## OFF

### 1

#### The meta ethic is practical reason.

#### 1] Is-ought gap – empiricism can only observe what is since that’s the only thing in our perception, not what ought to be, but it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises which requires a priori premises to form morality.

#### 2] Empirical uncertainty– evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know other’s experiences makes empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics.

#### 3] Infallibility – practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask why we should be reasoners is to concede authority to reason since the question itself uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### Reason requires that maxims we act upon must be universalizable – any reasoner would know that two plus two equals four because there is no a priori distinction between agents so norms must be universally valid.

#### And willing an action that violates the freedom of others is a contradiction – if I decide to kill someone, that action is not universalizable because that would justify other people killing me too.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom. Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### 2] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### Acquisition of property can never be unjust – to create rights violations, there must already be an owner of the property being violated, but that presupposes its appropriation by another entity.

Feser 1, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

### 2

#### Interp – affirmatives must demonstrate how they engage efforts to advocate the plan BEYOND scenario planning or embody methods of solvency against violence discussed in the AFF.

**Reid-Brinkley 20** [Shanara Reid-Brinkley 2020, “The Future is Black: Afropessimism, Fugitivity, and Radical Hope in Education”, Edited by Carl Grant, Ashley Woodson, Michael Dumas, https://books.google.com/books?id=SMHyDwAAQBAJ&pg=PR5&source=gbs\_selected\_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false//WY]

What lies in the wake" of competitive policy debate? How are Black debaters doing wake work? In the following section I take two examples from the National Debate Tournament Final Round to demonstrate wake work in competitive debate. Next, I ana-lyze the central argument in the final round characterizing the current clash of civilizations in debate and the ramifications of building community in debate. The final round of the 2017 National Debate Tournament was not just a com- petition, **it was a referendum on the notion of a universal community** and the **structural exclusions and fairness issues that characterize** the traditions and **norms of competitive practice**. Georgetown is affirmative in the debate and of fer a federal policy toward Alaska as an example of a specific proposal to combat catastrophic climate change. Based on the norms of competition, Georgetown presents a coherent affirmative argument providing an effective stasis point for fair deliberation of the climate change resolution. After the affirmative's speech Rutgers is allowed to cross-examine the speaker. Devane Murphy asks, “When is the first life saved as a result of the afffirmative]?” (2017). While Georgetown admits that a debate round cannot save lives directly, they argue that discuss- ing climate change policy is a valuable academic conversation. Rutgers then asks a series of questions about Georgetown's relationship as individuals to the people and places targeted by the federal policy they suggest: “Do you know any people in the arctic? Do you know any communities in the arctic? Can you name a family in the arctic?” (Murphy, 2017). While Georgetown answers no to these questions, they argue that a focus on debaters as individuals rather than the policy option they have presented is a distraction from the stasis point they have set for the debate. Using Afropessimism as a heuristic for engaging the resolution, debaters like Rutgers, reject any affirmation of the United States Federal Government. For these students, the federal government is always an unethical actor. In as much as the resolutional statement requires the affirmative to posit federal govern- ment action as an ethical response to public need, **the vast majority of Black debaters refuse to take such a position.** To combat this refusal to follow com- petitive norms, the Framework argument developed to confront the disruption of the normative form and content of policy debate competition. Framework debaters (mostly White and non-Black POCs) argue that if a team violates the norms of common practice they reject the normative stasis points for delibera-tion destroying the educational benefits of policy debate. Framework has operated as a strategic tool of capture and exclusion of Black thought in competitive debate. However, as "the holds multiply" so too does Black innovation. Rutgers' strategy in the final round took the form of the traditional Framework argument, but using Black thought **to revise the content and turn it against the norms of traditional debate**. Black Framework, Rutgers' strategy, argued that the affirmative **must embody their politics and demonstrate how they directly engage in** efforts to reduce climate change. Rutgers' argues that Georgetown is disconnected from their politics which is why they can advocate a policy that may affect the people of the Arctic while having little knowledge of those people or their lives. This kind of orientation toward policy action is dangerous, encouraging what Rutgers refers to as **“ascetic tourism"** by which debaters role-playing policy advocates “tour [the] trauma of various populations without ever acting to alleviate the harm” (Murphy, 2017). When Georgetown seeks further clarification of Black Framework, Rutgers' responds: "We provided an interpretation of what we think debate should look like, the same way in which when you're negative and you read my affirmative and you say we should not be able to do what we do. Very simple” (Murphy, 2017). Georgetown often runs the traditional Framework argument against Black Debate teams who fall outside their interpretation of a fair stasis point for debate about the resolution. Rutgers' turns the tables on Georgetown argu- ing that the traditional form of policy debate produces poor policy advocates and that Black Debate practice which centers embodied political practice is a superior method of training political advocates**.** Black Framework is an exam- ple of political theorizing from the hold. It operates from the perspective that anti-blackness is the stage upon which all political deliberation is played and then strategically identifies a tactic and an exigency for disruption.Rutgers capitalizes on the growing middle majority of judges who agree that Black Debate practice is an effective training tool for political advocacy. The use of Black Framework flips the script; it is a jarring (re)performance of the acts of exclusion that Black debaters have faced for decades. It took the form of Framework, paired with Black content, to argue that the neo-liberal norms of civil society would no longer get a free pass as the base frame for political negotiation. Rutgers turned a mirror on debate and offered a reflection of itself haunted by the specter of Black death. Arguing Black Framework was an act of bringing out the dead.

#### They violate.

#### First, ascetic tourism – reading the 1AC absent direct efforts to challenge communal violence posits them as tourists to violence. Benefits to scenario planning don’t disprove the violation.

#### Second, revitalization of stasis – our offense isn’t just “going beyond scenario planning” BUT specification of such since it revitalizes stasis and forces research beyond traditional norms.

#### Third, Effects T – words holding potential for action proves scenario planning could affect action, which still links since it still posits them as tourists over violence, and is infinitely regressive – anything could affect each other.

#### No RVIs – a) positions black individuals in a state of constant dispossession as violent rhetoric is imposed onto their bodies b) illogical – you don’t win for being fair c) chilling – good theory debaters bait theory and then win off the RVI every round. Encourages more abuse.

#### Competing interps –a) reasonability is arbitrary and bites judge intervention, b) competing interps is a race to the top where the best norm wins the debate.

## Case

### 1NC – Space Colonization

#### Try or die to avoid mass extinction

Becker, Presidential Climate Action Project for Obama, 15 years at the U.S. Department of Energy and a journalism career that began when he was a combat correspondent in Vietnam at age 19, 2/6/2017

(William, Who Wants to Live on Mars?, www.huffingtonpost.com/william-s-becker/who-wants-to-live-on-mars\_b\_14632700.html)

Some of the most intelligent people alive - among them,, billionaire Elon Musk, fellow billionaire Sir Richard Branson and theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking - want us to colonize Mars. Hawking predicts unless we prepare another celestial body to be our lifeboat, humanity is destined to suffer mass extinction due in part to our unsustainable squandering of Earth’s resources.

“Although the chance of a disaster to planet Earth in a given year may be quite low, it adds up over time, and becomes a near certainty in the next thousand or ten thousand years,” Hawking says. “By that time we should have spread out into space, and to other stars, so a disaster on Earth would not mean the end of the human race.”

Musk has less patience. He’s working with NASA on an interplanetary transport that will take take the first astronauts to Mars in the 2030s. Later, regular people could make the trip for $200,000 per ticket (checked baggage fees not included) in one of Musk’s interplanetary space buses. “I really think there are two fundamental paths,” Musk says. “One path is we stay on Earth forever, and some eventual extinction event wipes us out.” The other path: Traveling 19,000 miles over three months to get to a barren planet of rocks, dust and deadly radiation. “It will be like, really fun to go, you’ll have a great time,” Musk says.

#### Space exploration solves extinction and endless resource wars

Collins 10

Patrick Collins, professor of economics at Azabu University in Japan, and a Collaborating Researcher with the Institute for Space & Astronautical Science, as well as adviser to a number of companies, Adriano V. Autino is President of the Space Renaissance International; Manager, CEO/CTO, Systems Engineering Consultant / Trainer at Andromeda Systems Engineering LLC; and Supplier of methodological tools and consultancy at Intermarine S.p.A, Acta Astronautica, Volume 66, Issues 11–12, June–July 2010, “What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace”, Pages 1553–1562

7. World peace and preservation of human civilisation

The major source of social friction, including international friction, has surely always been unequal access to resources. People fight to control the valuable resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea. The natural resources of Earth are limited in quantity, and economically accessible resources even more so. As the population grows, and demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows exponentially. The threat of resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of “Resource Wars”. Having begun long ago with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the Middle East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of “resource wars” is that, if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become impossible to stop as resources become increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US and UK government advocates of “war on terror” to the language of the novel “1984” which describes a dystopian future of endless, fraudulent war in which citizens are reduced to slaves.

7.1. Expansion into near-Earth space is the only alternative to endless “resource wars”

As an alternative to the “resource wars” already devastating many countries today, opening access to the unlimited resources of near-Earth space could clearly facilitate world peace and security. The US National Security Space Office, at the start of its report on the potential of space-based solar power (SSP) published in early 2007, stated: “Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and strategic conflict in the 21st Century, and many see energy as the foremost threat to national security” [38]. The report ended by encouraging urgent research on the feasibility of SSP: “Considering the timescales that are involved, and the exponential growth of population and resource pressures within that same strategic period, it is imperative that this work for “drilling up” vs. drilling down for energy security begins immediately” [38].

Although the use of extra-terrestrial resources on a substantial scale may still be some decades away, it is important to recognise that simply acknowledging its feasibility using known technology is the surest way of ending the threat of resource wars. That is, if it is assumed that the resources available for human use are limited to those on Earth, then it can be argued that resource wars are inescapable [22] and [37]. If, by contrast, it is assumed that the resources of space are economically accessible, this not only eliminates the need for resource wars, it can also preserve the benefits of civilisation which are being eroded today by “resource war-mongers”, most notably the governments of the “Anglo-Saxon” countries and their “neo-con” advisers. It is also worth noting that the $1 trillion that these have already committed to wars in the Middle-East in the 21st century is orders of magnitude more than the public investment needed to aid companies sufficiently to start the commercial use of space resources.

Industrial and financial groups which profit from monopolistic control of terrestrial supplies of various natural resources, like those which profit from wars, have an economic interest in protecting their profitable situation. However, these groups’ continuing profits are justified neither by capitalism nor by democracy: they could be preserved only by maintaining the pretence that use of space resources is not feasible, and by preventing the development of low-cost space travel. Once the feasibility of low-cost space travel is understood, “resource wars” are clearly foolish as well as tragic. A visiting extra-terrestrial would be pityingly amused at the foolish antics of homo sapiens using long-range rockets to fight each other over dwindling terrestrial resources—rather than using the same rockets to travel in space and have the use of all the resources they need!

7.2. High return in safety from extra-terrestrial settlement

Investment in low-cost orbital access and other space infrastructure will facilitate the establishment of settlements on the Moon, Mars, asteroids and in man[/woman]-made space structures. In the first phase, development of new regulatory infrastructure in various Earth orbits, including property/usufruct rights, real estate, mortgage financing and insurance, traffic management, pilotage, policing and other services will enable the population living in Earth orbits to grow very large. Such activities aimed at making near-Earth space habitable are the logical extension of humans’ historical spread over the surface of the Earth. As trade spreads through near-Earth space, settlements are likely to follow, of which the inhabitants will add to the wealth of different cultures which humans have created in the many different environments in which they live.

Success of such extra-terrestrial settlements will have the additional benefit of reducing the danger of human extinction due to planet-wide or cosmic accidents [27]. These horrors include both man-made disasters such as nuclear war, plagues or growing pollution, and natural disasters such as super-volcanoes or asteroid impact. It is hard to think of any objective that is more important than preserving peace. Weapons developed in recent decades are so destructive, and have such horrific, long-term side-effects that their use should be discouraged as strongly as possible by the international community. Hence, reducing the incentive to use these weapons by rapidly developing the ability to use space-based resources on a large scale is surely equally important [11] and [16]. The achievement of this depends on low space travel costs which, at the present time, appear to be achievable only through the development of a vigorous space tourism industry.

