### 1AC – Framework

#### Agents must be practical reasoners –

#### [1] Regress – we can always ask why we should follow a theory, so they aren’t binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow

#### [2] Action Theory – every action can be broken into infinite small actions, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason

#### [3] Inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.

Wood07[Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 // WWBW rct st]

Kant holds that **the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is that of setting an end** (G 4:437). **To set an end is, analytically, to subject yourself to the hypothetical imperative that you should take the necessary means to the end you have set** (G 4:417). This is the claim that you rationally ought to do something whether or not you are at the moment inclined to do it. It represents the action of applying that means as good (G 4:414) – in the sense of “good” that Kant explicates as: what is required by reason independently of inclination (G 4:413). Kant correctly infers that **any being which sets itself ends is committed to regarding its end as good in this sense, and also to regarding the goodness of its end as what also makes application of the means good** – that is, rationally required independently of any inclination to apply it. **The act of setting an end, therefore, must be taken as committing you to represent some other act (the act of applying the means) as good.** In doing all this, however, **the rational being must also necessarily regard its own rational capacities as authoritative for what is good in general.** For it treats these capacities as capable of determining which ends are good, and at the same time as grounding the goodness of the means taken toward those good ends. **But to regard one’s capacities in this way is also to take a certain attitude toward oneself as the being that has and exercises those capacities. It is to esteem oneself – and also to esteem the correct exercise of one’s rational capacities in determining what is good both as an end and as a means to it.** One’s other capacities, such as those needed to perform the action that is good as a means, are also regarded as good as means. **But that capacity through which we can represent the very idea of something as good both as end and as means is not represented merely as the object of a contingent inclination, nor is it represented as good only as a means. It must be esteemed as unconditionally good, as an end in itself. To find this value in oneself is not at all the same as thinking of oneself as a good person. Even those who misuse their rational capacities are committed to esteeming themselves as possessing rational nature.** It also does not imply that a more intelligent person (in that sense, more “rational”) is “better” than a less intelligent one. The self-esteem involved in setting an end applies to any being capable of setting an end at all, irrespective of the cleverness or even the morality of the end setting. Kant’s argument supports the conclusion, to which he adheres with admirable consistency throughout his writings, that all rational beings, clever or stupid, even good or evil, have equal (absolute) worth as ends in themselves. For Kantian ethics **the rational nature in every person is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.**

#### [4] Epistemology – ethics must begin a priori, meaning they can’t be derived from our experience.

#### [A] Uncertainty – everyone has different experiences so we can’t have a unified perspective on what is good and bad – even roughly aggregating fails since there’ll always be a case when it fails so the framework o/w on probability.

#### [B] Is/Ought Gap – experience in the phenomenal world only tells us what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises within the noumenal world to make a moral theory.

#### Reason requires that maxims we act upon must be universalizable – A. Any reasoner would know that two plus two equals four because there is no a priori distinction between agents so norms must be universally valid. B. Any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends – it’s impossible to will a violation of freedom since deciding to do so would will incompatible ends since it logically entails justifying willing a violation of your own freedom.

#### Only a collective will with power over individuals can guarantee the enforcement of good maxims. Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will.

#### Impact calc –

#### [1] Only the omnilateral will can motivate action – it’s external to wills of agents so it can obligate them all to follow certain rules – unilateral wills fail since they would involve one person coercing other people under their will and there would be no obligation to follow a person.

#### [2] Consequences fail – A) Induction Fails – You only believe it works because past experiences have said it has, but that itself is a form of induction which that’s circular B) Butterfly Effect – Every action has an infinite number of consequences – me picking up a pen could cause nuclear war a hundred years down – you can’t quantify the infinite amount of pain and pleasure to come C) Aggregation fails – everyone has different feelings of pain and pleasure, so you can’t universalize that and say it’s good – it’s impossible to measure something that’s completely subjective D) Culpability – any consequence can lead to another consequence so it’s impossible to assign obligations since you can’t pinpoint a specific actor that caused a consequence.

### 1AC – Offense

#### I defend “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.” as a general principle.

#### I’m willing clarify or specify whatever you want me to in CX if it doesn’t force me to abandon my maxim. Check all spec interps in CX – I could’ve met them before the NC and abuse would’ve been solved. PICs don’t negate – they don’t disprove the general thesis of the affirmative.

#### [1] Property is an external right – it is something that we don’t innately have a right to by virtue of existing, but acquire once we exercise our freedom. However, this is impossible when there is no state to create property divisions.

