### Framework

#### Ethics is split between the deontic and the aretaic. Deontic theories describe how agents should act based on moral duties, while aretaic theories describe what kind of agent we must be to act morally.

**Gryz 1** [Jarek, professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. November 2011, Issue 5.] SHS ZS

**There are two fundamental classes of** terms traditionally distinguished within **moral vocabulary**: **the deontic and the aretaic**. The terms from **the first** set **serve in the prescriptive function of** a **moral code**. This function consists in **providing answers to questions like: What am I** **(morally) required to do**? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. **They are expressed by means of** such terms as: ‘**right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’**, etc. **The second class contains terms used for a moral** **evaluation of an** action (or an **actor**). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. **Terms used for evaluations include**: ‘**good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’**, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; **the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments**.

#### To clarify, deontic theories guide ethics by looking to the actions of agents, while aretaic theories guide ethics by looking to their character. Virtue is a positive characteristic that is not inherent, but rather inculcated over time so that one becomes disposed to always act in the right way.

#### Prefer the aretaic:

#### [1] Hijacks – A. Golden Mean – the complexity of moral dilemmas cannot be fully captured by inflexible deontic principles. Only virtue solves – to be virtuous requires becoming fully responsive to all situations in the appropriate degree. B. The aretaic provides a richer vocabulary for evaluating actions that extends beyond simply right or wrong. The deontic can be deduced from the aretaic, but not vice versa—that means the aretaic is conceptually prior.

**Gryz 2** (Jarek, Prof in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011, 14:493–501, Springer) SHS ZS   
The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. **Goodness and badness come in degrees**, hence **we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’**; **we lack similar terms for** **deontically evaluated actions**. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; **an all-or- nothing choice, implied by** the use of **‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on** only **one quantum quality**.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, **the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much** **finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary**. For example, **by saying** that **something is praiseworthy we imply** that **it deserves approval** or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet **expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems** just **impossible**. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that **all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms**. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. **If our task is** just **to substitute** **every** particular **deontic evaluation with an aretaic** one, **there are no** logical **reasons that would make it impossible** (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, **attractive ethical theories seem** to be much **better** off **than the imperative ones**.

#### [2] Collapses – A. Engaging in ethics concedes to the authority of becoming a good person through being conditioned properly, otherwise we would have no reason to act ethically. B. Infinite regress – we can always ask why to follow a deontic rule, but the terminus is always rooted in becoming a better person.

#### [3] Motivation – The aretaic allows people to fully consider the plurality of motivations they have for acting. They no longer forsake some of their values to follow an abstract deontic theory, but instead can make the motivational choice they think is correct.

**Sakellariouv ’15** [Sakellariouv, Alexandra M. “Virtue Ethics and its Potential as the Leading Moral Theory.” Discussions. [http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1385/virtue-ethics-and-moral-theory Published 2015](http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1385/virtue-ethics-and-moral-theory%20Published%202015).] SHS ZS

