### 1NC – Contact Info

#### Interp – debaters must disclose at least one form of contact information on their page of the 2021-2022 NDCA LD Wiki. This can be any way that allows me to contact them prior to the round (Facebook, Phone Number, Email, Discord, etc).

#### Violation – they don’t even have a wiki

Table

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Pre-Round Prep – contact info is key to ask for the aff or clarify disclosure. I don’t know what the 1NC should be and can’t make one. Key to education because otherwise we wouldn’t get substantive clash. Key to fairness because you get an unfair prep advantage. It also means that you can’t vote aff because 1NC didn’t have enough information to request it.

#### 2] Accessibility – if debaters require accommodations or need to read trigger warnings there’s no way for them to request that until it’s too late. Kills accessibility because there’s no way to make the round accessible if they can’t ask you to.

#### Fairness because debate’s a game and education because it’s the only portable skill from debate. Drop the debater – a) Deters future abuse, b) Rectifies time loss, c) DTA encourages baiting – Debaters could fill their cases w/ abusive args, baiting theory and then just drop the argument in the next speech and go for undercovered substance

#### Competing interps – a) It fosters the best norms through encouraging the fairest rule b) Reasonability collapses by debating the brightline

#### No RVIs – a) Illogical – you shouldn’t win for proving that you’re fair or edication because it’s a prima facie burden – logic outweighs because it determines what args count as valid b) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI c) people will be scared to read theory against good theory debaters and will never be able to check abuse

### 1NC – Kant NC

#### The meta ethic is practical reason. Prefer –

#### 1] Is-ought gap – empiricism can only observe what is since that’s the only thing in our perception, not what ought to be, but it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises which requires a priori premises to form morality.

#### 2] Empirical uncertainty– evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know other’s experiences makes empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### 3] Infallibility – practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask why we should be reasoners is to concede authority to reason since the question itself uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### 4] Action Theory – every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason.

#### Reason requires that maxims we act upon must be universalizable – any reasoner would know that two plus two equals four because there is no a priori distinction between agents so norms must be universally valid. These things are temporally consistent – I know that adding two numbers now and taking the sum will not result in me adding the same two numbers in the future and getting a different sum.

#### And willing an action that violates the freedom of others is a contradiction – if I decide to kill someone, that action is not universalizable because that would justify other people killing me too. If I die, I cannot exercise my freedom to kill someone else. Thus, willing a violation of freedom results in limitation of my own freedom.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom. Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### 2] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### 3] TJFs and they outweigh since it precludes engagement on the framework layer – prefer for Resource disparities- Our framework ensures big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity - their model crowds out small schools because they have to prep for every unique advantage under each aff, every counterplan, and every disad with carded responses to each of them

#### Now negate –

#### 1] Strikes fail to fulfill duty.

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

Kantian Ethics Kantian ethics suggest that actions are morally permissible based on **whether it fulfils a person's duty** (Banks, 2006). To further the concept of duty, Kantian ethics held the notion of Categorical Imperatives which is believed to determine the morality of duties as it enforces and commands adherence, complicity and application. The Categorical Imperatives consist of three formulas. Once such a formula is to "act only on the maximum whereby at the same time you can will that it become a universal law" (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). Through this perspective, Kant held that persons are to engage in actions that they are willing to allow others to engage in as well without conditions and exceptions. Applying this formula to the ethicality of social workers **participating in labor strike** demonstrations, it becomes evident that such an action is **not morally permissible or executing its duty**. Arguably, as much as social workers are trained professionals and rendering services that are crucial to the functioning and well-being of society, they remain ordinary citizens who also at some point will **require crucial services**. Examples of these crucial services that may cause significant harm because of its absence due to labor strike action are **medical personnel, suicide watch centers, mental health care professionals, law enforcement, court systems**, municipal service delivery, etc. With these services not available, social workers will experience suffering, frustration, unhappiness, harm as the clients will do with their absence from the office. To this regard, participating and demonstrating labor strike action is not adhering to duty or morally permissible.

#### 2] Strikes use others as a mere means to an end.

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

A further formula of the Categorical Imperative is "so, act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other context, never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself' (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. Participating in a labor-strike demonstration/action is **a direct violation of this** categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society **is used to duly and unduly influence the bargaining process for better working conditions**. In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of clients and society **is not seen as crucial** **and as an 'end'**, but rather used to demonstrate the undeniable need for the skills and expertise of social workers. Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

#### 3] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 4] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build solidarity among their supporters, they are susceptible to collective action problems. This is because the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be enjoyed by both strikers and non-strikers. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of free-riding problems, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.