#### Space solves every impact --- only exploration ensures survival

Pelton ‘03

(Joseph, Dir – Space and Advanced Communications Research Institute – GWU, 9-12,

http://www.space.com/news/commentary\_top10\_030912.html)

Actually the lack of a space program could **get us all killed**. I don’t mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that Homo sapiens as a species are actually endangered. Surprising to some, a well conceived space program may well be our **only hope for long-term survival.** The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow. Arthur C. Clarke, the author and screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: “The dinosaurs are not around today because they did not have a space program.” He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know a quite largish meteor crashed into the earth, released poisonous Iridium chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that blocked out the sun for a prolonged period of time. This could have been foreseen and averted with a sufficiently advanced space program. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASA’s Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our atmosphere, the hazards of solar radiation, the path of killer hurricanes or many other **environmental dangers**. But this is only a fraction of the ways that space programs are crucial to our future. We rely on space systems for communicating with many parts of the world, for navigating our airplanes, for coping with weather systems, for charting the path of hurricanes and tidal waves, and for monitoring air and water pollution. Right now space scientists and engineers are developing new technology to protect us from **environmental perils**, to alert us to terrorist attacks and to stimulate new industries that actually create new jobs. Cheap energy, essential to sustaining modern life, may very well have to come from space-based energy systems. Every dollar NASA spent on developing the communications satellites industry has put back more than $25 into the economy. It is important for citizens to know that the lack of a space program may truly imperil generations to come. Many people have said the time has come to re-evaluate our space programs, define a new vision and articulate new goals in space. These people are dead right. The time for a major review is indeed now. It is time for everyone to know and understand the ways that space programs are **absolutely critical for solving the largest problems** that all people living on our planet now face. NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe and President George W. Bush are welcome to share this list with the American people and members of the U.S. Congress who ask, “why do we need a space program?” Prevention of environmental disaster: Remote sensing satellites allow us to monitor the ozone hole, global warming, **air, water and ocean pollution**, the effect of **oil spills** on the melting of the ice caps, the **loss of rain forests** and other environmental threats to human survival. These systems can help us trace our recovery from the worst environmental threats and improve our quality of life. Creating a global network for modern communications, entertainment and networking: Advanced satellites provide global connectivity by means of the telephone, fax, the Internet, radio and television extend far beyond the reach of fiber optic cables. Eleven thousand television channels are now available via satellite and well over 200 countries and territories are linked via satellite. Global education and health services: Over 2 billion of the 6 billion people in our world today lack formal educational systems, health care services, potable water or power. The only way to provide global education and health care services in coming decades at reasonable cost and broad coverage is via space-based communication systems. Socrates once said, “there is only one good — knowledge, and only one evil -- ignorance.” In an age of terrorism and great intolerance the need for global education is ever more important. Cheap and environmentally friendly energy: NASA scientists and engineers already have gone a long way to develop space technology that can provide unlimited low cost energy from space. The operational systems, however, still need to be developed and proven in practice. Transportation safety: The 6,000 commercial airplanes that are aloft at one time during peak periods in the U.S. depend on satellite navigation for safe operation. New systems can provide better fuel efficiency, earlier warnings of safety hazards and alert of terrorist attack. This is but one of the ways that future space systems can provide greater transportation safety in decades to come. Emergency warning and recovery systems: **The ability to warn populations of pending dangers** from hurricanes, monsoons, tidal waves, fires and earthquakes are increasingly dependent on space-based systems. Further rescue operations, from emergency communications to disaster assessment to recovery operations, are dependent on satellite networks as well. Protection of our information networks from cyberterrorists: Many of our current electronic information networks that control transportation systems, energy grids, banking systems and governmental databases are vulnerable. Public Key Infrastructure systems are in need of upgrade. New types of security systems based on GPS location and encryption systems are dependent on space-based systems. National defense and strategic security: Space has been called the high frontier. **National security systems** are increasingly based on smart technologies and instruments that operate in outer space. Ever since Operation Desert Storm, military operations are based heavily on space systems and future systems will be even more so. **Protection against catastrophic planetary accidents**: It is easy to assume that an erratic meteor or comet will not bring destruction to the Earth because the probabilities are low. The truth is we are bombarded from space daily. The dangers are greatest not from a cataclysmic collision, but from not knowing enough about solar storms, cosmic radiation and the ozone layer. An enhanced Spaceguard Program is actually a prudent course that could save our species in time. Creation of new jobs and Industries -- a new vision for the 21st century and a mandate to explore truly new frontiers: Most of the economically advanced countries such as Japan, Canada, Australia and Europe, not to mention China, India and Russia, use their space programs to **stimulate their economy**, expand their educational and health care networks, improve their agriculture, upgrade their information networks, enhance their entertainment networks and create new jobs. In this respect the U.S. space program now spends precious little of its resources in these areas, but it once did and it could again. These are only some of the ways that space programs could help create a better future for generations yet to come, but it is an impressive list that impacts every American. Space is actually our future. Some would argue that space is the next great step forward for a pioneering nation that sees the need for advancement and discovery. In Nebraska a historical display dedicated to the pioneers that went out West notes that the cowards stayed home but the brave died seeking a better tomorrow. Now is the time to assess our values and our aspirations.

#### Space access key to resolve all the impacts

Tronchetti 13 [F. Tronchetti (Associate Professor—School of Law of the Harbin Institute of Technology, People's Republic of China), Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy, Ch. 5, 2013]

Overview

Outer space has progressively become a central component of international relations. Thanks to technological developments, regulatory changes, and a favorable political environment, outer space has acquired a growing significance both from an economic and a strategic point of view.

In terms of its economic impact, in the year 2011 the space sector grossed total commercial revenues of $110.53 billion, including profits deriving from the use of commercial satellite services in the areas of telecommunications, Earth observation and positioning services.159 Furthermore, the total institutional spending on space in 2011 was approximately $72.77 billion. This figure includes $44.92 billion of civilian expenditures (or 61.7 % of the total) and $27.85 billion of defense expenditures (38.3 %).

As far as the military applications of space are concerned, satellites are largely used to support military operations on the ground; with regard to its civilian uses of outer space, satellites contribute to enhance human activities in several areas, such as resource management, environmental protection, climate change, etc. Space activities are, thus, a mix of civil, commercial, and military interests. Balancing these diverse elements may be, at times, a quite challenging task. Practice shows that international cooperation constitutes an excellent tool to maximize the benefits deriving from space applications on a global scale. Nowadays, international cooperation in space-related projects or application is a widespread trend. However, the size and extent of such cooperative efforts is directly affected by the dynamic of international relations. In particular, changes in the international political and economic environment boost or restrict the dimension and nature of space activities. On the other hand, space activities also shape international relations to a certain extent. For example, space assets are indispensable tools used by governments to tackle a number of transnational challenges, such as global warming, the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and economic development issues.

#### Colonizing Mars is key – solves extinction and acts as a springboard for future colonization

Schulze-Makuch and Davies 10 – PhD and Professor @ the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences @ Washington State University; PhD and Regents’ Professor and Director of the Beyond Center for Fundamental Concepts in Science @ Arizona State University

Dirk and Paul, Journal of Cosmology, Vol.12, p. 3619-3626, October-November, “To Boldly Go: A One-Way Human Mission to Mars” http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars108.html

There are several reasons that motivate the establishment of a permanent Mars colony. We are a vulnerable species living in a part of the galaxy where cosmic events such as major asteroid and comet impacts and supernova explosions pose a significant threat to life on Earth, especially to human life. There are also more immediate threats to our culture, if not our survival as a species. These include global pandemics, nuclear or biological warfare, runaway global warming, sudden ecological collapse and supervolcanoes (Rees 2004). Thus, the colonization of other worlds is a must if the human species is to survive for the long term. The first potential colonization targets would be asteroids, the Moon and Mars. The Moon is the closest object and does provide some shelter (e.g., lava tube caves), but in all other respects falls short compared to the variety of resources available on Mars. The latter is true for asteroids as well. Mars is by far the most promising for sustained colonization and development, because it is similar in many respects to Earth and, crucially, possesses a moderate surface gravity, an atmosphere, abundant water and carbon dioxide, together with a range of essential minerals. Mars is our second closest planetary neighbor (after Venus) and a trip to Mars at the most favorable launch option takes about six months with current chemical rocket technology. In addition to offering humanity a "lifeboat" in the event of a mega-catastrophe, a Mars colony is attractive for other reasons. Astrobiologists agree that there is a fair probability that Mars hosts, or once hosted, microbial life, perhaps deep beneath the surface (Lederberg and Sagan 1962; Levin 2010; Levin and Straat 1977, 1981; McKay and Stoker 1989; McKay et al. 1996; Baker et al. 2005; Schulze-Makuch et al. 2005, 2008, Darling and Schulze-Makuch 2010; Wierzchos et al. 2010; Mahaney and Dohm 2010). A scientific facility on Mars might therefore be a unique opportunity to study an alien life form and a second evolutionary record, and to develop novel biotechnology therefrom. At the very least, an intensive study of ancient and modern Mars will cast important light on the origin of life on Earth. Mars also conceals a wealth of geological and astronomical data that is almost impossible to access from Earth using robotic probes. A permanent human presence on Mars would open the way to comparative planetology on a scale unimagined by any former generation. In the fullness of time, a Mars base would offer a springboard for human/robotic exploration of the outer solar system and the asteroid belt. Finally, establishing a permanent multicultural and multinational human presence on another world would have major beneficial political and social implications for Earth, and serve as a strong unifying and uplifting theme for all humanity.

### 1NC – Inevitable

#### Cap inevitable - evolution means we are all selfish

Thayer 2000 Bradley A., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense & Strategic Study, Missouri State University, International Security, 01622889, Fall2000, Vol. 25, Issue 2 “"Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics"

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.[41] In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life its survival--before that of other members of its group, be it pack, herd, or tribe. For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness. Evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory provides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. A conceptual shift is required here because Dawkins's level of analysis is the gene, not the organism. As Dawkins explains, at one time there were no organisms, just chemicals in a primordial "soup."[42] At first, different types of molecules started forming by accident, including some that could reproduce by using the constituents of the soup--carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. Because these constituents were in limited supply, molecules competed for them as they replicated. From this competition, the most efficient copy makers emerged. The process, however, was never perfect. Sometimes mistakes were made during replication, and occasionally these accidents resulted in more efficient replication or made some other contribution to fitness. One such mistake might have been the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together--a primitive cell. A second might have involved the division of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "survival machines." He explains, "The first survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But making a living got steadily harder as new rivals arose with better and more effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive."[43] From a genetic perspective, there is no intentionality in this process, but it continued nonetheless because of evolution. Dawkins makes clear, however, that the interests of the gene and the organism need not coincide at different stages in an organism's life, particularly after reproduction.[44] In general, however, the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

#### Humans inevitably seek power over others – the alternative to cap is militarism and violence

Wilson, 97 (James, professor of Government at Harvard, “The morality of capitalism,”)

Critics of capitalism argue that wealth confers power, and indeed it does, up to a point. Show people the road to wealth, status, or power, and they will rush down that road, and many will do some rather unattractive things along the way. But this is not a decisive criticism unless one supposes, fancifully, that there is some way to arrange human affairs so that the desire for advantage vanishes. The real choice is between becoming wealthy by first acquiring political or military power, or getting money directly without bothering with conquest or domination. If it is in man’s [human] nature to seek domination over other men, there are really only two ways to make that domination work. One is military power, and that is the principle upon which domination existed from the beginning of man’s time on this earth to down about two hundred years ago, when it began to be set aside by another principle, namely the accumulation of wealth. Now you may feel that men should not try to dominate other men – although I do not see how you could believe this in Australia given the importance attached to sports. You may like to replace man’s desire to dominate other men, and in a few cases it is prevented by religious conversion or a decent temperament. But as long as the instinct persists, you only have two choices, and if you choose to compete economically you will reduce the extent to which one group of men will tyrannise over another by the use of military might or political power.

