#### Volition, or the structure of the will, is a pre-condition for ethics and has intrinsic value – A) Proceduralism – the will is the mechanism by which every agent engages in any activity, which means regardless of the content of any ethical theory, the ability to will that theory is an intrinsic good B) Foundations – the will is the basis for what constitutes an ethical subject which means its relation to the world is the primary ethical consideration C) Motivation – the structure of the will is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject D) Identity – the nature of the will is most constitutive to the creation of the subject since it determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as an façade.

#### However, ethical theories to evaluate the will face a dilemma – they are either paternally objectivist to the extent they restrict the will, or they are weakened by subjectivism to the extent that it’s impossible to make true moral claims.

**Jaeggi 14,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. From the perspective of liberal theory one aspect of the critique of alienation appears problematic above all others: **theories of alienation appear to appeal to objective criteria that lie beyond the “sovereignty” of individuals to interpret for themselves what the good life consists in**. Herbert Marcuse exemplifies this tendency of many theories of alienation in One Dimensional Man—a book that provided a crucial impulse for the New Left’s critique of alienation in the 1960s and 1970s— when, unconcerned with the liberal objection, he defends the validity of diagnoses of alienation with respect to the increased integration and identification with social relations that characterize the members of affluent industrial societies: “I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion, but reality. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has become entirely objective; the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence.”10 The subjective satisfaction of those who are integrated into objectively alienated relations is, according to Marcuse, “a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood.”11 Here, however, the theory of alienation appears to have made itself immune to refutation. It would seem, then, that the concept of alienation belongs to **a perfectionist ethical theory that presupposes, broadly speaking, that it is possible to determine what is objectively good for humans by identifying a set of properties or a set of functions inherent in human nature—a “purpose”—that ought to be realized. But** if the foundation of modern morality and the fundamental conviction of liberal conceptions of society is the idea “that **it should be left to each individual how he lives his own life**” 12—that **individuals are sovereign with respect to interpreting their own lives—then a theory of alienation that relies on objective perfectionist ideals appears to reject this idea in favor of a paternalist perspective that claims to “know better.”** For the latter (and as seems to be the case for Marcuse), it is possible for something to count as objectively good for someone without him subjectively valuing it as such. By the same token, it is possible to criticize a form of life as alienated or false without there being any subjective perception of suffering. But can someone be alienated from herself in the sense outlined here if she herself fails to perceive it? Can we claim of someone that she is alienated from her own desires or driven by false (alienated) needs or that she pursues an alienated way of life if she claims to be living precisely the life she wants to lead? In diagnoses of alienation the question arises, then, whether there can be objective evidence of pathology that contradicts individuals’ subjective assessments or preferences. This is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. On the one hand, the concept of **alienation (this is what distinguishes it from weaker forms of critique) claims to be able to bring to individuals’ prima facie evaluations and preferences a deeper dimension of critique—a critical authority—that functions as a corrective to their own assertions**. On the other hand, it is not easy to justify the position of such a critical corrective. What could the objective criteria that overrule the assessments and preferences of individuals be in this case? 13 The arguments from human nature frequently appealed to in this context demonstrate, even in their most methodologically sophisticated, “thin” variants, the problems that plague attempts to derive normative standards from some conception of human nature. 14 **Even if there is**—in a banal sense—**something humans share on the basis of their natural, biological constitution, and even if**—in a banal sense—**certain functional needs can be derived from these basic presuppositions of human life** (all humans need nourishment or certain climatic conditions in order to survive), **these basic conditions imply very little when it comes to evaluating how humans, in relation to issues beyond mere survival, lead their lives**. On the other hand, the more human nature is given a specific content such that it becomes relevant to (culturally specific) forms of life, the more controversial and contestable the claims become. How are we to define human nature when its extraordinary variability and malleability appear to be part of human nature itself?15 And how are we to pick out among diverse forms of human life those that really correspond to human nature, given that even forms of life criticized as alienated have been in some way developed, advanced, and lived by human beings?

