# 1NC

### 1

#### I value morality.

#### First, being is always a prior question – only an existential analysis of what comprises our subjective nature can allow for ethical judgements.

#### A] Facticity – objects and entities only have meaning in the specific contexts they are presently confronted with. A rock can be used for analysis by a geologist or as a hammer by a survivalist – its meaning is contingently signified in the moment and not a metaphysical truth.

#### B] Alienation – the fact we are thrown into a world at a particular place and time forces us to inculcate moral responsibility. Confronting our existential freedom to mold ourselves in our own image is a prerequisite to being able to view ourselves as being agents across space and time.

#### Next, there is no metaphysical concept of agency. Rather, agents are simply constellations of contingent drives that form the impetus for the way in which they make sense of the world.

**Alfano 1** [Mark Alfano, no date, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. He specializes in moral psychology broadly construed, including virtue theory, decision making, ethics, and experimental philosophy. “Nietzsche’s virtues: Curiosity, courage, pathos of distance, sense of humor, and solitude.” *Handbook of Virtue and Virtue Ethics.* (Springer). <https://philpapers.org/rec/ALFNVC>] bxnk

Nietzsche starts with a naturalistic conception of drives, instincts, and types of people. He then moves in a normative direction by identifying some drives and instincts as virtues — at least for certain types of people in particular social and cultural contexts. Much of Nietzsche’s understanding of virtue must therefore be understood relative to a type of person and the context in which they find themselves. For instance, in The Gay Science 120, Nietzsche revises the dictum “virtue is the health of the soul” to “your virtue is the health of your soul.” And in Antichrist 11, he uses derisive scare quotes to distinguish between type-appropriate and type-inappropriate dispositions: A virtue needs to be our own invention, our own most personal need and self-defense: in any other sense, a virtue is just dangerous. Whatever is not a condition for life harms it: a virtue that comes exclusively from a feeling of respect for the concept of ‘virtue’, as Kant would have it, is harmful. Nietzsche pays special attention to his own type in his own context, emphasizing the virtues of curiosity, courage, the pathos of distance, the sense of humor, and solitude. These instincts-become-virtues are held together by conscience and integrity, as I explain in more detail below. For Nietzsche, drives are act-directed motivational and evaluative dispositions (Katsafanas 2016). An agent’s drives move her to engage in and positively evaluate a range of characteristic actions regardless of the consequences that may eventuate from those actions. Drives thus differ from preferences and desires in being associated primarily with the processes of agency rather than with teleologically-specified states of affairs. Passages about aggressive drives in Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy illustrate this idea. He claims that these drives do not disappear during the political shift into the “straitjacket” of norms and rules; instead, the drives remain but end up expressing themselves differently (Genealogy II.2). “After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers,” he claims, “strong and dangerous drives, like an enterprising spirit, foolhardiness, vengefulness, craftiness, rapacity, and the lust to rule, which had so far not merely been honored insofar as they were socially useful […] but had to be trained and cultivated […] are now experienced as dangers” (BGE 201). Indeed, they are “doubly dangerous, since the channels to divert them are lacking.” The supposition here is that aggressive drives, lacking an opportunity for discharge in action against an external enemy, will be “diverted” from their usual “channels” onto members of the society. Here we see a drive finding expression in alternative ways (same action-type, different goal and consequence) when the most natural manner of expression is no longer available. Nietzsche makes a similar claim about aggressive drives in Genealogy II.16: with the establishment of a strictly-regulated society, he says, suddenly all [people’s] instincts were disvalued and ‘suspended.’ […] in this new world they no longer possessed their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and infallible drives: […] at the same time the old instincts had not suddenly ceased to make their usual demands! Only it was hardly or rarely possible to humor them: as a rule they had to seek new and, as it were, subterranean gratifications. This susceptibility to displacement from usual “channels” is one of the main reasons why drive-motivated actions sometime seem irrational. This feature of drives explains and unites a range of seemingly irrational behaviors in which an agent performs an action that is drive-expressive despite the fact that she knows or could easily come to know that the action will not produce a desired state of affairs. In addition, Nietzsche thinks that instincts are innate drives, though other drives can be acquired. In Beyond Good and Evil 3, he claims that “by far the greater part of conscious thinking must still be included among instinctive activities, and that goes even for philosophical thinking. We have to relearn here, as one has had to relearn about heredity and what is ‘innate.’” And in Beyond Good and Evil 199, Nietzsche argues that “The strange limits of human development, the way it hesitates, takes so long, often turns back, and moves in circles, is due to the fact that the herd instinct of obedience is inherited best, and at the expense of the art of commanding.” In two additional passages, he refers to the process of breeding (‘züchten’ or a cognates) when talking about instincts. In Beyond Good and Evil 207, he contrasts the “ideal scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousands of total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end” with the “philosopher,” whom he characterizes as a “Caesarian breeder and brutal man of culture” who uses the scholar as a tool. And in Genealogy of Morals II.3, Nietzsche argues that “one has only to look at [Germans’] former codes of punishments to understand what effort it cost on this earth to breed a ‘nation of thinkers’ [….] These Germans have employed fearful means to acquire a memory, so as to master their basic mob-instinct.” These passages stand in opposition to passages such as Uses and Disadvantages of History For Life 4, Daybreak 38, and Daybreak 455, in which Nietzsche talks about drives and other dispositions in terms of an acquired second nature (‘zweite Natur’). Moreover, instincts and other drives are mutable on several dimensions, including their intensity, their objects, and the structural interrelations (Daybreak 109). And an agent’s instincts and other drives constitute her psychological type. Daybreak 199 is especially instructive on this point: However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute his being. He can scarcely name even the cruder ones: their number and strength, their ebb and flood, their play and counterplay among one another, and above all the laws of their nutriment remain wholly unknown to him. This nutriment is therefore a work of chance. This passage establishes what Nietzsche thinks is determinative of a person’s type: your type is the “totality of drives” that “constitute” your “being.” Your type is not dependent on your beliefs, your culture, or any of a variety of other candidates. What makes you who you are is the constellation of your drives.

