### 1AC – Econ

#### Vaccines will not cover LMICs until at least 2023—fortunately there is massive room for supply increase

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Since consequentialist justifications treat the value of IP as purely instrumental, they are also vulnerable to counterarguments showing that a sought-after goal is not the sole or most important end. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we submit that the vaccinating the world is an overriding goal. With existing IP protections intact, the world has fallen well short of this goal. Current forecasts show that at the current pace, there will not be enough vaccines to cover the world’s population until 2023 or 2024.15 IP protections further frustrate the goal of universal access to vaccines by limiting who can manufacturer them. The WHO reports that 80% of global sales for COVID-19 vaccines come from five large multinational corporations.16 Increasing the number of manufacturers globally would not only **increase supply,** but reduce prices, making vaccines more affordable to L[ow and] M[iddle] I[ncome] C[ountrie]s. It would stabilise supply, minimising disruptions of the kind that occurred when India halted vaccine exports amidst a surge of COVID-19 cases. It might be objected that waiving IP protections will not increase supply, because it takes years to **establish manufacturing capacity**. However, since the pandemic began, we have learnt it takes less time. Repurposing facilities and vetting them for safety and quality can often happen in 6 or 7months, about half the time previously thought.17 Since COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic humanity faces, expanding manufacturing capacity is also necessary preparation for **future pandemics**. Nkengasong, Director of the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, put the point bluntly, ‘Can a continent of 1.2billion people—projected to be 2.4billion in 30 years, where one in four people in the world will be African—continue to import 99% of its vaccine?’18

#### Unequal vaccine distribution has massive economic costs even with conservative estimates that don’t account for the Delta variant

Çakmakli 21-- Çakmakli, Cem [Assistant Professor at Koç University. PhD: Pennsylvania State University] et al. The economic case for global vaccinations: An epidemiological model with international production networks. No. w28395. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021. (AG DebateDrills)

To estimate the costs of inequitable vaccine distribution, we develop a global SIR-multi-sectormacro framework and calibrate it to 65 countries-35 sectors. We incorporate sectoral heterogeneity in infections together with inter-industry and international trade and production linkages. Once we account for this economic interdependence of the economies, we reveal the substantial costs, up to 3 percent of advanced countries pre-pandemic GDPs, that will be borne by the vaccinated countries through their trade relationships with unvaccinated countries.36 Our framework captures the short run. We find that AEs may bear somewhere from 13 percent to 49 percent of the global losses arising from an inequitable distribution of vaccines in 2021. Globalization might have amplified the effects of the pandemic but it is also imperative for an equitable distribution of the vaccines because this is the only way for open economies with international linkages to have a robust recovery. There are substantial uncertainties ahead of us regarding the course of vaccine distribution. Our estimates are based on the available information about the pandemic. For example, we did not incorporate the recent developments on the variants into our analysis. To the extent that these variants threaten the efficacy of the current vaccines, there is even more urgency to make the existing vaccines globally available as soon as possible. Mutations that risk a prolonged pandemic would not only have further health costs but also escalate the economic costs that we estimated in our analysis.

#### Economic loss and slow supply recovery causes inflation deanchoring and econ collapse in advanced economies as well as extreme poverty in EMDEs

World Bank 6-21 – World Bank Prospects Group; June 2021 Global Economic Prospects; <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35647/9781464816659.pdf> (AG DebateDrills)

