#### Outer space is an extension of sovereignty’s control, a “state of exception” – this month’s resolution neglects them as an integral part of the biopolitical loop of violence.

#### But hey… that just means the system is working as intended. :^)

[Ryan](https://books.google.com/books?id=axeEzHuHRbUC&pg=PA36&lpg=PA36&dq=agamben+AND+police+AND+liberalism+AND+reform&source=bl&ots=MFArf47ADx&sig=ACfU3U0-4357l8eFZwrPuTzAYey-TyNtyw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjssqir4bbpAhUZXM0KHUOPA1IQ6AEwAXoECF0QAQ" \l "v=onepage&q=agamben%20AND%20police%20AND%20liberalism%20AND%20reform&f=false) 11 – Barry J. Ryan is a Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy at Keele University, UK (“Statebuilding, Security-Sector Reform and the Liberal Peace: The Freedom of Security,” Routledge, p. 35-38, 3/31/11) //LM <3

The distinction between what is reasonable and what is excessive, according to one study, is impossible to measure (Alpert and Smith 1994). Importantly, as the authors report, in light of the difficulty of measuring the 'reasonable man' (not distinguishing between the mason of the police officer and the mason of the suspect), 'what is reasonable has become what is necessary' (Alpert and Smith 1994: 486). What we deduce from this finding is that reasonable force and necessary force are equivalent techniques of exerting (and increasing) state power in a manner that is considered to be principled. As Michael Dillon (2009: 38) has memorably put it: 'the cry of "unfair" has to contend with the reply "it works"'. The raison d’etat implicitly becomes an act of persuasion that carries with it the threat of extinction.' This impels us towards the conjecture that the system Foucault termed the rule of law approach carries within it an exemption clause that binds it to its predecessor; the police state approach to rule. It informs us that encoded within the norm lies the exception, within the principle the contingent, within reason a necessary violence.

The practice of reasonable force not only informs police operations, but also underpins the entire liberal statebuilding security apparatus. Consequently, one could argue that reasonable force is the primary source of liberal power, in the domestic and international spheres. Reasonable force ultimately enables liberalism to collapse any distinction between these spheres in the name of the law. Reasonable force transcends the division between what is inside and what is outside. Moreover, it shows that the traditional distinction between hard power and soft power is misleading. Hard power — the use or threat of force — is embed-ded within soft power (reason) strategies. In order to illustrate this further we must first return to Hannah Arendt's commentary on the relationship between power and legality, where she observes that:

The limitations of the law are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from within the body politic, just as the boundaries of the territory are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from without. (Arendt 1998: 191)

In other words, Arendt is pointing out that the exception is encoded within the doctrine of law. As Carl Schmitt explained, all law is situational law. Political order must be established for juridical order to make sense (Schmitt 2005: 13). Faced with the irrational, or with an alternative political rationality, the law admits exceptional measures to occur so that 'chaos' might once again be tamed and events be made calculable and decidable. This distinction embedded within the law between what is rational and what is irrational is drawn out in Giorgio Agamben's writings as core to the relation between interiority and exteriority, nomos and physis (Agamben 1998). The external 'other', that which defies the rational order, is included by the law's tendency to suspend itself and condone violence so that order can be (re)established. When order is to be established the law retreats only to be assert itself once again when the new order requires legitimation. Thus the proverb, 'nobody is beyond the law', informs us that the rule of law is a political construct of sovereignty that can regulate the lives of the entire population — both friends and the enemies. When Arendt calls it unreliable, she is pointing out that the law demarcates the arbitrariness of one's position as an 'insider' or as an 'outsider'. This essential ambiguity of the law constitutes, for Agamben, the 'force of law' as embodied by 'the capacity of law to maintain itself in relation to exteriority' (Agambcn 1998: 18). Law survives by allowing its (apparent) antithesis — violence — to subsist within it.

Jacques Derrida has similarly observed that the 'force of law' resides in the sense that law maintains 'a more internal, more complex relation with what one calls force, power or violence' (Derrida 1990: 941). Derrida draws on Pascal to observe that the law cannot function without force, that the law is always an authorized force. Distinguishing between one's sense of what is just or unjust with legal rational authority, Derrida advises that we obey laws because they are the law and that anyone who obeys them because they are just is not obeying them the way one ought to (Edkins 1999: 81). The law is what is necessary and justice always requires force in order to be enforced. This binding of rationality and force enables us to reconsider the 'age-old Aristotelian opposites of deliber-ation and action ... as two distinct forms' whereby the legal form is approached through deliberation while action is approached by technical formation (Schmitt 2005: 28). By maintaining that violent action is inherent within the form of law, a sense of continuity is more readily evincible between reasoning and enforcing. In fact, it is in the very relation between the mind and the body; in the consensus between the sovereign and its society, or the relation between rationality (logos) and action (force) that the powerful force of the law is best analysed It is in this continuum between reason and force, embedded in legal order, which we wish to illustrate as being foundational to liberal strategies of police power.