Stilz 1 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

One key reason Kant does not accept the skeptical view of political authority, as put forward by Simmons, is that, when it comes to rights over external resources, he does not see the value of freedom as having the moral structure that Simmons attributes to it. Kant and Simmons, however, (along with Rousseau, whom we will examine in the next chapter) do share the same conception of freedom at the most basic level, a conception we can call freedom as independence. Since this notion of freedom as independence is one I will use throughout this book, it is worth a few words of clarification here. To be free-as-independent, as all these thinkers conceive it, is not to be forced to obey the will of another person; it is to enjoy a sphere of independent self-government within which others cannot interfere. This notion of freedom is thus particularly concerned with the relationships between persons. It is not concerned in the same way with whatever restrictions may be placed on our choices by natural obstacles or constraints. Being unable to hike up a mountain because a tree blocks the path does not make me less free, on the freedom- as-independence view. But being unable to hike up a mountain because you have tied me up, or because I have to seek your permission to engage in any leisure activities, does make me unfree. Freedom as independence, therefore, always refers to a relation between one person’s will and anoth- er’s: to be unfree is to be forced to obey someone else’s will rather than one’s own. For both Kant and Simmons, attaining this sort of freedom as indepen- dence requires people possess rights of property in external things. This is because the only way one person can be free from subjection to another person’s will is to have exclusive control over a sphere of the physical world within which those others are not allowed to interfere with his actions. And to have that sort of control is to have property. This exclusive sphere of property includes (a) rights of control over one’s own body and (b) rights of control over specific objects. While Kant agrees with Sim- mons that freedom requires property, he also claims that property is only possible through the state. As a result, he concludes that freedom as inde- pendence is only possible through the state. Since Kant believes that there is a basis in natural right for claiming private property, and he believes that private property requires the state, he concludes that the state is not an optional or voluntary association. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that we may be forced into the state against our will.18 Kant: External Freedom as Independence How does Kant reach these conclusions? Kant begins his Metaphysics of Morals with the argument that every human being possesses an innate right to external freedom, which as we have seen, is a right to indepen- dence from being coerced or constrained by another person’s will in car- rying out our choices. This, he says, is the “only original right belonging to man by virtue of his humanity.” Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice [Willku ̈ r]), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of humanity. This principle of innate freedom al- ready involves the following authorizations, which are not really dis- tinct from it (as if they were members of the division of some higher concept of a right): innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti), since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone; and finally, his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it—such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promis- ing them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere (veriloquium aut falsiloquium); for it is entirely up to them whether they want to believe him or not. (MM, 6:238) As the sole human right, for Kant, the right to freedom as independence gives us several kinds of prerogatives. First, it gives us the title to do any- thing to other people that we may do to them without actually diminish- ing their freedom as independence, like simply communicating our thoughts to them: it thus grounds rights to freedom of speech and thought. Second, it gives us title to insist that we not be bound by any restrictions to freedom that are not reciprocal restrictions, that do not bind other people in the same way: it justifies a right to equal treatment. In addition, Kant holds that the innate right includes a minimum of bodily inviolability: someone who physically interferes with my body without my consent “affects and diminishes what is internally mine (my freedom), so that his maxim is in direct contradiction with the axiom of right” (MM, 6:250). Since my faculty of self-determination can only be exercised through my body, anyone who uses direct physical force on my body interferes with all possible expressions of my freedom.19 These titles—to freedom of thought and communication, to equal treatment, and to a minimum of bodily inviolability—together comprise our original claims to freedom. Unlike internal or