# 1NC

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#### The ROTB is to vote for the best account of desire. Debate is structured around the fantasy of progress, dispelling negative signifiers of deviance which results in error replication. Representations preclude the aff – as analysts, we must refuse the construction of the 1AC which avoids serial policy failure and means they can’t weigh case.

Fotaki, Marianna. (Organization Studies Group @ Manchester Business School). “Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction.” June 15, 2010. Sage, 713-716. LHP SG

**While policy makers express societal fantasies projected onto them by their constituencies, various professional groups or patient advocates are in their own ways involved in the construction of unattainable ideals, as they too pursue and legitimize their specific projects.** The role of fantasy in relation to patient choice seems obvious, but can this be generalized across all policy making processes in relation to health or other areas of public policy making? The answer is an unequivocal yes. **The fantasmatic structuration of public policy making is revealed in the difficulty of accepting the limitations that are intrinsic to human predicament and ‘to give up the dream of being all, of living forever, of narcissistic omnipotence and of living in the world that never frustrates our desires’** (Moi, 2004: 869).Health and social care is about dealing with the finitude of our physical bodies. Yet these concerns are no less relevant to the education system, for example, which is unconsciously preoccupied with ensuring the survival of future generations (see Obholzer, 1994) or economic development and the idea of ‘progress’ more generally, all of which enact omnipotent fantasies of the limitless possibilities in their own distinct ways. Being a part of the symbolic order, which is structured in lack and loss, these imaginary pursuits cannot be easily (if at all) translated into workable policy objectives. But where does this all leave policy makers and how can they purposefully integrate Lacanian and Kleinian insights by bringing them to bear on policy formation and implementation? A legitimate question is: if policies are about societal fantasies that cannot be fulfilled, would this not mean that all policies are bound to fail? More fundamentally, aren’t policies meant to address real issues rather than fantasmatic pursuits that cannot be realized? These are important questions as public policies are first and foremost about addressing issues that most of us care about, and a great deal of effort goes into their design and articulation. Therefore, I would not wish to suggest that policies are not about engaging with real problems. In contrast, my proposition is that socially constructed objects of fantasy are stirred up successfully only when policies concern issues that matter. Such is the case of patient choice for example. Yet **if policy-making is not to remain locked in searching for unattainable fantasms** (of choice for all), **originating in the imaginary reflections of the illusory self, we would have to recognize them for what they are. If**, on the other hand, **we carry on mis-taking them for reality, they will continue to mirror the misrecognized vision of ourselves and our society. The unique strength of psychoanalytic thought is that it demonstrates the injustice towards the other and alienation of the subject whenever we cling to impossible fantasies originating in the imaginary** (Leeb, 2008). **The emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis** on the other hand, **lies in its power to highlight** (and dispel) **the imaginary nature of the subjective drive for unity, certainty and stability which underpins various societal projects.** But **psychoanalysis does not only warn us about the consequences of mistaking the infinite desires of the psyche with the finitude of human bodies.** More crucially **it acknowledges the productive role of fantasy, and of its failure, in the social arena.** In so doing**, psychoanalysis presents us with a way of bridging fantasy with reality in our social and political endeavors. The incorporation of psychoanalytic insights**, I have suggested, as a necessary means for rethinking health policy making, is not meant to supplant economic and political explanations of social and organizational life. Instead it **is offered to elucidate the co-existence and subtle interplay between psychic mechanisms and calculating rationality that policy makers**, politicians, professionals and users of services **rely on** to make their decisions. Both theories of Lacanian and Kleinian **psychoanalysis** drawn upon in this article **imply the necessity of recognizing underlying imaginary dynamics as a starting point in the journey towards realistic policy-making. To do so we need firstly to accept the imaginary structuration of the desire to attain the unattainable. This recognition will lead to an** acknowledgement and **acceptance of the intrinsic instability and conflicting nature of the policy-making process**, overcoming the splits between policy design and implementation. In addition to political and financial constraints, policies are simultaneously driven (and limited) by the ambiguity and non-unified subjectivity of those who design them and the users/beneficiaries who are themselves split, enigmatic and multi-dimensional subjects. Such a policy, which is reflective of its context and of itself, would not easily be drawn into seeking simplistic ‘solutions’ reflecting the fantasies of the ego. It would also not become the mirror showing our deepest socially sanctioned desires/fantasies, that we are then encouraged to enact mindlessly.As I have shown, the rhetorical pronouncements of ‘Choice for All’ for example, stand for an injunction to exercise and enjoy (choice) even if it involves the experience of being ill or cared for. The call for the recognition of the fantasmatic structuration of the policy process does not however suggest a blank slate authorization of policies designed without thought as to how they can (not) be implemented in a complex multi-organization such as the National Health Service. As I have argued, **when policies are conceived at ‘a distance’ from** organizational **reality, they** cannot relate to patient requirements and **cannot be translated into** organizational **realities**. This brings me to my second and more important point, about the necessity of re-considering policy-making processes, as an inclusive process involving those who are concerned with policy implementation: health professionals, and users of services. **By engaging users and providers in decision-making and the co-production of services as self-aware subjects rather than as constituencies whose fantasies can be manipulated, there might be a possibility to break through the cycle of policy repetition and blame apportioning.** More importantly, **reconciling failure as an opportunity that keeps desire alive rather than an outcome to be avoided might create an opening for more realistic policy formation.** This in itself is a depressing process as **one must also give up the idealized objects, accepting the impossibility of ever attaining them.** Yet only by accepting the necessity of Samuel Beckett’s injunction to: **‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’** (Beckett, 1983: 7) may the process of un-encumbering oneself from the ideals that bind our ego begin.A participative policy making process that bridges fantasy and reality is a first step in such a direction. It would foster an engagement of self-aware subjects accepting the burden of their subjectivity and taking responsibility for their ontological predicament without surrendering to it, rather than a responsibilization of individual users of services or professionals. By re-considering the very idea of policy as grounded in an imaginary projection of a soon to be perfect world, we would have to learn to stop demanding such perfection of our politicians, and they would have to stop believing that they could deliver it. The comprehensive interpretation of policy-making at a societal level and through the lens of organizational defences suggested in this article might contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities and limitations of developing patients’ autonomy, beyond normalizing the ‘management of expectations’. It will alsochallenge a linear model of policy-making and policy analysis, which separates design from its implementation, showing it to be inadequate. But for this to happen, **the unconscious motivations that create and undo policies will have to be appreciated. Taking into account the inevitability of fantasy in policy-making and the inevitability of its failure, may not free us once and for all from the tyranny of imaginary pursuits. It might, however, enable a journey towards the discovery of new ways of desiring, engaging and being in organizations and society.**

#### To be a subject requires conformity with the meanings, norms, and traditions of the Symbolic. The illusive nature of the signifier induces Lack, a sense of loss which cannot be overcome by the subject. This dooms political projects, as the failure to overcome lack becomes our object of desire.