The main advantage **virtue ethics** has over other moral theories is that it **does not fall victim to 'moral schizophrenia'** as it does not compromise one's motivations and reasons. First, the problem moral schizophrenia poses, which most moral theories face, must be understood. Michael Stocker (1976) identifies the problem, which he calls 'moral schizophrenia', in **many** modern **moral theories** such as consequentialism and deontology. Moral schizophrenia, he explains, **causes a split between motives and reasons**, so an indicator of a 'good life' is having harmony between motives and reasons (p. 454). **If one wants to lead a good life one "should be moved by [one's] major values** and [one] should value what [one's] major motives seek" (p. 454). A moral theory should support personal motives. **However**, the **reasoning in many moral theories conflicts with personal motives**. They require that people do "what is right, obligatory, [their] duty no matter what [their] motive for so acting" (p. 454). Specifically**, the impartialist nature of most moral theories does not allow people to treat anyone else differently**. People cannot treat their family and friends any differently from strangers, even though moral intuitions support preferential treatment. Whatever personal motivation one may have to do something does not matter; one must always follow the reasoning of the moral theory, even if it conflicts with his or her motives. **Moral schizophrenia** in moral theories will **prevent the agents from ever achieving the good life**. Stocker explains that these moral theories "allow [people] the harmony of a morally impoverished life, a life deeply deficient in what is valuable ... people who do let them compromise their motives will, for that reason, have a life seriously lacking in what is valuable" (p. 455). **A life cannot be very fulfilling if everyone who performs his or her duty very rarely actually wants to**. Moral schizophrenia means that, in most situations**, individuals will end up discontent from following the reasoning of the moral theory.** Modern moral theories do not allow for personal pursuits such as love, friendship, and community, which are valuable sources of pleasure. These theories do not recognize the value people can bring to lives. Stocker writes "**there is a whole other area of values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities; and also of moral goodness, merit, and virtue**" (p. 453-456). People's motives need to be in harmony for these values to be realized. **Virtue ethics avoids moral schizophrenia because it allows for virtues that harmonize motives and reasons.** Recall that virtue ethics believes virtues are a plurality of intrinsic good; there are various reasons why certain virtues are valuable. It does not believe one overarching principle is the ultimate guide to live by, which generally would compromise other values in our life. **Virtues ethics considers traits such as love, friendship, and community as virtues that are important for the wellbeing of the individuals involved**. Specific varieties of virtue ethics will sometimes value certain virtues above others that are imperative to maintaining the personal and interpersonal connections other moral theories do not. **NeoAristotelian virtue ethics values what is good for the wellbeing of the individual**. Certainly acting upon personal motives is important for one's wellbeing, so it would value traits such as friendship and love that allow one to maintain personal connections. **Consider** the following example to help further explain. **A man** has recently **saved up** a considerable amount of **money** in order **to visit his friend in Iceland** for a week. **Instead** of spending money on the trip, **he could always donate it to a local homeless shelter** to help directly feed the hungry. **Surely donating** his money to such charitable efforts **would produce** **more happiness** than would spending the money to see his friend. It would most likely be agreed that **there is nothing wrong with him spending the money to see his friend**. He saved the money himself and would gain personal satisfaction from seeing his long-distance friend. **According to utilitarianism**, a theory plagued by moral schizophrenia, **the right thing to do is** **donate the money** because it would produce the most pleasure.**However**, think about what the **virtue ethicist** would say. The virtuous person would take all the virtues into account. They **would consider** the virtues of **love and friendship**. They would most likely conclude that **the right thing to do is take the trip to Iceland**. The reasons may include the fact that the person would be acting as a good friend or acting in their own best interest by going on the trip. This decision would satisfy the virtuous person because it harmonizes motives and reasons. **Virtue ethics allows people to maintain personal** and interpersonal **connections important for the good life.** Virtue ethics does not fall victim to moral schizophrenia, which is one advantage it has over most other moral theories.

#### This outweighs and hijacks other theories – A. All moral actions presuppose their own goodness, which is only defined by their intrinsic, virtuous, function. B. Agents won’t abide by ethical theories that they lack the motivation to follow, which is terminal defense on other standards C. Proves that maximizing well-being is a fallacy that will result in the individual actor ending up less satisfied.

#### The only ethics consistent with the aretaic is a virtue paradigm. Rather than providing a description of normative claims, we instead focus on developing agents to make them virtuous. Reader.

[Reader 2k (Reader, Soren. Late Professor of Philosophy, Durham University “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 2000.)] SHS ZS  
**Virtue is a** free **disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions**. Virtue ethics claims that **what is to count as a good action** or what is a good outcome **is** conceptually **dependent on claims about** **the virtue of an agent**. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself,’ **virtue ethicists** instead **explore the** concrete **dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from** already **virtuous agents**. They hold that **the key to moral rationality is** found **in moral education**. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent: the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These **beginner-agents learn from** the experienced, **wise moral agent by copying**, by mimicking in **their actions** the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. **Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things**, going on to do the same, **then going on to do the same in new ways**, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: **there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of** the phronimos **which can explain or justify it** (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learn ing of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-fol lowers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting virtue.