Walter Benjamin, who lived and died in exceptional circumstances, was a keen observer of the coherence between police power and violence. In his 'Cri-tique of Violence' (2006), force is portrayed as the ultimo ratio of modern political rationality. For Benjamin, violence is the ultimate action and as a means of rule is either law-making or law-preserving. Benjamin focuses on police 'law', or police violence, as the 'force' of law acting on behalf of a law that has retreated or in a space the law has not yet reached. In this space of exception, the police is unconstrained in the means it can adopt to reassert the primacy of the legal—rational order. His observation on police violence suggests that the police is an extension of the powers exercised by the rule of law — police violence is always justified as reasonable and/or necessary for security purposes. The police can fulfil for the state what cannot be accomplished in the rule of law model of liberal governance. In effect to apply Benjamin is to reiterate that the liberal ideal of a rule of law state, so central to the practice of statebuilding, contains within it the liberal horror of the police state, as principle is subservient to contingency:

#### **Dominating outer space has become the sovereign’s next step—to secure itself from its challengees, to privatise this new state of exception, to further feed the murderous, neoliberal machine within. :^(**

MacDonald, 2007 (Fraser Macdonaldschool Of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University Of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia, Fraserm@Unimelb.Edu.Au, 10-1-2007, "Anti-Astropolitik — outer space and the orbit of geography," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0309132507081492?journalCode=phgb)/kaichen

Second, space is becoming ordinary. Spacebased technology is routinely reconfi guring our experience of home, work, education and healthcare through applications in the transport, telecommunications, agricultural and energy sectors (Rumsfeld, 2001). Our everyday lives already extend to the outerEarth in ways that we entirely take for granted. America’s Global Positioning System (GPS), for instance, has become essential to the regular functioning of a variety of machines from bank tellers to supertankers. The spacebased science of weather forecasting is now integrated into the day-to-day management of domestic and national affairs. Satellite-based telecommunications, particularly international and cellular telephony, are a mundane part of everyday life in the west (see Warf, 2006). More obvious, perhaps, are the technical advances in space-enabled warfare that have inspired recent American military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq (Graham, 2004; Gray, 2005). Following in the vapour trails of the United States, Europe, Russia and China are also trying to extend their sovereignty into outer space. As I will go on to discuss, terrestrial geopolitics are increasingly being determined by extraterrestrial strategic considerations. More abstractly, I want to argue that through space exploration we are forging new subjectivities and new forms of sociality here on earth (Stern, 2000; Shaw, 2004). Space is a modality for hypermobile information which, in combination with advanced technologies of ‘software-sorting’ (Graham, 2005a), has enabled a wider ‘automatic production of space’ (Thrift and French, 2002; see also Dodge and Kitchin, 2005). Above all, I will make the case that outer space is the next frontier for military–neoliberal hegemony, as an earlier conception of space as common property, enshrined in the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty (OST), becomes subject to renegotiation. In place of the OST is the prospect of a new space regime, as transformative in its own way as the Bretton Woods consensus, that would oversee the privatization of space resources in the narrow interests of a global elite. Moreover, it is this conquest of space, I will argue, that underwrites much of the dynamic technological shaping and reshaping of Earthly environments recently discussed by Nigel Thrift (2005a).

#### Operativity as an ontological paradigm deprives humans of any meaningful being outside of formless substance, in turn reducing life to its bare, pure functionality. The unthinking commitment to maximizing life itself only serves to reproduce historical horrors. >:^(

**Colebrook ’16** (Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Pennsylvania State University, “Agamben,” pg. 23 - 26, *Emory Debate*)

This concept at once points back to what Agamben deems to be the two theories of being that characterize the West - the ontology of **being**, versus the ontology of **"having to be"** - at the same time as it explains some of our most horrific contemporary problems. There was, Agamben argues, a transition from a" classical" ontology that acknowledged some sense of being that was distinct (however problematically) from acting - a distinction between being and praxis - toward a **modern ontology of operativity** or effectuation, where being is nothing other than its fulfillment or unfolding. Christian thought had always maintained a relation of mystery toward the distance between God and his action or ministry, but this difficult distinction is increasingly covered over and being becomes nothing more than operation or effect:

One can say then that what is at stake in both the conception of the Trinity as an economy and that of the liturgy as a mystery is the constitution of an ontology of the effectus, in which potency and act, being and acting are distinct and, at the same time, articulated through a threshold of indiscernibility. To what extent this effective ontology, which has progressively taken the place of classical ontology, is the root of our conception of being - to what extent, that is to say, we do not have at our disposal any experience of being other than operativity - this is the hypothesis that all genealogical research on modernity will have to confront. (OD: 55)

One of the claims of Nazi Germany's **SS officers** was that their commitment of war crimes followed from simply doing their duty; it is as though who they were, or their being (an officer), was identical to a will that accepted the duties by which it was defined. It is as though being and acting require the acceptance of an **external** or transcendent **form** and **law**. At a more everyday level we might think that the horror of the twenty-first century lies in the notion that who we are is defined by what we do, and that a good life is one in which one dutifully obeys the implicit imperatives of one's job: "I was only doing my job ... " We also tend not to **value** life that is **not operational** (abandoning "the" unemployed, persons without papers, or those who do not possess a distinct identity), and yet this **bare life** is increasingly exposed and **pervasive**. All humans now potentially experience themselves precisely as bare life, as nothing more than **substance** that has no form unless it is recognized as worker, citizen, or some other proper human mode of being. How is it that we have come to think of ourselves as defined by what we do, with our will in turn being commanded to follow who we are? We become **nothing** more than **operations** or **functions** of the office we hold. To think of totalitarianism and the genocides of the past 100 years as having nothing to do with the Western tradition of theology and politics is, for Agamben, a laziness that **could cost us our future**. To think of the same atrocities as opposed to modem democracy and consumerism is similarly erroneous: democratic hedonism, and the notion of each individual in the polity becoming what he ought to be by maximizing his [their] **potential**, has the same unthinking commitment to will as the totalitarian structure that defines individuals as nothing more than beings who exist to **fulfill the duty of "the law."** The law, increasingly, becomes less and less about what is deemed to be lawful and instead becomes something like pure law, acting only to maintain itself without any end outside itself. Submission as such - or simply that there be law - becomes an end unto itself:

what is at stake is to understand that if the aberrant idea of an action carried out only for the sake of duty (that is, in obedience to a command, and not for- the sake of natural inclination) was able to penetrate into ethics and impose itself there, this is only because the Church, by means of a centuries-long praxis and theorization, had elaborated duty or office as a model of the highest human. activity. (OD: 112) - '

Agamben' s questioning of the will as that aspect of the self that defines us by making us necessarily become who we ought to be is not only opposed to a Western philosophical and political tradition committed to a privileging of the full actualization of force; it also provides. a stark contrast with many forms of contemporary theory and popular culture. Postmodemism - both in theory and popular culture - frequently celebrates the self as being nothing other than pure performance, or the roles freely adopted and taken to be definitive of who one is; one might say that both identity politics (where one speaks "as a" decided upon persona), modern advertising that exploits each of us becoming who we want to be by fully exercising consumer freedom, and the increasing power of a law that has no definitive being, and no relation to definitive being, other than exercising itself, are all aspects of what Agamben defines as **an operative ontology**. What something is is what it ought to become; the passage to actuality or achievement of an end that is nothing but that full actualization is all that matters (**doing one's duty**, **obeying the law**, being a **self-willing subject**). For Agamben, the question for the present is not simply one of retrieving some completely other space or utopia outside this problematic relation between being and acting, but rather of embracing the problem as a problem. Could we imagine a new polity or community, not as a collection of wills that produces a social whole in one actualizing force of pure self-creation, but a polity that could be poised between being and coming into being? What if we were neither impelled to maximize our full potential (become the willing, self-creating beings we ought to be) nor simply managed or determined as beings who were already fully realized (as in the worst cases of genetic or biological determinism)? Agamben tries to find a way between liberalism (where we are nothing but pure will, and where the only valuable life is one of work and efficiency) and the crisis of liberalism (where we are nothing but mere life subject to the force of law that manages us as so much living substance, and where we become nothing more than passive spectators).

