# 1NC [part one]

## 1

#### Interpretation – The affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of a topical government policy.

#### Resolved is used to introduce a policy resolution—limited to only the exact immediate question of the resolution – this is important because that’s all we have before the round.

**Robert 15** [General Henry M. Robert, US Army, 1915, http://www.bartleby.com/176/4.html]

A motion is a proposal that the assembly take certain action, or that it express itself as holding certain views. It is made by a member's obtaining the floor as already described and saying, "I move that" (which is equivalent to saying, "I propose that"), and then stating the action he proposes to have taken. Thus a member "moves" (proposes) that a resolution be adopted, or amended, or referred to a committee, or that a vote of thanks be extended, etc.; or "That it is the sense of this meeting (or assembly) that industrial training," etc. Every resolution should be in writing, and the presiding officer has a right to require any main motion, amendment, or instructions to a committee to be in writing. When a main motion is of such importance or length as to be in writing it is usually written in the form of a resolution; that is, **beginning with the words, "Resolved,** **That**," the word "Resolved " being underscored (printed in italics) and followed by a comma, and the word "That" beginning with a capital "T." If the word "Resolved" were replaced by the words "I move," the resolution would become a motion. A resolution is always a main motion. In some sections of the country the word "resolve" is frequently used instead of "resolution." In assemblies with paid employees, instructions given to employees are called "orders" instead of "resolutions," and the enacting word, "Ordered" is used instead of "Resolved." [continues] After a question has been stated by the chair, it is before the assembly for consideration and action. All resolutions, reports of committees, communications to the assembly, and all amendments proposed to them, and all other motions except the Undebatable Motions mentioned in 45, may be debated before final action is taken on them, unless by a two-thirds vote the assembly decides to dispose of them without debate. By a two-thirds vote is meant two-thirds of the votes cast, a quorum being present. In the debate each member has the right to speak twice on the same question on the same day (except on an appeal), but cannot make a second speech on the same question as long as any member who has not spoken on that question desires the floor. No one can speak longer than ten minutes at a time without permission of the assembly. **Debate must be limited to the merits of the immediately pending question** — that is, the last question stated by the chair that is still pending; except that in a few cases the main question is also open to debate [45]. Speakers must address their remarks to the presiding officer, be courteous in their language and deportment, and avoid all personalities, never alluding to the officers or other members by name, where possible to avoid it, nor to the motives of members. thing ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Government action is necessary to regulate private entities.

**Blaustein 18** (Blaustein, Richard. “Private-Sector Space Activities Require Government Regulation, Says US Report.” Physics World, IOP Publishing, 4 July 2018, physicsworld.com/a/private-sector-space-activities-require-government-regulation-says-us-report/.)//DebateDrills AY

**The US Congress must introduce legislation to regulate the activities of private companies operating in space.** That is according to a new report by the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, which says **the need for reform has been heightened by the “burgeoning” commercial space sector** in the US. One leader in the booming US private space sector is [Space X](http://www.spacex.com/), which was founded by Tesla head Elon Musk in 2002. The firm, which has had a number of recent high-profile rocket launches, is setting its sights on missions to Mars. Even Jeff Bezos, who founded the online shopping giant Amazon, is getting in on the act with plans for his firm Blue Origin to send a manned mission to the Moon.

#### Violation – They affirm “global orbital counter-operations” which isn’t a policy action. also cross- ex

#### Prefer our Interpretation—

#### 1] Their model makes neg engagement impossible by letting the aff skirt the resolutional stasis point, rendering our topic-specific preparation and research useless. Abdicating debates about the resolution makes all limits impossible – being “germane” or “about” the resolution isn’t enough.

#### We have 2 impacts.

#### Procedural fairness and competitive equity – their interpretation *explodes limits*, opening the floodgates to an infinite scope of 1ACs that Ns can't reasonably be expected to prepare for – it also allows the aff to *pre-determine the terrain of competition* and contestation by adopting any methodology, analytic, or literature base, which only grants the neg *concessionary ground* and forces us to debate against truisms – this kills neg ground and creates a structural side-bias for the aff. Vote neg if the aff wins they are a good idea in the slightest- means that the aff has engaged within the legal dystopic future which is what they say debate is.

#### Idea Testing/Argument-skills – A well-defined resolution is crucial to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-depth fashion---this process of negation produces iterative testing and improvement, where we learn to improve our arguments based on our opponents’ arguments. This process does not proscribe particular styles or forms of argument, but does require a common point of disagreement around which arguments can be organized. No impact turns—T is just an argument as to why aff is a bad idea. View this argument as an *impact filter* for the entire round.

Ralf Poscher 16, director of the Institute for Staatswissenschaft & Philosophy of Law, Professor of Public Law and Legal Philosophy, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement,” in *Metaphilosophy of Law*, ed. Gizbert-Studnicki, Dyrda, Banas, 2/19/16, SSRN recut amrita

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups 106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered? One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. The Semantics of Agonistic Disagreements The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes. In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements.

#### Vote neg – T is key to set the correct and ethical model of debate which means it comes first also means no impact turns because it’s a procedural and DTD since round is skewed.

#### CI—tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

#### Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

## 2

#### CP—Do the aff minus their rejection of inoperativity for black people. To clarify, the CP endorses inoperativity for black people only.

Inoeprativty – resistance is not an active process, but a passive.

Community organizations in Baltimore protest murders in Baltimore – but they also engage the community at a grassroots level. Poetics, community oritentations, sharing art is non-productive potentiality. This is a defense of inoperativty – we make black politics good. Inoperativity is goo

Constant politics is tiring – movements of withdrawal are a good thing.

#### The CP competes.

#### There’s no way to define GLOBAL counter operations without assuming black people.

#### Their last piece of Mezzadra and Nielsen 13 evidence puts their defense of operations in DIRECT OPPOSITION to inoperativity. Bridgeland reads green.

