# 1NC

### 1

#### 1. 1AR theory is drop the argument – a) 2ar collapse means the 1ar can read multiple shells and collapse on any one of them to win – the 2n can’t put 3 min of sufficient responses on every one of them b) Rectifies the skew since the 2n can’t go for the argument anyway which means the 2ar doesn’t have to answer the cause of the abuse.

#### 2. Use reasonability with the brightline of if you can concede the framework and generate at least 2 independent substantive outs on the alt and status being dispositional with the condition being if you win your framework. Competing interps incentivizes them to always read theory and ignored substance because you only need marginal offense – prefer: [A] strat skew- theory moots 7 minutes of NC offense and forces me to jump through nibs [B] Substantive education- by definition theory takes away from substance, which outweighs because we only have 2 months to debate the topic.

#### 3. Give the neg an RVI on 1ar theory – that’s key to checking frivolous 1ar theory since it will only read legitimate shells if it can lose on an RVI. Checking friv theory is key to substantive education since it preserves the requirement for substance.

### 2

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater who provides the best form of engagement with the fantasy---The embrace of the lack is the key to finding genuine enjoyment in the fantasy through trauma and providing an end to the quest of policymakers to find the perfect society so the K precludes the aff.

McGowan ‘13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 220-222)

Le Guin’s novel The Dispossessed shows us what this idea of politics might look like. It is a novel of political activity. The novel’s hero, Shevek, comes from a peaceful world of anarchists (on a moon named Anarres) that retains its way of life through isolation from other worlds. Shevek’s political activity consists in reaching out to the rest of the universe and specifically to the moon’s mother planet (Urras) with a revolutionary egalitarian philosophy. What is distinctive about Shevek is the motivation for his political activity. He doesn’t act out of a desire to eliminate loss by constructing a better world in the future; instead, he acts out of an embrace of loss. Unlike most revolutionary political figures, Shevek adopts a completely pessimistic view of existence. He is convinced of the utter hopelessness of the human condition. This sense of the necessity of loss animates Shevek as a political being. Shevek thus advances a political program that does not hold out the image of a future complete enjoyment. But if Shevek begins with the acceptance of loss and suffering, this doesn’t lead him to deny the possibility of enjoyment altogether. In fact, Shevek aims to convince others that the secret of enjoyment lies in the embrace of loss, not in the promise of overcoming it. According to Shevek (and psychoanalysis), loss doesn’t represent the end of enjoyment but the beginning. Throughout *The Dispossessed*, Shevek works toward a more egalitarian society both on his home world of Anarres and on the mother planet, Urras, that he travels to. But he recognizes that they cannot achieve an egalitarian society through the idea of overcoming loss and achieving wholeness. This image of a complete enjoyment that we might attain in the future (in, say, a future socialist society) is necessarily illusory because it depends on some kind of exclusion in order to sustain it. The only way to break out of this exclusionary logic is through abandoning the image of a future completeness. Instead of holding out this image, Shevek offers the ideal of a shared embrace of loss. Th rough the fantasy that Le Guin constructs in *The Dispossessed*, we can see the link between enjoyment and the loss of the privileged object, and through recognizing this link, we can rethink politics. Fantasy has the ability to foster a distinctive kind of politics, and psychoanalysis provides the key through which we can unlock fantasy’s emancipatory potential. Psychoanalysis allows us to understand both sides of fantasy and its relation to politics. On the one hand, fantasy does hide our subjection to the signifier, but on the other, because of the way it hides our subjection, it allows us to militate against our very subjected status itself in ways unthinkable outside of fantasy. Th rough its revaluation of the status of fantasy, psychoanalysis enables us to see fantasy’s fundamental political value in a way that neither philosophy nor Marxism can. Both the philosopher and the Marxist, because of their shared attitude toward fantasy, tend to remain stuck in attacks on the proliferation of false consciousness. Psychoanalysis allows us to rethink the way in which we conceive political activity: not as the triumph of the proper consciousness over the experience of enjoyment but as the embrace of the trauma inherent in real enjoyment. The political task as it might be envisioned by psychoanalytic thought entails not attempting to eliminate fantasy but transforming our relationship to it. Fantasy functions in an ideological way when it works to cover over the structural necessity of absence within the social order, but fantasy appeals to us because it also conveys an experience of loss or absence that we can access nowhere else. One could say that we are never more inauthentic than when we fantasize but never more authentic at the same time. In order to provide the pleasure that comes from overcoming absence, fantasy must introduce and narrate loss. As it does so, it allows the fantasizing subject to experience the impossible loss that founds subjectivity itself. In every fantasy, this loss is enacted, whether implicitly or explicitly. The political task involves fostering the recognition that we enjoy our fantasies for their depiction of loss rather than for the illusion of return. Accomplishing this task demands orienting ourselves and our societies around the enjoyment that fantasy provides. Rather than remaining a marginalized activity indulged in during sleep or while surfing for lewd Internet sites, fantasy must become central, the avowed basis of our social organization. We must count fantasy as worth more than our social reality because we already do. Though it always has a social and psychic centrality, we fail to recognize it, and the political project of psychoanalysis demands the recognition of fantasy’s primacy and a consequent devotion to fantasy. Without this, we cannot grasp the possibilities for enjoyment that inhere in the trauma of the lost object.

