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#### Settler colonialism is not a one-off event but an ongoing structure of dispossession that requires the elimination of Indigenous life. This is marked by ontological violence reasserted each day of occupation.

Tuck and Yang 14 [Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40 JJ]

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap4 - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. 3 In using terms as “white” and “whiteness”, we are acknowledging that whiteness extends beyond phenotype. 4 We don’t treat internal/external as a taxonomy of colonialisms. They describe two operative modes of colonialism. The modes can overlap, reinforce, and contradict one another, and do so through particular legal, social, economic and political processes that are context specific. 6 E. Tuck & K.W. Yang In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves5 , whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous 5 As observed by Erica Neeganagwedgin (2012), these two groups are not always distinct. Neeganagwedgin presents a history of the enslavement of Indigenous peoples in Canada as chattel slaves. In California, Mexico, and the U.S. Southwest under the Spanish mission system, Indigenous people were removed from their land and also made into chattel slaves. Under U.S. colonization, California law stipulated that Indians could be murdered and/or indentured by any “person” (white, propertied, citizen). These laws remained in effect until 1937. 6 See Kate McCoy (forthcoming) on settler crises in early Jamestown, Virginia to pay indentured European labor with land. Decolonization is not a metaphor 7 laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7 . Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.”

#### International law attempts to uphold the ideology of colonial saviorism – it attempts to justify ongoing genocide and serves as a scheme to remake native cultures into a Eurocentric image

Mutua 1 – Distinguished Professor and the Floyd H. and Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar at the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law (Makau, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 201-245, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1525547>, 2001)//CProst

The idea that the human rights corpus is concerned with ordering the lives of non-European peoples has a long history in international law itself. More recent scholarship explores this link between international law and the imposition of European norms, values, ideas, and culture on non-European societies and cultures. Since the inception of the current international legal order some five centuries ago, there have been outright challenges by non-European cultures to the logic, substance, and purpose of international law. The development of human rights has only blunted, but not eliminated, some of those challenges. V. THE METAPHOR OF THE SAVIOR The metaphor of the savior is constructed through two intertwining characteristics—Eurocentric universalism and Christianity's missionary zeal. This section examines these characteristics and the institutional, international actors who promote liberal democracy as the antidote to human rights abuses. First, the savior metaphor is deeply embedded in the Enlightenment's universalist pretensions, which constructed Europe as superior and as center of the universe. International law itself is founded on these assumptions and premises. International law has succeeded in governing "states of all civilizations, European and non-European," and it has become "universal" although some have argued that it bears an ethnocentric fingerprint. In addition to the Eurocentric focus of human rights, the metaphor of the savior is also located in the missionary's Christian religion. Inherent to any universalizing creed is an unyielding faith in the superiority of at least the beliefs of the proselytizer over those of the potential convert, if not over the person of the convert. The project of universality or proselytism seeks to remake the "other" in the image of the converter. Christianity has a long history of such zealotry. Both empire-building and the spread of Christendom justified the means. Crusades, inquisitions, witch burnings, Jew burnings and pogroms, burnings of heretics and gay people, of fellow Christians and of infidels —all in the name of the cross. It is almost as if Constantine, upon his and his empires conversion to Christianity in the fourth century, uttered a well-fulfilled prophecy when he declared: 'In the name of this cross we shall conquer.' The cross has played the role of weapon time and time again in Christian history and empire building. In fact, the political-cultural push to universalize one's beliefs can be so obsessive that it has been identified frequently with martyrdom in history. [T]he supreme sacrifice was to die fighting under the Christian emperor. The supreme self-immolation was to fall in battle under the standard of the Cross .... But by the time Christianity was ready to meet Asia and the New World, the Cross and the sword were so identified with one another that the sword itself was a cross. It was the only kind of cross some conquistadores understood. There is a historical continuum in this impulse to universalize Eurocentrism and its norms and to ratify them under the umbrella of "universalism." Whether it is in the push for free markets, liberal systems of government, "civilized" forms of dress, or in the ubiquity of the English language itself, at least the last five centuries can appropriately be called the Age of Europe. These Eurocentric models have not been content to remain at home. They intrinsically define themselves as eternal truths. Universalization is an essential attribute of their validity. This validation comes partly from the conquest of the "primitive" and his introduction and delivery to "civilization." For international law, Anghie has captured this impulse clearly: [T]he extension and universalization of the European experience, which is achieved by transmuting it into the major theoretical problem of the discipline [international law], has the effect of suppressing and subordinating other histories of international law and the people to whom it has applied. Within the axiomatic framework of positivism, which decrees that European states are sovereign while non-European states are not, there is only one means of relating the history of the non-European world, and this the positivists proceed to do: it is a history of the civilizing mission, the process by which peoples of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific were finally assimilated into a European international law. The impulses to conquer, colonize, save, exploit, and civilize non- European peoples met at the intersection of commerce, politics, law, and Christianity and evolved into the Age of Empire. As put by John Norton Pomeroy, lands occupied by "persons who are not recognized as belonging to the great family of states to whom international law applies" or by "savage, barbarous tribes" belonged as of right upon discovery to the "civilized and Christian nation." The savior-colonizer psyche reflects an intriguing interplay of both European superiority and manifest destiny over the subject. The "othering" project degrades although it also seeks to save. One example is the manipulative manner in which the British took over large chunks of Africa. Lord Lugard, the British colonialist, described in denigrating language a "treaty-making" ceremony in which an African ruler "agreed" to "British protection." He described this ceremony with both parties "[s]eated cross-legged on a mat opposite to each other on the ground, you should picture a savage chief in his best turn-out, which consists probably of his weapons of war, different chalk colourings on his face, a piece of the skin of a leopard, wild cat, sheep or ox." As put by a European missionary, the "Mission to Africa" was "the least that we [Europeans] can do ... to strive to raise him [the African] in the scale of mankind." Anghie notes that the deployment of denigrating, demeaning language is essential to the psyche of the savior. He writes: The violence of positivist language in relation to non-European peoples is hard to overlook. Positivists developed an elaborate vocabulary for denigrating these peoples, presenting them as suitable objects for conquest, and legitimizing the most extreme violence against them, all in the furtherance of the civilizing mission — the discharge of the white man’s burden. Human rights law continues this tradition of universalizing Eurocentric norms by intervening in Third World cultures and societies to save them from the traditions and beliefs that it frames as permitting or promoting despotism and disrespect for human rights itself.