#### The only solution is a concept of alienation that understands the will in a functional capacity to relate to itself and the world – a criterion that is concerned with how one wills, rather than what one wills.

**Jaeggi 2,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. In “The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity” Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. A modern inquiry into the good life must, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer cannot “deny the autonomy and thus the interpretive sovereignty of those concerned,” and its method must be such that it avoids committing itself to a “specific and unjustifiable picture of the human being.”3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, it must be able to identify an objective criterion that allows us to say “whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their actual perceptions of their present or future well-being.” **What is needed**, then, **is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination**. Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psychological health. **Starting from** (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of “functional capacity,” he develops for psychological health a conception of **the “functional capacity of willing” and its possible impairment**.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent and unevaluated preferences are: “In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing.”5 With **the standard of the “impairment of the functional capacity of willing,”** which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat **has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions** of the sort he was looking for. **One could call such a position a “qualified subjectivism.”**6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition between modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipaternalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a “true volition” and therefore not subject to internal constraints. I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. **This criterion is**, in the first place, **formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular**; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. **It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills**. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.” Second**, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself**, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of **alienation can be linked up with this conception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be understood as obstructions of volition and thereby**—formulated more generally—**as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world**. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s command, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. FREEDOM AND ALIENATION My thesis is that **alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom**, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Berlin, **positive freedom**. 8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, **freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) to the capacity to realize valuable ends**. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not. 9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive freedom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can “link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine” are “instances of freedom.”11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, the concept of **alienation concerns itself with the complex conditions of “linking” one’s actions and desires** (or, more generally, one’s life) **with oneself, “counting them as due to” oneself, or making them “one’s own.”** It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already “with oneself;” one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitutive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, **the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination.**

#### That functional capacity of willing is mediated by social roles – as the authentic self is inexplicably linked to the self that engages in social communities with others through duplication. Understanding the functionality of the will is impossible in a vacuum.

**Jaeggi 3,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa.

The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: **roles are** less alienating than **constitutive for the development of persons** and personality. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “**The human being is always himself only in ‘doubling’ in relation to a role figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.**22 Roles on this view are not only necessary in order **to make social interaction possible**, whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” **interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself**. When Plessner speaks of a “doubling in relation to a role figure,” he **means that one depends on roles not only to become a “figure” of experience for others but also in order to become such a figure for oneself**. Plessner’s thesis that the human being is a Doppelgänger is grounded in a comprehensive theory of human nature that, beginning from the fundamental concept of “eccentric positionality,” is critical of every idea of immediacy or spontaneity.23 According to Plessner: The distance that the role creates in family life, as well as in one’s profession, work, or public offices, is the human being’s characteristic detour to his fellow human being; it is the means of his immediacy. Whoever wants to see in this an instance of selfalienation misunderstands the human essence and foists on it a possibility of existence such as animals have on the level of life or angels have on the spiritual level. . . . Only the human being appears as a Doppelgänger, on the outside in the figure of his role and on the inside, privately, as himself. 24 Although at first glance the talk of a Doppelgänger raises the suspicion that Plessner, too, is trapped in a model of doubling that relies on an opposition between authenticity and role behavior—between the inner and the outer—this suspicion turns out to be unwarranted: the Doppelgänger character of human beings is illusory because there are not two real entities there; **our character as a “double” is a construct. There is not an internal division here to be overcome; rather, doubling is constitutive of the human self.** “The human being cannot abolish his status as a Doppelgänger without negating his humanity. He cannot complain of this doubling and play it off against the ideal of an original oneness, **for I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself.** The human being gets a hold of himself in others. He encounters these others on a detour via roles, exactly as the others encounter him.”25 **If the other “gets a hold of himself” in the other, and if these two can encounter each other only through roles, then a self that is prior to or outside roles is a fiction.** When Plessner says that “I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself,”26 he is referring to a constitutive internal division that precedes all possible unity—**it points to the fact that one’s relation to oneself must also be conceived of as a certain kind of relation, namely, one mediated by a relation to the outside or to others.** Thus I am not “someone” already at the outset; **I can become someone only in relation to others and hence only via the roles in which we reciprocally encounter one another:** “The human being gets a hold of himself in others.” Behind all roles, then, there is nothing or, in any case, **there is no “authentic being” there. No matter where we look, behind roles we find nothing we can grab hold of except for more roles that one “plays before oneself and others.”** We could call this an onion conception of the self: there are various layers but no inner core.