**Mezzadra**, S., & **Neilson**, B. (20**13**). Extraction, logistics, finance: Global crisis and the politics of operations. Radical Philosophy, 8-18. Recut – CSUF JmB

The politics of operations **What is an operation?** In our understanding an operation is something more than a relation of cause and effect or a model driven by linear processes of input and output. Throughout this article we have utilized the concept to name and analyse the syncopated pace of opening and closure that gives texture to and counterpoints the heterogeneity of space and time under global capitalism. In elaborating her famous distinction between labour and work, in The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt was well aware of the etymological nexus associated with the Latin opus. For Arendt ‘labour’ relates to the life or biologically necessitated dimensions of the human metabolism and reproduction. By contrast ‘work’ is inherently connected with the fabrication of an ‘“artificial” world of things’ that endures beyond the act of creation. [35] While Arendt associates the rise of industrial modernity with the encroachment of labour over work and its consequent effects of alienation, we wish to register the continuing role of the operation in the global present. But while for us an operation is connected with the fabrication of an ‘artificial’ world, it does not necessarily produce a ‘work’, a material ‘thing’. Operations also play a role in activities of finance and extraction. Think of the crane that lifts a container full of soy from a ship to a truck, the software-driven coordination of forklift vehicles in a fully wired warehouse, or the transmission of financial data through electronic networks by means of packet switching technologies. What is produced in these operations is not a ‘thing’ but rather a set of links or relations between things, which is to say the framework or skeleton of a world. In our use of the term, **an operation refers primarily to this fabrication of the world**, to the **production** **of** the **connections**, chains and **networks** that **materially envelop the planet enabling and framing the labour and action of subjects well beyond those directly involved in the execution of the operation itself**. In observing the ways in which such linkages are made we are observing the operations of capital. Aside from the material infrastructures required to establish such articulations, there is a need for rules, instructions and standards that guide and frame the operative principles at stake in these dynamics. Increasingly the frameworks and processes that enable the deployment of these operative principles are organized by means of computer code. More than a set of executable instructions or a means of information exchange, **code alters** conditions of perception, **communication and representatio**n. It participates heavily **in the economic, political, military and governmental domains, organizing and disrupting relations of power and collective life**. The code that governs activities of finance, extraction and logistics introduces the social relation of capital into the most minute and detailed of operations. **Capital’s code**, we might say, **insinuates itself into the world of operations**, embedding itself as a kind of organizing element or blueprint. Returning to the terminology of Arendt, the boundary between ‘labour’ and ‘work’ appears blurred in the operations of capital. At the same time, we have to recognize that some of the key features of ‘action’, the third concept discussed by Arendt, play an important role in the operations of capital, making them politically pregnant. This is to say that these operations are increasingly confronting the elusiveness, plurality, relationality and unpredictability of the ‘human condition’, which comprised for Arendt the domain of ‘action’. **It thus makes sense to speak of a politics of the operation**, taking into account both its structuring effect on human relations and the ways in which work, labour and action are combined both in the execution of specific tasks and in the **articulation** of **different subjects** that make operations possible. What we are calling **operations of capital are a privileged field of surveillance and control**. The rise of sophisticated performance measurement techniques makes it possible to monitor labour in real time. Data produced on the basis of such measurement can be fed back into production systems in order to adjust them accordingly. Traditional forms of workplace action are thus disrupted. Consider the worker who deliberately slows down. Not only can she be easily identified, but the effects of her foot-dragging can be minimized through computerized processes of system adaptation. Performance measurement is increasingly tied to **algorithmic** patterns and **processes** that give the operation a life of its own. We need to ask how the operation relates to performance and what the significance of this relation is in a situation where the operation threatens to detach itself from its performer. Is the operation a kind of paradigm of pure performativity? The concept of performativity has been at the centre of many recent debates about and approaches to the political. An important feature of the performative is its self-referring function – it constitutes that which it enunciates. The operation, by contrast, connects. It fabricates a world but does not do so only in relation to its own premisses. Its ontological moment is thus quite different to that of the performative, even if it retains a performative dimension. The operation has an outside, albeit constrained by parameters of connection and adaptation. The performative is self-contained, even if its affective dimension can trouble this containment. In the case of the operation, its politics registers the interaction between its inside and outside, between the protocols and standards that allow it to build connections across different situations and the heterogeneity of space and time in which it subsists. Only by thinking through these dynamics, which it is important to insist are productive of struggles and subjectivity, can we begin to understand how the Arendtian realm of action is increasingly folded into the worlds of work and labour. There is another sense in which the operation differs from its performance. This is the sense in which **the operation is effectual rather than performative, the sense in which it is productive of something other than itself.** We can think of the operation as a kind of interval: at one end lies that which initiates or triggers it, and at the other end lies that which it creates. While in reality these two aspects of the operation concatenate, in so far as one operation spurs another, it is instructive to consider the situation in this way to shed light on what unfolds between these moments of concatenation, which is to say on the time and space of the operation itself. We have already stressed the nonlinear and uneven nature of the operation. What we now want to emphasize is how thinking through these knotted relations gives us a different perspective on the theorization question of politics today. If the operation’s trigger or spur recalls a performative approach to politics, its creative capacities can be correlated with a version of politics that centres on the event. There is a temporality to the operation that cannot be separated from the temporality of politics. There is also a striking parallel between a politics of the event and the image of an operation that stresses only its generative outcome, particularly as regards the punctuated nature of time characteristic of both. While a focus on the performative aspects of the operation obscures the moment of connection, disconnection and friction generated through the articulation with its ‘outside’, a focus on its outcome does not shed light on the complex materiality of the operation, on the internal as well as external conditions of its