### adv

#### US primacy is hurt by blocking the vaccine

PC 5-3 – Public Citizen is a non-profit, progressive consumer rights advocacy group and think tank based in Washington, D.C., United States) “Don’t Buy Pharma’s Latest Distraction: A Temporary WTO IP Waiver for COVID Meds Would Not Hand “U.S. mRNA Technology” to China,” May 3, 2021. <https://www.citizen.org/article/dont-buy-pharmas-latest-distraction-a-temporary-wto-ip-waiver-for-covid-meds-would-not-hand-u-s-mrna-technology-to-china/> //advay

Real Geopolitical Threat for U.S. Is in Blocking 100+ Countries’ WTO Initiative While China and Russia Share Vaccine Technology Worldwide Russia’s Sputnik-5 vaccine and the Chinese Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines have become the go-to options for countries in the developing world. The Chinese and Russian companies, probably compelled by their governments who seek to leverage the vaccines for geopolitical gain, have engaged in significant tech and know-how transfer and partnerships with firms all over the world. Meanwhile, the U.S. and EU have pre-ordered vaccines for their populations while blocking the vast majority of WTO countries’ efforts to even negotiate the text of a waiver these countries consider necessary for their populations to also obtain vaccines.

#### Vaccine diplomacy is key to US spheres of influence – the aff creates incentives for other countries to align with US primacy

**Smith 21**, “Russia and China are beating the U.S. at vaccine diplomacy, experts say”, NBC News, 4/2, Alexander Smith: He is a senior reporter at NBC News Digital, where he has worked since 2013. He won an Emmy in 2015 as part of the team that covered the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. In 2017 he won the Society of Professional Journalists' Sigma Delta Chi Award as part of the NBC News Digital team covering the Brussels terror attacks, URL: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-china-are-beating-u-s-vaccine-diplomacy-experts-say-n1262742>, KR

Soon after Moscow sold 5.2 million doses of its Sputnik V vaccine, President Vladimir Putin was on the phone with his Bolivian counterpart, Luis Arce, in late January, discussing topics as varied as building a nuclear power plant to lithium mining and gas reserves.

In North Africa, Algeria didn't pay a dime for the Chinese vaccines that arrived in March. What it did offer was to support Beijing's "core interests" and oppose interference in its "internal affairs" — language China has used to defend against criticism over Hong Kong's autonomy and allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which it denies.

Although China and Russia deny it, experts say they are beginning to see how Beijing's and Moscow's strategy of selling or donating their vaccines abroad is greasing the wheels of their international relationships and allowing them to expand their influence throughout the world.

It's a development that should cause grave concern for the United States and other democracies, according to former U.S. ambassadors and other ex-diplomats.

What rankles these observers is not that China and Russia are winning at vaccine diplomacy, it's that the U.S. and others aren't even in the game yet. Washington and its allies have instead chosen to prioritize their domestic populations, keeping most doses at home and causing resentment abroad.

"The United States, until recently, was the go-to country for any major health disaster," said Thomas Shannon, the former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, the third-highest-ranking role in the State Department. "So to pull itself off the playing field is very disconcerting."

Shannon, who served in the administrations of presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump and was ambassador to Brazil from 2010 to 2013, said Trump's decision to step back from the international Covid-19 response has sent a "chilling and worrisome message to many countries that find themselves at a very vulnerable moment."

Unless that changes under President Joe Biden and into the future, "the world will realize we're not a reliable partner, and that would be dangerous for us," he said. "I believe it's something that will be remembered."

'Extremely narrow-minded'

Few would argue that sending lifesaving vaccines around the world is a bad thing.

"We're not talking arms sales here," said John Campbell, who was the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria from 2004 to 2007. "We're talking about something citizens around the world want and desperately need."

Indeed both countries deny exporting vaccines for diplomatic gain.

This idea is "extremely narrow-minded," Guo Weimin, spokesman for the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, said at its annual meeting last month. President Xi Jinping has vowed to make vaccines a "global public good."

Similarly, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said that Russia merely believes "there should be as many doses of vaccines as possible" so "all countries, including the poorest, have the opportunity to stop the pandemic."

After a cloud of skepticism, recent studies suggest that the state-made vaccines, China's Sinopharm and Russia's Sputnik V program, are as effective as others. They have been approved by dozens of regulators.

Of the near 250 million vaccine doses it had produced so far, China has sent 118 million to 49 countries, according to Airfinity, a pharmaceuticals analytics company based in London.

Russia has sent vaccines to 22 different countries, and India has exported or donated 64 million of the nearly 150 million shots it has produced, according to Airfinity, which some experts interpret as New Delhi's attempt to counterbalance the vaccine diplomacy overtures of its regional rival, Beijing.