metaphysical freedom, though, on Kant’s theory, ex- ternal freedom is defined by the individual’s capacity to set and pursue ends in the outside world, by acting. So in order to be externally free, I must be able to take up and use physical means—at the very least, spaces and also potentially objects—in order to carry out my choices. I am not externally free merely by thinking or wishing or setting myself a goal, without taking any concrete actions; I cannot be externally free in chains. I am externally free only when I can do something to further my projects. And this means that I must be able to actually take up some means to my ends without fear of your interference with my acts. External freedom thus involves the use of pieces of the physical world, where this use is potentially subject to interference by other persons.20 While all rights involve some sort of claim to external freedom, Kant draws a important distinction between rights that belong to us innately (like all those described above) and those we must acquire. Here, Kant differentiates between what he calls the internal and external “mine” (meum). Some rights—like the innate titles—are internally mine: I am born with them; they are my inalienable property; I do not have to do anything to acquire them. Other rights are acquired, and so belong to what Kant calls the external mine: these rights do not belong to us by birth, but require a particular act to be established (MM, 6:237). Kant refers to three broad kinds of acquired rights: rights to “(1) a (corporeal) thing external to me; (2) another’s choice to perform a specific deed (praestatio); (3) another’s status in relation to me” (MM, 6:248). These three kinds of acquired rights specify (1) my claims of ownership or prop- erty; (2) my contractual claims against others; and (3) my status as an occupant of a role, as a spouse, parent, or head of household.21 And shortly after introducing the innate right, interestingly, Kant suggests that it can more or less be laid aside in his political theory, in favor of a discus- sion of acquired rights: “It can be put in the prolegomena and the division of the doctrine of right can refer only to what is externally mine or yours” (MM, 6:238). Most of Kant’s political theory, then, is concerned not with the innate right, but instead with acquired rights, which define the precise bounds of our sphere of control over the external world. The fundamental task of a science of right, as Kant sees it, is to show how these rights to an “external mine” should be defined and guaranteed: “The doctrine of right wants to be sure that what belongs to each has been determined (with mathematical exactitude)” (MM, 6:233). As we shall see, Kant con- cludes that we cannot acquire these sorts of rights without a state. One reason for this is that unlike our titles to freedom of thought and communication or to minimal bodily inviolability, our rights to specific external objects are not naturally determinate. Freedom as independence requires that I have rights of control over a particular body (my own), but not that I have rights of control over a particular object. In order to be free-as-independent, I must have a right to some sphere of property, but it does not matter which specific objects I have a right to.22 Kant’s position can perhaps be made more intuitive if we reflect that any system of prop- erty will require the existence of a set of rules that is complex and to some extent conventional: rules about what sorts of things are eligible to be held as private property, what precisely are the conditions defining voluntary exchange, what constitutes an exploitative agreement, what are the condi- tions of publicly recognized spousal or parental rights, and how to distrib- ute opportunities, education, and income. The conditions specifying these sorts of rights would be imprecise and difficult to judge in a state of nature. The basic thought here is that while a principle of equal freedom pro- vides us some information about what just property distributions should look like, the principle’s content is underspecified, and therefore cannot be directly applied. The equal freedom principle suggests that whatever system of property we implement, it ought to be consistent with every- one’s possession of a zone of freedom that is guaranteed against others’ coercive interference. Nevertheless, many possible systems of property— collective allocation, market socialism, unfettered private ownership— are potentially consistent with that sense of equal freedom. And under each one of these many possible systems, there will again be many possible particular rules consistent with everyone’s freedom—rules about the pre- cise bundle of claims conferred by ownership, about how exchange is to be regulated, about which objects belong to which particular persons. And finally, any system of property will also have to include some aspects that are wholly conventional: rules about what precise formalities are required to conclude a contract, exactly how long a statute of limitations to institute, down, indeed, to what side of the road to drive on.

