### 1NC – Contracts

#### Morality must be internally motivating because we must internalize and care about external claims for them to drive action, which means external motivation collapses.

Joyce 01 [Joyce, Richard – Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington. The Myth of Morality. pp. 109-110. 2001. https://tonysss.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/the-myth-of-morality.pdf]

How could an external reason fulfill the condition quoted above? Let us first see how an internal reason does. Suppose I am thirsty, but unbeknownst to me the cup of coffee I am (reasonably) reaching for contains poison. I have an internal reason not to drink, in that I have a desire not to poisoned, and refraining from drinking helps satisfy that desire. Because of my ignorance, of course, the reason explains nothing about my actions – but it could. If I were to be granted true beliefs on the matter, then I would refrain from drinking, and the reason would explain that inaction. This explanation would presumably be a matter of psychological causation: the belief that the coffee was poisoned coupled with the desire not to be poisoned causes my act of refraining.2 (This is not to say that these two states automatically result in that action – I may be irrational and drink the poison anyway.) Back to the external reason. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. Regardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink – I have a reason not to drink. But how could that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the external reason even explain my refraining from drinking? Clearly, in order to explain it the external reason must have some causally efficacious role among the antecedents of the action (in this case, an omission) – I must have, in some manner, “internalized” it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim: I believe that the coffee is tapu. There’s no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions – including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the belief alone can produce action, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that in order to explain an action the belief must couple with desires (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with desiderative elements – but in that case the putative external reason collapses into an internal one.3 We started out discussing normative reasons, but, if we follow Williams, the argument quickly becomes one about motivating reasons, and about the Humean conception of action in general. In short, if Hume is correct that action requires belief and desire operating together, then an external reason could never explain an action, for even if the subject believes the reason claim, action will ensue only if certain desires are present.

#### Additionally, agents can only be motivated by their own desires – a) Opacity: We can’t see into other people’s minds which means their desires and motivation can’t have influence on our motivation, b) People are self-interested; if they weren’t nothing bad would ever happen because everyone would just be selfless all the time, c) Desires are infinite and incommunicable.

#### Contracts solve – people agree to certain constraints to better promote their self-interest. People agree to channel their desires and in doing so, establish a set of moral agreements.

**Gauthier 86** [Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print]

Moral principles are introduced as the objects of full voluntary ex ante agreement among rational persons.  Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.  But the parties to agreement are real, determinate individuals, distinguished by their capacities, situations, and concerns.  In so far as [Since] they would agree to constraints on their choices, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.  As rational persons understanding the structure of their interaction, they recognize for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarian principles of mutual restraint. This is when people agree to constrain their actions for their own self-interest. To clarify, obligations arise from restraints we place on ourselves by entering contracts.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Actor Specificity – states are not moral entities but derive authority from the contracts that allows them to constrain action. This outweighs on empirics – states aren’t bound by moral obligations, but they are by their contracts to other entities.

#### 2] Performativity – you agree to 4 minutes of prep and if you tried to go over the judges would vote you down – their very performance justifies the NC framework and proves it collapses.

#### 3] Regress – we can always question morality – authority begs the question of why their assessment ought to be preferred over other assessments – Contractarianism avoids this by allowing individuals to construct conceptions of the good based on a rational restriction of their future actions.

#### 4] Consent – contractarianism is based on consent which determines what qualifies as a net good or harm. Moral theories must be based in consent otherwise actions could never be determinate.

#### Now negate –

#### 1] Striking cannot be unconditionally justified under contracts. Workers enter a contract when they agree to work for their employer in exchange for money. Breaking that contract by refusing to work but expecting pay is a violation of said contract.

#### 2] A just government would be one that is consistent with contracts so it wouldn’t recognize a right that allows workers to break contracts

### 1NC – Police PIC

#### CP Text: A just government should recognize the unconditional right of non-police workers to strike, abolishing police unions.

