# Aff – Disability [1ac] Vol.3

## Part 1 – Broken Promises (hollow hope)

## Part 2 – The Ideal Child

#### The current medical industry is designed to profit off of ALL people through processes of medical capacitation, breaking disability down into a question of capacity rather than one of lived experience. (Fritsch 15)

Fritsch 15 [Fritsch, Kelly Michelle. "The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices." Diss. York U, Toronto, 2015. YorkSpace Institutional Repository. York University, 16 Dec. 2015. Web.] //Lex VM

Puar argues that all bodies in neoliberal capitalism are “being evaluated in relation to their success or failure in terms of health, wealth, progressive productivity, upward mobility, [and] enhanced capacity” (2011, 155). As such, there is no body that meets the standard of adequately able-bodied anymore, only “gradations of capacity and debility” (2011, 155) that blur the distinction between disabled and non-disabled. Puar contends that given biopolitical developments in neoliberal capitalism, normalizing the disabled body is no longer the major focus of medical intervention. She claims that a biopolitical shift has occurred focusing on the differential capacitation of all bodies, not the achievement of a normative able-bodiedness. That is, through capacitating processes like genetic therapies, surgeries, supplements, prosthetic enhancements, and healthism, there is a shift from regulative normality that cures or rehabilitates to ongoing biological control, where bodies are to be capacitated beyond what is thought of as the able-body. Capacitating or enhancing the body beyond the traditional boundaries of what has been marked and produced as the able-body can be traced through Dumit’s (2012) research. For example, Dumit attends to the ways in which cure is an intervention that occurs only once, and thus is limited in the scope of its potential profitability. In comparison, life-long interventions, such as being prescribed drugs for hypertension, diabetes, or high cholesterol are much more profitable because they are taken “not to cure the condition but to reduce the risk factor and potential future events, such as heart disease or heart attacks” (2012, 5). This profitability comes to influence our very understandings of health and the body, shifting the dichotomous terrain of the able/disabled, normal/abnormal. The imperative is for as many people as possible to constitute an “at risk” group, such as those requiring cholesterol lowering drugs, so as to lower their risk through taking drugs. As Dumit’s research shows, 106 through the production of risk, the use of statistics in clinical trials, and the power of the pharmaceutical industry, it has become commonly accepted within medical communities to prescribe cholesterol-lowering drugs to everyone over 30 in America (2012, 13). Even further, Dumit’s research shows that not only is this practice widely accepted but that the pharmaceutical industry itself, alongside public health discourses, have managed to morally obligate the use of preventative pharmaceutical treatments for those deemed “at risk” (13). According to Puar, neoliberalized biopolitics mobilizes the tension between capacity and debility to break down the binaries between normative/non-normative, disabled/abled because “debility is profitable to capitalism, but so is the demand to ‘recover’ from or overcome it” (2011, 154) through processes of capacitation, such as that of taking cholesterol drugs everyday. An economy of debility and capacity serves the interests of neoliberal biocapitalism and reshapes formations of disability. As a result, disability is not a uniformly oppressed identity category or form of embodiment that lacks or is abnormal. Although oppression may be part of the story, disability can be caught up in processes of both debility and capacity. Rather than clear distinctions being made between who is normal and who is abnormal, emphasis instead is placed on “variegation, modulation and tweaking;” (2011, 155) forms of inclusion/exclusion that involve modes of differential inclusion; and with self and other or subject and object displaced in favour of the “construction of micro-states of subindividual differentiation” (2011, 155). In contrast to the sub-subjective nature of debility and capacity, the disability rights perspective usually focuses on the ways in which disability has been cast as an oppressive identity through structural forms of ableism that produce disability as a diminished state of being. For example, the ways by which disabled people have been excluded from paid work 107 has led some disability activists and scholars to highlight the importance of disabled people’s inclusion in productive work (Gleeson 1999; Taylor 2004). This has been, and continues to be, an important fight for disabled people, for as Wilton and Schuer (2006, 187) note, “neoliberalism’s privileging of paid work as a marker of citizenship has intensified the costs associated with failing to access the workplace.”

