### Advocacy

#### Because of Objectivity’s insistence on pitting lies and truth against each other as “equal” I Negate the resolution that Resolved: In a Democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy

### Definitions

#### Prioritize means to value something as more important than something else

**Collins Dictionary No Date** [Collins Dictionary, No Date, "Prioritize definition and meaning," Collins Dictionary, [https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/prioritize]/Kankee](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/prioritize%5D/Kankee)

Prioritize Word forms: prioritizes, prioritizing, prioritized 1. TRANSITIVE VERB If you **prioritize** something, you treat it as **more important** than other things. Prioritize your own wants rather than constantly thinking about others. 2. TRANSITIVE VERB If you prioritize the tasks that you have to do, you decide which are the most important and do them **first**. Make lists of what to do and prioritize your tasks.

One of the most pertinent questions on the topic is the objective meaning of terms like objectivity (often thought to be synonymous with terms like neutrality, fairness, and balance) and advocacy (which often is defined as “non-objective”). Some scholars of journalism do believe objectivity can be objective given striking differences between individual journalist’s interpretations and practice of objective reporting, rejecting objectivity outright. Others think current journalistic practices aren’t objective despite claims by the media of its objective coverage. Here are definitions of both objectivity and advocacy for context:

#### To prioritize, the Affirmative and Negative teams are not required to do away with either side, but instead prioritize one. One side cannot defend an equivalent amount of both.

#### (If Ought is defined) Ought is used to express (insert aff definition), however it expresses more than a moral obligation to do so.

#### (If Ought is not defined) Ought expresses more than a moral obligation to do something, but also the possibility to do so.

#### As the Britannica Encyclopedia writes, (Britannica Encyclopedia; fact-checked online encyclopedia. “Ought implies can” <https://www.britannica.com/topic/ought-implies-can> No Date)

ought implies can, in [ethics](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethics-philosophy), the principle according to which an agent has a [moral](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral) obligation to perform a certain action only if it is possible for him or her to perform it. In other words, if a certain action is impossible for an agent to perform, the agent cannot, according to the principle, have a moral obligation to do so.

#### This means the Affirmative team must also prove it is possible alongside why it is preferable if the opposing team wishes to win the round.

### Value/Criterion

#### The value is life – I’ll defend it as the biological state of being alive – prefer it

#### It’s intrinsic good – other values are subjective, being alive is objectively preferable

#### It’s a precondition to other values – we can’t have equality, justice, value to life, etc. if we are already dead

#### It’s quantifiable – we can measure whether someone is alive or not, but moral values are invisible and subjective

#### The Criterion is Reverse Utilitarianism, the act of seeking the least suffering for the most amount of people – Prefer it

#### It’s measurable – we can objectively compare body counts – that’s important for debates with a forced decision at the end, anything else necessitates judge intervention

#### It supercharges reversibility – I’ll isolate impacts of extinction, which is the ultimate irreversible impact. If we go extinct, that’s it forever

#### Your generic utilitarianism bad answers don’t apply – regular “greatest good” thought justifies sacrificing the 49% to help the 51%, but my parameters on minimizing suffering avoid sacrifice

#### Combined, my value and criterion show you exactly how you will judge today’s debate, using a lens of reverse utilitarianism to judge which side best proves their side represents their value.

### Contention 1 – Climate Change Denialism

#### A disproportionate contrarian presence in news compared to the scientific consensus on climate change prevents further climate action

**Petersen et al. 19** [Alexander Michael Petersen, Associate Professor at UC Merced, Emmanuel M. Vincent, Research Scientist with a PhD at the University Pierre et Marie Curie and a post-doctoral fellowship at MIT, and Anthony LeRoy Westerling, professor at UC Merced with a PhD from UC San Diego, 2019, “Discrepancy in scientific authority and media visibility of climate change scientists and contrarians,” Nature Communications, [https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-09959-4]/Kankee](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-09959-4%5D/Kankee)