#### That outweighs:

#### A] Identity – the structure of the drives is most constitutive to the creation of the subject since it determines what each subject interprets as intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as a façade.

#### B] Empirics – there is no factual account of the self or how to approach the good since all agents’ drives and motivations are different – means only subjectivism solves.

#### This culminates in a paradigm of Nietzschean virtue that integrates drives as a form of meaningful self-expression, avoiding ressentiment.

**Alfano 2** [Mark Alfano, no date, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. He specializes in moral psychology broadly construed, including virtue theory, decision making, ethics, and experimental philosophy. “Nietzsche’s virtues: Curiosity, courage, pathos of distance, sense of humor, and solitude.” *Handbook of Virtue and Virtue Ethics.* (Springer). <https://philpapers.org/rec/ALFNVC>] bxnk

This in turn makes it possible to say what a Nietzschean virtue is: namely, a well-calibrated instinct or other drive. What it takes for a drive to be well-calibrated involves both internal and external (social) integration, or at least non-interference. In particular, a drive is a virtue to the extent that it is conducive to life, does not systematically or reliably induce negative self-directed emotions that respond to fixed aspects of the self, and does not systematically or reliably induce reactions from the agent’s community that are liable to be internalized as negative self-directed emotions that respond to fixed aspects of the self. The first and second constraints together are what I call “internal integration” (Alfano forthcoming). One drive is integrated with another when expressing it typically also expresses the other (strong integration) or at least does not frustrate the expression of the other (weak integration). Since drives induce not only characteristic patterns of action but also characteristic patterns of evaluation, integrated drives will tend to result in actions that the agent approves of or at least is not disposed to disapprove. Failures to enjoy internal integration Nietzsche calls “decadence” (*Ecce Homo* Destiny 7), which he sees as a vicious state of overall character. In *Daybreak* 26, he argues that, “The beginnings of justice, as of prudence, moderation, bravery — in short, of all we designate as the *Socratic virtues*, are *animal*: a consequence of that drive which teaches us to seek food and elude enemies.” Virtues are here consequences of drives. Their instinctual adaptiveness (in pursuit of the nutrition and security that foster life and health) makes them virtues. Likewise, in *Beyond Good and Evil* 262, Nietzsche argues that communities “call virtues” whatever instincts and other drives have enabled them to survive and triumph. Such adaptiveness is one aspect of what I mean by a drive’s being well-calibrated.