#### The aff makes police collective bargaining worse and gives more power to police unions.

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- ("What is The Blue Flue and How Has It Increased Police Power," Washington Post, 7-1-2020, 11-2-2021https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/)//AW

This weekend, officers from the New York City Police Department are rumored to be planning a walkout to protest calls to defund the police. This builds on a similar tactic used by police in Atlanta less than a month ago. On June 16, Fulton County District Attorney, Paul L. Howard Jr. announced that Garrett Rolfe, the Atlanta police officer who fatally shot Rayshard Brooks, would face charges of felony murder and aggravated assault. That night, scores of Atlanta Police Department officers caught the “blue flu,” calling out sick en masse to protest the charges against Rolfe. Such walkouts constitute, in effect, illegal strikes — laws in all 50 states prohibit police strikes. Yet, there is nothing new about the blue flu. It is a strategy long employed by police unions and rank-and-file officers during contract negotiations, disputes over reforms and, like in Atlanta, in response to disciplinary action against individual officers. The intent is to dramatize police disputes with municipal government and rally the citizenry to their side. But the result of such protests matter deeply as we consider police reform today. Historically, blue flu strikes have helped expand police power, ultimately limiting the ability of city governments to reform, constrain or conduct oversight over the police. They allow the police to leverage public fear of crime to extract concessions from municipalities.

#### Police unions use collective bargaining to reinforce systems of racism and violence. Clark ‘19

Paul F. Clark [School Director and Professor of Labor and Employment Relations, Penn State], 10-10-2019, "Why police unions are not part of the American labor movement," Conversation, [https://theconversation.com/why-police-unions-are-not-part-of-the-american-labor-movement-142538 //accessed 10/20/2021](https://theconversation.com/why-police-unions-are-not-part-of-the-american-labor-movement-142538%20//accessed%2010/20/2021) //marlborough jh