McGowan ’16 Todd McGowan (Associate Professor of Film and Television Studies at the University of Vermont). “Capitalism and Desire: The Psychic Cost of Free Markets, Columbia University Press, 2016, pgs. 28-32.

When he writes Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 1920, Freud begins to define the subject through its constitutive loss. From this point on in his thinking, he conceives of the subject as completely determined by loss, as driven toward its own destruction—a process that he misleadingly labels "death drive.” Though there are hints of this breakthrough in earlier works, the radicality of the 1920 revolution should not be understated. In fact, even Freud himself did not fully grasp its radicality, as evidenced by his failed attempt to reduce the subject's repetition of failure and loss to a tendency to return to an inorganic state. Death drive connotes a desire to die, which is why it leads readers of Freud (and even Freud himself) astray. What he is really onto with this concept is that the subject finds satisfaction in repeating loss, that the subject's satisfaction is inextricable from failure. No one sets out consciously to fail, and, even if one did, the act of making failure a goal would immediately transform it into a different form of success. Within consciousness the subject cannot give failure primacy. Consciousness is oriented around projects in which the subject aims at succeeding, and the failures of these projects, from the perspective of consciousness, are only contingent failures the subject can attempt to remedy by trying again or trying harder. Unconsciously, however, the subject depends on failure to satisfy itself. Failure and loss produce the object as absent, and it is only the absence of the object that renders it satisfying. Absence animates the subject, driving it to act, in a way that presence cannot. If we think about who marches in the street, it is those who lack, not those who have, and when those who have do march, it is because the threat of loss manifests itself. Even though they march for the elimination of this lack, it is absence that motivates them to march in the first place. It is also absence or the threat of it that enables us to get out of bed in the morning and go to work. The subject that had no absence in its existence would be unable to act and would lack the impetus even to kill itself. After seeing numerous patients display their attachment to absence and loss, Freud concludes that it holds the key to the subject's form of satisfaction. We can see this play out in sports fandom. Though we consciously root for our favorite team to win, we find more unconscious satisfaction in the persistent struggles of the sports team that we root for than in its unqualified successes. The close game is infinitely more interesting than the blowout because it enables the fan to experience loss while not having loss enter into consciousness. No one wants to root for a team that wins all its games, and if fans flock to the games of teams that win all the time, they go to see the loss (or potential loss) that will disrupt the winning, just like auto racing fans go to see cars crashing (or potentially crashing), though this desire remains unconscious. Even when our favorite team wins a championship, we begin almost immediately to consider how they might fare the next year. This is a way of leaving the terrain of success for that of potential failure. When we achieve the pinnacle of success, we seek out a way to return loss into our existence by imagining a new challenge or embarking on a new project. Loss injects value into the subject's existence and gives it an object that provides satisfaction. Freud's conception of the priority of loss and its repetition troubles other psychoanalysts (like Fairbairn, for instance) because it highlights the impossibility of any satisfaction associated with obtaining the object. After this point, for Freud, one simply cannot have the satisfying object. Any notion of success becomes unthinkable, and one must reconceive satisfaction in terms of how one fails. Failure becomes the only option. On the basis of privileging failure, Freud reimagines the object in a way that challenges both much of the history of philosophy and the psychic demands of capitalism. The object is not an object that the subject hopes to obtain but a limit that the subject encounters. The subject cannot overcome the limit but constitutes itself and its satisfaction through the limit. That is to say, the object that thwarts the subject's efforts at obtaining it retroactively creates the subject around the recalcitrance. The subject seeks out what it cannot obtain and latches itself onto these objects. Its failure with regard to them provides a satisfaction that completely defies the capitalist image of reality. Freud's conception of the object enables us to rethink the famous slogan from May 1968 in France. The mantra of this movement—jouir sans entraves (enjoy without hindrances)—expresses the critique of capitalism’s repressiveness, the critique that dominated much of the twentieth century. The problem with this slogan is that eliminating the barriers to enjoyment would eliminate the source of enjoyment. By slightly changing it to jouir les entraves (enjoy the hindrances), we capture the constitutive importance of the obstacle. Satisfaction exists in the obstacle that the object erects in the face of the subject's efforts to obtain it rather than in the eradication of all obstacles. But this is what the capitalist imperative to accumulate enables us to avoid confronting. The speaking subject satisfies itself through its process of failing to obtain its object, even if this goes unrecognized by the subject itself. The relationship between subjectivity and loss leads the subject to flee this recognition and find asylum in the framework of capitalist accumulation. The subject repeats a constitutive loss because loss is the only way that the speaking subject has to relate to objects, even though capitalism provides the image of an alternative. The signifier confronts the subject with an absence that forms subjectivity and that the subject can never overcome. But the loss that haunts the subject also constitutes the subject, which is why it seeks to repeat this loss. The signifier creates the subject through the act of removing what is most essential for the subject, even though this essential object doesn't exist prior to its removal. From this point on, the subject will remain unable to divorce satisfaction from loss. One might say that through the signifier the subject loses the object into existence. Loss generates the object at the same time that it marks its disappearance, which has a determinative effect on how the subject satisfies itself. The subject may find fleeting pleasure in success and achievement, but its only satisfaction will take the form of the repetition of loss. Subjects undermine themselves and self-sabotage not because they are stubborn or stupid but because this is their path to satisfaction. For the speaking subject, winning is only a detour on the way to losing. Even the winners in the world of the signifier are ultimately on the side of defeat, but just take a longer time to get there than others. When we understand the difference between instinctual beings and speaking subjects, the appeal of thinking about ourselves in terms of instinct rather than subjectivity becomes self-evident. Instinctual beings have the capacity to overcome loss and obtain satisfaction through the object they seek. Instinctual beings can become winners that suffer only contingent failures rather than remaining ensconced in perpetual failure. Instinct holds within it the promise of a satisfaction untainted by loss, a full satiation that, even if it soon disappears, can often be replicated. The being envisions a goal that would provide satisfaction and then either attains the goal or not. Success may be difficult and may not endure, but it's not impossible. But the subject attains satisfaction through the repetition of its inability to obtain its object. Failure is the subject's mode of success. Lacan describes this in one of his most lucid explanations of the structure of subjectivity. In Seminar XI, he separates the subject's goal from its aim and uses a metaphor to explain the aim. He claims, "When you entrust someone with a mission, the aim is not what he brings back, but the itinerary he must take. The aim is the way taken.” The satisfaction of the subject derives from the path that it takes. But what Lacan fails to add here is that this path necessarily involves an encounter with loss: rather than seeking out its object, the subject finds ways to miss it and to ensure that it remains lost. The lost object is constitutively lost, and the satisfaction that it offers depends on it remaining so. The subject has no hope that it might attain its lost object, which is why psychoanalysis must refrain from describing the infant's satisfying relationship with the mother's breast prohibited by the father. It is only in retrospect (or from the perspective of an observer) that this relationship appears perfectly satisfying. Freud first conceives of the appeal of loss in response to his observation of self-destructive actions that appear to violate the pleasure principle. It is the penchant for self-sabotage and self-destruction that leads Freud to speculate about the existence of a death drive that aims at a return to an inorganic state. But we don't have to indulge in this type of hypothesis if we recognize the constitutive role that loss plays in the subject's satisfaction. Without the lost object, the subject would lose what animates it and the source of its enjoyment. The act of self-sabotage, even though it detracts from the subject's pleasure, enables the subject to continue to satisfy itself. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud theorizes that the negative therapeutic reaction that subverts the psychoanalytic cure is not just the product of resistances. The subject does not want to be cured because it associates healing with the loss of its foundational loss, a prospect much more horrifying that the pain of the neurosis. With the recognition of the constitutive role of loss in the psychic economy, psychoanalysis must alter its conception of the cure. Rather than simply ending repression or even overcoming loss, the cure has to involve changing the subject's relation to its lost object, experiencing the intimate connection between loss and satisfaction.