effectiveness. Thinking of the operation in terms of its interval, which it is important to stress is only a heuristic approach, allows us to begin to specify in more philosophical terms what we mean by the politics of operation. We do not equate a causal notion of the operation with the moments of performance and event. The **politics** of performativity can never be correlated with the linearity of a cause; nor can the event be reduced to an effect. But once we begin to understand the workings of the operation beyond the mechanism of cause and effect, we enter an ontological and epistemological domain in which the questions of performativity and event become relevant. For now we limit ourselves to some brief comments on how such a politics **diverges from** what Giorgio Agamben, following Jean-Luc Nancy, terms an ethics of ‘in operativity’. [36] **Such an ethics is** supposed to signal **a** radical **deactivation of the operation** that is held in the tension between potentiality and activity. Inoperativity corresponds to the possibility inherent in potentiality that an activity has not realized. For Agamben, this suggests a way of living ‘without purpose’ since it refuses an orientation towards ends or outcomes. [37] **This is not the occasion to explore** Agamben’s theological derivation of the concept of **inoperativity**. [38] Suffice it to say that it suggests a style of politics that seems rather contemplative. Agamben explicitly contrasts a politics based on in operativity with ‘the ingenuous emphasis on productivity and labour that has long prevented modernity from accessing politics as man’s most proper dimension’. [39] Arguing that subjectivity ‘opens itself as a central inoperativity in every operation’, he develops what one of us has previously described as a ‘politics without action’ and an ‘economy without labour’. [40] By contrast, **what we are calling the politics of operation involves the coalescing of action, labour and work and attempts to imagine processes of antagonism rooted in the production of subjectivity, implied by such coalescing**. The interval of the operation not only separates it from the moments of performance and event; it also **establishes** a mesh of **connections that challenge boundaries between ways of living**, ways of earning a living **and the fabricating of worlds**. Considering the operation from the point of view of its interval operates like a freeze-frame that brings into relief the combination of social activities, technical codes and devices that make an operation possible, while at the same time it allows us to look at the outcome of the operation without taking it for granted. This means that there is a need analytically to suspend the role played by the operation in the fabrication of the world in order to grasp the tensions and conflicts produced by the encounter of the operation with its ‘outside’. It is through this suspension that other ways of fabricating the world become theoretically visible and **the politics of operation can give way to the forging of ‘counter-operations**’. These differ fundamentally from an ethics of inoperativity. While inoperativity implies a withdrawal from productivity and a gestural ethos of play, **counter-operations involve targeted action within existing networks of production. Crucial to their** effectiveness, which is to say to their **ability to fabricate a world, is the political task we have already mentioned of determining the time and space in which to focus the organization of struggles**. In this regard, knowledge of the interlinked operations of logistics, finance and extraction is decisive. **Between the expansion of capital’s frontiers and its drive to closure**, the workings of **differential accumulation** produce **an** **excess** of labour that can no longer be **contained by traditional models of technical or political division**. Here **the production of subjectivity meets** what we earlier described as the **intensification of labour**, its multiplication beyond the wage relation and its explosion of established **legal and social statuses**. Under these conditions, **political organization must establish forms of coordination and solidarity that reach across these multiple lines of division**, ranging across borders at different geographical scales and keeping in view the way supply chains, financialization and extractive economies overlap. A movement like **Occupy Wall Street,** which boldly challenged finance capital by taking hold of its territorial and symbolic heartland, **is** probably **not enough**. **It needs to connect to struggles that confront capital’s logistical and extractive logics**, such as those conducted in ports and mines that we discussed earlier. This is **not** to valorize horizontal, networked or communicative modes of organization at the expense of **vertical structures** that can help ensure discipline and continuity. There are still lessons to be learned from historical episodes of **party**, trade-union and internationalist **organization**. Elsewhere, we have argued that contemporary efforts of political organization need to grapple with what, following Gramsci’s interpretation of a famous speech by Lenin, we call the question of ‘translatability’. [41] This means these **efforts need to come to terms with the deep rooting of struggles in material networks and settings**. It also means they have to devise strategies for dealing with the untranslatable aspects of struggles, which expose the limits of communication, tear established political subjectivities away from themselves, and provide an unstable ground on which to open new horizons of organization. We have in mind a similar process of politicization when discussing counter-operations. In this sense, **the counter-operation is something more than an act of sabotage**. Undoubtedly, sabotage remains one of the primary ways in which the generative claims and actions of subjects within and against the social relation of capital can be realized. To be sure, **sabotage has a long history**, within which the activities of early-twentieth-century dock workers, miners and railwaymen documented by Émile Pouget figure prominently. [42] What has become more pronounced within current systems of extraction, financialization and logistics is the capacity for capital to **route around episodes of disruption**. Although we still might assert with Antonio Negri that ‘self-valorization is sabotage’, [43] it has become more urgent to coordinate struggles across the heterogeneity of global time and space. **Isolated conflicts may register subjectivity’s** **excess** over the networks of subordination within which they are situated, **but their ability to ‘leap vertically’ and challenge capital on the global level** (as Hardt and Negri wrote over a decade ago now) [44] **has been curtailed**. What is needed are new models of solidarity that can negotiate difference across the fractured geographies of globalization, taking into account **and finding alternative paths to the socio-technical systems** and assemblages that enable current processes of financialization, extraction and logistics. We thus speak of counter-operations both as a way of registering the **constitutive moment of struggles**, which can easily get lost if one focuses only on the ‘negative’ moment of sabotage, and as a thread along which the vested question of organization can be tested and rethought. It is important to stress that speaking of **counteroperations does not imply a simply reactive use of ‘the master’s tools’** in order to prompt practices of resistance. It involves an accurate analysis of the processes of **dispossession** and exploitation that crisscross the operations of capital and an attempt to **build new forms of political organization** **capable of combining struggles and multiplying their affirmative aspects**. This is the chance that exists within the moment, the political decision that would make the crisis worthy of its name.