#### Empirically verified with communist movements – Stalinism and Maoism ended in mass violence – proves political attempts to replace capitalism inevitably are worse

### 1NC – Growth/Poverty

#### Capitalism is key to growth – and also reductions in poverty.

Skarbek, 10 – Research Fellow at the Independent Institute, founding Director of the Institute's Center on Entrepreneurial Innovation (COEI) and the COEI Government Cost Calculator, and Lecturer in the Department of Political Economy at King's College in London, England. She received her Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University, and she has been Assistant Professor of Economics at San Jose State University and an F.A. Hayek Scholar, and she is the recipient of the Don Lavoie Memorial Award.

Emily C. Skarbek, “Capitalism and Economic Growth,” Independent Institute. April 15, 2010. <https://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=2769>

When the current administration talks of entrepreneurship, they speak of politically favored businesses and privileged recipients of the taxpayers’ dollars. To be clear, that is not entrepreneurship. It has become conventional to say that those who openly embrace capitalism, free markets and free trade are dogmatic, ideologues, idealistic, or market fundamentalists. And if you look to the media and our leaders, you get the impression that being in favor of free markets is somehow an unreasonable position.

Unless one is ashamed of unprecedented increases in income, rising life expectancy, greater education, and more political freedom, there is no reason to be a fair-weather fan of capitalism. Sprawling free markets in countries that became more capitalist over the last 25 years have meant many more people enjoy improvements in well being and opportunities to advance human capabilities.

There is no evidence that countries that eschewed freer markets and embraced substantially greater state control performed better on any of these major indicators. On the contrary, those countries that adopt increased taxation, increased regulation, fiscal mismanagement and enormous public debt have performed demonstrably worse.

From a global perspective, we have witnessed remarkable progress of mankind through the increased acceptance of free market policies in both rich and poor countries. Before the industrial revolution, 80% of the world’s population lived in abject poverty. By 1980, that number has fallen to 34.8% and by 2000, less than 20% of the population lives on less than $1 a day. In five years, the number is expected to fall to 10% if free trade is allowed to flourish.

In just the past 25 years increased private ownership, increased free trade, and lower taxes all came at the hands of politicians like Deng Xiaoping in China, Margaret Thatcher in England, and Ronald Reagan in United States. In the years following the adoption of these policies by these global leaders, per capita income nearly doubled from 1980 to 2005; Tariffs fell and trade increased; Schooling and life expectancy grew rapidly, while infant mortality and poverty fell just as fast.

In the average country that became more capitalist over the last 25 years, the average citizen gained a 43% increase in income, nearly half a decade in life expectancy, and a 2-year increase in the average years of schooling. In my lifetime alone, freer markets have improved the lives of billions of people from all walks of life.

When we look back at our own history, the tremendous economic growth that Americans experienced from the time of the original Tea Party up to 1914 was the result of economic freedom from government regulation, open boarders for free immigration, and very few trade restrictions on the global flow of goods, services, and capital. Anyone could get on a boat, land on Ellis Island and become an immigrant and this benefited both domestic Americans and the immigrant alike. Business and labor were free to be entrepreneurial—and entrepreneurship created wealth. But we don’t want wealth for wealth’s sake. Wealth allows for the improvement of the human condition.

For example, in 1905, our average life expectancy in the U.S. was 47. Today it is 78. A hundred years ago only 14% of homes had a bathtub; 8% had a phone; 95% of all births took place at home; most women washed their hair once a month; and the average worker made about $300 per year.

As recent as 1984, it took the average American wage earner 456 hours of labor to earn enough to purchase a cellphone. Today, it takes the average American 4 hours. A computer has fallen from costing 435 hours of labor to less than 20. None of this accounts for the tremendous improvements in technological capacity. There are several reasons that the costs of goods have dropped so drastically, but perhaps the biggest is increased international trade.

Simply put, the free market means the poor are less poor. Globalization extends and deepens a capitalist system that has for generations been lifting American living standards—for high-income households, of course, but for low-income ones as well. When the world embraces free market reforms, the world economy expanded greatly, the quality of life improves sharply for billions of people, and dire poverty was substantially scaled back. This is not a coincidence.

It is a well-established fact that when people are free to buy from, sell to, and invest with one another as they choose, they can achieve far more than when governments attempt to control economic decisions. Widening the circle of people with whom we transact—including across political borders—brings benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices, greater variety, and better quality, and it allows companies to reap the benefits of innovation, specialization, and economies of scale that larger markets bring. Free markets are essential to prosperity, and expanding free markets as much as possible enhances that prosperity.

Voluntary economic exchange is inherently fair and does not justify government intervention. When two free people come together on terms they have agreed upon to exchange peacefully, both benefit. Government intervention in voluntary economic exchange on behalf of some citizens at the expense of others is inherently unfair. One person is coerced in order to privilege another. It really is that simple.

When goods, services, labor and capital flow freely across U.S. borders, Americans can take full advantage of the opportunities of the international marketplace. They can buy the best or least expensive goods and services the world has to offer; they can sell to the most promising markets; they can choose among the best investment opportunities; and they can tap into the worldwide pool of capital. Study after study has shown that countries that are more open to the global economy grow faster and achieve higher incomes than those that are relatively closed. This is capitalism.

Growth is not guaranteed. It seems obvious that the central challenges facing America have to do with the with predatory regulatory and tax policies conducted by governments domestic and abroad. From an economic perspective, then, the case for unilateral trade liberalization—that is reducing our own trade barriers and subsidies without preconditions or reciprocal commitments from other countries—is the best policy to promote peace and prosperity globally.

Politically, however, the concentrated and organized beneficiaries of protectionism are powerful relative to the much larger, disorganized, beneficiaries of free trade. Politicians tend to be most responsive to the loudest interest groups and are therefore inclined to view free trade unfavorably. But we as Americans must be clear—capitalism is not evil. It has done more good for more people than any acts of state, any stimulus spending, any health program or welfare initiative. Americans can no longer afford to fear freedom.

Finally, acknowledging the relationship between free markets and economic prosperity does not make someone “dogmatic”. It is unreasonable to continue to ignore these facts. Capitalism’s superiority for economic growth and development deserves the unqualified support of everyone who believe that wealth is better than poverty, life is better than death, and liberty is better than oppression.

#### That outweighs---and turns sustainability.

Smith ’18 – assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University

Noah. September 19. “Saving the Planet Doesn’t Mean Killing Economic Growth” <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-19/saving-the-planet-doesn-t-mean-killing-economic-growth>

In the 19th and 20th centuries, a few countries got fabulously rich. These included most of Europe, parts of East Asia, some small oil producing states and parts of the former British Empire. In recent decades, more of the world — large parts of China, portions of India, Southeast Asia and part of Latin America — have joined the rich world, thanks to an unprecedented explosion of global growth. But for large swathes of the world, life remains a grinding daily struggle. Women in poor countries spend hours every day carrying water. Hundreds of millions of people contract malaria every year. Almost a billion people still defecate outdoors.

The obvious solution to lifting these people out of poverty — without inflicting poverty on some of those who have already escaped it — is economic growth. But there is a small but vocal group of environmentalists telling us that growth is no longer possible — that unless growth ends, climate change and other environmental impacts will destroy civilization. Writing in Foreign Policy, anthropologist Jason Hickel declares:

Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up … Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations.

Hickel cites analyses by the United Nations Environment Program and others showing that even big improvements in resource efficiency, encouraged by very high carbon taxes, will be unable to halt overall resource use or global carbon emissions. But this evidence doesn’t support Hickel’s conclusions, which rely on several misconceptions about the nature and the importance of growth.

First, Hickel doesn’t seem to grapple with the fact that most economic growth now happens in countries that are relatively poor. The International Monetary Fund estimates that from 2010 to 2015, emerging markets and developing countries were responsible for about 70 percent of global output and consumption growth, while advanced economies were responsible for the rest. The World Bank’s forecasts for 2017-2019 are similar:

China’s contribution to global growth will be double that of the U.S., and India’s will be larger than that of the entire euro zone.

The same is true of greenhouse gas emissions. Since about 1990, emissions from the U.S. and EU have fallen, while emissions from developing countries, especially China and India, have exploded:

In 2017, the International Energy Agency estimated that the growth in energy-related carbon emissions in China and the rest of developing Asia was more than five times the growth in the European Union, while U.S. emissions declined.

In other words, if Hickel and others stop economic growth, it won’t be rich countries that bear the brunt of the change. It will be poor and middle-income countries like India and China. African countries that are still desperately poor will not even get their chance.

Hickel tries to avoid this outcome by declaring that “We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly,” but even total global redistribution — which is, of course, far outside of the realm of political and logistical possibility — would afford the average person a standard of living only slightly better than that now enjoyed in China. A realistic amount of redistribution would do far less for the global poor — meaning they’d be the ones on the hook in a zero-growth world.

The second thing that Hickel leaves out is the connection between growth and fertility. Once countries pass per-capita gross domestic product of $10,000, fertility rates rapidly drop to or below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. Halting growth now would leave most African countries trapped well below that magic level, meaning their population growth — and thus, the world’s population growth — would continue without limit. That in turn would eventually overwhelm the world’s resources — if not in terms of the climate, then certainly in terms of fresh water and food.

Fortunately, Hickel and the zero-growth environmentalists ignore a third crucial factor — technology. In rich countries, growth has shifted somewhat from physical things to digital services, which require much less energy consumption. Even more importantly, green energy, especially solar power, has progressed by leaps and bounds:

In many regions, wind and solar are already cheaper than coal power, and electric vehicles are rapidly becoming more common. This incredible technological progress means that rich countries could see a renewable-powered electrical grid and fully electrified transportation before the century is out. More importantly, cheap renewable energy means that poor countries in Africa and South Asia will be able to follow a different, cleaner path to industrialization without sacrificing living standards. Ultimately, technological progress will be much more important for limiting global resource use than the energy-efficiency measures Hickel considers.

In the movie “Avengers: Infinity War,” the supervillain Thanos kills off half the universe in a misguided attempt to prevent resource overuse. The zero-growth environmentalists are embracing a solution only slightly less destructive. Thanos’s better course would have been to use his vast powers to provide the universe with renewable energy technology that would let them get rich — and lower their fertility rates — without destroying the environment. Environmentalists in the real world should take that approach as well.

### 1NC – Interstate Wars

#### And solves interstate conflicts which outweighs, while also net-reducing intrastate conflicts

Griswold 07

Daniel Griswold directs the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, Cato Institute, April 20, 2007, “Trade, Democracy and Peace: The Virtuous Cycle”, http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/trade-democracy-peace-virtuous-cycle

The Peace Dividend of Globalization

The good news does not stop there. Buried beneath the daily stories about suicide bombings and insurgency movements is an underappreciated but encouraging fact: **The world has** somehow **become** a **more peaceful** place.

A little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story a while back reported, “War declining worldwide, studies say.” In 2006, a survey by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that **the number of** armed **conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half-century**. Since the early 1990s, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 17, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. The Institute’s latest report found that 2005 marked the second year in a row that no two nations were at war with one another. What a remarkable and wonderful fact.

**The death toll** from war **has also been falling**. According to the Associated Press report, “The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number.” Current estimates of people killed by war are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War.

Many causes lie behind the good news—the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them—but **expanding trade** and globalization **appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace.** Far from stoking a “World on Fire,” as one misguided American author argued in a forgettable book, growing commercial ties between nations have had **a dampening effect on armed conflict and war**. I would argue that free trade and globalization have promoted peace in **three main ways**.