We juxtapose 386 prominent contrarians with 386 expert scientists by tracking their digital footprints across ∼200,000 research publications and ∼100,000 English-language digital and print media articles on climate change. Projecting these individuals across the same backdrop facilitates quantifying disparities in media visibility and scientific authority, and identifying organization patterns within their association networks. Here we show via direct comparison that contrarians are featured in **49% more** media articles than scientists. Yet when comparing visibility in mainstream media sources only, we observe just a 1% excess visibility, which objectively demonstrates the crowding out of professional mainstream sources by the proliferation of new media sources, many of which contribute to the production and consumption of climate change **disinformation** at scale. These results demonstrate why climate scientists should **increasingly** exert their **authority** in scientific and public discourse, and why professional journalists and editors should adjust the **disproportionate** attention given to contrarians. Introduction Since the early 2000s there has been **little disagreement** among scientific experts over the fundamental evidence supporting the existence, origin, and societal significance of anthropogenic climate change (CC)1,2,3,4. Yet, while an anthropogenic cause is supported by an overwhelming majority of climate change scientists (CCS)5, climate change contrarians (CCC) have **successfully** organized a **strong voice** within politics and science communication in the **U**nited **S**tates6,7. Historians of science have detailed the political origins of the CCC movement, documenting how its strategic efforts [and] succeeded in distorting the science-based narrative on multiple fronts, e.g., by promoting the idea that there is a lack of scientific consensus concerning anthropogenic CC6,8,9,10,11,12, despite the fact that objective research has found **little evidence** for such a claim. One study comparing consensus scientists with unconvinced scientists found that the 2–3% of researchers unconvinced by evidence for anthropogenic CC were not only small in group size but also had substantially lower levels of authority in the CC literature10. Another study surveying ∼3000 earth scientists found the highest levels of CC consensus to be among the most expert climatologists5. Public confusion over science affects various other domains13, in addition to CC communication14, and requires a better understanding of the human, social, and technological factors that facilitate widespread disinformation efforts15,16,17,18. One salient human factor that contributes to the public’s susceptibility to information manipulation is cognitive bias. A particularly relevant example is motivated reasoning—the tendency for individuals to bias their judgements according to personal- and group-level values, even when faced with documented facts19,20,21. Another class of factors are prominent external influences, owing to elite political cues22, ideological biases23,24, cultural worldviews25, and even personal weather experiences26,27. Not least among these external factors is the news media15, which has a longstanding and dominant role empowering cultural politics28. A third decisive technological factor is the paradigm of new media and the nearly boundless scalability of content distribution across the internet. Even in the case where individuals have complete control in choosing their sources of information, they are nevertheless susceptible to significant disparities in content production in addition to being susceptible to media coverage that is disproportionate to the authority and number of scientists holding the consensus viewpoint. Recent research highlights the ramifications of this problem, finding that the **acceptance** of CC increases (respectively decreases) with consumption of media content that **acknowledges** (respectively dismisses) CC realities, other factors being equal24. Susceptibility to information manipulation may continue to be a **serious problem** until society fully adapts to managing the sheer range and volume of new media sources. As such, addressing the opportunities and threats facing CC communication requires an integrated understanding of these human, social, and technological factors. Accordingly, the literature on CC communication is multi-disciplinary. Research efforts draw on a wide range of methods that typically target a single entry point—such as applying content and meta-analysis methods to select collections of scientific publications2,3,10,29, news media articles7,8,9,12,28,30,31,32,33,34, or surveys4,22,23 or by developing behavioral experiments and survey instruments5,11,19,24,25,35. For example, applying in-depth content analysis to select media article sets, researchers identified common factors among skeptical critics, estimated the percentage of CC articles that contain skeptical elements, and developed a typology of CC skeptics30. Building on this framework, another recent study reports that contrarians have strategically shifted away from their external narrative—initially based upon challenging fundamental tenets of CC science (e.g., its anthropogenic origins), thereby positioning themselves as skeptics with legitimate scientific motives for dissent—to instead challenging assessments of CC impacts in an effort to impede the development of proactive regulations33. However, a separate large-scale analysis of internal documents from 19 contrarian organizations shows that the inward contrarian narrative is still rather focused on CC science, with the relative frequency of science-related topics increasing relative to policy-related topics over the period 2009–201334. We complement these extensive efforts by investigating the degree to which socio-technical factors facilitate the visibility and emergence of authority among contrarian claims-makers36. To address this literature gap, we focus our analysis on a group of 386 prominent contrarians, denoted both individually and collectively by CCC. We compare these CCC with 386 prominent scientists active in CC research, denoted hereafter by CCS. These experts in CC science serve as an objective measurement baseline for juxtaposing visibility in the media with authority in the scientific domain. To operationalize this integrative comparison, we collected two large datasets through 2016, comprised of ∼200,000 CC research articles from the Web of Science (WOS) and ∼100,000 English-language CC media articles from the Media Cloud (MC) project37. By focusing on a fixed set of individuals, we leverage large-scale data-driven methods of computational social science38 in an effort to reveal individual-, pair-wise-, and group-level phenomena at the intersection of science and the media. In what follows, we characterize and compare these CC actors at various levels of aggregation: first, by comparing their scientific authority and media visibility at both the individual and group levels; and second, by mapping their associations that are manifest in media co-visibility networks and scientific co-citation networks. Our approach accounts for the variation in visibility across a wide range of sources, from main-stream to non-mainstream sources. By simultaneously accounting for each individual’s scientific authority, our quantitative analysis contributes to the CC communication literature by revealing the degree to which prominent contrarian voices benefit from the scalability of new media, in particular the large number of second-tier news sources and blogs that do not implement rigorous information quality assessment standards. Such disproportionate media visibility of contrarian arguments and actors not only **misrepresents** the distribution of expert-based beliefs28,36,39, it also manifestly **undermines** the **credible authority** of career CCS experts and reinforces the trend of CCC presiding over public scientific discourse40, which all together **hinders** prospects for **rapid** public action on CC41. Results

