### 1AC – Yield

#### Farmer’s yield is nearing an all-time low – government support doesn’t help the neediest and isn’t a long-term solution.

**Farm-Aid 20** [9/14/20, “Understanding the Economic Crisis Family Farms are Facing”, 2Farm Aid works with local, regional and national organizations to promote fair farm policies and grassroots organizations coordinating campaigns designed to defend and bolster family farm-centered agriculture. RL: <https://www.farmaid.org/blog/fact-sheet/understanding-economic-crisis-family-farms-are-facing/>, KR]

EVEN BEFORE COVID-19, FARM FAMILIES HAD NEGATIVE FARM INCOME

Things have been bad in farm country for a while. Between 2013 and 2018, farmers experienced a nearly 50% drop in net farm income as the prices for corn, wheat, dairy, beef and other farm products crashed. While net farm income rose by 3% in 2019, government payments accounted for all of that increase (namely, via the trade bailout program). Without it, 2019 delivered farmers their second lowest income since 2013.[13]

As for 2020, while the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is forecasting a $19 billion (or 22.7%) increase in net farm income this year, government payments like trade bailouts and federal COVID-19 relief programs account for 36% of net farm income — the highest share since 2001 and the eighth highest share since The Great Depression.[14] Without the $22.4 billion provided in government payments, net farm income in 2020 would be well below the sector’s average from 2000 to 2019.[15] What’s more, the vast majority of payments flowed to the very largest farms. CNBC reports that the top 5% of trade bailout recipients received nearly half of all $28 billion paid in 2018 and 2019.[16]

Perhaps more troubling is USDA’s pre-pandemic data. In February, USDA forecast 2020 median farm household income at -$1,840 — meaning that farm households would lose money from the farm.[17] More recent USDA data suggests a slightly better median income level,[18] presumably from high levels of government payments. But even these sector-wide income numbers likely mask severe distress in many parts of farm country, as many farmers who have been squeezed by years of low income did not benefit from federal payments. Most farmers rely on off-farm jobs to feed their families, secure health insurance, and keep their farms afloat. Given the pandemic’s broader economic impacts, which arrived after farmers have had to dig into their savings for the better part of the last decade, droves of farms are at risk of going under in the next year.

FARM CREDIT CONDITIONS WEAKEN

Farmers rely heavily on credit to buy the seeds, fertilizer, machinery, livestock and other inputs that keep their farms running. Because most farmers require operating loans at the start of each season, a critical aspect of a farm’s financial health relates to its ability to make loan payments on time. Economists utilize various solvency measures to measure this, including the debt-to-asset ratio, debt-to-equity ratio and equity-to-asset ratio. All of these measured weakened for the eighth consecutive year in 2020. As farm debt continues to rise, the sector’s risk of insolvency in 2020 is at its highest level since 2002.[19] The following trends reveal weakening credit conditions for farmers and ranchers in today’s strained economy:

Farmers struggle to make loan payments. Farm loan delinquency rates are rising. The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, which covers Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Wyoming, reports that the volume of delinquent farm real estate and operating loans increased by about 17% and 13%, respectively, over the past year.[20] Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, covering Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin, reports the share of farm loans with “major” or “severe” repayment problems is now at 8.3% — a level not seen since 1988.[21]

The 1980s all over again? Pre-COVID-19, total farm debt was estimated to hit a record $425 billion, just shy of the 1981 peak of $440 billion.[22] Since 2014, real estate debt has been rising to historic levels, potentially indicating not just rising land values, but farmers refinancing higher-interest loans or other debt into farm real estate. In a time of persistently low farm income where farmers are defaulting on loans, this trend places a lot of farmland at risk of liquidation.[23]

Growing demand for credit: If farmers can’t secure affordable and timely credit, they face an economic uncertainty that threatens the survival of their farms. Several bankers are reporting growing demand for loans, yet significant decreases in both the number and the size of agricultural loans in their portfolios.[24]

While economists and lenders note that federal relief has helped farmers navigate these conditions, many remain concerned that without more intervention, a wave of foreclosures will strike farm country. These conditions are challenging for all farmers, but beginning farmers, smaller and midsized farmers, as well as other disadvantaged farmers in particular continue to struggle.

#### The aff is key to increase incentives to farm – increased wages, living conditions, AND helps farmers expand products.

**Reilly 11** [Penn State Law, “Agricultural Laborers: Their Inability to Unionize Under the National Labor Relations Act”, Penn State: Masters of Science, JD Law, URL: <https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/Publications_Library/Agricultural_Laborers.pdf>, 2011 + since most recent citation is from then, KR]

The rate of pay agricultural laborers earn in return for their work would increase if these workers were able to organize and engage in collective bargaining with their employers. Agricultural workers in 2008 made between $8.64 per hour and $13.02 per hour.50 The hourly wage is relatively low, especially when compared to other occupations with the ability to unionize that require similar training and working conditions. For example, construction laborers in 2008 earned between $10.80 and $14.95 per hour51 and textile, apparel and furnishing workers earned between $9.14 and $18.15 per hour.52 While there is a wide range of earnings for anyone entering these three professions, the two professions that are able to unionize earn more per hour on a national level than the agricultural workers who are exempted form organizing under the NLRA. The low earnings of agricultural laborers as compared to other laborers supports a finding that the NLRA would benefit agricultural laborers and are the type of workers that were meant to be extended the right to organize. If agricultural laborers were afforded protection under the NLRA to engage in collective bargaining, the likely result would be that bargaining representatives would be able to negotiate with agricultural employers for higher wages that would lead to less of an earnings gap between agricultural laborers and laborers in other industries.

There is one major similarity between the construction industry and the agriculture industry that would seem to tip the scales in favor of affording agricultural laborers the right to unionize under the NLRA. That is that both industries hire seasonally.53 The seasonal nature of agricultural work is often cited as a reason against unionization, but with the similarity in the construction industry and the ability of those workers to unionize, the seasonal nature of agricultural work should be a factor in considering whether or not to include these workers under the NLRA, but is not itself conclusive. If seasonal workers in other industries are able to unionize, the seasonal nature of agricultural work should not be a major point of opposition to allowing agricultural laborers the right to collectively bargain.

Agricultural laborers are also subject to harsh conditions because of the work that they perform and should be able to organize under the NLRA in order to bargain with their employers for better working conditions. Agricultural laborers are not always provided with access to clean drinking water nor are there typically adequate restroom facilities for these workers to use.55 Unions can help workers to gain access to sanitary facilities and clean drinking water by bargaining for these necessities with the employers.56 By making these issues part of a collective bargaining agreement, unions will be able to hold employers contractually liable to follow such conditions and will thereby improve the conditions of employment for agricultural laborers who would otherwise be subject to sub-standard facilities.

Another hazardous working condition that arises for agricultural laborers is the exposure to pesticides. Agricultural laborers may be exposed to pesticides that are carcinogens or other pesticides that affect the endocrine and/or hormone systems.57 Agricultural laborers, especially those who apply pesticides, are at a greater risk of acute pesticide poisoning which many times is more prevalent than it needs to be because agricultural employers do not take the kinds of precautions necessary to prevent pesticide poisoning.58 Unions again can aid agricultural laborers by limiting such exposure through a collective bargaining agreement because unions would be able to bargain for certain safety precautions to be taken before workers are able to spray pesticides and can also ensure that safety gear is provided before spraying commences. Inadequate facilities and pesticides are two examples of the hazardous conditions that agricultural laborers are exposed to that could be cured through the right to unionize and collectively bargain with employers. Unions would be able to protect workers from such sub-standard conditions which in turn would lead to less illness and disease that agricultural laborers would be subjected to and would increase productivity on farms because field workers will not be slowed by sickness and would be able to work more as a result.