#### Enter: the Ideal Child. To society, the Ideal Child is born into the world and immediately forced into medical capacitation. In reality, the Ideal Child cannot coexist with disability due to being perceived as better-than-able-bodied, allowing able-bodied children to grow up while disabled-bodied children are forced forever to remain without the promise of futurity. (Fritsch 2)

Fritsch 2 [Fritsch, Kelly Michelle. "The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices." Diss. York U, Toronto, 2015. YorkSpace Institutional Repository. York University, 16 Dec. 2015. Web.] //Lex VM

What Berardi (2011) and Edelman (2004) do not account for are the ways in which the Child as the image of the future is not only central to the notion of progress, but how this Child relies on an economy of disability that is deeply entrenched in neoliberal practices. As I have marked in other chapters, this not only to alludes to the multifaceted ways in which neoliberal practices produce disability or are complicit in rising rates of disabling conditions, but also marks the ways by which the practices of neoliberalism that demand that some succeed at the expense of others cannot be fully accounted for without addressing disability. This is to say, Paige’s withering is related to the enhancement of others and simply capacitating Paige within the context of neoliberal futurity does not address the myriad ways in which disability functions within neoliberal economies. Thus, while Edelman (2004) is correct in asserting that the contemporary political order favours heteronormativity in the ways in which it incites the Child as the image of the future, this image of the Child of the future also continuously incites compulsory enhanced bodiediness as the child of reproductive futurity is not only not to be disabled, but must be better than able-bodied. McRuer, in the context of Edelman’s work comments: “‘everybody,’ after all, or so the saying goes, ‘wants a healthy baby.’ At the same time, despite this commonplace desire, the imagined future is actually inescapably inaccessible; no real, flesh-and-blood child can ever embody the innocence, health, and ability associated with the sacred Child” (2008). I agree with Edelman’s sharp and scathing critique of 146 reproductive futurity, and while I also agree with McRuer that Edelman’s Child is ablebodied, what neither Edelman or McRuer elucidate is how reproductive futurity relies on both a capacitated and bodily enhanced Child that shapes the ways the political gets mobilized in the name of the future, and for some disabled children to grow up at the expense of others who are never intended to grow up. Edelman is right, then, about the ways in which the figure of the Child re-inforces heteronormativity but he fails to take stock of the ways in which the Child is also always, already able-bodied, or how the Child is capacitated and enhanced. While McRuer is right to point out that no child can fully embody the desirable able-bodied child, and, thus, sets up disability as the impediment to a desirable future, I am interested in how the better-than-able-bodied Child requires some disabled children to grow up at the expense of other disabled children in order to give the Child meaning. Thus, the disabled child is the figure of no future, as will be demonstrated in the case of Emily Rapp (2013) desiring to terminate pregnancy on the basis of disability, and in the case of infanticide and filicide on the basis of disability. However, the disabled child is also the figure of the future in that the suffering child creates particular neoliberal futures through the mobilization of biocapital, cure, and enhancement. Therefore, as I will go on to show, we are deeply invested in narratives of suffering children, but some of those children are always supposed to remain children, never growing up, while others are celebrated, enhanced, and capacitated precisely because they can be made to slide into the neoliberal promise of the future. As I will argue, it is precisely in sliding into neoliberalism’s forms of capacitation and enhancement that incapacitates and disables others.

#### Capacitation of the Ideal Child is happening now with ADHD medications because the neoliberal demands of following an ever-accelerating Infosphere exceed the capacities of able-bodied folks– this causes the overmedication of children and marks disabled suffering as a normalized part of the system. Berardi 17

(Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of the Media at the Accademia di Brera, “Futurability, The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility”, Verso 2017, pg. 87 - 92)