#### Arbitrarily including contrarian opinion for the sake of balance causes climate change denialism

Brüggemann and Engesser 17 [Michael Brüggemann, educator at the University of Hamburg, and Sven Engesser, educator at the Technical University of Dresden, 2017, “Beyond false balance: How interpretive journalism shapes media coverage of climate change,” Research Gate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312015168\_Beyond\_false\_balance\_How\_interpretive\_journalism\_shapes\_media\_coverage\_of\_climate\_change]/Kankee

22 1. Introduction 23 While scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change has been growing in recent 24 decades (Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Oreskes, 2004), public opinion has also become 25 increasingly uncertain about the urgency of climate change as a problem (Patt and Weber, 2014; 26 Ratter et al., 2012). Citizens of the biggest carbon emitters of the world (the United States and China) 27 are even less concerned about climate change than people from other countries (PEW, 2015). 28 Outright denial of climate change persists among salient minorities in the United States, United 29 Kingdom, and Australia, and in small niche publics in other countries (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; 30 European Commission, 2014; Leiserowitz et al., 2013, 2013; Whitmarsh, 2011). One reason for this 31 entrenched denialism in public opinion may be the way the media portray the scientific consensus on 32 climate change as represented by the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 33 (IPCC). By providing a forum for contrarian views, the media “perpetuate the myth of a lack of 34 international scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change—and thereby succeed in 35 maintaining public confusion” (Antilla, 2005: 350). Various studies have shown the detrimental 36 effects of ‘balanced’ media coverage that depict climate change as an open debate between 37 ‘skeptics’ and ‘warners’ (with regards to public debates about vaccines, see: Dixon and Clarke, 2013; 38 Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Thus, the study of media content and its influencing factors is not only 39 relevant for scholars of journalism, but also for everyone seeking to understand how societies 40 struggle to deal with the challenge of climate change. 41 Our study tackles this challenge by analyzing how the IPCC stance on climate change and its 42 challengers are covered in different journalistic media. We seek to explain different patterns of 43 media content by taking into account the influence of different editorial and national contexts. The 44 study contributes to our understanding of how and why contrarian views remain salient in media 45 debates. It is based on a content analysis of articles (N = 936) published in four different types of 46 leading news outlets (left-leaning, right-leaning, regional, online) in five countries (Germany, India, 47 Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States), and is complemented by a survey of the authors of 48 these articles. We argue that a common explanation for the presence of climate change denial in 49 media coverage – adherence to the journalistic norm of balance (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004) – can no 50 longer be regarded as the most powerful driver of climate coverage. Instead we find a transnational 51 pattern of interpretive journalism that puts the denial of anthropogenic climate change into context. 52 2. Analytical framework and state of research: journalists’ role in the climate debate 53 To assess how journalists report on climate change and how they deal with its denial, it is 54 first necessary to describe what we call the climate change frame or IPCC view, as well as the 55 contrarian voices in public debates. The climate change frame or consensus as presented in IPCC 56 reports and in scientific journals may be summarized in four statements (Brüggemann and Engesser, 57 2014; Shehata and Hopmann, 2012): (1) Global warming represents an extraordinary rise in average 58 global temperatures since the industrial revolution. (2) It is mainly caused by human-induced 59 emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. (3) It creates problems for both ecosystems and 60 humanity. (4) Emissions need to be reduced to avoid future damage. These statements allow us to 61 identify four types of contrarianism or challenges to the climate change frame; they focus on 62 doubting: the trend (climate change), the attribution (anthropogenic), the impact (risks, severe 63 problems), and the treatment (reducing emissions) (see Rahmstorf (2004) for the first three types of 64 contrarianism). This framework does not capture all variants of contrarian claims (Capstick and 65 Pidgeon, 2014); it focuses on the challenges that attack the core of the consensus among the world’s 66 leading climate scientists.67 We call actors who challenge the climate change frame in public debates ‘contrarians’ rather 68 than ‘skeptics’ or ‘deniers,’ following a suggestion by McCright (2007) and O’Neill and Boykoff (2010). 69 There are few climate scientists among the contrarians; the group is comprised of people from 70 different backgrounds, many of whom are closely connected to professional lobbyists and the ‘denial 71 machine’ (Dunlap and McCright, 2011) – i.e., their professional activities are part of a strategy to 72 prevent pro-active climate policy-making (Boussalis and Coan, 2016). Contrarians as visible speakers 73 in public debates need to be distinguished from both individual citizens who may have doubts about 74 climate change and from actors who challenge more specific claims in the climate debate that are 75 not part of the basic consensus outlined above. 