one’s being and the mode through which one att ains satisfaction. Conceiving politics in terms of the embrace of repetition rather than the construction of a good society takes the movement that derails traditional political projects and reverses its valence. Th is idea of politics lacks the hopefulness that Marxism, for instance, can provide for overcoming antagonism and loss. With it, we lose not just a utopian ideal but the idea of an alternative future altogether — the idea of a future no longer beset by intransigent limits — and this idea undoubtedly mobilizes much political energy.33 What we gain, however, is a political form that addresses the way 21 that subjects structure their enjoyment. It is by abandoning the terrain of the good and adopting the death drive as its guiding principle that emancipatory politics can pose a genuine alternative to the dominance of global capitalism rather than incidentally creating new avenues for its expansion and development. The death drive is the revolutionary contribution that psychoanalysis makes to political thought. But since it is a concept relatively foreign to political thought, I will turn to various examples from history, literature, and fi lm in order to concretize what Freud means by the death drive and illustrate just what a politics of the death drive might look like. Th e chapters that follow trace the implications of the death drive for thinking about the subject as a political entity and for conceiving the political structure of society. Part 1 focuses on the individual subject, beginning with an explanation of how the death drive shapes this subjectivity. Th e various chapters in part 1 trace the implications of the death drive for understanding how the subject enjoys, how the drive relates to social class, how the drive impacts the subject as an ethical being, and how the subject becomes politicized. Th e discussion of the impact of the death drive on the individual subject serves as a foundation for articulating its impact on society, which part 2 of the book addresses, beginning with the impact of the death drive on the constitution of society. Part 2 then examines how the conception of the death drive helps in navigating a path through today’s major political problems: the ineffi cacity of consciousness raising, the seductive power of fantasy, the growing danger of biological reductionism and fundamentalism, the lure of religious belief, and the failure of att empts to lift repression. The two parts of the book do not att empt to sketch a political goal to be att ained for the subject or for society but instead to recognize the structures that already exist and silently inform both. Th e wager of what follows is that the revelation of the death drive and its reach into the subject and the social order can be the foundation for reconceiving freedom. The recognition of the death drive as foundational for subjectivity is what occurs with the psychoanalytic cure. Th rough this cure, the subject abandons the belief in the possibility of fi nding a solution to the problem of subjectivity. The loss for which one seeks restitution becomes a constitutive loss — and becomes visible as the key to one’s enjoyment rather than a barrier to it. A political project derived from psychoanalytic thought would work to broaden this cure by bringing it outside the clinic and enacting 22 on society itself. Th e point is not, of course, that everyone would undergo psychoanalysis but that psychoanalytic theory would function as a political theory. Politically, the importance of psychoanalysis is theoretical rather than practical. Politically, it doesn’t matt er whether people undergo psychoanalytic therapy or not. This theory would inaugurate political change by insisting not on the possibility of healing and thereby att aining the ultimate pleasure but on the indissoluble link between our enjoyment and loss. We become free to enjoy only when we have recognized the intractable nature of loss. Though psychoanalytic thought insists on our freedom to enjoy, it understands freedom in a counterintuitive way. It is through the death drive that the subject attains its freedom. The loss that founds this drive frees the subject from its dependence on its social environment, and the repetition of the initial loss sustains this freedom. By embracing the inescapability of traumatic loss, one embraces one’s freedom, and any political project genuinely concerned with freedom must orient itself around loss. Rather than looking to the possibility of overcoming loss, our political projects must work to remain faithful to it and enhance our contact with it. Only in this way does politics have the opportunity to carve out a space for the freedom to enjoy rather than restricting it under the banner of the good.

# Case

### Overview

Prefer our ROTB

1] meta level constraint on theirs –

2] fiat illusory

3] simulation da-

4] root cause

### Link wall

#### Lundberg –

“While one part of that is to continue pursuing outright bans, like those already in place in France, Germany and New York, this must be done alongside the **demand** for something better.”

#### McGowa - Communism must be seen as running parallel to flourishing on a personal scale, rather than a sacrifice to some greater good

### Case

#### Asteroid mining fails.

Fickling 20 [(David, Bloomberg opinion columnist, previously at Guardian and Financial Times, MA in Eng Lit from Cambridge) “We’re Never Going to Mine the Asteroid Belt,” Bloomberg Opinion, December 21, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-21/space-mining-on-asteroids-is-never-going-to-happen>] TDI

It’s wonderful that people are shooting for the stars — but those who declined to fund the expansive plans of the nascent space mining industry were right about the fundamentals. Space mining won’t get off the ground in any foreseeable future — and you only have to look at the history of civilization to see why.