**At the level of form, radical demands are an affective investment which robs agency, cede the political, and reaffirms state authority.**

Lundberg ’12 (Chris, comm studies prof at UNC, Lacan in Public)

The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a po liti cal practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level of the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics **to retreat from the “politics of policy** and public **debate**.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal of ten makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to po liti cal purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the **content** of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: “demand in itself . . . is demand of a presence or of an absence . . . pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs, that it is

#### The impact is value to life – the continuous drive towards escaping loss prevents the subject’s acceptance of the finitude of death, destroying value. Only by embracing the inescapability of traumatic loss are we able to affirm life and carve out spaces for freedom.

**McGowan 13** (Todd McGowan, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, “Enjoying what we don’t have: the political project of psychoanalysis,”|*bxnk*)

An insistence on **the death drive marks an option beyond** what seems possible on **the** **contemporary political** landscape. The implications of this other path will emerge through the following examination of the widespread opposition of life and death. On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the **love of death is** a **counterintuitive** phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western **leftists** oft en **view** it. Interpreting **terrorist attacks as an** ultimately **life-affirming response to imperialism** and impoverishment, **they** implicitly **reject** the possibility of **being in love with death**. But **this** type of interpretation **can’t explain why** so **many** suicide **bombers are middle-class, educated subjects** and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.4 We must imagine that **for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself**. Th ose who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because **death is the source of value**.5 **The fact that life has an end**, that 225 Beyond Bare Life **we do not have** an **infinite** amount of **time to experience every possibility, means** that **we** must value some things above others. **Death creates hierarchies of value**, and **these** hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the **pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without** the **value that death provides**, neither **love** nor **ice cream** nor **friendship nor anything** that **we enjoy would have** any **special worth** whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones**. We would be** left **unable to enjoy what** seems to **make life most** **worth living.** Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infi nite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infi nite as a fi nite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. **Without** the **limits of fi nitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as** **our everyday lives** (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infi nite emerges as such. The struggle **to assert the importance of death** — the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are — **is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the** infinite enjoyment that death doesn’t extinguish but instead spawns**.**6 Th is is exactly why Martin Heidegger att acks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the eff ect of creating value for us. As he puts it, “With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. Th is is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.”7 **Without** the **anticipation of** our own **death, we fl it through the world and fail to take up fully an att itude of care**, the att itude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matt ers to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By **depriving us of an authentic relationship to death**, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value **creates a valueless world** where nothing matt ers to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. Th ey simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and **seein**g 226 Society **death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without** the **mediation that death provides**, **the system of** pure **life becomes a system** utterly **bereft of value.**8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity — science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. Th e scientifi c quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientifi c discoveries with morality aft er the fact. Aft er scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and att empt to police the practice. Aft er Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 Th e same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can’t produce enough — crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one — but because it produces too much. Th e crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. Th e capitalist economy suff ocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 **Modernity emerges with** the **bracketing of death’s finitude** **and the belief** that **there is no barrier to human possibility**.13 **Th e problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death** **is** that **it never finds enough life and** thus **remains perpetually dissatisfied.**

#### Thus the alternative is to traverse the fantasy – this spills up to tangible political change, shifting politics away from one focused on escaping loss to one embracing it.