#### Impact Calc:

#### [1] There is a distinction between procedural and substantive actions. Procedural actions allow agents to engage under the framework to practice virtue while substantive offense is an unvirtuous action. Procedural offense comes first since A) Prerequisite – if it’s impossible to engage in the framework it’s impossible to generate a substantive ethical conclusion from it B) Magnitude – being incapable of generating ethical principles is an intrinsic wrong that infinitely violates all the ethical decisions that you would have made under the framework. Independently takes out calc indicts; we don’t need to know what a virtue is, we just need to have humans making decisions.

#### [2] Reject calc indicts versus virtue – A) Just proves being virtuous is hard but moral practice is the point, so it just proves the aff is necessary B) Actions aimed toward the good life are virtuous and resolved by our intuitions. Anything else collapses to skepticism since we can’t trust our own judgements about morality.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Constitutiveness – moral questions are derived from the life-form of a particular entity, which justifies following our true form. This outweighs – just as I would say a knife is bad if it is blunt, humans would be bad if they do not follow their true form. Any deontic theories are simply a deviation from our form. Foot:

[Foot, Phillipa; “Natural Goodness”; Oxford University (2001)] SHS ZS

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by…other means.’ Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called **an ‘Aristotelian necessity’**: [is] that which **is necessary because** and in so far as **good hangs on it.** We invoke the same idea when we say that **it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill**. These ‘**Aristotelian necessities’ depend on** what the **particular species of plants and animals** need, **[and] on their natural habitat**, and the ways of making out that there are in their repertoire. **These** things together **determine** **what** it is for members of **a particular species** to be as they **should be,** and to do that which they should do. And for all the enormous differences between [the] life [of] and humans and that of plants or animals, we can see **that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do.**

#### [2] Actor specificity – Virtue is impossible without impetus to act ethically: the state must provide conditions that facilitate virtue development. Ingrahm 13.

[Ingram 13 Andrew Ingram (The University of Texas School of Law, J.D.; The University of Texas at Austin, M.A. Philosophy; A.B. Brown University.) “A (Moral) Prisoner’s Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining” 2013 <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2013/12/8.-Ingram.pdf> ] SHS ZS

Now there are some philosphers and lay people who may profess not to care about character. On the other hand, there are some who care about character a great deal. Though it is not a commonly held position today, there have been some thinkers who argued that **the purpose of the state is the development of virtue in the citizens.**23 For these theorists, the objective of the ideal state is to facilitate and cultivate the development of virtuous individuals. **This principle would extend to criminal-justice policy**. **A justice system which** deliberately **took steps** with a high chance **of rewarding dishonesty would not be** in keeping with the criteria for criminal justice in **the character-building state**. At a minimum, the state would be sending the wrong message to its citizens, declaring that it cares not for virtue and vice and will nonchalantly punish the relatively virtuous more than the comparatively vicious. Beyond this, **there is the problem that the state is encouraging vice and discouraging virtue** by incentivizing the one and penalizing the other. Strictly speaking, this is not my thesis, although it is suggested by the same phenomenon. The traditional position in virtue ethics is that **virtuous actions build virtue and vicious actions build vice**—just like other habits. **From the perspective of the** character-building **state**, **it is** obviously **unacceptable for it to be encouraging** betrayal given that such acts nourish **bad character**. Finally, **there is something** twisted and **cruel about** deliberately **putting a person to** a **choice between** her **conscience and** her **freedom**. Tracy, we imagined, was not someone who made the decision to turn state’s evidence lightly. There are, however, some people who do so easily, with utter indifference to their former partners or even malice in their hearts against them. **When the prosecutor offers to make a deal with** such **an awful character**, **his only hesitation will involve** just **how good of a deal he can bargain** to obtain. Now contrast this person with someone like Louisa who is honest or who has tender feelings and wishes not to harm another human being by increasing the amount of time that person will spend in prison. She is **caught between** the demands of her **compassion** or her honor on one hand, **and** the prospect of **years** of misery **behind bars** on the other. Moreover, Louisa must also be mindful of her duties as a mother. The thought of violating one’s principles or bringing harm to one’s former partner in crime (who could be a close friend or even a close family member as well) is tortuous for the woman of conscience. The same is true for the fear of prison; its deprivations are at least as miserable for the saint as they are for the sinner. In sum, the perverse reality is that the more honest or compassionate a person is, the more she will suffer from the dilemma the prosecutor has fashioned.