Since May 2020, however, inflation has gradually picked up.By April 2021, inflation had risen above pre-pandemic levels, in both advanced economies and EMDEs. The inflation pickup was broad-based and present in about four-fifths of countries, although the change in inflation varied widely, especially in EMDEs. The 2020 global recession featured the most muted inflation decline and fastest subsequent inflation upturn of the five global recession episodes of the past 50 years (box 4.1). While this behavior partly reflects lower levels of inflation at the beginning of 2020, purchasing managers report growing pressures on input as well as output prices in 2021 (figure 4.1). Looking ahead, as the global economy gradually reopens, monetary and fiscal policies continue to be accommodative to support the global recovery, and pent-up demand may be about to be unleashed in advanced economies.1 For major advanced economies, some have raised concerns that this confluence of factors may generate significant inflationary pressures (Blanchard and Pisani-Ferry 2020; Goodhart and Pradhan 2020; Landau 2021). Others, in contrast, see little reason for concern, at least for many advanced economies, because of the temporary nature of price pressures over the short-term as well as wellanchored inflation expectations and structural factors still depressing inflation (Ball et al. 2021; Gopinath 2021). If growing inflationary pressures cause financial market participants to become concerned about persistently higher inflation in advanced economies, they may reassess prospects for continued accommodative monetary policies by major central banks. This could trigger a significant rise in risk premia and borrowing costs. EMDEs are particularly vulnerable to such financial market disruptions because of their record high debt and a lagging economic recovery from the pandemic (chapter 1). In the event of financial market stress, sharp exchange rate depreciations and capital outflows may force them to abruptly tighten policies in a manner that could throttle their recoveries. Even in the absence of dislocating financial market stress, E[merging] M[arket] D[eveloping] E[conomie]s may face rising inflation as global price pressures feed into domestic inflation through input prices and exchange rate movements. A temporary increase in inflation may not warrant a monetary policy response. Again, if rapidly rising price pressures risk de-anchoring inflation expectations, EMDE central banks may be forced to tighten monetary policy before the recovery is fully entrenched. Persistently higher inflation would erode discretionary incomes of the poorest households and may tip some back into poverty (Ha, Kose, and Ohnsorge 2019). This is a particularly serious risk for low-income countries (LICs; box 4.2). Since food accounts for a substantial share of consumption in these countries, recent increase in food prices have led to higher inflation and compounded the challenges confronting the poor during the pandemic.

#### Economic Collapse goes Nuclear.

Tønnesson 15, Stein. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review 18.3 (2015): 297-311. (the Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

### 1AC – Disease

#### Extended COVID in developing countries will exacerbate inequalities fostered by COVID—job loss, poverty, and lack of health insurance all increase

Pley et al 21-- Pley, Caitlin M. [University of Cambridge Department of Medicine, Public Policy Researcher], et al. "The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection." BMJ Global Health 6.1 (2021): e004275. (AG DebateDrills)

The COVID-19 pandemic is amplifying existing economic and public health inequalities. The pandemic is likely to cause a worldwide recession and the contraction of national economies, pushing millions more below the poverty line, especially in countries without universally accessible health systems and already high levels of outof-pocket spending on health.21 Furthermore, the most vulnerable members of society are not only more likely to be affected by HBV, but they are also more likely to have comorbid non-communicable diseases that raise the risk of a severe COVID-19 disease course**.** Rural and indigenous communities in LMICs, as reported in India and Nigeria, are most severely affected by movement restrictions, as they impede access to health centres and the ability to earn a living wage.6 Individuals working in unstable employment arrangements risk losing their health insurance, and those working in the informal sector frequently already pay for healthcare expenditures out-of-pocket, with no access to fiscal stimulus packages and other social safety nets if they lose their employment. Such issues extend to HICs, such as the USA, where a large number of job losses have led to 6.2million people losing their health insurance since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.22 Drops in healthcare coverage will likely lead to worsening of chronic conditions, including CHB, and may reduce the incentive to seek testing services when treatment is unaffordable.

#### The plan also sets a precedent to seamlessly shift to a direct support model during pandemics--that solves future pandemics but avoids the innovation DA.

Brink **Lindsey 21**. Vice President, Niskanen Center; Writes for Brookings, “Why Intellectual Property and Pandemics Don’t Mix,” Brookings, June 3, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/03/why-intellectual-property-and-pandemics-dont-mix/>, RJP, **DebateDrills**.

**PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES AND DIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT** For pandemics and other public health emergencies, patents’ mix of costs and benefits is misaligned with what is needed for an effective policy response. The basic patent bargain, even when well struck, is to pay for more innovation down the road with slower diffusion of innovation today. In the context of a pandemic, that bargain is a bad one and should be rejected entirely. Here the imperative is to accelerate the diffusion of vaccines and other treatments, not slow it down. Giving drug companies the power to hold things up by blocking competitors and raising prices pushes in the completely wrong direction. What approach to encouraging innovation should we take instead? How do we incentivize drug makers to undertake the hefty R&D costs to develop new vaccines without giving them exclusive rights over their production and sale? The most effective approach during a public health crisis is direct government support: public funding of R&D, advance purchase commitments by the government to buy large numbers of doses at set prices, and other, related payouts. And when we pay drug makers, we should not hesitate to pay generously, even extravagantly: we want to offer drug companies big profits so that they prioritize this work above everything else, and so that they are ready and eager to come to the rescue again the next time there’s a crisis.It was direct support via Operation Warp Speed that made possible the astonishingly rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines and then facilitated a relatively rapid rollout of vaccine distribution (relative, that is, to most of the rest of the world). And it’s worth noting that a major reason for the faster rollout here and in the United Kingdom compared to the European Union was the latter’s [misguided penny-pinching](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/opinion/europe-vaccines-commission.html?smid=tw-share). The EU bargained hard with firms to keep vaccine prices low, and as a result their citizens ended up in the back of the queue as various supply line kinks were being ironed out. This is particularly ironic since the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine was developed in Germany. As this fact underscores, the chief advantage of direct support isn’t to “get tough” with drug firms and keep a lid on their profits. Instead, it is to accelerate the end of the public health emergency by making sure drug makers profit handsomely from doing the right thing.Patent law and direct support should be seen not as either-or alternatives but as complements that apply different incentives to different circumstances and time horizons. Patent law provides a decentralized system for encouraging innovation. The government doesn’t presume to tell the industry which new drugs are needed; it simply incentivizes the development of whatever new drugs that pharmaceutical firms can come up with by offering them a temporary monopoly. It is important to note that patent law’s incentives offer no commercial guarantees. Yes, you can block other competitors for a number of years, but that still doesn’t ensure enough consumer demand for the new product to make it profitable. DIRECT SUPPORT MAKES PATENTS REDUNDANT The situation is different in a pandemic. Here the government knows exactly what it wants to incentivize: the creation of vaccines to prevent the spread of a specific virus and other drugs to treat that virus. Under these circumstances, the decentralized approach isn’t good enough. There is no time to sit back and let drug makers take the initiative on their own timeline. Instead, the government needs to be more involved to incentivize specific innovations now. As recompense for letting it call the shots (pardon the pun), the government sweetens the deal for drug companies by insulating them from commercial risk. If pharmaceutical firms develop effective vaccines and therapies, the government will buy large, predetermined quantities at prices set high enough to guarantee a healthy return. For the pharmaceutical industry, it is useful to conceive of patent law as the default regime for innovation promotion. It improves pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to develop new drugs while leaving them free to decide which new drugs to pursue – and also leaving them to bear all commercial risk. In a pandemic or other emergency, however, it is appropriate to shift to the direct support regime, in which the government focuses efforts on one disease. In this regime, it is important to note, the government provides qualitatively superior incentives to those offered under patent law. Not only does it offer public funding to cover the up-front costs of drug development, but it also provides advance purchase commitments that guarantee a healthy return. It should therefore be clear that the pharmaceutical industry has no legitimate basis for objecting to a TRIPS waiver. Since, because of the public health crisis, drug makers now qualify for the superior benefits of direct government support, they no longer need the default benefits of patent support. Arguments that a TRIPS waiver would deprive drug makers of the incentives they need to keep developing new drugs, when they are presently receiving the most favorable incentives available, can be dismissed as the worst sort of special pleading. That said, it is a serious mistake to try to cast the current crisis as a morality play in which drug makers wear the black hats and the choice at hand is between private profits and public health. We would have no chance of beating this virus without the formidable organizational capabilities of the pharmaceutical industry, and providing the appropriate incentives is essential to ensure that the industry plays its necessary and vital role. It is misguided to lament that private companies are profiting in the current crisis: those profits are a drop in the bucket compared to the staggering cost of this pandemic in lives and economic damage. What matters isn’t the existence or size of the profits, but how they are earned. We have good reason to want drug makers to profit from vaccinating the world: the comparative price is minuscule, and the incentive effects are a vital safeguard of public health in the event of future crises. What we want to avoid at all costs is putting drug makers in the position where drug companies can profit from standing in the way of rapid global vaccination. That is why intellectual property rights need to be taken out of the equation. Vaccinating the world in any kind of reasonable time frame will require large-scale technology transfer to drug firms in other countries and rapid expansion of their production capacity. And looking beyond the current pandemic to the longer term, we need [ample, redundant global vaccine production capacity](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22397914/vaccine-mrna-adenovirus-manufacturing-process-investment) that is widely distributed around the planet. To achieve these goals as rapidly as possible will require the active cooperation of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which is why the direct support model now needs to be extended. What is needed now is an Operation Warp Speed for the world, in which we make it worth current vaccine producers’ while to share their know-how broadly and ramp up global capacity. Here again, we must recognize that the choice isn’t between people on the one hand and profits on the other. Rather, the key to good pandemic response policy is ensuring that incentives are structured so that drug company profit-seeking and global public health are well aligned. That means opting out of the default, decentralized patent bargain in favor of generous but well-focused direct government support.

