### 1

#### Interpretation: affirmative debaters must delineate what intellectual property they reduce in the 1AC.

#### There are four distinct types of IP

Ackerman 17 [Peter; Founder & CEO, Innovation Asset Group, Inc; “The 4 Main Types of Intellectual Property and Related Costs,” Decipher; 1/6/17; <https://www.innovation-asset.com/blog/the-4-main-types-of-intellectual-property-and-related-costs>] AK re-cut

Intellectual property protection isn’t as simple as declaring ownership of a particular product or asset. In most countries, there are four primary types of intellectual property (IP) that can be legally protected: patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. Each has their own attributes, requirements and costs. Before narrowing your focus on which form of protection to use, know that these forms of protection are not mutually exclusive. Depending on what you’re doing, you might be able to use a “belt & suspenders” approach and apply multiple forms of protection, or one approach might be the most sensible. Read the descriptions below to get some of the basics. Used to protect inventive ideas or processes – things that are new, useful and nonobvious - patents are what most often come to mind when thinking of IP protection. Patents are also used to protect newly engineered plant species or strains, as well. Procedure For most companies, patents result from the following stages: Conceptualization Typically, innovation teams work to address a common problem facing their organization, industry, or the world at large when developing their idea. When they’ve arrived at a solution or concept, they’ll draw up plans and gather the resources necessary to make it a reality. Prototypes or drawings can be created to provide a more accurate description of the end product or process. Invention Disclosure An internal review process often occurs with every invention. The innovation team consists of internal counsel and an invention review panel of varying disciplines. The reviewers assess, rate, rank, score, and highlight potential flaws in the supporting documents and descriptions for the invention, which are then addressed by the inventor. These reviews can and often do take place multiple times for a single invention. Patent Application If the invention is deemed meritorious enough for the pursuit of patent protection, some organizations prepare their own provisional or nonprovisional patent applications. Others will farm this stage out. There may be more tweaks as an application is prepared, and then submission to the appropriate patent office and the prosecution stage begins (the back & forth with the government patent office). Typically it is outside counsel that manages this process and related docketing activities. Docketing is the overarching name for activities that include management of paperwork and meeting filing deadlines specified by the government patent office. Because the application process is often very complicated, patent offices highly recommend working with experienced patent attorneys to handle this process. Maintenance Once a patent is approved, it has a finite lifetime. Patent holders are responsible for maintaining and tracking the usage of their patents and paying the appropriate periodic government renewal fees. If a given technology or other patented asset is collecting dust, you might not want to renew it. Instead, you can try and sell, license or donate it. Conversely, if a patented asset is performing well through product sales or licensing activities and its life is getting shorter, you might think about innovating ahead and maintaining competitive momentum. Costs Costs will vary depending on the country or countries where you file an application, and can run into tens of thousands of dollars depending on the invention’s complexity, plus attorney fees. Maintenance fees over the lifetime of the patent can run into thousands more per patent, per country where patent rights have been granted. You have to keep your eyes on these costs. Trademark A trademark is unlike a patent in that it protects words, phrases, symbols, sounds, smells and color schemes. Trademarks are often considered assets that describe or otherwise identify the source of underlying products or services that a company provides, such as the MGM lion roar, the Home Depot orange color scheme, the Intel Inside logo, and so on. Procedure Trademarks do not necessarily require government approval to be in effect; they can apply through abundant use in interstate commerce. Still, registration of a trademark affords far superior protection and is gained by filing an application with the proper government office. A trademark application requires the company or user to provide a clear description and representation of the mark and its uses in conjunction with associated products or services. As with patents, it’s a good idea to partner with outside counsel that specializes in trademark applications and/or search services so they can help ensure there is a clear path for your desired mark. Costs Trademarks are generally quite less expensive to obtain. According to the US Patent and Trademark Office, trademark registration currently costs between $225 and $325 for each class code you use per mark. Attorney and search fees are extra. There are also periodic (and relatively inexpensive) government maintenance fees for trademarks. Copyrights do not protect ideas, but rather the manner in which ideas are expressed (“original works of authorship”) - written works, art, music, architectural drawings, or even programming code for software (most evident nowadays in video game entertainment). With certain exceptions, copyrights allow the owner of the protected materials to control reproduction, performance, new versioning or adaptations, public performance and distribution of the works. Procedure Copyrights in general attach when the original works become fixed in a tangible medium, but should be registered with the government copyright office for optimal protection in the form of damages, injunctions and confiscation. Copyright registration applications are much simpler than patents or trademarks, and typically can be obtained by the author alone. The US Copyright Office encourages use of their online application system, and requires a sample of the work to be protected and some background information about the author. Costs Depending on the type of work being protected, currently fees vary between $25-$100 in the US. The most frequent copyright registration sought is for one work by one author, and costs about $35. Trade Secret Trade secrets are proprietary procedures, systems, devices, formulas, strategies or other information that is confidential and exclusive to the company using them. They act as competitive advantages for the business. Procedure There actually isn’t a federally-regulated registration process for trade secrets. Instead, the onus is on the company in possession of the secret to take necessary precautions to maintain it as such. This is an ongoing, proactive process and can include clearly marking relevant documents as “Confidential,” implementing physical and data security measures, keeping logs of visitors and restricting access. The issuance of nondisclosure agreements or other documented assurances of secrecy can also be employed. One of the first defenses typically put up when you assert that someone misappropriated your trade secret is that you failed to adequately treat it as a trade secret. Costs Though there are no official registration costs, there are costs associated with taking appropriate precautions and security measures. You must weigh the competitive significance of your secrets against the cost of protecting them.