The overall grand claim we need to confront in Agamben' s work is the necessity of thinking, and then the restoration of thinking to a life that is no longer set outside the will or the mind as mere means. What appear to be the **most brutal events** of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries - ranging from the Nazi death camps to Guantanamo Bay - cannot be truly understood without an analysis of the ways in which our political values have been generated from a past that we have yet to comprehend. The rethinking of the present requires a confrontation with a theological past, but this is not because of some texts that happen to have a dominant influence. Agamben is not claiming that we maintain ideas, ideologies, or beliefs from a past that we simply need to reread critically; he is not making a claim for an analysis of Plato, the Bible, or the supposedly founding texts of liberal political theory. On the contrary, often the sources Agamben draws upon are seemingly minor, but they express an ongoing problem or aporia that is continually articulated because of a deeper political problem of the human being as an animal who speaks. Speaking is at once our essential condition, and yet this /1 essence" both distances us from ourselves and places us in relation to our own animality, which can never be rendered meaningful or fully articulated:

uniquely among living things, man is not limited to acquiring language as one capacity among others that he is given but has made of it his specific potentiality; he has, that is to say, put his very nature at stake in language. Just as, in the words of Foucault, man "is an animal whose politics places his living being in question," . . . so also is he the living being whose language places his life in question. (SL: 68-9)

#### Therefore, we affirm: the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### An ethics of openness comes first—our last stance in the world of morals. There can be no authentic community organized by exclusion. Instead, incentivize profane communities and allow for the “whatever being” to emerge.

**Prozorov ’14** (Sergei Prozorov, Professor of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki, “Agamben and Politics”, Edinburgh University Press, pg. 74 - 80, \*gendered pronouns substituted, *Emory Debate*)

We do not have **the slightest idea** of what either a **people** or a **language** is. It is well known that linguistics can construct a grammar – that is, a unitary system with describable characteristics that could be called language – only by taking the factum loquendi, a fact that is still inaccessible to science – for granted. [In turn,] **political theory** must presuppose, without the ability to explain it, the factum pluralitatis – with which I would like to indicate the simple fact that human beings form a community – whereas linguistics must presuppose, without questioning it, the factum loquendi. The simple correspondence between these two facts defines modern political discourse. (Agamben 2000: 66)

Just as the factum loquendi is negated and maintained in this negated state as the foundation of particular languages, so the factum pluralitatis, which refers to the sheer existence of the **multiplicity** of (human) beings with no **criterion** of belonging or exclusion, is converted into the ineffable foundation for multiple communities structured precisely according to these criteria. And yet the phenomenon of nihilism, already well familiar to us, makes sure that these particular communities can no longer maintain the illusions of either consistency or closure. For Agamben, the ultimate symptom of the falsity of all particular communities or ‘peoples’ is their dependence on the power of the state: ‘All well-meaning chatter notwithstanding, the idea of **a people** today is nothing other than the **empty** support of state identity and is recognized only as such’ (ibid.: 67). Just as the people without a state makes no sense and has no rights, so a language lacking ‘state dignity’ (Catalan, Basque, Gaelic) is treated as a dialect or a jargon. Yet this only means that in the **absence** of state support, ‘all peoples are Gypsies and all languages are jargons’ (ibid.: 68), there being nothing in particular languages and communities themselves to authorise any greater dignity. In Agamben’s reading, then, particularism in language and politics only serves to subject the potentiality of human existence to apparatuses and traditions that are already devoid of all sense:

The plurality of nations and the numerous historical languages are the false callings by which [**humanity**] ~~man~~ attempts to respond to [**its**] ~~his~~ intolerable absence of voice: or, if one prefers, they are the attempts, fatally come to nothing, to make **graspable** the **ungraspable**, to become – this eternal child – an adult. Only on the day when the **original** **infantile openness** is truly, dizzyingly taken up as such, will ~~men~~ [**humanity**] be able finally to construct a history and language that are universal and **no longer deferrable**, and stop their wandering through traditions. This authentic recalling of humanity to the infantile soma is called thought – that is, **politics**. (Agamben 1995: 98)

In this manner, Agamben’s philosophy of language is directly and immediately converted into political thought, or, rather into ‘thought as politics’. If the factum loquendi can be brought to speech in any speech act whatsoever in the experience of infancy, then the factum pluralitatis, which lies at the foundation of every particular community, may also be ‘taken up as such’ as the sole substance of a com- munity that has abandoned all presuppositions:

There can be **no true** human **community** on the basis of a **presupposition** – be it a nation, a language, or even the a priori of communication of which hermeneutics speaks. What **unites** human **beings** among themselves is not a nature, a voice or a common experience in a signifying language; it is the **vision of language itself** and therefore the experience of language’s limits, its end. A **true community can only be a community that is not presupposed**. (Agamben 1999b: 47; emphasis original)

Agamben’s explicit theorisation of this community begins with the introduction of two key notions: ‘being-thus’ and ‘whatever being’. While both concepts continue to puzzle many commentators, our preceding discussion makes them instantly recognisable as ontological equivalents of the ‘thing itself’ of language. **Whatever being** is a **being** that appears solely in its being, subtracted from all its **positive predicates**, be they gender, colour, profession, political or sexual preferences. Since, in Kant’s famous expression, ‘being is not a real predicate’ (Kant 2008 [1781]: 504; cf. Heidegger 1998: 337–63, 1962: 127), the subtraction of a being from all real predicates leaves it with nothing but its **being itself**, the sheer facticity of its existence.