#### Pandemics will always temporarily disrupt developing country healthcare—preventing prolonged pandemics is key to overall health

Pley et al 21-- Pley, Caitlin M. [University of Cambridge Department of Medicine, Public Policy Researcher], et al. "The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection." BMJ Global Health 6.1 (2021): e004275. (AG DebateDrills)

There is previous evidence to show that routine immunisation programmes are highly vulnerable to disruption resulting from epidemics, political upheaval or economic crises. When vaccination coverage rates sharply dipped in West Africa during the 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak, the incidence of measles rapidly rebounded.7 Although HBV global vaccination coverage has steadily increased since the 1990s, previous experience shows correlation of declines in vaccination coverage with political and economic unrest that disrupt infrastructure (figure 1). Since the progression to overt liver disease occurs slowly, the impact of a drop in HBV vaccination coverage may go unnoticed for decades in settings without adequate diagnostic infrastructure. Preliminary data from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation indicate that overall global vaccination coverage levels in 2020 have dropped to levels last seen in the 1990s, threatening 25 years of progress in just 6 months**.**8 The USA’s federally financed ‘Vaccines for Children’ Programme has documented notable declines in vaccine ordering and administration after declaration of the national emergency on 13 March 2020, although more markedly in children older than 24 months than younger children, reflecting some success in maintaining routine vaccination of infants.9 In England, electronic health records have shown that coverage of the measles, mumps, rubella vaccination dropped by 19.8% when physical distancing measures were implemented between February and April 2020, compared with the same period in 2019.10 Reduced vaccination coverage may have particularly strong repercussions on HBV incidence in infancy and early childhood, contributing to an increase in the global burden of chronic infection and providing a long-term source of onward transmission that threatens progress towards the 2030 elimination goals. The repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic on HBV vaccination and control may even outweigh the number of direct COVID-19 deaths in the long term. A recent model has projected that for one excess COVID-19 death attributable to visiting a vaccination delivery point, mostly in the older household contacts of children, the deaths of 84 children under 5years could be prevented if routine childhood immunisation programmes were sustained in sub-Saharan Africa.11

#### Future pandemics will cause extinction – it only takes one “super-spreader” to kill us all.

**Bar-Yam 16** [[Yaneer Bar-Yam](https://twitter.com/YaneerBarYam), Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world, New England Complex Systems Institute (July 3, 2016), https://necsi.edu/transition-to-extinction] //DD PT

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### Plan: Member nations of the WTO ought to grant a TRIPS waiver for COVID medicines.