Further, “farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers” are able to form associations for the mutual benefit of all members.59 These associations allow their members to work collectively in preparing their products for market.60 These producers are also able to form cooperatives to market their products and maintain the “bargaining position of individual farmers” in order to prevent adverse consequences of overcrowding the market.61 These agricultural producers are free to engage in concerted activity for the mutual protection of the association’s members, but agricultural laborers are exempt from asserting these same rights.62 Agricultural producers are therefore able to become even stronger entities, further widening the differences in the bargaining positions between producers and agricultural laborers. The unionization of agricultural laborers would better equalize the bargaining position on each side affording laborers the protections they need against agricultural employers as they become more powerful through associations.

#### I’ll isolate 2 internal links –

#### 1] Productivity – wage increases boost consumer spending and economic value.

**Jayachandran 20** [6/18/2020, New York Times, “How a Raise for Workers Can Be a Win for Everybody”, Seema Jayachandran is an economics professor at Northwestern University, URL:<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/business/coronavirus-minimum-wage-increase.html>, KR]

Two new studies show that giving pay raises to low-wage workers is good for consumers, too. That finding could add momentum to efforts to help grocery store clerks, nursing home workers and delivery drivers who are being paid a minimum wage despite their efforts being so essential during the current pandemic. The new research shows that raising the minimum wage improves workers’ productivity, which translates into businesses offering higher-quality service. Because many customers are willing to pay more when quality improves, a company can raise its prices without losing sales volume. That means that profits need not suffer even though employee salaries increase.

Moreover, because companies are getting better performance from workers in return for paying them more, a higher minimum wage does not necessarily lead to fewer jobs. With a more productive work force, more economic value is being created and there is more money to go around, so a higher paycheck for one person does not imply another person’s loss.

The federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour has not increased since 2009, though Democrats in the House of Representatives have tried to raise it. State and local governments can set their own minimum wage, provided that it is above the federal rate. For example, Ohio’s minimum wage is $8.70 an hour and New York state’s is $11.80. San Francisco’s is $15.59 an hour.

The two new studies, one focused on nursing homes and the other on department stores, looked at the effects of minimum wage changes made at various levels of government. While they are both still working papers and have not appeared in scholarly journals, they were conducted rigorously, by my estimation, and the evidence they offer deserves consideration in the debate on the minimum wage, particularly during our current health and economic crises.

The nursing home study, by the economist Krista Ruffini, a visiting scholar at the Minnesota Federal Reserve, has direct implications in the current pandemic. The improvements in quality it found may be a very a big deal: They imply fewer medical complications and, perhaps, a longer life for patients.

Ms. Ruffini analyzed hundreds of increases in the minimum wage across the United States from 1990 to 2017. In each case, she compared employment in neighboring counties that suddenly had different minimum wage levels.

Her method expands on a landmark study by David Card, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, and Alan Krueger, the former presidential adviser and Princeton economist, who found no drop in fast-food employment when New Jersey raised its minimum wage in 1992 above the level paid across the state line in Pennsylvania.

Similarly, Ms. Ruffini found little change in employment levels in nursing homes. Many employees were paid the minimum wage or somewhat more than that. Even in cases of the workers — nursing assistants — who had been paid more than the minimum wage, an increase in that base wage rippled through the labor market and still raised their salaries.

Rivian edges closer to an I.P.O., seeking a valuation above $50 billion.

PG&E says it faces a federal inquiry and $1.15 billion in losses over the Dixie fire.

The Biden administration will publish vaccine mandate rules ‘in the coming days.’

Ms. Ruffini’s most startling finding was that higher minimum wages reduced mortality significantly among nursing home residents. Her research suggests that if every county increased its minimum wage by 10 percent, there could be 15,000 fewer deaths in nursing homes each year, or about a 3 percent reduction.

How did pay increases translate into better patient health and longer lives? It appears that with better pay, jobs in nursing homes became more attractive, so employee turnover decreased. Patients benefited from more continuity in their care.

In addition, the better paid employees may have simply worked harder, perhaps because they cared more about holding onto their jobs. Economists say they have been paid an “efficiency wage”: Employees become more productive when their wages are higher.

The higher wage may also have attracted more skilled or industrious people to the job, but this seems to account for at most a small portion of the improvements in patient health.

#### The only empirics flow aff.

**Katovich 18** [Maia Katovich, 1-4/2018, “The relation between labor productivity and wages in Brazil:”, Scielo Brazil, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, Universidade de Campinas, Campinas, São Paulo. URL: <https://www.scielo.br/j/neco/a/QR5hfyMfL9c3gwQSGGcRyHD/?lang=en>, KR]

In Brazil, real wages grew significantly more than did labor productivity between 1996 and 2014. However, this general trend disguises significant sectoral variations, which can be grouped into four conceptual trends. Firstly, in the agriculture and commerce sectors, large gains in labor productivity were accompanied by real wage increases and improvements in the quality of employment. This dynamic was likely due to a positive interplay between productivity-enhancing market developments (incorporation of new technologies, high levels of investment, exploitation of new consumer markets/agricultural frontiers) and income-enhancing institutional developments (formalization and minimum wage valorization). In conjunction, these forces resulted in productivity gains that outpaced wage growth, leading to declining relative wages in agriculture and commerce (see Appendix A for data on relative wages).

In a second sectoral trend, the construction and real estate and other services sectors enjoyed real wage gains over the 1996-2014 period, despite stagnation in labor productivity. Both sectors offer little natural room for drastic productivity growth through the incorporation of new technologies, investments, or practices. And both were major beneficiaries of institutional interventions such as formalization and valorization of the minimum wage.14 Together, these forces resulted in a sharp rise in relative wage for construction and real estate and other services.

In a third variation of the productivity-wage relationship, both labor productivity and real wages largely stagnated or declined slightly in the industry and transportation sectors. In the case of industry, international competition likely held down wages, while productivity suffered from ongoing processes of deindustrialization. By its nature, the transportation sector offers little room for major productivity gains, while the average wage may have fallen as a result of changing forms of employment relations (i.e., increasing levels of self-employment) and increasing relative costs of transport (Chahad; Cacciamali, 2005). These dynamics explain the moderate decline in relative wages for industry and transportation.

In a fourth and final trend, the financial and information services and public services sectors saw stable or declining levels of labor productivity, accompanied by increasing or stable real wages. Productivity declines in financial and information services were due largely to changes in the Brazilian banking system over the 1998-2004 period. Earnings increases in both sectors may have resulted from persistently high returns to education, growing demand for qualified workers, and high levels of labor organization. As a result, the relative wage rose sharply for these sectors between 1996 and 2014.

It is important to note that all analyses above should be interpreted with caution, due to the difficulty inherent in estimating absolute values of labor productivity for some sectors, particularly public services and real estate. Nevertheless, the values serve to elucidate temporal dynamics of labor productivity within (if not necessarily across) sectors, revealing essential patterns in the productivity-wage relationship.

