# 1ac- Korsgaard

### The meta-ethic to morality is to follow practical reason:

### [1] Is-Ought Gap- Empiricism fails because it can only generate what is through the descriptive perception of events, but fails to generate what out to be because it is impossible to derive a premise from description alone. For example, I can experience that a door is open, but it fails to generate and answer to whether the door ought to be open or closed. Only a priori premises solve because they generate obligations rather than descriptions.

### [2] Inescapability- **Reason is inescapable, questioning why it is or asking for a reason concedes its authority to agency itself. It’s a side constraint on ethics- all arguments must appeal to reason and the ability to act in the first place, otherwise they would be unwarranted or baseless.**

### [3] Empirical Uncertainty- Multiple factors that could make empiricism objectively false in generating standards of morality- simulation, dreaming, illusions make it impossible to verify that knowledge derived from experiences is objectively true. Only rationality solves because it develops moral knowledge independent of human experience, creating objective morality.

### [4] Bindingness- Only reason according to principles can explain personal motivation to take action- desires and internal motivation fail because I could just choose not to act on my desire.

Reath [Andrews, Professor of Philosophy at UC Riverside. “Contemporary Kantian Ethics.” 2013. <http://philosophy.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Reath-Contemporary-Kantian-Ethics.pdf>] AA

Contemporary Kantians reject the Humean view of reasons and motivation because they believe that **moral principles are requirements of reason that apply to agents independently of desire**. They are committed to holding that **human beings can be moved to act by reason alone**. Kantians hold that **it is part of rational agency that one can be motivated to act by one’s application of rational principles and one’s judgments about what one has reason to do, without** the **intervention of any desire or further source of motivation**. In the above example,the fact that I need to begin saving money in order to afford my trip is a reason to begin saving, and the judgment that I ought to begin saving money now by itself can motivate me to do so. Likewise **the judgment that I ought to take steps now to ensure my well-being later in life can motivate me to do so, without any further felt desire.** (Note that the claim is that one can be motivated by one’s judgment of what one has reason to do – that is not to say that one always will be motivated by that judgment.) Since the reasons in these two cases ultimately stem from some desire (e.g., some future desire), the full significance of the Kantian view of motivation comes to light in moral cases. **Here Kantians hold that moral requirements apply to us simply as rational beings independently of our desires, and that the judgment that we ought to perform** (or refrain from) **some action can motivate us to do so, without the stimulus of any further desire.** So for example, **judging that I ought to refrain from taking unfair advantage of a competitor** or that I ought to help someone in need **can motivate me to do so**. The Kantian view here is that the **application of principles of reason** (or the judgment about reasons) **produces the motivation to comply with the principle and does not simply redirect** or elicit **a prior motivational state that exists independently of any reasoning.**

#### [5] Unity of Action- – evaluating action through reason is the only way to unify action as intent explains the entirety of an action – for example if I do my homework, I could infinitely divide that action into multiple smaller actions but only the intention to do my homework unifies the actions since anything else couldn’t classify actions as moral or not since we could just infinitely divide them.

### And, rationality requires that maxims must be universalizable.

### [1] Moral subjectivity is rationally incoherent- For example, 2+2=4 must be the same for you and me, otherwise rationalism collapses because two realities would not be true at the same time, making it impossible to reason.

### [2] Moral truths are objective and universally applicable- all agents would be able to reason and action is good because morality is a priori and separate from their own experience. Any other interpretation fails- it fails to bind actors to itself which precludes the point of morality in the first place.

### [3] Non-universalizable actions justify violating your own ends and are contradictory- unilaterally willing actions such as violating freedom would imply that someone could violate your own freedom, which is a prior question to being able to do the action in the first place.

### Thus, the standard is respecting a system of inner and outer freedom.

### Violating freedom is not universalizable- if you violated freedom of someone else, it would be contradictory because it entails their right to violate your own, which would precede you from doing the action in the first place.

### Prefer additionally:

### [1] Constitutiveness – Being free to be able to identify yourself as the cause of your actions is constitutive to agency- we must be able to set our own ends.

### **Korsgaard-** “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant” by Christine M. Korsgaard

**“Now I’m going to argue that that sort of willing is impossible. The first step is this: to conceive of yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice. For instance, suppose you experience a conflict of desire: you have a desire to do both A and B, and they are incompatible. You have some principle that favors A over B, so you exercise this principle, and you choose to do A.** In this **kind of** case**, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. You regard the choice as yours, as the product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you, another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious or rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which you act.” (123)**

### [2] Actor Spec- The point of the state is to be Kantian- the state should be an impartial enforcer to prevent unilateral willing and violations of freedom.