76 The journalistic practices of (1) giving disproportionate voice to contrarians and (2) 77 challenging the climate change consensus will be the focus of our study. The two practices are 78 interrelated but do not necessarily go together as the empirical analysis will show. First, we will 79 briefly sketch a conceptual framework of important factors that shape media content. Three levels of 80 influence can be distinguished: individual (journalist), organizational (newsroom), and external (e.g. 81 social institutions and culture) (cf. Shoemaker and Reese, 2014). In different contexts, the 82 ‘discretionary power’ (Semetko et al., 1991) of individual journalists varies: They are provided with 83 more or less leverage to set the frames of their coverage (Brüggemann, 2014). On all three levels of 84 influence, two main forces leave their imprint on media coverage: ideological biases and structural 85 media logics (Schulz, 2011: 68). Biases are preferences or inclinations to treat a topic in a certain way 86 (Lee and Grimmer, 2008) that stem from individual journalists, editors, external actors, and the wider 87 cultural context. ‘Media logic(s)’ include the professional norms and routines of journalists and 88 newsrooms, which Altheide (2004, p. 294) defines as “assumptions and processes for constructing 89 messages within a particular medium.” The most powerful media logics are news factors such as 90 novelty, elite actors, or proximity: editors look for these attributes when deciding which stories to 91 run, and journalists emphasize them in their coverage (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). 92 Past studies have found evidence that the power of bias and media logics at different levels 93 of influence explains the role of contrarians in climate coverage. Depending on ideological bias, 94 climate change is depicted as more or less uncertain, and climate policy is described as more or less 95 costly, depending on the policies of the respective national government (Grundmann, 2007). Below 96 the national level that introduces this kind of political/cultural bias, newsroom policies affect climate 97 coverage; right-leaning media are more likely to cite contrarian views (Carvalho, 2007; Feldman et 98 al., 2015; Feldman et al., 2011). There is also evidence that the ideological stance of the individual 99 author matters: right-wing columnists in the United States cultivate hard-core denialism of climate 100 change in their columns (Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013). Hence, different interpretations of climate 101 change, which are often strongly related to political ideology, influence the coverage of this issue. 102 Explanations drawing on media logics – particularly the professional norms of journalism – 103 are strongly connected to the work of Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) who emphasize the professional 104 norm of balance as an important influencing factor: "[...] journalists present competing points of 105 views on a scientific question as though they had equal scientific weight, when actually they do not’’ 106 (127). The norm of balance is part of the broader concept of objectivity (Westerstahl, 1983), which 107 calls on journalists to provide a ‘neutral’ account by giving equal voice to both sides in a conflict 108 (Hopmann et al., 2012). Journalists follow this practice as it allows them to demonstrate their 109 professional objectivity and to fend off accusations of one-sided coverage (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 110 1972). Balance also serves as a "surrogate for validity checks" (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992: 129) if 111 journalists lack the time or expertise to assess the validity of conflicting statements from different 112 sources. Earlier research on environmental and science journalists in the United States cited evidence 113 of their lack of knowledge about what climate experts consider to be basic common in climate 114 research (Wilson, 2000). The norm of balance is particularly powerful in cases of contested 115 knowledge claims and a lack of expertise among the journalists who cover the respective issue. 116 Finally, conflicts create news value and thus stories that grasp audience attention. The presence of 117 contrarians in media coverage may therefore be explained by either bias (ideological fit) as outlined 118 above or as part of journalistic norms (objectivity/balance) and routines (news values). Yet applying 119 the norm of balance amplifies the views of contrarians (which may attract audience attention) and 120 distorts coverage of the issue. By quoting contrarian voices out of context, journalists give them 121 legitimacy and ‘media standing’ that might also translate into political power (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 122 1993). 123 Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) examined the coverage of climate change in US newspapers from 124 1988 to 2002, and found that half of the articles presented a balanced account of the issue; slightly 125 more than half of the television newscasts analyzed during that time did so (Boykoff, 2008). A 126 replication of the study found the share of balanced coverage reduced from more than a third of all 127 articles in 2003 to about three percent in 2006 in US newspapers (Boykoff, 2007). Thus, balanced 128 reporting may be retreating, but contrarians have not necessarily vanished from the media. Painter 129 and Gavin (2016) find that the British press quoted contrarians in every fifth article during the years 130 2007 to 2011. Schmid-Petri et al. (2015) find that almost a third of articles in the US press contain 131 contrarian voices. Have journalists therefore moved on to a one-sided promotion of denial of climate 132 change, which would be proof of ideological bias, rather than adhere to professional logics such as 133 the norm of balanced coverage? 134 A recent survey of journalists covering climate change in different countries found that most 135 of them strongly agreed with the climate change consensus (Brüggemann and Engesser, 2014). 136 Therefore, it seems that they quote contrarians despite being aware that their claims defy the 137 findings of climate science. A much earlier US study identified a journalistic tendency to amplify 138 outlier views and give ‘mavericks’ a forum: Dearing (1995) analyzed US newspaper coverage of three 139 maverick science stories (e.g., propagating an alternative theory on the cause of AIDS). Our study 140 follows his model of analyzing the content of coverage and then conducting a survey of the authors 141 of the articles. Dearing found that the surveyed journalists were aware that the ‘maverick scientists’ 142 did not represent credible science, yet the articles’ neutral coverage of their views gave the 143 mavericks credibility. Dearing explained this with news values such as conflict that attract larger 144 audiences as well as a general sympathy for mavericks in US public culture, which values 145 individualism expressed through outlier views (also see Gans (1979)). 