#### Violation: they don’t

#### Negate:

#### 1] Shiftiness- they can redefine what intellectual properties the 1ac defends in the 1ar which decks strategy and allows them to wriggle out of negative positions which strips the neg of specific IP DAs, IP PICs, and case answers. They will always win on specificity weighing.

#### CX can’t resolve this and is bad because A] Not flowed B] Skews 6 min of prep C] They can lie and no way to check D] Debaters can be shady.

#### 2] Real World- policy makers will always specify what the object of change is. That outweighs since debate has no value without portable application. It also means zero solvency since the WTO, absent spec, can circumvent aff’s policy since they can say they didn’t know what was affected.

#### This spec shell isn’t regressive- it literally determines what the affirmative implements and who it affects

#### Voters –

#### Fairness matters – debate is a competitive activity which requires equal rules

#### Education matters – it’s the only terminal impact to debate

#### Drop the debater –

#### They skewed the round so they should lose

#### it’s key to deter future abuse

#### use competing interps – reasonability is vague and arbitrary

#### no rvi

#### chilling effect – debaters won’t read theory if others read pre-empts

#### logic – you shouldn’t win for being fair

### 2

#### Sustained military power key to preserving the liberal world order that prevents catastrophic transition wars with revisionist Russia and China – multiplicity of factors explains their historical grievances and strategic motivations, but ONLY hard power can check their revisionist rise.

Kagan ’17 – Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings

Robert Kagan, “The Twilight of the Liberal World Order,” Brookings Big Ideas for America edited by Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Press (2017): <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.31>

The liberal world order established in the aftermath of World War II may be coming to an end, challenged by forces both without and within. The external challenges come from the ambition of dissatisfied large and medium-size powers to overturn the existing strategic order dominated by the United States and its allies and partners. Their aim is to gain hegemony in their respective regions. China and Russia pose the greatest challenges to the world order because of their relative military, economic, and political power and their evident willingness to use it, which makes them significant players in world politics and, just as important, because the regions where they seek strategic hegemony—Asia and Europe—historically have been critical to global peace and stability. At a lesser but still significant level, Iran seeks regional hegemony in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which if accomplished would have a strategic, economic, and political impact on the international system. North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula, which if accomplished would affect the stability and security of northeast Asia. Finally, at a much lower level of concern, there is the effort by ISIS and other radical Islamist groups to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. If accomplished, that, too, would have effects on the global order.

However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided.

The role of the United States, however, has been critical. Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost insuperable obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism has posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful.

The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined military power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge.

Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions.

The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core order—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.

In recent years, however, the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core. As a result of many related factors—difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism—there has emerged a crisis of confidence in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project tended to elevate universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and fa cilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism; an increasing focus on the “other” in all societies; and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence.

This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable. It may indeed have been cyclical, due to inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy, which periodically have been exposed and have raised doubts about both—as happened, for instance, throughout the West in the 1930s. Now, as then, moreover, this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order. In this case, however, the key variable has not been the United States as the outside power and its willingness, or not, to step in and save or remake an order lost by other powers. Rather it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power.

That willingness has been in doubt for some time. Increasingly in the quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always apparently served and when, indeed, the United States seems to be making sacrifices while others benefit. The reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century have been largely forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing such a role has worn thin. Thus, whereas previous unsuccessful wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as in the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2007–09 have had that effect. President Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but the main thrust of his approach was retrenchment. His actions and statements were a critique of previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests.

With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have sig naled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order.

Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. The weakness of the liberal core and the abdication by the United States of its global responsibilities will encourage more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers, which may in turn exacerbate the sense of weakness and helplessness and the loss of confidence of the liberal world, which will in turn increase the sense on the part of the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests.

History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of global responsibility, to reject strategic involvement to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict.

One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltics, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. The cycle only ends if and when the great powers that make up the existing power structure, in today’s case, the United States, decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.

The new administration seems to be fixated almost entirely on the threat of radical Islam and may not believe its main problem is going to be great power confrontation. In fact, it is going to have to confront both sets of challenges. The first, addressing the threat of terrorism, is comparatively manageable. It is the second, managing great power competition and confrontation, that has historically proved the most difficult and also the most costly when handled badly.

The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear from the outset. That position should be that the United States welcomes competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.

But security competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

If history is any guide, the next four years are the critical inflection point. The rest of the world will take its cue from the early actions of the new administration. If the next president governs as he ran, which is to say if he pursues a course designed to secure only America’s narrow interests; focuses chiefly on international terrorism—the least of the challenges to the present world order; accommodates the ambitions of the great powers; ceases to regard international economic policy in terms of global order but only in terms of America’s bottom line narrowly construed; and generally ceases to place a high priority on reassuring allies and partners in the world’s principal strategic theaters—then the collapse of the world order, with all that entails, may not be far off.

#### American military force key to prevent genocidal violence – their reactionary “anti-Imperial” ethics sanction authoritarian intervention, locks out globalism, and condemn millions to death

Hamid ’16 - senior fellow at the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution

Shadi Hamid, “Is a Better World Possible Without U.S. Military Force?,” The Atlantic, October 18, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/american-intervention-syria/504512/>.

The eight years of the Obama presidency have offered us a natural experiment of sorts. Not all U.S. presidents are similar on foreign policy, and not all (or any) U.S. presidents are quite like Barack Obama. After two terms of George W. Bush’s aggressive militarism, we have had the opportunity to watch whether attitudes toward the U.S.—and U.S. military force—would change, if circumstances changed. President Obama shared at least some of the assumptions of both the hard Left and foreign-policy realists, that the use of direct U.S. military force abroad, even with the best of intentions, often does more harm then good. Better, then, to “do no harm.”