#### Inoperativity is good for black people. It’s key to embracing social life and they have no defense of conscripting black people into their counter-ops.

Mason 20 (Mason, Elliot C. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Languages, Department of English. “Thing: a fugitive in( )operation” 2020.

What we arrive at here is a mad and beautiful scene in which Hortense Spillers emerges out of Moten in order to topple Heidegger from the landscape of Agamben, which gives Agamben fully to Moten, at which point **Moten shares** his own pseudo-Agambenified **sociality** with Spillers and **we have a fugitive poetics of sharing in the warm nest beneath inoperativity**. Harney brings Spillers into the discussion as soon as Moten stops talking. ‘Sharing is not an interpersonal relationship […] One doesn’t share. One is shared. Now, the great moment, as Fred says, [of] feeling the combination of horror and possibility in this is in Hortense Spillers’s work. [What she is] emphasizing for us is this utter access, an access so deep that it undoes gender, that it undoes patriarchy […] Somehow that access has to stay open for that type of sharing to take place’ (2020a: 41–45”). Now the nest opens up. This is what we want, what I’ve been looking for throughout these words, in the months of sweating above them, pointing out the figures who look nothing like me, then shouting ‘Hey, you!’ as they dodge, again, fugitively away, into a sociality that precedes, exceeds and pleases me. ‘The kind of sharing we’re talking about is about being accessed, and it is such because we’re already shared”’. **That kind of sharing is the anti-statist anti-univers(al**)ity; the local **act of love**; it is Edwards singing to Franklin, saying ‘Ooh!’ when he’s too old to sing, and then becoming, posthumously, Franklin in Moten’s study; it is the shocking beauty that Agamben never speaks about; it is the threat to thinking that Arendt denounced Black studies for (1970); it is, as Moten and Harney say in their latest collaborative essay, **the ‘anti- and ante-natal undercommonality’** (2020b: 3) **that is Blackness**. That Blackness, that act of sharing, the constant ethical imperative that is the thing I’ll never know called Black sociality, is the obliteration of the divide between public and private. And what that obliteration does, once we get this far into it, is suspend the activity of archaeology. Agamben, you can stop digging now. The job has been cancelled and they have closed the institution, or at least from this point in the burnt-out corpse of the (European Being’s) landscape, we cannot see the policies they stamp into our skin; we cannot hear the duplicity of the institution’s happy consumption of its internal criticism. Archaeology is over, above. What we were digging up is the reason for our digging. But, really, it is sharing, and it is already shared. For Agamben, sharing is a public act (2016: Prologue). It is the public counterpart to the almost shameful ‘clandestinity of private life’ (2016: xvii). To share, as he elaborates in his short essay ‘The Friend,’ is ‘purely existential, a condivision that […] lacks an object’ (Agamben, 2009: 36); friends ‘do not share something (birth, law, place, taste): they are shared by the experience of friendship’ (2009: 36). It is sharing that is the lived experience of friends. Sharing as a spatial practice, as an ethical imperative conducting certain beings into a life that is nonbeing, however, is for Agamben, after Aristotle, the practice of the animal. ‘In this sense, we say that humans live together, unlike cattle who share the pasture together’ (Aristotle in Agamben, 2009: 36). The animal beneath is unseen in the public act of sharing; there is an already stolen — but fugitively capacious and beautiful — sharing going on that is neither private nor public, that is under the landscape of Man and his endless emergence. ‘To bring to light’, Agamben neatly states, ‘the intimate interweaving of being and living: **this is** today certainly **the task** of thought (and **of politics**)’ (2016: xix), but in the sharing of the pasture, in the ethical imperative of sharing before and inside any ontology, there is something that is too dark to bring to light, and against whose darkness the lightness knows its light. For Moten and Harney, in opposition to Agamben, sharing is inherently internal; it is the constitutive poetics of sociality that constitutes the being. And exactly its purpose is to share the pasture; to enact an inherent resistance to property within the property of Man’s light. Brought to the light already, sharing is the ethics of darkness in the pasture before Man, in the flesh. For Agamben, the correct path away from modernity’s brutal juridical space of inter(n)ment is the use of one’s own body, in the sense of sōmatos chrēsthai, of experiencing one’s potential without making it actual, of living in and by and for the community. This is the radical magic of **The** Use of Bodies, its **care of inoperative internalization**, of seeing oneself as oneself within oneself in order to **create** the non-teleological, **non-productive potentiality** of others as constituent and constituted (which in this moment of performative chrēsthai become difficult to distinguish) sociality. It renders Denise Ferreira da Silva’s ‘affectability’ (da Silva, 2007: xv) optimistic, in the weirdest Motenian way; **it turns the affective capacity and wound of being created by nature into the inoperative potentiality of the coming politics.** The problem, however, that I keep tripping up on every time I jump with joy at the sound of this beautiful inoperativity, is that Dennis Edwards (as plural; as we that rhymes with me that rhymes with you, badly; as Black sociality) is alone, having been watched by tens of thousands, and it is only in the act of his disappearance from the sociality that constitutes him that he can produce the thing that summarily sings his own constitution in/as a poetics of inoperativity. Edwards was made by the crowd. He was made by The Temptations. But in the moment of being able to be alone and to sing, for you, for his love, to constitute and be mutually constituted by his potentiality as song, he disappears. The disappearance is surely the result of inoperativity’s divergent spatiality; it attempts to make and place bodies elsewhere, in Aristotle’s inoperative landscape or Heidegger’s constituting Lichtung. What comes out of this immobile tide washing into the shoals of Edwards and Agamben is Moten on the radio saying, ‘You are everything except you’. **While the juridical regime extracts sharing from the shared beings in the given ontology** of modernity, Agamben’s **inoperativity removes the beings into a deconcentrated, decamped space** of sōmatos chrēsthai and non-teleological use **beyond** the activation of **potentiality**. However, in the fugitive undercommons of Black sociality, something else is happening, and, beyond what I’ve already said above, I don’t know what that something is. Love / Home PERFORMANCE (OF) THING / BLACK ABANDON(ING) The point is, maybe, if there’s a point, that the condition of Black sociality is permanent operativity in the service of White inoperativity in the institution of criticism. All Whites are not allowed to employ the service of this displacement of operativity, as the misleading example of Dennis Edwards might have suggested (since it is not a necessarily privileged position to have access to Edwards’s song; it’s available on YouTube). Other genocidal strikes constitute the atomic tunnels of the driver’s lash: gender, class, sexuality, ability. Instead, what I mean to say is that access to **the emancipatory poetics of inoperativity is premised on an employment of Black sociality as permanent reduction to the performative excess of operativity**, and that is a significant limitation in Agamben’s project when listened to from the record player of Black study. I am not suggesting that thinking against Agamben is the response to this limitation; I’d go for a pint with Giorgio any day. But the concept of sharing, **the careful emancipatory poetics** of Moten and Harney, can **enhance a reworking of** the secret Whiteness worn in the muffled policies of **inoperativity** that still designate certain Heideggerian zones of Being as the spaces of ontic initiation, which I cannot see a place **for** in **a**ny **fugitive project.**

# Case

### AT: FW

#### FW: The 1AC must tangibly and causally demonstrate HOW they AFFECT the success of global counter operation. This is the minimum condition for NOT immediately voting negative on presumption.

#### Burden of Proof- The 1AC has to defend a positive change from the status quo and their evidence concedes that these operations exist. What does the 1AC do is the operative question?

#### Their OWN ev says so. 1AC Mezzadra and Nielsen says quote “the operation is effectual rather than performative, the sense in which it is productive of something other than itself.”

#### Challenges to neoliberalism fails – Focus on orientation, language, consciousness, culture, and ethics is a self-fulfilling prophecy that affirms futile resistance and trades off with real activism.