The Exploding Self Two articles on drugs appeared in the 19 April 2015 issue of the New York Times. The first, ‘Workers Seeking Productivity in a Pill Are Abusing ADHD Drugs’ by Alan Schwarz, described the spread of Adderall among American professionals. Adderall contains a combination of amphetamine and dextroamphetamine, two central nervous system stimulants that affect brain and nerves, contributing to hyperactivity and impulse control. In recent decades, millions of American children have been diagnosed with ADHD, with Ritalin as the suggested therapy. Now it is the turn of young cognitive workers, engaged in the market of attention: they take Adderall because they need to accelerate their mental performance in order to compete. Alan Schwartz interviewed some of them: ‘Elisabeth, a Long Island native in her late twenties, said that not taking Adderall while competitors did would be like playing tennis with a wooden racket.’ On the same day in the same newspaper, an op-ed by Sam Quinones titled ‘Serving All Your Heroin Needs’, started with the notice that ‘fatal heroin overdoses in America have almost tripled in three years’, and goes on to describe the normalization of heroin distribution in American towns: a system that according to Quinones ‘resembles pizza delivery’. On 10 November 2015, the New York Times published the alarming article ‘A.D.H.D. Rates Rise Around Globe, but Sympathy Often Lags’ by Katherine Ellison about the spread of Attention Deficit Disorders worldwide. While global diagnoses of A.D.H.D. are on the rise, public understanding of the disorder has not kept pace. Debates about the validity of the diagnosis and the drugs used to treat it - the same that have long polarized Americans - are now playing out from Northern and Eastern Europe to the Middle East and South America. Data from various nations tell a story of rapid change. In Germany, A.D.H.D. diagnosis rates rose 381 percent from 1989 to 2001. In the United Kingdom, prescriptions for A.D.H.D. medications rose by more than 50 percent in five years to 657,000 in 2012, up from 420,000 in 2007. Consumption of A.D.H.D. medications doubled in Israel from 2005 to 2012. The surge in use of the medications has prompted scepticism that pharmaceutical firms, chasing profits in an $11 billion international market for A.D.H.D. drugs, are driving the global increase in diagnoses. In 2007, countries outside the United States accounted for only 17 percent of the world’s use of Ritalin. By 2012, that number had grown to 34 percent. I think diseases of this kind that affect the ability to focus on an object and the ability to produce a consistent flow of enunciation may be viewed as the signals of a process of psychological mutation that is marked by the externalization of the self. The fragmentation and acceleration of the flow of info-stimulation, the multitasking effect and the competitive pressure that is tied to the ability to follow the rhythm of the Infosphere are provoking the explosion of the centred self and a sort of psychotic deterritorialization of attention. The intensification of the info-flow provokes a disturbance in the cognitive ability to detect and interpret signs, but simultaneously pushes us towards a swarm-like automation of the functioning of the mind. The self is both pressured from the outside world and replicated by the surrounding world of other minds. The faster the act of interpretation of info-stimulus, the more the process of interpretation is shared and homologated. The swarm mutation is proceeding both from the outside world and from the interaction with other minds.

#### The capacitated ‘Ideal’ Child, stuck in between identities of abled and disabled. To invest in a reimagination of ability is the best way to ensure futurity of the capacitated Ideal Child. To be clear – this is BOTH a reason to reject the resolution on face, as it encourages further capacitation AND a reason to embrace non-traditional forms of debate as a survival strategy.

Fritsch 3 [Fritsch, Kelly Michelle. "The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices." Diss. York U, Toronto, 2015. YorkSpace Institutional Repository. York University, 16 Dec. 2015. Web.] //Lex VM

“Puar's intervention is uncomfortable for disability studies insofar as she challenges the ways in which the field reproduces disability as an oppressed identity and an aggrieved subject enacted through what Brown (1993) terms “wounded attachments.” According to Brown, identity groups form wounded attachments when they define themselves through the suffering they experience within dominant society in such a way that their identity becomes the painful underside of normative culture. While Brown does not argue that marginalized groups who are left to wither do not suffer, her concern is that such wounded attachments foreclose the freedom of a group by identifying exclusively with its “historical and present pain rather than conjure an imagined future of power to make itself” (1993, 400). Instead of critically evaluating dominant culture and working to replace it with something else, Brown argues that wounded attachments lead groups to strive for the material, social, and political wellbeing enjoyed by the very social elites whose privilege produced their suffering and marginalization. By enunciating and making claims for themselves through “entrenching, dramatizing, and inscribing [their] pain in politics” a suffering group hold “out no future – for [themselves] or others – that triumphs over this pain” (Brown 1993, 406). Wounded attachments lead to an unproductive but self-sustaining loop: because one identifies through their own suffering, a future without suffering would cause them to cease to exist. As such, they continuously reiterate their suffering and, thus, demand that everyone put their intellectual and affective energies into the source of their suffering as opposed to alternative political relations that would produce a more just and less oppressed future. Neither dismissing the suffering any group faces, nor abetting the social relations that are at the root of that suffering, Brown instead wants to foster ways in which a group can enunciate and perform its historical oppression so as to not entirely delimit themselves but open themselves up to modes of healing that produce new and more just social relations. And because the wound or suffering that defines a marginalized group works to detach their suffering – and, thus, their group identity – from the ways in which that group participates in dominant culture, those wounds can cause others to suffer as well. As such, Sara Ahmed (2004) argues that enunciating and performing historical and contemporary injustices must also open up any oppressed group to the suffering they cause others through the few privileges they enjoy. By focusing on normal/abnormal, or abled/disabled, rather than on gradations of debility and capacity, disabled people hang onto an understanding of themselves as being excluded in a way that is not productive for fighting the neoliberal biocapitalist conditions in which disabled people are situated. One such wounded attachment is expressed in the desire of disabled people to be included in the workforce, from which they are largely excluded, despite the ways in which such a goal can re-inscribe the competitive, individualized, entrepreneurial subject formation that is key to neoliberalism’s success. This wounded attachment pre-empts certain critiques of the violence of neoliberalism more generally; critiques that would orient disabled subjects towards a future that rejects inequitable labour practices and the desire to be good neoliberal subjects. This wounded attachment and the desire to be included closes avenues of political discussion and action that recognize and work to counter the suffering such inclusion would perpetuate for others – including other disabled subjects. Just as Brown wants to approach suffering from an obtuse angle and not negate it, Puar takes up debility and capacity not to “disavow the crucial political gains enabled by disability activists globally, but to invite a deconstruction of what ability and capacity mean, affectively and otherwise, and to push for a broader politics of debility that destabilizes the seamless production of abled-bodies in relation to disability” (2009, 166). In doing so, Puar asks: “How would our political landscape transform if it actively decentered the sustained reproduction and proliferation of the grieving subject, opening instead toward an affective politics, attentive to ecologies of sensation and switchpoints of bodily capacities, to habituations and unhabituations, to tendencies, multiple temporalities, and becomings?” (2011, 157). While Puar may be interested in decentering a liberal political subject, rather than rehabilitating a grieving subject through intersectional politics, debility and capacity can be a means to open up the suffering of disabled people and their communities in multiple ways that could allow for a more just future for everyone.” (116-119)