#### [2] In outer space, there is no governing authority and thus claiming property imposes your will over others.

Stilz 2 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

It might seem, then, that Kant, like Simmons, would hold that although our acquired rights are initially indefinite, our private acts of appropria- tion in a state of nature can function to more clearly delimit their contours. Once I appropriate an external object—for example, my piece of land in the state of nature—the boundaries of my right to external freedom might simply be equivalent to those of the things and spaces that I have appropriated. If this were so, then individuals could succeed in more precisely defining property without the help of the state, and simply by coordinating expectations based on their private acts. In order to respect and acknowledge my external freedom, on this view, you would just have to cede me the spot I have rightfully occupied and to refrain from infringing on my choices within that sphere. Yet Kant does not take this position: he argues that the rights made possible by the postulate of practical reason are problematic. Whatever rights our private acts of appropriation outside the state confer upon us can only be understood as provisional rights, that is, they are not conclusive and settled (peremp- torische): indeed, for him, “It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, giving laws publicly, that is, a civil condition” (MM, 6:255). What is the problem with these private methods of defining our rights to property? Why are they so unsatisfactory, from Kant’s perspective? The essential problem with acquiring property rights in a state of nature, for Kant, seems to be that we cannot unilaterally—through private will— impose a new obligation on other persons to respect our property that they would not otherwise have had.30 “By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain from using a thing, an obligation he would not otherwise have; hence I can do this only through the united choice of all who possess it in common” (MM, 6:261).31 Even claiming to interpret the a priori general will on another person’s behalf, says Kant, is at- tempting to impose a law on them on my own private authority, since every act of appropriation is “the giving of a law that holds for everyone” (MM, 6:253).32 And he worries that this claim to private authority over others is a potential source of injustice: “Now when someone makes ar- rangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria)” (MM, 6:314). My will to appro- priate, in the belief that my appropriation is justifiable to others, cannot yet serve as a (coercive) law for everyone else, because it cannot put them under an obligation. Kant suggests, in other words, that figuring out how to carve up shares of the external world consistently with everyone’s freedom does not ex- haust the entire problem of justice involved in acquiring rights to prop- erty. We might appeal to criteria of salience or convention to help coordi- nate our expectations on which of the many possible property distributions to choose. But we face an additional difficulty: how do we impose one of these distributions without at the same time arrogating to ourselves the private authority to lay down the law for an equally free being, one who has an innate right not to be constrained by our private will? In coercing someone to respect our view of our property rights, we are also necessarily claiming the right to impose our private will upon that person. If it is to really respect everyone’s freedom, Kant thinks, a property distribution cannot be unilaterally imposed in this way. This additional dimension of the problem of justly acquiring rights— the problem of unilateral imposition—is rooted in each person’s basic “right to do what seems right and good to him and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this” (MM, 6:312). This right to do what seems right and good to him derives from the moral equality of persons: no one has an innate right to decide in another person’s behalf. And be- cause each person is an equally authoritative judge, it is therefore impossi- ble—in a state of nature—to put [them] under an obligation of justice that [they] himself does not recognize. The will of all others except for himself, which proposes to put him under obligation to give up a certain possession, is merely unilateral, and hence has as little lawful force in denying him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can be found only in a general will). (MM, 6:257) In conditions of equal authority—such as those that exist in any state of nature—one is obligated only by what one recognizes, by one’s own lights, as an objectively valid requirement of justice. For that reason, no other person’s merely unilateral will can bind one in the face of one’s own disagreement. Kant concludes from this that “no particular will can be legislative for the commonwealth” (TP, 8:295), since no private person’s will can effec- tively claim to impose an obligation on others. Instead, Kant says that “all right,” that is to say all claims that impose binding duties on others, “depends on laws” (TP, 8:294). Law overcomes the problem of unilater- alism inherent in imposing new obligations on others on one’s own au- thority, by substituting an omnilateral will in place of a unilateral one: “Only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all, and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative” (MM, 6:314). But why is law—imposed from a public perspective—consistent with everyone’s freedom in a way that particular wills—based on our private judgments—are not? Fundamentally, Kant argues that defining and enforcing both our rights over our bodies and our rights to external objects through public and nonarbitrary laws is the only way to secure ourselves against the coercive interference of other private persons in our affairs. For Kant, then, the only sort of property distribution to which we could all hypothetically consent must necessarily be one that is defined and enforced by the state, since all privately enforced distributions have the inevitable side-effect of subjecting us to the wills of others. To show this in more detail, Kant points out two different ways that unilateral private enforcement under- mines our right to independence: first, through unilateral interpretation— a particularly pervasive problem in the enforcement of property rights, since these rights are fully conventional in a way our rights over our bod- ies are not; and second, through unilateral coercion, which threatens in- terference by others in all our rights, both our rights over our bodies and our rights over external things.

#### [3] In the state of nature, everyone is an equal arbitrator of justice – that makes rights violations impossible to resolve.