This has been Barack Obama’s position on the Syrian Civil War, the key foreign-policy debate of our time. The president’s discomfort with military action against the Syrian regime seems deep and instinctual and oblivious to changing facts on the ground. When the debate over intervention began, around 5,000 Syrians had been killed. Now it’s close to 500,000. Yet, Obama’s basic orientation toward the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has remained unchanged. This suggests that Obama, like many others who oppose U.S. intervention against Assad, is doing so on “principled” or, to put it differently, ideological grounds.

Despite President Obama’s very conscious desire to limit America’s role in the Middle East and to minimize the extent to which U.S. military assets are deployed in the region, there is little evidence that the views of the hard Left and other critics of American power have changed as a result. (Yes, the U.S. military is arguably involved in more countries now than when the Obama administration took office, but—compared to Iraq and Afghanistan before him—Obama’s footprint has been decidedly limited, with a reliance on drone strikes and special-operations forces.) As for those who actually live in the Middle East, a less militaristic America has done little to temper anti-Americanism. In the three countries—Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon—for which Pew has survey data for both Bush’s last year and either 2014 or 2015, favorability toward the U.S. is significantly worse under Obama today than it was in 2008. Why exactly is up for debate, but we can at the very least say that a drastic drawdown of U.S. military personnel—precisely the policy pushed for by Democrats in the wake of Iraq’s failure—does not seem to have bought America much goodwill.

Despite the fact that Assad and Russia are responsible for indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, many leftists have viewed even the mere mention of the U.S. doing anything in response as “warmongering.” We have had the unfortunate situation of someone as (formerly) well-respected as Jeffrey Sachs arguing that the U.S. should provide “air cover and logistical support” to Bashar al-Assad. We have had Wikileaks’ attacks on the White Helmets, who have risked—and, for at least 140, lost—their lives in the worst conditions to save Syrian lives from the rubble of Syrian and Russian bombardment. Of course, it is not an absurd position to be skeptical of any proposed American escalation against Assad, and many reasonable people across the political spectrum have made that case. But it is something else entirely to apply such skepticism selectively to the U.S. and not to others, especially when the others in question deliberately target civilians as a matter of policy. It can be a slippery slope. While no one would accuse Obama of liking Putin, coordinating with and enabling Russia in Syria is effectively U.S. policy. As the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen noted in February, well before the current disaster in Aleppo: “The troubling thing is that the Putin policy on Syria has become hard to distinguish from the Obama policy.”

The Left has always had a utopian bent, believing that life, not just for Americans, but for millions abroad, can be made better through human agency (rather than, say, simply hoping that the market will self-correct). The problem, though, is that the better, more just world that so many hope for is simply impossible without the use of American military force. At first blush, such a claim might seem self-evidently absurd. Haven’t we all seen what happened in Iraq? The 2003 Iraq invasion was one of the worst strategic blunders in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Yet, it’s not clear what exactly this has to do with the Syrian conflict, which is almost the inverse of the Iraq war. In Iraq, civil war happened after the U.S. invasion. In Syria, civil war broke out in the absence of U.S. intervention.

What all of this suggests is that attitudes toward the U.S. military, and by extension the United States, are often “inelastic,” meaning that what the U.S. actually does or doesn’t do abroad has limited bearing on perceptions of American power. As a general proposition, many leftists, for example, seem to believe that there is something intrinsically wrong with the use of military force by the United States. In other words, when America does it, it is a bad thing, irrespective of the outcomes it produces, and therefore should be opposed outright. There is rarely any real effort to explain why it’s bad—after all, if it were purely a moral stand against the killing of innocents, the use of Russian or Syrian military force would have to be considered much worse.

But, for the use of American power abroad to be intrinsically wrong or immoral, all uses of military force would have to be either immoral or ineffective, or both. However, as a factual matter, this is simply not the case. There was no way to stop mass slaughter and genocide in Bosnia or Kosovo without U.S. military force, buttressed, as it should be, by broad regional or international consensus. In those two cases, a U.S.-led coalition acted. In those cases where the international community did not act, genocide did, in fact, occur, as we witnessed in Rwanda. What became clear then—and what has become clear once again in Syria—is that a world where others than the U.S. take the initiative to stop such slaughter does not exist, and is unlikely to exist at any point in the foreseeable future. While they may be less common, there are also cases where dictators will not only kill their own people but try to forcefully invade and conquer their neighbors. As in the first Gulf War, the gobbling up of Kuwait could not have been prevented without a U.S.-led coalition, again with broad international support.

The list goes on. From a moral standpoint, no one should have to suffer under the indignities of ISIS rule. From a strategic standpoint, having an extremist state the size of Indiana in the middle of the Middle East, needless to say, does not suggest the coming of a better, more secure world. While Obama was late to act against the organization and while the anti-ISIS campaign has been deeply flawed, the amount of territory that ISIS controls has been reduced significantly, due in large part to U.S. airstrikes, intelligence, and special-operations forces. No one, not Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or anyone else, was going to seriously confront ISIS without U.S. coordination and leadership, and it’s U.S. coordination and leadership that is facilitating the current battle for the Islamic State’s Iraqi stronghold in Mosul. This is the faulty—and ultimately quite dangerous—premise behind one of the founding assumptions of Obama’s foreign policy: that if the U.S. steps back, others will step in. Even when “others” do step in, the results are often destructive, since America’s allies and adversaries alike do not generally share its values, interests, or objectives.

Of course, U.S. military force may be necessary, but it can never be sufficient on its own. This is where the judgment, morality, and strategic vision of politicians and policymakers can make the crucial difference. The United States has not been the “force for good” that many Americans would like to think it’s been. There is a tragic history of intervention abroad that more Americans should be aware of, whether it’s overthrowing democratically elected leaders in Latin America or backing brutal dictators in the Middle East. There is no reason to think the U.S. is necessarily doomed to repeat those mistakes indefinitely. But even if it was, there would still be instances where only U.S. military force could be counted on to stop genocide.