#### This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself.

**Jaeggi 4,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa. What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. **In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation**—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—**means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it**. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. **In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves** in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. **It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own**. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. **This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them**, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. **In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed**. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are constantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept: the possibility of appropriating something refers, on the one hand, to a subject’s power to act and form and to impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent meaning and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (**Thus a role**, for example, **in order to be appropriated, must always be “found” as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch**. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is formable, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, “I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate.”14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of reappropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creation ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a **successful appropriation of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them**.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with non-alienated relations.

#### The role of the ballot and judge is to investigate the conditions that instigate alienation. Only this coheres the nature of who you are and prevents psychological violence.

#### Education must be oriented around reducing alienation and creating the potential for the oppressed and the individual to actively engage in the world. Cognition itself is impossible without active engagement. FRYMER 2:[[1]](#footnote-1)

The alienated condition of the oppressed necessitates a revolutionary pedagogy for humanization and critical consciousness. This pedagogy is no mere collection of methods or technical teaching skills to be applied within the framework of traditional schooling. It is impossible to separate Freire’s methodology from his philosophy and social theory of the dialectic of oppression and liberation. For Freire, the pedagogy of the oppressed must be consistently dialogical. Education for liberation cannot be imposed on or imparted to the oppressed; it can only be created with them in the process of humanization. Dialogical education is based on the assumption that human beings are potentially active, conscious agents capable of knowing and transforming the worlds they live in. Drawing upon Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Jaspers, Freire argues that libratory pedagogy must recognize that students can learn to think actively, and with intentionality and purpose—in other words, with a critical consciousness. Cognition for Freire is not passive or unfocused but always a part of our actions in the world and our intentions to carry out acts in the situations we confront. Corresponding to this unique feature of human being, Freire advocates a critical and dialogical education that poses problems for students. Teacher and students work together as equals to actively solve problems about the nature of social reality and, in the process, to change it. If consciousness is intentional and active, authentic education cannot be based on depositing facts into it, or what Freire termed “banking education.” For Freire, the banking notion of education is motivated not by a concern for the student, but by a kind of interest in death—of the self, of the critical faculty of consciousness, and therefore of the soul.

#### Impact calc: 1. There are four types of alienating relations: A) Objectification – treating an agent with normative potential as a passive object B) Standardization – Enforcing one particular way to engage in a role such that the subject has no interpretive leeway C) Fixation – preventing the acquisition of new experiences within a particular role rather than fostering the development of an agent and D) Over-identification – allowing the portrayal of a particular role to over-identify you as merely that role.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### [1] Action theory – only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentions can hold agents culpable and decipher the difference between actions and wishes.

**Small No Date,** Will Small, *Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action,* UChicago//Scopa **Aspiring to do something differs from merely wishing** for some state of affairs or event to obtain or transpire. As Anscombe notes, **“[a] chief mark of an idle wish is that a man does nothing**—whether he could or no—**towards the fulfilment of the wish”** (63, §36).Even though **a mere** or idle **wish** represents its object as in some sense good, it **does not amount to practical thought because it has no inner tendency towards action, which is what practical thought is ultimately for.**³²By contrast, just as an intention has the inner tendency to further articulate and re-articulate itself in action, so an aspiration has the inner tendency to articulate itself such that it becomes an intention. This articulation too is the work of practical reasoning: **an agent’s aspiration can become an intention, by his coming up with a plan**—by reasoning from the end which is at a distance, to an immediate means that he can take. **This inner tendency towards such articulation**—an inner tendency towards perfecting itself in action and practical knowledge—**is what marks practical thought out as rationally efficacious;** that is, **as practical.** It is in the nature of the thought ‘I want (aspire, intend) doing A’ and realizes that articulation in action and practical knowledge: ‘I am doing D by doing C by doing B by doing A’. Such inner efficacy is absent in mere wish”