## Part 3 – Methodology

#### Communicative arenas like debate demand compulsive able-bodiedness to be successful through the mode of fluency which systematically smooth over disruptions in the neoliberal machine in the name of social security, while simultaneously erasing disabled bodies and pushing them out– we have to ask ourselves who this social security is meant for and who it is meant to exclude from this space.

St. Pierre 17 [Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony Joshua St. Pierre Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, Volume 11, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 339-356 (Article) Published by Liverpool University Press] //Lex VM

“Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, “the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness” (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. “Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment. Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—thus facilitating in one move the rationalization and naturali- zation of embodied difference that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, as if everyone agrees. But whatever else it may be, fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal. Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology. Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers within Speech-Language Pathology often focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency. There are a few characteristics: Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns. Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; a conceit of mastery over language that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. Autistics are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by what I am here calling technologies of fluency. Tics of loud cursing and grunting from a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as an interruption to communication. Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others. Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.” (342-344)

#### Thus, my method - a reimagination of disability that views disability outside of current neoliberal conditions of production and desirability. This requires interrogation into how neoliberalism creates desirability in the first place, which is an independent reason that the aff is a good idea – before we can investigate who is deemed desirable, we must first understand what desirability is. (Fritsch 4)

Fritsch 4 [Fritsch, Kelly Michelle. "The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices." Diss. York U, Toronto, 2015. YorkSpace Institutional Repository. York University, 16 Dec. 2015. Web.]// UTDD recut Lex VM

Challenging the undesirability of disability is a shared responsibility and goes beyond the inclusion of disabled people within the exploitative and individualized relations of neoliberal capitalism. That is, challenging the undesirability of disability requires more than individualized access to education, employment, or vibrant social lives. Challenging the undesirability of disability requires that disability be imagined differently, that is, imagined in ways that ensure that disability can be collectively practiced and experienced differently. In order to imagine disability differently, it is imperative to understand how the neoliberal hegemonic social imagination both works to curtail who is considered desirable and informs the production of a good, individualized neoliberal subject that limits disabled and able-bodied people alike. Neoliberal policies and practices individualize both able-bodied and disabled bodies through forms of debility and capacity (Puar 2011) and through the economization of social relations and life itself (Murphy 2013) such that being critical of these forms of social, economic, and political relations is not enough to extricate ourselves from our role in maintaining and reproducing these relations. In order to desire disability differently, we must begin with marginal, heterotopic imaginations whereby disability is practiced as not something to overcome or merely tolerate, but rather as a part of a life worth living. Building on Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopia (1998), a concept that marks “outside places” by their discontinuity and multiplicity, and drawing on the work of Mel Chen (2012) and Rod Michalko (1999), I argue that the heterotopic imagination reconfigures how disability emerges, with whom it emerges, and where. When disability is viewed through the lens of the heterotopic imagination, it becomes an intracorporeal, non-anthropocentric, multiplicity that exceeds the individualized human body inscribed by 175 neoliberal biocapitalism. To elaborate on disability as this emergent multiplicity, I read Chen’s and Michalko’s work alongside Thomas Lemke’s (2015) work on Foucault’s concepts of the milieu and government of things, as well as the agential realism of feminist materialist Karen Barad (2007; 2008). Desiring disability differently does not merely allow the current formulation of disability to become desirable. On the contrary, desiring disability differently through the heterotopic imagination radically alters what disability is, how it is practiced, and what it can be.