**Smith 19** (Shawn Nicholas Smith has a Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Texas, Austin. “BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT: BOOKER T. WASHINGTON AND RHETORICAL INTERVENTION IN MARKETS”. May 2019)

The Federal Reserve and the monetary policy surrounding it demonstrate how private interest is an integral part of the U.S. economy, monetary policy, and government. For this reason, **it is imprudent to suggest that neoliberalism**, the takeover of public modes of operation with privatization, **is a new phenomenon.** Rather, the very logic of European capitalist governments carries within it the incipient prioritized monetary motive. The market motive, when prioritized, bends the fabric of society toward the pursuit of profit and away from the common good.86 As I have shown in this chapter, the European capitalist state began thwarting opportunities for a common humanity prior to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade first with the enslavement of Europeans, then Africans. As such, the marriage of the public and the private did not begin in 1970, but instead has its origins in the fifth century with the fall of the Western Holy Roman Empire.87 To mistake this fact is also to mislabel the necessary actions of neoliberal resistance in the current era. **Giroux is wrong: modern resistance movements like Occupy and The Battle in Seattle did little to jeopardize the neoliberal scene**.88 In fact, the very problems of neoliberal state society have hastened, not slowed, in the last two decades.89 **When we misidentify the root problem of the neoliberal scene, we mischaracterize traditional protest and resistance as viable solutions** to the neoliberal conundrum and omit other useful strategies, particularly those that involve the very markets we wish to resist. Conclusion The above history I have provided is long and deep. This **history highlights both the limitations of contemporary neoliberal criticism and represents a pragmatic rhetorical tradition defined by an evolutionary model of ideation.** Deep within the unfolding of time from the Middle Ages to the present, we have seen how Europe was seduced by a capitalist psychosis following from a basic Orientation of Markets. Importantly, we have also seen how the perversion of capital is not merely a symptom of the state but is instead an offspring of the state as modern governments, infected with the habits of desperate feudal merchants, became the first corporations. Every orientation comes with it a certain training that teaches us how and what tools to select in order to deal with our challenges. **In some ways, orientation is the source of our problems** and solutions. That is, problems and their solutions are made possible when we view experience from a unique ontological and epistemological standpoint. As Burke writes, One’s ideas of relationship obviously have a great deal to do with the selection of means under such circumstances. Savages could make fires by considering dry wood and friction as appropriate linkages in the process of fire-making.”90 **Orientations can cause us to make inefficient connections between events and therefore draw ineffective conclusions** as in the tribe person who, believing the missionary wore the rain coat to bring rain instead of shield against rain, asked the missionary to wear the rain coat to protect against drought. This demonstrates a “faulty selection of means due to a faulty theory of causal relationships.”91 Similarly, the Orientation of Markets transforms humans into agents of markets. Rather than maintain money and markets as abstractions designed to serve human needs, the Orientation of Markets and the subsequent capitalist psychosis configures humans in market terms. They can either be owner or owned by markets, or sometimes both at the same time, but there is seldom room to be anything else. Such a psychosis, the corresponding social structure that follows from an Orientation of Markets has been the mainstay of society for over 1000 years. Race helped to jumpstart capitalism and continues to be a site for the investigation of the transformation of capital. So, **what is the way out and forward**? **The central escape from a corporate governmentality** and ascendant logic **of** race and **capital requires various forms of pragmatic force.** As James Baldwin writes, Black folks must use any available means of persuasion in order to turn the tides of oppression. Indeed, for Baldwin, troubling the pious linkages surrounding Black folks are the key in transforming national, international and governmental consciousness. Interrupting the pious association of the terms “Europe” and “Civilization,” Baldwin imagines nationhood and governmentality absent a Euro-centric logic: This is because White Americans have supposed ‘Europe’ and ‘civilization’ to be synonyms which they are not –and have been distrustful of other standards and other sources of vitality, especially those produced in America itself…What it comes to is that if we, who can scarcely be considered a White nation, persist in thinking of ourselves as one, we condemn ourselves with the truly White nations, to sterility and decay, whereas if we could accept ourselves as we are, we might bring new life to the Western achievements and transform them. The price of this transformation is the unconditional freedom of the Negro.92

### Presumption

#### Presumption ALWAYS flips neg against K affs – That places a hard cap on debatable material since it ensures the aff must robustly defend their advocacy AND that the negative has a shot at engagement.

#### Now, vote neg:

#### They cant solve public space operations. Their evidence is about repurposing technology but they have no description for what that means or how they get NASA’s tech.

#### Counteroperations fail. They get crushed by backlash which matters since they conceded these operations are only valuable if they SUCCESSFUL. How do they beat NewSpace?

### AT: Case Proper

#### Their Genovese 17 evidence lists out elements of technoscientific development they disagree with. It says quote technoscientific development—as I have argued in previous chapters—science and science fiction are melded into a Baudrillardian simulation where artificial intelligence, autonomous rocket boosters that land on autonomous drone ships, and a constant human presence in outer space is the sedimentation of hyperreality.

#### We’ll defend these simulations as good.

#### Crisis Escalation- Computational entanglement through AI and autonomous weapons solves crisis escalation.

Corneliu Bjola 19, Head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, University of Oxford, 11/10/19, “Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_en/contenido?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari98-2019-bjola-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

Taking note of the fact that developments in AI are so dynamic and the implications so wide-ranging, another report prepared by a German think tank calls on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to immediately begin planning strategies that can respond effectively to the influence of AI in international affairs. Economic disruption, security & autonomous weapons, and democracy & ethics are the three areas they identify as priorities at the intersection of AI and foreign policy. Although they believe that transformational changes to diplomatic institutions will eventually be needed to meet the challenges ahead, they favour, in the short term, an incremental approach to AI that builds on the successes (and learns from the failures) of “cyber-foreign policy”, which, in many countries, has been already internalised in the culture of the relevant institutions, including of the MFAs.13 In the same vein, the authors of a report prepared for the Centre for a New American Security see great potential for AI in national security-related areas, including diplomacy. For example, AI can help improve communication between governments and foreign publics by lowering language barriers between countries, enhance the security of diplomatic missions via image recognition and information sorting technologies, and support international humanitarian operations by monitoring elections, assisting in peacekeeping operations, and ensuring that financial aid disbursements are not misused through anomaly detection.14

From an AI perspective, consular services could be a low-hanging fruit for AI integration in diplomacy as decisions are amenable to digitisation, the analytical contribution is reasonable relevant and the technology favours collaboration between users and the machine. Consular services rely on highly structured decisions, as they largely involve recurring and routinised operations based on clear and stable procedures, which do not need to be treated as new each time a decision has to be made (except for crisis situations, which are discussed further below). From a knowledge perspective, AI-assisted consular services may embody declarative (know-what) and procedural knowledge (know-how) to automate routinised operations and scaffold human cognition by reducing cognitive effort. This can be done by using data mining and data discovery techniques to organize the data and make it possible to identify patterns and relationships that would be difficult to observe otherwise (e.g., variation of demand for services by location, time, and audience profile).Case study #1: AI as Digital Consul Assistant

The consulate of country X has been facing uneven demand for emergency passports, visa requests and business certifications in the past five years. The situation has led to a growing backlog, significant loss of public reputation and a tense relationship between the consulate and the MFA. An AI system trained with data from the past five years uses descriptive analytics to identify patterns in the applications and concludes that August, May and December are the most likely months to witness an increase of the demand in the three categories next year. AI predictions are confirmed for August and May but not for December. AI recalibrates its advice using updated data and the new predictions help consular officers manage requests more effectively. As the MFA confidence in the AI system grows, the digital assistant is then introduced to other consulates experiencing similar problems.