### Offense

#### I affirm, resolved: the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. I’m willing clarify or specify whatever you want me to in CX if it doesn’t force me to abandon my maxim. Check all interps in CX – I could’ve met them before the NC and abuse would’ve been solved.

#### [1] Spacecol demonstrates hubris – to take control and appropriate space is to believe that you are above nature itself, which is arrogance.

Sparrow, 3 (Robert Sparrow, Professor at Monash University; At the highest level of description my research interests are political philosophy and applied ethics; I am interested in philosophical arguments with real-world implications. More specifically, I am working in or have worked in: political philosophy, bioethics, environmental ethics, media ethics; just war theory; and the ethics of science and technology., 1999, accessed on 12-12-2021, Environmental Ethics 21, " Robert Sparrow, The ethics of terraforming - PhilPapers", [https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)[bracketed](https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)%5bbracketed) for gen lang]//phs st

IV. THE SIN OF HUBRIS The other vice which terraforming might involve us in is the sin of hubris. Hubris is a vice, discussed in classical Greek literature and mythology, which is popularly thought to involve excessive pride before the gods.'9 It occurs when humans willfully ignore their limits and seek to become like gods.2° Hubris is traditionally punished by disaster. The excess of pride is the undoing of those who possess it and they are put in their place, usually roughly. The paradigmatic example of hubris can be found in the legend of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun in the attempt to reach heaven and lost his son as a result.21 Planetary engineering strikes me as a good candidate for the sort of project which would demonstrate hubris. We would be playing god. This sentiment is never far from the literature. The rhetoric of terraforming is quite self-consciously a rhetoric of transformation and transcendence. Terraforming is not just another project. It is a project that would make us world makers .22 It would mark the next stage of human destiny and the beginning of the conquest of space. But what about someone who denies that there are any limits on human activity? Someone who holds that there are no gods, no one to challenge, and that human beings can and should forge a glorious destiny? It is obviously unsatisfactory to rely on theistic claims about the proper place of humanity. For the argument to be convincing in modern circumstances, we must be able to give a non-theistic account of hubris. There are two strategies we may pursue to develop such an account. The first and the easiest is to focus on the character and phenomenology of the vice of hubris. To do so, we must provide a description of hubris as an attitude and show that the project of terraforming is both the result of and a source of such attitudes. As noted above, the proponents of terraforming often seem to demon-strate an attitude which is a good prima-facie candidate for hubris. Classically, hubris involves glorying in one's own powers, a false optimism about them, and a haste to put them to the test. A lack of self-knowledge and self-reflection is also characteristic of hubris, as is a dismissive attitude toward both critics and past failures. All of these traits are sometimes evidenced in the discussion of terraforming. The project attracts interest simply because it is so dramatic and because of the proof it could provide of the supremacy of human spirit and engineering skill. This enthusiasm for terraforming looks particularly damning in the light of past technological disasters on Earth. There is little self-reflection going on in the debate about terraforming, which is largely a technical debate about feasibility and methods and which allows little room for questions about why we would want to engage in such a project.23 Thus, the attitudes surrounding and driving terraforming seem to fit the phenom- enology of hubris. But this strategy will not, I suspect, prove effective against an entirely serious (including morally serious) and reflective advocate of terra- forming who denies that any of the above attitudes are involved and who challenges the conservative and parochial consequences of the critique. Although the attitudes described above are all, as a matter of contingent fact, demon- strated by current advocates of terraforming, it remains to be argued that they are always likely to be so. In order to meet objections of this type, we need to try to show that the sin of hubris involves a reference to certain sorts of projects. The above attitudes are all part of the burning desire to transgress our limits. We need to give some account of our limits and to show that terraforming is outside of them. The second strategy is thus to try to formulate a (non-theistic) account of humanity's place