In the wake of George Floyd’s death at the hands of a Minneapolis police officer, news reports have suggested that [police unions bear some of the responsibility](https://www.salon.com/2020/06/27/police-unions-blamed-for-rise-in-fatal-shootings-even-as-crime-plummeted/) for the [violence perpetrated against African Americans](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html). ¶Critics have assailed these unions for [protecting officers who have abused their authority](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/09/limits-when-police-can-use-force-is-better-solution-than-banning-police-unions/). Derek Chauvin, the former police officer facing [second-degree murder charges for Floyd’s death](https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868910542/chauvin-and-3-former-officers-face-new-charges-over-george-floyds-death), had nearly [20 complaints filed against him during his career](https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/05/30/minneapolis-officers-work-personal-background-detailed-2/) but only received two letters of reprimand. ¶Many people who support labor unions in principle, who view them as a countervailing force against the power of employers, have only recently [come to view police unions as problematic](https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-15/police-unions-george-floyd-reform) – as entities that [perpetuate a culture of racism and violence](https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses). But this sentiment reverberates through the history of the U.S. labor movement. As a [labor scholar](https://ler.la.psu.edu/people/pfc2) who has [written about unions](https://theconversation.com/essential-us-workers-often-lack-sick-leave-and-health-care-benefits-taken-for-granted-in-most-other-countries-136802) for [decades](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjir.12526), I think this viewpoint can be explained by the fact that police unions differ fundamentally from almost all trade unions in America. Foot soldiers for the status quo For many veterans of the labor movement, [police have been on the wrong side](https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-3) of the centuries-old struggle between workers and employers. [Rather than side with other members of the working class](https://www.businessinsider.com/mayhem-in-madison-police-remove-protesters-lockdown-capitol-2011-3), police have used their legal authority to protect businesses and private property, enforcing laws viewed by many as anti-union. The strain between law enforcement and labor goes back to the origins of [American unions in the mid 19th century](https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-3). Workers formed unions to fight for wage increases, reduced working hours and humane working conditions. For employers, this was an attack on the existing societal power structure. They enlisted the government as the defender of capital and property rights, and [police officers were the foot soldiers](http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/22/police-unions-havealwaysbeenalabormovementapart.html) who defended the status quo. ¶When workers managed to form unions, companies called on local police to disperse union gatherings, marches and picket lines, using [violence and mass arrests to break the will of strikers](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-1897-massacre-pennsylvania-coal-miners-morphed-galvanizing-crisis-forgotten-history-180971695/). A narrow focus Police work is a fundamentally conservative act. And police officers tend to be politically conservative and Republican. A poll of police [conducted in September 2016 by POLICE Magazine](https://www.policemag.com/342098/the-2016-police-presidential-poll) found that 84% of officers intended to vote for Donald Trump that November. And law enforcement unions like the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Union of Police Associations and the National Border Patrol Council [all endorsed Trump’s candidacy in 2016](https://theintercept.com/2016/10/09/police-unions-reject-charges-of-bias-find-a-hero-in-donald-trump/). This contrasts sharply with the 39% share of all [union voters who voted for Trump](https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-labor-to-stem-flow-of-union-voters-to-trump-11567422002) and the fact that every other union which made an [endorsement supported Hillary Clinton](https://justfacts.votesmart.org/candidate/evaluations/55463/hillary-clinton). Exclusively protecting the interests of their members, without consideration for other workers, also sets police unions apart from other labor groups. Yes, the first priority of any union is to fight for their members, but most other unions see that fight in the context of a [larger movement that fights for all workers](https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/social-economic-justice). Police unions do not see themselves as [part of this movement](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-to-know-police-unions-labor-movement). With one exception – the [International Union of Police Associations](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/11/police-unions-american-labor-movement-protest), which represents just [2.7% of American police](https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ftelea9716.pdf) – law enforcement unions are not affiliated with the AFL-CIO, the U.S. labor body that unites all unions. Alternative justice system A central concern with police unions is that they use collective bargaining to negotiate contracts that reduce police transparency and accountability. This allows officers who engage in excessive violence to [avoid the consequences of their actions](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/) and remain on the job. In a way, some police unions have created an [alternative justice system](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/restorative-justice-police-violence/489221/) that prevents police departments and municipalities from disciplining or discharging officers who have committed crimes against the people they are sworn to serve. In Minneapolis, residents filed more than [2,600 misconduct complaints](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-with-police-unions-11591830984) against police officers between 2012 and 2020. But only 12 of those grievances resulted in discipline. The most significant [punishment any officer received was a 40-hour suspension](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html). Besides collective bargaining, police have used the political process – including [candidate endorsements and lobbying](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/23/police-unions-spending-policy-reform-chicago-new-york-la) – to secure local and state legislation that protects their members and quells efforts to provide greater police accountability. Police officers are a formidable political force because they represent [the principle of law and order](https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-gop-and-police-unions-a-love-story). Candidates endorsed by the police unions can claim they are the law and order candidate. Once these candidates win office, police unions have [significant leverage to lobby for policies](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/george-floyd-protests-police-abuse-reform-qualified-immunity-polls.html) they support or block those they oppose. Because of this power, critics claim that police unions don’t feel accountable to the citizens they serve. An attorney who sued the Minneapolis Police Department on behalf of a Black resident who was [severely beaten by police officers](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html) said that he is convinced that Minneapolis “officers think they don’t have to abide by their own training and rules when dealing with the public.” George Floyd’s death has raised serious concerns about the current role of police and police unions in our society. Several unions have demanded that the International Union of Police Associations be expelled from the U.S. labor federation. Other [unions oppose expulsion](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/national-labor-groups-mostly-close-ranks-defend-police-unions-n1231573). They argue that the labor movement can have a greater impact on a police union that is inside the “House of Labor.” In any case, there is a growing recognition that police unions differ significantly from other unions. And there is a growing acceptance that they are not part of the larger American labor movement but rather a narrowly focused group pursuing their own self-interests, often to the detriment of the nation at large.

#### Police backed by unions are more violent than non-unionized police. Ingraham ’20.

Christopher Ingraham [Reporter] 20. ("Police Unions and Police Misconduct: What the Research Says About the Connection," Washington Post, 6-10-2020, 10-27-2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/)//AW