#### For them to win an impact turn, they need to defend and robustly define their alternative to US primacy

Kagan ’18 - Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings

Robert Kagan, “The World America Made—and Trump Wants to Unmake,” POLITICO Magazine, September 28, 2018, <https://politi.co/2zB3qCg>.

So, yes, the liberal order has been flawed, with its share of failure and hypocrisy. Liberal goals have sometimes been pursued by illiberal means. Power, coercion and violence have played a big part. The order has been the product of American hegemony and it has also served to reinforce that hegemony. But to note these facts is hardly to condemn the order. No order of any kind can exist without some element of hegemony. The Roman order was based on the hegemony of Rome; the British order of the 18th and 19th centuries was based on the hegemony of the Royal Navy; such order as existed briefly in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon—the so-called Concert of Europe—rested on the collective hegemony of the four victorious great powers. The idea of a peaceful, stable multipolar world where no power or powers enjoy predominance is a dream that exists only in the minds of one-world idealists and international relations theorists.

The same is true of those who would condemn the liberal world order because of the persistence of violence, coercion, hypocrisy, selfishness, stupidity and all the other evils and foibles endemic to human nature. Perhaps in the confines of academia it is possible to imagine a system of international relations where our deeply flawed humanness is removed from the equation. But in the real world, even the best and most moral of international arrangements are going to have their dark, immoral aspects.

The question is, as always, compared to what? Patrick Porter, the author of a widely discussed critique of the liberal world order, acknowledges that “if there was to be a superpower emerging from the rubble of world war in midcentury, we should be grateful it was the United States, given the totalitarian alternatives on offer. Under America’s aegis, there were islands of liberty where prosperous markets and democracies grew.” Indeed, that would seem to be the key point. At any given time there are only so many alternatives, and usually the choice is between the bad and the worse.

Are the alternatives on offer so much better now? Graham Allison, dismissing any return to the “imagined past” when the United States shaped an international liberal order, proposes that we instead make the world “safe for diversity” and accommodate ourselves to “the reality that other countries have contrary views about governance and seek to establish their own international orders governed by their own rules.” Others, such as Peter Beinart, similarly argue that we should accommodate Russian and Chinese demands for their own spheres of interest, even if that entails the sacrifice of sovereign peoples such as Ukrainians and Taiwanese. This wonderfully diverse world would presumably be run partly by Xi Jinping, partly by Vladimir Putin, and partly, too, by the Ayatollah Khamenei and by Kim Jong Un, who would also like to establish orders governed by their own rules. We have not enjoyed such diversity since the world was run partly by Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini.

The idea that this is the solution to our problems is laughable. Porter points out American policy has led to “multiplying foreign conflicts” and put the United States “on a collision course with rivals.” Setting aside the fact that multiplying foreign conflicts and collisions between rivals is the natural state of international relations in any era, it is hard for any student of history to imagine that these problems would lessen if only we returned to the competitive multipolar world of the 19th and early 20th centuries. To suggest that there could be a world with no collisions and no foreign conflicts, if only the United States would pursue an intelligent policy, is the very opposite of realism.

Strikingly absent from all these critiques of the liberal world order, too, is any suggestion of an alternative approach. The critiques end with lists of questions that need to be answered. Allison calls for a “surge of strategic thinking.” Others call for “new thinking” about “difficult trade-offs.” Some critics even complain that so long as people continue to talk about a U.S.-dominated liberal order, it will be “impossible for us to construct a reasonable alternative for the future.”

The most the critiques will offer are suggestions that sound more like attitudes than policies. They throw around words like “realism,” “restraint” and “retrenchment.” Allison proposes that the United States “limit its efforts to ensuring sufficient order abroad.” Beinart comes closest to offering an alternative, but he clearly has not yet thought it through fully. He wants to grant other powers their spheres of interest, for instance, but he mentions only Russia and China. Does this mean Russia should be granted full sway in, say, Ukraine, the Balkans, the Baltics and the Caucuses? Should China be able to impose its will on the Philippines and Vietnam?

And what of the other great powers? Does Japan get its own sphere of interest? Does India? Do Germany, France and Britain? They all had their spheres a century ago, and of course it was the clashes over those inevitably overlapping spheres that led to all the great wars. Is Beinart suggesting we should return to that past?

Of course, we may be moving toward that world, anyway. That is the implication of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy philosophy, his attacks on “globalism” and his recent suggestion that all nations look out strictly for themselves. Trump’s speech at the U.N. was an invitation to global anarchy, a struggle of all against all. His boasting about American power put the world on notice that the United States was turning from supporter of a liberal order to rogue superpower. This breakdown may be our future, but it seems odd to choose that course as a deliberate strategy, as Allison and others seem to do. Little wonder that they don’t wish to spell out the details of their alternative but prefer to carp at the inevitable failures and imperfections of the liberal world we have. As John Hay once remarked, “Our good friends are wiser when they abuse us for what we do, than when they try to say what ought to be done.”

No honest person would deny that the liberal world order has been flawed and will continue to be flawed in the future. The League of Nations was also flawed, as was Woodrow Wilson’s vision of collective security. Yet the world would have been better had the United States joined in upholding it, given the genuine alternative. The enduring truth about the liberal world order is that, like Churchill’s comment about democracy, it is the worst system—except for all the others.