#### The foundational assumptions in every facet of IR are complicit in the destructive of Native life and governance. IR attempts to ignore the long history of genocide of Indigenuous peoples as well as cast them aside domestic, primitive, and landless.

King 17 [Hayden King, Gchi'mnissing Anishinaabe writer and educator based in the Faculty of Arts at Ryerson University in Toronto., 7-31-17, The erasure of Indigenous thought in foreign policy, https://www.opencanada.org/features/erasure-indigenous-thought-foreign-policy/, JKS, Recut VM

This type of arrangement between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians might be conceptualized as politics, indeed effective diplomatic practice in an imperfect world. But for the scholars and practitioners in the field of foreign policy it is invisible. Likewise with the more provocative type of Indigenous diplomacy: the countless blockades to protect the land and water, land and treaty claims, the Idle No More movement, and so on. In the discipline of International Relations (IR), too, Indigenous philosophy and politics has been excused, marginalized and categorized as domestic, at best. Indeed, the centuries of colonization that have subjugated Indigenous political communities are the foundation on which contemporary thinking about ‘the global’ has revolved. In this sense, foreign policy and IR are implicated in both spawning and sustaining settler colonialism in Canada. As a result, there is a need to chart the links between these processes and consider the shape and content of long-neglected Indigenous philosophies of the international. For as long as settler colonialism defines the limits of what is possible for foreign policy, the relationship (or, the politics) between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous will continue to be characterized by conflict. Foreign policy, but in whose national interest? For those studying and working in foreign policy, there are certainly debates over what constitutes the definition of the field. In Canada, there are debates about what counts as foreign policy (defence, security, trade, peacekeeping) and also how to approach those subjects (from liberal frameworks, realist, even some critical lenses). In his textbook on foreign policy Kim Nossal notes that the field is inherently divisive, emerging from “the interplay of conflicting interests, divergent objectives, contending perceptions, and different prescriptions about the most appropriate course of action.” Yet despite these divisive debates, there is near universal acceptance of two core assumptions: the legitimacy of the Canadian state itself as the primary actor in foreign policy and the concept of the national interest, which the field of foreign policy strives to serve. This is no surprise, really, considering these assumptions are underwritten and supported by every domestic institution — from Canada’s constitutional sources, to the cultural organizations that currently promulgate the fantasy of Canada as 150 years of glowing hearts, or decisions of the Supreme Court that reflect on the “assertion of Crown sovereignty” without ever explaining how that sovereignty was obtained. But for critical Indigenous scholars, these assumptions are myths that form not a legitimate state in the community of nations, but rather a violent settler colony. Flower break Indigenous Between 1921 and 1923, after many years of resistance to the young countries, Canada and the United States were steadily encroaching into Haudenosaunee territory and governance. Cayuga Chief Deskaheh, also known as Levi General, travelled to London, England, to appeal to King George on the matter. (He wasn’t the first or last to appeal to a King or Queen; Anishinaabe leader Shingwaukonse actively attempted to, post-War of 1812, and Chief Theresa Spence did so in 2013, among many others). But when King George refused him, Deskaheh turned to the Geneva-based League of Nations, seeking a seat for the Haudenosaunee. With his efforts undermined by English officials there too, he returned home but was stopped at the U.S.-Canada border and turned away by Canadian border guards. He spent his final days in Rochester, New York. Before his death he made one last plea to ordinary Canadians and Americans for justice: “Do you believe — really believe — that all peoples are entitled to equal protection of international law now that you are so strong? Do you believe — really believe — that treaty pledges should be kept? Think these questions over and answer them to yourselves…We have little territory left — just enough to live and die on [because] the governments of Washington and Ottawa have a silent partnership of policy. It is aimed to break up every tribe of red men so as to dominate every acre of their territory.” (His plea is documented in Rick Monture’s We Share Our Matters.) The last two sentences of this quote are an apt description of modern settler colonialism, nearly 100 years before scholars identified the process. For anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, there is a distinction between colonialism, which eventually ends when the invaders leave, and settler colonialism, where they don’t. While in the former formulation the Indigenous population is often transformed to labour for colonial extraction, in the latter, the settler colony attempts to liquidate all remnants of the previous (Indigenous) societies to legitimize its permanent presence. Deskaheh was speaking in the North American context, Wolfe in the