### 1NC – Presumption and Permissibility

#### Presumption and permissibility negate –

#### 1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics outweighs – A. it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res B. It’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### 2] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e., if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both “P” and “~P” are true

#### 3] Intuitions – A. We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories; B. Statements are more often false than true because any part of the resolution could be false.

#### 4] Negating is harder – A. The aff gets the first and last speech which controls the direction of the debate, B. Affirmatives can strategically uplayer in the 1AR giving them a 7-6 time skew advantage, splitting the 2NR, C. They have infinite prep

### 1NC – Util Triggers Permissibility

#### 1] Util can’t guide action because it never has consistent rules – morality constantly changes based on each situation’s specific benefits. Without tangible rules to tell people how to be moral, they don’t know how to act.

#### 2] There’s always infinite pleasure and pain in the universe—util is incoherent since we can’t add or subtract from that

**Bostrom ’08** (Bostrom, Nick [Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from London School of Economics]. The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics. 2008. http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf)

In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. **Current data suggests a flat or open universe**, although the final verdict is pending. **If the universe is either open or flat, then it [that] is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets**. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) ‘observable universe’. But **the observable part**—the part that coulsd causally affect us—**would be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole**. Statements about the “mass of the universe” or the “number of protons in the universe” generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. **Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes** (a multiverse), **and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite**; for a popular review, see

#### 3] Predictions are impossible – any action could theoretically cause nuke war in 10 billion years

#### A] There’s no non-arbitrary cutoff to calculations since ethics shouldn’t be, but even if there were, finite possibility of infinite extinction impacts on each side make expected utility equal.

#### B] Util Can’t guide action: it requires constantly calculating to determine the maximally productive time to make an action.

#### 4] Justifying predictions is circular – there’s no reason trends continue, which means they’re justified by experience, but that relies on extrapolating trends.

#### 5] Aggregation impossible – Multiple chemicals in the brain make me happy. So, there’s no way to compare them. Or determine which ones to maximize.

#### 6] Calculative regress: util requires we calculate how much time to spend on our calculations, then how much time to spend on those calculations to infinity, freezing action which means we can never do anything since we’re always calculating the time to calculate.

### 1NC – AT: Democracy

#### 1] Their concerns about democracy fading are completely unfounded – more than half of the countries on the planet are democratic and the number of democracies has been increasing since the end of the Cold War – their Freedom House study doesn’t account for Biden getting reelected.

**DeSilver 19** [DeSilver, Drew. “Despite Global Concerns about Democracy, More than Half of Countries Are Democratic.” Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center, 14 May 2019, [www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/).] //DD PT