#### Fantasy productions are not neutral models of risk but collusions between capital and state that prevent the change they’ll talk about. The neg rejects this model of beautifying space policy.

**Ormrod 11 -** “Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space” by James S Ormrod School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, Falmer BN1 9PH, Sussex, England; e-mail: j.s.ormrod@brighton.ac.uk Received 17 August 2011; in revised form 19 September 2012 [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1068/d16511] // ahs emi

I have highlighted throughout that, where risks are not directly confronted and are uncertain, the operation of economic power becomes more important. One dimension to how power operates under these circumstances has recurred throughout the paper: the ability to create and manage fantasies about catastrophe. The more sophisticated the technologies used to rationalise risk become, the more significant what it cannot model becomes. Various approaches to psychoanalysis have examined how fantasy creates both what is feared (its ‘horrific’ dimension) and the pacifying solution that relieves this fear (its ‘beautific’ dimension). This is true of Kleinian psychoanalysis (eg, Klein, 1946, page 6), but particularly of contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has dealt with images of catastrophe specifically. This provides tools to explore in more depth Beck’s category of ‘things we are unwilling to know’. The Lacanian social theorist Slavoj Žižek (2008, page xii), for example, adds another category—‘unknown knowns’—to Donald Rumsfeld’s typology of knowledge. Žižek argues that when gaps appear in the symbolic order (in this case rationalising risk discourses) fantasy operates to conceal the true horror of the Lacanian Real; that which cannot be articulated. Žižek (2008, pages 5–6) provides the example of safety demonstrations on aeroplanes. These demonstrations do not serve to pacify our true fears about a crash landing, but to construct the horrific scenario. The true horror remains our inability to know how the crash scenario will play out. Precisely the same is true of NASA’s Environmental Impact Statements, which are known to be fabrications but are still preferred to uncertainty (the UN demands an impossible risk assessment that is probabilistic and geographically limited). Beyond world risk society? 741 The image of a collision cascade in orbit taking out global communications is also a fantasy, as are Haynes’s and McKay’s mutant bacteria. These fantasies each allow us to contemplate uncertainty. But each has a different effect, engineered and selected to function in the interests of those in power. Environmental Impact Assessments provide scenarios that legitimate State acquiescence to capital. They cover over not only science’s failings, but also those of the State and capital in turn. They function to draw activists into what Beck (1995, page 42) describes as “orgies of mathematics and science” that work to prevent a truly reflexive discussion of risk. Whilst informed activists engage with these scenarios as though they were rationalities (and, for example, demand to see more of the information on which they are based), less informed members of the public leave them to it. Collision cascade fantasies and solutions for them in the form of fantastic technologies also sustain a relationship between capital and the State in which disaster and solution must be conceived within the existing regime governing space activities. Not many people have direct economic interests in planetary engineering as yet, bar a marginal group of scientists. Desiring an impossible knowledge, these fantasies give scientists recourse to seek further funding (though more advanced modelling will make the unknown more, not less, terrifying), whilst at the same time making any politicisation of their work seem absurd. Meanwhile, the notion of planetary engineering itself functions as a fantasy sustaining our unsustainable relationship with the Earthly environment. Such fantasies are especially effective in immobilising public concern because of their remote setting in outer space. Space colonisation advocate Kraaft Ehricke (1972) referred to the development of outer space as the ‘benign industrial revolution’ precisely because it removed the negative consequences of industrial activity to a place where they no longer mattered. The same principle underpinned proposals to dump nuclear waste in outer space. Such a manoeuvre is a form of Beck’s “symbolic detoxification”, and the relationship between purity, exclusion, and avoidance has been tackled in the literature on risk (eg, Douglas, 1992; Joffe, 1999).

#### Apocalyptic rhetoric attempts to mediate the infinitude of the Real, but backfires through neocon cooption and indeterminate prescriptions. Scenario planning – especially with respect to space colonization -- is an investment in apocalypse that justifies genocidal logic and desires the end of the world.