#### This virtuous meaning creation is ultimately enabled by an epistemic process of self-overcoming, wherein an agent overcome the static labels and perspectives affixed to them to truly embrace their identity. Thus, the standard is consistency with reflexive virtue.

**Alfano 3** [Mark Alfano, no date, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. He specializes in moral psychology broadly construed, including virtue theory, decision making, ethics, and experimental philosophy. “Nietzsche’s virtues: Curiosity, courage, pathos of distance, sense of humor, and solitude.” *Handbook of Virtue and Virtue Ethics.* (Springer). <https://philpapers.org/rec/ALFNVC>] bxnk

Nietzsche also pays special attention to the role of community in fostering virtues. For him, one’s community and the language used by that community play a constitutive role in the cultivation of virtue. This is because part of what it means for a person to be of a certain type is that she is susceptible to social determination of her character (Alfano 2015b). Some types are *meta-types*. They’re not dispositions to *act* in certain ways, but dispositions to become the sort of person who acts in particular to-be-specified ways. Unlike Aristotle, who thinks that one becomes virtuous through practice and habituation, realizing all the while that one is not yet virtuous but aiming to become so, Nietzsche thinks that the temporal relation sometimes runs in the other direction. First, one supposes, imagines, hopes, or fantasizes oneself to be a certain way. In so doing, one becomes committed to a standard of conduct that includes not only one’s actions but also one’s thoughts, feelings, emotions, and deliberative strategies. Commitment to this standard in turn induces congruent behavior. Thus, thinking of oneself as having certain traits is temporally and conceptually prior to actually having those traits. This is a theme that crops up especially in the *Genealogy*, where Nietzsche describes the nobles not so much as being psychologically higher but as imagining themselves to be higher psychologically (because they are already politically higher), as enchanted by the pathos of distance (*Genealogy* I.3, III.14). This pathos induces (enough of) them to behave as if they were higher, which has knock-on social effects that lead to self-confirmatory conduct. This theme also crops up, in a less uplifting way, in his description of psychological slavishness — a disposition to simulate, mimic, or acquire whatever character traits are attributed to one. Instead of or in addition to feeling committed to a certain code of conduct, the slavish person feels that other people, especially others with the power to impose sanctions and punishments, expect him to behave in accordance with a certain code of conduct. Thus, while both psychological masters and psychological slaves become what they are taken to be, the masters do so by becoming what they take themselves to be (and what fellow masters take them to be), whereas the psychologically slavish become what others take them to be. Thus, there are two Nietzschean styles of becoming what one is called: the social and the reflexive. Someone whose character is built according to the social plan becomes what others consider and call him — good, bad, or mixed. By contrast, someone whose personality is built according to the reflexive plan becomes what she [they] considers and calls herself [themselves]. Nietzsche associates this method of personality construction with masterliness. One of Nietzsche’s great innovations is the idea that there is a looping effect between the psychological disposition named by a character trait-term and the practice of using that term (Hacking 2006). While he affirms that people are differentially disposed to certain patterns of behavior, he conceives of these dispositions as fluid both in their objects and, to a lesser degree, in their strength and aim. The valence and content of the labels applied to an agent, together with the power-relation between the labeler and labeled, interact with her preexisting psychological dispositions to produce the kind of person she [they] eventually become[s]. Because Nietzsche held a type-relative unity of virtue thesis, if we want to discern his virtue theory, we need to look at his self-attributions. This allows us to pick out the set of traits he considers virtues for his type. Thus, there is no universal specification of “the virtues” in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nevertheless, we can say quite a bit about the virtues he celebrates in his own type. Most of these are more closely connected to epistemic than traditionally moral or prudential flourishing. The first distinctively Nietzschean virtue is curiosity (Alfano 2013, Bamford forthcoming, Christy forthcoming, Reginster 2013). It is notably epistemic and therefore better contextualized by contemporary virtue epistemology (especially responsibilist epistemology — on which see Roberts & Wood 2007) than contemporary virtue ethics. Curiosity is deeply embedded in Nietzsche’s perspectivism. He thinks that perspectives support inquiry in essential ways. For him, a perspective is emotional and evaluative. The perspective someone inhabits leads them to see some things as good, right, noble, admirable, desirable, or enviable, while also leading them to see other things as bad, wrong, base, contemptible, disgusting, aversive, or pitiable. One’s perspective reveals and emphasizes (sometimes overemphasizes) some of the evaluative properties of the things in one’s ambit. For example, Nietzsche argues that we can never give a rational ground for our synthetic a priori judgments, but that we hold onto them nevertheless because they belong to “the perspectival optics of life” (Beyond Good and Evil 11). Then, in Beyond Good and Evil 32, he characterizes the shift from basing evaluations of actions on their consequences to basing evaluations on origins (motives) as a “reversal of perspective.” A couple sections later, he declares that “life could not exist except on the basis of