McGowan ‘13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 208-210)

Like philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis also has a history of opposing itself to fantasy. Its basic trajectory appears to involve curing the patient of an excessive investment in fantasy life. It seems as if neurotics come to psychoanalysts suffering from their fantasies and that the sessions allow the neurotics to gain some distance from these fantasies and thereby see them for what they are. Gaining purchase on one’s fantasy life — or simply **becoming aware that one is fantasizing** — **is one** predominant **image of the psychoanalytic process**. My own therapy, for instance, consisted in gaining awareness of the nonexistence of normal people. The analyst’s unremitting silence in response to my questions about how everyone else would react in similar situations ultimately allowed me to recognize the obvious fact that there was no such thing as a normal reaction or normal person**. I was invested in the fantasy of normality without realizing that it was a fantasy**, and **analysis laid this fantasy bare and** thus **facilitated a disinvestment in it.** In this way, like so many patients I felt as if I was able to move beyond a barrier that I did not even know existed. Many theorists who recognize the political importance of psychoanalysis do so because of its ability to combat fantasy. For example, **this dimension** of psychoanalysis **leads** Yannis Stavrakakis, in *Lacan and the Political*, to see **the contemporary** **political task of psychoanalysis as one of “traversing the fantasy of utopian thought**.”25 In the vein of the philosopher or the Marxist, Stavrakakis sees a danger in the way that **fantasy hides the gap that haunts the symbolic order**. As he notes, “**Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it,** by promising **to close the gap between the real and reality**, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production.”26 Here, Stavrakakis sees the ideological dimension of fantasy, and **psychoanalysis** for him **facilitates** this **recognition and** provides **a way to dissolve fantasy’s power**. This kind of psychoanalytic politics evinces the attitude toward fantasy that both modern philosophy and Marxism take up, and this attitude certainly seems faithful to psychoanalytic practice and its attempt to assist the subject in “traversing the fantasy.”27 But despite the seeming antipathy directed toward fantasy in its very practice, for psychoanalysis the political valence of fantasy is not so unambiguous as it is for philosophy and Marxism. To unlock fully the political potential of psychoanalysis, we must turn our attention to the positive significance that psychoanalysis bestows on fantasy. Both philosophy and Marxism are, of course, right about the role that fantasy has in disguising our social situatedness. But the problem with this conception of politics is that, by focusing on what fantasy conceals, it fails to consider what fantasy reveals. It is at this point — the point of what fantasy reveals to us — that we can see the political significance of psychoanalysis. The value of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to grasp the political importance of fantasy in a way that philosophy and Marxism have been unable to do. At the same time that **fantasy disguises our subjection to the signifier and makes it difficult for us to experience** this **subjection, it also has the effect of making otherwise impossible experiences possible**.28 Fantasy **offers the subject a transcendent experience**, and this transcendence, despite its illusory quality, has a political content. It represents **a moment at which the subject is no longer bound by the limitations of the symbolic structure** that ordinarily constrain it. As such, this moment of **fantasmatic transcendence poses for the subject a** fundamental **challenge to the authority of that symbolic structure**. In fact, the radical import of fantasy is located in precisely the same feature that causes fantasy to further ideology: the illusions of **fantasy keep subjects content with the** ruling **symbolic structure, but** they also **provide a venue for thinking beyond that structure.** In contrast to modern philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis permits us to see this political complexity inhering within the structure of fantasy. From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, this respect for fantasy makes itself felt. When it comes to the psyche of the subject in analysis, the **fantasy has more significance than** **actual memories**. For instance, Freud’s early essay “Screen Memories” describes early childhood memories as screens for unconscious fantasies. The sexual content of the fantasy, Freud contends, can only appear through the vehicle of a genuine memory. He writes: “It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it . . . must be content to find its way allusively and under a fl owery disguise into a childhood scene.”29 Freud’s point here is not that we must subtract the distortion of fantasy from the memory in order to discover what actually happened but that what actually happened has far less psychic importance than the fantasy it conceals. **The subject uses the memory of a genuine scene to access and at the same time disguise a fantasy. Fantasy distorts, but its distortion embodies subjectivity itself and transports the subject outside the constraints of actual experience**, which is why Freud values it over memory. **This valuation is part of the implicit political project inhering within psychoanalytic thought**, and it distances the politics of psychoanalysis from other political projects rooted in the Enlightenment. **Because it allows** the subject an experience of **transcendence** beyond the limits of the ruling symbolic structure, fantasy has tangible political benefits. These benefits can be characterized in three related ways: (1) **through fantasy, we experience alternatives to the ruling symbolic structure that remain unthinkable** within this structure; (2) fantasy **facilitate**s **an encounter with traumatic disruption that** our everyday **reality guards against; and** (3) fantasy makes evident the link between loss and enjoyment, allowing us to **conceive of a politics that embraces loss rather than attempting to escape it**. These political dimensions of fantasy all manifest themselves in the thought of Freud and Lacan, even though neither conceives of fantasy (or psychoanalysis as a whole) in a political sense.

# 1NC – Case

### Framework

#### [1] Our ROTB is a meta level constraint on their framework:

#### [A] Ontology –

#### [B] Universality imposs

#### [C] Fantasy constructs apriori –

#### [D] Apriori world overdetermined by signifiers – Symbolic first