Matheson 15 Calum Lister Matheson (Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh; PhD, Communication Studies, University of North Carolina). “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive.” UNC Chapel Hill Dissertation, 2015, <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/downloads/sn009z17m?locale=en>. MBPZ

Later, diagnosed with terminal cancer, von Neumann supposedly converted to Catholicism on his deathbed, convinced by another, long dead, mathematician: Blaise Pascal (Jordan 1). Pascal’s wager, that one should believe in God even if He is very unlikely to exist because the consequences of eternal damnation are infinite (Pascal 67- 9), is the basic structure of the sign of survival that was inverted in the twentieth century to be an argument mandating care for the material world instead. Incubated in the warmth of the Bomb, this sign has metastasized to other areas of apocalyptic fantasy predictions. As its transmogrification from Jonathan Schell’s pacifist anti-nuclear stance to Dick Cheney’s defense of preemption will show, arguments based on the attempt to calculate the incalculable are indeterminate. The excess of tuché frustrates automaton, and this secular version of Pascal’s wager is the broken machinery it leaves behind. Jonathan Schell wrote perhaps the most famous book about nuclear war to be marketed as non-fiction. Fate of the Earth is an attempt to make nuclear war seem real through the unabashed use of sublime language. The first of its three parts is full of beautiful passages about the destruction that a nuclear war might produce before ending in a “republic of insects and grass.” Relying heavily on the assumption that a nuclear winter would follow a war between the USA and USSR and that such an event would cause humanity to go extinct,14 Schell contemplates what the end of the human species might mean and what its possibility suggests for defense policy. Schell, like Kristiakoswky at the Trinity test, thought of nuclear war as the end of humanity. Seeing the world apparently as one for us, he wrote that all value was human value, so a nuclear war would destroy everything meaningful in the known universe (95). Nuclear war must, therefore, be avoided at all costs. Schell wrote: [T]he mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than, that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account…It represents not the defeat of some purpose, but an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history…although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is…infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity…morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. (Schell 95) This passage serves as the end of the first part of Fate of the Earth and a transition to the middle section of the book, “The Second Death,” which is about future generations. Schell’s argument is a version of Pascal’s wager where “infinity” takes the place of a Christian God. “Infinity” as a concept is always an attempt to mediate the Real because it replaces something that by definition cannot be resolved in language or understood by human beings in its entirety into a single word, a placeholder to represent with finite bounds something that can never be represented. It is the ultimate license in metonymy since all associations are included within it; no proliferation of meaning is prohibited. Its symbolic function can be compared to the various names of God in negative theology, all of which stand in for something that is acknowledged to be inexpressible (Pseudo-Dionysius 52-53). Some version of Schell’s infinite risk argument was used by anti-nuclear activists in public rallies (Sorensen 141), and also used by others to think about a range of other “existential threats” (e.g., Matheny). A report by the Global Challenges Foundation explicitly focuses on “infinite risks” including nuclear war, describing itself as “the first science-based list of global risks with a potentially infinite impact” (Pamlin and Armstrong 31). Representatives of the Vatican recently used the argument too, signing on to a statement including this line: “as long as nuclear weapons exist, there remains the possibility of a nuclear explosion. Even if the probability is small, given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear weapon detonating, the risk is unacceptable” (Gagliarducci). Even when the hazard is expressed as “catastrophic,” or quantified with some suitably huge number, it is effectively infinite: as Yudkowsky argues, human beings calculate scale poorly, and a sufficiently large number is not rationally understood. “Human emotions take place within an analog brain,” writes Yudkowsky. “The human brain cannot release enough neurotransmitters to feel emotion a thousand times as strong as the grief of one funeral. A prospective risk going from 10,000,000 deaths to 100,000,000 deaths does not multiply by ten the strength of our determination to stop it. It adds one more zero on paper for our eyes to glaze over, an effect so small that one must usually jump several orders of magnitude to detect the difference experimentally” (16). In the more elegant formulation attributed to Josef Stalin, one death is a tragedy. One million deaths is just a statistic. Our failure to grasp these magnitudes could be called the problem of hrair after the Lapine language of Watership Down. Rabbits in the novel can only count to four. Any larger number, be it five or one thousand, is simply hrair. The word means “a great many; an uncountable number; any number over four” (Adams 475). The language we employ attempts to master and reduce the 103 incomprehensible vastness of time and space to mark difference where comprehension is impossible. Infinity is perhaps the best example, but any very large number serves the same structural function of expressing loss beyond practical measure. Thus, although the Global Challenges Foundation argues that “infinite risk” is not meant in a mathematical sense and that calculations are possible, they are in effect meaningless: the investments of “infinity” exceed our ability to calculate, as indeed the report acknowledges when it argues for a categorically different treatment of these risks (Pamlin and Armstrong 33). This quandary frustrates the attempt to make calculable values that seem to exceed calculation itself. A shadow always remains in the quantification of infinity and the attempt to master it technologically, a remainder that haunts the edges of supposedly perfect reason. This is Martin Heidegger’s concept of the gigantic, something much like the sense of the Real that shines through in the sublime: The gigantic is rather that through which the quantitative becomes a special quality and thus a remarkable kind of greatness... as soon as the gigantic in planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure shifts over out of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is gigantic, and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes, precisely through this, incalculable. This incalculable remains the invisible shadow that is cast around all things everywhere when man [sic] has been transformed into subiectum and the world into picture. (Heidegger 135) Through this shadow the modern world extends itself into “a space withdrawn from representation” and gestures towards something which we are denied to know (Heidegger 136). For Schell, the losses possible in a nuclear war are infinite because they threaten future generations beyond count. Preventing the birth of future individuals is immoral, by this logic, which has some bizarre (and apparently unintended) echoes in the Catholic view on abortion (Schell 116). As no future individuals are cotemporal with those assigning them worth, the value of future generations is symbolic, not unique to the individuals actually “prevented” (Kleinig 196-197). The reason we must not immolate ourselves in nuclear fire, then, is that we must continue to reproduce—the value of each individual lies in that person’s ability to create more individuals. There is no discussion of anything else that we are obligated to do for the future. For Schell, responsibility seems to be a finite obligation to an infinite number of people. This infinite future is frequently represented by the metaphor of the child. In Lyndon Johnson’s infamous “Daisy Girl” campaign ad, a child pulls petals off a daisy, accompanied by a mechanical countdown and interrupted by the familiar mushroom cloud of the Bomb. “These are the stakes,” a man’s voice intones. “To make a world in which all of God’s children can live, or go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die” (“Campaign Spot”). Lee Edelman’s words, bitterly describing the Child as a figure for “compulsory investment in the misrecognition of figure,” could have been about the Johnson ad. “And lo and behold,” he writes, “as viewed through the prism of the tears that it always calls forth, the figure of this Child seems to shimmer with the iridescent promise of Noah’s rainbow, serving like the rainbow as the pledge of a covenant that shields us against the persistent threat of apocalypse now—or later” (Edelman 18). Unfortunately for disarmament activists, nuclear strategists have children too, and some, like Jim Lipp, express the value of their own work in the same terms—as a matter of caring for “grandchildren’s grandchildren” through nuclear deterrence (Kaplan 78). The “fraction of infinity” argument has been used by those defending an aggressive