Estimation of hierarchical wage models using pooled data assessed the main structural and individual determinants of real wages over the sample period. Growth in sector- and state- level labor productivity was significantly positively associated with growth in real wages for all economic sectors from 1996 to 2012. Elasticity between labor productivity and real wages was greatest for sectors where workers’ earnings are often based directly on productivity (real estate, commerce), or where firms can easily measure employees’ productivity (industry). Elasticities appear smaller in sectors where productivity is more difficult for firms to measure, or where there are high levels of minimum wage employment (agriculture, construction) or labor organization (financial and information services).

In general, productivity’s impact on wages was comparable to the impacts of institutional factors, particularly worker formalization and minimum wage. Formalization, which primarily impacts labor markets through the enforcement of a minimum wage-floor, exhibited the largest impacts on sectors with high proportions of minimum wage employment. Labor organization had varied effects on wage levels. In sectors with high levels of organization, increases in union-participation exhibited a significantly positive association with wages. In contrast, increases in union-participation in less-organized sectors were negatively associated with wages, perhaps because union activity served to draw earnings away from the larger share of non-unionized workers. Nonetheless, unionization changed little over the sample period and exerted a relatively small impact on hourly wages.

Wage growth in line with the first sectoral trend (observed in the agriculture and commerce sectors) may be the most sustainable in the long term, in the sense that increased earnings over the 1996 to 2014 period accompanied real gains in labor productivity. In contrast, rising relative wages in the financial and information services and public services sectors highlight the capacity of labor organization, institutional protections, and skill-biased job polarization to decouple wages from productivity levels. In sum, institutional mechanisms display the capacity to substantially reallocate factor incomes toward workers, but these mechanisms face natural limitations if not accompanied by growth in labor productivity. Thus, sustainable future wage growth in Brazil will likely depend on positive interplays between market-driven productivity gains and continued institutional interventions.

#### That drives economic confidence – increased productivity drives farm growth which kicks of a chain of investment.

**Wang et. al, 19** [“How Farmers Make Investment Decisions: Evidence from a Farmer Survey in China”, Sustainability, Shuangjin Wang 1, Yuan Tian 2,\*ORCID, Xiaowei Liu 3 and Maggie Foley 4, 1: School of Management, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin 300134, China, 2: School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China, 3: College of Business, St. Ambrose University, Davenport, IA 52803, USA, 4: Davis Business School, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, FL 32211, USA, URL: <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwii17vKue7zAhVdJjQIHUr3D7YQFnoECAUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mdpi.com%2F2071-1050%2F12%2F1%2F247%2Fpdf&usg=AOvVaw1RMvM-hGadn_uoetBxebDi>, KR]

A variety of research methods were used in previous research to study farmers’ investment adjustment behavior from different perspectives. For example, Factor Analysis [3,7], Multinomial Logit Model [8,10,11], Deterministic Discrete Event Model [9], Mixed Logit Model with Flexible Mixing Distribution [12], Tobit Model [13,14], Probit Model [15–17], and Structural Equation Modeling [18,19].

It is widely accepted that farmers’ investment adjustment behavior is affected by many factors, but different literature has different opinions on key influencing factors that affect farmers’ investment behavior. Adimassu et al. [20] have found that farmers’ investments are limited by their capabilities. Okello et al. [21] have revealed that economic benefits, such as higher yields and income, can affect farmers’ investment in seed selection. Also, the cropped area, scale of the farmland, and agricultural income significantly influence farmers’ willingness to invest [10]. The government’s support and favorable policies can positively promote the agriculture investment of farmers [22,23]. Adimassu et al. [2] finds that farmers’ investment behavior is affected by five major factors: households’ resource endowments, knowledge, and experience of farming, access to information, social capital, and availability of family labor.

Moreover, some economic studies focus on specific factors that affect investment choice, such as state subsidies [24], the impact of agricultural cooperatives [25], risk preferences [26,27], the mode of communal land acquisition [28], government policies [29], and the presence of a price floor [13]. Besides, Ullah and Anad [30] examine the factors that influence the level of agricultural mechanization: economic condition of farmers, the land tenure system, scale of farmland, cost of fuel, and the cost of renting agricultural machinery. Konrad et al. [15] have found that the scale of farm operations, environmental concerns, and innovation readiness are important for farmers’ technology investments.

Factors such as the effect of planting structure adjustment and the output elasticity of capital can affect the investment adjustment behavior of farmers, and have been investigated by some studies. Ji et al. [31] have found that the shortage of a labor force can be supplemented by increasing capital input. In addition, other reasons may also lead to investment adjustment behavior such as attitudes toward capital input [4], the amount of agricultural income [32], expected financial benefits from capital input [33], and differences in adjustment capabilities [34].

#### 2] Capital investment – boosted wages creates incentives for investment.

**Duke 16** [9/2/2016, “To Raise Productivity, Let’s Raise Wages”, Center for American Progress, Brendan Duke: Princeton University; MPA in Economic Policy, Macalester; B.A. nin political science, Associate Director for Economic Policy, Senior Policy Analyst for US Congress Joint Economic Committee, URL: <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2016/09/02/142040/to-raise-productivity-lets-raise-wages/>, KR]

Gordon argues that a key reason productivity surged during this period was that rising real wages provided an incentive for firms to invest in capital, such as machinery. When labor is cheap, businesses have little incentive to invest in capital because they can always hire another worker on the cheap. But higher wages reduce the price of capital relative to labor, nudging firms to make investments and raise productivity.

The 1929–1950 increase in wages was at first a result of several policies that directly raised workers’ wages, including the first federal minimum wage, the first federal overtime law, and the National Labor Relations Act, which made it easier for workers to join a union and bargain with their employers. The entry of the United States into World War II further drove investment higher, as the economy converted into what Gordon describes as a “maximum production regime.”

It is striking that during this period of rapid productivity growth, wages for production workers grew even faster than productivity growth did. The current debate about whether a typical worker’s compensation has kept track with the economy’s productivity typically envisions productivity growth as the precondition for wage growth. But Gordon’s research implies that the relationship can go both ways: Not only can productivity growth raise wages, but higher real wages also can boost productivity growth—the main reason for slow gross domestic product growth—by giving firms a reason to purchase capital.

Can higher wages raise productivity growth in 2017? Basic economic theory and common sense suggests that an increase in the price of labor—wages—achieved through higher labor standards will cause firms to invest in more capital, raising the economy’s productivity.

Some have tried to use this fact to claim that raising wages ultimately will hurt workers by causing them to be replaced with machines. But automation is just another way of saying productivity growth: Robots replacing humans means more output produced using fewer human hours—the literal definition of higher productivity. We can either have a productivity problem or an automation problem, but we cannot have both at the same time.

The sharp slowdown in productivity growth today heavily implies that we currently have too little automation rather than too much. At the same time, the evidence on policies that raise wages—such as the minimum wage—points to no noticeable effect on employment. Indeed, the New Deal and its rising labor standards were also a period of rapid employment growth.

A more important question is whether we have enough of the other key ingredient for the productivity growth that made the 1930s possible: innovation. Technological change itself is another reason firms purchase new capital—otherwise, investment amounts to “stacking wooden ploughs on top of wooden ploughs.” Gordon makes clear that the 1930s were in fact one of the most innovative decades in history, as the economy began to harness the potential of the internal combustion engine and electrification. Firms ultimately could afford policies that raised wages because they could raise their productivity with new equipment featuring innovative technology.

