# 1NC

Table

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### 1

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater who provides the best form of engagement with the fantasy---The embrace of the lack is the key to finding genuine enjoyment in the fantasy through trauma and providing an end to the quest of policymakers to find the perfect society so the K precludes the aff.

McGowan ‘13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 220-222)

Le Guin’s novel The Dispossessed shows us what this idea of politics might look like. It is a novel of political activity. The novel’s hero, Shevek, comes from a peaceful world of anarchists (on a moon named Anarres) that retains its way of life through isolation from other worlds. Shevek’s political activity consists in reaching out to the rest of the universe and specifically to the moon’s mother planet (Urras) with a revolutionary egalitarian philosophy. What is distinctive about Shevek is the motivation for his political activity. He doesn’t act out of a desire to eliminate loss by constructing a better world in the future; instead, he acts out of an embrace of loss. Unlike most revolutionary political figures, Shevek adopts a completely pessimistic view of existence. He is convinced of the utter hopelessness of the human condition. This sense of the necessity of loss animates Shevek as a political being. Shevek thus advances a political program that does not hold out the image of a future complete enjoyment. But if Shevek begins with the acceptance of loss and suffering, this doesn’t lead him to deny the possibility of enjoyment altogether. In fact, Shevek aims to convince others that the secret of enjoyment lies in the embrace of loss, not in the promise of overcoming it. According to Shevek (and psychoanalysis), loss doesn’t represent the end of enjoyment but the beginning. Throughout *The Dispossessed*, Shevek works toward a more egalitarian society both on his home world of Anarres and on the mother planet, Urras, that he travels to. But he recognizes that they cannot achieve an egalitarian society through the idea of overcoming loss and achieving wholeness. This image of a complete enjoyment that we might attain in the future (in, say, a future socialist society) is necessarily illusory because it depends on some kind of exclusion in order to sustain it. The only way to break out of this exclusionary logic is through abandoning the image of a future completeness. Instead of holding out this image, Shevek offers the ideal of a shared embrace of loss. Th rough the fantasy that Le Guin constructs in *The Dispossessed*, we can see the link between enjoyment and the loss of the privileged object, and through recognizing this link, we can rethink politics. Fantasy has the ability to foster a distinctive kind of politics, and psychoanalysis provides the key through which we can unlock fantasy’s emancipatory potential. Psychoanalysis allows us to understand both sides of fantasy and its relation to politics. On the one hand, fantasy does hide our subjection to the signifier, but on the other, because of the way it hides our subjection, it allows us to militate against our very subjected status itself in ways unthinkable outside of fantasy. Th rough its revaluation of the status of fantasy, psychoanalysis enables us to see fantasy’s fundamental political value in a way that neither philosophy nor Marxism can. Both the philosopher and the Marxist, because of their shared attitude toward fantasy, tend to remain stuck in attacks on the proliferation of false consciousness. Psychoanalysis allows us to rethink the way in which we conceive political activity: not as the triumph of the proper consciousness over the experience of enjoyment but as the embrace of the trauma inherent in real enjoyment. The political task as it might be envisioned by psychoanalytic thought entails not attempting to eliminate fantasy but transforming our relationship to it. Fantasy functions in an ideological way when it works to cover over the structural necessity of absence within the social order, but fantasy appeals to us because it also conveys an experience of loss or absence that we can access nowhere else. One could say that we are never more inauthentic than when we fantasize but never more authentic at the same time. In order to provide the pleasure that comes from overcoming absence, fantasy must introduce and narrate loss. As it does so, it allows the fantasizing subject to experience the impossible loss that founds subjectivity itself. In every fantasy, this loss is enacted, whether implicitly or explicitly. The political task involves fostering the recognition that we enjoy our fantasies for their depiction of loss rather than for the illusion of return. Accomplishing this task demands orienting ourselves and our societies around the enjoyment that fantasy provides. Rather than remaining a marginalized activity indulged in during sleep or while surfing for lewd Internet sites, fantasy must become central, the avowed basis of our social organization. We must count fantasy as worth more than our social reality because we already do. Though it always has a social and psychic centrality, we fail to recognize it, and the political project of psychoanalysis demands the recognition of fantasy’s primacy and a consequent devotion to fantasy. Without this, we cannot grasp the possibilities for enjoyment that inhere in the trauma of the lost object.