defense posture. The George W. Bush administration invaded Iraq citing that country’s possible future development of weapons of mass destruction as a primary casus belli. It is only logical that no time ought to be wasted—every second that the decision for war is delayed increases the chance that a rogue regime could develop nuclear weapons. Any non-zero risk is equivalent to an infinite one. Vice President Dick Cheney went one further, however, establishing the “Cheney Doctrine” in response to nuclear terrorism. Told at a briefing with CIA director George Tenet that Pakistani scientists could potentially be assisting Al Qaeda in the development of nuclear weapons, Cheney responded that if “there’s a one percent chance…we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.” The response must be immediate, regardless of proof: “It’s not about our analysis,” he said, “or finding a preponderance of evidence. It’s about our response” (Suskind 62). Members of the security community often assert that nuclear terrorism is an “existential risk,” a threat to American “civilization” or even the entire species despite the complete lack of evidence to this effect (Mueller 19-20). There is no mathematical way to distinguish between infinite risks. If any fraction of infinity is infinity, then every fractional risk is infinite—Heidegger’s unquantifiable “gigantic” casts its shadow over attempts to calculate. While the last part of Schell’s book is a passionate case for disarmament, the opposite is equally plausible: if there is any chance greater than zero that disarmament opponents are right and American nuclear weapons are deterring a nuclear war (and uncertainty in calculation alone ensures that there must be), then the risk is infinite. The future is compressed entirely into the present, since any action we take now could determine whether that future exists at all and what character it might have. We are enjoined to do everything, right now, as fast as we can, because any delay might cost trillions of deaths—an argument Nick Bostrom has made about space colonization using the same structure of Pascal’s wager used by Schell (Bostrom 3). At the same time, we must be in (literally) perfect stasis and do nothing at all, for any change might be the one that cascades into nuclear war. If we extend this infinite value to human extinction more generally, it might even be imperative that we deliberately cause a nuclear war as soon as possible to destroy industrial civilization and thus prevent the collapse of global ecosystems on which all life depends (Caldwell).15 The logic of infinite loss results in aporia. It is simultaneously true that no risk is worth taking and that every risk must be taken. At the same time, each individual is afforded some symbolic connection to the Real, because each action we take has effects on the unbounded infinity of future human beings. Each decision we make now is of limitless import, and thus we can enjoy the imagination of destroying future generations because it invests us with the power over existence and nonexistence on a cosmic scale. This quasi-secular iteration of Pascal’s wager shares its defect with nuclear war games. Both attempt to make rational calculations about nuclear war by quantifying variables that cannot be quantified. The Symbolic order can be analogized to a set of operations, like an equation, that provides the conditions of possibility for meaning, while the Imaginary describes the value of specific variables in that equation. If the Bomb is valued as infinity, then the rest of an operation is overshadowed: no probability assigned to that variable fundamentally changes the result. Like the sun outshining dimmer lights in Longinus’s treatment of metaphor, the threat of human extinction as an unquantifiable evil outshines the issues attached to it (preemption or pacifism, reproduction or culling, counterforce or countervalue, and so forth) such that many paths lead audiences to the same result: the poorly-healed scar in the Symbolic that results from automaton’s sutures over the wound of tuché. In fact, because nuclear war is a problem in which two or more agents are pitted against each other and the optimal solution for one party requires responding to the optimal solution of the others, rationality must necessarily collapse—the only way to frustrate enemy calculations of American plans is to ensure that they are irrational. Rationality thereby demands irrationality (Rose, ch. 5). Nuclear war games might incorporate data from nuclear testing or conventional bombing, but they still rely largely on guesswork. The “infinite risk” of Schell’s argument does the same, warping calculations by including a cipher for the incalculable. Both operations are sustained by enjoyment. As Cheney said, it’s not about our analysis—it’s about our response. In the case of war games, simulations allow players to enjoy their ability to enjoy—to attach to subjectivity itself. The appeal to infinite destruction is remarkably similar, only those who use it can enjoy the capacity to make the world present and absent in speech. Imagining the apocalypse is fun; doubly so if apparently sophisticated simulations allow us to alter the models of its occurrence. While this kind of scenario planning and simulation had its most important early developments in Cold War nuclear games, the cultural technology has become deeply ingrained and proliferated in a number of different discourses and practices. A cottage industry in extinction prediction has blossomed in the last few decades, concerned with everything from asteroid collisions and ice ages to magnetic pole shifts and whether the universe is a simulation that might be switched off (see for example Bostrom; Leslie; Posner; Matheny; Yudkowsky). The 2014 outbreaks of the Ebola virus in Africa are a recent example. Modelers quickly produced simulations of the spread of this disease. An article on the Infowars website discusses the most extreme of these disease models, asking if “you really want to wait until after infections have been identified in the United States to make your preparations?” (Slavo). An embedded Youtube link leads to a video entitled “Mathematical Model Shows How Ebola Will Spread: ‘Worse Case Scenario... An Extinction Event’” posted by TheDailySheeple. The graphical presentation of this video closely resembles the gameplay of Pandemic 2, a game with millions of online plays popular long before the outbreak. In Pandemic 2, the player controls the disease and the object is to kill everyone in the world (Crazy Monkey Games). The notorious difficulty of infecting Madagascar in the game has spawned its own Internet meme where players express frustration in sympathy with their fictional pandemic (interestingly, the aforementioned Ebola video leaves Madagascar untouched). The website for Northeastern University’s MoBS lab (Laboratory for the Modeling of Biological and Socio-Technical Systems) shows efforts to model the spread of Ebola using graphical icons that also closely resemble Pandemic 2, right down to aircraft flight paths and a similar color-coding system for the incidence of infection (MoBS). It is no wonder that many people might share the feelings of journalist Abraham Riesman who recently wrote a self-reflective piece on his “amoral twinge of excitement” on reading Ebola news and imagining the end of the world (Riesman). We might imagine many apparently credible threats to the existence of human beings on Earth; the ways the world might end seem nearly endless. While RAND tried to calculate how a nuclear war might begin and how it should be fought, Schell lacked Vice Admiral Giardina’s passion for risk and argued that probability hardly mattered. Alongside nuclear war there are many other low risk/high impact events that introduce the possibility of extinction and thus stand in for the Real—metonymic expansions of the Bomb’s grand place as the monarch of American terror since the 1940s. Along with those resigned to such threats there have always been others organized under the sign of survival. Perseverance has become a duty: despite our attempts to calculate risk, the specter of societal annihilation motivates some to refuse extinction, to live so that a new, even better, society can be built. If we cannot predict, we must instead prepare, for the specter of apocalypse enjoins us to survive at all costs. After all, if the end of the species is an infinite evil, then sacrifice at any price is a bargain we must take. The material, emotional, and cultural labor of postapocalyptic survival is an expression of enjoyment, and this investment organizes life in response to the threat of death, creating communities bound by the notion of survival. But for the fantasy of postapocalyptic survival to be fulfilled, the world must end, and thus destruction and renewal are twinned aspects of the same sign, one that has exerted its powerful influence from Cold War civil defense to contemporary zombie narratives. Survivalists are not irrational fringe elements circulating their own disharmonious language in an otherwise orderly society. The sign of survival speaks through them, organizing communities of those who are willing to undergo—and enjoy—hardships, real or imagined, in order to increase their odds of survival in the end times. Before this phenomenon can be explored fully, we must explore the logic of sacrifice that it is pitted against, along with the material traces of a society organized by this sacrificial logic.