There exists a vigorous debate today about whether we live in a period of very ordinary or extraordinary innovation. Some—such as Gordon himself—argue that productivity growth inevitably will be slower because today’s new technology is inherently less innovative than that of the 1930s. In that case, there still exists a strong justification for raising labor standards: Slow productivity growth makes it that much more important that its fruits be shared equitably.

But others—including Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the country’s leading growth optimists—argue that we live in a period of extraordinary technological change. Even so, recent innovations—such as 3-D printing and social media—have failed to raise productivity growth, even after accounting for the possible problems with how statistics measure it. Therefore, it may be the ability of firms to hire workers at wages that have barely grown since 2000—rather than purchasing new equipment and adopting new technology—that has prevented productivity from rising.

The truth likely falls somewhere in between the pessimists and the optimists, with healthy—if not necessarily explosive—productivity growth possible. In that case, policies that raise wages may be the key to unlocking productivity growth by increasing incentives for firms to invest in capital. Such wage-raising policies include making it easier for workers to bargain collectively, raising the federal minimum wage, and modernizing overtime rules. Fortunately, the Obama administration recently has taken action on the latter and proposed an increase in the overtime threshold to $47,000 per year.

#### Two scenarios for extinction –

#### First, food shortages force mass deforestation and habitat destruction that kills biodiversity.

**Tian et al 21** [Tian, Zhixi [principal investigator, Institute of Genetics and Developmental Biology and former research geneticist at Purdue], et al. "Designing future crops: challenges and strategies for sustainable agriculture." The Plant Journal 105.5 (2021): 1165-1178. (AG DebateDrills)]

From the perspective of human evolution, each period of rapid population growth, such as during the Neolithic agricultural revolution, which began at about 8000 BC, the hydro agricultural or irrigation revolutions in the Near East, which began about 3000 BC, and the medieval and modern agricultural periods, which began about 1000 AD, benefited from an advance in agriculture (Taiz, 2013; Wallace et al., 2018). The recent rapid population growth during the past 300 years, in contrast, mainly resulted from the Industrial Revolution, which began in Britain about 1760. The Industrial Revolution greatly increased the range of human activities and accelerated farmland expansion. In 1700, it was reported that nearly 95% of Earth’s ice-free land consisted of wildlands and semi-natural anthromes; however, by 2000, ~55% of these regions were used as arable land (Figure 1a, data from https://ourworldindata.org/). The Industrial Revolution also gave birth to new technologies and production systems in agriculture, such as the application of larger irrigation systems, and more fertilizers and pesticides. In the 1960s, semi-dwarf wheat and rice varieties were introduced. These semi-dwarf crops exhibit beneficial characteristics, such as improved response to fertilizer input, lodging resistance and enhanced light utilization (Hedden, 2003; Wallace et al., 2018). Along with the fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation systems made possible by the Industrial Revolution, semi-dwarf crops were quickly adopted and resulted in a significant increase in total grain production globally. This big leap in agriculture was known as the ‘Green Revolution’ (Khush, 2001). Indeed, statistical data have revealed that the average daily food supply per person (in terms of calories) has doubled since the middle of the 19th century (Figure 1b, data from https://ourworld indata.org/). It is estimated that the world population will rise to more than 9 billion by 2050 (Alexandratos, 1999; Cassman, 1999), and at that time we will need at least 60% more food than is consumed by humans today. Moreover, our population will continuously increase, reaching over 11 billion by 2100 (Figure 1a, data from https://ourworldindata.org/). How to feed the increasing population is a challenge facing the whole world (Tilman et al., 2001; Godfray et al., 2010; Foley et al., 2011; Wallace et al., 2018). A simple solution to feed a population of 9 billion is to constantly turn wild habitats into farmland. However, this type of expansion is unrealistic as most of the world’s icefree and non-barren land area has been exhausted, and much of the rest is unlikely to sustain high yields (Cassman, 1999). More importantly, intact forests have been known to play essential roles in protecting the environment, such as storing fresh water, decreasing flooding and regenerating fertile soils. Clearing of forests will result in prohibitive ecological costs, such as loss of biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions. It was reported that, due to agriculture expansion, ~30% of all plant species will become extinct (Taiz, 2013). The destruction of tropical forests releases about 1.1 9 1012 tons of carbon per year, which accounts for 12% of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Friedlingstein et al., 2010).

#### Biodiversity loss causes extinction.

**Torres 16** [Phil Biologist, conservationist, science advocate & educator. 2 years based in Amazon rainforest, now exploring science around the world. “[Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable to Climate Change](http://futureoflife.org/2016/05/20/biodiversity-loss/)” <http://futureoflife.org/2016/05/20/biodiversity-loss/>.]

According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the two greatest existential threats to human civilization stem from climate change and nuclear weapons. Both pose clear and present dangers to the perpetuation of our species, and the increasingly dire climate situation and nuclear arsenal modernizations in the United States and Russia were the most significant reasons why the Bulletin [decided](http://thebulletin.org/press-release/doomsday-clock-hands-remain-unchanged-despite-iran-deal-and-paris-talks9122) to keep the Doomsday Clock set at three minutes before midnight earlier this year.

But there is another existential threat that the Bulletin overlooked in its Doomsday Clock announcement: biodiversity loss. This phenomenon is often identified as one of the many consequences of climate change, and this is of course correct. But biodiversity loss is also a contributing factor behind climate change. For example, deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere reduces the amount of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere by plants, a natural process that mitigates the effects of climate change. So the causal relation between climate change and biodiversity loss is bidirectional.

Furthermore, there are myriad phenomena that are driving biodiversity loss in addition to climate change. Other causes include ecosystem fragmentation, invasive species, pollution, oxygen depletion caused by fertilizers running off into ponds and streams, overfishing, human overpopulation, and overconsumption. All of these phenomena have a direct impact on the health of the biosphere, and all would conceivably persist even if the problem of climate change were somehow immediately solved.

Such considerations warrant decoupling biodiversity loss from climate change, because the former has been consistently subsumed by the latter as a mere effect. Biodiversity loss is a distinct environmental crisis with its own unique syndrome of causes, consequences, and solutions—such as restoring habitats, creating protected areas (“biodiversity parks”), and practicing sustainable agriculture.

Deforestation of the Amazon rainforest decreases natural mitigation of CO2 and destroys the habitats of many endangered species.

The sixth extinction.

The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 [study](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26601195) published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone.

The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago.

But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 [Global Biodiversity Outlook](https://www.cbd.int/gbo3) report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006.

The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” [Other studies](http://commondreams.org/views/2016/02/10/biodiversity-loss-and-doomsday-clock-invisible-disaster-almost-no-one-talking-about) have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying.

Consistent with these data, the 2014 [Living Planet Report](http://bit.ly/1ssxx5m) shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006[study](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/314/5800/787) published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048.

48% of the world’s primates are threatened with extinction.

Catastrophic consequences for civilization.

The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 [paper](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v486/n7401/full/nature11018.html) published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization.

As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive.

Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been [linked](http://thebulletin.org/climate-change-and-syrian-uprising) to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary [Chuck Hagel](http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603441)and CIA director [John Brennan](http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/cnsnewscom-staff/cia-director-cites-impact-climate-change-deeper-cause-global), have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.)