#### Ripstein 09 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 2009, PDF

Kant’s point about disputes is not just a reiteration of Locke’s familiar claim that people often disagree about the application of principles to particular situations, especially when their interests are at stake. Unilateral judgment is a problem because of the two dimensions of the innate right of humanity. The innate right to freedom demands that people be able to acquire things as their means without the explicit leave of others. Rightful honor requires people to stand up for their rights, and so that no person defer to any other private person’s judgment in cases of dispute about what either is permitted to do. If you think that you have performed an act establishing a right, you are entitled to stand by your claim in the face of all who contest it, but those who contest it are no less entitled to stand by their claims. Rightful honor requires that each party accept no standard other than “what seems right and good” to him.”24 The only reason to defer is because you can’t win. Might makes right, regardless of how "good and law-abiding" you or the person who disputes your claim might be. The solution to disputes about rights is to make the omnilateral will institutional. Disputes can be resolved in a way that is consistent with rightful honor if the parties to it are subject to the authority of an impartial judge, and an enforcer who can carry out the decision. The state is a generalized version of this structure. It is a common authority, charged with making, applying, and enforcing law. It is legitimate because it makes it possible for people to resolve disputes about rights in a way that is consistent with the rightful honour of all. Legitimacy flows from what the state does, and so does not require an explicit act of instituting it.

#### [3] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought – thus, framework is a topicality debate about how to define terms of the resolution. Prefer this definition –

#### A] Resource disparities – a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytic arguments are required. Key to fairness so all people can engage.

#### B] Resolvability – clarity of weighing under interpretation of my framework: perfect duties and imperfect duties. Duties in right. Explicit categories that supersede other categories. All other frameworks are consequentialist that use unquantifiable probability, magnitude, or probability x magnitude. Resolvability is an independent voter otherwise the judge can’t make a decision.

#### [4] Use epistemic confidence - A] Logic – If three different doctors diagnosed you with three different diseases, you wouldn’t take 33 of all of the pills- you have to be certain B] Collapses – you use confidence to determine modesty being true which concedes the authority of confidence

### Impact Calculus: My framework only cares about intentions, and consequences are irrelevant.

### [1] There is an Act Omission Distinction: [A] Logicality- we are only responsible for actions that we intend to happen- otherwise we responsible for an infinite number of actions [B] Resolvability- Only way to resolve issues between two immoral decisions- we shouldn’t be held culpable for choosing inaction over taking immoral action.

### Calc Indicts:

### [1] Consequences are impossible to calculate and are infinitely regressive- each consequence would have it’s own consequence, leading to an infinite amount of consequences, there is not brightline of when the consequences end. Even if they prove that consequences are intrinsically valuable, it indicts insofar that it can’t guide action.

**[2] Induction Fails- [A] In order to know that induction works, it relies on induction working in the past, which means it’s circular. This outweighs because it’s infinitely regressive- the premise that induction works relies on infinite examples from the past of it working to prove the next[B] Induction collapses to deduction- in order for us to know that induction is always true, it relies on us making the universal premise that induction is true, which relies on deductive reasoning.**

### Ideal Framing First:

### Non-ideal theory relies on ideal theory to conceive of itself- we imagine the ideal form of the world when we imagine what’s moral.

### Non-Ideal theory is a constantly changing yardstick- we couldn’t conceive morality because the standard of morality wouldn’t be consistent with the SQ.

### Offense

Journalists have a duty under the Categorical Imperative to tell the truth, which requires objective, accurate reporting---deception treats readers as a mere means to an end.

**Beggs 19-** Beggs, Ernie. “The Importance Of Kantian Ethics For Journalists.” The Circular. April 22, 2019. Web. February 12, 2022. <https://thecircular.org/if-youre-a-journalistyou-kant-and-you- must/>.

In the doctrine Critique of Pure Reason, Kant considers time and space as mentalities of how a mind perceives the world. If that mind is that of journalist then there is a moral obligation to make proper sense of the how accurately that mind perceives events prior to reporting of same to media consumers who have put their trust in a noble profession to tell truths. (Frankfurt) Kant stated that humans must never lie and that this is a perfect duty which must always hold true. If a journalist alters a story in any way, be it by embellishment, positive or negative subjective bias, withholding of essential facts etc, and in doing so alters the true reporting of the story and thereby rendering it a fiction. According to Kant’s “means to an end” preposition this was an immoral choice where truthfulness is one of the cornerstones of Categorical Imperative”. (Warburton) Otherwise, all parties to the story engage in a conspiracy of “fake news” which is a Hypothetical Imperative desire driven action and not from the reasoning of the Categorical Imperative.