in the cosmos and of appropriate limits to human activities, in order to show that projects which transgress these demonstrate hubris.24 It is important to understand that this argument is an attempt to show that seeking to transcend certain limits demonstrates hubris; and is therefore wrong, rather than an attempt to show why seeking to transcend certain limits is wrong, and therefore demonstrates hubris. It is intended to remain within an agent-based framework. We need an account of our limits in order to better show when people are trying to overcome them. Nevertheless, the fact that trying to do so is wrong is solely a function of whether it demonstrates hubris or not, which also depends on any other number of things.25 How do we distinguish these limits? Again it seems to me that there are two ways we might seek some guide to the limits of proper human action. The first moves indirectly toward an account of our limits by fodusing on the nature of our actions and by arguing that certain features are characteristic of projects which seek to transcend our proper limits. There is often a significant relation between our actions and the projects they are part of. In the case of hubris, acts of hubris are usually large, dramatic, and unprecedented acts. They are usually punished by disaster. The pride and the fall go hand in hand. The possibility of disaster, then, of failure which would bring us low, operates as a sign of hubris. Terraforrning certainly involves the possibility of catastrophic failure. Given the scale of the project and the amount of energy involved, failures are likely to be disastrous. Instead of a habitable planet, we may produce .one with a poisonous atmosphere or without water or lashed by continual typhoons. Indeed, given the amount of resources and human effort which would need to be dedicated to terraforming, anything other than complete success would be a disaster. Note that it is the possibility of disaster rather than its probability which is important here. I am not arguing that the risks are too great or that the costs of failure are too high. Instead, the possibility of a catastrophic failure which would reveal our ambitions as arrogant and futile acts as an indication that the project is one which oversteps the limits of our wisdom and abilities. Second, we might attempt more directly to flesh out the idea of our own proper human place. We could try to gain a sense of possible limits to the ambitions which are appropriate to human beings. When considering terraforming, because the limit we are considering here is the physical limit of being confined to a single planet, it seems fair to invoke the metaphor of our proper place in a spatial sense. However, this metaphor can also be understood more generally to pose the question of our proper place in the scheme of things or the limits of the sphere of human activity.26 To say that some location or area is our proper place is not an empty thought. It implies a certain relation of appropriateness in our presence there. A proper place is one in which one can flourish without too much of a struggle. It is one that we can live in and sustain. It is a place in which one fits and does not appear uncomfortable or out of place. It is prima facie implausible'to suggest that Mars is our proper place. The vast amount of effort required for us to sustain a presence there, even to the point of entirely transforming the planet, indicates that it is not a natural environment for us. Our presence there would be analogous to that of a penguin in the Sahara or a rabbit underwater. If we have to wear space suits to visit and to completely remodel it in order to stay, then it's simply not our place. Another way to try to understand our proper place is by relating •it to the idea of a home. It seems natural to say of most creatures, at least as individuals and perhaps as species, that they have a home. This is a place which nurtures them, in which they grow up, reproduce and which offers them some semblance of safety. It is difficult to say of human beings collectively, who have colonized all reaches of the globe, where our homeis. But "Earth" looks like a plausible answer. Planets seem to have a certain status as possible homes for creatures because of their nature as whole systems on which life can evolve. The relation between the idea of a home and the idea of our proper place that I am suggesting is an ethical one. Our proper place is at home until we have shown that we are mature enough to leave it. Whether or not people are ready to leave home depends on how well they live at home and how they look after that home. On this test, the human species does not look well qualified to start moving out to other planets. We must show that we are capable of looking after our current home before we could claim to have any place on another. For the moment, at least, our proper place is on Earth and the desire to colonize other planets is indicative of hubris.