Exposure, in other words being-such-as, is not any of the real predicates (being red, hot, small, smooth, etc.), but neither is it other than these (otherwise it would be something else added to the concept of a thing and therefore still a real predicate). That you are exposed is not one of your qualities, but neither is it other than them (we could say, in fact, that it is none-other than them). (Agamben 1993a: 96)

We must emphasize that in their exposure ‘whatever beings’ do not discard or destroy their positive predicates, just as the ecstatic character of the existence of Dasein in Heidegger consists in ‘exiting’ from itself without ‘abandoning’ itself (Heidegger, 1995: 365). Yet even though these beings retain their predicates, they are **no longer definable through them**: being-thus is ‘neither this nor that, neither thus nor thus, but thus, as it is, with all its predicates (all its predicates is not a predicate)’ (Agamben 1993a: 93). In other words, whatever beings undergo neither a deprivation (of the old identity) nor a transformation (into a new one), but solely the exposure of the sheer fact that they are in the **absence of** any identification of what they are.

By virtue of this **becoming inoperative** of all particular identities, the members of this community share nothing else but the very fact of their being, their **being-as-they-are**, whatever they are. In 1986 Jean-Luc Nancy, a philosopher perhaps closest to Agamben among contemporary continental thinkers, published a book entitled Inoperative Community (1991). Although Agamben’s The Coming Community, published four years later, does not refer explicitly to Nancy’s work, there are numerous parallels with Nancy’s argument, particularly with regard to the idea of inoperativity as the key to the overcoming of the dangers of **exclusion**, violence and **totalitarianism** that the very notion of community became associated with during the twentieth century. Both Nancy and Agamben emphasise the need to separate the idea of community from anything like a **political project** that would realise its essence by **dominating**, excluding or eliminating the **inessential**, the false or the alien. Evidently the community of whatever being, whose members’ positive identities are deactivated, can only be inoperative, since there is no longer anything in which its ‘**work’** or ‘**task’** **could be grounded**. For both Agamben and Nancy, this inoperative condition marks not the end but the **very beginning of ethical life**, which, to be worthy of the name, must be entirely dissociated from any **teleological tasks** and identitarian predicates.

There is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realise. This is the only reason why something like **ethics** can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible – there would be only tasks to be done. (Agamben 1993a: 42)

The only possible ethical injunction that could be formulated in the inoperative community is to persist in ‘being (one’s own) potential- ity, of being (one’s own) possibility’ rather than to actualise (and hence exhaust) this potentiality in the form of a positive identity, which would be equivalent to a passage into a ‘deficit of existence’ (ibid.: 44).

The immediately political stakes of this ethics of inoperative potentiality are made explicit in ‘Tiananmen’, the moving concluding fragment of The Coming Community:

Whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own being-in-language, and thus rejects all identity and every condition of belonging, is the **principal enemy** of **the State**. Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common, there **will be a Tiananmen**, and sooner or later tanks will appear. (Ibid.: 86)

For Agamben, what is absolutely threatening to the state, what the state ‘cannot tolerate in any way’ is not any particular claim for identity, which can always be recognised or conceded, but rather the possibility of human beings co-belonging in the absence of any identity: ‘A being radically devoid of any representable identity would be absolutely irrelevant to the State’ (ibid.: 85). Contrary to the Hegelian emphasis on the struggle for recognition that continues to define most contemporary political theories, the key political problem for Agamben is not the recognition of an identity but rather the affirmation of the radical heterogeneity or non-identity between the state (or any other apparatus of government) and the inoperative community of whatever beings:

The novelty of the **coming politics** is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or **control** of the State, but a struggle between the State and the non-State (**humanity**), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization. This has nothing to do with the simple affirmation of the social in opposition to the State that has often found expression in the protest movements of recent years. Whatever singularities cannot form a societas, because they do not possess any identity to vindicate any bond to belonging for which to seek recognition. (Ibid.: 86)