#### India and South Africa have signaled ability to increase vaccine production after a TRIPS waiver—this is also our solvency advocate

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This view has come under increasing fire. Two competing positions have emerged. First, India and South Africa petitioned the WTO for a temporary waiver of IP rights for medical products pertaining to preventing, containing or treating COVID19.2 The wavier would apply to all WTO members and lift restrictions in four TRIPS sections: copyright and related rights, industrial designs, patents and protection of undisclosed information. It would be annually reviewed and last for a set length, determined by the WTO Council. Proponents of the proposal argue that IP protections have ‘hindered urgent scale-up of vaccine production’ and that ‘many countries—especially LMICs countries—may face institutional and legal difficulties when using TRIPS flexibilities’.12 To break the divide, WTO Director General, Okonjo-Iweala, proposed ‘a third way’ in which ‘we… license manufacturing to countries so that we can have adequate supplies while still making sure that IP issues are taken care of.’13 This approach permits companies to retain ownership while licensing other companies to manufacture their vaccines.

#### The plan is also a prerequisite to starting the WHO technology transfer hub.

WHO 4/21—WHO, 4-21-2021, “Establishment of a COVID-19 mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub to scale up global manufacturing,” <https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/establishment-of-a-covid-19-mrna-vaccine-technology-transfer-hub-to-scale-up-global-manufacturing>. (AG DebateDrills)

WHO and its partners are seeking to expand the capacity of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to produce COVID-19 vaccines and scale up manufacturing to increase global access to these critical tools to bring the pandemic under control. WHO will facilitate the establishment of one (or more, as appropriate) technology transfer hub(s) that will use a hub and spoke model (REF) to transfer a comprehensive technology package and provide appropriate training to interested manufacturers in LMICs. This initiative will initially prioritize the mRNA-vaccine technology2 but could expand to other technologies in the future.The intention is for these hubs to enable the establishment of production process at an industrial or semi-industrial level permitting training and provision of all necessary standard operating procedures for production and quality control. It is essential that the technology used is either free of intellectual property constraints in LMICs, or that such rights are made available to the technology hub and the future recipients of the technology through non-exclusive licenses to produce, export and distribute the COVID-19 vaccine in LMICs, including through the COVAX facility. Preference will be given to applicants who have already generated clinical data in humans, as such clinical data will contribute to accelerated approval of the vaccines in LMICs. It is anticipated that WHO will work with funders and donors to mobilize financial support to establish the hubs and, as they are being established, to support the transfer of technology to selected manufacturers in LMICs, taking into consideration the need to establish permanent vaccine production capacity in regions where this is currently mostly absent. This broader objective will ensure that all WHO regions will be able to produce vaccines as essential preparedness measures against future infectious threats.

#### There are many countries including Canada, Bangladesh, Denmark, and African nations that have capacity to produce millions of doses

Meldrum and Cheng 21-- ANDREW MELDRUM and MARIA CHENG, AP News, “Vaccine technology transfer center to open in South Africa,” 6/21/2021, <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-south-africa-africa-technology-coronavirus-vaccine-3cbdee395502802b55db2b5c81e6becd>. (AG, DebateDrills)