#### [2] Regardless of the consequences, colonizing space fails to recognize the beauty of space which reveals aesthetic insensitivity.

Sparrow, 2 (Robert Sparrow, Professor at Monash University; At the highest level of description my research interests are political philosophy and applied ethics; I am interested in philosophical arguments with real-world implications. More specifically, I am working in or have worked in: political philosophy, bioethics, environmental ethics, media ethics; just war theory; and the ethics of science and technology., 1999, accessed on 12-12-2021, Environmental Ethics 21, " Robert Sparrow, The ethics of terraforming - PhilPapers", [https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)[bracketed](https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)%5bbracketed) for gen lang]//phs st

Furthermore, an agent-based ethics need not be as human-centered as it first appears. Although it must focus on the character of the human agent, some strong environmental conclusions may follow from an agent-based ethics if it is possible to show that a failure to respond to the environment in certain ways constitutes a vice or that certain sorts of responses are virtuous. These virtues (and vices) need,not serve human ends. Even familiar virtues, such as kindness, which do contribute toward human happiness in an obvious fashion, often require that we respond in certain ways to circumstances around us and in this way may place demands upon us which are independent of human interests. For instance, kindness may require us to be kind to animals as well as people. t3 The anthropocentrism of virtue ethics, therefore, need only consist of the fact that its claims are claims upon human beings. Such anthropocentrism is a feature of any ethics. Using an agent-based virtue ethics, I argue that terraforming reveals in us two serious defects of character. First, it demonstrates that we are suffering from an ethically significant aesthetic insensitivity. We would become cosmic vandals. Second, it involves us in the sin of hubris. We show ourselves to be suffering from an excessive pride which blinds us to our own place in the world. In attempting to shape another planet, to our ends, we are seeking to become gods. I deal with each of these claims in turn. The first vice that terraforming would demonstrate in us is a reprehensible aesthetic insensitivity—on a massive scale. Destroying the unique natural landscape of an entire planet to turn it to our own purposes reveals us to be vandals and brutes. It shows that we lead impoverished lives, being unable to respond appropriately to the beauty which is in the world (and on the worlds) around us.14 The argument that the destruction of natural environments may reveal in us a problematic aesthetic insensitivity has been made before.15 What I wish to emphasize in my account, however, is that the virtue ethics I am applying allows that a vice may be demonstrated simply because of the character it reveals in the agent and regardless of any considerations of the consequences it may have. There are two cases which suggest that an aesthetic insensitivity is a vice that may render the destruction (or neglect) of beauty wrong simply in itself. First, the act of destroying beauty is itself reprehensible independent of any consequences that may flow from it. Even if the beauty destroyed would replace itself, it would still be wrong to destroy it precisely because doing so demonstrates an aesthetic insensitivity. This claim is best illustrated by use of an example. Consider a person who goes hiking in the Snowy Mountains early one morning and discovers, by the edge of a cutting, a stunning array of icicles, a thing of great beauty, formed when the creek which ran over the cutting at that point froze over. Moreolier, the hiker knows that this display is formed anew every night and occasionally disappears completely by the end of the day. [They] also knows that no one else will be hiking that path that day. Yet, isn't it still the case that if the hiker destroys the icicles, [they] will have demonstrated a significant defect of character and lessened him or herself as a person in doing so? The person who casually runs a stick across them, thus destroying them for no reason but a petty act of will, demonstrates an insensitivity to their beauty which is gross and disturbing. The destruction of the icicles suggests that the hiker has not seen them clearly. If the hiker had truly seen and comprehended their beauty, [they] could not have destroyed them. The fact that they were destroyed is not important here, except in that it points to the insensitivity of the vandal. What is significant is the blindness the hiker has displayed to beauty even though no one else may suffer

#### [3] Commodifying nature strips value away from our form – the correct way to respond to nature is to conform to it instead of restructuring it to fit us. Space colonization is just a method to conquer more parts of nature.