One factor rules out most space mining at the outset: gravity. On one hand, it guarantees that most of the solar system’s best mineral resources are to be found under our feet. Earth is the largest rocky planet orbiting the sun. As a result, the cornucopia of minerals the globe attracted as it coalesced is as rich as will be found this side of Alpha Centauri.

Gravity poses a more technical problem, too. Escaping Earth’s gravitational field makes transporting the volumes of material needed in a mining operation hugely expensive. On Falcon Heavy, the large rocket being developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, transporting a payload to the orbit of Mars comes to as little as [$5,357 per kilogram](https://www.spacex.com/media/Capabilities&Services.pdf) — a drastic reduction in normal launch costs. Still, at those prices just lofting a single half-ton drilling rig to the asteroid belt would use up the annual exploration budget of a small mining company.

Power is another issue. The international space station, with 35,000 square feet of solar arrays, generates up to 120 kilowatts of electricity. That drill would need a [similar-sized power plant](https://www.rocktechnology.sandvik/en/products/exploration-drill-rigs-and-tools/compact-core-drill-rigs/) — and most mining companies operate multiple rigs at a time. Power demands rise drastically once you move from exploration drilling to mining and processing. Bringing material back to Earth would raise the costs even more. Japan’s Hayabusa2 satellite spent six years and 16.4 billion yen ($157 million) recovering a single gram of material from the asteroid Ryugu and returning it to Earth earlier this month.

#### The aff begins from the premise of the failure of state solutions and a refusal of this world. Those state-based solutions are critical and necessary to win the transition to communism. The aff gives up on the transition and, ironically, hopes that things will work out in the meantime – they won’t.

Parenti ‘16 (Christian, Clinical Assistant Professor of Liberal Studies @ New York University, “Environment-Making in the Capitalocene Political Ecology of the State,” *Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism*, pp. 181-183)

The unacknowledged centrality of the state to the functioning of capitalism is especially relevant today, with a devastating climate crisis already upon us in the form of desertification, powerful storms, ocean acidification, melting glaciers, incrementally rising sea levels, and mass migrations. The crisis requires immediate action on a truly massive scale. I have laid out an analysis of the state rooted in a political ecological reading of value. As a central catalyst of social nature, the capitalist state does not have a relationship to "nature" – it is a relationship with nature. The state is not merely "part" of the Capitalocene but central to it. Why? Because the geopower of the capitalist state makes it possible for capital to treat the surface of the earth as a warehouse of Cheap Nature. As we have seen, the history of capitalist development is almost always the history of state-guided development. To reform capitalism - and to move beyond it – the Left needs to place the state front and center in its strategic considerations. Appeals to corporate social responsibility, attempts to shame capital into reform, strategies that declare politics "broken" and seek to circumvent the state, or escapist hyperlocalism – all hallmarks of American environmentalism – are fundamentally unrealistic. This argument has political implications. First, the state cannot be avoided, as scholars like Holloway suggest (2002). For Left politics to become effective, especially in the face of the climate crisis, they must come up with strategies that engage and attempt to transform the state. The idea of escaping the state is to misrecognize the centrality and immutably fundamental nature of the state to the value form and thus to capitalist society (Mazzucato 2013). The chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (the export credit agency of the federal government) tried to explain the centrality of the state to reporters after a business trip to the Czech Republic: "It's time to drop the fantasy that a purely free market exists in the world of global trade .... In the real world our private enterprises are pitted against an array of competitors that are often government-owned, government- protected, government-subsidized, government-sponsored or all of the above" (Economist 2013). In other words, the legal frameworks of property are territorially fixed and states remain the crucial political units of global capitalism. Managing, mediating, producing, and delivering nonhuman nature to accumulation is a core function of the modern, territorially defined, capitalist state. When we speak of capital having a metabolism, we must think of the state as an indispensable mediating membrane in that process. In that regard, the climate crisis does not require a new role for the state, but merely a different and better version of the environment-making that it already does. For that to happen, critical scholars need a renewed theoretical engagement with the state. I have suggested that we begin by considering the state as the central environmental actor within the larger world historical drama of capitalism. The state remains at the center of modern political struggle. More specifically, the state's seemingly new role as an economically crucial, environmental agent, which can appear to be merely a political by-product of climate change and the broader ecological crisis, is actually not new at all. Climate change brings disasters and emergencies that call forth the state. How the state responds is a different question: sometimes it fails, but always it is called.