#### Extinction outweighs

-precautionary principle= default

**Jablonowski 10**

**(Mark, April, Lecturer in Economics at the University of Hartford, “Implications of Fuzziness for the Practical Management of High-Stakes Risks,” International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, Vol.3, No. 1, JKS)**

**“Danger” is an inherently fuzzy concept. Considerable knowledge imperfections surround** both **the probability of high-stakes exposures, and the assessment of their acceptability.** **This is due to the complex and dynamic nature of risk in the modern world**. ¶ **Fuzzy thresholds for danger are most effectively established based on natural risk standards. This means that risk levels are acceptable only to the degree they blend with natural background levels**. This concept reflects an evolutionary process that has supported life on this planet for thousands of years. By adhering to these levels, **we can help assure ourselves of thousands more.** While the level of such risks is yet to be determined, **observation suggest that the degree of human-made risk we routinely subject ourselves to is several orders of magnitude higher.** ¶ Due to the fuzzy nature of risk, we can not rely on statistical techniques. **The fundamental problem with catastrophe remains, in the long run, there may be no long run**. That is, **we can not rely on results “averaging out” over time.** With such risks, **only precautionary avoidance** (based on the minimax’ing of the largest possible loss) **makes sense. Combined with reasonable natural thresholds, this view allows a very workable approach to achieving safe progress**.

### 3

#### Dems win the Senate now, but it’s close---it determines the Biden presidency.

Shane **Goldmacher 7/17**. Reporter, New York Times, “Democrats See Edge in Early Senate Map as Trump Casts Big Shadow,” The New York Times, July 17, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/17/us/politics/midterm-elections.html>, RJP, DebateDrills.

Six months into the Biden administration, Senate Democrats are expressing a cautious optimism that the party can keep control of the chamber in the 2022 midterm elections, enjoying large fund-raising hauls in marquee races as they plot to exploit Republican retirements in key battlegrounds and a divisive series of unsettled G.O.P. primaries.

Swing-state Democratic incumbents, like Senators Raphael Warnock of Georgia and Mark Kelly of Arizona, restocked their war chests with multimillion-dollar sums ($7.2 million and $6 million, respectively), according to new financial filings this week. That gives them an early financial head start in two key states where Republicans’ disagreements over former President Donald J. Trump’s refusal to accept his loss in 2020 are threatening to distract and fracture the party.

But Democratic officials are all too aware of the foreboding political history they confront: that in a president’s first midterms, the party occupying the White House typically loses seats — often in bunches. For now, Democrats hold power by only the narrowest of margins in a 50-50 split Senate, with Vice President Kamala Harris serving as the tiebreaker to push through President Biden’s expansive agenda on the economy, the pandemic and infrastructure.

#### The plan is unpopular---it’s seen as soft on China.

Cynthia Hicks 21. Director of Public Affairs at PhRMA focusing on polling and opinion research that supports advocacy communications and strategy. “New polling shows Americans are sounding the alarm on the TRIPS IP waiver,” PhRMA, May 14, 2021, <https://catalyst.phrma.org/new-polling-shows-americans-are-sounding-the-alarm-on-the-trips-ip-waiver>, RJP, DebateDrills

\*\*\*NOTE – the stuff after “include the following” is a picture that couldn’t be pasted. Go to the URL if you want to see it.

2. Americans are concerned that the TRIPS waiver could risk patient safety, sow public confusion, and cede America’s global innovation leadership to China.

Americans worry that waiving intellectual property introduces unnecessary and dangerous risks to safety and vaccine manufacturing. The top concerns – expressed by more than six in ten voters – include the following:

#### China is the key for the midterms---Senate control hinges on it.

Sarah Mucha 21. Politics reporter at Axios, covering the Biden administration and Congress. “Parties pounce on China as midterm issue,” Axios, June 23, 2021, <https://www.axios.com/democrat-republicans-china-2022-midterms-6c242c54-b51b-444e-b9b2-65ff0afb906a.html>, RJP, DebateDrills

Democrats and Republicans in purple states are already leaning into U.S. competition with China as a key issue in the fight to control the Senate in 2022.

Why it matters: American voters hold [increasingly negative feelings](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/12/americans-views-of-asia-pacific-nations-have-not-changed-since-2018-with-the-exception-of-china/) toward the Chinese government, particularly around bilateral economic relations and following the nation’s handling of the COVID-19 outbreak.

President Biden also has made it clear that confronting China remains a foreign policy priority.

[Possibly vulnerable Democratic senators](https://www.axios.com/senate-seats-2022-midterm-elections-aa166e09-65e9-49be-a1f4-428c36a8dad0.html) are capitalizing on the passage of the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, a sweeping global competition bill focused on China that [recently passed by a rare bipartisan vote](https://www.axios.com/senate-china-competition-bipartisan-e2fa3f88-16d4-4d79-bab0-1b9c6a4f2774.html).

Sen. Raphael Warnock (D-Ga.) visited Kia’s West Point factory in Georgia to address how the bill could address the recent semiconductor shortage and avoid future plant shutdowns, like one the factory experienced.

Sens. Maggie Hassan (D-N.H.) and Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) wrote op-eds in their local news outlets highlighting the bill's benefits.

The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and state Democratic parties are calling out Republicans like Sens. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), both of whom voted against the bill.

They’ve also targeted Republicans running in open Senate seats who have expressed opposition to the bill.

Meanwhile, Rubio has been making a play for China hawks in Florida, Axios’ Lachlan Markay [reported last week](https://www.axios.com/rubios-anti-china-voters-senate-race-florida-7f6539ab-86b8-4d08-a423-0a26598863ea.html).

Rubio, who is up for re-election next year, has been sending campaign emails with subject lines such as, "Dems <3 China," and, "Is it time to stand up to Communist China?" to a list maintained by a nonprofit group called Stand Up to China.

In Arizona, Republicans latched onto [Kelly's ties to a Chinese tech firm](https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/05/14/senate-elections-2020-mark-kelly-business-ties-chinese-tech-firm-under-fire/5187587002/) last year, and it's likely they'll continue to use that strategy.