Stilz 3 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

The Problem of Unilateral Interpretation Kant centrally appeals to the idea that to conclusively possess a right, it must be an objective right, rather than a subjective right based on one individual’s private interpretation of what justice requires. A subjective right is an individual’s good-faith belief about his rights: this belief gives him title to coerce others to keep off his property or to allow him bodily inviolability. But it does not yet place other people under a correlative duty. That would be so only if all individuals shared [their] interpretation of justice. But since individuals are equally authoritative judges in the state of nature, whenever they do not share another person’s belief about jus- tice, his belief imposes no duty on them at all. Instead, they are obliged only by the duties imposed by their own good-faith interpretation of jus- tice, which may not be concordant with his. It might be said, by someone of a more Lockean persuasion, that one of these competing interpreta- tions is the one that simply is valid as a matter of moral fact. That may be so. But as long as we remain in a state of nature, even this true view of right must remain unrealized, since each person, being an equally au- thoritative judge, has a right to enforce [their] own interpretation of justice, which means the true view of right places the person under no duties when it does not correspond with the person’s own. So as long as we remain our own judges and self-enforcers, there is no means by which we might establish which interpretation of right is morally valid without claiming the authority to serve as judge in another person’s behalf and forcibly subject the person to our will. And to claim that authority over someone else, Kant thinks, is refuse to recognize a person’s independence as an equally free being. For this reason, Kant thinks a procedure for the determination of objec- tive rights is a constitutive feature of justice, since a common process of adjudication is logically necessary if anyone’s rights are to impose any objective duties on other people.33 Objective rights are rights that are de- termined through such a process of adjudication, and that impose recog- nizable duties on us even when we disagree about what justice requires. If each person is threatened with violence every time another person’s private interpretation of justice disagrees with her own, [they] cannot possi- bly enjoy a secure sphere of freedom, since this other person is able to interfere with it whenever he sees fit. Instead, it is a constitutive part of justice that there be one univocal interpretation of the rights and duties to which everyone is subject, because only then can people securely enjoy independence from each other. Part of what justice demands, then, is a mechanism by which people can have their rights guaranteed in the exter- nal world without depending on the concordance of other people’s beliefs. Justice cannot be attained in the absence of such a procedure: only once it is in place are we fully independent of interference by other people, as we have an innate claim to be. To see how the unilateralism of interpretation undermines indepen- dence, imagine for a moment that you and I are state-of-nature neighbors. Say we have managed to resolve the indeterminacy of our property rights somewhat, perhaps by appropriating only in accordance with our inter- pretation of Kant’s a priori general will, or by coordinating our expecta- tions based on the most salient just system. So we have hit on some right- ful boundary that sets off your property from mine, such that if I desire to live side by side with you in peace, simply by respecting your basic rights, I ought to be able to do so. Let’s call our initial “property-owning” equilibrium E1. Now suppose some dispute arises between us over whether your prop- erty right has in fact been infringed. Perhaps I have built a huge garage in my area, which blocks the sunlight to your property and makes your gar- den unusable. Any number of examples are possible; what unites them all is that they represent new contingencies, the disposition of which is going to be indefinite enough according to whatever original criterion of appro- priation we are working with to make it likely parties acting in good faith might disagree. In our state-of-nature system, however, the interpretation of what right actually requires in this contingency is left up to you, along with the choice of whether or not to exercise your coercive rights to re- dress any (perceived) violation. So let’s say that you decide my garage is a violation of your acquired rights, since it makes your entire garden unusable, and so you cross our boundary in order to prevent me from blocking the light and to exact compensation from me. If I do not agree with your interpretation of your rights, I am under no obligation to submit to you: I am an equally authori- tative interpreter of justice. I may object to the rightfulness of your bound- ary-crossing in this case, or, even if I concede that you had a right to exact punishment, I may (in all good faith) think that you have exceeded the bounds of the compensation you are entitled to. So I may struggle against you, and regard myself as doing so rightfully. In this situation we both regard ourselves as having a claim of justice, and since we both act in good faith, we act with full subjective right. But in our state of nature, the only thing that can decide the matter between us is a contest of strength, since both sides are equally right from their point of view. As Jeremy Waldron puts it: there is an affront to the idea of justice when force is used by opposing sides, confrontationally and contradictorily, in justice’s name. The point of using force in the name of justice is to assure people of that to which they are entitled. But if force is being used to further contradic- tory ends, then its connection with assurance is ruptured.3 Let’s say that in this case you are the stronger, and that you succeed in demolishing my garage and in exacting what you regard as rightful com- pensation for my supposed infringement—say, one-quarter of my prop- erty. Now we have a new property-owning equilibrium, E2, in which you possess 125 percent of our combined share and I possess only 75 percent. And keeping with our initial assumption that both parties were acting in good faith, with full subjective right, this new equilibrium would not have come about unrightfully. Yet there is a real sense in which I retain a claim here, since the only reason you now possess more of the total is that you were stronger, not that I was convinced by your interpretation of justice. But the bounds of our sphere of control in the external world ought not to depend on the contingencies of who is stronger, and our innate independence ought not to be subject to continual interference by others who may coerce us at any moment in accordance with their private views. For this reason, Kant thinks it is a constitutive feature of justice that it be administered by an authoritative legal system, which can impose one set of objective rules about what constitutes an infringement of property—rules we must re- spect even when we disagree about what justice requires—and adjudicate our conflicting claims in a way that is consistent with our continued inde- pendence from each other. The idea is that if we want to possess claims that, as objective rights, are actually respected by others in the external world, we will need to recognize one and only one common set of rules about rights, not a variety of competing private interpretations that coer- cively struggle for the upper hand.

