### 1AC – Framing (1)

#### Ethics must begin a priori –

#### A] Unity of Action – evaluating action through reason is the only way to unify action as intent explains the entirety of an action – for example if I do my homework, I could infinitely divide that action into multiple smaller actions but only the intention to do my homework unifies the actions since anything else couldn’t classify actions as moral or not since we could just infinitely divide them.

#### B] Is-ought gap – empiricism can only observe what is since that’s the only thing in our perception, not what ought to be, but it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises which requires a priori premises to form morality.

#### C] Empirical uncertainty– evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know other’s experiences makes empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### D] Infallibility – practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask why we should be reasoners is to concede authority to reason since the question itself uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### Reason requires that maxims we act upon must be universalizable – A. Any reasoner would know that two plus two equals four because there is no a priori distinction between agents so norms must be universally valid. B. Any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends – it’s impossible to will a violation of freedom since deciding to do so would will incompatible ends since it logically entails justifying willing a violation of your own freedom.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. Prefer:

#### 1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### 2] Consequences fail – A. Every action has infinite stemming consequences because every consequence can cause another consequence B. Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events C. Aggregation fails – suffering is not additive – you can’t compare between 1 migraine and 10 headache

#### 3] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought – thus, framework is a topicality debate about how to define terms of ther resolution. Prefer this definition –

#### A] Resource disparities – a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytic arguments are required. Key to fairness so all people can engage.

#### B] Resolvability – clarity of weighing under interpretation of my framework: perfect duties and imperfect duties. Duties in right. Explicit categories that supersede other categories. All other frameworks are consequentialist that use unquantifiable probability, magnitude, or probability x magnitude. Resolvability is an independent voter otherwise the judge cant’ make a decision.

#### 4] Negative args presuppose the aff being true since they begin with a descriptive premise about the aff such as the aff does, and then justify why x is bad. But if the aff does not have truth value, that entails the descriptive premise would also not have truth value which is contradictory.

#### 5] Use epistemic confidence - A] Logic – If three different doctors diagnosed you with three different diseases, you wouldn’t take 33 of all of the pills, B] Collapses – you use confidence to determine modesty being true which concedes the authority of confidence

#### 6] Infinite worlds means the aff is logical in one.

**Vaidman 2** [Vaidman, Lev, 3-24-2002, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/>]

-MWI: Multiple Worlds Interpretation

The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave. (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions of the Universe prior to the experiment: only the probabilities are governed by the initial state. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI.

#### 7] Negating affirms because it assumes that the 1AC is a statement worthy of contestation which means our arguments are legitimate.

#### 8] The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

SEP [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG Massa

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false. For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

#### If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.

#### 9] Decision Making Paradox – to judge we need a decision-making procedure to determine it is a good decision. But to choose a decision-making procedure requires another meta-level decision making procedure leading to infinite regress so just vote aff to break the paradox.

### 1AC – Offense (1)

#### The negative and I affirm the resolution – Resolved: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike. PICs don’t negate because they don’t’ disprove the general thesis of the aff.

#### Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined.

#### Affirm means to express agreement[[2]](#footnote-2) and I do.

#### Workers are coerced into working if they do not have the power to strike – without the ability to strike, workers are treated as a mere means to an end which violates the categorical imperative.


**Chima ‘13** (Sylvester C Chima, 1Programme of Bio & Research Ethics and Medical Law, Nelson R Mandela School of Medicine & School of Nursing and Public Health, College of Health Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa, 12-19-2013, accessed on 6-22-2021, PubMed Central (PMC), "Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike?", <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3878318/#B64>) // VandegriftDD

One can also argue that denial of such striking rights may also be considered unfair discrimination and therefore morally unjustifiable. Some philosophers have described moral obligations or duties, which ought to guide ethical behavior, such as the duty of fidelity or the obligation to keep promises, and beneficence - the obligation to do 'good' [10]. However, it has been suggested that some other equally compelling moral duties or ethical obligations may conflict with the above duties, such as the right to justice. Justice is the right to fair treatment in light of what is owed a person [63]. For example, it may be argued that everybody is equally entitled to a just wage for just work. The philosopher Immanuel Kant based his moral theory on a categorical imperative which encourages moral agents to act, based on a principle, which they would deem to become a universal law [64]. One can argue that the decision by any HCW to go on strike may not be universalisable. However, looking at this decision from the principle of respect for autonomy, or freedom of choice, one can conclude that individual autonomy is a sentiment which is desirable for all human beings. Accordingly, every worker should be free to choose whether to work or not, based on a whether any specific set of conditions of their own choosing have been met**.** Kant argues further that moral agents or individuals should be treated, "whether in your own person or in that of any other, never solely as a means, but always as an end" [64]. This idea that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves has influenced political philosophy for centuries, and stresses the libertarian ideology that people should not have their individual freedoms curtailed either for others or for the good of society in general [10,64]. From this axiomatic considerations, one can conclude that it would be unethical for people to be used as slaves or be forced to work for inadequate wages or under slave-like conditions [4,10,12,51]. The issue of HCW strikes can also be analyzed from utilitarian principles as formulated by one of its major disciples JS Mills as follows [65]: The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. One can argue based on utilitarian principles that the short term suffering induced by doctor and HCW strikes can be mitigated by the long-term benefits such as improvement of healthcare services for the greatest number of people over time [2]. Even if the immediate gains are improved wages and conditions of employment for HCWs alone, in the long-term these will translate into better healthcare service delivery to the local community and society-at-large. Similarly a rights based approach to the issue of strikes, would suggest that even though the goal of bringing about the better healthcare for individual patients or the public at large is a major ethical duty. There is an equally compelling moral duty to protect and enhance individual rights. Protection of individual rights in employment helps to ensure that no group of citizens, are unfairly discriminated against in the quest for equal rights for all in a democratic society**.**