Poor countries in Africa and elsewhere are facing dire shortages of COVID-19 jabs despite some countries having the ability to produce vaccines, lamented Lara Dovifat, a campaign and advocacy adviser for Doctors Without Borders. “The faster companies share the know-how, the faster we can put an end to this pandemic,” she said in a statement. Numerous factories in Canada, Bangladesh, Denmark and elsewhere have previously called for companies to immediately share their technology, saying their idle production lines could be churning out millions of doses if they weren’t hampered by intellectual property and other restrictions**.** More than 1 billion coronavirus vaccines have been administered globally, but fewer than 1% have been in poor countries. South Africa accounts for nearly 40% of Africa’s total recorded COVID-19 infections and is currently suffering a rapid surge, but vaccine rollout has been slow, marked by delayed deliveries among other factors. South Africa currently does not manufacture any COVID-19 vaccines from scratch, but its Aspen Pharmacare assembles the Johnson & Johnson shot by blending large batches of the ingredients sent by J&J and then putting the product in vials and packaging them, a process known as fill and finish. Earlier this month the company had to discard 2 million doses because they had ingredients produced in the U.S. in a factory under suspect conditions.

### 1AC – Util

#### The standard is maximizing expecting well-being.

#### 1] Phenomenal introspection - it’s the most epistemically reliable - historical and moral disagreement over internal conceptions of morality such as questions of race, gender, class, religion, etc. prove the fallibility of non-observational based ethics - introspection means we value happiness because we can determine that we each value it - just as I can observe a lemon’s yellowness, we can make those judgements about happiness.

#### 2] Actor specificity

#### ---A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### ---B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments actively decide not to act so there is no omission.

#### --C] Governments empirically use util which solves calc indicts because it empirically works.

#### 3] Only consequentialism can explain degrees of wrongness - If I break a promise to meet up for lunch that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first.

#### 4] Extinction first under any framework:

#### ---A] It precludes the possibility of any kind of moral value – we can’t confer value onto anything if we’re not alive.

#### ---B] Future generations means infinite magnitude – we have to look towards future lives too.

### 1AC – Theory

#### 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) reject the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time, e) no 2NR theory – 2-to-1 time tradeoff makes it devastating for the 2AR, f) comes first – it’s a bigger percentage of the 1AR than 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time and only the 2N has time to win multiple layers, g) voters – fairness because debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education since it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

### 1AC – Method

#### 1] Rejection of legal restrictions undermines the progress of democratic movements and the welfare state and only reproduces violence

Colatrella 11 (Steven Colatrella, Ph.D. is a professor at the University of Maryland University College, “Nothing Exceptional: Against Agamben,” Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, vol.9. no.1, 2011, http://www.jceps.com/wp-content/uploads/PDFs/09-1-05.pdf)