First, as I argued a moment ago, **trade** and globalization have **reinforced the trend toward democracy**, and **democracies tend not to pick fights with each other**. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world’s countries today are democracies—a record high. Some studies have cast doubt on the idea that democracies are less likely to fight wars. While it’s true that democracies rarely if ever war with each other, it is not such a rare occurrence for democracies to engage in wars with non-democracies. We can still hope that **has more countries turn to democracy, there will be fewer provocations for war** by non-democracies.

A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by **promoting** more **economic integration**. **As national economies become** **more intertwined** with each other, those **nations have more to lose should war break out.** War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also **ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage** on the economy. In short, **globalization** has **dramatically raised the economic cost of war.**

The 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report contains an insightful chapter on “Economic Freedom and Peace” by Dr. Erik Gartzke, a professor of political science at Columbia University. Dr. Gartzke compares the propensity of countries to engage in wars and their level of economic freedom and concludes that **economic freedom**, including the freedom to trade, **significantly decreases the probability** that **a country will experience a military dispute with another** country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, **the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free.**”

By the way, Dr. Gartzke’s analysis found that economic freedom was a far more important variable in determining a countries propensity to go to war than democracy.

A third reason why **free trade** promotes peace is because it **allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest** of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of **i**ntellectual **p**roperty, financial assets, and human capital. Such **assets cannot be easily seized by armies**. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in a high-tech, service economy. **If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they** can **acquire them peacefully by trading away what they** can **produce** best **at home**. In short, globalization and the development it has spurred have **rendered** the **spoils of war less valuable.**

Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linier. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But **deep trade** and investment **ties among nations make war less attractive.**

A Virtuous Cycle of Democracy, Peace and Trade

The global trends we’ve witnessed in the spread of trade, democracy and peace tend to **reinforce each** other in a grand and virtuous cycle. As trade and development encourage more representative government, those governments provide more predictability and incremental reform, creating a better climate for trade and investment to flourish. And as the spread of trade and democracy foster peace, the decline of war creates a more hospitable environment for trade and economic growth and political stability.

We can see this virtuous cycle at work in the world today. The European Union just celebrated its 50th birthday. For many of the same non-economic reasons that motivated the founders of the GATT, the original members of the European community hoped to build a more sturdy foundation for peace. Out of the ashes of World War II, the United States urged Germany, France and other Western European nations to form a common market that has become the European Union. In large part because of their intertwined economies, a general **war in Europe is now unthinkable.**

**In East Asia**, the **extensive** and growing **economic ties among** Mainland **China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is helping** to **keep the peace**. China’s communist rulers may yet decide to go to war over its “renegade province,” but **the economic cost** to their economy **would be staggering and** could **provoke** a **backlash among its citizens**. In contrast, poor and isolated North Korea is all the more dangerous because it has nothing to lose economically should it provoke a war.

In Central America, countries that were racked by guerrilla wars and death squads two decades ago have turned not only to democracy but to expanding trade, culminating in the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. As the Stockholm Institute reported in its 2005 Yearbook, “Since the 1980s, **the introduction of a more open economic model in** most states of the **Latin American** and Caribbean region **has been accompanied by** the **growth of** new **regional structures, the dying out of interstate conflicts and** a **reduction in intra-state conflicts.”**

### 1NC – World Improving

#### Free market capitalism has drastically improved the world.

Empirical education in child mortality and increase in life expectancy, development of tech innovation in the private market k2 medical advances, food production increased with agriculture tech green revolution, also decreased armed conflicts

Feyman 14 Yevgeniy [adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. He writes on health care policy, entitlement reform, and the Affordable Care Act. His research has focused on a variety of topics, including the physician shortage, the cost of health care reform, and consumer-directed health care. Feyman was previously the deputy director of health policy at the Manhattan Institute and is currently a research assistant in the department of health policy at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health] “The Golden Age Is Now” May 23, 2014. IB

In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World? Lomborg and a group of economists conclude that, with a few exceptions, the world is richer, freer, healthier, and smarter than it’s ever been. These gains have coincided with the near-universal rejection of statism and the flourishing of capitalist principles. At a time when political figures such as New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and religious leaders such as Pope Francis frequently remind us about the evils of unfettered capitalism, this is a worthwhile message. The doubling of human life expectancy is one of the most remarkable achievements of the past century. Consider, Lomborg writes, that “the twentieth century saw life expectancy rise by about 3 months for every calendar year.” The average child in 1900 could expect to live to just 32 years old; now that same child should make it to 70. This increase came during a century when worldwide economic output, driven by the spread of capitalism and freedom, grew by more than 4,000 percent. These gains occurred in developed and developing countries alike; among men and women; and even in a sense among children, as child mortality plummeted. Why are we living so much longer? Massive improvements in public health certainly played an important role. The World Health Organization’s global vaccination efforts essentially eradicated smallpox. But this would have been impossible without the innovative methods of vaccine preservation developed in the private sector by British scientist Leslie Collier. Oral rehydration therapies and antibiotics have also been instrumental in reducing child mortality. Simply put, technological progress is the key to these gains—and market economies have liberated, and rewarded, technological innovation. People are not just living longer, but better—sometimes with government’s help, and sometimes despite it. Even people in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America are better educated and better fed than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of children who would have died during previous eras due to malnutrition are alive today. Here, we can thank massive advancements in agricultural production unleashed by the free market. In the 1960s, privately funded agricultural researchers bred new, high-yield strains of corn, wheat, and various other crops thanks to advances in molecular genetics. Globalization helped spread these technologies to developing countries, which used them not only to feed their people, but also to become export powerhouses. This so-called “green revolution” reinforced both the educational progress (properly nourished children tend to learn more) and the life-expectancy gains (better nutrition leads to better health) of the twentieth century. These children live in a world with fewer armed conflicts, netting what the authors call a “peace dividend.” Globalization and trade liberalization have surely contributed to this more peaceful world (on aggregate). An interdependent global economy makes war costly. Of course, problems remain. As Lomborg points out, most foreign aid likely does little to boost economic welfare, yet hundreds of billions of dollars in “development assistance” continue to flow every year from developed countries to the developing world. Moreover, climate change is widely projected to intensify in the second half of the twenty-first century, and will carry with it a significant economic cost. But those familiar with the prior work of the “skeptical environmentalist” understand that ameliorating these effects over time could prove wasteful. Lomborg notes that the latest research on climate change estimates a net cost of 0.2 to 2 percent of GDP from 2055 to 2080. The same report points out that in 2030, mitigation costs may be as high as 4 percent of GDP. Perhaps directing mitigation funding to other priorities—curing AIDS for instance—would be a better use of the resources. Lomborg’s main message? Ignore those pining for the “good old days.” Thanks to the immense gains of the past century, there has never been a better time to be alive.

#### We turn poverty.

Horwitz 16 Steven Horwitz is the Schnatter Distinguished Professor of Free Enterprise in the Department of Economics at Ball State University, where he also is a Fellow at the John H. Schnatter Institute for Entrepreneurship and Free Enterprise. He is the author of Hayek’s Modern Family: Classical Liberalism and the Evolution of Social Institutions. “Capitalism Is Good for the Poor” June 09, 2016. IB

Critics frequently accuse markets and capitalism of making life worse for the poor. This refrain is certainly common in the halls of left-leaning academia as well as in broader intellectual circles. But like so many other criticisms of capitalism, this one ignores the very real, and very available, facts of history. Nothing has done more to lift humanity out of poverty than the market economy. This claim is true whether we are looking at a time span of decades or of centuries. The number of people worldwide living on less than about two dollars per day today is less than half of what it was in 1990. The biggest gains in the fight against poverty have occurred in countries that have opened up their markets, such as China and India. If we look over the longer historical period, we can see that the trends today are just the continuation of capitalism’s victories in beating back poverty. For most of human history, we lived in a world of a few haves and lots of have-nots. That slowly began to change with the advent of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. As economic growth took off and spread throughout the population, it created our own world in the West in which there are a whole bunch of haves and a few have-more-and-betters. For example, the percentage of American households below the poverty line who have basic appliances has grown steadily over the last few decades, with poor families in 2005 being more likely to own things like a clothes dryer, dishwasher, refrigerator, or air conditioner than the average household was in 1971. And consumer items that didn’t even exist back then, such as cell phones, were owned by half of poor households in 2005 and are owned by a substantial majority of them today. Capitalism has also made poor people’s lives far better by reducing infant and child mortality rates, not to mention maternal death rates during childbirth, and by extending life expectancies by decades. Consider, too, the way capitalism’s engine of growth has enabled the planet to sustain almost 7 billion people, compared to 1 billion in 1800. As Deirdre McCloskey has noted, if you multiply the gains in consumption to the average human by the gain in life expectancy worldwide by 7 (for 7 billion as compared to 1 billion people), humanity as a whole is better off by a factor of around 120. That’s not 120 percent better off, but 120 times better off since 1800. The competitive market process has also made education, art, and culture available to more and more people. Even the poorest of Americans, not to mention many of the global poor, have access through the Internet and TV to concerts, books, and works of art that were exclusively the province of the wealthy for centuries. And in the wealthiest countries, the dynamics of capitalism have begun to change the very nature of work. Where once humans toiled for 14 hours per day at backbreaking outdoor labor, now an increasing number of us work inside in climate-controlled comfort. Our workday and workweek have shrunk thanks to the much higher value of labor that comes from working with productive capital. We spend a much smaller percentage of our lives working for pay, whether we’re rich or poor. And even with economic change, the incomes of the poor are much less variable, as they are not linked to the unpredictable changes in weather that are part and parcel of a predominantly agricultural economy long since disappeared. Think of it this way: the fabulously wealthy kings of old had servants attending to their every need, but an impacted tooth would likely kill them. The poor in largely capitalist countries have access to a quality of medical care and a variety and quality of food that the ancient kings could only dream of. Consider, too, that the working poor of London 100 years ago were, at best, able to split a pound of meat per week among all of their children, which were greater in number than the two or three of today. In addition, the whole family ate meat once a week on Sunday, the one day the man of the household was home for dinner. That was meat for a week. Compare that to today, when we worry that poor Americans are too easily able to afford a meal with a quarter pound of meat in it every single day for less than an hour’s labor. Even if you think that capitalism has made poor people overweight, that’s a major accomplishment compared to the precapitalist norm of constant malnutrition and the struggle even 100 years ago for the working poor to get enough calories. The reality is that the rich have always lived well historically, as for centuries they could commandeer human labor to attend to their every need. In a precapitalist world, the poor had no hope of upward mobility

or of relief from the endless physical drudgery that barely kept them alive. Today, the poor in capitalist countries live like kings, thanks mostly to the freeing of labor and the ability to accumulate capital that makes that labor more productive and enriches even the poorest. The falling cost of what were once luxuries and are now necessities, driven by the competitive market and its profit and loss signals, has brought labor-saving machines to the masses. When profit-seeking and innovation became acceptable behavior for the bourgeoisie, the horn of plenty brought forth its bounty, and even the poorest shared in that wealth. Once people no longer needed permission to innovate, and once the value of new inventions was judged by the improvements they made to the lives of the masses in the form of profit and loss, the poor began to live lives of comfort and dignity.

### 1NC – Best of Worst

#### None of their impact evidence is unique – they need to prove that a better system will replace cap to access their impacts. Cap is better than any other system – it prevents war and reduces poverty.