perspectival valuations and appearances” (Beyond Good and Evil 34). And in Beyond Good and Evil 201, he says that, when “the structure of society seems on the whole to be established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation.” In the transition from war to peace, society shifts from valuing courage and cunning, which are useful during periods of insecurity and inter-group conflict, to condemning them as dangerous to internal cohesion. Likewise, in Beyond Good and Evil 211, Nietzsche argues that a proper philosopher must have already inhabited a huge number of perspectives: “the philosopher has had to be a critic and a skeptic and a dogmatist and a historian and, moreover, a poet and a collector and traveler and guesser of riddles and moralist and ‘free spirit’ and practically everything” if he wants to be able to “run through the range of human values and value feelings and be able to gaze with many eyes and consciences from the heights into every distance, from the depths up to every height, from the corner onto every expanse.” But the world is a complex place. Inhabiting only one perspective is liable to make complex evaluative phenomena difficult to appreciate. Since perspective-free inquiry is impossible, Nietzsche recommends combatting these unavoidable distortions by taking up different perspectives over time. This is why Nietzsche repeatedly enjoins his readers to get control over their emotions; this control or capacity is, for him an epistemic methodology. Nietzsche first articulated the method of getting control over one’s pro and con in 1886, when he published Beyond Good and Evil and republished Human, All-too-human with new prefaces both for the main body of the book and for the Assorted Opinions and Maxims. In Human, All-too-human P6, we read: You shall get control over your For and Against and learn to display first one and then the other in accordance with your higher goal. You shall learn to grasp the sense of perspective in every value judgment — the displacement, distortion and merely apparent teleology of horizons and whatever else pertains to perspectivism; also the quantum of stupidity that resides in antitheses of values and the whole intellectual loss which every For, every Against costs us. You shall learn to grasp the necessary injustice in every For and Against, injustice as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned by the sense of perspective and its injustice. In this neglected passage, Nietzsche argues that evaluative perspectives are unavoidable, and that each one brings with it “displacement, distortion, and merely apparent teleology.” He responds to these distortions neither by trying to eliminate perspective altogether nor by seeking a perspective evacuated of value and emotion, but by getting control one’s emotions and learning “to display first one and then the other.” Perspectivism is meant to reveal, through the controlled cycling-through of various emotional and evaluative points of view, properties that would otherwise be invisible and to rectify inquiry by pitting biases of perspectives against each other. Nietzsche developed this methodology to express the virtue of curiosity. Nietzschean curiosity is a drive to engage in inquiry, especially when that inquiry is into interesting subjects and is both intellectually and morally challenging. In addition, Nietzschean curiosity does not stop when it arrives at an answer; it always finds a new question, a new investigation, a new inquiry. The curious person is concerned with the product of investigation; she would not be satisfied with false beliefs, unsupported beliefs, or the withholding of judgment. But she is even more concerned with the process of investigation; she can’t stop thinking, inferring, refuting, synthesizing, and so on. For Nietzsche, doxastic change through investigation is essential. He says that the will to truth “still tempt[s]” to “many a venture” (Beyond Good and Evil 1) and that “travelers and adventurers” like him discover a “world of insight” (Beyond Good and Evil 23). Nietzschean curiosity is opposed to both ataraxia and faith because faith, as he understands it, is the disposition to stop investigating. It’s an expression of the need for something firm “that one does not wish to be shaken because one clings to it” (Gay Science 347). Faith is “a veto on science” because it involves “not wanting to know the truth” (Antichrist 52). This makes sense if the virtue of curiosity is a drive, since drives impel their bearers to act. Nietzschean curiosity is a matter of struggling with difficult, interesting questions. The next characteristically Nietzschean virtue is courage, which, like all Nietzschean virtues, is a disposition to engage in characteristic patterns of activity and evaluation. His version of courage is more a matter of intellectual confrontation than of martial or physical contest. It’s a matter of managing one’s fears in the midst of inquiry and of approaching epistemic phenomena with aplomb and self-assurance. It’s also a matter of doubting where others are certain, of exercising one’s conscience about questions, and of laughing contemptuously at the sacred values and sacred cows of one’s community. While it may be uncontroversial to say that courage is the virtue most relevant to responding to threats, Nietzsche has an idiosyncratic take on which threats are most worth finding and facing. Nietzsche sees curiosity and thinking well of people (both others and oneself) as implacable enemies. If one seeks the truth only to do the good, he says, one “finds nothing” (Beyond Good and Evil 35). If Nietzschean curiosity is a matter of investigating difficult problems, of overcoming great intellectual resistances, then one of its purest expressions is in the investigation precisely of the most nauseating facts about ourselves. The soul of the intellectually courageous investigator is the battleground on which curiosity contends with “life-preserving errors,” where the question “To what extent can truth endure incorporation?” is put to the torture (Gay Science 110).