#### [2] Performativity – Every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.

#### [3] Solves oppression – A) Universality – The structure of the will is a basis for justifying why all agents are normatively equivalent which undermines the ideology underlying all forms of violence B) Empowerment – it ensures agents view themselves as active which motivates agents to combat systems of oppression rather than viewing themselves as passive objects C) Explanatory power – oppression operates through the alienation of oneself from the world through various categories of relations D) Movement building – it’s normativity can explain why oppression is wrong and convince others to agree through rigorous explanation that impact justified frameworks can’t provide.

### Contention

#### I defend that a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike through coercive tactics as outlined in Gourevitch. I’ll defend the resolution as a general principle and PICS don’t negate because they just steal aff ground. I’ll spec whatever you want me to in CX as long as it doesn’t force me to abandon my maximum.

#### [1] The aff rectifies conditions of alienation:

#### [A] Objectification – coercive strikes are intrinsic expressions of collective appropriation and self-determination that are key to resist capitalist oppression and self-alienation due to worker passivity - that comes first

**Gourevitch ‘18** [Alex, associate professor of political science at Brown University and the author of From Slavery To the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century. “A Radical Defense of the Right to Strike,” (Jacobin), https://jacobinmag.com/2018/07/right-to-strike-freedom-civil-liberties-oppression.] BXNK

**Workers have an interest in resisting the oppression of class society by using their collective power to reduce, or even overcome, that oppression**. Their interest is a liberty interest in a double sense. First, **resistance to** that **class-based oppression carries** with it, at least implicitly, a **demand for freedoms not yet enjoyed**. A higher wage expands workers’ freedom of choice. Expanded labor rights increase workers’ collective freedom to influence the terms of employment. Whatever the concrete set of issues, workers’ strike demands are **always also** a demand for control over portions of one’s life that they do not yet enjoy. Second, strikes don’t just aim at winning more freedom — they are themselves expressions of freedom. When workers walk out, they’re using their own individual and collective agency to win the liberties they deserve. The same capacity for self-determination that workers invoke to demand more freedom is the capacity they exercise when winning their demands. Freedom, not industrial stability or simply higher living standards, is the name of their desire. Put differently, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to freedom**. It has intrinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self-emancipation. And it has instrumental value insofar as the strike is an effective means for resisting the oppressiveness of a class society and achieving new freedoms**. But if all this is correct, and the right to strike is something that we should defend, then it also has to be meaningful. The right loses its connection to workers’ freedom if they have little chance of exercising it effectively. Otherwise they’re simply engaging in a symbolic act of defiance — laudable, perhaps, but not a tangible means of fighting oppression. The right to strike must therefore cover at least some of the coercive tactics that make strikes potent, like sit-downs and mass pickets. It is therefore often perfectly justified for strikers to exercise their right to strike by using these tactics, even when these tactics are illegal. Still, the question remains: why should the right to strike be given moral priority over other basic liberties? The reason is not just that liberal capitalism produces economic oppression but that the economic oppression that workers face is in part created and sustained by the very economic and civil liberties that liberal capitalism cherishes. Workers find themselves oppressed because of the way property rights, freedom of contract, corporate authority, and tax and labor law operate. Deeming these liberties inviolable doesn’t foster less oppressive, exploitative outcomes, as its defenders insist — quite the opposite. The right to strike has a stronger claim to be protecting a zone of activity that serves the aims of justice itself — coercing people into relations of less oppressive social cooperation. Simply put, to argue for the right to strike is to prioritize democratic freedoms over property rights. Which Side Are You On? Skeptics might still object that the right to strike is the wrong answer to the facts of oppression. Isn’t the proper response to push for altogether different social policies — like a universal basic income, workplace democracy, and socialized means of production — that would eliminate oppression? Why bother with the chaos and collateral injustice that strikes often unleash? The short answer is that this is a non **sequitur. The question for us is, “Given the facts of oppression, what may those who suffer it do to resist it?” It does no good to ask, instead, “What would the ideal, or at least reasonably just, society look like?**” The latter is its own question, but as a response to our question it is unacceptably quietist. It verges on arguing that those who are oppressed must suffer until utopia becomes possible. And anyhow, utopia [only becomes possible](https://catalyst-journal.com/vol1/no4/the-basic-income-illusion) when the many have taken it upon themselves to exercise their own collective power to demand that utopia. One might also object that it sounds like I am saying there are no restraints on what strikers may do. I am not saying that either. My point is to explain why a specific set of coercive strike tactics, which have been the centerpiece of the strike repertoire whenever the majority of workers have had it in their mind to walk out, are not limited by the requirement to respect those economic liberties that they violate. There are all kinds of things strikers shouldn’t do just to win a strike. But that is a complex and separate problem of political ethics — and it is one that we can only tackle once we have first acknowledged the shortcomings of liberal capitalism and the prevailing political morality that surrounds it. The stakes of all of this are high**. If one does not agree that workers are generally justified in engaging in mass, disruptive, and unlawful activity as part of exercising the right to strike, then one is committed to arguing that the state is justified in violently suppressing strikes — a violence with a** [**long**](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100529240) **and** [**bloody**](https://www.amazon.com/Labor-Wars-Maguires-Workers-Memorial/dp/1931859701)[**history**](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/div-classtitlepolice-work-the-centrality-of-labor-repression-in-american-political-historydiv/7DF60C0EBD68C32C500D28EF215D765B). Some might very well draw that latter conclusion. But they should be clear about which side they’re choosing. Either workers are justified in resisting the use of legal violence to suppress their strikes, or the state is justified in violently suppressing coercive strike tactics. No amount of dressed-up rhetoric about liberty and justice for all can shroud that inescapable fact.