Weede 2008 [Erich, professor at the Institute for Political Science and Sociology, “Globalization and Inequality” Comparative Sociology 7, p. 415-433]

Globalization refers to an increasing international division of labor and more trade between economies, to cross-border investment and rapid transfers of technology between nations, to global capital ﬂows and, to a lesser degree, to increasing labor mobility. Th ere is as yet no global labor market. Globalization also implies better opportunities to learn from foreigners or strangers. Th e more similar you are to others, the less likely it is that you can learn from them.1 Unfortunately, many people prefer to rely on established routines and resent the challenge of having to learn from others. Globalization is another word for a worldwide expansion of capitalism. It results in international tax competition (Edwards and de Rugy 2002; Mitchell 2005). Globalization is based on some technological and political prerequisites. These include ever cheaper and faster means of communication and transportation as well as an adequate political environment. The global expansion of capitalism requires political fragmentation: markets should be larger than political units.2 This provides an exit option from oppressive government for capital and, to a lesser degree, for qualiﬁed labor. Such an exit option protects economic freedom from ever-increasing state interference and tax burdens. If one state should be much more powerful than all others, as the US currently is, then globalization requires a deeper commitment to capitalism and economic freedom by the hegemon than by other states. Th ese political requirements of globalization are fulﬁlled. Globalization maximizes the size of the market. Since Adam Smith (1776/1976) we know that the size of the market determines the degree of division of labor which promotes productivity. Thus, globalization is beneﬁcial because it increases productivity. This is not only a theoretical claim, but also an empirical statement. For instance, based on data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, yearly economic gains from globalization have been estimated to be somewhere between $1,650 and $3,300 per capita for Americans (Scheve and Slaughter 2007:36–37). Real compensation per hour (including beneﬁts and wages) has also gone up in the past decade, by 22 percent (Griswold 2007:1).3 Since Deng Xiaoping opened China in the late 1970s by introducing reforms which imply creeping capitalism, Chinese agricultural production grew rapidly. Later, China attracted a lot of foreign direct investment. Today China is a major base for manufacturing. By 2005 it was already the third largest exporter, still behind Germany and the US but already ahead of Japan (Th e Economist 2005). By 2008 China is likely to become the biggest exporter in the world. In the early 1980s (but no longer thereafter) even the disparity between urban and rural incomes in China decreased (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003:145). Hundreds of millions of Chinese were taken out of abject poverty. In the ﬁrst two decades of reform, per capita incomes grew fourfold (Bhalla 2002:218). Later, less radical reforms in India led to nearly doubling per capita incomes in a similar period of time and pulled about two hundred million Indians out of abject poverty (Das 2002:360). Since China and India together account for nearly forty percent of mankind and about half of the population living in less developed countries, economic growth in China and India and other Asian countries contributes to the equalization of the global distributions of income between individuals and households. If we are interested in individuals rather than states, then the empirical indicators are clear. Globalization or the global expansion of capitalism has contributed to, or at least been compatible with, an equalization of the size distribution of income between human beings. Since cross-national differences between average incomes are still a more important component of inequality between human beings than intra-national differences in income, it is possible – and currently true – to have the following two trajectories at the same time: growing inequality within many or even most countries amidst some movement towards equality among individuals worldwide (Bhalla 2002; Firebaugh 1999; Goesling 2001; Sala-i-Martin 2007; World Bank 2005). Admittedly, many economies, including the US and China, suffered some deterioration in their domestic income distributions. This is why the legitimacy of capitalism and globalization comes under attack, even in the American citadel of capitalism. This is also why calls for protectionism become louder and louder (Scheve and Slaughter 2007). But critics of globalization tend to forget a basic truth about free trade (Griswold 2007:3): “If workers, capital, and resources can shift within the domestic economy, jobs eliminated by import competition will quickly be replaced by jobs created elsewhere.”4 One should not blame the consequences of institutional sclerosis, or of an unwillingness to adjust, on globalization. Globalization has led to a significant reduction in mass poverty. Although the Chinese distribution of income has become much less equal since the reform process began in the late 1970s, the strong growth performance of China has pulled hundreds of millions out of abject poverty. In India growth has been less spectacular than in China such that the distribution of income has changed less, and yet again hundreds of millions have been pulled out of abject poverty.

Although Latin America and Africa have benefitted much less from globalization than Asia has, these continents also cannot match the demographic weight of Asia. Therefore, their comparative lack of success cannot neutralize Asian progress in global perspective. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that winning in the process of globalization presupposes participating in it, not abstaining from it. One may illustrate global change with data provided by Indian economist Surjit Bhalla (2002:187). He deﬁnes people with a daily income between $10–$40 USD as members of the global middle class. In 1960 this class consisted largely of whites; only six percent were Asians. By 2000, however, 52 percent was Asian. Th e era of globalization is one in which Asia is now recovering, after falling for about two centuries further behind the West. Except for Africa abject poverty worldwide is likely to become signiﬁcantly reduced within one or two decades. Th e African share of abject poverty in the world is expected to rise until 2015 from 36 percent to about 90 percent (Bhalla 2002:S. 172).5 Why did so many people in Asia beneﬁt from globalization, whereas Africans did not? A plausible explanation has been oﬀered by Collier (2007:79).6 He points out that about three quarters of the bottom billion7 live in countries which have suﬀered from civil war or long periods of bad governance and poor economic policies. According to Collier (2007:27), “civil war is development in reverse. It damages both the country itself and its neighbors.” Bad governance and poor economic policies distort incentives and misallocate the meager resources of poor countries. Africa has suﬀered from these development traps to a greater degree than other continents. Moreover, one may argue that a focus on income and income distributions is biased towards understating the beneﬁts of globalization. As Goklany (2007:chaps. 2–3) has pointed out, the same income per capita today (in terms of purchasing power) implies higher life expectancies, lower infant mortalities, less malnutrition, healthier lives, and less child labor than it did decades or centuries earlier. Less developed, still poor countries do benefit from the technological progress achieved by developed and rich countries. Thus, even if one disputes the widely held and well-supported view regarding some equalization of individual or house-hold incomes worldwide in recent decades, one should still accept Goklany’s contention (2007:72): “In the aspects of human well-being that are truly critical – life expectancy, infant mortality, hunger, literacy, and child labor – the world is far more equal today than it was a century ago, in large part because of globalization.”8 Another advantage of globalization is that it contributes to preventing war (Russett and Oneal 2001; Weede 2005). Quantitative research demonstrates that the risk of war between nations is reduced if they trade a lot with each other. There is something like a commercial peace or peace by trade. Moreover, economic freedom reduces involvement in military conﬂict and ﬁnancial market openness also reduces the risk of war (Gartzke 2005, 2007). In particular, I want to underline that economic cooperation paciﬁes the geopolitical relationship between rising China and the West.9 Moreover, there is also something like a democratic peace. The risk of war between democracies is extremely small. In my view, one should conceptualize this as a component of a capitalist peace because democracies prosper best in wealthy countries10 and because capitalism or economic freedom and thereby globalization contribute to prosperity (Weede 2005, 2006). Since rising powers tend to challenge the political status quo, it is fortunate that the two demographic giants of this world seem to prosper under global capitalism.

#### Empirics outweigh – none of their evidence outlines a realistic alternative to capitalism

### 1NC – Solves War

#### Cap key to peace – prefer 40 years of empirics

Mousseau 2009 [Michael, associate professor of International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul, “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace,” International Security Vol 33 No 4, Spring, Muse]