The senator's team has argued he isn't beholden to Chinese authorities.

Republicans have long branded Democrats as "weak" on China as a line of attack. Expect that to continue through the campaign cycle, as Democratic candidates tout the passage of the U.S. Innovation Act and reframe the narrative.

They plan to focus on increasing the United States' competitive edge with China as a policy priority.

What they’re saying: David Bergstein, a spokesman for the DSCC, said the campaign committee will be “reminding voters that any Republican who refused to back this critical bill was too weak to stand up to China in order to protect and grow good-paying jobs.”

Chris Hartline, spokesman for the NRSC, said in a statement that "no one believes that Joe Biden and Senate Democrats will do what it takes to confront the geopolitical and economic threat posed by (President) Xi (Jinping) and the Chinese Communist Party.

#### GOP control of the Senate will be used to usher in a new wave of Trumpism, crushing democracy.

Morton **Kondracke 21**. Retired executive editor of Roll Call, a former "McLaughlin Group" and Fox News commentator and co-author, with Fred Barnes, of Jack Kemp: The Bleeding Heart Conservative Who Changed America. “Why Democrats Must Retain Control of Congress in 2022,” RealClearPolitics, August 4, 2021, <https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2021/08/04/why_democrats_must_retain_control_of_congress_in_2022_146189.html>, RJP, DebateDrills

The 2020 election demonstrated how fragile our democracy is. As Donald Trump tried, [by means both legal and illegal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attempts_to_overturn_the_2020_United_States_presidential_election), to overturn the results of a free and fair election, only the [courts and a thin line of courageous Republican election officials](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/its-official-election-was-secure) guaranteed that the peoples’ choice prevailed.

But the safeguards are weaker. Although the Supreme Court [upheld](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-rejects-final-trump-election-challenge-n1260023) the last lower-court dismissal of multiple Trump-inspired lawsuits charging election fraud, in July the court [upheld new voting restrictions](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/voting-rights-breyers-future-spotlight-us-supreme-court-2021-07-01/https:/www.reuters.com/world/us/voting-rights-breyers-future-spotlight-us-supreme-court-2021-07-01/) enacted in Arizona.

And many of the [Republican election officials](https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/565657-new-spotlight-on-secretaries-of-state-as-electoral-battlegrounds) who refused to back up Trump’s bogus fraud charges have been [threatened](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/election-officials-under-attack),  [fired, or are being challenged for reelection by Trump followers](https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/07/03/state-level-republicans-are-reforming-how-elections-are-administered). Meanwhile, [17 Republican-controlled state legislatures](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-july-2021) have  joined Arizona in making voting more difficult: In several of them,  legislators are trying to [seize control of election management](https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jul/14/are-state-legislators-really-seeking-power-overrul/), including power to replace county election officials or even decide how a state’s election results should be certified, regardless of the popular vote.

Republicans claim they are acting restore faith in elections, but—with fraud repeatedly shown to be rare and of no effect in in 2020—Trump and his followers are really [undermining faith](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/24/2020-election-republican-official-races-490458) in American elections.

The result of this frenzy of activity in furtherance of Trump’s “Big Lie”—that he won the 2020 election (and that he won in a “landslide,” no less) —is that the preservation of American-style self-government depends on Democrats retaining control of Congress in 2022.

Republicans have shown that they simply can’t be trusted to safeguard democracy. Donald Trump now [owns the Republican Party](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/11/how-republican-party-became-party-trump/) as GOP politicians up and down the line do his bidding, out of fear or belief.

Even after a mob of Trump supporters invaded the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, Republicans in Congress voted overwhelmingly against [impeaching](https://www.politico.com/interactives/2021/trump-second-impeachment-vote-count-house-results-list/) and [convicting](https://www.politico.com/interactives/2021/trump-second-impeachment-senate-vote/) him for his actions and inaction. Eight GOP senators and 147 representatives [voted not to certify](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/politics/republicans-against-certification.htmlhttps:/www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/politics/republicans-against-certification.htmlhttps:/www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/politics/republicans-against-certification.html) Electoral College counts submitted by two states (had they prevailed, there would have more). Then only six GOP senators voted in favor of forming a truly bipartisan 9/11-style commission to investigate the insurrection, [killing the proposal by filibuster](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/january-6-commission-senate/2021/05/28/54e9f692-bf27-11eb-b26e-53663e6be6ff_story.htmlhttps:/www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/january-6-commission-senate/2021/05/28/54e9f692-bf27-11eb-b26e-53663e6be6ff_story.html).  After Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi established a select committee to conduct an investigation, Republican leaders attacked her as responsible for the riot,  [falsely claiming](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/us/insurrection-pelosi-claims-fact-check.html) she is in charge of security at the Capitol.

Republicans who voted against Trump on any issue relating to Jan. 6 now face [primary opponents](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/28/cpac-donald-trump-expected-claim-leadership-republican-party/6843815002/https:/www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/28/cpac-donald-trump-expected-claim-leadership-republican-party/6843815002/) backed by him and [censure](https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/republican-groups-censure-party-lawmakers-who-voted-impeach-convict-trump) by their state parties. Rep. Liz Cheney, the most vocal Trump critic in the GOP, lost her House leadership post. Trump has even [attacked Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/16/trump-attacks-mcconnell-in-fiery-statement-469150https:/www.politico.com/news/2021/02/16/trump-attacks-mcconnell-in-fiery-statement-469150), who criticized him after Jan. 6 but also blocked creation of the 9/11 commission. It’s classic authoritarian behavior—demanding [total loyalty](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/22/us/politics/trump-disloyalty-turnover.html) from his followers and total control of his faction, and assailing any rivals in power.