Australian, but the phenomenon can be seen elsewhere, from Aotearoa/New Zealand to Palestine/Israel. Common strategies in this liquidation are as follows: physical extermination; oppressive Indian legislation designed to contain; the creation of reserves/reservations/settlements, residential or boarding schools; discrimination aimed specifically at women; and eventually legal absorption into state apparatuses and assimilation. While the genocidal nature of settler colonialism may not appear as physical violence today (though we do still have plenty of that), the underlying motivation to expunge threats to settler sovereignty endures. But where the specific harms of the field of foreign policy come into greater focus are in crafting a common sense around what counts as a legitimate politics of the international. Consider the core concepts of the field, or at least the discipline of IR that foregrounds foreign policy. I think its fair to say most traditional perspectives view the international system as an anarchic environment where self-interested and (mostly) rational states compete against each other for power. Or, in contrast, they may cooperate. For foundational IR scholar Hedley Bull, this simple formulation is “the supreme normative principal of the political organization of mankind.” I don’t need to elaborate on these concepts for this audience. But, what about political communities that do not resemble a state, that eschew coercive notions of exclusive sovereignty, that are bound by obligations and responsibilities to the land and thus do not recognize an anarchic world, political communities that do not start and end with men? The discipline of IR, as well as practice of foreign policy, effectively casts Indigenous peoples as primitive (or at least inferior), sanctions the theft of their lands, and then forecloses the possibility of resurgent political communities. At a fundamental level the perpetuation of this conceptual galaxy denies opportunities for Indigenous expressions of liberation — whether the case is the Six Nations of the Grand River, whose demands for a seat at the League of Nations in 1922 were rejected, or the current Canadian government demands that the articulation of international Indigenous rights not challenge territorial integrity or state sovereignty (this is true generally but seen clearly with the United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Such a denial is also expressed in the the unequivocal support of the state of Israel at the expense of Palestinian existence, or the collaboration with a Honduran government that suppresses Indigenous communities and murders activists like Berta Cáceres. I am talking about more than denying liberation. By continuing to enforce the view of humanity as a set of political states, with Europe at the centre of the planet – as Chickasaw lawyer James Youngblood Henderson once pointed out in his deconstruction of the familiar Mercator world map – foreign policy actively contributes to the erasure of Indigenous political difference conceptually as well as Indigenous bodies physically. (Not to mention non-Indigenous but racialized political communities and bodies, too.) Thus, Canadian foreign policy is a foreign policy that normalizes and affirms settler colonialism.”

#### Positioning other countries as “dependent” on the US’ aid reinforces settler colonial hierarchies and imperialism under the guise of rationality

Westwood 6 (Robert Westwood, University of,Western Sydney. (2006). International business and management studies as an orientalist discourse: A postcolonial critique. Critical Perspectives on International Business, 2(2), 91-113. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1108/17422040610661280) //bc(rcut AHS ZA)

Postcolonialism has provided a trenchant critique of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism and its critical practice is now being applied to globalisation and its effects, interpreted by some as a contemporary manifestation of the imperialist impulse. Indeed, for Said colonialism was just one manifestation of the West’s imperialist project (Parry, 1997). Parry, (1997, p. 227), whilst recognising different manifestations of imperialism, notes the contemporary form of “industrial-military interventions and aggressive investment programmes implemented by the expansionist social orders of western nation-states”. However, she also recognises that imperialism no longer requires military intervention or form of occupation, but is constituted by the construction of dependencies of the sort the US has most prodigiously pursued. Imperialism is “the radically altered forms of capitalism’s accelerated penetration into the noncapitalist world” (Parry, 1997, p. 228) creating an unbalanced and asymmetrical new world order under western hegemony. Other commentators also see modern capitalism and globalisation as a form of imperialism imposing a new spatial and temporal order on the world, but masking the imperialist impulse with rhetoric of rationality and modernisation (Harvey, 1989; Soja, 1989). Clearly, international business is central to the globalisation process and its effects. Thus postcolonialism offers a critique of globalisation that abuts directly with the concerns of the IBMS discourse. It is a critical practice that orthodox IBMS with its functionalist and managerialist inclinations has not engaged with as yet to any marked degree (exceptions include Banerjee and Linstead, 2001; Chakravartty, 2004; Mirchandani, 2004; Prasad, 1997).