#### [B] Through labor, one becomes alien to the rest of the world since your life becomes meaningless once you orient yourself towards private property. Setting up a system of property like that in the neg world entails that individuals are separated from their projects by the property they have. MARX 44:

Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Karl Marx “Estranged Labour”

All these consequences are implied in the statement that the worker is related to the product of labor as to an alien object. For on this premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he [the agent] creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself – his inner world – becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his life into the object; but now his [their] life no longer belongs to [the worker] him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the more the worker lacks objects. Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he himself. The alienation of the worker in his [their] product means not only that his [their] labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside [them] him, independently, as something alien to [them] him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien. ||XXIII/ Let us now look more closely at the objectification, at the production of the worker; and in it at the estrangement, the loss of the object, of his product. The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is the material on which his labor is realized, in which it is active, from which, and by means of which it produces. But just as nature provides labor with [the] means of life in the sense that labor cannot live without objects on which to operate, on the other hand, it also provides the means of life in the more restricted sense, i.e., the means for the physical subsistence of the worker himself. Thus the more the worker by his labor appropriates the external world, sensuous nature, the more he deprives himself [themselves] of the means of life in two respects: first, in that the sensuous external world more and more ceases to be an object belonging to his labor – to be his labor’s means of life; and, second, in that it more and more ceases to be a means of life in the immediate sense, means for the physical subsistence of the worker. In both respects, therefore, the worker becomes a servant of his object, first, in that he receives an object of labor, i.e., in that he receives work, and, secondly, in that he receives means of subsistence. This enables him to exist, first as a worker; and second, as a physical subject. The height of this servitude is that it is only as a worker that he can maintain himself as a physical subject and that it is only as a physical subject that he is a worker. (According to the economic laws the estrangement of the worker in his object is expressed thus: the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the more powerful labor becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the more ingenious labor becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature’s slave.) Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labor by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labor) and production. It is true that labor produces for the rich wonderful things – but for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces – but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty – but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labor by machines, but it throws one section of the workers back into barbarous types of labor and it turns the other section into a machine. It produces intelligence – but for the worker, stupidity, cretinism. The direct relationship of labor to its products is the relationship of the worker to the objects of his production. The relationship of the man of means to the objects of production and to production itself is only a consequence of this first relationship – and confirms it. We shall consider this other aspect later. When we ask, then, what is the essential relationship of labor we are asking about the relationship of the worker to production. Till now we have been considering the estrangement, the alienation of the worker only in one of its aspects , i.e., the worker’s relationship to the products of his labor. But the estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity, itself. How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of labor is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the estrangement of the object of labor is merely summarized the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labor itself.