Lately, Trump [reportedly](https://www.forbes.com/sites/markjoyella/2021/06/01/maggie-haberman-trump-telling-people-he-expects-to-be-reinstated-as-president-by-august/) has encouraged his followers to believe he can somehow be reinstated as president later this month, and the Department of Homeland Security is [concerned](https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/30/politics/dhs-summer-violence-warnings-conspiracy/index.html) that the violent acts of Jan. 6 may be repeated when he’s not.

The sad, but inevitable conclusion is that if Republicans take control of either chamber in Congress, they will not try to do what’s best for America as a whole. They will do what Trump tells them to do, probably starting with trying to undo everything President Biden and the Democrats in Congress have done during the previous two years.

For starters, if Democrats are to prevail next November, Biden must be seen as a successful moderate-progressive president—one who can defy the historical pattern that presidential parties [almost invariably](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch2_tbl4.pdf) lose seats in their first midterm election.

The last two Democratic presidents s who launched major initiatives without GOP support, Bill Clinton (tax increases and health care reform) and Barack Obama (Obamacare and anti-recession stimulus spending), suffered historic shellackings in the ensuing midterms—54 House seats and eight Senate seats in 1994, and 63 House and six Senate seats in 2010. Biden, who has multiple big programs in his policy agenda, has smaller Democratic margins in Congress than Clinton and Obama.  In other words, the Democrats must hang on to almost all of their contested districts and states.

McConnell, who earned the moniker [“grim reaper”](https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/555877-mcconnell-returns-as-senate-grim-reaperhttps:/thehill.com/homenews/senate/555877-mcconnell-returns-as-senate-grim-reaperhttps:/thehill.com/homenews/senate/555877-mcconnell-returns-as-senate-grim-reaper) for blocking Obama, was supposed to be a willing negotiating partner for Biden. Instead, the Senate Republican leader has pronounced himself  [“100% focused”](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/joe-biden/mcconnell-says-he-s-100-percent-focused-stopping-biden-s-n1266443) on defeating Biden’s legislative agenda. So far, Biden has succeeded in passing a $1.9 trillion COVID relief package (with no Republican votes). He is trying to work out a bipartisan $1 trillion [“physical infrastructure”](https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/28/politics/infrastructure-bill-explained/index.html) package. McConnell isn’t the obstruction with this legislation, as Senate negotiators and the White House [sound optimistic](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senators-move-forward-with-infrastructure-bill-sunday-2021-08-01/). But with Rep. Kevin McCarthy openly angling for Pelosi’s job, nothing is certain in the House.

Trump is actively trying to scuttle infrastructure spending. He’s telling Republicans to oppose it, saying passage means letting “the Radical Left play you for weak fools and losers,” and he has [threatened primary challenges](https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2021/07/28/trump-threatens-lots-of-primaries-for-gop-senators-over-infrastructure-deal/?sh=4be66d98276b) against GOP legislators who support it. This, despite his promising to pass a [$2 trillion bill](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/28/infrastructure-deal-trump-501287) while president (then never delivering). Republicans who support it obviously want money for roads, bridges and broadband for their constituents.

But they don’t like the contents of Biden’s follow-up proposal—a $3.5 trillion “human infrastructure” program, which would expand Medicare, caregiving for the disabled and elderly, and child care, while funding universal pre-kindergarten, free community college, national paid family leave, and extended child tax credits. And they don’t like the corporate and capital gains tax increases Democrats propose to pay for it all. So the Democratic plan is to pass it as a “budget reconciliation” measure requiring only Democratic votes.

If, next November, the GOP captures one chamber—most likely, the [House](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/forecasting-the-2022-midterm-election-with-the-generic-ballot/)—whatever Biden can get done in his first two years can’t be easily undone, but he will get nothing more passed. If the GOP gets control of both chambers, Republicans will try to reverse anything he has accomplished. He’ll have only his veto pen as protection.  Stalemate from 2023 through 2024—and an unsuccessful-seeming Biden presidency—could reelect Trump (or someone backed by him), in which case constitutional norms and respect for election results and the rule of law would again be in peril.

**Extinction**

**Kasparov 17**

Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf>

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and **the world has become much worse off as a result**. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of **terror, war**, refugees, and **military intervention** that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There **existential threat** today is not found on a map, but it **is very real**. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. **Terrorist** movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in **North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail,** and, at the center of the web, an **aggressive KGB dictator in Russia**. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And **they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated**. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but **this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home**, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. **Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully**. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of **democracy is the only** proven **remedy for** nearly **every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism**–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

### Case

#### Capitalism’s sustainable

Rose ’12 Gideon Rose, Editor of Foreign Affairs, “Making Modernity Work,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136776/gideon-rose/making-modernity-work