#### The desire for US hegemony is settler nationalism – this ethnocentric viewpoint is the exact logic that has justified violence against all immigrants and the systematic elimination of Indigenous peoples

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Even before the collapse of 2008 brought the Western economic model to its knees, political analysts were discussing whether U.S. primacy was in decline. Fareed Zakaria described a comparative decline of U.S. dominance when he wrote about the "rise of the rest," forecasting the continued emergence of countries like China, India and Brazil. This talk of U.S. decline has led to questions of what such a decline would mean not only for the United States, but for the rest of the world. Some analysts have a more hubristic take on the subject than others. In his article "Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline," published in The New Republic, Robert Kagan argues that American decline could put the entire world order at risk of collapse. In Kagan's words: "The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power declines, this world order will decline with it." Kagan insists that the idea of a liberal, democratic order surviving without the United States propping it up is "a pleasant illusion." The degree of ethnocentricity that underlies Kagan's article would be hard to understate. In fact, the words "ethnocentricity," "hubris" or "jingoism" fall short of characterizing a worldview that puts U.S. hegemony on par with the life-sustaining power of the sun. To the people in countries who have found themselves on the receiving end of brute U.S. influence—not to mention the generations of people inside U.S. borders who have seen the myth of U.S. benevolence dispelled by their own struggles for civil rights or a living wage—the illusion being weaved here is not so much a pleasant one. Would Kagan have a different view of U.S. dominance if he had lived in Iran in 1953, when a CIA plot overthrew the country's prime minister and replaced him with a brutal shah? Or if he'd lived in Guatemala in 1954? Lebanon in 1958, Brazil in 1964, Indonesia in 1965? How would he have felt living in one of the South American countries in the 1970s that saw a U.S.-backed coup remove a popular government while killing and torturing thousands in the process? The U.S. list of post-World War II military interventions is a long one, leading up to the recent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and it requires a very skewed vision of reality to think we were greeted as liberators each time our boots—or bombs—hit the ground. Kagan criticizes Iran and North Korea for defying "American demands that they cease their nuclear weapons programs." Never mind the implicit assumption here that countries should obey U.S. demands. Why does he think those countries might have wanted nuclear weapons in the first place? Take a look at a map of U.S. military bases in all the countries surrounding Iran, and the picture becomes clear pretty quickly. Kagan complains that "Arabs and Israelis refuse to make peace, despite American entreaties." Again, put aside the implication that U.S. "entreaties" should be treated as gospel. Such a statement ignores layers of geopolitical strategy embedded in the conflict, which do not revolve completely around the United States. It also ignores the role that the United States has played in perpetuating the conflict, by tacitly supporting Israel in its occupation of the West Bank and blockade of the Gaza Strip. Also absent from this narrow point of view is mention of the international agreements and institutions that have managed to come together without U.S. ratification, such as the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court. There is a world out there that keeps turning even when the United States isn't pushing it. Throughout the article, the fiber of Kagan's language is laced with this implicit assumption that the United States should have its hands in all matters of global importance—if anything, for the global good. When he talks of the Arab Spring spinning out of U.S. control, he implies that this is a decidedly bad thing, not for reasons of U.S. strategic interest in the region, but for the sake of liberal democracy. To non-Americans—or to Americans who have managed to avoid getting drunk on the Kool-Aid—this must be insulting at the least. The trouble is, Kagan's blindly nationalistic perspective is shared by so many Americans that he is able to proceed on the basis of these assumptions without ever bothering to explain or justify them. The source of that nationalism runs deep. It is a nationalism that has survived the massacre of Native Americans, the enslavement of blacks, the persecution of immigrants, the repression of women, the exploitation of the poor working class and the imperialistic conquest of foreign markets, and has still managed to come out clean on the other side. Don't get me wrong; I'm not about to trade in my U.S. citizenship anytime soon. But if we are to discuss the implications of U.S. dominance entering a state of decline, we would be wise to first put that dominance in its proper context. The United States is but a single country, and to suggest that the prosperity of all others relies on it is to egregiously misrepresent the hegemonic order.

#### Settler colonialism explains the aff’s violence and is constitutive of the global. The U.S. serves as the foundational architect for global violence, which makes the alternative a prior question.

Cornellier and Griffiths 16 [Bruno Cornellier, Department of English, University of Winnipeg, Manitoba, & Michael R. Griffiths, School of the Arts, English and Media, University of Wollongong, (2016) Globalizing unsettlement: an introduction, Settler Colonial Studies, 6:4, 305-316, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090522, JKS] Recut VM

