# 1NC- korsgaard

## 1

### The meta-ethic to morality is to follow practical reason:

### [1] Is-Ought Gap- Empiricism fails because it can only generate what is through the descriptive perception of events, but fails to generate what out to be because it is impossible to derive a premise from description alone. For example, I can experience that a door is open, but it fails to generate and answer to whether the door ought to be open or closed. Only a priori premises solve because they generate obligations rather than descriptions.

### [2] Inescapability- **Reason is inescapable, questioning why it is or asking for a reason concedes its authority to agency itself. It’s a side constraint on ethics- all arguments must appeal to reason and the ability to act in the first place, otherwise they would be unwarranted or baseless.**

### [3] Empirical Uncertainty- Multiple factors that could make empiricism objectively false in generating standards of morality- simulation, dreaming, illusions make it impossible to verify that knowledge derived from experiences is objectively true. Only rationality solves because it develops moral knowledge independent of human experience, creating objective morality.

### [4] Bindingness- Only reason according to principles can explain personal motivation to take action- desires and internal motivation fail because I could just choose not to act on my desire.

Reath [Andrews, Professor of Philosophy at UC Riverside. “Contemporary Kantian Ethics.” 2013. <http://philosophy.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Reath-Contemporary-Kantian-Ethics.pdf>] AA

Contemporary Kantians reject the Humean view of reasons and motivation because they believe that **moral principles are requirements of reason that apply to agents independently of desire**. They are committed to holding that **human beings can be moved to act by reason alone**. Kantians hold that **it is part of rational agency that one can be motivated to act by one’s application of rational principles and one’s judgments about what one has reason to do, without** the **intervention of any desire or further source of motivation**. In the above example,the fact that I need to begin saving money in order to afford my trip is a reason to begin saving, and the judgment that I ought to begin saving money now by itself can motivate me to do so. Likewise **the judgment that I ought to take steps now to ensure my well-being later in life can motivate me to do so, without any further felt desire.** (Note that the claim is that one can be motivated by one’s judgment of what one has reason to do – that is not to say that one always will be motivated by that judgment.) Since the reasons in these two cases ultimately stem from some desire (e.g., some future desire), the full significance of the Kantian view of motivation comes to light in moral cases. **Here Kantians hold that moral requirements apply to us simply as rational beings independently of our desires, and that the judgment that we ought to perform** (or refrain from) **some action can motivate us to do so, without the stimulus of any further desire.** So for example, **judging that I ought to refrain from taking unfair advantage of a competitor** or that I ought to help someone in need **can motivate me to do so**. The Kantian view here is that the **application of principles of reason** (or the judgment about reasons) **produces the motivation to comply with the principle and does not simply redirect** or elicit **a prior motivational state that exists independently of any reasoning.**

### And, rationality requires that maxims must be universalizable.

### [1] Moral subjectivity is rationally incoherent- For example, 2+2=4 must be the same for you and me, otherwise rationalism collapses because two realities would not be true at the same time, making it impossible to reason.

### [2] Moral truths are objective and universally applicable- all agents would be able to reason and action is good because morality is a priori and separate from their own experience. Any other interpretation fails- it fails to bind actors to itself which precludes the point of morality in the first place.

### Thus, the standard is respecting a system of inner and outer freedom.

### Violating freedom is not universalizable- if you violated freedom of someone else, it would be contradictory because it entails their right to violate your own, which would precede you from doing the action in the first place.

### Prefer additionally:

### [1] Constitutiveness – Being free to be able to identify yourself as the cause of your actions is constitutive to agency- we must be able to set our own ends.

Korsgaard- “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard

**“Now I’m going to argue that that sort of willing is impossible. The first step is this: to conceive of yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle that favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A.** In this **kind of** case**, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. You regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.” (123)**

### [2] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate:

### Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought – thus, framework is a topicality debate about how to define terms of the resolution. Prefer this definition –

#### A] Resource disparities – a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytic arguments are required. Key to fairness so all people can engage.

#### B] Resolvability – clarity of weighing under interpretation of my framework: perfect duties and imperfect duties. Duties in right. Explicit categories that supersede other categories. All other frameworks are consequentialist that use unquantifiable probability, magnitude, or probability x magnitude. Resolvability

### Impact Calculus: My framework only cares about intentions, and consequences are irrelevant.

### Calc Indicts:

### [1] Consequences are impossible to calculate and are infinitely regressive- each consequence would have it’s own consequence, leading to an infinite amount of consequences, there is no brightline of when the consequences end. Even if they prove that consequences are intrinsically valuable, it indicts insofar that it can’t guide action.

### Ideal Framing First:

### Non-ideal theory relies on ideal theory to conceive of itself- we imagine the ideal form of the world when we imagine what’s moral.

### Non-Ideal theory is a constantly changing yardstick- we couldn’t conceive morality because the standard of morality wouldn’t be consistent with the SQ.

#### Presumption and permissibility negate –

#### 1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics outweighs – A. it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res B. It’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### 2] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e., if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both “P” and “~P” are true

#### 3] Intuitions – A. We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories; B. Statements are more often false than true because any part of the resolution could be false.

#### 4] Negating is harder – A. The aff gets the first and last speech which controls the direction of the debate, B. Affirmatives can strategically uplayer in the 1AR giving them a 7-6 time skew advantage, splitting the 2NR, C. They have infinite prep

## Offense

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 3] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build solidarity among their supporters, they are susceptible to collective action problems. This is because the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be enjoyed by both strikers and non-strikers. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of free-riding problems, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.