Digital platforms could also emerge as indispensable tools for managing diplomatic crises in the digital age and for good reasons. They can help embassies and MFAs make sense of the nature and gravity of the events in real-time, streamline the decision-making process, manage the public’s expectations, and facilitate crisis termination. At the same time, they need to be used with great care as factual inaccuracies, coordination gaps, mismatched disclosure level, and poor symbolic signalling could easily derail digital efforts of crisis management.15 AI systems could provide great assistance to diplomats in times of crisis by helping them make sense of what it is happening (descriptive analytics) and identify possible trends (predictive analytics). The main challenge for AI is the semi-structured nature of the decisions to be taken. While many MFAs have pre-designed plans to activate in case of a crisis, it is safe to assume that reality often defies the best crafted plans. Given the high level of uncertainty in which crisis decision-making operates and the inevitable scrutiny and demand of accountability to occur if something goes wrong, AI integration can work only if humans retain control over the process. As a recent SIPRI study pointed out, AI systems may fail spectacularly when confronted with tasks or environments that differ slightly to those they were trained for. Their algorithms are also opaque, which makes difficult for humans to explain how they work and whether they include bias that could lead to problematic –if not dangerous– behaviours.16

1. **The alternative is human-centric warfare is privy to biases, error, and ethical practices---LAWs are net better.**

**Umbrello, et al, 20**—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, 35, 273–282 (2020),)

Yet, we would argue, such positions are predicated on an **unfounded fear** that taking control away from humans will enable robotic weaponry to **demolish current**, **human-involved warfare practices**. **Extrapolating techno-development trends into the future**, it is **reasonable to expect** future robotic weapons to acquire the capacity to **reliably** and **accurately differentiate** between combatants and noncombatants (Sharkey 2012; Egeland 2016); this **could even occur in the near future** (see Guizzo 2016). Indeed, Ronald Arkin (2008) anticipates such technologies—in particular, recognition software—to not only be **developed** but **surpass human performance capabilities** (see also O’Meara 2011; Egeland 2016). As he writes, “we must protect the innocent non-combatants in the battlespace far better than we currently do. Technology can, must, and should be used toward that end.” Like Nadeau, Arkin believes that moral LAWs would act in an **ethically superior way** to humans in war, saying that: The commonplace occurrence of slaughtering civilians in conflict over millennia gives rise to my pessimism in reforming human behaviour yet provides optimism for robots being able to exceed human moral performance in similar circumstances (Arkin 2015). One must also take into account the consequences of humans personally engaging in warfare. Historical records, including those of concurrent military engagements, recount numerous acts of barbarism as a result of the harsh conditions that combatants are exposed to (Arkin 2015). In fact, Lin et al. (2008) discuss how one of the most attractive prospects of LAWs is their inability to be affected by emotions on the battlefield (Lin et al. 2008). It is the emotional distress that often causes combatants to mistreat the enemy and commit war crimes. Hence, the introduction of LAWs that are unaffected by such emotional stress serves as an incentive for continued development (Klincewicz 2015).3 Second, the **emotional** and **physical pressures** that human combatants must endure during wartime have **performance costs**. The fatigue of a long and drawn-out battle affects the ability of individual soldiers to **perform optimally**, and thus affects the **accuracy of their shots** (Burke et al. 2007; Nibbeling et al. 2014). LAWs are **naturally unaffected** by similar physical pitfalls and can always—as long as the physical infrastructure is designed optimally from the start—permit the LAWs to **continually perform accurately** and **as expected**. The ability for LAWs to engage in **unwavering**, **precise combat** also **resolves some ethical issues** that arise from human-waged war. In light of the fact that LAWs do not possess emotions to guide their behaviors or personal stakes that affect their combat approaches, LAWs will always perform duties accurately under **even the most** physically—or to a human, emotionally—**stressful conditions**, thus enabling them to, at least more often than not, kill in a **more humane manner**. LAWs can be programmed to only engage targets in manners deemed most ethical based on the dynamics of war at the time of combat: the changing environment, the weapons being used by both the aggressor and the defender, and the characteristics of the target (human, robot, or physical structure). **Already**, computerized weapons platforms can engage targets **far more accurately than any human counterpart can** (Geibel 1997; Shachtman 2007; Katz and Lappin 2012; United States Navy 2017). Strong arguments can be levied that LAWs outfitted with such weapons platforms could engage in otherwise normal wartime duties but in a means that is **far more accurate** and thus **ethical**4 as a consequence of LAWs’ **technological superiority**. Part of this ethical prowess exhibited by LAWs is not only because they **never tire**, but because they are **impervious** to the **psychological shortcomings of humans**. Though a contentious topic, **several high-profile cognitive psychologists** suggest that humans **fabricate reasons for their actions after committing them** (Davidson 1982; Nadeau 2006). Thus, it is human to be **irrational**, to **make unreasoned decisions** toward an action that is then validated after carrying through. Such is **not the nature of a robot**. As mentioned, LAWs **do not have any particular affinity to** or **personal interests in surviving battle**; they **do not have any drive to exhibit particular harshness** against enemies of a certain culture; and they **do not**, outside of their goals, **worry about winning the war** and heading back home after using any unsavory methods to do so. What they do mind is their **particular set of rules**, their **value-laden code** that dictates **how they are to conduct themselves in an ethical manner** during combat.

# 1NC [part two]

## 3

#### CP—Do the aff except in instances of violence. In response to the unjust appropriation of outer space by private entities, we will affirm nonviolent global orbital counter-operations.

#### The CP solves but competes through nonviolence. Their capitulation to violence as an organizational strategy invokes a violent form of self-preservation that destroys challenges to racial cap.

**Butler 20** JudithButler, Comparative Literature @ Berkeley, 20, “The force of nonviolence: The ethical in the political.” Verso Books, 2020.29-32.