This issue of Settler Colonial Studies marks the attempt to think the global adjacent to and, indeed, constituted in relation to questions of internal colonialism and settlement. As editors, we implicitly follow a contention of Scott Morgensen’s that settler colonialism is not merely a violent phenomenon of the colonial periphery, but in fact functions as constitutive of geopolitics at a global level. As Morgensen puts it, ‘Settler colonialism directly informs past and present processes of European colonization, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance. If settler colonialism is not theorized in accounts of these formations, then its power remains naturalized in the world that we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it.’ 1 Settler colonialism, then, is not merely a global phenomenon, it is also constitutive of the global. So many nation states which were founded on settler colonialism are considered first world nation states, and many are implicated, through this role, in broader operations of regional and global neoimperial control of territory and interests. This is a central premise of many of the contributions to this volume, from Kevin Bruyneel’s analysis of the settler colonial vocabulary that animates US military incursions in the Middle East to Shiri Pasternak’s analysis of the relation between Canadian multi-national private resource extraction and the ongoing dispossession of native lands in Canada to Mark Rifkin’s careful geopolitical reading of indigenous internationalism in the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. If the USA is the most paradigmatic (though not the sole) instantiation of global ‘capitalist-territorialism’ (to use Giovanni Arrighi’s phrase), then as Bruyneel asserts elsewhere ‘the persistent reproduction of the American foundational mythos [ … ] serves critically in the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonialism as a structure’, and does so in the manifest global reach of its neoimperial imprint.2 As such, ‘via the logic of elimination [ … ] and dependent upon settler colonialism America takes up its imperial stance overlooking the world. This image illustrates that one cannot acknowledge the fact of US empire without acknowledging settler colonialism, and vice versa’. 3 To cite US Empire here, as constituted in relation to its own history of internal (settler) colonialism and manifest destiny is to cite an example of this relation that might be explored globally. If settler colonialism bears relation to the global, as the US example illustrates, then global comparisons of such modes of dispossession also might shed light on the complexity of specific internal settler colonial experiences. This issue, then, calls upon scholarship to address the ideologies that traverse comparable political spaces, of which a number are surveyed in this issue: Australia, Canada, and Chiapas, Mexico. From the perspective of a critique of settler colonialism – which this approach, grounded in the initial premise of internal colonialism and the idea of elimination, is uniquely poised to reveal – what these spaces have in common is a certain strange double vision surrounding their self-conception. On the one hand, settler nation states stress their liberalism and inclusivity and on the other, they aim to either repress indigenous presence and difference, or, alternately to occlude its particularly salient claims by subsuming this difference under a wider multicultural settlement on the management of alterity. Here, the more the modernity and liberalism of the settler state is rhetorically stressed and pushed, the more it indulges in the repression of an indigenous presence often imagined as an anachronistic and aliberal residue of the type of ethnically bound and territorially fixed political cultures that violently clashed and sunk in our pre-global and pre-modern world. This is a second crucial premise of this collection’s relation to the globality of settler colonialism: liberal multicultural policies act comparably across multiple sites and spaces as avenues for the reinstitution of dispossession. From Melissa Forbis’ analysis of Chiapas to Michael Griffiths’ argument about the relation between race and culture in Australia, liberal logics are used to conceal new and incipient modes of dispossession globally.”

#### The role of the ballot is to center indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16

(Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213, JKS)

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

#### Thus, the only alternative is one of decolonization.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

Conclusion An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

*when you take away the punctuation*

*he says of*

*lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land*

*its acreage and location*

*you take away its finality*

*opening the possibility of other futures*

-Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

### case

#### Soft power fails

Robson 2/11/15

Jon Robson, Professor at the University of Ottawa, Ph.D in American history from the University of Texas at Austin, Toronto Sun, February 11, 2015, “Hard truth about soft power”, http://www.torontosun.com/2015/02/11/hard-truth-about-soft-power

Does anybody remember soft power? Apparently Canada has it in abundance. It just doesn’t work.

Soft power is, like so many trendy ideas in this country, an American invention. It originates with Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye, who basically argued that the power of example matters more than the military or economic kind.

It’s a bit of a tweak on the popular notion from my undergraduate days that economics was replacing geopolitics, transnational corporations were more important than governments etc. But either way, the claim is we can finally beat our swords into ploughshares.

It’s a seductive idea because war is horrible and it’s great to think nice guys necessarily finish first in geopolitics. The problem is, the world is a hard place and soft power has turned out to be a lot more soft than powerful.

In the very long run, Nye has an important point. The cultural creativity, economic prosperity, and general air of sane honesty in open societies is impossible to ignore, and over time can penetrate the most closed and repulsive societies.

Clearly the American example has had that effect over the last 250 years. Politically engaged people around the world may love or hate it, but mighty few have no strong opinion on the place because America is a standing reproach to repressive, impoverished regions, asking why they don’t trust their people to flourish in freedom. Britain has been too, over an even longer period, with salutary effects particularly on France.

There are nevertheless two significant problems with the whole “soft power” theory.

First, the example of the West frequently inspires horror rather than admiration. Second, we live in the short run and can easily die in it.

In Ukraine and Iraq, for example, all the blankets, university seminars and Facebook posts in the world can’t stop Vladimir Putin’s thugs or ISIS maniacs from shooting up the place. And it’s just so hard to have a long-run cultural impact on the dead and the traumatized.