The central question of modernity has been how to reconcile capitalism and mass democracy, and since the postwar order came up with a good answer, it has managed to weather all subsequent challenges. The upheavals of the late 1960s seemed poised to disrupt it. But despite what activists at the time thought, they had little to offer in terms of politics or economics, and so their lasting impact was on social life instead. This had the ironic effect of stabilizing the system rather than overturning it, helping it live up to its full potential by bringing previously subordinated or disenfranchised groups inside the castle walls. The neoliberal revolutionaries of the 1980s also had little luck, never managing to turn the clock back all that far. All potential alternatives in the developing world, meanwhile, have proved to be either dead ends or temporary detours from the beaten path. The much-ballyhooed "rise of the rest" has involved not the discrediting of the postwar order of Western political economy but its reinforcement: the countries that have risen have done so by embracing global capitalism while keeping some of its destabilizing attributes in check, and have liberalized their polities and societies along the way (and will founder unless they continue to do so). Although the structure still stands, however, it has seen better days. Poor management of public spending and fiscal policy has resulted in unsustainable levels of debt across the advanced industrial world, even as mature economies have found it difficult to generate dynamic growth and full employment in an ever more globalized environment. Lax regulation and oversight allowed reckless and predatory financial practices to drive leading economies to the brink of collapse. Economic inequality has increased as social mobility has declined. And a loss of broad-based social solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic has eroded public support for the active remedies needed to address these and other problems. Renovating the structure will be a slow and difficult project, the cost and duration of which remain unclear, as do the contractors involved. Still, at root, this is not an ideological issue. The question is not what to do but how to do it--how, under twenty-first-century conditions, to rise to the challenge Laski described, making the modern political economy provide enough solid benefit to the mass of men that they see its continuation as a matter of urgency to themselves. The old and new articles that follow trace this story from the totalitarian challenge of the interwar years, through the crisis of liberalism and the emergence of the postwar order, to that order's present difficulties and future prospects. Some of our authors are distinctly gloomy, and one need only glance at a newspaper to see why. But remembering the far greater obstacles that have been overcome in the past, optimism would seem the better long-term bet.

#### Free market capitalism is vital to preventing extinction and ensuring equality, value to life including individual rights– also solves disease and poverty

#### The 1AC’s performative cultivation of a drag-king workhop is ultimately a resilience project that strips away agency in favor of capitulation to neoliberalism. Debate creates a market economy by opening up spaces for localized resistance which locks in their impacts globally. Turns the case.

**Evans and Reid 14** [Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, *Resilient Life*, 2014, p. 102-4]

The significance of linking self-worth and achievement to the ‘social norm’ cannot be underestimated as it allows us to illustrate the differences between the learning processes of resilience as compared to a properly critical pedagogy which would encourage children to question the fundamental tenets of power and inequality in the world. **Strategies of** resilience when applied to children take the form of training exercises which enable them to deal with the localized effects of their vulnerability and the forms of attachments and dependencies they have created which amplify the problems. The examples of youths falling into membership of inner-city gangs become a prime example of a vulnerable child that has fallen through the cracks. Countering this is the idea of ‘educational resilience**’**, defined as the ‘heightened likelihood of success in school and other life accomplishments despite environmental adversities brought about by early traits, conditions, and experiences’.20 But how exactly do we measure success? Is the educationally resilient the vulnerable subject who goes on to fulfill their neoliberal potential, or is it the subject who goes to war with the system that seeks to render them resilient as such? Resilience, as we have learned, is more a code for social compliance than a political ambition to transform the very sources of inequality and injustices experienced by marginalized populations. We find this in early educational theories where resilience is again conflated with strategies of resistance such that the resilient child, individualistically conceived, pathologically outlives its conditions of impoverishment to exhibit social achievement in ways that are altogether in tune with the normal functioning of society.21 Indeed, more than simply learning to cope in conditions of impoverishment and vulnerability, as Steven Condly succinctly puts it in an approving review of the prevailing mainstream educational approaches, the doctrine of resilience offers new ways to assess qualities, competences and capabilities, as ‘resilient children tend to possess an above average intelligence and have a temperament that endears them to others and that also does not allow them to succumb to self-pity’.22 What of course qualifies as ‘self-pity’ in another setting could easily be read as a conscious attempt to challenge that which is beyond the control or individual responsibility of the particular subject. Sheila Martineau is attuned to this and writes of the political dangers of resilience in education with considerable foresight: ‘Though resilience conveyed anomalous childhood behaviour in the context of traumatic events in the 1970s, it has become detached from the traumatic context … dangerously, resilience has become constructed as a social norm modelled on the behavioural norms and expectations of the dominant society’.23 Resilience, in other words, becomes a normalized standard for mapping out (ab)normal behaviours such that the very terms of success are loaded with moral claims to a specific maturity, wherein the maturity itself is qualified through one’s ability to connect to the liberal order of things and partake in the world such that to resist means, without contraction, that one successfully learns to conform. Or to put it in more critical terms, since the ‘solution’ is to teach children to overcome ‘obstacles’ to personal development without ultimately challenging wider relations of power, the resilient child (which, although said to include all children, overwhelmingly concentrates on those from poorer, culturally and racially distinct backgrounds) encounters policies which, instead of ‘treating the individual’, end up by virtue of its logic ‘blaming the victim’.24 Disadvantage as such becomes once again the means to author new forms of discrimination that plays the vulnerable card to remove any political claims that things could be otherwise. Today we can situate these earlier demands for resilience within the strategic context of what Henry Giroux calls the ‘war on youth’. Indicative of **the neoliberal** assault on the education **system** more generally, Giroux maintains that youth has become a privileged object for power in a way that seeks to strip away any sense of critical awareness and political agency at the earliest possible stages of intellectual development. As he wr**it**es, since ‘neoliberalism is also a pedagogical project designed to create particular subjects, desires, and values defined largely by market considerations’, questions of ‘destiny’ become ‘linked to a market-driven logic in which freedom is stripped down to freedom from government regulation, freedom to consume, and freedom to say anything one wants, regardless of how racist or toxic the consequences might be’.25 This has a profound bearing upon education policy as ‘Critical thought and human agency are rendered impotent as neoliberal rationality substitutes emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to political problems’**.**26 Hence, within this ‘depoliticized discourse, youths are told that there is no dream of the collective, no viable social bonds, only the actions of autonomous individuals who can count only on their own resources and who bear sole responsibility for the effects of larger systemic political and economic problems’. Whilst education therefore should have a pedagogical commitment to the globally oppressed, what takes its place is a substitution for education that produces vulnerable consumers whose very training renders the political impossible**.**