Thus Agamben posits as the key antagonism of contemporary politics a conflict between the governmental logic of the state and other apparatuses that capture human existence and transform its potentiality into a set of positive identities and the generic ‘what-ever community’, whose only foundation is the factum pluralitatis of being-in-common and which never attains an institutional form. This antagonism may therefore not be formulated in the classical terms of the **friend-enemy** distinction, posited by Schmitt (1976) as the essence of the political. While the latter distinction presupposes a strong degree of symmetry between friend and enemy, which must be homologous or commensurable figures for their enmity to make sense, the antagonism between apparatuses and the inoperative community is radically asymmetric, pitting the indiscernible community of whatever being against the apparatuses, whose very modus operandi consists in discernment and identification (see Prozorov 2009c). Moreover, the community of whatever being does not seek inclusion into or recognition by these apparatuses, not even the formation of the alternative apparatus of its own, but rather affirms its non-recognition of itself in the apparatuses that capture it. While in the Hegelian logic only the universalisation of recognition may guarantee political pacification under the aegis of the ‘universal homogeneous state’, for Agamben the possibility of peace rather lies in something like a universalised non-recognition:

[There] is not and can never be a sign of peace, since true peace would only be there, where all the signs were fulfilled and exhausted. Every struggle among [**humanity**] ~~men~~ is in fact a struggle for recognition and the peace that follows such a struggle is only a convention instituting the signs and conditions of mutual, precarious recognition. Such a peace is only and always a **peace amongst states** and of the law, a fiction of the recognition of an identity in language, which comes from war and **will end in war**. Not the appeal to guaranteed signs or images but the fact that we cannot recognise ourselves in any sign or image: that is peace in non-recognition. Peace is the perfectly **empty sky of humanity**; it is the display of non-appearance as the only homeland of man. (Agamben 1995: 82)

#### The only way to disrupt the state’s sovereignty is to make visible the bodies that have been effaced, exposing the injustices and creating empathy within the population that can lead to revolution.

**Frymire, 17** (Erin Frymire, Ph.D., Northeastern Univ. (2017)B.A., Skidmore College (2009), April 2017, accessed on 7-23-2020, Repository.library.northeastern, "", https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/files/neu:cj82px203/fulltext.pdf)//fibow