By contrast, the U.S. has delivered just over 200 million vaccine doses to is own population, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It has agreed to share only a tiny number — around 4 million AstraZeneca-Oxford University shots that it wasn't using anyway — with Mexico and Canada.

The West's own vaccine nationalism has created a vacuum in which lower-and middle-income countries have been unable to get access to shots. And Beijing and Moscow have been only too happy to step in.

'Political suicide'

The majority of Chinese and Russian vaccine doses have gone "where Western powers and Russia and China have been competing for years for more influence," said Agathe Demarais the global forecasting director at the Economist Intelligence Unit, a research group based in London.

One key battleground is Egypt, which gets $1.3 billion in U.S. aid every year but whose human rights situation has led to strained ties with the West. It ordered tens of millions of doses from Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Sinopharm and Russia's Sputnik V program. But the first to arrive in Cairo in January were from China.

"For the man on the street" in African countries using the vaccines, "Russia and China become somewhat more attractive as possible models for going forward," said Campbell, the former ambassador to Nigeria. "Arguably, it will help increase the attractiveness of authoritarian forms of government at the expense of more democratic forms of government."

The pandemic has also allowed Russia to build relationships in Latin America beyond its traditional foothold of Venezuela, Shannon said, while the call between the Russian and Bolivian presidents was clearly linked to their vaccine deal, Demarais said. The Bolivian presidency didn't respond to a request for comment.

#### Absent the plan we risk great power war with China – transition to multipolarity is unstable and collapses deterrence

**Forsyth 19** [Jim Forsyth currently serves as dean of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD from the University of Denver, Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He has written and published extensively on great power war, intervention, and nuclear issues. “Through the Glass—Darker”, Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 4 (WINTER 2019), pp. 18-36, JSTOR]//recut SLC PK

As the article argued in 2007, “technological shifts have continuously altered the methods of war,” but in the end, “political arrangements matter, and the deterrent effect of any weapon should be evaluated within the context of the structure of the international system.”20 This claim is as true now as it was then. Indeed, one might conclude that structure matters even more now than it did 10 years ago, given the shift to multipolarity.21 Under “lopsided” multipolarity—where the United States outweighs both China and Russia militarily—it will maintain power advantages on some fronts, but at smaller margins than it did during the unipolar moment when it reigned supreme. Power diffusion, and related great power competition concerns, will be governed by the continued growth of Asian economic and military clout predominantly from China and India and the relative decline of Western economic influence.22 As China continues to translate economic gains into military modernization, the US will “focus mainly on countering China.”23 Avoiding the perils of security competition will require that the US be more cautious about exercising its power abroad.24

Yet exercising diplomacy and restraint could prove to be challenging. Even scholars who adopt a more circumspect view of emerging multipolarity, and the implications of growing military-technological parity, acknowledge its underlying risks. Barry Posen, who questions the assumption that multipolarity is inherently unstable, nonetheless acknowledges that growing parity will only “mute” great power competition. The diffusion of power will not eradicate “great power adventures.”25 China’s rise is apt to entail alliance reconfigurations and temptations to employ conventional military power.26 In fact, just as the original article predicted, the United States and India, Russia and China, and France and Germany have taken steps toward tightening their security relationships. China’s progress toward narrowing its power gap with the US has already met with a return to US defense budget growth and the establishment of new US defense cooperation commitments—notably with India. In parallel, China and Russia have grown closer, with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meeting three times in 2018 and China sending a “strong supporting contingent” to Russia’s Vostok-2018 military exercises.27

Given the complexities and uncertainties of multipolarity, the US arsenal of advanced conventional weapons (and those of other great powers) may not only prove ill suited to deterring great power war but also provide occasion for its inadvertent onset. The stealth, speed, and lethality of advanced conventional technologies—allowing for quick and decisive US victories in the Persian Gulf (1991), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001)—have proven increasingly enticing to other great powers. Russia and China drew similar lessons from these conflicts, each embarking on military modernization programs geared toward antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and grey zone strategies.28 Advanced conventional weapons already undergird Russia’s and China’s respective salami-slicing campaigns in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea. Russia began modernizing its military following its 2008 war with Georgia, enhancing its ground force readiness and updating its integrated air defense system. The improvements have allowed for significant defensive and force-projection gains (against border states).29 Though Russia has since dialed back modernization efforts in the wake of its economic downturn, China continues to seek avenues for undermining the United States’ conventional weapons edge. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still trails the United States in the areas of innovation and operational proficiency. Its modernization achievements, though—especially the development of intermediate-range missiles that threaten US forward bases and carrier strike groups—have substantially augmented China’s “advantage of proximity in most plausible conflict scenarios.”30