146 Another trend in journalism should be considered for making sense of the finding that 147 balanced coverage may be gone, but not so, the quoting of contrarian voices. Studies find a trend 148 towards interpretive reporting among online science journalists (Fahy and Nisbet, 2011) and in 149 political journalism in different Western countries (Esser and Umbricht, 2014). Hiles and Hinnant 150 (2014) found a radically redefined understanding of objectivity among experienced climate 151 journalists that goes beyond ‘balanced coverage.’ They found that while these specialist journalists 152 still attempted to refrain from letting their biases influence their coverage, they followed “weight-of153 evidence reporting” (Dunwoody, 2005) in which stories reflect scientific consensus and are “written 154 with authority” (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014: 15), thereby distinguishing between views that represent 155 valid, peer-reviewed science and those that represent outliers with no backing from scientific 156 evidence or peers (Boykoff, 2011). Another qualitative interview study with science journalists in the 157 United States confirms this trend: journalists claim that they want to go “beyond balance” and even 158 ignore contrarian voices (Gibson et al., 2016). 159 Yet, whether these approaches are put into practice has not been comprehensively 160 investigated with regards to different media types in different cultural contexts. Most studies focus 161 on the US and British contexts or on the coverage of upmarket newspapers (Schäfer and Schlichting, 162 2014). Grundmann and Scott (2014) also include France and Germany from 2000 to 2010 and a great 163 number of newspapers using corpus linguistic methods. Their study shows that, overall, contrarians 164 are much less prominent in media discourses than speakers who support the climate change 165 consensus. They also show that countries consistently diverge on the salience of contrarians, with a 166 much stronger entrenchment of contrarian voices in the United States. This is in line with findings 167 from Painter and Ashe (2012), who also included quality papers from Brazil, China, France, and India 168 in their analysis. They compared the coverage in 2007 and 2009/2010 during the UN Climate summit 169 in Copenhagen and, at the same time, ‘Climategate’ (the pseudo scandal constructed around 170 personal e-mails between climate researchers that were published by contrarian bloggers in order to 171 discredit climate research, Holliman (2011)). Overall, these findings show that there is no linear 172 decline in contrarianism in the news, but rather that specific events (or staged pseudo events like 173 Climategate) provide ‘media opportunity structures’ (Adam et al., 2003) for contrarians to become 174 salient voices in media coverage. This explains why Shehata and Hopmann (2012), who focused on 175 media coverage between 1997 and 2007, did not find contrarians in the news. They studied UN 176 climate conferences, where contrarians have not managed to play a significant political role. This was 177 radically different in the context of the Climategate campaign: the content analysis of Painter and 178 Ashe (2012) found that contrarian views occurred in every third article in the United States, followed 179 by the United Kingdom, while contrarians played only a negligible role in all other countries. 180 Painter and Ashe also found that roughly the same number of articles raised doubts about 181 climate change in right-leaning and left-leaning papers. The only difference was that right-leaning 182 papers hosted contrarianism in their commentary pages, while these sources were quoted in the left183 leaning newspapers. This confirms the influence of editorial bias on climate coverage: in right-leaning 184 papers, it is part of the editorial opinion; in left-leaning papers, contrarianism is raised by external 185 voices. Thus, past research has identified the salience of contrarianism and the evaluation of 186 contrarians as an important case for studying the influence of both ideological biases (along the left187 right spectrum) and journalistic norms (e.g., balance, news values). While the studies mentioned 188 above have pushed the research in this area ahead, there are three main gaps in the literature. 189 The first concerns the role of contrarianism in post-Climategate coverage, after 2010. 190 Climategate was an extraordinary moment of success of political spin, but it remains to be seen 191 whether climate change denial retained a voice in transnational journalism afterwards. Grundmann 192 and Stock (2014) extended their analysis to 2010 and show that after the peak of attention to 193 contrarians, the levels declined, but remained somewhat higher than during earlier times. In Britain, 194 the level of contrarianism in media coverage remained high in 2011 (Painter and Gavin, 2016). 195 Second, Painter and Ashe’s finding that contrarians were equally prominent in right- and left196 leaning papers raises the question whether (and how) these quotes were evaluated in the coverage. 197 For example, it is not clear whether contrarians were mentioned in the context of how they continue 198 to make unsubstantiated claims with no backing in climate science, whether they were balanced with 199 other voices (as originally posited in the Boykoff and Boykoff study from 2004), or whether 200 unbalanced contrarianism is occurring (as Painter and Gavin (2016) show for parts of the right201 leaning press in Britain). In this regard, the study by Grundmann and Stock (2012) provides a first 202 hint, as the term Climategate in their co-location analysis linked with the terms ‘stolen’ and ‘hacked’ 203 in the US media, while the British media preferred ‘leaked,’ which indicates that journalists in 204 different countries framed Climategate quite differently. This shows that analysis of the frequency of 205 reporting contrarian viewpoints needs to also include whether and how they were evaluated in the 206 articles. 207 Third, it is unclear whether the quoting of contrarians is motivated by media logic through 208 adherence to journalistic norms (such as balance or news values) or by ideological biases (such as 209 genuine questioning of the validity of climate science). This can best be explored by connecting 210 content analysis data with survey data (following the model introduced in Dearing (1995)).