One of **the most popular argument**s on the left **to defend the tactical use of violence** begins with the claim that many people already live in the force field of violence. Because violence **is** already happening, the argument continues, there is no real choice about whether or not to enter into violence through one’s action: **we are already inside the field of violence**. According to that view, the distance that moral deliberation takes on the question of whether or not to act in a violent way is a privilege and luxury, betraying something about the power of its own location. In that view, the consideration of violent action is not a choice, since one is already—and unwillingly—within the force field of violence. Because violence is happening all the time (and it is happening regularly to minorities), such resistance is but a form of counter-violence. 7 Apart from a general and traditional left claim about the necessity of a “violent struggle” for revolutionary purposes, there are more specific justificatory strategies at work: violence is happening against us, so we are justified in taking violent action against those who (a) started the violence and (b) directed it against us. We do this in the name of our own lives and our right to persist in the world. As for the claim that resistance to violence is counter-violence, we might still pose a set of questions: Even if violence is circulating all the time and we find ourselves in a force field of violence, do we want to have a say about whether violence continues to circulate? If it circulates all the time, is it therefore inevitable that it circulates? What would it mean to dispute the inevitability of its circulation? The argument may be, “Others do it, and so should we”; or else, “Others do it against us, so we should do it against them, in the name of self-preservation.” These are each different, but important claims. The first holds to a principle of straightforward reciprocity, suggesting that whatever actions the other takes, I am licensed to take as well. **That line of** **argumentation**, however, sidesteps the question of whether what the other does is justifiable. The second claim **links violence with self-defense and self-preservation**, an argument we will take up in the subsequent chapters. For the moment, though, let us ask: **Who is this “self” defended in the name of selfdefense? 8 How is that self delineated from other selves, from history, land, or other defining relations?** Is the one to whom violence is done not also in some sense part of the “self” who defends itself through an act of violence? There is a sense in which violence done to another is at once a violence done to the self, but only if the relation between them defines them both quite fundamentally. This last proposition indicates a central concern of this book. For if the one who practices nonviolence is related to the one against whom violence is contemplated, then there appears to be a prior social relation between them; they are part of one another, or one self is implicated in another self. **Nonviolence would**, then, be a way **of acknowledg**ing that **social relation**, however fraught it may be, and of affirming the normative aspirations that follow from that prior social relatedness. As a result, an ethics of nonviolence cannot be predicated on individualism, and it must take the lead in waging a critique of individualism as the basis of ethics and politics alike. An ethics and politics of nonviolence would have to account for this way that selves are implicated in each other’s lives, bound by a set of relations that can be as destructive as they can be sustaining. The relations that bind and define extend **beyond the dyadic human encounter**, which is why nonviolence pertains not only to human relations, but to all living **and inter-constitutive relations**. To launch this inquiry into social relations, however, we would have to know what kind of potential or actual social bond holds between both subjects in a violent encounter. **If the self is constituted through its relations with others, then part of what it means to preserve or negate a self is to preserve** or negate the extended social ties that define the self and its world. Over and against the idea that the self will be bound to act violently in the name of its individual self-preservation, this inquiry supposes that nonviolence requires a critique of egological ethics as well as of the political legacy of individualism in order to open up the idea of selfhood as a fraught field of social relationality. That relationality is, of course, defined in part by negativity, that is, by conflict, anger, and aggression. The destructive potential of human relations does not deny all relationality, and relational perspectives cannot evade the persistence of this potential or actual destruction of social ties. As a result, **relationality is not by itself a good thing**, a sign of connectedness, an ethical norm to be posited over and against destruction: rather, relationality is a vexed and ambivalent field in which the question of ethical obligation has to be worked out in light of a persistent and constitutive destructive potential. Whatever “doing the right thing” turns out to be, it depends on passing through the division or struggle that conditions that ethical decision to begin with. That task is never exclusively reflexive, that is, dependent on my relation to myself alone. Indeed, when the world presents as a force field of violence, the task of nonviolence is to find ways of living and acting in that world such that violence is checked or ameliorated, or its direction turned, precisely at moments when it seems to saturate that world and offer no way out. The body can be the vector of that turn, but so too can discourse, collective practices, infrastructures, and institutions. **In response to the objection that a position in favor of nonviolence is simply unrealistic, this argument maintains that nonviolence requires a critique of what counts as reality, and it affirms the power and necessity of counterrealism in times like these**. Perhaps nonviolence requires a certain leavetaking from reality as it is currently constituted, laying open the possibilities that belong to a newer political imaginary. Many on the left argue that they believe in nonviolence but make an exception for self-defense. To understand their claim, we would need to know who the “self” is—its territorial limits and boundaries, its constitutive ties. If the self that I defend is me, my relatives, others who belong to my community, nation, or religion, or those who share a language with me, then I am a closet communitarian who will, it seems, preserve the lives of those who are like me, but certainly not those who are unlike me. Moreover, I apparently live **in a world in which that “self” is recognizable as a self**. Once we see that **certain selves are considered worth defending while others are not,** is there not a problem of inequality that follows from the justification of violence in the service of selfdefense? One cannot explain this form of inequality, which accords measures of grievability to groups across the global spectrum, without taking account of the racial schemes that make such grotesque distinctions between which lives are valuable (and potentially grievable, if lost) and those which are not. Given that self-defense is very often regarded as the justifiable exception to the norms guiding a nonviolent practice, we have to consider both (a) who counts as such a self and (b) how encompassing is the “self” of self-defense (again, does it include one’s family, community, religion, nation, traditional land, customary practices?). For lives not considered grievable (those treated as if they can be neither lost nor mourned), dwelling already **in what** Frantz **Fanon called “the zone of non-being,”** the assertion of a life that matters, as we see in the Black Lives Matter movement, can break through the schema. Lives matter in the sense that they assume physical form within the sphere of appearance; lives matter because they are to be valued equally. And yet, the claim of self-defense on the part of those who wield power is too often a defense of power, of its prerogatives, and of the inequalities it presupposes and produces. **The “self” who is defended in such cases is one who identifies with others who belong to whiteness**, to a specific nation, to a party in a border dispute; and so the terms of self-defense augment the purposes of war. Such a “self” can function as a kind of regime, including as part of its extended self all those who bear similitude to one’s color, class, and privilege, thus expelling from the regime of the subject/self all those marked by difference within that economy. Although we think of self-defense as a response to a blow initiated from the outside, **the privileged self requires no such instigation to draw its boundaries and police its exclusions. “Any possible threat”—that is, any imagined threat, any phantasm of threat—is enough to unleash its self-entitled violence**. As the philosopher Elsa Dorlin has pointed out, only some selves are regarded as entitled to selfdefense. 9 Whose claims of self-defense, for instance, are more readily believed in a court of law, and whose are more likely to be discounted and dismissed? Who, in other words, bears a self that is regarded as defensible, an existence that can appear within the legal frames of power as a life worthy, worth defending, not worth losing?

## 4

#### CP- Do the aff minus their rejection of politics.

#### They suture neoliberalism-- individual action depoliticizes any concrete power struggles and causes climate change, fascism, and rampant inequality.