The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime.

The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.

#### Second, U.S. agricultural collapse and food insecurity trigger great power wars – multiple hotspots.

**Castellaw 17** (John – 36-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Founder and CEO of Farmspace Systems LLC, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” 5/1/17, <https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security>)

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom. Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

#### Extinction.

**Cribb 19** [Julian Cribb is a distinguished science writer with more than thirty awards for journalism. He was a newspaper editor, founder of the influential ScienceAlert website and author of eight books, including The Coming Famine. Food as Existential Risk. August, 2019. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/food-or-war/food-as-an-existential-risk/8C45279588CD572FE805B7E240DE7368]

As things stand, the only entities that can afford to own nuclear weapons are nations - and if humanity is to be wiped out, it will most likely be as a result of an atomic conflict between nations. It follows from this that, if the world is to be made safe from such a fate it will need to get rid of nations as a structure of human self-organisation and replace them with wiser, less aggressive forms of self-governance. After all, the nation state really only began in the early nineteenth century and is by no means a permanent feature of self-governance, any more than monarchies, feudal systems or priest states. Although many people still tend to assume it is. Between them, nations have butchered more than 200 million people in the past 150 years and it is increasingly clear the world would be a far safer, more peaceable place without either nations or nationalism. The question is what to replace them with.

Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, in the twentyfirst century with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out. Indeed, chemical weapons have frequently been deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought, agricultural failure and hunger among its early drivers. And nuclear conflict remains a distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East, especially, as these regions are already stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their nuclear firepower or access to nuclear materials is multiplying.

It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands - but the possibility ought not to be ignored.

That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming’.15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited.

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of agricultural workers to strike

#### CX checks T and spec interps – I have the ability to meet them but they chose not to let me

**Reilly 11** [Penn State Law, “Agricultural Laborers: Their Inability to Unionize Under the National Labor Relations Act”, Penn State: Masters of Science, JD Law, URL: <https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/Publications_Library/Agricultural_Laborers.pdf>, 2011 + since most recent citation is from then, KR]

The NLRA gives workers “freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing” in order to equalize the bargaining power between employers and employees in the hopes of limiting the interruptions to the free flow of commerce.10 The statute covers a large number of workers based on the broad definition of “employee,”11 but excludes from coverage all agricultural laborers.12 The NLRA does not define who these agricultural laborers are that are excluded from the right to organize, but rather Congress has instructed the National Labor Relations Boards (NLRB)13 in the annual Appropriations Act that in determining who is an agricultural laborer excluded from the NLRA, to rely on the definition of “agriculture” found in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).14 Agriculture in the FLSA is defined as “farming in all its branches ... and any practices ... performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations...”15 The definition also lists specific activities to further define what would specifically be considered agricultural work.16 Therefore, workers whose responsibilities are contained in the FLSA’s definition of “agriculture” are excluded from the right to organize and form unions under the NLRA.

The reasoning behind this exclusion is somewhat vague, especially considering that the bill originally proposed in the Senate did not exclude agricultural laborers from the definition of “employee.”17 There is not much mentioned about the agricultural exclusion because of the statute’s primary focus on addressing problems in the industrial sector. There is, however, a debate from in the House addressing the agricultural laborer exemption,18 where an argument was made that agricultural laborers should be included because they needed the same protections as industrial workers. Agricultural labor issues were brought to light in 1935 after governmental investigations into child labor issues and the lack of clean water provided for such workers.19

In response, two possible reasons were briefly mentioned that may explain why agricultural laborers were excluded: first, in regions like the Midwest, farms are mostly family farms and should not be within the scope of the NLRA, and second there was a concern that Congress did not have jurisdiction over agricultural workers because it was questionable whether such workers were engaged in interstate commerce.20 Many commentators believe that it was the former argument that led to the exclusion of agricultural workers from protection under the NLRA. Another possible reason for this exclusion as presented by some commentators is that the larger farms lobbied to have their workers excluded from the NLRA.21 While not expressly stated, the most likely explanation is that Congress wanted to protect the family farmer from having to pay higher wages that unions would inevitably demand of the employers.22 Realizing that agriculture was important to the entire nation, Congress wanted to shield this industry from unionization, and wanted to protect the family farmer from having to pay what they could not afford. Congress did not think it necessary to equate the family farmer with big business.

The broad definition of “agriculture” under the FLSA would seem to exclude from the NLRA any worker who is employed by any agricultural entity. This is not the case, however, because the Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to determine if an employee is in fact an agricultural laborer excluded from the NLRA.23 An agricultural employee will be excluded from the right to organize if he or she is engaged in either primary or secondary farming. The Supreme Court has taken the FLSA definition of agriculture and essentially limited its application based on a strict application of the statutory language. Primary farming are those tasks specifically referred to in the statutory definition of “agriculture” such as “cultivation and tillage of the soil [and] dairying.”24 The rest of the definition is considered secondary farming, and therefore a worker is an agricultural laborer if the work performed is of the type that would be performed “by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations.”25

In one of the more recent cases to address the question of who is considered an agricultural employee, the Supreme Court in Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B. upheld the determination made by the NLRB that workers on live-haul chicken crews do not engage in agricultural labor and therefore are not subject to the agricultural exception from the NLRA.26 The responsibility of the live-haul crew is to enter the farms of independent contractors who raise chickens supplied by Holly Farms; the chickens are then caught and caged by nine chicken catchers, moved by a forklift operator onto a truck to be transported by a truck driver to the processing plant.27 These live-haul crews were not engaged in primary farming because primary farming would have been the actual raising of the poultry, which was the responsibility of the independent contractors, not the live- haul crews.28

The court then focused on whether these live-haul crews were engaged in secondary farming. In doing so, the court immediately found that that the work performed by the live-haul crews were not of the kind “performed by a farmer” because Holly Farms gave up its farmer status as soon as the chicks were delivered to independent contractors for raising.29 As a result of this determination, the truck drivers were not considered agricultural laborers and were therefore not part of the agricultural exception to the NLRA and were able to unionize.30

The court then looked to whether the chicken catchers and forklift operators were engaged in work “on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with” raising poultry.31 The Supreme Court found that neither the chicken catchers nor the forklift operators “worked on a farm” because the work these employees performed were part of Holly Farms’ poultry processing operations and was not of the type of work contemplated to be included in the statutory definition of “farming.”32 The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the NLRB in deciding that the catchers and forklift operators were not performing work “incident to or in conjunction with” the farming operations of the independent contractors.33 In doing so, the Supreme Court decided that it was more important to look at the status of the employer as a farmer rather than where the laborer carried out the responsibilities of the job he or she was hired to perform. Because, as previously determined, Holly Farms was not considered a farmer by the time the live- haul crews went in to catch the chickens, the catchers and the forklift operators were not engaged in secondary farming as defined in the FLSA.34 This meant that all the members of the live-haul crews were not agricultural laborers and therefore all had the right to organize under the NLRA.

