# 1NC

### 1

#### The ontological nature of the subject is self-determining – there is no inherent meaning to the world and freedom is the only choice for subject formation. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who cultivates existential subjectivity.

**Moore 67** Asher. “Existential Phenomenology.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 27, no. 3, 1967, pp. 408–414. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/2106066.//Scopa](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106066.//Scopa).

**A human being is not a universal structure** or a set of universal structures. Whatever may be true of other things, the identity of human persons is not defined by Leibniz' principle. **A human being is unique, unrepeatable, and entirely particular.** Or rather, since of course human beings may participate in or illustrate common structures, let us say that whether or not a particular person illustrates a certain structure is always a question of fact, to be determined by consulting him, never a question about man, to be settled by essential insight into man-ness, or a question about men, to be settled by inductive inference from other men. A human being who lacked all common structures would doubtless be literally incommunicado, but he would still be himself. **What a human being is, in the sense of what universals he exemplifies, does not determine, but is determined by, who he is. A human being is free, and his life is not necessary but contingent. There are no patterns or laws to which a human being's life must con- form, no channels it must follow.** A particular life may be in large part, or even entirely, necessitated - habitual, predictable, compulsive. But whether this is so or not is a contingent matter. **As it is contingent that there is something rather than nothing, so a thing is necessary only if it happens to be. A person can be un-free, but whether he is lies within the scope of his freedom.** The neurotic is genuinely compelled, but in the end the only way for him to stop being compelled is to stop. **Existential psychoanalysis may succeed in uncovering an individual's basic project, but there can be no guarantee of success, since some of as may have no basic project. It lies within a human being's freedom to choose chaos**: in some sense, dissociation is exactly that choice. Since there is nothing which a human being must inevitably be, or become, or do, one must wait to see what he will do, wait to see what will happen. **Temporality is a timeless structure but human life is not timeless, but open to a future**. It will be objected that we have misunderstood the nature of those structures which universally and necessarily characterize human existence by mistakenly identifying them with the sort of universal structure which constitutes the determinate nature of a thing, determinig what the thing is. **A human being is not a what but a who**. The structures involved in being a human being are therefore not what a human being is; they do not make up his nature. **A human being is not determinate, but self-determining**. He will have been what he chooses to be. But the fact that human beings do not embody the same structures as things, or embody them in the same way, does not mean that human beings embody no structures. On the contrary, they embody those structures which apply to a free who, those structures which are conditions of the possibility of a free life. **These structures are ontological, not ontic; they are not categories or essences, but existentials.** Furthermore, it will be pointed out, we have throughout our own discussion freely availed ourselves of exactly such structures. A human being, we said, is not a universal or a set of universals, because he is a unique individual. But what does that mean if not that human existence universally and necessarily' involves the existential structures of individuality, and uniqueness, and everything implicated in them? After all, particularity is a universal structure. **Similarly, in the sense of the term necessary which is applicable to things, human acts are not necessary, but contingent, since human existence is free. Nonetheless, it is a necessary truth that human existence is free.** Man is condemned to freedom. And it is a necessary truth that freedom is just the sort of thing it is. That we ourselves, **in the act of denying that universal and necessary structures can be ascribed to human beings, ascribed to them the structures of freedom and individuality, was no avoidable slip, but illustrates the fact that without such structures nothing at all can be said about human existence**, even that it is human existence. It is these structures, it is contended, which are open to, and open only to, phenomenological insight.

#### Security requires that one fear the unknown instead of confronting it in the manner constitutive to the will to power. This kills value to life, causes ressentiment, and controls the root cause to their impacts.

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Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes’s and Marx’s interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical “other” of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others–who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: “Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results.”34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche’s view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and effective force of becoming, from which values and meanings – including self-preservation – are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for “… life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation – but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages.”35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: “life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war.”36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference– that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader: “Look, isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?” The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The “why?” shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause–a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. … That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation–that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility–recycling the desire for security. The “influence of timidity,” as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the “necessities” of security: “they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences.”39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. “Trust,” the “good,” and other common values come to rely upon an “artificial strength”: “the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god.”40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: “Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error: in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes.”41 Nietzsche’s interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one’s ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists–and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength.42 Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for the ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god. 43 As the ancestor’s debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an “artificial strength”: “the feeling one lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside, the “man without peace,” is exposed … since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the “love of the neighbor” quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: My rights are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then: by donation and cession.45 The point of Nietzsche’s critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative – and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it – have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: “Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation.”46 Nietzsche’s worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox – all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche’s lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues – How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness, not also diminished?47

#### The state is a complex managerial system of classificatory regimes that promises a politically generated subject capable of accessing the empty promise of liberal universality – this promise is sustained through production of difference, subject management, and the demand for political attachments to sustain identity.