One of the most important achievements in the study of international security has been the arrival and broad acceptance of the “democratic peace,” that is, the statistically significant absence of war between democracies. This discovery has produced a broader acceptance of domestic factors in the study of international conflict. It has also influenced public policy: since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have widely embraced democracy as a cause of peace. The extent to which scholars and practitioners can be convinced that democracy causes peace, however, depends on how confident they are in explaining it. Numerous studies have identified democracy as a cause of democratic peace, but none have yielded much meaningful, clear-cut, and nontrivial predictive power—achievements that lie at the heart of scientifically identifying causality. On the contrary, it appears increasingly likely that existing explanations for how democracy causes peace may be incomplete. Several studies have shown that the impact of democracy on peace may depend on the level of economic development.1 No compelling challenges to these findings have been offered, and some scholars who once confirmed the democratic peace now acknowledge the role played by economic conditionality.2 It follows that [End Page 52] democracy, alone, may not be the cause of the peace. Instead, some factor related to economic development either causes the peace or qualifies the impact of democracy on peace. This article advances the understanding of the democratic peace by demonstrating how a particular kind of economic development, contract-intensive development, appears to account for this peace. The economic conditionality of the democratic peace was originally predicted by economic norms theory, which identifies how liberal values may be rooted in the decisionmaking heuristics of a social market economy—that is, one where most people have the opportunity to choose, as individuals in the market, their sources of income and where to spend it.3 In this economy, sometimes called “advanced capitalism,” individuals habitually trust strangers in making contracts and depend on the state to enforce them impartially. They learn to prefer free choice and the equal application of law, and they expect their government to behave accordingly in foreign affairs. As a consequence, contract-intensive societies tend to agree on the preservation of the Westphalian order of sovereign states and the primacy of international law over power politics, and they are in natural alliance against any entity—state or nonstate—that seeks to challenge this order. This study demonstrates that from 1961 to 2001 not a single fatal conflict occurred among nations with contract-intensive economies. In contrast, democracies without contract-intensive economies engaged each other in several fatal conflicts during this period, about the number to be expected if democracy in states without a contracting economy has no impact on foreign policy. These results are highly robust after consideration of many competing causes, few of which have any significant impact on war and peace once the role of the contract-intensive economy variable is considered. The existence of this variable, in contrast, has the strongest impact of all nontrivial variables normally observed in studies of international conflict. Several implications follow from this study. First, this research supports the claims of some critics of the democratic peace who have long argued that a third variable may cause both democracy and peace:4 that variable is a [End Page 53] contract-intensive economy. Second, although challenging the role of democracy as a cause of democratic peace, this study shows that a zone of peace does exist among democratic nations, but it is one that appears to be caused by economic rather than governing institutions. Third, whether or not shared democracy contributes to international peace is an important issue because U.S. leaders’ belief in this proposition has influenced their conduct of foreign policy. President Bill Clinton, for example, supported the United States’ “democratic enlargement” policy because he believed that “democracies don’t attack each other.”5 His successor, George W. Bush, explained that his administration promoted democracy because “democracies don’t go to war with each other.”6 President Barack Obama has asserted that “we benefit from the expansion of democracy” because democracies are “the nations with which we share our deepest values.”7 Although support for democracy may be good for a variety reasons, this article presents compelling evidence that the promotion of peace among nations is not one of them. The article is organized as follows. First, I review the emergence of the democratic peace literature and the evidence linking this peace to economic development. Next, I present several explanations for the role of economic conditionality. I draw out the implications of economic norms theory for explaining stable democracy and peace among nations. After discussing the test conditions, reporting the results, and exploring alternative explanations, I offer a case study of the economic peace involving Greece and Turkey to illustrate the usefulness of the theory. I conclude with several policy implications that follow from the analysis. Two pioneers in the study of the democratic peace were Dean Babst in the 1960s and Rudolph Rummel in the 1970s.8 Key articles by Michael Doyle and [End Page 54] Jack Levy brought increased attention to the concept.9 By the early 1990s, a large number of highly rigorous studies had widely confirmed the proposition that democracies do not go war with each other.10 There are two primary sources of continuing skepticism, however. First, because most explanations for the democratic peace were created after it was first observed—the primary exception being Immanuel Kant in 179511—empirical confirmation for any of them can come only with the observation of novel empirical facts.12 To my knowledge, there are few confirmed, clear-cut, nontrivial, and novel facts that have been explicitly deduced from any explanation for the democratic peace. The closest candidate is the war-winning hypothesis, an expectation deduced from several accounts. The weight of the evidence is mixed as to whether democracies tend to win their wars.13 [End Page 55] Second, the finding that the democratic peace may be conditioned on some level of economic development indicates that democracy, alone, is probably not an independent cause of the peace. The most compelling study in this regard appeared in 2003, when several scholars came together to examine their contending expectations.14 The following four hypotheses were tested: (1) the democratic peace holds firm without any conditions; (2) the democratic peace is conditioned by economic development;15 (3) the democratic peace is conditioned by trade;16 and (4) the interaction of trade and development accounts for the democratic peace.17 The test failed to support hypotheses (1), (3), and (4), and robustly reconfirmed hypothesis (2). Most other studies that have examined the role of economic conditionality have confirmed it, including those of some scholars who had once supported the democratic peace thesis.18 Some scholars have responded to this finding by stressing that the level of economic development at which democracy becomes significant is low enough that, at least in recent years, most democracies are included among [End Page 56] those nations that do not engage in war with each other.19 But in a previous study, I argued that the exact level at which democracy becomes significant is not important, for two reasons. First, the question probably cannot be answered to everyone’s satisfaction. The precise level is highly sensitive to the researcher’s choice of control variables, sample, and measure of economic development.20 Second, without theory, the predicted level of development at which democracy becomes significant poses the danger of the fallacy of induction. Scholars can be much more confident in predictions grounded in theories with established predictive and explanatory power. Not only have all theories of democracy acting alone in causing the peace been unable to produce compelling novel facts, but the economic conditionality of this peace strongly suggests that all of these theories are, at best, incomplete. The issue is not the level of economic development at which democracy becomes a significant force for peace: it is how development causes the peace. Economic Conditionality and Economic Norms Theory Following the first report of the economic conditionality of the democratic peace, several studies sought to explain it. Azar Gat offered a list of factors potentially associated with what he calls economic “modernization,” including industrialization, which has delinked territory from the production of wealth, and a cultural “feminization” of men caused by urbanization and the service economy.21 Erik Gartzke argued that openness of markets may be the cause of the economic peace: nations with freer capital markets are more dependent than others on international investors, who are likely to divest from a country about to engage in war. Policymakers first recognize which nations have free capital markets and which do not, and then give greater credibility to threats made by those with freer capital markets than those with controlled ones. In theory, this can cause countries with freer capital markets to be more peaceful than others. The role of development in the democratic peace is based, presumably, on the assumption that development and capital openness are related.22 [End Page 57] My explanation for the economic peace integrates two long-standing findings in social science.23 First, research in economics and sociology has established the notion of bounded rationality: that is, individuals economize on the costs of decisionmaking by forming cognitive habits—heuristics—for situations they repeatedly encounter.24 Second, studies in economic history and sociology have documented that dependency on ties with friends and families—clientelism—often constitutes significant portions of trade and services in middle- and lower-income countries.25 It follows that divergent everyday routines of individuals in clientelist and contract-intensive societies should give rise to divergent decisionmaking heuristics. In a previous study, I showed how these divergent heuristics can affect political culture and institutions.26 In clientelist economies, individuals depend on group leaders, called “patrons,” who promote loyalty by providing economic and physical security in the form of gifts. To obtain these gifts, clients learn to habitually signal their willingness to abide by all of their patron’s commands with alacrity. When clientelist societies face rapid change and leadership is fluid, political entrepreneurs offer themselves as new group patrons. To increase the demand for security, these political entrepreneurs promote fear of outsiders. This may explain why societies in civil anarchy or in transition between clientelism and advanced capitalism—when high unemployment rates often coexist with clientelist traditions in large cities—tend to give rise to extremist dogmas that fit in-group worldviews, such as nationalist, Marxist, fascist, and militant Islamist ideologies.27 In contract-intensive societies, in contrast, making contracts with strangers promotes loyalty not to patrons but to a state that enforces these contracts with [End Page 58] impartiality and equal application of the rule of law. Because bigger markets offer more contracting opportunities than smaller ones, and because contracts cannot be arranged unless all parties explicitly state their preferences, individuals habitually perceive it as in their interest to respect the preferences and rights of strangers. Compared with voters in clientelist-integrated societies, voters in contract-intensive societies are more likely to support candidates for office who stress individual freedoms, at home and abroad, and who advocate government transparency and equal enforcement of the law. Discussion of the causes of a nation’s transition from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy is largely beyond the scope of economic norms theory. Exogenous factors include those that make the benefits of trusting strangers in the market greater than the benefits of personalized ties. The theory identifies political factors as the primary cause of economic changes because a contract-intensive economy cannot exist unless government authorities make the decision to enforce contracts with impartiality. But this decision does not guarantee a contract-intensive economy: geographic factors, such as poor harbors or an absence of neighbors with contract-intensive economies, can constrain markets. 28 There is also a likely feedback loop from an emerging market culture to greater opportunities in the market. As increasing numbers of individuals decide to accept the risk of contracting with strangers—as a society approaches the “tipping point”29—the division of labor must grow increasingly complex. This in turn enhances opportunities in the market, causing more individuals to accept the risk of trusting strangers and their states. The shift in loyalty from group leaders to impartial states is not monotonic, however. Acontract-intensive economy can collapse for a variety of reasons, as the nascent capitalist and quasi-liberal political cultures of Classical Athens and Renaissance Italy did after defeats in foreign wars. In the modern era, the feedback loop seems to have started anew in Holland in the fifteenth century (possibly triggered by climate change), and was soon entered into by its neighbors with good harbors: England, northern France, northwestern Germany, and Scandinavia. Over time, contract norms reached more deeply into these societies. By the eighteenth century, however, in only two societies were [End Page 59] these norms in all likelihood highly institutionalized: possibly Switzerland and almost certainly the northern colonies of British North America, led foremost by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.30 By extrapolating from economic history and global migration patterns (because emigration can inversely reflect the level of opportunities in the market), I was able to determine that by the early twentieth century contract-intensive economies were highly institutionalized in all of the previously mentioned regions, as well as in the settler communities of the American West, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. But between World Wars I and II, global economic troubles stalled the diffusion of contracting, causing it to decline in northwestern Germany when hyperinflation wiped out the middle class. Drawing on data discussed below, I found that by the 1960s contract norms were institutionalized throughout much of West Germany, rural France, the southern United States, and northern Italy, as well as Austria, Finland, and Japan.31 By the end of the Cold War, much of the rest of Italy, as well as Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan seemed to have reached the tipping point. Since the end of the ColdWar, the peoples of Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, and Slovenia may have reached it as well. A broad range of research documents the crucial role of economic norms in influencing political and social phenomena. Karl Polanyi’s book The Great Transformation highlights the transition from clientelist to contractual modes of exchange in Europe from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries.32 Studies in anthropology and archaeology document how economic conditions influence political and institutional preferences.33 As predicted by economic norms theory, there exists a correlation between high income and contracting and between low income and clientelism. Experimental studies have confirmed sizable differences in the way individuals from low- and high-income countries react in tests involving economic preferences.34 Studies in comparative politics have confirmed a strong linkage between economic development and stable, liberal [End Page 60] democracy.35 Survey and case studies in sociology and economics have linked in-group norms with collectivist preferences, and economic development with individualist preferences and higher levels of trust among strangers.36 The contract-intensive economy represents only one form of economic development. In the twentieth century, noncapitalist forms of development included fascism, communism, and petro-clientelism. Nations with these forms of development included totalitarian states (command economies—e.g., the Soviet Union), bureaucratic clientelist states (where authorities distributed wealth with an eye toward promoting and maintaining loyalty—e.g., Saudi Arabia), and “hybrid” states involving a mix of clientelism and totalitarianism (e.g., Nazi Germany). To test whether individuals in contract-intensive, higherincome economies think differently from those in other higher-income economies, I obtained data on levels of trust in nations from the World Values Survey project.37 Recall that contract-intensive economies are thought to foster the expectation that strangers will fulfill their contractual commitments, so a crucial prediction of economic norms theory is that, comparatively speaking, nations with contract-intensive economies should tend to have higher levels of impersonal trust than other nations. There are forty-four countries in 1997 with data on all variables. I regressed trust on gross domestic product (logged) and contract-intensive economy (see measure below). The result confirms this expectation: the contract-intensive economy variable, not higher income per se, is associated with higher levels of trust in nations.38 Both economic norms theory and classical liberal theory focus on the role of markets. But their assumptions and implications differ. Classical liberalism assumes that Adam Smith’s “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” is ingrained [End Page 61] in human nature, and that freer markets (less state regulation and more foreign trade) promote economic development.39 Economic norms theory suggests that the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange is learned from the sustained presence of market-based opportunities, and that these opportunities have geographic and political origins. In this way, economic norms theory identifies the origins and popularity of classical liberal and social contract theories in the sustained presence of market-based opportunities. When contracting in the market becomes the way of life, people begin to think of it as natural and conceive of democratic governance too as a “social” contract or as embedded in “natural” law.40 Economic norms theory thus offers an explanation for why the classical liberal, social contract, and natural law traditions emerged when and where they did: in the areas of northwestern Europe that were developing contract-intensive economies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, in