The rhetoric of other people’s bodies is, in these cases, violent. In each case, the state transforms unwilling human beings into rhetorical tools to support its own narratives. In order to accomplish this transformation, **the state disrupts** or even destroys **these individuals’ agency via acts of physical and psychological violence**. The state **replaces their victims’ freedom to act** and choose for themselves **with the state’s own agency** – using these bodies to bolster the narratives upon which state power and legitimacy depends. While this pattern is an old one, it takes on new features in the modern era. A distaste for public acts of violence and greater attention to human rights shift the context in which such violence functions, particularly within democratic states like the US, but also in cases like Argentina’s dictatorship, which operated under international scrutiny. When the power of bodily 146 violence must coexist with legal legitimacy, **strategic invisibility of the body becomes a central part of state rhetoric**. By **making the bodies of its victims invisible**, **the state can continue to engage in violent – and even illegal – practices without forfeiting its** **legitimacy** or tarnishing its public image. This cautious duality sustains the powerful narratives that the state creates using other people’s bodies. Strategic invisibility, though its particular deployment varies, is a common feature of state rhetoric in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In these cases, we find that multiple layers and forms of legal, textual, and even spatial invisibilities work collectively to hide the state’s acts of violence – both legal and illegal – and obscure the agentic responsibility for that violence. These invisibilities protect the disidentifications that sustain the status quo. As we have seen in the photographs from Abu Ghraib or the public display of Emmett Till’s remains, **a visual encounter with the suffering or mutilated body can unsettle one’s entrenched disidentifications and provoke an empathy that counters the state’s narratives**. This identification is, of course, not the outcome of every encounter between two people; if it were, violence would not occur. **Visibility is significant in that it provides an opportunity for empathy**. It **has the potential to form a crack in the wall of disidentification**. As discussed in Chapter One, a disidentification is a buried identification that must be “leveled and buried again and again” (Butler, Bodies 114). A visual encounter with the body can bring these disidentifications into one’s conscious awareness and, perhaps, unbury them. **By making the bodies of incarcerated, tortured, and disappeared people invisible to the broader public, the state closes down the potential for a visual encounter with the suffering body**. **Such an encounter is dangerous to the state, because the empathy it invites could challenge the political frames that lead to disidentifications** and the failure to recognize the Other as precarious life. 147 Despite these efforts, the state’s attempts at bodily invisibility are not always successful. Activists have worked against mandatory minimums, recognizing their racist assumptions and the injustice of such lengthy sentences. The Abu Ghraib photographs and the Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture, along with the testimony of people like Bashmilah, have led to some (albeit limited) backlash against the US for committing acts of torture. The Argentine military dictatorship is now remembered for its human rights violations and the disappearances it committed, abuses that contributed – along with the economic crises and a failed war against the British – to its downfall. **The walls of invisibility are not impenetrable, and neither is the state’s seemingly monolithic, indomitable power**. As Garland puts it, **“[t]he disappearing body always reappears**” (790), **and when it does, the evidence and empathy it produces can lead to resistance**. Though the state’s power can seem insurmountable, as the case of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo demonstrates, resistance is possible – and even those murdered by the state can be reclaimed. **When the invisible body is visible again, resistance can diminish the power of the state**. In their activism, the Madres not only prove that resistance is possible; they also reveal other possibilities for the rhetorical use of other people’s bodies. **The Madres use their bodies and representations of their children’s bodies to resist** rather than enact violence, to expose rather than to cover up the reality of the state’s culpability. While their goals differ from the state’s, they are also using other people’s bodies as a central rhetorical tactic, yet the relationship between the rhetor and the body used rhetorically is entirely different. Unlike the state, they use the bodies of close, beloved relatives; as a result of this familial connection, the nature of that rhetorical use shifts dramatically from how it is enacted by the state. In understanding the possibilities for a nonviolent, and even anti-violent, rhetoric of other people’s bodies, even more 148 important than the social relationship between the rhetor and the body is the agentic relationship. To be sure, one could use a family member violently, in a way more similar to the state. The Madres’ use of bodies differs from the state’s not only in this familial connection, but in how they work with their children in a mutual use of one another’s bodies. Though the absence of the disappeared complicates their status as willing participants, the efforts toward collaboration exist both in their goals, with the Madres taking up the projects begun by the disappeared, and in their methods. **They use their own bodies in conjunction with their children’s, even putting themselves at risk** – not using their children to create false narratives or avoid responsibility for their own actions. It is this collaborative nature of their work that distinguishes their use of bodies from the state’s use of those same bodies. **Rather than attempting to usurp the agency of their children’s bodies and convert them into unwilling tools, the Madres collaborate to strengthen (or recover) the agency of these bodies**. This project has considered the rhetoric of other people’s bodies with particular attention to state violence, and the patterns of this violence raise questions about other rhetorical uses of bodies. Certainly, there are nonviolent rhetorical uses of others’ bodies – consider the tattoo artist or choreographer. Those cases, while they use other’s bodies rhetorically, involve the use of willing bodies – people who have chosen to participate. Even the collaborative efforts of the Madres did not have willing participants in the same way; though they work to continue their children’s work, those children are absent. The use of willing bodies is worthy of scholarly attention, and undoubtedly has its own complications of agency, but the nature of such acts positions them outside of the pattern discussed here, which focuses on the use of unwilling bodies. 149 I believe the most immediate questions this project raises are whether the patterns and strategies of state violence characterize other cases of this violent rhetorical use of unwilling bodies. For example, does gang violence function similarly to state violence? Do murderers use similar means of disrupting the agency of their victims? Do perpetrators of domestic violence also deploy strategic invisibility to avoid culpability? If these forms of violence are also rhetorical in nature, as I believe they are, who is the audience for this rhetoric? Do the perpetrators of this violence also attempt to maintain a public face of civility or legality? How does the state interact with or complicate these other forms of violence? How do these rhetors account for both the state and the public in their deployment of strategic invisibilities? Though I suspect these forms of non-sanctioned violence follow a rhetorical pattern similar to that of state violence, a more thorough investigation of these questions is necessary for a fuller understanding of this rhetoric of other people’s bodies. Scholarly attention to the rhetorics of these other types of violence is important, as they can be as damaging, pervasive, and inescapable as state violence. Understanding the rhetorical patterns and strategies that use people’s bodies against their will is crucial in determining how to address, resist, and overcome violence. **The Madres understood how the state was using denial and bodily invisibility to hide the reality of its crimes from the public**; they knew that, **to resist this violence, they had to reverse the strategies of the state and make the disappeared body visible once more**. This **use of visibility**, the creation of an encounter that holds the potential for empathetic identification, **is the most effective means of resisting state violence**. **By revealing the crimes that the state attempts to hide, the reality of violence and injustice becomes clear**. As important as this evidentiary function is, visibility is perhaps even more significant for how it can challenge the political and social frames governing 150 disidentification. Invisibility is not merely the screen behind which the state inflicts violence; it is also the means by which identifications are kept buried and unconscious. **Encountering the Other**, visually or otherwise, **is the only route toward a greater recognition of the precariousness of all human life**, toward identification. In uncovering the state’s narratives of power, we also uncover the humanity of those on whose suffering this power depends. Therefore, as rhetoricians and citizens, we must look closely at what is absent in state rhetoric. It is here in the invisibilities that power grows unchecked. **By making visible the bodies erased from view, we can question the state’s narratives and expose the prejudices on which extralegal power depends** as it violently transforms unwilling human beings into rhetorical tools.