**Brown 93,** Brown, Wendy. “Wounded Attachments.” *Political Theory*, vol. 21, no. 3, 1993, pp. 390–410. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/191795. Accessed 9 Mar. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795.%20Accessed%209%20Mar.%202020). //Scopa//RECUT BXNK

The tension between particularistic "I's" and a universal "we" in liberal- ism is sustainable as long as the constituent terms of the "I" remain un- politicized indeed, as long as the "I" itself remains unpoliticized on one hand, and the state (as the expression of the ideal of political universality) remains unpoliticized on the other. That is, the latent **conflict within liberalism between universal representation and individualism remains latent**, remains unpoliticized, **as long as differential powers in civil society remain natural- ized and as long as the "I" is subordinated to the abstract "we" encoded in the state's guarantee of universal freedom and equality**. This **subordination is achieved either by the "I" abstracting from itself in its political represen- tation, thus trivializing its "difference" so as to remain part of the "we"** (as in homosexuals who are "just like everyone else except for whom we sleep with") **or by the "I" accepting its construction as a supplement, complement, or partial outsider to the "we"** (as in homosexuals who are just "a little different," a bit "queer"). The history of **liberalism's management of** its inherited and constructed **"others" could be read as a history of** variations on and **vacillations between these two strategies**. The abstract character of **liberal political membership** and the ideologi- cally naturalized character of liberal individualism together work against politicized identity formation in liberal regimes. A formulation of the political state and of citizenship that, as Marx put it in the "Jewish Question," **abstracts from the substantive conditions of our lives, works to prevent recognition or articulation of differences as political-as effects of power-in their very construction and organization**; they are at most the stuff of divergent political or economic interests.2 **Equally** important, to the extent that political mem- bership in the liberal state involves abstracting from one's social being, **it involves abstracting not only from the contingent productions of one's life circumstances but from the identificatory processes constitutive of one's social** construction and **position**. Whether read from the frontispiece of Hobbes' Leviathan, in which the many are made one through the unity of the sovereign, or from the formulations of tolerance codified by John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and, more contemporaneously, George Kateb, in which the minimalist liberal state is cast as precisely what enables our politically unfettered individuality, we are invited to seek equal deference-equal blindness from-but not equalizing recognition from the state, liberalism's universal moment.3 As Marx discerned in his critique of Hegel, **the universality of the state is ideologically achieved by** turning away from and thus **depoliticizing, yet at the same time presupposing our collective particulars**, not by embracing them, let alone emancipating us from them.4 In short, **"the political"** in liberalism **is precisely not a domain for social identification: expected to recognize our political selves in the state, we are not led to expect deep recognition** there. Indeed, in a smooth and legitimate liberal order, the **particularistic "I's" must remain unpoliticized, and the universalistic "we" must remain without specific content or aim, without a common good other than abstract universal representation** or pluralism. The abstractness of the "we" is precisely what insists upon, reiterates, and even enforces the depo- liticized nature of the "I." In Ernesto Laclau's formulation, "if democracy is possible, it is because the universal does not have any necessary body, any necessary content."5 Although this detente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, **the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations**. This occurs **as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman"** state **to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state**, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of **economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification**: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; **consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual** (and subindividual) **desires are produced, commodified, and mobilized as identities**; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. **These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normalizing social behaviors as social positions**. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identities (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, **the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdivided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity** through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always **imminent** but increasingly politically manifest **failure of liberal universalism to be universal**-the transparent fiction of state universality-**combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects** through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. **As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities**.

#### Util is a link – it’s a religion of pity that justifies the eradication of suffering as evil and primes the subject for a comfortableness that kills the value to life. It writes itself into a paradox through its misunderstanding of human happiness.