contrast to what classical liberalism advocates claim, heavy state regulation of the economy may well be a prerequisite for countries to build and sustain a social market economy. Examples include the Scandinavian countries that have both contract-intensive economies and extensive state redistribution and regulation policies. Economic norms theory predicts that the leaders of contact-intensive nations will be less likely than other leaders to visibly challenge the sovereign rights of other states. This is because the modern interstate system is itself based on contract norms of legal equality: the Protestant Reformation was the consequence of the initial rise of contract norms in northwestern Europe in the sixteenth century; and the Treaty of Westphalia, which settled the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, institutionalized these norms across nations.41 Leaders of contract-intensive nations thus tend to view the continuation of the [End Page 62] Westphalian system of legally equal sovereign states, and the supremacy of international law over brute power politics, as consistent with the values and interests of their domestic populations. At first glance, economic norms theory may seem to imply the monadic expectation that contract-intensive nations should be less likely than other nations to engage in militarized conflict. But nothing in this theory suggests this to be true: rather, it is how they perceive their interests that makes contract-intensive nations different from other nations. Because contract-intensive nations consider the preservation of the Westphalian order to be in their interest, they may engage in wars with non-contract-intensive nations that challenge this order: for example, they may oppose states that threaten other states for economic gain in ways that violate international law. Economic norms theory predicts instead two hypotheses, one dyadic and one conditionally monadic. The dyadic hypothesis predicts a peace among contract-intensive nations; the monadic hypothesis predicts that contract-intensive nations, which are almost always highly democratic, will refrain from fighting other democratic nations. Starting with the dyadic hypothesis, the theory predicts that contract-intensive nations not only will be at peace with each other but are in a natural alliance. The alliance is the result of their fundamental agreement across a range of global issues and their consequent tendency to be on the same side in militarized confrontations.42 When the comparatively rare militarized dispute does occur between two contract-intensive nations, they are more likely than others to settle short of deadly force because their domestic audiences— and domestic opposition leaders—are more likely than their counterparts in non-contract-intensive nations to accept resolution through legal arbitration. The monadic hypothesis is conditioned by democracy. Recall that economic norms theory identifies how a contract-intensive economy can cause a population to value liberal democratic government. It follows that voters in contract-intensive democracies expect their leaders to refrain from fighting other democracies, regardless of the latters’ actions or economic conditions. This expectation accords with Spencer Weart’s view that liberal ideology causes [End Page 63] democratic nations to refrain from attacking other democratic nations.43 The key difference between Weart’s thesis and mine is that I predict that liberal ideology originates in contract-intensive economies, and thus only contract-intensive democracies—not other democracies—are so constrained. In this way, economic norms theory offers an explanation for why the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad appears on the agendas of contract-intensive democracies, but seemingly not on those of democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, or nations with other kinds of political systems. If this monadic thesis is correct, then democratic dyads where at least one state has a contract-intensive economy will be peaceful. Tests that do not control for this pattern would yield misleading results. Constructing the Test Conditions To test my hypotheses, I closely followed the analytic procedures used in a previous study.44 I included all fatal militarized disputes and wars as identified in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set over the years 1961 to 2001.45 I made one modeling change to this previous study by [End Page 64] controlling for the development level of the more developed state in the dyad and its interaction with geographic distance.46 To my knowledge, two sources of direct contracting data across nations are available: investments in stocks and bonds and life insurance policies. Of all economic sectors to gauge, economic securities and life insurance are probably the most informative because it is the essential need for economic security that compels individuals to form loyalties to patrons or liberal states. Unfortunately, national-level data on stocks and bonds include foreign investment, and foreign investment does not reflect a society’s norms. Life insurance contracts, however, are not affected in this way. These contracts should also serve as an accurate indicator of contracting heuristics because, in predominantly clientelist societies, individuals normally protect their families in the event of death through ties with friends and extended families, as children inherit the debts of their parents as well as the favors owed them. In this type of society, few individuals are likely to trust strangers and the state enough to place their family’s welfare in an insurance contract; prevailing heuristics prevent most from even considering it. In societies where contracting is highly institutionalized, in contrast, comparatively few will have the personalized ties that are sufficiently strong and reliable that they will place their family’s security in them; comparatively larger numbers will act on prevailing heuristics and trust their family’s welfare to strangers in the form of life insurance contracts.47 [End Page 65] I gathered cross-national data on active life insurance contracts collected under the auspices of the World Bank from 1960 to 2000.48 Only sixty-five nations are included in the data, however, and many of these only after 1978. It is possible, however, to expand the data to most countries for this period by adopting a binary threshold and assuming that missing data reflect zero contract norms. This assumption follows from economic norms theory: contract-intensive societies are comparatively reliable providers of economic data because contracts must be enforced, and enforcement requires written records. States that promote markets also have an interest in collecting data on contractual transactions, so that they can monitor and promote contractual economic activity as well as tax it. In contrast, recording and tallying clientelist transactions are difficult tasks because they are framed as favors, which is why much more economic data exist on contract-intensive societies than on others, past and present. For instance, we know that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, merchants in Cairo engaged in extensive contracting with merchants in Spain, North Africa, the Levant, and even India, because many of these contracts were later discovered in a repository of Old Cairo called the Geniza.49 The insurance data are most comprehensive for the years 1979 to 2000, so I identified the contract-intensive nations as those with existing insurance policies above the median level over this period. Additional tests show that the choice of threshold has no effect on the results. I also obtained identical results, unreported, using the original continuous data with missing values treated as missing.50 Model 1 in table 1 confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and fatal militarized disputes from 1961 to 2001. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.10) is negative and highly significant, confirming the expectation of democratic peace when the presence or absence of contract-intensive economy is not considered. The performance of most of the control variables is similar to that found in these earlier studies.51 To test the dyadic hypothesis that contract-intensive nations refrain from engaging in militarized disputes with each other, I constructed a binary indicator for both states having contract-intensive economies, which I call “Both States CIE.” As can be seen in table 1, the test yields a startling result: the Both States CIE variable must be dropped from the estimate because it predicts peace perfectly; that is, in the sample from 1961 to 2001, no fatal militarized disputes occurred between two nations with contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this peace cannot be reasonably attributed to chance (p < 0.001). In contrast, with the binary measure “Both Coherent Democracies,” as defined by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder,52 ten fatal militarized disputes took place between democratic nations that lacked contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test suggests that this is about the expected number if democracy in countries without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations (p < 0.715). To test the monadic hypothesis, I distinguished democratic dyads where one state has a contract-intensive economy from those where neither state has one by including the variable “One State CIE” and its interaction with [End Page 68] DemocracyL. As can be seen in model 2 in table 1, the coefficient for the interactive term DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.20) is negative and significant. This confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between contract-intensive economy and democracy. Because the coefficients for constituent terms (DemocracyL) in interactive models are meaningful only for cases where the other constituent term (One State CIE) equals zero, the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) in model 2 confirms the results of the bivariate chi-square tests: in countries without a contract-intensive economy, democracy does not cause peace among nations.53 Models 3 and 4 in table 1 repeat the analyses for the onset of war, defined by convention as militarized interstate disputes that include more than 999 battle deaths. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.15) in model 3 is negative and highly significant. This confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and war from 1961 to 2001. In model 4 all cases where Both States CIE equals one are excluded because this variable predicts peace perfectly. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this absence of war among contract-intensive nations is probably not the result of chance (p < 0.10). In contrast, the data yield two wars among coherent democracies where both lacked contract-intensive economies over the sample period: Cyprus and Turkey in 1974 and the Kargil war fought between India and Pakistan starting in 1993 (this dispute continued to 1999 when it reached the war level while both countries were still democratic). A chi-square test indicates that this is approximately the number to be expected if democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not prevent wars among nations (p < 0.857).54 The remaining coefficients in model 4 are substantially identical to the results for fatal militarized interstate disputes in model 2. The coefficient for [End Page 69] DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.30) confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between a contract-intensive economy and democracy at the war level; the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) confirms that democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations. Identical results also appear, for fatal militarized disputes and wars, using the dyadic dummy variable for Both Coherent Democracies. One possible explanation for the insignificance of democracy may be that there are too few cases of democracies without contract-intensive economies. The data, however, do not support this conclusion. Economic norms theory predicts that a contract-intensive economy will cause and stabilize democracy: it is thus no surprise that 88 percent of contract-intensive nation-years from 1960 to 2000 are also coherently democratic.55 But non-contract-intensive nations can experiment with democratic government for a host of reasons, and 49 percent of coherent democratic nation-years do not have contract-intensive economies during this period. Because there are about as many democratic nation-years without contract-intensive economies as there are with them, a dearth of non-contract-intensive democratic cases cannot explain the insignificance of the democratic peace. Could the causal arrow point in the opposite direction, with democracy the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economies and peace? The evidence does not support this conclusion. Correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are excluded. If democracy was a direct cause of both contract-intensive economy and peace, then there would be some variance remaining, after its moderate correlation with contract-intensive economy is excluded, that links democracy directly with peace.56 The insignificance of the DemocracyL coefficients in models 2 and 4 in table 1 indicates that no such direct effect exists. In addition, the scholarly consensus is that higher income per capita, which correlates with the contract-intensive economy variable, is far more likely to cause democracy [End Page 70] than democracy is to cause development.57 Still, the analysis here is not designed to test for reverse causation, though performance of such a test would be a valuable addition to the literature. Robustness tests indicate that in analyses of wars, democracy remains highly insignificant under any examined circumstance. In analyses of fatal disputes, on the other hand, the removal of some control variables can cause democracy to reach significance at the 0.10 level, which is the lowest threshold statisticians normally assign significance. Further tests show that democracy is not significant with the removal of all control variables.58 Nor does democracy become significant under any circumstance when observing only bordering nations. This suggests that if peace exists among non-bordering democracies, it is because non-contract-intensive democracies usually have weak economies and thus refrain from fighting each other because they do not have the capability to do so. The results in table 1 support both aspects of the economic peace: the dyadic unconditional peace and the supplemental monadic peace conditioned by democracy. These patterns conform with the economic norms expectation that a contract-intensive economy promotes liberal values and consolidated liberal democracy. Common preferences and interests cause foreign policy agreement and peace among contract-intensive nations, whereas liberal ideology causes contract-intensive democracies to refrain from using force against other democracies, including those without contract-intensive economies. Democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, on the other hand, have no such constraints and do not perceive common interests within the Westphalian order; thus they tend to fight each other about as often as other nations do. Further calculations indicate that a contract-intensive economy is a powerful force for peace. I could not directly estimate the substantive impact of Both States CIE because it predicts peace perfectly, so I reestimated model 2 after combining the dyadic and monadic measures into a single “super” variable: “One or Both States CIE.” I then included the product of this variable and Both Coherent Democracies to identify cases where both states are democracies and at least one has a contract-intensive economy. The results—unreported for reasons [End Page 71] of space—indicate that, among bordering democracies, a change from neither to one or both states with a contract-intensive economy causes a 97 percent reduction in the probability of fatal dispute onset. None of the remaining variables has an impact of this magnitude.59 Exploration of Alternative Explanations This section examines the possibility that the results discussed above may be explained by variables that I have excluded thus far because economic norms theory predicts that they are at least partly caused by the contract-intensive economy variable. Because correlations among independent variables are not credited to any variable in a multivariate regression, economic norms theory predicts that inclusion of the variables below will reduce the impact of the contract-intensive economy variable. Therefore, this section cannot serve as a test of economic norms theory. Instead, it departs from the theory and examines the possibility that competing theories may account for the results discussed above. Economic norms theory identifies contract norms as a cause of economic development. It is also likely, however, that wealthier individuals are better positioned than poorer ones to engage in contracts. To ensure that the results of model 2 in table 1 are not a function of wealth, I added a control for economic development (see model 1 in table 2). The coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variables hold firmly, and the coefficient for DevelopmentL (0.05) is not significant. This means that the results of this study cannot be attributed to the fact that contract-intensive nations tend to be wealthier than other nations.60 Economic norms theory predicts that individuals in contract-intensive societies will be more likely than individuals in other societies to seek profitable contracts wherever they may find them. Because the nature of governance in contract-intensive nations is expected to reflect the contractualist worldview that good government abets the private pursuit of wealth, it predicts that governments of contract-intensive nations will be more likely than others to encourage foreign trade. Trade per capita is not the same as trade interdependence (trade/gross domestic product), however, and economic norms theory does not predict trade interdependence per se. But contract-intensive nations prefer law over brute force, and thus they are more likely to prefer trade over imperialism in foreign economic policy.61 Richard Rosecrance has argued that the decision to trade rather than to fight is a key factor in explaining peace among trading nations.62 Economic norms theory thus complements Rosecrance’s insights, and the contract-intensive economy variable can potentially account for the pacifying role of trade interdependence in international relations. But the reverse is also possible: trade interdependence may account for peace among contract-intensive nations. This is the view of economic liberals: interstate trade promotes market development, democracy, and peace.63 As can be seen in model 2 in table 2, the coefficient for Trade Interdependence (−0.59) is not significant. It thus appears that contracting is the more likely cause of both trade interdependence and peace among nations. Still, caution must be exercised: the trade variable is close to significant, and this regression model was not designed for resolving this issue. Also, scholars have not settled on how best to gauge trade interdependency.64 Further examination of the impact of trade in conflict is thus warranted. Some explanations for the democratic peace suggest that only democracies with mature or consolidated institutions might be peaceful. In addition, mature democracies may promote contract-intensive economies, suggesting the potential reversal of causation. In model 3 in table 2 the coefficient for Democratic MaturityL (−0.09) is not significant.65 It thus appears that even mature, consolidated democracies are not more peaceful with each other than [End Page 74] other nations. Rather, a contract-intensive economy is the more likely cause of both democratic maturity and the prevailing peace. Economic norms theory predicts that contract-intensive nations will perceive common security interests in the primacy of international law over power politics, causing them to form alliances. Common interests can develop for other reasons, however, and it is possible that alliances may account for the economic peace.66 In model 4 in table 2, the coefficient for Alliance (0.16) is not significant. The evidence thus favors the conclusion that contract-intensive economy partially accounts for the existence of both alliances and peace. As discussed above, Gat has offered several explanations for the peace among developed democratic nations.67 Most of these are broad and unfalsifiable, but he does offer urbanization and size of the service sector as variables, which he suggests make individuals less accustomed to the suffering of war and therefore opposed to it. But a service economy may be a function of contract norms, which encourage the commodification of services as well as of labor and capital. I gauge the variable Service Economy as the proportion of gross domestic product in the service sectors.68 In model 5 in table 2, the coefficient (0.01) is not significant. Analyses of urbanization show that dyads where both states are highly urbanized are significantly more likely than other dyads to engage in fatal disputes. Neither urbanization nor a service economy is thus a likely explanation for the economic peace. Also discussed above, Gartzke argues that free capital markets might explain the developed democratic peace. But these markets could be caused by contract norms, as states promote foreign trade and financial markets diffuse within, as well as across, international borders. Model 6 in table 2 reports the results using Gartzke’s measure. 