Concern has been growing for the past several years about the [future of democracy](https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Howe-28-4.pdf), and there is considerable [dissatisfaction in many countries](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/) with how democracy is working in practice. But public support for democratic ideals [remains strong](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/), and by one measure, global democracy is at or near a modern-day high. As of the end of 2017, 96 out of 167 countries with populations of at least 500,000 (57%) were democracies of some kind, and only 21 (13%) were autocracies. Nearly four dozen other countries – 46, or 28% – exhibited elements of both democracy and autocracy. Broadly speaking, the share of democracies among the world’s governments has been on an upward trend since the mid-1970s, and now sits just shy of its post-World War II record (58% in 2016). To track the spread of democracy around the globe, we used the ratings contained in the Center for Systemic Peace’s [Polity IV dataset](http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html). Polity is a widely used resource in political science that analyzes and codes how political authority is gained and used in every fully independent state with a population of 500,000 or more (167 of the world’s 200 or so sovereign states in the current version). Polity assesses six key factors, from openness of political participation to constraints on the chief executive, to place each country on a 21-point scale ranging from +10 (“consolidated democracy”) to –10 (“hereditary monarchy”). It doesn’t rate countries whose central government has collapsed or those subject to foreign intervention or occupation. In 2017, there were three countries in the former group (Libya, Yemen and South Sudan) and one in the latter (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Following the Polity guidelines, we categorized all countries scoring from +6 to +10 as democracies, those from –6 to –10 as autocracies and everything in between as “mixed.” We then tracked the changing prevalence of democracy and autocracy over the seven decades since the end of the Second World War. In 2017, 33 countries were considered fully consolidated democracies, with a Polity rating of +10. The peak postwar year for consolidated democracies was 2006, when there were 35; since then, two (Belgium and the United States) have slipped from the top tier. Belgium fell 2 points, to +8, following its June 2007 parliamentary election, which deepened divisions between the country’s French- and Flemish-speaking communities and sparked a long-running political crisis that at times threatened to split the country. The United States was docked 2 points in 2016 due to an increase in “factional competition,” and now also sits at +8. The Polity researchers noted that “political discourse in the United States had become increasingly partisan” during Barack Obama’s administration, and that Donald Trump “used combative rhetoric to excite ‘populist’ support and seize the Republican Party nomination.” Trump’s “surprise” Electoral College victory, they added, “polarized political competition into ‘anti-establishment’ and ‘anti-Trump’ factions.” In 1977, only 35 of the 143 countries rated by Polity (24%) qualified as democracies, while 89 (62%) were classified as autocracies of one stripe or another (including nine absolute hereditary monarchies). Although the number of democracies began edging higher in subsequent years and the number of autocracies gradually fell, half of the Polity-rated countries were still considered autocracies as recently as 1988. But democracy spread rapidly as the Cold War ended and the Soviet-led bloc – and eventually the Soviet Union itself – crumbled between 1989 and 1991. Of the 75 countries rated as autocracies in 1987, only 15 (20%) were still rated that way three decades later. More than a third (27) had become democracies, and most of the rest had mixed ratings. (One, Libya, was not rated in 2017 because of regime instability, and five other states had ceased to exist.) Among 30 new nations formed since 1987, 17 were rated as democracies in 2017, six were autocracies, four were mixed and three were not rated due to instability or foreign intervention. Polity’s democracy ratings are by no means the only ones out there, though because of differing methodologies they tell somewhat different stories. [Freedom House](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf), for instance, rates 86 out of 195 countries (44%) as “free,” using criteria that include both political and civil rights. And though nearly half of the 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s [Democracy Index](https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index) are considered to be some form of democracy, only 12% (20) are rated as “full democracies”; nearly a third (55 countries) are counted as “flawed democracies” – including the U.S. Although our analysis of the Polity data indicates that more countries are democratic than not, at least formally, that doesn’t mean people are happy with democracy in action. In a Pew Research Center survey of 27 countries conducted last year, a global median of [51% said they were dissatisfied](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/) with how democracy is working in their country, while 45% said they were satisfied. (All but one of the 27 countries in the Center’s survey are considered democratic by the Polity IV methodology; the exception is Russia, which is in the “mixed” category.) Of the countries surveyed, Sweden and the Philippines were among those with the highest levels of popular satisfaction with democracy: 69% in each nation said they were satisfied. (Indonesia, South Korea and the Netherlands weren’t far behind.) At the other end, people in Mexico, Greece, Brazil and Spain expressed the most dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in their countries.

#### 2] No UQ – The Biden administration is intensely focused on democracy and is pushing it abroad.

**Wolf 6/15** [Zachary B. Wolf, CNN, 6-15-2021, "Analysis: Biden pushes democracy abroad. Republicans openly question it at home," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/15/politics/biden-democracy-us-abroad/index.html>]

The defense of democracy has so far been the ideological cause of Biden's presidency. "This is democracy's day," he said in his inaugural address, promising to pursue unity at all costs and defend people's rights to disagree. He's come back to the theme repeatedly, including in his [address to Congress](https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2021/04/politics/biden-address-annotated/) in April, when he declared: "We have to prove that democracy still works." Earlier this week, as he brought NATO and members of the G7 in line, he said: "I think we're in a contest -- not with China per se, but a contest with autocrats, autocratic governments around the world -- as to whether or not democracies can compete with them in the rapidly changing 21st century."

#### 3] Democracy is unsustainable and causes war – 2500 years of history prove.

Brooks 17 (Rosa, law professor at Georgetown University, “REVIEW --- Books: Democracy Is Dependent on War” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/democracy-is-dependent-on-war-1483741787>)