Besides, Daesh, Boko Haram and the Taliban are exactly the kind of brittle people who lash out at the West rather than embracing its example. And the problematic Western example of individualism and liberty under law has loomed over Russian debates about national identity since Peter the Great and so far produced more Lenin, Stalin and Putin than Garry Kasparov.

Give it time, you may say. But 300 years is a long time. And without hard power to protect the soft kind, you don’t get that luxury.

Wikipedia says “According to the 2014 Monocle Soft Power Survey, the USA currently hold the top spot in soft power, being followed by Germany in second place. The top 10 is completed by the UK, Japan, France, Switzerland, Australia, Sweden, Denmark, and Canada.”

Maybe they need to put a lens in their other eye. Because that’s pretty much a list of the free societies with the greatest economic and military as well as cultural power. And these powerfully soft nations are having trouble facing the rising menace of China, coping with Putin or acting decisively in the Middle East.

As for the swords-to-ploughshares thing, Barack Obama recently begged the British not to slash defence spending further. When even he gets it, the rest of us don’t have much excuse.

As a hard power advocate, let me stress that sometimes nothing works. There are no practical Western military options in Ukraine. It’s too close to Russia’s heart, geographically and emotionally, and Moscow can escalate in ways we cannot match without courting disaster. Invading Nigeria is also out. But that’s precisely the point.

Without hard power, soft power doesn’t have time to operate. And sometimes neither can do much. Illusions certainly can’t.

These are the hard facts about soft power.

#### Soft power won’t be used for peace-keeping

**Forrestall 98**

[Michael Forrestall 98 - Senator of Canada (Soft power dead wrong for Canada: [Final Edition], May 6, 1998, <http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/240188678>)]

I was concerned by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy's April 25 letter, "Why `soft power' is the right policy for Canada." Mr. Axworthy attacks one of Canada's foremost academics, Prof. Kim Richard Nossal; academics in general who disagree with him; and Canada's senior military leadership who do not accept the Canada 21 agenda for a constabulary military and feel-good peacekeeping operations conceived in the Pearsonian Liberal past. The minister should, and indeed is obligated, to bring himself up to date, and take some note of international events. It is a sin that he has not, and shows an amazing lack of knowledge with regard to recent international history. **Soft power and Pearsonian peacekeeping died at Srebrenica, where lightly armed peacekeeping troops were forced to lay down their weapons and watch as the civilian population was systematically butchered.** Similarly, Mr. Axworthy might want to go and visit the families of Belgian peacekeepers who were butchered by superior forces in Rwanda. The examples go on and on, but armed conflict continues throughout the globe, and between groups and states. If Canada is to be as engaged on the world stage, as Mr. Axworthy suggests, then Canada must maintain well-equipped, modern, combat- ready forces geared for activities all across the spectrum of combat. Without question, soft power was rejected in the 1993 Special Joint Committee Report on Canada's Defence and in the 1994 White Paper, and for well-thought-out reasons. It is time for Mr. Axworthy to accept the realities of world politics/power politics and stop living in the woolly-headed past of Trudeau Liberal defence and foreign policy.

#### Multilateral efforts terminally fail

Barma et al. 13

Naazneen Barma is an assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Ely Ratner is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Steven Weber is a professor of political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, The National Interest, March/April 2013, "The Mythical Liberal Order", http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146

Not only have we seen this movie before, but it seems to be on repeat. Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international cooperation on significant issues. Global governance is in a serious drought—palpable across the full range of crucial, mounting international challenges that include nuclear proliferation, climate change, international development and the global financial crisis.

Where exactly is the liberal world order that so many Western observers talk about? Today we have an international political landscape that is neither orderly nor liberal.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In the envisaged liberal world order, the “rise of the rest” should have been a boost to global governance. A rebalancing of power and influence should have made international politics more democratic and multilateral action more legitimate, while bringing additional resources to bear. Economic integration and security-community enlargement should have started to envelop key players as the system built on itself through network effects—by making the benefits of joining the order (and the costs of opposing it) just a little bit greater for each new decision. Instead, the world has no meaningful deal on climate change; no progress on a decade-old global-trade round and no inclination toward a new one; no coherent response to major security issues around North Korea, Iran and the South China Sea; and no significant coordinated effort to capitalize on what is possibly the best opportunity in a generation for liberal progress—the Arab Spring.

It’s not particularly controversial to observe that global governance has gone missing. What matters is why. The standard view is that we’re seeing an international liberal order under siege, with emerging and established powers caught in a contest for the future of the global system that is blocking progress on global governance. That mental map identifies the central challenge of American foreign policy in the twenty-first century as figuring out how the United States and its allies can best integrate rising powers like China into the prevailing order while bolstering and reinforcing its foundations.

But this narrative and mental map are wrong. The liberal order can’t be under siege in any meaningful way (or prepped to integrate rising powers) because it never attained the breadth or depth required to elicit that kind of agenda. The liberal order is today still largely an aspiration, not a description of how states actually behave or how global governance actually works. The rise of a configuration of states that six years ago we called a “World Without the West” is not so much challenging a prevailing order as it is exposing the inherent frailty of the existing framework.