#### Vote aff to enact dysfluencies in communicative spheres and create frictions that disrupt the flow of debate and to reject the constant ability checks associated with the debate space.

## Part 4 – Framing

#### The role of the judge is to vote for the debater who best discursively and methodologically challenges oppression. The exclusionary nature of debate means that accessibility is a multiplier for all other impacts in the round because it control who is able to access those impacts in the first place.

Smith ’13: (Elijah Smith. “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate.” Vbriefly. September 6, 2013//FT)

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.

#### The overly-competitive nature of debate mandates endless ability checks, internalized ableism and psychic violence. Assimilation into normative debate fails – thus the role of the ballot is to create a safer space in debate for disabled folk – prefer this analysis because understanding ability is a prerequisite to intersectional analysis of identity.

Richter 15. Zahari Richter is a Policy Debate Coach, is a Ph.D. Candidate in Communications and has a Master’s in Disability Studies. <https://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2015/01/conditions-of-judgment-ableist-ranking.html> “[Conditions of Judgment: Ableist ranking structures in educational and political environments](https://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2015/01/conditions-of-judgment-ableist-ranking.html)” “///” indicates paragraphs Language edited NT 17

While **rhetorical arenas are** commonly **cast as equalizing playing fields**, there is a way in which even the socratic can **yield to the authoritarian**. If we think of disability as a relationship defined in part by the terrain of normativity and in part by individual traits, one must recognize how **the entrance of an impaired body into an elitist highly competitive academic space necessarily entails the focusing of micro-aggressions onto such a body**, both in the structure of normative communications and in the framing of intellectual worth by efficiency. /// If one considers the design of political and scholarly competitive environments, one imagines two gazes through which players are evaluated. The first type of evaluation considers the intellectual performance of the player. The second evaluation monitors interpersonal conduct. /// I will call the first evaluative frame "pedagogical judgment" to reference how performance of ability as well as intellect are measured according to valuable and worthlessness. /// The second frame will be called "interpersonal judgment" to reference how performances of normative sociality are graded according to their closeness to pregiven notions of how the social should be played in various instances. /// The dual conditions of pedagogical and interpersonal judgment, as a **grids of meaning that are projected across bodies** as a function of a designed organizational structure, cooperate in the production of educational spaces as gesturally normative as well as intellectually normative. /// **Gestural as well as intellectual normativities** act as a net around which **atypical** or disruptive **embodiments are captured and disciplined**. On a social level, the truth of intellect is captured in good habits and appearances, but the multiplicity of types of intelligence may be forgotten about. Similarly, the standardization of gestural economies is a well known falsity, as different cultures require different emotional responses to situations. /// Conditions of judgment set a value to bodies, based on their ability to pass an inspection or to fulfill a given criteria. A condition of judgment can thus only isolate one aspect or strand of the complexity of human functioning. A condition of judgment is necessary to grade someone accord to hierarchies, but it is also a condition of peril. Competitions thrive on failure: the loss of a debater feeds debate as an elite culture. **To exist in debate is to constantly answer numerous ability checks positively**. /// It may thus be possible to view [understand] conditions of judgment as an ableist emanation from the origin of professionalism, which raised the rank of professionals whose bureaucratic trials achieved apparent value. In a condition of judgment, the body becomes paralyzed [incapacitated] by two sets of institutional limitations. Disablement is not merely a spatial or economic process but is a process in teaching limbs and lips and bodies to move properly. **Disabled bodies must labor** **to** ensure that their voices, their bodies, their words will **not fall out of synch.** To **suppress the wildness that hides in the body**, in such instances, the containment of the self is an additional extra labor and **the appearance of** **disability connotes a debt**. **Self-containment is** thus an additional **endless debt that disables impaired bodies**. In having to pay penance for our burdensome conditions, we learn to accept less than ideal circumstances. /// Multiple modes of subversion exist. One of such normative ways of rebelling is disaffiliation. In abandoning and repatriating from the intellectual or interpersonal standards, it may be possible to self-represent in the opposite standards or unevenly distribute resources to gain an advantage. **The most resistant option is to** endeavor to **change the terms of the standards themselves**, the bars that **force a representation of ableness for entrance into normativities**. In the speech or **invocation of other possible worlds**, if it can be heard, others may gather. The establishment of a communal stake in a new group identity upsets the apparatus by which integration appears as the only option. **Upsetting ableist assimilation** will bring many others who resigned to hermetically life in opposition into a possible alliance with you. ///