#### This outweighs – having everything around one non-alienated doesn’t solve alienation, but rather, one must be able to identify with the alien events that happen around the self. You can be denied certain ends, but you can’t be denied the ability to pursue ends at all.

Rahel Jaeggi 7 (August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory.

There must be, then, a distinction between alienating and nonalienating situations where one has lost control or where the results of our actions take on an independent existence in relation to us. This distinction can be located [on whether], on the one hand, in one’s later attitude to the events in question: one can reject or accept them; one can identify (or not) after the fact with events that had a dynamic of their own. On the other hand, we can also locate the distinction in different ways of participating in events that have taken on an independent existence. The idea of a self’s being “present” (or “present to itself”) at least hints at the relevant point here: there can be degrees of identification with events for which the self is not entirely responsible that depend not on the amount of control one has over them but on the greater or lesser extent to which one is present in them.22 (One is then “taken in” by the situation, absorbed in it; one forgets oneself in it, in contrast to the distance that characterizes the young man of our example.) According to this analysis, then, not every case in which the results of actions have taken on an independent existence and not every uncontrollable dynamic of life events is alienating per se. We have seen that the question of whether a life takes on an independent existence in an alienating manner is not decided by whether it is in every respect self-structured, controlled, or predictable but rather on whether the part of it that is outside one’s command can be appropriated in a certain way. The theme of appropriation here (as set out in chapter 1) is supposed to bring out the point that having something at one’s command, “putting oneself in relation to something,” or being able to identify with something does not depend on understanding that something as—in Marx’s sense—the product of one’s own activity. Rather, it is a question of whether or not one can appropriate the events that determine our lives, especially when they are not steered or controlled by us, where they are not “placed into the world” by us. The process of externalization and reappropriation at issue here is perhaps best thought of as a process of “balancing out”: every decision, every action sets processes in motion or produces results that may at first be alien and can be made our own only by (re)appropriating them. What is one’s own, then, is not necessarily something one has produced or directed oneself; the result of an act of appropriation does not consist only of something that was previously one’s own. Having an appropriating relation to the (uncontrollable) events of one’s own life means that one must be able to bring oneself into an affirmative relation to what is alien or uncontrollable. Alienation is not the foreignness (or the becoming foreign) per se of the results of actions but rather an interruption or disturbance of the process in which actions produce (uncontrollable) results to which one then establishes a relation of reappropriation. The concept of appropriation is well-suited for illustrating the practical character of this process. Appropriation is not a matter of making a choice from a disengaged or objective standpoint, nor is it a matter of merely rejecting or agreeing to the result of an action. What I have called balancing out does not depend on weighing things from an external perspective; it is a process in which one is involved. The process of appropriation is not made up only of cognitive elements, and it is not subject only to the will. Not every- thing one might like to be can actually be made one’s own. Appropriation is a process of learning and experience in which the relation between freedom and uncontrollability is negotiated. Conversely, alienation is a halting of this process.

er them.

1. Frymer, Benjamin. 2005 “Friere, Aleination and Contemporary Youth: Toward a Pedagogy of Everyday Life [↑](#footnote-ref-1)