#### Journalistic objectivity undermines climate action by framing established science as undecided, evenly balanced debates

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Uncertainty and Risk in Climate Change A final set of important frames in climate news coverage involves the communication of uncertainty and risk in climate change. Scientific uncertainty exists when there is a lack of scientific knowledge or disagreement over the knowledge that exists at a given point in time (Friedman et al., 1999). Researchers understand that all forms of scientific endeavors involve such uncertainty. In the context of climate change, discussion of uncertainty can focus on conflicting claims or a lack of knowledge about the existence or cause of climate change, its present-day effects, and the difficulty with assessing probabilities of specific outcomes and their consequences in the future (Patt and Schrag, 2003; Renn et al., 2011). Journalists covering scientific issues, such as climate change, are also routinely confronted with uncertainty, since controversy and debate are important criteria for the “newsworthiness” of a story (Friedman et al., 1999). As a result, how journalists present and describe scientific uncertainty affects how the public interpret such uncertainty. Communicating this uncertainty, however, is **notoriously difficult** (Fischhoff and Davis, 2014). Scientific discourse often involves an amount of details that can overwhelm even seasoned experts. It can also leave out crucial uncertainties that are commonly understood by the experts within the field, but need to be communicated to the broader public (Fischhoff and Davis, 2014). Finding the right balance is difficult, yet essential, considering the important role that uncertainty plays in human decision making (Curley et al., 1986; Sword-Daniels et al., 2018). Psychological research shows that uncertainty generally has a **negative** effect on prosocial behaviors, since it tends to **enable** people to adopt **self-serving** narratives about their actions and **limit** their capacity to cooperate in social dilemma situations (Hine and Gifford, 1991; Dannenberg et al., 2015; for a review of the literature, see Kappes et al., 2018). Experimental work highlights that uncertainty framing also matters for climate change related behaviors, such as decreasing one's energy consumption (Morton et al., 2011). A focus on uncertainty in news coverage can potentially **reduce** the public's support and engagement in climate action because of the **unclear outcomes** of such actions. Uncertainty can take several forms in climate change coverage. On a wide range of climate impacts and long-range forecasts of future warming there is uncertainty that is appropriately acknowledged by experts in the media's coverage of climate science. More problematic is if uncertainty is used in a way that casts doubt on the **well-established** tenants of the **climate** **consensus** of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (**IPCC**)—that climate change is happening, is predominantly man-made through the production of greenhouse gas emissions, and will result in **severe** environmental and human **harm**. The **persuasive power** of uncertainty in this context is its implicit **justification** and **reification** of the status quo, especially as it pertains to fossil-fuel usage and carbon emissions (Feygina et al., 2010). One way in which this type uncertainty enters the media coverage of climate change has been through the journalistic engagement of so-called “**false balance**.” Reporters frequently treat topics as **debates** in which they present “**both sides**” in order to adhere to a journalistic norm of **objectivity**. This norm exists, in part, because both journalists and the general public prize it (Schudson, 1978; Giannoulis et al., 2010), but also because it acts as a mechanism to protect journalists from attacks on their credibility and to preserve access to sources on both sides of a given political debate (Hallin, 1989; Shoemaker and Reese, 2013). The desire for balance also serves the media's tendency toward **drama** and **conflict** in news coverage (Bennett, 2007). In many contexts it is important for journalists to be fair and evenly balanced in their presentation of different sides of a story, but it quickly becomes awkward when discussing the existence or causes of climate change where the credibility of each side does not have **equal weight**. And, the **consequences** of this coverage are **troubling**. Presenting a scientific consensus as a debate confuses the public on the state of the science and, in the case of climate change, possibly reduces support for climate action (Friedman et al., 1999; Corbett and Durfee, 2004; Koehler, 2016; McCright et al., 2016). Newsroom norms of objectivity will only contribute to a balanced presentation of a political debate if another side presents itself. Journalists ultimately rely on easily accessible sources when reporting on the news. And, because of the activism of the fossil fuel industry and conservative movement, there have been no shortage of sources ready and willing to use a platform provided by journalists to cast doubt on climate science—the so-called “**Merchants of Doubt**” (Oreskes and Conway, 2011). Scholars have noted that these groups have made a **concerted** effort to mobilize opposition to climate mitigation policy by **undermining trust** in **foundations** of climate science for both the public and policy makers (Jacques et al., 2008; Dunlap and McCright, 2011; Dunlap and Jacques, 2013; Farrell, 2016a,b). While these groups are likely not as active in the media as conventional wisdom might suggest (Merkley and Stecula, 2018), it is still possible that the press, and in particular conservative media, pick up on their message of uncertainty in their coverage of climate science even if they don't explicitly cite these actors. As the broader research on misinformation has shown, various myths surrounding climate science, including those pertaining to certainty of different outcomes, tend to be “sticky,” and hence very difficult to correct (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Efforts to correct such information tend to be ineffective, and, in some circumstances might even result in what is called a backfire effect, when people get more entrenched in their original position (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Some promising work suggests that exposing people to correct information prior to misinformation might be an effective way to “inoculate” them from the perils of misinformation, at least in some contexts, but the broader point remains that, if the press disseminates uncertainty frames about climate change, such information might play a **negative** role in people's attitudes about climate change and climate change mitigation policies (Cook et al., 2017; Jolley and Douglas, 2017). The themes of uncertainty have been analyzed in the context of climate change news coverage. Some research has shown that coverage of climate change in the 1990s and early 2000s was characterized by scientific inaccuracy and uncertainty, which was driven by an adherence to balanced **reporting** and resistance to a growing body of scientific evidence. More recently, however, balance nearly disappeared from the press (Zehr, 2000; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 2007; Boykoff, 2007). The scope of this work, however, has been fairly limited in terms of the time dimension as well as the amount of news coverage examined, as was highlighted in the previous section. However, scholars who have been examining this feature of news coverage of climate change in the comparative context, have highlighted that the U.S. coverage features substantially more climate skeptic voices pushing doubt about climate science, compared to countries like India or France (Painter and Ashe, 2012). Furthermore, contrary to the findings in the U.S.-centric literature, the authors found that skeptics voicing climate increased their media presence between 2007 and 2010 (Painter and Ashe, 2012). In a separate analysis, Painter (2013) also found that uncertainty was the second most common frame used in climate change coverage, appearing in 76 percent of American articles, however it was the salient frame in only 13 percent of the coverage. It is important to note that this analysis, however, was based only on a total of 55 articles. This disparity in findings highlights the need to systematically examine uncertainty in the context of American news coverage and examine degrees of uncertainty, not just whether the frame is present or not.