In failing to take into account the expropriation of the slave, the enclosure of the commons, the expropriation of the peasantry and the burning of the witch, the occupation of the colonized’s lands, the IMF Structural Adjustment Program and the repression needed to impose it against resistance, hasn’t Agamben also failed to provide his own theoretical framework with the tools needed to explain the survival or death of the Jew in the Nazi camp, his own paradigmatic example? If we find, as Isabella Clough-Marinaro has34, that the camps for Roma in Italy today are classic examples of homo sacer, right down to publicly exposed showers on concrete enclosures surrounded by barbed wire, needn’t we try to understand what these new horrors have to do with the rolling back of the welfare state in Europe?; with the attack on employment and wages?; with the intensified exploitation that includes that of the undocumented immigrants and the public discourses demonizing them?; with the increased law and order regimes, campaigns against crime that criminalize the Roma, the undocumented and other minorities that have allowed the Italian military to be deployed in the streets to keep an eye on the population; with the creation of such scapegoats to divide the working class exactly at such a time of attack on hard-won social gains? Agamben, as Clough-Marinaro demonstrates, is indispensable to help analyze the camps in the first place, but I would argue that he is of nearly no help at all to help us strategize about what to do about them, because he doesn’t understand what any of it has to do with class relations, relations of expropriation, exploitation and class struggle against these. And that means he can’t understand what the latter has already accomplished and what it has yet to accomplish. To understand this, we need to understand the welfare state itself as it has developed. To do that we need to understand democracy, which in turn requires us to think about the state, as Agamben calls on us to do, but to do so in a way that goes beyond the drama of the state of exception to include the historical accomplishments of the class struggle, particularly those other two categories, democracy and the welfare state. While this is not the place to enter into a full discussion of these issues, which I address elsewhere35, a brief summary of my argument on democracy is useful to make clear my differences with Agamben’s approach. Modern democracy is part of what Polanyi calls the “double movement36” of expropriation and the establishment of the self-regulating market and the efforts by society to defend itself from this process. Modern democracy is born from the English and French Revolutions37, from the anti-slavery movement in the US, and from the labor and socialist movements in Europe38. Mass democratic movements that have furthered this process have been fought either to retard the separation of the people from the land and access to means of production and subsistence, or to provide new guarantees of meeting these needs and providing livelihood to those already expropriated and now exploited. Put differently, the commitment of ordinary people to democracy comes from their need and desire to use it to do something; democracy is an instrument of popular classes to defend and extend their interests. If, as I have argued, citing various authors’ work to the point, the protection of individual rights, avoidance of becoming homo sacer, and prevention of the state of exception required material foundations, those material foundations have, in modern times, required political protection. The modern democratic class struggle, the establishment of democracy and its extension, remain, along with defending or reestablishing control of subsistence and means of production directly in the hands of the people (the commons), the best means of avoiding the fate that Agamben warns us about. This means that the too-facile dismissal of all legal, democratic or constitutional protections, hard-won by generations of struggle, that appear in his analysis that the state of exception is already unexceptional but rather the rule, disarms the very efforts needed to protect us from the state power39 [Insert footnote 39] Agamben provides us with some of the most facile and dangerous thinking, passing for profundity, imaginable: “Once their fundamental referent becomes bare life, traditional political distinctions (such as those between Right and Left, liberalism and totalitarianism, private and public) lose their clarity and their intelligibility and enter into a zone of indistinction.” Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.122. This statement, with the word “capitalism” replacing the phrase “bare life” could have been written by an adherent of the Third International’s Third Period, whose disastrous policies helped bring about precisely the states of exception – Nazi victories – that Agamben is concerned about. See the classic analysis in C.LR. James, World Revolution 1917-1936: The Rise and Fall of the Third International, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey 1993, especially pp. 307 and 339 and chapter 12, “After Hitler, Our Turn.” [End footnote 39] The democratic movements have broken down the sterile and false separation between the oikos and the polis argued for by Hannah Arendt40, and the similar separations between everyday life and social reproduction and public life, between zoe and bios. This is not by chance: slave plantations were private homes; the family enterprise studied by Marx was considered virtually an extension of the owners’ household; the needs of working families for subsistence or health care, or the infant mortality rate, unwanted pregnancies and their impact on women’s lives and the mortality rate of women in childbirth were all considered private affairs, not public or political ones. It was the accomplishment of the modern workers and women’s movements, of modern democracy, to change this state of affairs. Agamben sneeringly dismisses, indeed scarily demonizes this accomplishment as “biopolitics”: What comes to light in order to be exposed apud Westminster is, once again, the body of homo sacer, which is to say, bare life. This is modern democracy’s strength, and at the same time, its inner contradiction: modern democracy does not abolish sacred life but rather shatters it and disseminates it into every individual body, making it into what is at stake in political conflict. And the root of modern democracy’s secret biopolitical calling lies here: he who will later appear as the bearer of rights, and according to a curious oxymoron, as the new sovereign subject…can only be constituted as such through the repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation of corpus, bare life, in himself. If it is true that law needs a body in order to be in force, and if one can speak, in this sense, of “law’s desire to have a body”, democracy responds to this desire by compelling law to assume the care of this body.41 Agamben goes on to argue, incredibly, that the very right of habeas corpus by requiring the sheriff to exhibit the body of the accused undermines the liberty of the accused, an interpretation unique in the thousand-year history of habeas corpus rights whose defense has quite rightly underpinned many oppositions to Bush administration tactics in the War on Terror, and whose history has recently been provided a radical defense and materialist interpretation by Linebaugh already cited. The long process of democracy “compelling law to assume the care of the body” instead is the accomplishment of centuries of struggles by ordinary people precisely to move the state out of the business of killing and into the business of providing health care and education. This is what led Ernest Gellner to state, while overstating the case, “"At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor… The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than the monopoly of legitimate violence.42” That the European social democratic welfare state coincided with the European Union’s one great accomplishment, the end of wars between the nation-states of Europe should give us pause for thought43. That the abolition of the death penalty followed these developments should make the relationship clear. What seals the argument is that the revived militarism, political repression and demonization of unpopular minority groups in Europe follow upon the efforts directed by the EU Commission and signed on to by every EU member government to privatize, liberalize markets, overcome workers’ resistance to “flexible” work organization, and impose neoliberal globalization44. The relationship between the democratic class struggle to defend subsistence and basic needs and the defense of individual rights and limitation of state power should be clear. That it isn’t should be attributed to an elitist, too-sophisticated by half approach to the state, democracy and class struggle that appears radical but in fact undermines the very foundations of democracy and social welfare by not making these struggles an integral part of its analysis. The movements for democracy, the class and gender struggles that brought it about and have continued to try to extend it to more spheres of life are, as Marx explained to the First International, not extensions of state power, but partial transformations of the state from a police apparatus and killing machine for the ruling class into a set of functions whose institutions and cadre now concern themselves with caring for the needs of society’s members, with all the contradictions and flaws that studies of the welfare state have demonstrated but with all its benefits too: However, the more enlightened part of the working class fully understands that the future of its class, and, therefore, of mankind, altogether depends upon the formation of the rising working generation. They know that, before everything else, the children and juvenile workers must be saved from the crushing effects of the present system. This can only be effected by converting social reason into social force, and, under given circumstances, there exists no other method of doing so, than through general laws, enforced by the power of the state. In enforcing such laws, the working class do not fortify governmental power. On the contrary, they transform that power, now used against them, into their own agency. They effect by a general act what they would vainly attempt by a multitude of isolated individual efforts45