The Supreme Court limited the applicability of the definition of “agriculture” in Holly Farms and in doing so opened up the possibility that more workers employed by large, vertically integrated employers would be able to organize.35 By taking the approach to look at the status of the employer rather than where the work is performed, the Supreme Court broadened the already broad definition of “employee” under the NLRA. More employees working for these vertically integrated employers will be able to experience the protection of the NLRA that has been open to industrial workers since the act was first passed in 1935. The impact of the Holly Farms decision is for courts to engage in an in depth analysis before deciding whether a worker is an agricultural laborer not protected by the NLRA. Switching the focus to the status of the employer rather than where the employees are performing their responsibilities will ensure greater protection for workers and a broader reach of the NLRA.

While the definition of “employee” has expanded to include some employees who are employed by agricultural employers, there is still the exception for agricultural laborers included in the statute and therefore there are still many workers who are unable to form unions. These may be the workers that need the most protection because they are the field workers who are subjected to abuse, poverty and hazardous working conditions.36 Many commentators would like to see the NLRA extended to include agricultural laborers. The main advantage to extending the definition of “employee” to include agricultural laborers under the NLRA is that the statute has been in existence for many years, and most of the challenges that would be brought up with respect to agricultural laborers attempting to unionize have most likely already been resolved in other employment sectors allowing the NLRB and courts to rely on precedent. This will make application of the statue to the agricultural laborers consistent with other employment sectors. Reliance on precedent would lead to predictable outcomes when labor disputes arise. Agricultural laborers still have a ways to go before they will be able to reap the benefits of the NLRA; but, if this were to happen, agricultural laborers would be able not only to unionize and have their association protected, but also would have the advantage of being able to rely on others with experience and knowledge of the NLRA and its intricacies.

### 1AC – Util (Long)

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

#### 1] Phenomenal introspection – it’s the most epistemically reliable- historical and moral disagreement over internal conceptions of morality such as questions of race, gender, class, religion, etc. prove the fallibility of non-observational based ethics. Introspection means that we value happiness because we can determine that we each value it – just as I can observe a lemon’s yellowness, we can make those judgements about happiness.

#### 2] Actor specificity – A] Aggregation – every policy benefit some and harms others, which also means that side constraints freeze action, B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments actively decide not to act so there is no omission, C] States lack wills or intentions since policies are inherently collective actions. Actor specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings.

#### 3] Only consequentialism can explain degrees of wrongness – If I break a promise to meet up for lunch that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only by evaluating the consequences of each scenario can we explain why the second one is much worse than the first.

#### 4] Extinction first under any other framework – A] It precludes the possibility of any kind of moral value – we can’t confer value onto anything if we’re not alive, B] Future generations mean infinite magnitude – we must look towards future lives as well.

#### 5] Reductionism – empirics prove.

**Parfit 84** [Derek Parfit, cool hair. “Reasons and Persons” 1984. Brackets for gender]

Some recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View. Human beings have a lower brain and two upper hemispheres, which are connected by a bundle of fibres. In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, surgeons have cut these fibres. The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. The effect, in the words of one surgeon, was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by various psychological tests. These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, psychologists can thus present to this person two different written questions in the two halves of [their] ~~his~~ visual field, and can receive two different answers written by this person’s two hands.

#### 6] No intent-foresight distinction— If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.

#### 7] Calc indites fail – A) they prove util is hard not impossible B) empirically denied policymakers use util all the time and every round on the west coast is larp, which proves its possible to reliably resolve offense under the framework.

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) reject the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time, e) no 2NR theory – 2-to-1 time tradeoff makes it devastating for the 2AR, f) comes first – it’s a bigger percentage of the 1AR than 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time and only the 2N has time to win multiple layers, g) voters – fairness because debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education since it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### 2] The role of the ballot is to evaluate the desirability of the hypothetical consequences of the plan. Prefer –

#### A] Intuition – policymakers don’t implement policy based on whether the text of the policy is logically true; they decide the real world implications of it and then pass the policy.

#### B] Clash – truth-testing incentivizes reading a bunch of blippy a priori’s that kill substantive education. Comparative worlds solves because it forces substantive phil, policy and K debate.

#### C] Inclusion – their ROB excludes novices and lay debaters from the activity because they would just auto-lose to trix debaters every time. It’s an independent voter because their practice is exclusionary for debate.

#### Truth testing makes up rules to constrain discussion of race and cement the status-quo and is just plain wrong

Overing and Scoggin 15 “In Defense of Inclusion”; September 10, 2015; John Scoggin (coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and former debater for the Blake School in Minneapolis. His students have earned 77 bids to the Tournament of Champions in the last 7 years. He’s coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country) and Bob Overing (former debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, and current student at Yale Law School. As a senior in high school, he was ranked #1, earned 11 bids and took 2nd at TOC. In college, he cleared at CEDA and qualified to the NDT. His students have earned 98 career bids, reached TOC finals, and won many championships.); http://premierdebatetoday.com/2015/09/10/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/ //BWSWJ