#### Climate change melts the Permafrost in the Arctic, opening the floodgates to devastating diseases and radiation

Mindy **Weisburger**, Senior Writer for Live Science, *Melting permafrost in the Arctic could release radioactive waste and awaken sleeping viruses,* Live Science, October 5th 20**21**, https://www.livescience.com/warming-arctic-nuclear-waste-viruses#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20known%20hazards,Live%20Science%20reported%20in%202020.

As climate change warms the Arctic, melting ice could release[s] hazardous chemicals and radioactive material dating to the Cold War. Vanishing permafrost could also free[s] viruses and bacteria that have slumbered beneath Arctic ice for tens of thousands of years, a new study shows. By poring over historical records and past studies on contamination, the researchers found that in addition to fallout from nuclear explosions and pollutants such as mercury, arsenic and DDT, so-called Methuselah microorganisms — microbes that have been locked in permafrost for millennia — may awaken if climate change melts Arctic ice and the microbes defrost. That could release bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics or introduce viruses that humans have never encountered before. The term "permafrost" describes ground that has been continuously frozen for two years or longer and can include soil alone or dirt mixed with ice and covered by snow, according to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC). Permafrost covers about 9 million square miles (23 million square kilometers) of the Northern Hemisphere, and it ranges in thickness from less than 3 feet (1 meter) to more than 3,000 feet (1,000 m), according to NSIDC. Most Arctic permafrost cover has persisted for 800,000 to 1 million years, but climate change is eating away at even some of the most ancient ice reserves. Warming in the Arctic is progressing at least twice as rapidly as elsewhere in the world, and the past 15 years have warmed and melted the region to the point where the frozen landscape has been permanently transformed, according to the 2020 Arctic Report Card released by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  One of the known hazards of Arctic warming is the release of vast reserves of greenhouse gases. Melting permafrost releases millions of tons of carbon dioxide and methane each year, and that amount is likely to increase as Earth continues to warm, Live Science reported in 2020. But until now, scientists did not know the extent of hazards posed by pollutants stored in permafrost — "everything from microbes and potential viruses, to nuclear waste, chemicals and mercury," said lead study author Kimberley Miner, a science systems engineer with NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab at the California Institute of Technology (JPL-Caltech). "Almost no one had ever put all of these different things together," Miner told Live Science. Scientists reviewed hundreds of prior studies "to catalogue emergent microbial, viral and chemical hazards within the new Arctic, and recommend research priorities to quantify and address these risks," the authors wrote. Since nuclear testing began in the 1950s, radioactive materials have been dumped in the Arctic. During the Cold War, from the end of World War II until 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted nuclear testing and research in the Arctic that left high levels of radioactive waste in soil and permafrost, the researchers discovered. Detonations by the Soviet Union in the country's Novaya Zemlya archipelago, between 1959 and 1991, released 265 megatons of nuclear energy; the Russians also scuttled more than 100 decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Barents and Kara seas, releasing radioactive plutonium and cesium that can be detected today in sea bottom sediments and ice sheets, and in plants and soil beneath glaciers, according to the study. The U.S. Camp Century, a nuclear-powered research center in Greenland, generated radioactive waste that was abandoned beneath the ice when the site was decommissioned in 1967. That ice is now rapidly retreating, with losses of about 268 tons (243 metric tons) per year, as the Arctic warms. And when a U.S. B-52 bomber crashed near Denmark's Thule Air Base in Greenland in 1968, its nuclear missile payload ruptured and released uranium and plutonium from four bombs into the ice sheet. Arctic radiation levels could remain harmful until 2500, the study authors reported. Decades of mining in the Arctic across tens of thousands of square miles also left behind waste rich in toxic heavy metals such as mercury, arsenic and nickel. These pollutants have since sunk deep into Arctic soil and could threaten wildlife and human communities in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Scandinavia and Russia, according to the study. An estimated 880,000 tons (800,000 metric tons) of mercury alone is stored in permafrost, and current warming trends could increase Arctic mercury emissions by up to 200% by 2300, the researchers found.  