Some of the most shocking images to emerge from the demonstrations that have dominated recent headlines stem from violent interactions between law enforcement officers and peaceful protesters. They’ve also escalated calls for police reform. But police unions tend to be resistant to such efforts, as their mandate is to protect the interests of their members — even in cases when those interests may be counter to democratic norms and values. Though an understudied topic of criminology, what research that does exist is unequivocal: “Virtually **all** of the **published items** that express an opinion **on the impact of police unions regard them as having a negative effect**, particularly **on innovation, accountability, and police — community relations**,” as a review in the journal Police Practice and Research put it. Researchers say unionized officers draw more excessive-force complaints and are more likely to kill civilians, particularly nonwhite ones. Here are some key findings: Unionization emboldens violent officers A recent University of Chicago working paper found violent misconduct among sheriff’s officers increased about 40 percent after a state supreme court ruling allowing the officers to unionize. The incidents examined in this paper are among the most serious types of violent misconduct, including sexual assault and excessive force. It’s worth noting the baseline numbers of these types of incidents are very low, such that the 40 percent increase translates into roughly one additional violent incident per sheriff’s office every five years. Certain union-negotiated contract provisions — including time limits on misconduct investigations, expungement of misconduct records, and mechanisms allowing officers to challenge disciplinary findings — make it more difficult to detect and punish officers who abuse their position, the researchers say. Additionally, the authors write, unionization “may increase solidarity among officers and thereby strengthen a code of silence that impedes the detection of misconduct.” Use-of-force complaints more likely among unionized officers A 2006 report from the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics found unionized police agencies garnered 9.9 use-of-force complaints for every 100 officers, compared with 7.3 for non-unionized agencies. During the disciplinary process, about 7 percent of those complaints were sustained, or found to have merit, in unionized agencies. In nonunion agencies, the sustain rate was more than double, at 15 percent. In effect, officers in unionized police forces are more likely to be the subjects of an excessive-force complaint, but more likely to beat the allegations in disciplinary hearings. Lengthy appeals processes make it more difficult to fire ‘bad apples’ Writing in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Stephen Rushin analyzed 656 police union contracts to examine the role of the disciplinary appeals process in misconduct cases. “The median police department in the data set offers police officers as many as four layers of appellate review in disciplinary cases,” he found. Some provided six or seven layers of review. After those levels are exhausted, most departments then allow officers accused of misconduct to appeal to a third-party arbitrator. More than half gave the offending officers some control over the selection of the arbitrator. The result, as detailed in a 2017 Washington Post investigation, is that a stunningly high percentage of officers fired for misconduct are eventually rehired after a lengthy appeals process. In Washington, D.C., for instance, 45 percent of the officers fired for misconduct from 2006 to 2017 were rehired on appeal. In Philadelphia, the share is 62 percent. In San Antonio, it’s 70 percent. Other contract provisions also shield police from accountability In a separate paper in the Duke Law Journal, Rushin analyzed 178 police union contracts and found a number of provisions that played a role in shielding police from the consequences of misconduct, including provisions that “limit officer interrogations after alleged misconduct, mandate the destruction of disciplinary records, ban civilian oversight, prevent anonymous civilian complaints, indemnify officers in the event of civil suits, and limit the length of internal investigations.” He found that “overall, 156 of the 178 police union contracts examined in this study — around 88 percent — contained at least one provision that could thwart legitimate disciplinary actions against officers engaged in misconduct.” Police unions advocate shielding disciplinary records from public view Writing in the Stanford Law & Policy Review, Katherine Bies notes that “police disciplinary records are public in only 12 states,” due in no small part to lobbying efforts by police unions. The article deals specifically with the efforts of police unions to pass laws in two states — New York’s notorious Section 50-a and a similar law in California — that shield disciplinary records from public scrutiny. “Police unions often strategically frame any opposition to their agenda of secrecy as endangering public safety and harming the public interest,” Bies writes. “However, police unions often conflate ‘the public interest’ with the private interests of police officers.” Unionized police may be more likely to kill civilians, particularly nonwhite ones Economist Rob Gillezeau recently previewed his research examining the relationship between unionization and police killings of U.S. citizens. While provisional, his initial results suggest the police unionization happening in the 1950s through the 1980s led to “about 60 to 70″ additional civilians killed by police each year. The “overwhelming majority” of those civilians were nonwhite. “With the caveat that this is very early work, it looks like collective bargaining rights are being used to protect the ability of officers to discriminate in the disproportionate use of force against the nonwhite population,” he recently said on Twitter.