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) reject the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time, e) no 2NR theory – 2-to-1 time tradeoff makes it devastating for the 2AR, g) voters – fairness because debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education since it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### 2] Ideal theory is good and inevitable.

Shelby 13 [Tommie Shelby, “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” *Critical Philosophy of Race*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2013), pp. 145-162] AG

On the Rawlsian view, injustices are conceptualized as deviations from the ideal principles of justice, in much the same way that fallacious reasoning is conceived as a deviation from the rules of logical inference. An injustice is a failure on the part of individuals or social arrangements to satisfy what the ideal principles of justice demand. Thus, charges of injustice presuppose ideals of justice, which particular individuals and institutions can and often do depart from. Such deviations can be small or great, minor or serious, and depending on the size and nature of the gap between ideals and practice (and also on whether these deviations are avoidable or blameworthy), different remedies will be required. Nonideal theory specifies and justifies the principles that should guide our responses to such deviations from ideal justice.17 Within nonideal theory (and here I focus on domestic rather than global justice), we should distinguish at least four sets of principles: 1. Principles of reform and revolution: the principles that should guide efforts to bring an unjust institutional arrangement more in line with justice such that the society’s members have a more just (though not necessarily perfectly just) society within which to live. 2. Principles of rectification: the principles that should guide the steps a society takes to remedy or make amends for the injuries and losses the oppressed have suffered as a result of past injustice. 3. Penal principles: the principles that should guide the policies a society relies on when responding to individual noncompliance with what justice requires (e.g., principles for punishment, detention, and deportation). 4. Political ethics: the duties and permissions individuals have under unjust social conditions, that is, the principles that should guide their response to injustice. Rawls’s theory provides some direction for (1) and (4), and some limited guidance for (3). But he provides almost no help with (2). And it is (2)—principles of rectification—that is Mills’s chief concern and the main concern of many black radicals. Most of my work has focused on principles of reform and revolution and political ethics (particularly the political ethics of the oppressed), and on the relationship between the two. Yet I certainly see value in work defending principles of rectification Indeed, we can view the principles of reform and revolution and the principles of rectification as jointly constituting a theory of corrective justice. Principles of type (1) have to do with altering the basic structure of a society so that it better approximates a well-ordered society. Type (2) principles address the need to make amends to those burdened and harmed by unjust basic structures. Type (1) principles are forward looking, oriented toward establishing a just society. Type (2) principles are backward looking, oriented toward settling unpaid moral debts. To see that (1) and (2) are distinct it is enough to observe that one could fully pay reparations to the victims of past racial injustice and yet their society remain unjust, including racially unjust. Rawls is concerned with corrective justice, but he thinks of it as encompassing more than laying down principles for making amends to the victims of past injustice. He conceives of it as also including the philosophical arm of reform or revolutionary efforts to establish a society regulated by a mutual commitment to justice, a well-ordered society. When the principles of justice function as a goal of reform or revolution, what the reformers and revolutionaries are ultimately aiming at is this: a society in which the principles are fully realized in its institutions and citizens support and comply with institutional rules because these are in accord with their shared conception of justice. It is in this way that ideal theory serves as a guide for nonideal theory. Mills might accept this more expansive conception of corrective justice and even concede that Rawls’s ideal theory can aid us in its development. But I suspect he would still have doubts about ideal theory’s helpfulness in developing the rectificatory dimension of nonideal theory. After all, Rawls’s two principles are supposed to provide a basis for citizens to judge the validity of their claims of justice on their social system. One kind of claim citizens may make (on their own behalf or on behalf of others) is that they or others are due reparations for harms they have incurred as a result of serious injustice. Does Rawls provide any guidance for judging the validity of such claims? Mills is skeptical. He asserts, “Surely forty years is long enough—especially in a society to whose creation racism has been central—for there to be a significant body of work by now showing how one derives principles of rectificatory racial justice (a “pressing and urgent matter” [Rawls, Theory, 9] if ever there was one) from the idealtheory principles!” (23, note 6) In reply I would note that serving as a guide for nonideal theory is not the same as serving as a set of axioms from which theorems of rectification can be directly deduced. I doubt that ideal theory could play this latter justificatory role. And it should not surprise us if auxiliary precepts of justice were required for a fully adequate theory of compensatory justice. (The same would presumably be true of penal principles. After all, one cannot strictly derive a principle of proportionality in punishment from the two principles of justice either.)18 What ideal theory can provide, however, are evaluative standards for judging when such rectification is prima facie called for—namely, when culpable violations of the principles of justice have caused serious and identifiable harm. The ideal principles (particularly the equal liberty principle) help to explain what was wrong with, say, Jim Crow and Apartheid and why the damage they did to their victims warrants various corrective measures, perhaps including reparations. The trouble with Mills’s view is that he regards nonideal theory as independent of ideal theory, indeed as an alternative to it. But nonideal theory—the study of the principles that should guide our responses to injustice—cannot succeed without knowing what the standards of justice are (and perhaps also what justifies these standards). It is not clear how we are to develop a philosophically adequate and complete theory of how to respond to social injustice without first knowing what makes a social scheme unjust. When dealing with gross injustices, such as slavery, we may of course be able to judge correctly that a social arrangement is unjust simply by observing it or having it described to us, relying exclusively on our pre-theoretic moral convictions. We don’t need a theory for that. But with less manifest injustices, or when our political values seem to conflict, or when we’re uncertain about what justice requires, or when there is great but honest disagreement about whether a practice is unjust, we won’t know which aspects of a society should be altered in the absence of a more systematic conception of justice. Without a set of principles that enables us to identify the injustice-making features of a social system, we could not be confident in the direction social change should take, at least not if our aim is to realize a fully just society.