#### Their approach destroys politics, ethics, and value to life.

Ruti ‘14 (mari, English, Toronto, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 297–314) SJBE, recut from Harvard BoSu//RECUT BXNK

On the other hand, Lacan – again like Marcuse – recognizes that the symbolic order is repressive beyond the demands of subject formation, that it includes forms of violence that exceed the ubiquitous violence of the signifier. Indeed, even the violence of the signifier is not equally distributed, so that some of us are much more vulnerable to its injurious effects than others (consider, for instance, hate speech). Lacan **does not necessarily talk about the unequal distribution of resources in the manner Marcuse does, but there is no doubt that his analysis of symbolic law as the Law of the Father elucidates a historically specific, deeply heteropatriarchal and hierarchical organization of social life. In point of fact, one reason I have taken a detour through Marcuse is to illustrate the obvious ways in which Lacan’s portraiture of the symbolic mirrors that of Marcuse’s explicitly historical account: what Marcuse calls “the performance principle,” Lacan calls the “service of goods.” Both thinkers identify the underpinnings of a social order dominated by the ideal of productivity – an ideal that is, moreover, placed in direct opposition to the pleasure principle. Both emphasize that the dominant morality of this symbolic – what Lacan calls “the morality of the master” – measures the merit of lives based on largely pragmatic criteria.** And both acknowledge that the model citizen of this symbolic is a subject who shows up at work reliably every morning, performs its duties with a degree of diligence, does not let its desires get the better of its productivity, and seeks satisfaction (“enjoys”) in moderate, socially sanctioned ways. **“Part of the world has resolutely turned in the directions of the service of goods,” Lacan writes, “thereby rejecting everything that has to do with the relationship of man to desire” (318). This, he adds, “is what is known as the postrevolutionary perspective” (318). In other words, the service of goods reflects the mindset of the levelheaded utilitarian subject who has deemed revolutionary change to be unrealistic. Lacan is here referring to the kind of depoliticization that is arguably the hallmark of Western subjectivity under capitalism.** Lacan’s point is by no means, as critics such as Butler have suggested, that a different kind of symbolic is intrinsically impossible but rather that the configuration of subjectivity that Western modernity has produced – a subjectivity that has been subjected to a particular form of surplus-repression (the performance principle, the service of goods) – makes it virtually impossible for us to entertain the idea that the symbolic could be organized differently, that it could be centered around a different version of the reality principle**. As Marcuse remarks, one reason the performance principle is so powerful is that it has managed to convince us that all alternatives to it are either utopian or otherwise unpalatable. Yet, for Marcuse, the fact that this principle has been so successful also points to the possibility of transcending it. As he states, “The very progress of civilization under the performance principle has attained a level of productivity at which the social demands upon instinctual energy to be spent in alienated labor could be considerably reduced. Consequently, the continued repressive organization of the instincts seems to be necessitated less by the ‘struggle for existence’ than by the interest in prolonging this struggle – by the interest in domination” (pp. 129–130). This is to say that there is really nothing besides social power that keeps us invested in the notion that our welfare demands relentless toil. The performance principle has outlived its usefulness in the sense that our collective productivity these days surpasses what is necessary for the provision of food, clothing, housing, and other basic amenities. The fact that these amenities have not yet reached all corners of the world, or even all corners of our own society (the homeless, innercity dwellers, etc.), is a function of domination (the unequal distribution of resources) rather than of any deficiencies of productivity. As a result, in Marcuse’s view, all we would need to do to bring about a more “non-repressive civilization” (p. 134) would be to refuse the parameters of the current symbolic; even something as simple as reducing the length of the working day would immediately realign our priorities, perhaps even impacting the very organization of our psychic lives. Our standard of living might drop somewhat, but we might also learn to assess the value of our lives according to other, less performance-oriented, measurements. Psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian analysis, does not have a normative goal; it does not seek to tell us how we should desire but merely to explore the idiosyncratic contours of our desire. But this does not change the fact that Lacan, at least as a theorist, was exasperated by people’s inability to make their way out of the maze of the master’s morality, including its performance principle; he was frustrated by** individuals who were so out of touch with the truth of their desire that they were willing to sacrifice this desire for the sake of social conformity and that they were, furthermore, willing to do so to the point of self-betrayal**. As he explains, “What I call ‘giving ground relative to one’s desire’ is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will observe it in every case and should note its importance. Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, or, more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him what their pact entailed” (p. 321).** Such a betrayal invariably results in the reassertion of the status quo, sending the subject back to the service of goods, what Lacan in this context calls “the common path” **(p. 321). And given that desire, for Lacan, is “the metonymy of our being” (p. 321), betraying it in this way leads to the kind of psychic death that extinguishes the subject’s sense of agency. To use Lacan’s wording, “Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting us not only from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes” (p. 319). It is precisely such inner catastrophes that Lacanian clinical practice was designed to counter, though it may be Julia Kristeva – rather than Lacan himself – who has most clearly developed this interpretation of analytic work. Kristeva depicts psychoanalysis as a means of restoring the subject’s psychic aliveness, as an explicit revolt against the numbing impact of what she calls “the society of the spectacle” (2002, p. 4).