#### Death, suffering, and extinction are inevitable. Humanity is a cosmic accident whose consciousness produces its own demise; We will inevitably disappear—but at least a value to life can we maximally enjoy whatever time we have left.

Ligotti ‘12 [Thomas Ligotti, contemporary American philosopher and horror author, THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE HUMAN RACE, p. 42—AD: 4/21/15]

Consciousness is an existential liability, as every pessimist agrees—a blunder of blind nature, according to Zapffe, that has taken humankind down a black hole of logic. To make it through this life, we must make believe that we are not what we are—contradictory beings whose continuance only worsens our plight as mutants who embody the contorted logic of a paradox. To correct this blunder, we should desist from procreating. What could be more judicious or more urgent, existentially speaking, than our selfadministered oblivion? At the very least, we might give some regard to this theory of the blunder as a “thoughtexperiment.” All civilizations become defunct. All species die out. There is even an expiration date on the universe itself. Human beings would certainly not be the first phenomenon to go belly up. But we could be the first to precipitate our own passing, abbreviating it before the bodies really started to stack up. Could we know to their most finegrained details the lives of all who came before us, would we bless them for the care they took to keep the race blundering along? Could we exhume them alive, would we shake their bony, undead hands and promise to pass on the favor of living to future generations? Surely that is what they would want to hear, or at least that is what we want to think they would want to hear. And just as surely that is what we would want to hear from our descendents living in far posterity, strangers though they would be as they shook our bony, undead hands. Nature proceeds by blunders; that is its way. It is also ours. So if we have blundered by regarding consciousness as a blunder, why make a fuss over it? Our selfremoval from this planet would still be a magnificent move, a feat so luminous it would bedim the sun. What do we have to lose? No evil would attend our departure from this world, and the many evils we have known would go extinct along with us. So why put off what would be the most laudable masterstroke of our existence, and the only one? Of course, phenomena other than consciousness have been thought to be blunders, beginning with life itself. For example, in a novel titled At the Mountains of Madness (1936), the American writer H. P. Lovecraft has one of his characters mention a “primal myth” about “Great Old Ones who filtered down from the stars and concocted earth life as a joke or mistake.” Schopenhauer, once he had drafted his own mythology that everything in the universe is energized by a Willtolive, shifted to a commonsense pessimism to represent life as a congeries of excruciations. [L]ife presents itself by no means as a gift for enjoyment, but as a task, a drudgery to be performed; and in accordance with this we see, in great and small, universal need, ceaseless cares, constant pressure, endless strife, compulsory activity, with extreme exertion of all the powers of body and mind. Many millions, united into nations, strive for the common good, each individual on account of his own; but many thousands fall as a sacrifice for it. Now senseless delusions, now intriguing politics, incite them to wars with each other; then the sweat and the blood of the great multitude must flow, to carry out the ideas of individuals, or to expiate their faults. In peace industry and trade are active, inventions work miracles, seas are navigated, delicacies are collected from all ends of the world, the waves engulf thousands. All push and drive, others acting; the tumult is indescribable. But the ultimate aim of it all, what is it? To sustain ephemeral and tormented individuals through a short span of time in the most fortunate case with endurable want and comparative freedom from pain, which, however, is at once attended with ennui; then the reproduction of this race and its striving. In this evident disproportion between the trouble and the reward, the will to live appears to us from this point of view, if taken objectively, as a fool, or subjectively, as a delusion, seized by which everything living works with the utmost exertion of its strength for some thing that is of no value. But when we consider it more closely, we shall find here also that it is rather a blind pressure, a tendency entirely without ground or motive. (The World as Will and Representation, trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp) Schopenhauer is here straightforward in limning his awareness that, for human beings, existence is a state of demonic mania, with the Willtolive as the possessing spirit of “ephemeral and tormented individuals.” Elsewhere in his works, he denominates consciousness as “an accident of life.” A blunder. A mistake. Is there really anything behind our smiles and tears but an evolutionary slipup?

Cross apply Colebrook 16—the role of the judge is to shed their skin as a biopolitical educator, to not use their position to help the sovereign single out the most productive, the most useful, the most valuable political debater or policymaker for society to enslave later, but rather affirming or negating these sovereign ideals in favour of looking beyond the capitalist curtains

Prefer bc otherwise, the judge affirms active harm towards the debaters in debate—that’s the biggest immediate material harm from this round and outweighs on magnitude and timeframe