### And, public reason in journalism is essential to freedom- the injection of truth into discourse is key to healthy reasoning without dominating lies that restrict discussions of the truth.

**Splichal 02-** Splichal, Slavko. “The Principle Of Publicity, Public Use Of Reason And Social Control.” Media, Culture & Society 24. 2002. Web. February 12, 2022. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/016344370202400101>.

Newspapers were the most common medium of expression of public opinion during the early phase of its modern development. From the start, they were not intended only to supplement privately mediated news (letters), but mostly to spread news and opinions that were specifically intended for the public. Paradoxically, before newspapers reached a nationwide circulation, which was a sine qua non of public opinion as a national phenomenon (Splichal, 1999), they ceased to be a genuine means of public opinion expression, since they became organs of political parties or ‘a large capitalist business whose direct and main goal is to create profit’, and even journalists had to conform to this objective (T ̈onnies, 1922: 179–80). These changes in the press essentially relate to the nature of publicity from which public opinion emanated. Fundamental to any normative discussion of freedom of the press is Kant’s universal ‘principle of publicity’ mediating between politics and morals in public law. Kant argued that this ‘mechanism of nature’ should be used as a means to create a legal maxim that all the people would accept and obey. Kant postulated ‘the transcendental formula of public justice: “All actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with publicity.” This principle is to be considered not only ethical ... but also juridical’ (1795/1983: 135). Without the possibility of publicity and public agency, there would be no justice. If a goal can only be achieved with the help of publicity, it means that there is no distrust in the underlying political maxims that are congruent with the goals and rights of all. Any regulation of relationships in a (political) community would contradict the public interest and citizens’ freedom if citizens could not discuss matters of common concern and be convinced by reason in the public realm. Publicity alone therefore can guarantee harmony between politics and morals: it guarantees legal order and fulfils an enlightened role. In such a way, publicity reconciles politics and morals in a republican system of government4 founded on the representation of the people.

## UV

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. It’s drop the debater and competing interps since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance and reasonability bites intervention since it’s up to the judge to determine. The 3-minute 2ar is spread too thin to beat back every layer the 1nc introduces. aff theory is the highest layer of the round, you forced me into a spot that I couldn’t escape, you have 6 minutes to go for T in the 2nr which means I can never win.

#### 2] Fairness is a voter – a] every argument you make concedes the validity of fairness since you presume it will be evaluated fairly, b] otherwise people wouldn’t debate, c] debate is a game structured by rules like speech times – you following the rules of the game concedes that fairness matters

**3] Presumption and permissibility affirm – [a] Statements are true1 before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me. [b] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason. [c] Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water. [d] If anything is permissible, then definitively so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it.**

#### 4] Reject ad homs – Kant’s ideas are important precisely because his abstract ideas were more advanced than his political beliefs and ad homs don’t implicate the truth of Kant’s theory.

Wood 07 [Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 // WWBW]

This seems to me a fundamentally wrong way to look at the matter. For one thing, great figures in the history of philosophy are often great precisely because their insights into highly abstract matters of principle far outrun the capacity of their own time – and often enough, also their own capacity – to understand fully what these insights mean in practice. To see this gap – either in the case of the philosopher or in the case of the entire age – as a case of simple hypocrisy is to misunderstand badly the relation of important philosophical principles to the historical conditions of their genesis. To a more judicious way of looking at things, it might even be expected that the greatest philosophical insights will be those that furthest outrun the philosopher’s own ability to absorb and apply them. Kant’s assertion of the equal dignity of rational nature in all persons is a striking example of this, when we come to some of his opinions about the family, political, and economic relations, and the concept of race. The other main disanalogy between the historical philosopher and the hypocritical politician is that when we study texts in the history of philosophy in order to learn from them, we should care only marginally, if at all, about the moral character of the philosopher. Politicians are people who wield power over us, and it is important that we be able to have personal trust in their sincere adherence to the principles they advocate. This is not true of long-dead philosophers whose texts we study, or at least it should not be. What we learn from them should rest not on the author’s moral authority but on the content of the doctrines and the strength of the arguments for them. Whether Kant’s personal adherence to the moral principles he articulated was sincere or hypocritical might be of interest to biographers, but it should be of little or no interest to philosophers today who are attempting to construct a Kantian ethical theory. 12