** This society of the spectacle – of technology, image, and speed – shares many parallels with Adorno’s “culture industry”: a flattened surface of the life world, a constriction of psychic space, a death of critical thought, the worship of efficiency over intellectual curiosity, and the incapacity to revolt**. Against this backdrop, psychoanalysis – along with art, writing, and some forms of religious experience – offers, for Kristeva, a gateway to revolt, a way of resurrecting “the life of the mind” (a phrase Kristeva borrows from Hannah Arendt) through ongoing questioning, interrogation, and psychic recreation. “Freud founded psychoanalysis as an invitation to anamnesis in the goal of a rebirth, that is, a psychical restructuring,” Kristeva writes: “Through a narrative of free association and in the regenerative revolt against the old law (familial taboos, superego, ideals, oedipal or narcissistic limits, etc.) comes the singular autonomy of each, as well as a renewed link with the other” (2002, p. 8). In the context of my overall argument in this essay, it is worth stressing that it is “the desire of the subject” that, in Kristeva’s view, reserves a place “for initiative, autonomy” (2002, p. 11). This is in part because the “Freudian journey into the night of desire was followed by attention to the capacity to think: never one without the other” (2010, p. 41). In other words, the exploration of desire, in psychoanalysis, is akin to the critical (or at least curious) movement of thought – the very movement that Arendt also saw as vital to the life of the mind. This is why psychoanalysis has, Kristeva asserts, “the (unique?) privilege today of accompanying the emergence of new capacities of thinking/representing/thinking, beyond the frequent and increasingly noticeable disasters of psychosomatic space – capacities that are so many new bodies and new lives” (2010, pp. 41–42). Kristeva therefore draws the same link between desire and autonomy (in this instance, the capacity for critical thought) as Lacan does. Furthermore, to translate Kristeva’s point into Marcuse’s terminology, one might say that psychoanalysis, at least the kind of analysis that refuses to uphold social adaptation as a therapeutic goal, presents the possibility of sidestepping, or at the very least diminishing, the effects of surplus-repression. This, in turn, creates space for the truth of the subject’s desire in the Lacanian sense. This does not mean that repression as such is defeated. Quite the contrary, as we will see shortly, the truth of the subject’s desire is inextricable from the primary (constitutive) repression that accompanies subject formation.** But as I have already suggested, the lifting of surplus-repression renders the imprint of primary repression more clearly discernable, for when surplus-repression is removed, what remains are the always highly singular outlines of primary repression. And if Lacan – like Marcuse – sought to remove surplus-repression, it was because he understood that it was on the level of primary repression (fundamental fantasies) that one could find the most basic building blocks of the subject’s psychic destiny; primary repression was the layer of psychic life that expressed something essential about the distinctive ways in which the pleasure principle, in the subject’s life, had become bound up with the repetition compulsion**. This is why Lacan states, “If analysis has a meaning, desire is nothing other than that which supports an unconscious theme, the very articulation of that which roots us in a particular destiny, and that destiny demands insistently that the debt be paid, and desire keeps coming back, keeps returning, and situates us once again in a given track, the track of something that is specifically our business” (p. 319).According to Lacan, analysis aims to enable us to understand something about the eccentric specificity (or truth) of our most fundamental desire as well as about the track of destiny that this desire carves out for us (and that is therefore “specifically our business”). If it is indeed the case, as I have conceded, that most of us tend to be alienated from our desire, Lacanian analysis strives to undo this alienation by familiarizing us with the truth of this desire. This process entails, among other things, recognizing that the destiny we owe to this desire can never be definitively overcome, that the debt of desire can never be fully redeemed (for how are we to compensate the signifier for having brought us into being as subjects of desire?). Our destiny – which might initially coincide quite seamlessly with our repetition compulsion – consists of recurring efforts to pay off this debt, which is why it keeps ushering us to the same track of desire, the same nexus of psychic conundrums, our unconscious hope being that if we wear out the track of our desire by incessant reiteration, one day we might be able to absolve ourselves of our debt. But since we cannot, the only thing to be done is to “own” our destiny even as we might seek to mitigate its more painful dimensions. That is, the only way to arrive at the kind of psychic rebirth Kristeva is talking about is to take full responsibility for our (unconsciously generated) destiny. In the ethical act, our impulse is to embrace this destiny wholesale regardless of consequences (this is one way to understand what it means to plunge into the jouissance of the real). In analysis, the exploration of our destiny is more gradual, more self-reflexive.** But in both cases, the point is not to obliterate our foundational destiny (or fundamental fantasies) but merely to elaborate it in more satisfying directions, away from the incapacitating effects of the repetition compulsion and toward the rewards of subjective autonomy. And, if we are to achieve this goal, nothing is more important than staying faithful to the truth of desire that, on the most elementary level, determines our destiny.