In establishing affirmative and negative truth burdens, truth-testing forecloses important discussions even of the resolution itself. Consider the fact that in 1925-1926, there were two college policy topics, one for men and one for women. Men got to debate child labor laws, and women had to debate divorce law. On the truth-testing view, the women debating the women’s topic would be barred from discussing the inherent sexism of the topic choice and the division of topics to begin with. Or consider the retracted 2010 November Public Forum topic, “Resolved: An Islamic cultural center should be built near Ground Zero.” Many debaters would feel uncomfortable arguing that resolution, just like they did on the 2012 January/February LD topic about domestic violence. We both know individuals who felt the domestic violence topic was so triggering that they did not want to compete at all. We can draw two conclusions from examples like these. First, there are good reasons to not debate a particular topic. These reasons have been spelled out over decades of debate scholarship ranging from Broda-Bahm and Murphy (1994) to Varda and Cook (2007) to Vincent (2013). Second, truth-testing prevents either team from making the argument that the topic is offensive or harmful. A hypothetical case, such as a resolution including an offensive racial epithet, makes the problem more obvious. Maybe the idea behind the resolution is good, but there’s something left out by analysis that stops there and ignores the use of a derogatory slur. Truth-testing makes irrelevant the words in the topic and the words used by the debaters. Thus, it fails to capture the reasons that any good person would “negate” or even refuse to debate an offensive topic. Clearly, there are elements of a topical advocacy beyond its truth that are worthy of questioning. Nebel (2015) acknowledges that some past resolutions were potentially harmful to debate (1.2, para. 5). Rather than exclude affected students as ‘not following the rules’ of semantics or truth-testing, we conclude that they should not be required to debate the topic. Nebel grapples with harmful topics in the following passage: I don’t think there is a magic-bullet response to critiques of the topic…I think they must be answered on a case-by-case basis, in their own terms…The question boils down to whether or not the topic is harmful for students to debate, and whether those harms justify breaking, or making an exception to, the topicality rule (1.2, para. 5) This statement is hard to square with Nebel’s thesis that semantic interpretations of the resolution come “lexically prior” (in other words, they always come first). He wants to allow exceptions, but doing so proves that harmfulness concerns can and do trump the topicality rule. As Nebel’s struggle with the critique of topicality illustrates, every article that claims to espouse a comprehensive view of debate must allow some exceptions to comply with our intuitions. The exceptions do not prove the rule. They prove there is a high level of concern in debate for affording dignity and respect to different kinds of arguments and modes of argumentation. There is no one principle of proper debate. Once the door is open for external factors like harmfulness, the inference to the priority of pragmatics is an easy one to make. If we care about the effects of debating the resolution on the students debating it, then other values like exclusion, education, and fairness start to creep in. If we can justify avoiding discussion of a bad topic on pragmatic grounds, we can also justify promoting discussion of a good topic. Any advantage to allowing discursive kritiks, performances, and roles of the ballot further justifies this pragmatic view against truth-testing. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) warns that without these argument forms, we “distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day”. Christopher Vincent (2013) built on that idea, arguing that universal moral theory “drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation” (para. 3). While we don’t agree wholesale with these authors, their work unequivocally demonstrates the value of departures from pure truth-testing. While we may not convince our opposition that they should presume value in kritik-based strategies, they should remain open to them. In a recent article for the Rostrum, Pittsburgh debate coach Paul Johnson (2015) extolled the ‘hands-off’ approach. Let the debaters test whether the arguments have merit, rather than deciding beforehand: In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case…But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation (p. 90) Suggesting that non-topical, race-based approaches are “vigilantist” and “self-serving” “adventure[s]” is to demean the worth of these arguments before the debate round even starts (Nebel 2015, 1.1, para. 2). The claim that they ‘break the rules’ or exist ‘outside the law’ otherizes the debaters, coaches, and squads that pursue non-traditional styles. Especially given that many of these students are students of color, we should reject the image of them as lawless, self-interested vigilantes. Students work hard on their positions, often incorporating personal elements such as narrative or performance. To defend a view of debate that excludes their arguments from consideration devalues their scholarship and the way they make debate “home.” That’s unacceptable. Branse notes “the motivation for joining the activity substantially varies from person to person” yet excludes some debaters’ motivations while promoting others (5, para. 4). We agree with Smith on the very tangible effects of such exclusion: “If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives” (para. 5). Of course, we do not believe that Nebel or Branse intend their views to have these effects, but they are a concern we need to take seriously. III. Changing the Rules In Round One thought is that rejecting truth-testing is the wrong solution. Instead, we should create a better topic-selection process or an NSDA-approved topic change when the resolution is particularly bad. These solutions, however, are not exclusive of a rejection of truth-testing. An offensive topic might be reason to reform the selection process and to stop debating it immediately. Good role of the ballot arguments are the best solution because they pinpoint exactly why a debater finds the resolution inadequate. They highlight the problems of the proposed topic of discussion, and outline reasons why a different approach is preferable. While Branse believes these examples of in-round rule-making are problematic, we think debate rounds are an excellent location for discussing what debate should be. The first reason is the failure of consensus. Because there are a wide variety of supported methods to go about debating, we should be cautious about paradigmatic exclusion. While we don’t defend the relativist conclusion that all styles of debate are equally valuable, there is significant disagreement that our theories must account for. Truth-testing denies a number of ways to debate that many find valuable. The second reason is the internalization of valuable principles. Even people who do not think kritiks are the right way to debate have taken important steps like removing gendered language from their positions. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) identified hateful arguments and comments “you expect to hear at a Klan rally” as commonplace in LD rounds and the community (para. 2). We’d like to think those instances are at least reduced by the argumentation he’s encouraged. For instance, the much-maligned “you must prove why oppression is bad” argument now sees little play in high-level circuit rounds. Truth-testing forecloses this kind of learning from the opposition. Roles of the ballot and theory interpretations are examples of how in-round argumentation creates new rules of engagement. We welcome these strategies, and debaters should be prepared to justify their proposed rules against procedural challenges. The arguments we have made thus far are objections to truth-testing as a top-down worldview used to exclude from the get-go, not in-round means of redress against certain practices. There is a major difference between a topicality argument in a high school debate round and a prominent debate coach and camp director’s glib dismissal of non-topical argument as follows: [Y]ou can talk about whatever you want, but if it doesn’t support or deny the resolution, then the judge shouldn’t vote on it (Nebel 2015, 1.2, para. 4) Branse is equally ideological: Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction (2, para. 12) We take issue with debate theorists’ attempts to define away arguments that they don’t like. At one point, Jason Baldwin (2009) actually defended truth-testing for its openness, praising the values of the free market of ideas: That’s how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work. But it is supposed to be a free marketplace where buyers (judges) examine whatever sellers (debaters) offer them with an open mind, not an exclusive marketplace where only the sellers of some officially approved theories are welcome (p. 26) Unfortunately for the truth-tester, debate has changed, and it will change again. What was once a model that allowed all the arguments debaters wanted to make – a prioris, frameworks, and meta-ethics – is now outdated in the context of discursive kritiks, performance, and alternative roles of the ballot. IV. Constitutivism, Authority, and the Nature of Debate Branse’s goal is to derive substantive rules for debate from the ‘constitutive features’ of debate itself and the roles of competitors and judges. We’ll quote him at length here to get a full view of the argument: [P]ragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity….education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is (2, para. 7) Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. (2, para. 12) The resolution, in fact, offers one of the only constitutive guidelines for debate. Most tournament invitations put a sentence in the rules along the lines of, “we will be using [X Resolution].” Thus, discussion confined to the resolution is non-optional (3, para. 5) [T]he delineation of an “affirmative” and a “negative” establishes a compelling case for a truth testing model…two debaters constrained by the rules of their assignment – to uphold or deny the truth of the resolution…[J]udging the quality of the debaters requires a reference to their roles. The better aff is the debater who is better at proving the resolution true. The better neg is the debater who is better at denying the truth of the resolution. The ballot requests an answer to “who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role”, and since debaters’ roles dictate a truth-testing model, the judge ought to adjudicate the round under a truth testing model of debate. The judge does not have the jurisdiction to vote on education rather than truth testing (3, para. 7-8) Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules…the rules are absolute and non-optional (4, para. 4) Similarly, Nebel uses contractual logic – appealing to the tournament invitation as binding agreement – to justify truth-testing: “The “social contract” argument holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic….given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism (1.1, para. 2) This approach