Gude 12 Shawn Gude, Shawn Gude is an associate editor at Jacobin. “Occupy Anti-Politics.” Jacobin. November 13, 2012. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2012/11/occupy-anti-politics

In my new neighborhood, in Baltimore, “Occupy the Vote: Re-Elect Obama” signs still pepper the landscape. They’re planted in front yards, posted in front windows, positioned on sidewalk strips. This irks me, to an extent — this wanton appropriation of the Occupy name, used to declare allegiance to a president firmly ensconced in the very neoliberal consensus the movement hoped to dislodge. Yet as much as I find the diction disquieting, its social movement-electoral politics linkage is provocative and pregnant, given Occupy’s missteps. Last year at this time, the Left was emboldened and highly visible. And now? Occupiers are providing important support to existing struggles and launching their own campaigns. Last week, Sarah Jaffe documented Occupy’s heartening role in the post-Sandy recovery [in these pages](http://jacobinmag.com/2012/11/power-to-the-people/). But this is all occurring locally, on a relatively small scale. As [Thomas Frank points out](http://www.thebaffler.com/past/to_the_precinct_station) in the current issue of the Baffler, the term “the one percent” has been the movement’s only lasting contribution to national politics; a tax code classification morphed into a usefully polarizing pejorative. But that’s it. The way Obama and Romney campaigned, you’d think Occupy never happened. So what went wrong? Frank is unsparing in his criticism, hitting occupiers for being self-absorbed and self-aggrandizing, more taken by esoteric theorizing than apt to take consequential action. Frank also assembles a rather conventional list of objections to Occupy: its absence of enumerated demands, its consensus model and distaste for structure, its outsized love for building community. The blows that really land all have a common thread. Each are, at bottom, instances of occupiers’ aversion to politics. This antipathy wasn’t unanimous among the movement’s ranks, but it was pervasive. And it was, along with police repression, one of the key reasons Occupy failed. Early on, many occupiers, myself included, fretted that established progressive groups and Democratic partisans would try to funnel the élan of Occupy into mainstream politics; the movement would then quickly wither and die. Co-opt: utter the word, and the implicated party was instantly put on the defensive. These worries weren’t entirely born of paranoia, and activists were right to keep a wary eye on the center-left. But the vigilance had the unfortunate tendency of cloistering and marginalizing the movement. Activists customarily viewed anyone connected to electoral politics with suspicion. And when not a few occupiers averred that the movement was resolutely anti-political, they weren’t being glib — they meant electoral politics, the political process, everything. The world they sought would have no politics, no debased struggles for power. They didn’t just want to democratize power, but eradicate it. In their minds, the encampments were harmonious, experimental sites of prefiguration, a glimpse into the politics-free future. Transforming a stodgy corporate park into a liveable space, they would provide the model. The desire to foster community and build emotional bonds was well-intentioned and, in small doses, salutary. Developing and maintaining relationships is vitally important to retaining and attracting new people, to building a strong movement. Casual participants are more apt to leave — or limit their involvement — if they lack personal connections to other movement members. Particularly trying junctures are easier to handle if you know your comrades have your back, and vice versa. Facing a phalanx of riot cops becomes disconcerting, not disabling (that is, until they start letting their truncheons fly). So community is important. Occupiers were wrong, however, when they viewed it as a resounding step towards a more egalitarian, just society. I remember a beautiful moment this spring. It was a Sunday night in Chicago, the weekend of the Occupy anti-NATO protests. Most everyone was tired after several days of meandering marching. Following a thousands-strong, permitted march earlier in the day, several hundred of us had tried and failed to break through a police line; our chimerical goal was to shut down the conference. Now it was night, and hundreds of us had headed north to the Art Institute, the site of a dinner for NATO leaders’ spouses. Police ringed the building. We could make some noise and mount a sit-in, but little else. Soon, it started pouring. The rain didn’t precipitate despair among the youthful throng, though, but euphoria. There was a street dance party, and then a group hug. A feeling of deep, visceral cohesiveness with my fellow occupiers overcame me. I felt fulfilled. This was, in many ways, Occupy encapsulated. It was marvelous. And, in retrospect, meaningless. The one percent is content with the fetishization of feelings, because it poses little threat to their plutocratic power: Build your small, mutual aid communities. We’ll continue our rapacious behavior, unmolested and untouched. We’ll continue to brandish the coercive power of the state, a state that, if so pressured, could pose an existential threat to capitalist power. Politically, Occupy accomplished little because we were often too wary of acting politically, of making demands on the political system, of acknowledging conflict and structuring our movement accordingly. Many in the movement thought structure carried the patina of the establishment, that demand making would simply serve to legitimize the malevolent state. So we got an amorphous, highly decentralized movement that, after a miraculous flourish in its embryonic stages, tapered off. This wasn’t the practice of politics. It was an attempt to transcend it. Joseph Schwartz, a political philosopher at Temple University, argues in his 1995 book The Permanence of the Political that the Left has long had these anti-political inclinations — “either through the stifling solidaristic general will of Rousseau, the spontaneous postscarcity anarchism of Marx’s ‘full communism,’ or the technocratic, scientistic rule of Lenin’s vanguard party.” Schwartz continues: [A]lthough viewed by some as patron saints of “radical democracy,” these theorists did not conceptualize a further democratization of political life but rather the transcendence of politics through the creation of societies characterized by minimal social conflict and universally shared conceptions of the public or human good. Sound familiar? Even for those who find the state of American politics repulsive (and I, emphatically, do) the principle, the idea, of politics and the democratic process must be defended. Jaundiced resignation redounds to the benefit of the Right. They relish anti-political cynicism. They oppose concerted collective action, so they harness the sentiment to subvert politics itself. They adopt a sort of aloof, cooler-than-thou detachment from the political arena, a pernicious posture that ineluctably elevates apathy and inaction to the status of beau ideal. Politics-averse leftists risk falling into the same pattern of passivity and discrediting the necessarily political solutions to our social ills. What we have in the case of climate change, for example, is both the largest market failure and most daunting collective action problem in human history. The hyper-decentralized, quasi-primitivist solutions popular in some corners of the radical left are laughably inadequate or execrably anti-humanist. The antidote to a collective problem is collective action. So too with issues of inequality, poverty, and imperialism. Acting politically means confronting power, not side-stepping it. It means reshaping existing institutions, not just building alternative ones. It means directly and indirectly engaging the state, not cocooning oneself from it. Even as we on the democratic left offer impassioned critiques of our political system we mustn’t eschew politics. We’ve already seen what that can do to our most promising social movements.