This might sound like bad news for American foreign policy and even worse news for the pursuit of global liberalism, but it doesn’t have to be so. Advancing a normative liberal agenda in the twenty-first century is possible but will require a new approach. Once strategists acknowledge that the liberal order is more or less a myth, they can let go of the anxious notion that some countries are attacking or challenging it, and the United States can be liberated from the burden of a supposed obligation to defend it. We can instead focus on the necessary task of building a liberal order from the ground up.

Loyalists are quick to defend the concept of a robust liberal order by falling back on outdated metrics of success. The original de minimis aims of the postwar order achieved what now should be considered a low bar: preventing a third world war and a race-to-the-bottom closure of the global-trade regime. Beyond that, the last seventy years have certainly seen movement toward globalization of trade and capital as well as some progress on human rights—but less clearly as a consequence of anything like a liberal world order than as a consequence of national power and interest.

What would a meaningful liberal world order actually look like if it were operating in practice? Consider an objective-based definition: a world in which most countries most of the time follow rules that contribute to progressively more collective security, shared economic gains and individual human rights. States would gradually downplay the virtues of relative advantage and self-reliance. Most states would recognize that foreign-policy choices are constrained (to their aggregate benefit) by multilateral institutions, global norms and nonstate actors. They would cede meaningful bits of sovereign authority in exchange for proactive collaboration on universal challenges. And they would accept that economic growth is best pursued through integration, not mercantilism, and is in turn the most reliable source of national capacity, advancement and influence. With those ingredients in place, we would expect to see the gradual, steady evolution of something resembling an “international community” bound by rights and responsibilities to protect core liberal values of individual rights and freedoms.

No wonder proponents of the liberal-world-order perspective hesitate to offer precise definitions of it. Few of these components can reasonably be said to have been present for any length of time at a global level in the post–World War II world. There may be islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different. Moreover, the vectors today are mostly pointing away from the direction of a liberal world order.

HOW DID we get here? Consider two founding myths of liberal internationalism. The first is that expressions of post–World War II American power and leadership were synonymous with the maturation of a liberal order. The narrative should sound familiar: The United States wins World War II and controls half of global GDP. The United States constructs an international architecture aimed at promoting an open economic system and a semi-institutionalized approach to fostering cooperation on security and political affairs. And the United States provides the essential global public goods—an extended security deterrent and the global reserve currency—to make cooperation work. Some essential elements of the system survive in a posthegemony era because the advantages to other significant powers of sustained institutionalized cooperation exceed the costs and risks of trying to change the game.

In the 1990s the narrative gets more interesting, controversial and relevant. This is when the second foundational myth of the liberal world order—that it has an inexorable magnetic attraction—comes to the fore. The end of the Cold War and the attendant rejection of Communism is supposed to benefit the liberal world order in breadth and depth: on the internal front, new capitalist democracies should converge on individuals’ market-based economic choice and election-based political choice; on the external front, the relationships among states should become increasingly governed by a set of liberal international norms that privilege and protect the civic and political freedoms that capitalist democracies promise. The liberal order’s geography should then expand to encompass the non-Western world. Its multilateral rules, institutions and norms should increase in density across economic, political and security domains. As positive network effects kick in, the system should evolve to be much less dependent on American power. It’s supposedly easier—and more beneficial—to join the liberal world order than it is to oppose it (or even to try to modify it substantially). A choice to live outside the system becomes progressively less realistic: few countries can imagine taking on the contradictions of modern governance by themselves, particularly in the face of expanding multilateral free trade and interdependent security institutions.

The story culminates in a kind of magnetic liberalism, where countries and foreign-policy decisions are attracted to the liberal world order like iron filings to a magnet. With few exceptions, U.S. foreign policy over the last two decades has been predicated on the assumption that the magnetic field is strong and getting stronger. It’s a seductive idea, but it should not be confused with reality. In practice, the magnetic field is notable mainly for its weakness. It is simply not the case today that nations feel equally a part of, answerable to or constrained by a liberal order. And nearly a quarter century after 1989, it has become disingenuous to argue that the liberal world order is simply slow in getting off the ground—as if the next gust of democratic transitions or multilateral breakthroughs will offer the needed push to revive those triumphalist moments brought on by the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the contrary, the aspirational liberal end state is receding into the horizon.

THE PICTURE half a century ago looked more promising, with the initial rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the successful establishment of NATO setting expectations about what multilateral governance could achieve. But international institutions picked off the low-hanging fruit of global cooperation decades ago and have since stalled in their attempts to respond to pressing international challenges. The 1990s served up the best possible set of conditions to advance global liberalism, but subsequent moves toward political and economic liberalization that came with the end of the Cold War were either surprisingly shallow or fragile and short-lived.