**At the level of form, radical demands are an affective investment which robs agency, cede the political, and reaffirms state authority.**

Lundberg ’12 (Chris, comm studies prof at UNC, Lacan in Public)

The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a po liti cal practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level of the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics **to retreat from the “politics of policy** and public **debate**.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal of ten makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to po liti cal purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the **content** of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: “demand in itself . . . is demand of a presence or of an absence . . . pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied.”46

#### Specifically, regulating the strike into the right to strike allows the state to dictate revolution – that diffuses planning into policy and subverts radicality. Even if tactical leaders recognize the right to strike – that begs the question of whether the state’s aims will truly be shifted.

Crépon 19 Mark Crépon (French philosopher), translated by Micol Bez “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence,’” Critical Times, 2:2, August 2019, DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331 Recut Justin

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­ tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­ tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis­à­vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.”1 In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the per­ fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of ques­ tioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja­ min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi­ tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to con­ tain class strugles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufcient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that jus­ tifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) lef once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufcient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufcient rationale, allow­ ing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situ­ ation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

#### Thus the alternative is to traverse the fantasy – this spills up to tangible political change, shifting politics away from one focused on escaping loss to one embracing it.

McGowan ‘13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 208-210)

Like philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis also has a history of opposing itself to fantasy. Its basic trajectory appears to involve curing the patient of an excessive investment in fantasy life. It seems as if neurotics come to psychoanalysts suffering from their fantasies and that the sessions allow the neurotics to gain some distance from these fantasies and thereby see them for what they are. Gaining purchase on one’s fantasy life — or simply **becoming aware that one is fantasizing** — **is one** predominant **image of the psychoanalytic process**. My own therapy, for instance, consisted in gaining awareness of the nonexistence of normal people. The analyst’s unremitting silence in response to my questions about how everyone else would react in similar situations ultimately allowed me to recognize the obvious fact that there was no such thing as a normal reaction or normal person**. I was invested in the fantasy of normality without realizing that it was a fantasy**, and **analysis laid this fantasy bare and** thus **facilitated a disinvestment in it.** In this way, like so many patients I felt as if I was able to move beyond a barrier that I did not even know existed. Many theorists who recognize the political importance of psychoanalysis do so because of its ability to combat fantasy. For example, **this dimension** of psychoanalysis **leads** Yannis Stavrakakis, in *Lacan and the Political*, to see **the contemporary** **political task of psychoanalysis as one of “traversing the fantasy of utopian thought**.”25 In the vein of the philosopher or the Marxist, Stavrakakis sees a danger in the way that **fantasy hides the gap that haunts the symbolic order**. As he notes, “**Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it,** by promising **to close the gap between the real and reality**, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production.”26 Here, Stavrakakis sees the ideological dimension of fantasy, and **psychoanalysis** for him **facilitates** this **recognition and** provides **a way to dissolve fantasy’s power**. This kind of psychoanalytic politics evinces the attitude toward fantasy that both modern philosophy and Marxism take up, and this attitude certainly seems faithful to psychoanalytic practice and its attempt to assist the subject in “traversing the fantasy.”27 But despite the seeming antipathy directed toward fantasy in its very practice, for psychoanalysis the political valence of fantasy is not so unambiguous as it is for philosophy and Marxism. To unlock fully the political potential of psychoanalysis, we must turn our attention to the positive significance that psychoanalysis bestows on fantasy. Both philosophy and Marxism are, of course, right about the role that fantasy has in disguising our social situatedness. But the problem with this conception of politics is that, by focusing on what fantasy conceals, it fails to consider what fantasy reveals. It is at this point — the point of what fantasy reveals to us — that we can see the political significance of psychoanalysis. The value of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to grasp the political importance of fantasy in a way that philosophy and Marxism have been unable to do. At the same time that **fantasy disguises our subjection to the signifier and makes it difficult for us to experience** this **subjection, it also has the effect of making otherwise impossible experiences possible**.28 Fantasy **offers the subject a transcendent experience**, and this transcendence, despite its illusory quality, has a political content. It represents **a moment at which the subject is no longer bound by the limitations of the symbolic structure** that ordinarily constrain it. As such, this moment of **fantasmatic transcendence poses for the subject a** fundamental **challenge to the authority of that symbolic structure**. In fact, the radical import of fantasy is located in precisely the same feature that causes fantasy to further ideology: the illusions of **fantasy keep subjects content with the** ruling **symbolic structure, but** they also **provide a venue for thinking beyond that structure.** In contrast to modern philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis permits us to see this political complexity inhering within the structure of fantasy. From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, this respect for fantasy makes itself felt. When it comes to the psyche of the subject in analysis, the **fantasy has more significance than** **actual memories**. For instance, Freud’s early essay “Screen Memories” describes early childhood memories as screens for unconscious fantasies. The sexual content of the fantasy, Freud contends, can only appear through the vehicle of a genuine memory. He writes: “It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it . . . must be content to find its way allusively and under a fl owery disguise into a childhood scene.”29 Freud’s point here is not that we must subtract the distortion of fantasy from the memory in order to discover what actually happened but that what actually happened has far less psychic importance than the fantasy it conceals. **The subject uses the memory of a genuine scene to access and at the same time disguise a fantasy. Fantasy distorts, but its distortion embodies subjectivity itself and transports the subject outside the constraints of actual experience**, which is why Freud values it over memory. **This valuation is part of the implicit political project inhering within psychoanalytic thought**, and it distances the politics of psychoanalysis from other political projects rooted in the Enlightenment. **Because it allows** the subject an experience of **transcendence** beyond the limits of the ruling symbolic structure, fantasy has tangible political benefits. These benefits can be characterized in three related ways: (1) **through fantasy, we experience alternatives to the ruling symbolic structure that remain unthinkable** within this structure; (2) fantasy **facilitate**s **an encounter with traumatic disruption that** our everyday **reality guards against; and** (3) fantasy makes evident the link between loss and enjoyment, allowing us to **conceive of a politics that embraces loss rather than attempting to escape it**. These political dimensions of fantasy all manifest themselves in the thought of Freud and Lacan, even though neither conceives of fantasy (or psychoanalysis as a whole) in a political sense.