#### 3] Psychoanalysis is unfalsifiable – their politics fail


Robinson 4 (Andrew Robinson is a political theorist at The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, “The Politics of Lack”, BJPIR: 2004 VOL 6) AqN \*modified for ableist language\*

For Lacanians, the return of the Real is always a disruptive, almost revolutionary event which shatters the entire social totality constructed around its exclusion. Every social order, therefore, has a single touchy ‘nodal point’ which it must maintain, or else it will collapse. Since the exclusion of a Real element is supposed to be necessary, Lacanians urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these. The acceptance of lack takes the form of an Act or Event, in which the myth of subjective completeness is rejected and the incompleteness of the self is embraced. The primary ethical imperative in Lacanian politics is to ‘accept’ the primacy of antagonism, i.e. the central ontological claim of the Lacanian edifice itself. Mouffe, for instance, demands that one accept ‘an element of hostility among human beings’ as something akin to a fact of human nature (2000, 130–132). She attacks deconstructive and dialogical approaches to ethics for being ‘unable to come to terms with “the political” in its antagonistic dimension’. Such approaches lack ‘a proper reflection on the moment of “decision” which characterises the field of politics’ and which necessarily ‘entail[s] an element of force and violence’ (ibid., 129–130). Mouffe’s alternative involves a politics which ‘acknowledges the real nature of [the] frontiers [of the social] and the forms of exclusion that they entail instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality’ (ibid., 105). She celebrates democracy, but her version of democracy depends on ‘the possibility of drawing a frontier between “us” and “them”’ and ‘always entails relations of inclusion–exclusion’ (ibid., 43). The derivation of such views is unclear from the text, but seems to be that, since everyone needs a master-signifier as an element in their psyche, and since such a signifier arises through the machinations of ‘the political’, therefore the exclusionary and violent operations of coercive state apparatuses must be accepted as an absolute necessity for any kind of social life. This is Hobbesian statism updated for a post-modern era. As should by now be clear, the central claims of Lacanian theory are ontological rather than political. Indeed, since Lacan’s work deals with politics only very occasionally, the entire project of using Lacan politically is fraught with hazards. With rare exceptions, Lacanian theorists put ontology in the driving seat, allowing it to guide their political theorising. Political discourse and events are subsumed into a prior theoretical framework in a manner more reminiscent of an attempt to confirm already-accepted assumptions than of an attempt to assess the theory itself. Among the authors discussed here, Zizek takes this the furthest: the stuff of theory is ‘notions’, which have a reality above and beyond any referent, so that, if reality does not conform to the notions, it is ‘so much the worse for reality’ (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 244). The selection and interpretation of examples, whether in concrete analysis of political discourse or in theoretical exegesis, is often selective in a way which appears to confirm the general theory only because inconvenient counterexamples are ignored. The entire edifice often appears wholly a priori and non-falsifiable, and the case for its acceptance is extremely vague. Most often, the imperative to adopt a Lacanian as opposed to (say) a Rawlsian or an orthodox Marxist approach is couched in terms of dogmatically-posited demands that one accept the idea of constitutive lack. A failure to do so is simply denounced as ‘shirking’, ‘~~blindness’~~ [stunning], ‘inability to accept’ and so on. In this way, Lacanian theory renders itself almost immune to analytical critique on terms it would find acceptable. Furthermore, a slippage frequently emerges between the external ‘acceptance’ of antagonism and its subjective encouragement. For instance, Ernesto Laclau calls for a ‘symbolisation of impossibility as such as a positive value’ (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 1999, original emphasis). The differences between the texts under review mainly arise around the issue of how to articulate Lacanian themes into a concrete political discourse. This becomes especially clear in the Butler, Laclau and Zizek volume from