#### 2] The ballot is a yes/no question of the plan –

#### A] Clash – only the plan provides the predictable locus point necessary to consolidate arguments because it sifts broad questions down to specific steps.

#### B] Turns their interp – the justifications for our research and the utility of using institutions stem from the consequences which means defenses of the link are inseparable from the plan – this means we get to weigh the case absent the framework interpretation because the aff impacts turn the links.

#### C] Resolvability – weighing the case invites judge intervention because there’s no explicit method to evaluate the impacts of the 1AC against the discourse impacts of the K.

#### 3] Policy debate is cool even though, and get this, voting aff doesn’t cause the plan IRL.

John Hird 17. Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. “How Effective is Policy Analysis,” in D. Weimer & L. S. Friedman (eds.) *Does Policy Analysis Matter? Exploring Its Effectiveness in Theory and Practice*. University of California Press. 44-76.

Classical policy analysis, however absent from actual policy making, remains an important vehicle for teaching policy analysts the connections between their analysis and the policymaking world in which their recommendations would live. Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have, classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems. Bringing policy ideas to fruition, bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop. In addition, policy schools are instilling in prospective policy analysts the structure and habits of mind to engage successfully in the policy enterprise. 28 Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important. Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems" (Weiss 2009). In the absence of written classical policy analyses, policy analysts become their human embodiment. Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed. They can derive elements of policy analysis from writing position papers, briefing policy makers, and controlling meetings. They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options. In short, the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis. Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems, not just political expediency. The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients. This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research. Finally, prospective policy analysts are instructed repeatedly about the importance of their relationship to the client(s), yet far less attention is paid to the other part of the policy analyst's relationship: to the community of knowledge producers. Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic literature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover. Identifying and connecting pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education. Policy analysts may offer the central means to provide policy makers with the key elements of classical policy analysis, though not in the way, through written reports, it was originally conceived. Creating a profession for committed, accomplished, and well-trained individuals to participate in the world of public policy may be among the most important contributions of policy analysis education.