Arctic permafrost also traps reservoirs of hazardous chemicals that were banned in the early 2000s, such as the insecticide DDT (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane) and PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), a group of chemicals that were widely used in coolant fluids. These and other persistent organic pollutants, or POPs, traveled to the Arctic atmospherically and over time became concentrated in permafrost. However, "few studies have traced POP transport and risk," suggesting that "the impact of these chemicals within Arctic systems is underestimated," according to the study.  Microbial threats could lurk in Arctic permafrost, too. Because Arctic microbes have evolved to survive subzero temperatures with minimal access to nutrients or water, many are capable of coming back to life even after thousands of years in a deep freeze. In prior studies, other researchers revived bacterial populations in permafrost dating to 30,000, 120,000 and even a million years ago, the scientists reported. But identifying pollutants in permafrost is just one part of calculating their risk to the Arctic and beyond; the other part of the equation is how quickly the permafrost is melting, Miner said. "There's gradual thaw, which is just year-over-year thaw that moves down slowly from the top. And then there's abrupt thaw, where, for example, you can lose an entire side of a permafrost hill in a series of weeks. That's the kind of difference that will need to be mapped in order to understand when and how these things can emerge," Miner said. Another important factor is that different pollutants pose varying levels of risk depending on pollutant quantity, duration of exposure, and how people and wildlife might come into contact with it, she added. For that reason, a next step for researchers could be assigning a risk profile to the recently identified pollutants in permafrost. But it's harder to evaluate the risks of permafrost's Methuselah microbes, as it's unknown which types of bacteria and viruses could emerge from ancient frozen soil. "We have a very small understanding of what kind of extremophiles — microbes that live in lots of different conditions for a long time — have the potential to reemerge," Miner said. "These are microbes that have coevolved with things like giant sloths or mammoths, and we have no idea what they could do when released into our ecosystems." In the long run, keeping these organisms and pollutants in their permafrost tombs would be preferable to trying to contain them once they've escaped, Miner said. "It's absolutely critical to make sure that we do everything in our power to keep the permafrost — and generally the Arctic — frozen," she said. "It would be so much easier if we didn't have to deal with any of these, besides long-term remediation proposals."

#### It’s fast---extinction within 5 years

Dr. Jim Garrison 21, PhD from the University of Cambridge, MA from Harvard University, BA from the University of Santa Clara, Founder/President of Ubiquity University, “Human Extinction by 2026? Scientists Speak Out”, UbiVerse, 7/1/2021, https://ubiverse.org/posts/human-extinction-by-2026-scientists-speak-out

This may be the most important article you will ever read, from Arctic News June 13, 2021. It is a presentation of current climate data around planet earth with the assertion that if present trends continue, rising temperatures and CO2 emissions could make human life impossible by 2026. That's how bad our situation is. We are not talking about what might happen over the next decades. We are talking about what is happening NOW. We are entering a time of escalating turbulence due to our governments' refusal to take any kind of real action to reduce global warming. We must immediately and with every ounce of awareness and strength that we can muster take concerted action to REGENERATE human community and the planetary ecology. We must all become REGENERATION FIRST RESPONDERS, which is the focus of our Masters in Regenerative Action.

### Line – by - Line

### Underview

#### In conclusion, a round must focus on what matters most, life. The Negative case best appeals to the value of life. The criterion is preferable for all the reasons I’ve already given you in this round. With that in mind, a Negative ballot is essential for preservation of more than just advocacy, but life itself. I now open myself up for cross examination and further points of clarification.