Lewis (C.S. Lewis, Clive Staples Lewis was a British writer and lay theologian. He held academic positions in English literature at both Oxford University and Cambridge University., 1943, accessed on 12-12-2021, Samizdat.qc, "The Abolition of Man", [http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/cosmos/philo/AbolitionofMan.pdf)[bracketed](http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/cosmos/philo/AbolitionofMan.pdf)%5bbracketed) for gen lang]//phs st

My point may be clearer to some if it is put in a different form. Nature is a word of varying meanings, which can best be understood if we consider its various opposites. The Natural is the opposite of the Artificial, the Civil, the Human, the Spiritual, and the Supernatural. The Artificial does not now concern us. If we take the rest of the list of opposites, however, I think we can get a rough idea of what men have meant by Nature and what it is they oppose to her. Nature seems to be the spatial and temporal, as distinct from what is less fully so or not so at all. She seems to be the world of quantity, as against the world of quality; of objects as against consciousness; of the bound, as against the wholly or partially autonomous; of that which knows no values as against that which both has and perceives value; of efficient causes (or, in some modern systems, of no causality at all) as against final causes. Now I take it that when we understand a thing analytically and then dominate and use it for our own convenience, we reduce it to the level of ‘Nature’ in the sense that we suspend our judgements of value about it, ignore its final cause (if any), and treat it in terms of quantity. This repression of elements in what would otherwise be our total reaction to it is sometimes very noticeable and even painful: something has to be overcome before we can cut up a dead [hu]man or a live animal in a dissecting room. These objects resist the movement of the mind whereby we thrust them into the world of mere Nature. But in other instances too, a similar price is exacted for our analytical knowledge and manipulative power, even if we have ceased to count it. We do not look at trees either as Dryads or as beautiful objects while we cut them into beams: the first man who did so may have felt the price keenly, and the bleeding trees in Virgil and Spenser may be faroff echoes of that primeval sense of impiety. The stars lost their divinity as astronomy developed, and the Dying God has no place in chemical agriculture. To many, no doubt, this process is simply the gradual discovery that the real world is different from what we expected, and the old opposition to Galileo or to ‘body-snatchers’ is simply obscurantism. But that is not the whole story. It is not the greatest of modern scientists who feel most sure that the object, stripped of its qualitative properties and reduced to mere quantity, is wholly real. Little scientists, and little unscientific followers of science, may think so. The great minds know very well that the object, so treated, is an artificial abstraction, that something of its reality has been lost. From this point of view the conquest of Nature appears in a new light. We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may ‘conquer’ them. We are always conquering Nature, because ‘Nature’ is the name for what we have, to some extent, conquered. The price of conquest is to treat a thing as mere Nature. Every conquest over Nature increases her domain. The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them: the soul does not become Nature till we can psychoanalyse her. The wresting of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things to Nature. As long as this process stops short of the final stage we may well hold that the gain outweighs the loss. But as soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed are one and the same. This is one of the many instances where to carry a principle to what seems its logical conclusion produces absurdity. It is like the famous Irishman who found that a certain kind of stove reduced his fuel bill by half and thence concluded that two stoves of the same kind would enable him to warm his house with no fuel at all. It is the magician’s bargain: give up our soul, get power in return. But once our souls, that is, ourselves, have been given up, the power thus conferred will not belong to us.