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Motivation – existentialism is the only motivational ethic insofar as every action we take is driven by the desire to take that action; regardless of what the motivation is, whenever an act is externally realized, it entails the action was necessarily motivated by the freedom to take such action.

#### [2] Lexicality –

#### [A] Answering the framework is self-defeating because you use your perspective that perspectivism is nonsense to answer perspectivism, which is tautological and proves everything devolves to perspectivism since your arguments are inseparable from how you communicate them.

#### [3] Oppression – only existentialism provides a framework that allows individuals to overcome domination, as social norms only carry the normative force that we assign to them.

**Newman 06**  (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, 2006)

Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power **-- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche**.[[56]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn56) This is **to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.** To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification. We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, **a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose**.

#### Impact calc – consequences do not link - maximizing appropriation has no impact under the framework – only the things that structurally preclude us from experimenting and mixing ourselves with the world has evaluative potential.

#### I contend that the appropriation of outer space is not unjust -

#### [1] Space is an open canvas – A] Appropriation is the meaningful expression of the will to power. Mixing our will with the cosmos is what allows us to ground ourselves as subjects. B] Fixation – Preventing space exploration artificially limits the possibility of human experience, which alienates us from our potential and from the world that exists beyond the arbitrary limits of our atmosphere.

#### [2] Epistemology – A] All of reality is the will to power. Thus, it is only by appropriating space can we truly embrace the nature of our existential subjectivity and designate it as an externality to make sense of.

#### [3] The aff is the will to will – A] It homogenizes all instances of outer space appropriation as bad when there is no universal metaphysical truth.

#### [4] Private property is key to recognizing agents through the personality in their work. Recognition is necessary for agents to be non-alienated bc we need to establish relations with the world.

**Hughes 98 -** "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property," 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988) by Justin Hughes [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html] // ahs emi