69 The coefficient for Capital OpennessL (−0.15) is negative and significant, and coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variable also hold firmly. This suggests that, even if there is some causality stemming from the contract-intensive economy variable, free capital markets have an independent impact on the onset of fatal disputes. In short, the data support both Gartzke’s theory and economic norms theory. This result is reasonable, as the theories do not contain incompatible assumptions and are [End Page 75] not mutually exclusive.70 Further tests show that contract-intensive economy is the far stronger variable, with an impact about twice that of capital openness. Subsequent tests for war onsets produced identical results for all variables except Capital OpennessL, which is not significant at the war level. The Greek-Turkish Case An examination of a case study of recent changes in Greece’s economy and its relations with its neighbor Turkey illustrates how economic norms affect the domestic and foreign politics of nations. I chose this case because both countries have experienced many years of “coherent” democracy as defined above: Greece since 1975, with eighty-four years of democracy previously; and Turkey since 1983, with twenty-five years of democracy previously.71 Nevertheless, from 1960 to 2000, twenty militarized interstate disputes occurred between the two countries, five of which resulted in fatalities. If economic norms theory is correct, these tensions were a function of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes of voters on both sides. In 1990 Greece transitioned from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy. This offers a direct opportunity to test the economic norms expectation that Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy should have been followed by substantial moderation and rationalization of Greek domestic and foreign politics, including Greece’s relations with Turkey. As discussed earlier, an increase in the use of contracts is thought to have political and geographic root causes. For Greece, the political roots stem from a desire to join the European Community (EC) and the role played by the EC in giving politicians an “excuse” to make institutional changes, such as the equitable enforcement of banking and trade laws, which favors the transition to a market economy. Geographically, Greece’s entry into the EC was followed by a substantial increase in foreign investment into the country from 1980 to 1995.72 Starting in 1986, the rate of growth in life insurance contracting in Greece increased dramatically; it crossed the global median into contract-intensive status in 1990. Still, in the year 2000 Greece’s level of per capita life insurance [End Page 76] contracting was only one-twenty-fifth that of the contract-intensive standard-bearers Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Most observers agree that the mid-1990s was a turning point in Greek politics. Before then, the two main parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND), were primarily agents of bureaucratic clientelism. As economic norms theory would expect, both parties were highly personalist and centered on charismatic leaders prone to populist and ideological bombast.73 Interparty relations were tense and based on opposing social identities and systems of patronage.74 The rule of law was weak,75 and distrust of the state ran deep76; in addition, the people identified with “the political parties rather than governments.”77 In foreign policy there was an “exclusivist notion of ‘Greekness.’”78 In the 1980s and early 1990s, PASOK won elections with the xenophobic, anticapitalist, anti-American, and anti-European rhetoric of its populist leader, Andreas Papandreou. In 1976 Greece confronted Turkey on issues in the Aegean over which the International Court of Justice later ruled the Greeks had no case. When a similar issue arose in 1987, Prime Minister Papandreou asserted that it was time to “teach the Turks a hard lesson.”79 The two countries came close to war in 1976, 1987, and 1996.80 Although during this period Greek and Turkish leaders made frequent attempts to resolve their differences, “these initiatives were not sustainable in the face of an adverse political climate, limited social contacts, high level of biases, and sensationalist press.”81 The watershed moment in Greek politics came in 1996, when Papandreou died and PASOK elected Costas Simitis to replace him. The gulf separating the two leaders was vast. Simitis was elected largely on the platform of [End Page 77] Eksynchronismos (modernization). In the words of Kevin Featherstone, “Simitis and his supporters advocated a greater separation of party from the state” and a break from the “bureaucratic clientelism of the recent past.” Whereas Papandreou “exercised a dominant authority over his party,” Simitis was “more managerial and technocratic.”82 As economic norms theory would expect, PASOK’s choice of a reformer reflected deep-seated changes in Greece’s political culture. The opposition ND also moved to the center, with the nationalist posturing and ideological bravado of both parties largely disappearing from Greece’s political discourse.83 A “cultural shift” occurred,84 as the new rhetoric of reform struck a strong chord with the electorate, which increasingly viewed the leaders of the country’s oldstyle politics as “dinosaurs.”85 Voters began to distance themselves from Greece’s political parties; legal institutions became more central to everyday life; and a “new sense of security changed the way ordinary citizens viewed public life.”86 Reflecting an increased respect for the rule of law, the two leading parties agreed on new protections for individual rights in the constitution. 87 Still, a minority continued to vocalize opposition to what many Greeks called Greece’s growing “Europeanization,” led by Archbishop Christodoulos. Both leading parties also backed fundamental changes in Greece’s foreign policy.88 For Europe, the country that was once viewed as the “black sheep” of European foreign policy had evolved into a more consensual partner.89 Prior to the late 1990s, Greece maintained an uncompromising approach in its relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, and was widely viewed in Europe as the “bully of the Balkans.” In the late 1990s, however, a more cooperative attitude emerged, and Greece’s relations with these countries greatly improved.90 This realignment with other contract-intensive countries following Greece’s own transition to a contract-intensive economy, and its more cooperative attitude toward other democracies, accords with expectations of economic norms theory. [End Page 78] Greece’s foreign policy toward Turkey also underwent fundamental change in the late 1990s.91 Reflecting a change in Greek attitudes, foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos—considered a hard-liner—asserted that “we Greeks must get over the old knee-jerk reaction that if something is bad for Turkey it is good for us.”92 The most significant change occurred in 1999, when Greece moved from perennial obstructer to supporter of Turkey’s membership bid to join the European Union (EU). In all likelihood, this move was not strategic but an outcome of deep-seated shifts in Greeks’ perceptions of their national interest.93 Greek scholars and think tanks have stressed that it is in Greece’s interest to have Turkey in the EU as a partner.94 From 2000 to 2004, Greece and Turkey signed twenty-five major agreements; from 1970 to 2000 there were none.95 It must be recalled, however, that fundamental differences remain over the division of Cyprus and exploitation of the Aegean seabed.96 Resolution of the deeper issues in Greek-Turkish relations would also require change in how Turkish leaders perceive their interests. Unlike Greece, Turkey has not transitioned to a contract-intensive economy. If economic norms theory is correct, then Turkish politics should appear similar to Greek politics before Greece’s transition; this would include strong party loyalties, intense identity issues, and fear of outsiders in the country’s political discourse. In foreign policy, compromise should be difficult, as opposition parties seeking to garner the nationalist identity seize any reason to criticize the government for “giving in” to outsiders. Most observers agree that the above description characterizes Turkish politics today. There is no significant liberal party concerned with individual rights, equal enforcement of the law, or transparency in government. The left is characterized as favoring the elite-led modernization project, which increasingly includes “an intensifying nationalism with an underlying xenophobia”; the right emphasizes communitarian religious identity and social conservatism.97 [End Page 79] Turkey’s national identity includes a strong ethnoreligious dimension, and communitarianism remains a prominent feature: it continues to be a criminal offense to insult Turkishness. The political parties are weakly institutionalized and headed by strong, charismatic leaders who compete over state rents with ideological and populist appeals. Voters identify with parties, and the parties offer competing images of national identity.98 Although Turkey has contributed in many ways to the rapprochement with Greece, domestic core values continue to place constraints on further progress. For instance, Turkey could grant more religious freedom to its Orthodox community. 99 But with the international community, Turks feel that they can rely only on themselves, and the EU concern over Turkey’s human rights record is widely viewed “as part of a design to undermine Turkish national unity.”100 Engagement with Greece is considered risky for any incumbent government because it tends “to generate widespread nationalist sentiments.”101 The opposition can easily brand concessions, even if mutual, as giving in to outsiders and contrary to Turkish interests. Public opinion surveys in Turkey show that there continue to be very low levels of trust in the society, and “popular sentiment towards Greeks tends to be quite negative.”102 Turkey may have engaged with Greece in part due to the “earthquake diplomacy” that occurred after the catastrophic earthquake that struck Turkey in August 1999.103 Consistent with the economic norms expectation of a new universalism in Greek identity, many Greek individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and local authorities, in addition to the Greek government, offered substantial help to the Turks in their time of need. This opened a temporary window of good feeling toward Greece in Turkey that allowed Ankara to sign a number of confidence-building measures with Athens. [End Page 80] An alternative explanation for the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations might be the constraining and moderating role of the EU. It is true that Turkey’s constructive responses to Greek initiatives have been at least partly aimed at satisfying EU conditions for full membership. For instance, after refusing for decades to allow an international solution to the Cyprus dispute, Ankara acquiesced after the EU made doing so a condition of Turkey’s candidacy. In this way, the carrot of the EU acts as political cover for Turkish politicians, just as the EC once did for Greek politicians, offering leaders an “excuse” for “giving in” to the foreigners. Given Greece’s full membership in the EU since 1981, however, EU incentives do not offer a satisfying account for the changes in Greek politics and foreign policy in the 1990s. Recognition of the EC’s role in Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy suggests some promise for a more stable peace between Greece and Turkey in the years ahead. Like Greece in the 1980s, after Turkey became an official EU candidate, it experienced an explosion of foreign direct investment. 104 In the 1990s Turkey also experienced a rise in per capita life insurance contracting. If the rate of growth of the 1990s continues, the country will pass the contract-intensive threshold in the year 2019. If the time lag for political change after the economic transition in Turkey is the same as it was in Greece (seven years), significant moderation and individualization of Turkey’s political culture may occur around 2026. If the EU continues to act as an incentive for institutionalizing the market and as a source of foreign investment, Turkey’s change could come sooner.105 Economic norms theory would predict that when this happens, all of Turkey’s security-related issues with Greece will be positively and permanently settled; the enduring rivalry will end; and fatal militarized confrontations in this dyad will be a thing of the past. Conclusion Many policymakers and scholars of international relations believe that the promotion of democracy abroad will enhance global order and the security of the United States and its allies. Yet since the terrorist attacks on New York and [End Page 81] Washington on September 11, 2001, efforts to promote democracy as part of U.S. grand strategy in the Muslim Middle East only increased the influence of anti-U.S. factions in the region, including in Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. This study challenges the strategic assumptions of U.S. policymakers by showing that democracy is not a likely cause of peace among nations. Rather, domestic economic conditions appear to be the main factor in promoting peace. Scholars have erroneously linked democracies with peace because most contract-intensive nations are democratic. But this study showed that about half of all democratic nations lack contract-intensive economies, and these democratic countries are not peaceful. Indeed, all the potential exceptions to the democratic peace—such as the Spanish-American War, the Continuation War of Finland against the Allies during World War II, and the Kargil war between India and Pakistan—are easily accounted for in this study because in each of these wars the democracy on at least one of the sides lacked a contract-intensive economy. This article examined the implications of economic norms theory, which integrates the insights of bounded rationality with research by economic historians to show how voter preferences for democracy and respect for individual rights and equal protection under the law may be rooted in the conditions unique to social market economies, where individuals trust both strangers in making contracts and a state that enforces them with impartiality. In many middle- and low-income countries, in contrast, high structural unemployment encourages dependence on the patronage of friends and family. This dependency can promote the heuristics of identifying and trusting in-groups and their leaders, and distrusting strangers from out-groups and state institutions. The study traced the path of causation from economic norms to interstate peace across levels of analysis and methodologies and found that contract-intensive societies are associated with higher levels of trust. It is not this trust, however, that causes peace among contract-intensive nations: peace is the result of a fundamental agreement among voters and elites in these countries on the Westphalian order of sovereign states, including the primacy of international law over power politics and imperialist bullying. This agreement emerges from the heuristics of their common economic way of life. Leaders of states with contract-intensive economies thus perceive common security interests in defending the global status quo and are in natural alliance against any state or nonstate entity that seeks to challenge it. Although democracies are not inherently peaceful, there is a conditional role for democracy in the economic peace: Because contract-intensive economy [End Page 82] promotes the heuristics that value individual freedom and equitable government, most contract-intensive nations have liberal democratic governments. Valuing democracy, voters and elites in contract-intensive democracies tend to value the promotion of individual rights and democracy abroad. They therefore restrain themselves from fighting other countries perceived as democratic, regardless of their economic or foreign policy behavior. These patterns were confirmed in the quantitative analyses and in a case study of Greece and Turkey.

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