### 1AC – Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs open source with highlighting on the NDCA LD wiki within an hour after debating.

#### Violation – I’ve inserted a screenshot



#### Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

Antonucci 5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2005 December/060990.html]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – otherwise you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### Fairness is a voter – its constitutive of any competitive activity based on skills, wins, and losses – unfair practices skew the judge’s ability to determine the better debater

#### Drop the debater to set a norm – if you lose you’ll open source from now on

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and begs the question of what’s reasonable requiring judge intervention

#### No neg rvi – otherwise the 6 minute 2nr can collapse to a short shell and get away with infinite 1nc abuse via sheer brute force and time spent on theory

### 1AC – Theory (1)

#### 1] Aff theory is drop the debater, no RVI, and competing interps – the 4-minute 1ar does not have time to win both theory and substance so you must be punished. It’s also key to deterring abusive NC’s from spreading out the 1AR on paradigm issues or the 2NR from overwhelming the 2A on the line by line. Fairness is a voter because debaters must be on an equitable level before engaging in substantive education.

#### 2] Presumption and permissibility affirm –

#### a] Logic – if its permissible to do P, then you don’t have an obligation to do not P by definition.

Paraphrasing McNamara[Paul McNamara (Associate Professor of Philosophy @ the University of New Hampshire). “Deontic Logic.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Tue Feb 7, 2006; substantive revision Wed Apr 21, 2010. Accessed 11/16/19. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic//> Xu]

The five normative statuses of the Traditional Scheme are:[[4](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/notes.html#4)] it is obligatory that (OB) it is permissible that (PE) it is impermissible that (IM) it is omissible that (OM) it is optional that (OP) The first three are familiar, but the fourth is widely ignored, and the fifth has regularly been conflated with “it is a matter of *indifference* that p” (by being defined in terms of one of the first three), which is not really part of the traditional scheme (more below). Typically, one of the first two is taken as basic, and the others defined in terms of it, but any of the first four can play the same sort of purported defining role. The most prevalent approach is to take the first as basic, and define the rest as follows: PEp ↔ ~OB~p IM*p* ↔ OB~*p* OM*p* ↔ ~OB*p* OP*p* ↔ (~OB*p* & ~OB~*p*).

#### Thus, if you do not have an obligation to do not P, then you have an obligation to do P by the Law of Double Negation.

#### b] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me

#### c] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason

#### d] Otherwise, we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water

#### e] If anything is permissible, then definitively so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it

#### f] Permissibility means that there’s no risk that the aff is bad but there is always a risk that it could be good

#### 3] Allow new 1AR arguments –

#### A] They’re necessary to overcome 1NC’s that try to outspread the aff

#### B] They get 6 minutes to respond to 4 minutes of the 1AR – just because I made new arguments doesn’t mean that you had to answer net more of them.

#### C] Otherwise the 1NC could be infinitely abusive and I would never be able to check back with new theory shells

#### D] The 1NC is capable of line by lining the 1AR with 3 extra minutes but the 1AR can’t line by line the 1NC

#### E] No reason not to – people read new arguments like theory all the time in the 1AR but the fact that a new arg was read is not the reason the neg lost

#### 4] Evaluate the debate after the 1AC – it ensures that the nc can’t outspread the 1AR

#### 5] GCB – I am the greatest conceivable being so vote aff because I am infinitely good. To prove this, I will make them contest the 1AC

#### 6] Affirm because either the neg is true meaning its bad for us to clash with because it turns us into Fake News people OR it’s not meaning that you can’t vote on it for ethics

#### 7] A priori’s 1st – even worlds framing requires ethics that begin from a priori principles like reason so we control the internal link to functional debates

#### 8] All a prioris the negative reads are reasons to auto-affirm – the NC could just read 7 minutes of a prioris which the 1AR can’t line by line

#### 9] Nobody asked them to respond to the aff which means you should ignore their arguments since nobody asked

#### 10] Quantum superposition proves different ethics can exist simultaneously.

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### 11] Round the probability of disads to zero

Menand 05 Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert

“Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### 12] The neg may not read meta-theory – I only have time to check abuse 1 time but you can do it in the NC and 2N, up-layering my attempt means we never get to the best norm.

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm [↑](#footnote-ref-2)