Ask yourself this: Have developing countries felt and manifested over time the increasing magnetic pull of the liberal world order? A number of vulnerable developing and post-Communist transitional countries adopted a “Washington Consensus” package of liberal economic policies—freer trade, marketization and privatization of state assets—in the 1980s and 1990s. But these adjustments mostly arrived under the shadow of coercive power. They generally placed the burden of adjustment disproportionately on the most disempowered members of society. And, with few exceptions, they left developing countries more, not less, vulnerable to global economic volatility. The structural-adjustment policies imposed in the midst of the Latin American debt crisis and the region’s subsequent “lost decade” of the 1980s bear witness to each of these shortcomings, as do the failed voucher-privatization program and consequent asset stripping and oligarchic wealth concentration experienced by Russians in the 1990s.

If these were the gains that were supposed to emerge from a liberal world order, it’s no surprise that liberalism came to have a tarnished brand in much of the developing world. The perception that economic neoliberalism fails to deliver on its trickle-down growth pledge is strong and deep. In contrast, state capitalism and resource nationalism—vulnerable to a different set of contradictions, of course—have for the moment delivered tangible gains for many emerging powers and look like promising alternative development paths. Episodic signs of pushback against some of the excesses of that model, such as anti-Chinese protests in Angola or Zambia, should not be confused with a yearning for a return to liberal prescriptions. And comparative economic performance in the wake of the global financial crisis has done nothing to burnish liberalism’s economic image, certainly not in the minds of those who saw the U.S. investment banking–led model of capital allocation as attractive, and not in the minds of those who held a vision of EU-style, social-welfare capitalism as the next evolutionary stage of liberalism.

There’s just as little evidence of sustained liberal magnetism operating in the politics of the developing world, where entrenched autocrats guarding their legitimacy frequently caricature democracy promotion as a not-very-surreptitious strategy to replace existing regimes with either self-serving instability or more servile allies of the West. In practice, the liberal order’s formula for democratic freedom has been mostly diluted down to observing electoral procedures. The results have been almost uniformly disappointing, as the legacy of post–Cold War international interventions from Cambodia to Iraq attests. Even the more organic “color revolutions” of Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century have stalled into equilibria Freedom House identifies as only “partly free”—in reality affording average citizens little access to political or economic opportunities. Only two years past the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring a similar disillusionment has set in across the Middle East, where evidence for the magnetic pull of a liberal world order is extremely hard to find.

Contemporary developments in Southeast Asia illustrate where the most important magnetic forces of change actually come from. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has successfully coordinated moves toward trade liberalization in the region, but this has not been underpinned by a set of liberal principles or collective norms. Instead, the goals have been instrumental—to protect the region from international economic volatility and to cement together some counterweight to the Chinese economy. And ASEAN is explicitly not a force for individual political and economic freedom. Indeed, it acts more like a bulwark against “interference” in internal affairs. The aspirations one occasionally hears for the organization to implement collective-governance measures come from Western observers much more frequently than from the people and states that comprise the group itself.

Global governistas will protest that the response to the global financial crisis proves that international economic cooperation is more robust than we acknowledge. In this view, multilateral financial institutions passed the stress test and prevented the world from descending into the economic chaos of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies and retaliatory currency arbitrage and capital controls. The swift recovery of global trade and capital flows is often cited as proof of the relative success of economic cooperation. The problem with this thesis is that very real fears about how the system could collapse, including the worry that states would retreat behind a mercantilist shell, are no different from what they were a hundred years ago. It’s not especially indicative of liberal progress to be having the same conversation about global economic governance that the world was having at the end of the gold-standard era and the onset of the Great Depression. Global economic governance may have helped to prevent a repeat downward spiral into self-defeating behaviors, but surely in a world order focused on liberal progress the objectives of global economic governance should have moved on by now. And the final chapter here has yet to be written. From the perspective of many outside the United States, the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented “quantitative easing” policies are not far off from monetary warfare on the exchange and inflation rates of others. Astute analysts have observed that as banks have operated more nationalistically and cautiously, the free flow of capital across borders has declined. A global climate that is at serious risk of breeding currency and trade wars is hardly conducive to the health and expansion of any liberal world order.

On matters of war and peace, the international community is fighting similar battles and for the most part experiencing similar failures to provide a system of collective security. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, more than five million people have died directly and indirectly from fifteen years of civil war and conflict. Just to the north, the international community stood by and watched a genocide in Sudan. In places more strategically important to leading nations, the outcome—as showcased in Syria—is geopolitical gridlock.

The last time the Security Council managed to agree on what seemed like serious collective action was over Libya, but both China and Russia now believe they were intentionally misled and that what was sold as a limited humanitarian mission was really a regime-change operation illegitimately authorized by the UN. This burst of multilateralism has actually made global-security governance down the road less likely. Meanwhile, international cooperation on security matters has been relegated to things like second-tier peacekeeping operations and efforts to ward off pirates equipped with machine guns and speedboats. These are worthy causes but will not move the needle on the issues that dominate the international-security agenda. And on the emerging issues most in need of forward-looking global governance—cybersecurity and unmanned aerial vehicles, for example—there are no rules and institutions in place at all, nor legitimate and credible mechanisms to devise them.

Assessed against its ability to solve global problems, the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions dissolve when the going gets tough—