#### Thus, the alternative is to traverse the fantasy – this spills up to tangible political change, shifting politics away from one focused on escaping loss to one embracing it.

McGowan ‘13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 208-210)

Like philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis also has a history of opposing itself to fantasy. Its basic trajectory appears to involve curing the patient of an excessive investment in fantasy life. It seems as if neurotics come to psychoanalysts suffering from their fantasies and that the sessions allow the neurotics to gain some distance from these fantasies and thereby see them for what they are. Gaining purchase on one’s fantasy life — or simply **becoming aware that one is fantasizing** — **is one** predominant **image of the psychoanalytic process**. My own therapy, for instance, consisted in gaining awareness of the nonexistence of normal people. The analyst’s unremitting silence in response to my questions about how everyone else would react in similar situations ultimately allowed me to recognize the obvious fact that there was no such thing as a normal reaction or normal person**. I was invested in the fantasy of normality without realizing that it was a fantasy**, and **analysis laid this fantasy bare and** thus **facilitated a disinvestment in it.** In this way, like so many patients I felt as if I was able to move beyond a barrier that I did not even know existed. Many theorists who recognize the political importance of psychoanalysis do so because of its ability to combat fantasy. For example, **this dimension** of psychoanalysis **leads** Yannis Stavrakakis, in *Lacan and the Political*, to see **the contemporary** **political task of psychoanalysis as one of “traversing the fantasy of utopian thought**.”25 In the vein of the philosopher or the Marxist, Stavrakakis sees a danger in the way that **fantasy hides the gap that haunts the symbolic order**. As he notes, “**Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it,** by promising **to close the gap between the real and reality**, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production.”26 Here, Stavrakakis sees the ideological dimension of fantasy, and **psychoanalysis** for him **facilitates** this **recognition and** provides **a way to dissolve fantasy’s power**. This kind of psychoanalytic politics evinces the attitude toward fantasy that both modern philosophy and Marxism take up, and this attitude certainly seems faithful to psychoanalytic practice and its attempt to assist the subject in “traversing the fantasy.”27 But despite the seeming antipathy directed toward fantasy in its very practice, for psychoanalysis the political valence of fantasy is not so unambiguous as it is for philosophy and Marxism. To unlock fully the political potential of psychoanalysis, we must turn our attention to the positive significance that psychoanalysis bestows on fantasy. Both philosophy and Marxism are, of course, right about the role that fantasy has in disguising our social situatedness. But the problem with this conception of politics is that, by focusing on what fantasy conceals, it fails to consider what fantasy reveals. It is at this point — the point of what fantasy reveals to us — that we can see the political significance of psychoanalysis. The value of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to grasp the political importance of fantasy in a way that philosophy and Marxism have been unable to do. At the same time that **fantasy disguises our subjection to the signifier and makes it difficult for us to experience** this **subjection, it also has the effect of making otherwise impossible experiences possible**.28 Fantasy **offers the subject a transcendent experience**, and this transcendence, despite its illusory quality, has a political content. It represents **a moment at which the subject is no longer bound by the limitations of the symbolic structure** that ordinarily constrain it. As such, this moment of **fantasmatic transcendence poses for the subject a** fundamental **challenge to the authority of that symbolic structure**. In fact, the radical import of fantasy is located in precisely the same feature that causes fantasy to further ideology: the illusions of **fantasy keep subjects content with the** ruling **symbolic structure, but** they also **provide a venue for thinking beyond that structure.** In contrast to modern philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis permits us to see this political complexity inhering within the structure of fantasy. From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, this respect for fantasy makes itself felt. When it comes to the psyche of the subject in analysis, the **fantasy has more significance than** **actual memories**. For instance, Freud’s early essay “Screen Memories” describes early childhood memories as screens for unconscious fantasies. The sexual content of the fantasy, Freud contends, can only appear through the vehicle of a genuine memory. He writes: “It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it . . . must be content to find its way allusively and under a fl owery disguise into a childhood scene.”29 Freud’s point here is not that we must subtract the distortion of fantasy from the memory in order to discover what actually happened but that what actually happened has far less psychic importance than the fantasy it conceals. **The subject uses the memory of a genuine scene to access and at the same time disguise a fantasy. Fantasy distorts, but its distortion embodies subjectivity itself and transports the subject outside the constraints of actual experience**, which is why Freud values it over memory. **This valuation is part of the implicit political project inhering within psychoanalytic thought**, and it distances the politics of psychoanalysis from other political projects rooted in the Enlightenment. **Because it allows** the subject an experience of **transcendence** beyond the limits of the ruling symbolic structure, fantasy has tangible political benefits. These benefits can be characterized in three related ways: (1) **through fantasy, we experience alternatives to the ruling symbolic structure that remain unthinkable** within this structure; (2) fantasy **facilitate**s **an encounter with traumatic disruption that** our everyday **reality guards against; and** (3) fantasy makes evident the link between loss and enjoyment, allowing us to **conceive of a politics that embraces loss rather than attempting to escape it**. These political dimensions of fantasy all manifest themselves in the thought of Freud and Lacan, even though neither conceives of fantasy (or psychoanalysis as a whole) in a political sense.

# Case

### Top Level

#### Link wall ---

#### 1AC Johnson:

Links to 1NC matheson, also ormord

The result is a nightmarish world, one step away from nuclear war, economic disaster, and potential mass starvation

### Framing

No framing or ROTB – ddefault to ours which they don’t have offense under – presumption which negates since more ways to prove statement false than true

Don’t allow 1ar rearticulations

#### Independently – our ROTB comes first as a sequencing question to theirs:

#### [1] Our framework acts as a meta level constraint to theirs as theirs operates within the Lack – only symbolic rupture is able to create the agential capacity that serves as the prerequisite to their fwk in the first place

#### [2] Objectivity is impossible – signifiers such as pain or pleasure fundamentally have no meaning as only the aff explains their generation via symbolic differentiation – means their fwk collapses to ours

#### [3] Fiat is illusory - debate isn’t internal to real world change—spreading, extinction impacts, theory, and 10-word plans all prove that debate doesn’t emulate Congress nor spillover

#### [4] Simulation DA – simulation mirrors Pentagon war games that were played not in pursuit of knowledge but in pursuit of desires.

#### [5] Hijack – only we solve the death drive which leads us to act contrary to the pleasure principle.

### Adv 1

#### Collision risk is infinitesimally small

Fange 17 Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

#### No debris cascades, but even a worst case is confined to low LEO with no impact

Daniel Von Fange 17. Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong. What is Kessler Syndrome? Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites. It is a dark picture. Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen? I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit. The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. 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So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely. Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner. Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided. The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler. Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting) So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect. I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### No collisions---takes centuries and mitigation checks.

Hugh Lewis 15. Senior Lecturer in Aerospace Engineering at the University of Southampton, “Space debris, Kessler Syndrome, and the unreasonable expectation of certainty.” Room, <https://room.eu.com/article/Space_debris_Kessler_Syndrome_and_the_unreasonable_expectation_of_certainty>

There is now widespread awareness of the space debris problem amongst policymakers, scientists, engineers and the public. Thanks to pivotal work by J.C. Liou and Nicholas Johnson in 2006 we now understand that the continued growth of the debris population is likely in the future even if all launch activity is halted. The reason for this sustained growth, and for the concern of many satellite operators who are forced to act to protect their assets, are collisions that are expected to occur between objects – satellites and rocket stages – already in orbit. In spite of several commentators warning that these collisions are just the start of a collision cascade that will render access to low Earth orbit all but impossible – a process commonly referred to as the ‘Kessler Syndrome’ after the debris scientist Donald Kessler – the reality is not likely to be on the scale of these predictions or the events depicted in the film Gravity. Indeed, results presented by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) at the Sixth European Conference on Space Debris show an expected increase in the debris population of only 30% after 200 years with continued launch activity. Collisions are still predicted to occur, but this is far from the catastrophic scenario feared by some. Constraining the population increase to a modest level can be achieved, the IADC suggested, through widespread and good compliance with existing space debris mitigation guidelines, especially those relating to passivation (whereby all sources of stored energy on a satellite are depleted at the end of its mission) and post-mission disposal, such as de-orbiting the satellite or re-orbiting it to a graveyard orbit. Nevertheless, the anticipated growth of the debris population in spite of these robust efforts merits the investigation of additional measures to address the debris threat, according to the IADC.