Some books should come stamped with a surgeon general's warning: "Likely to cause discomfort," perhaps, or "Not suitable for romantics." The political scientists John Ferejohn and Frances McCall Rosenbluth have written such a book: "Forged Through Fire: War, Peace and the Democratic Bargain" is not for the faint of heart.¶ It begins with a paradox. "Humans have inflicted untold horrors on each other through wars," Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth write, but these wars have also been responsible for fostering one of our "most cherished human values": modern democracy, with its unique combination of universal suffrage and property rights.¶ This isn't the story we're taught in high-school civics. But it's a compelling one, powerfully told by two scholars with mastery of their subject. The authors walk the reader through 2,500 bloody years of Western history, from the Peloponnesian wars to the war in Vietnam, highlighting, again and again, a brutal trade-off: The emergence and consolidation of democracy depends on warfare, and a particular kind of warfare, at that.¶ Here's the logic: The rich and powerful prefer to remain that way, and are, as a general rule, disinclined to share either wealth or political power with the poor. Only when elites are faced with external military threats do the poor become valuable to the rich. This is so because armies have traditionally required bodies -- and plenty of them.¶ This, the authors argue, is the awful "alchemy of iron and blood" that produces democracy. Manpower-intensive forms of warfare require the large-scale mobilization of the population, which forces elites facing external threats to grant political concessions to the common man. Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth are not the first to chart the linkages between warfare and the evolution of the modern democratic state, but their magisterial volume makes the case in persuasive and explicit detail.¶ We begin in Athens, where the shift from aristocracy to democracy was driven by the need to defend the city against foreign invasion. In 508 B.C., Cleisthenes "promised to turn political power over to the Athenian public in exchange for their help in repelling Spartan intervention," and the great age of Athenian democracy was born.¶ It might soon have died, too, but for the existence of near-continuous external threats during the Peloponnesian and Persian wars, and the fact that Athenian naval supremacy soon came to require the active participation of tens of thousands of ordinary men. "Whether they liked it or not," note the authors, "Athens' wealthy and conservative citizens seem to have understood that the city's survival rested in the hands of thousands of commoners who rowed the triremes."¶ Similar dynamics led Rome's elites to grant freedom, land, citizenship and the franchise to an expanding body of commoners and ultimately to residents of far-flung colonial outposts. As in Athens, "Roman military accomplishments rested on wide manpower mobilization rewarded by . . . political voice."¶ But not all wars produce democracy. In medieval Europe, feudal lords were able to rely mainly on small forces of heavy cavalry to sustain their power, not on large-scale mobilization of the poor, and this mostly eliminated the need to offer political concessions to the masses in exchange for military service.¶ Later, in early modern Europe, "the effective use of gunpowder decisively tipped the balance away from the cavalry-dominated militaries of the previous 500 years and in favor of mass armies . . . shifting political power upward to leaders who could finance and maintain such large armies." Even so, for a time most European governments were able to finance armies with plunder from the New World, "or, where necessary, through exchanges of favors with merchants that were less destabilizing than the bargains [monarchs] would otherwise have had to strike with the poor." As a result, pressures to democratize remained minimal and episodic. "As long as monarchies could buy armies with money, blood did not buy voting rights, as it had in Athens and Rome," the authors write.¶ It was only in the 19th and 20th centuries, Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth observe, that conditions once again became favorable for the widespread expansion of democracy. The French Republic's levee en masse set the stage: Mass mobilizations required both an effective administrative state and eventually a more egalitarian approach to politics. By the end of the 19th century, both France and Germany had "enormous standing armies" and "both had adopted representative government," with universal suffrage placating the masses, counterbalanced by protections for property rights to assuage the concerns of the wealthy.¶ In much of Europe, however, the interests of the wealthy and the working class remained at odds. It "took the white-hot wars of the twentieth century, which required both money and manpower, to hinge them into a single coalition in favor of representative democracy," the authors write.¶ When it happened, it happened quickly. Norway and Sweden initiated universal military conscription at the beginning of the 20th century; within a decade, both had also granted universal male suffrage. In Britain, conscription did not begin until 1916; by 1918, universal male suffrage had also been granted. By the end of World War II, 60 million people were dead, but democracy had become the norm throughout the West.¶ "Forged Through Fire" is full of grim lessons. One lesson: warfare, as the authors of this book soberly remind us, has been a near-constant throughout human history. Those inclined to take solace in the post World War II decline of interstate wars might pause to consider that 70 years is, in the grand scheme of things, not a very long time. Another lesson: Those with power have rarely been inclined to relinquish it voluntarily. Only fear and threat have driven the rich and powerful to share -- grudgingly -- with history's have-nots.¶ A third lesson -- perhaps the hardest to swallow -- is that our most cherished modern liberal political values would likely never have triumphed without war and its multiple horrors, and even the democratic gains produced by centuries of war were "neither easy nor inevitable." Democracy depended upon a unique combination of circumstances: technologies favoring manpower-intensive forms of warfare; the lack of external sources of wealth that might have enabled governing elites to purchase military power, rather than coax it from their citizens; and so on. Even with all these conditions present, coercion and propaganda were sometimes sufficient to thwart the development of democracy. Russia and China, for instance, have managed, so far, to buck the trend.¶ All this leads to an uncomfortable question. Wealthy modern states can once again increasingly outsource their security to private contractors, and in any case, the emergence of new military technologies is again reducing the need for mass armies. Drones, surveillance technologies and cyber-warfare make it possible for states to achieve war's traditional ends without much need to mobilize their citizens, shifting the balance of power away from ordinary citizens and back towards governing elites.¶ "When armies no longer need flesh and blood," wonder Mr. Ferejohn and Ms. Rosenbluth, "what can take their place to stabilize democracy?" In other words: forged through war, can democracy survive peace?