### 2

**Interpretation – On the 2021 November/December topic the affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of a post-fiat policy.**

#### Resolved means a legislative policy.

**Words and Phrases 64,** Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. Definition of the word “**resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘**it was resolved by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “**to establish by law**”

**Violation – You don’t**

**Vote neg -**

#### [1] Ground – not defending implementation means affs gut neg prep since they can spike out of util DA’s, CP’s, strategic solvency deficits, and circumvention in the 1AR by saying that implementation is irrelevant, which equally applies to the few generics we could read to ensure the aff takes a concrete action. A couple impacts: (a) link turns critical ed – we can’t test the aff from a policy standpoint since util offense doesn’t link, which kills critical contestation (b) policy education – in your world we kill any discussion of real world factors that would constrain the passage of the aff – hijacks their solvency – otherwise there’s no way to ensure the aff gets passed

#### [2] Limits – Ex post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny. Their interp creates a race to the margins incentivizing affs to defend uncontestable statements like “2+2=4” or “racism is bad” and the lack of a stable mechanism means they can always revise their aff to de-link from the few generics that are responsive. Fairness first – debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary to produce any benefit from the activity. Fairness independently outweighs:

#### 1] Decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented – things like doing c-x, following speech times etc, prove. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments – that negates since statements are more often false than true.

#### 2] Ballot proximity - individual ballots can’t alter subjectivity or inspire broader political change, but are most proximate to resolving in-round skews

#### [3] SSD – solves all their offense – if your aff is incompatible with the topic, read the aff on the neg – key to test convictions we hold as debaters – otherwise produces insular debates where we are never forced to confront our personal convictions which reproduces the violence the aff talks about.

#### [5] No impact turns: (a) We should experiment with ideological opposition – reading T is a good thing even if its false because it makes us test a multiplicity of strategies from many directions and refines good methods (b) They can’t win on an impact turn absent justifying an RVI because they’re still operating under the model of theory.

#### Use competing interps – (a) reasonability britelines are arbitrary and cause judge intervention (b) reasonability collapses - you use an offense/defense paradigm to compare britelines.

#### Drop the debater - (a) the entire round is skewed since the entire 1NC is premised off of the 1AC strategy (b) DtA is incoherent with T since we indict the entire advocacy which means we drop the whole aff anyway.

#### No RVI’s - T is a stock issue and you shouldn’t win for meeting it or your burden of being fair. Logic comes first – args need to be coherent before they’re evaluated