which the above quotation is taken. Laclau and Zizek share a theoretical vocabulary and agree on a number of issues of basic ontology. However, they both—and each in an equally dogmatic way—insist on a particular decontestation of this vocabulary in their analysis of contemporary events. For Laclau, Lacanian analysis dovetails with ‘radical democracy’, whereas for Zizek, it entails a radical refusal of the status quo from a standpoint cross-fertilised with insights from Hegel, Kant and the Marxist tradition. This disagreement represents a broader split of Lacanian theorists into two camps: ‘radical democrats’ who follow Laclau’s line that liberal democracy is a realisation of the Lacanian model through the acceptance of antagonism and its conversion into symbolically accepted electoral and interest-group competition, and more-or-less nihilistic Lacanians such as Zizek and Badiou who maintain that a Lacanian politics requires a radical break with the present political system. Butler, for her part, is not sufficiently committed to an ontology of lack to accept the other protagonists’ inability to provide substantial argumentation for their positions. She calls Lacanian theory a ‘theoretical fetish’, because the ‘theory is applied to its examples’, as if ‘already true, prior to its exemplification’. Articulated on its own self-sufficiency, it shifts its basis to concrete matters only for pedagogical purposes (in Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000, 26–27). She suggests, quite accurately, that the Lacanian project is in a certain sense ‘a theological project’, and that its heavy reliance on a priori assumptions impedes its ability to engage with practical political issues, using simplification and a priori reasoning to ‘avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement’ involved in studying specific political cases (ibid., 155–156). She could perhaps have added that, in practice, the switch between ontology and politics is usually accomplished by the transmutation of single instances into universal facts by means of a liberal deployment of words such as ‘always’, ‘all’, ‘never’ and ‘necessity’; it is by this specific discursive move that the short-circuit between ‘theology’ and politics is achieved. Butler questions the political motivations involved in such practices. ‘Are we using the categories to understand the phenomena, or marshalling the phenomena to shore up the categories “in the name of the father” [i.e. the master-signifier]?’ (ibid., 152). The problems raised by Butler are serious, and reflect a deeper malaise. Aside from the absence of any significant support for their basic ontological claims, the two Lacanian camps both face enormous problems once they attempt to specify their political agendas. For the Laclauians, the greatest difficulty is that of maintaining a ‘critical’ position even while endorsing assumptions remarkably close to those of the analytical-liberal mainstream. The claim that liberal democracy is necessary to take the bite out of intractable conflicts arising from human nature, and the resultant condemnation of ‘utopian’ theories such as Marxism for ungrounded optimism and resultant totalitarian dangers, is hardly original. To take one example, it arises in Rawls’ discussion of ‘reasonable pluralism’ and the ‘burdens of difference’ in Political Liberalism (1996, Lecture 2 and passim). Since much of the appeal of Lacanian theory depends on its claims to be offering a new, radical approach to politics, such similarities must be downplayed.

#### 4] Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs open source with highlighting on the NDCA LD wiki within an hour after debating.

#### Violation – they haven’t disclosed anything from this tournament.





#### Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

Antonucci 5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2005 December/060990.html]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – otherwise you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### Fairness is a voter – its constitutive of any competitive activity based on skills, wins, and losses – unfair practices skew the judge’s ability to determine the better debater

#### Drop the debater to set a norm – if you lose you’ll open source from now on

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and begs the question of what’s reasonable requiring judge intervention

#### No neg rvi – otherwise the 6 minute 2nr can collapse to a short shell and get away with infinite 1nc abuse via sheer brute force and time spent on theory