**Anomaly 05** Anomaly, Jonny. “Nietzsche's Critique of Utilitarianism.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 29, 2005, pp. 1–15. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20717848. Accessed 9 Mar. 2020. //Scopa \*Brackets for Clarity\*

Nietzsche also portrays **egalitarian values as [are] myopic, dangerous, and poten tially self-subverting**. This is **because**, Nietzsche thinks, **the opposite of these values: pain, suffering, inequality; in short, "evil" is equally indispensable for the survival and happiness of the very herd that seeks to eradicate it**. Accordingly, Nietzsche sharply criticizes Bentham's hedonic calculus (which correlates hap piness maximization with pain minimization) as inconsistent with utilitarian goals. In its place, **Nietzsche stresses the necessity of physical suffering and intellectual struggle for the self-improvement of each and, by extension, the vitality and happiness of the group**. He accordingly rebukes the proponent of any moral ity that makes the reduction of suffering its fundamental goal: **"[I]f you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, worthy of annihilation and as a defect of existence, then** it is clear that **besides your religion of pity you also harbor** **another religion** in your heart **that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity:** the reli gion **of comfortableness**" (GS 338). This religion or, more specifically, **morality of comfort thwarts its own goals by attempting to eliminate all suffering** (BGE 44).9 In a passage that anticipates what we now call the "hedonic paradox," according to **which pleasure is diminished when we pursue it directly**, Nietzsche ridicules those who, like Bentham, seek to maximize individual or collective happiness by minimizing pain: **"[H]ow little you know of human happiness**, you comfortable and benevolent people, **for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or**, as in your case, **remain small together"** (GS 338).10 He goes on to underline the idiosyncratic nature of suffering and the simplemindedness of those who heedlessly strive to relieve the suffering of others. "It never occurs to them," Nietzsche adds, "that... **the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell**" (GS 338)

#### Ressentiment produces a powerless subject incapable of acting and internalizes a hatred for the self that is unendurably painful.

**Brown 93** Brown, Wendy. “Wounded Attachments.” *Political Theory*, vol. 21, no. 3, 1993, pp. 390–410. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/191795. Accessed 9 Mar. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795.%20Accessed%209%20Mar.%202020). //Scopa

Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what **Nietzsche terms ressentiment, the moralizing revenge of the powerless, "the triumph of the weak** as weak."17 This incitement to **ressentiment inheres** in two related **constitutive paradoxes of liberalism**. There is a paradox between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, **which produces failure** turned to recrimination **by the subordinated and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful."** There is one between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality. This latter paradox stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences, on the one hand, and the suppression of them, on the other, and offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored within-included-in the terms of universalism. Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on how the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds **ressentiment as welfare-state liberalism-attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged."** Conversely, a strong com- mitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds **ressentiment expressed as neoconservative antistatism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth**. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their **situatedness within power**, their **production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production** that **casts the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself** in the context of a discourse in which its self-making is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must find either a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame on which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For **every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering**, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering-in short, some living thing upon **which he can on some pretext or other, vent his affects**, actually or in effigy ... This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengeful- ness, and the like: **a desire to deaden pain by means of affects** ... to deaden, **by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness** at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.18 **Ressentiment** in this context **is a triple achievement: it produces an affect** (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt, it produces **a culprit respon- sible** for the hurt, **and** it produces **a site of revenge to displace the hurt** (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's terms, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable."

#### The aff’s resentment produces a form of political apathy that causes their harms.

Leslie Paul Thiele 94, Distinguished Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida, Twilight of Modernity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Politics. Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug**.,** 1994**),** pp. 468-490///AHS PB

If we could somehow achieve an Archimedean point allowing an impartial judgment of life's worth, Kateb observes, then the abundant cruelty, waste, and ugliness of life would preclude its justification: "existence on the earth fails every test that is strenuously pressed by moral or teleological inquir- ers."45 But such metaphysical hypothesizing is beside the point. Kateb takes seriously Nietzsche's understanding that we cannot properly evaluate life's worth. Without a God's eye point of view, we can no more muster reasons to justify existence than we can muster reasons to condemn it. Religious or metaphysical justifications of life (under whose rubric we may subsume all moral and teleological efforts) are ill-begotten: at best they will fail to convince us of their impartiality and hence their prerogative to judge; at worst they will prove counterproductive, begetting a destructive resentment of all the wickedness in life, for wnich they ultimately cannot account. This resentment of life may lead to political apathy or to a hyperactive pursuit of mastery, either of which may allow or promote nuclear war making. It follows that attachment to existence is best cultivated, and therefore the threat of human extinction best addressed, when all religious and metaphysical at- tempts to justify existence have been thoroughly discredited.

#### **The alternative is to affirm a will to power. Self-affirming internalism is necessary to overcome external domination that perpetuates oppression. It’s uncondo.**

**Newman ‘06**, (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, 2006 AD: 7/8/09) //Scopa//RECUT BXNK

Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power **-- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche**.[[56]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn56) This is **to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.** To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification. We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, **a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose**.

# Case

### Framework

#### Permissibility Negates –

#### [1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – a) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and b) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### [2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)