At first blush, this economic rationale seems far removed from the concerns of personality theory, [n244](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n244) yet it can be recast into the framework of the personality theory. From the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition. These payments acknowledge the individual's claim over the property, and it is through such acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a person. [n245](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n245) "Recognition" involves more than lip service. If I say "this forest is your property" and then proceed to flagrantly trespass, cut your timber, and hunt your deer, I have not recognized your property rights. Similarly, verbal recognition of an intellectual property claim is not equal to the recognition implicit in a payment. Purchasers of a copyrighted work or licensees of a patent form a circle of people recognizing the creator as a person. Furthermore, this generation of income complements the personality theory in as much as income facilitates further expression. When royalties from an invention allow the inventor to buy a grand piano he has always wanted, the transaction helps maximize personality. But this argument tends to be too broad. First, much income is used for basic necessities, leading to the vacuous position that life-sustenance is "personally maximizing" because it allows the personality to continue. Second, this approach could justify property rights for after-the-fact development of personality interests without requiring [\*350] such interests in the property at the time the property rights are granted. The personality theory provides a better, more direct justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially copies. The alienation of copies is perhaps the most rational way to gain exposure for one's ideas. This is a non-economic, and perhaps higher, form of the idea of recognition: respect, honor, and admiration. Even for starving artists recognition of this sort may be far more valuable than economic rewards. Two conditions appear essential, however, to this justification of alienation: first, the creator of the work must receive public identification, and, second, the work must receive protection against any changes unintended or unapproved by the creator.VARA Hegel's prohibition of "complete" alienation of intellectual property appears to result from his recognition of the necessity for these two conditions. While he would permit alienation of copies, and even the rights to further reproduction, [n246](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n246) he disapproves alienation of "those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute . . . private personality and the universal essence of . . . self-consciousness." [n247](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n247) Such alienation necessarily occurs if the recognition of the connection between a creator and his expression is destroyed or distorted. When the first condition is violated, this recognition is destroyed; when the second condition is violated, it is distorted.

# Case

### Framing

#### OV -

**[1] Meaning creation is the normative force behind the creation of consequences – consequences merely represent the existential value we hold externally which means even if consequentialism is true, the only reason those consequences are produced is because they reflect our existential preferences**

**[2] SV can’t explain our fundamental ontological nature – I’m winning the internal link to the strongest ethical concept at the base of humanity which precedes the realization of ethical principles since ethics without an explanation of our being cannot explain how we ought to act as beings.**

**[3] SV are just examples of filters into our existential calculus – it may inform the creation of future value but it is too shallow to explain the normative potential of actions in themselves, even if util influences the way we decide to take those actions.**

### 1

### 2

#### 1 - Non UQ – squo debris thumps – Bronx reads blue

Orwig 16 [(Jessica, MS in science and tech journalism from Texas A&M, BS in astronomy and physics from Ohio State) “Russia says a growing problem in space could be enough to spark a war,” Insider,’ January 26, 2016, <https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-says-space-junk-could-spark-war-2016-1>] TDI

NASA has already [warned that](https://www.businessinsider.com/space-junk-at-critical-density-2015-9) the large amount of space junk around our planet is growing beyond our control, but now a team of Russian scientists has cited another potentially unforeseen consequence of that debris: War.

Scientists estimate that anywhere from 500,000 to 600,000 pieces of human-made space debris between 0.4 and 4 inches in size are currently orbiting the Earth and traveling at speeds over [17,000 miles per hour](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html).

If one of those pieces smashed into a military satellite it "may provoke political or even armed conflict between space-faring nations," Vitaly Adushkin, a researcher for the Institute of Geosphere Dynamics at the Russian Academy of Sciences, reported in a paper set to be published in the peer-reviewed journal [Acta Astronautica](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094576515303416), which is sponsored by the International Academy of Astronautics.

#### 2 - Public sector mining thumps.

NASA 19 [“NASA Invests in Tech Concepts Aimed at Exploring Lunar Craters, Mining Asteroids,” NASA, June 11, 2019, <https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-invests-in-tech-concepts-aimed-at-exploring-lunar-craters-mining-asteroids>] TDI

NASA Invests in Tech Concepts Aimed at Exploring Lunar Craters, Mining Asteroids

Robotically surveying lunar craters in record time and mining resources in space could help NASA establish a sustained human presence at the Moon – part of the agency’s broader [Moon to Mars exploration](https://www.nasa.gov/specials/moon2mars/) approach. Two mission concepts to explore these capabilities have been selected as the first-ever Phase III studies within the [NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts](https://www.nasa.gov/niac) (NIAC) program.

“We are pursuing new technologies across our development portfolio that could help make deep space exploration more Earth-independent by utilizing resources on the Moon and beyond