is attractive because it seeks to start from principles we all seem to agree on and some very simple definitions. The primary problem is that the starting point is very thin, but the end point includes very robust conclusions. The terms “affirmative” and “negative” are insufficient to produce universal rules for debate, and certainly do not imply truth-testing (Section I, paragraph 3.) Branse does some legwork in footnoting several definitions of “affirm” and “negate,” but does little in the way of linguistic analysis. We won’t defend a particular definition but point out that there are many definitions that vary and do not all lend themselves to truth-testing. On a ballot the words “speaker points” are as prominently displayed as the words “affirmative” or “negative,” but neither Branse nor Nebel attempt to make any constitutive inference from their existence. Further, to find the constitutive role of a thing, one needs to look at what the thing actually is, rather than a few specific words on a ballot. Looking at debates now, we see that they rarely conform to the truth-testing model. It is simply absurd to observe an activity full of plans, counterplans, kritiks, non-topical performances, theory arguments, etc. and claim that its ‘constitutive nature’ is to exclude these arguments. Not only that, but the truth-testing family has been heavily criticized in both the policy and LD communities (Hynes Jr., 1979; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Mangus, 2008; Nelson, 2008; O’Donnell, 2003; O’Krent, 2014; Palmer, 2008; Rowland, 1981; Simon, 1984; Snider, 1994; Ulrich, 1983). The empirical evidence also points toward argumentative inclusion in three important ways. The first is argument trends. The popularity of kritiks, a prioris, meta-ethics, etc. confirm that at different times the community at large has very different views of what constitutes not only a good argument but also a good mode of affirming or negating. The second is argument cycles. An alternate view would suggest that debate evolves and leaves bad arguments by the wayside. Nevertheless, we see lots of arguments pop in and out of the meta-game, suggesting that we have not made a definitive verdict on the best way to debate. The third is judge deference. While people’s views on proper modes of debate shift, we retain a strong deference to a judge’s decision. Judges have different views of debate; if there were some overarching principle that all judges should follow, we would expect tournament directors to enforce such a rule. In sum, there is no way to view debate as a whole and see truth-testing as the general principle underlying our practices. The existence of a judge and a ballot are also insufficient to produce universal rules for debate. Branse thinks “[t]he ballot requests an answer to ‘who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role.’” While that may be a valid concern, it is dependent on what the judge views the roles of debaters to be. The absence of any sort of instruction other than determining the ‘better debating’ or the ‘winner’ most naturally lends itself to a presumption of openness. In fact, many practices very explicitly deviate from the constitutive roles Branse lays out. Some counterplans (PICs, PCCs, topical CPs and the like) may do more to prove the resolution than disprove it, yet are generally accepted negative arguments. Another type of objection to Branse’s view is an application of David Enoch’s “agency shmagency” argument. Enoch (2011) summarizes in his paper “Shmagency revisited”: [E]ven if you find yourself engaging in a kind of an activity…inescapably…and even if that activity is constitutively governed by some norm or…aim, this does not suffice for you to have a reason to obey that norm or aim at that aim. Rather, what is also needed is that you have a reason to engage in that activity…Even if you somehow find yourself playing chess, and even if checkmating your opponent is a constitutive aim of playing chess, still you may not have a reason to (try to) checkmate your opponent. You may lack such a reason if you lack a reason to play chess. The analogy is clear enough: Even if you find yourself playing the agency game, and even if agency has a constitutive aim, still you may not have a reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent) (p. 5-6) The application to chess helps us see the application to debate. Truth-testing may be the constitutive aim of doing debate, but it does not follow that our best reasons tell us to test the truth of the resolution. In fact, you may have no reasons to be a truth-testing debater in the first place. If “affirmative” means “the one who proves the resolution true,” we’ve demonstrated times when it’s better to be “shmaffirmative” than “affirmative.” Finally, we think one of the most important (perhaps constitutive) features of debate is its unique capacity to change the rules while playing within the rules. Education-based arguments and non-topical arguments are just arguments – they’re pieces on the chess board to be manipulated by the players. Branse concedes that in APDA debate, the resolution is “contestable through a formal, in-round mechanism (3, para. 9). LD and policy debate also have this mechanism through theory arguments, kritiks, and alternative roles of the ballot. Branse is right that in soccer and chess, there is no way to kick a ball or move a chess piece that would legitimately change the rules of the game. Debate is different. While soccer and chess have incontrovertible empirical conditions for victory (checkmates, more goals at fulltime), debate does not. In fact, discussing the win conditions is debating! Whenever a debater reads a case, they assume or justify certain win conditions and not others. This deals with Branse’s “self-defeatingness” objection because debate about the rules does not create a “free-for-all” — it creates a debate (6, para. 1). The truth-testing judge does not get to pick and choose what makes a good debate; to do so is necessarily interventionist. This demonstrates truth-testing is more arbitrary and subjective [2] than the education position Branse criticizes (4, para. 4; 5, para. 2, 5). To be truly non-interventionist, we should accept them as permissible arguments until proven otherwise in round. Of course, not all rules are up for debate. There is a distinction between rules like speech times (call these procedural rules) and rules like truth-testing (call these substantive rules). The former are not up for the debate in the sense that the tournament director could intervene if a debater refused to stop talking. The latter are debate-able and have been for some time. No tournament director enforces their pet paradigm. Because the tournament director, not the judge, has ultimate authority, we liken her to the referee in soccer. On this view, the judge is not the referee tasked with enforcing “the rules”; she should decide only on the basis of arguments presented in the debate. Tournaments are not subject to any form of higher authority and are not obligated to follow NSDA rules, TOC guidelines, or anything else to determine a winner. Something is only a procedural rule if it is enforced by the tournament, and truth-testing has not and shouldn’t be enforced in this manner. To our knowledge, no bid tournament director has ever imposed a truth-testing burden on all competitors. If anything is a binding contract, it is the judge paradigm. Judge philosophies or paradigms are explicitly agreed to in writing because each judge establishes their own, and there is no coercion at play. Most tournaments mandate or strongly encourage written paradigms, have time to review them, and accept judge services instead of payment for hiring a judge. These norms establish a clearer contractual agreement in favor of judge deferral than universal truth-testing. We have tested the constitutive and contractual arguments by considering how truth-testing is not a procedural rule like speech times. As such, it cannot accrue the benefits of bindingness, authority, and non-arbitrariness. We can also test the argument in the opposite direction. There are some rules that seem even more “constitutive” of debate than the resolution but are not examples of procedural rules. For instance, every judge and debate theorist would likely reject completely new arguments in the 2AR, but there is nothing within Branse’s constitutive rules (speech times, the resolution, the aff and neg) to justify the norm. The no-new-arguments rule does not need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. V. Pragmatic Justifications for Truth-testing With the priority of pragmatics established and constitutive arguments well addressed, we turn to some hybrid arguments that attempt to justify truth-testing by appealing to pragmatics. Nebel argues that the advantages stemming from truth-testing must be weighed against all exceptions to it and that the advantages of debating the ‘true meaning’ of the topic nearly always outweigh: It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash…people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules (1.1, para. 2) However, the advantages of topicality for the semantic/truth-testing view hold on the pragmatic view as well. We agree that the reasons to debate the meaning of the topic are strong. The only difference is that the pragmatic theory can explain the possibility of exceptions to the rule without interpretive contortion. It makes much more sense to understand that strict topicality is just a very good practice than to tout it as an absolute, lexically prior, constitutively- and contractually-binding rule. Ultimately, all benefits to topicality and debating something other than the resolution are weighed on the same scale, so we should adopt the theory that explicitly allows that scale. We are unconvinced that direct appeals to pragmatic considerations would be worse on pragmatic grounds than an external and absolute rule like ‘always be topical.’ If topicality is as important and beneficial as Nebel says it is, then it should be easy to defend within a particular debate, avoiding the worst slippery slope scenarios. Nebel also argues that the pragmatic view “justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate” (1.1, para. 5). Branse makes the same claim about education: “Education as a voting issue legitimizes reading positions and debating topics that have no association with the resolution” (5, para. 3). This alarmism we’ve answered with our discussion of harmful resolutions. There is no empirical indication of a slippery slope to a world where no one discusses the topic. The disadvantages to one debate round departing from topical debate are quite small, and we have no problem biting the bullet here. Sometimes (and it may be very rare), it’s better not to debate the resolution. There may also be reasons to debate something else even when the resolution is very good. Black students should not have to wait for a reparations topic to talk about race in America. As conversations about racial oppression and police brutality grow louder and louder, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to defend a view of debate that ignores their relevance to the everyday lives of our students. It should be clear that the pragmatic view takes no absolute stance on topicality or burdens. A debate practice may be pragmatic in one context but not another. For that reason, we reject the narrowness of truth-testing.