As great power rivals continue to chip away at the United States’ once considerable smart-weapons advantage, national security experts are reevaluating the viability of deterrence. On this front, the diffusion of capabilities, as well as the expansion of competition to the space and cyber domains, do more than complicate appraisals of the balance of power; they threaten to upend the foundations of deterrence.31 The arrival of dualcapable hypersonic weapons (and delivery systems)—currently being designed and tested by the US, China, and Russia—will arguably risk jeopardizing strategic stability. Their ultrahigh velocity could reduce warning time to the extent that “a response would be required on first signal of attack”; likewise, their deployment in ready-to-launch mode could trigger preemptive strikes, as others might perceive it as a sign of impending attack.32 Further, cyber weapons’ potential for disabling an opponent’s “early warning and command systems” may diminish the expected costs of first strike under crisis conditions.33 Autonomous weapons also have the potential to fundamentally alter the psychological underpinnings of strategy And, as Kenneth Payne notes, there is no “a priori reason” to expect that substituting artificial intelligence (AI) for human intelligence—that rapid, accurate, and unbiased information processing and responses—“will necessarily be safer.” Because AI limits the risks of using force, it could make conflict more acceptable to risk-averse states; because its speed and precision favor the offense, it could prove more conducive to aggression than deterrence; and because it shapes a host of processes and technologies rather than a single weapon or system, its effects on strategy (and the challenges of its regulation) could prove counter to deterrence.34

As noted in the original article, nuclear weapons helped sustain the “cold peace” during the Cold War—not because of their awesome destructive power but because that awesome destructive power helped buttress bipolarity.35 The simplicity of bipolarity and superpower balancing, in turn, limited “the dangers of miscalculation and overreaction.”36 Multipolarity, though, makes for complexity; additional great power players provide additional opportunities for miscalculation and overreaction. Given these conditions and the perceived “usability” of advanced conventional weapons relative to nuclear weapons, it seems likely that they will fall short of yielding “the kinds of political structures necessary to enhance deterrence.”37 To counter Posen, the diffusion of advanced conventional technology may well have cheapened the near-term costs and risks of going to war, and particularly engaging in hybrid warfare. Even if the US manages to avoid a direct confrontation with Russia or China, it seems increasingly plausible that it could be dragged into a conflict involving one or more of their allies.

#### US-China war goes nuclear.

[Caitlin Talmadge (10-15-2018), PhD in Political Science from MIT, BA in Government from Harvard, Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option]//recut](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option%5d//recut) SLC PK

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

#### Extinction – nuclear winter, crude oil amplifies, smoke covers the world

Snydera and Ruyle 17 (Brian F.Snydera and Leslie E. Ruyle, 12-15-2017, [Brian F. Snyder. Department of Environmental Science, Louisiana State University, United States. Leslie E. Ruyle. Center on Conflict and Development, Texas A&M University, United States]"The abolition of war as a goal of environmental policy," No Publication, [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969717316431?via%3Dihub)//SLC](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969717316431?via%3Dihub)//CHS) PK

While the precise impacts of a hypothetical nuclear war are difficult to predict, the detonation of the world's nuclear weapons would plausibly kill all or nearly all humans on Earth and initiate a mass extinction event. There are a total of about 9400 nuclear warheads in active service around the world, with approximately 8300 of these weapons in U.S. and Russian arsenals (Kristensen and Norris, 2017a). Because of government secrecy, it is difficult to reliably estimate the total explosive power contained in these warheads, but in most cases, each warhead ranges between 100 and 1200 kt of TNT equivalent (for comparison, the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of approximately 15–20 kt). The combined arsenals of the U.S. and Russia likely have a yield of at least 2–3 billion tons of TNT equivalent (Kristensen and Norris, 2017b,c). 2.1. Nuclear winter In the 1980s climate scientists used simple and early climate models to estimate the effects of large-scale nuclear wars on climate. The estimates they derived were catastrophic. For example, Turco et al. (1983) reported temperature reductions of 43 °C for 4 months in the Northern Hemisphere following nuclear war using the explosive power of 10 billion tons of TNT.1 As the cold war ended, interest in modelling the climate effects of nuclear war declined and some policy-makers considered the threat of nuclear winter to be either disproved or exaggerated (Martin, 1988). Toon et al. (2007) and Robock et al. (2007) reignited interest in the climate effects of nuclear war. Toon et al. (2008) modeled the effects of a medium scale nuclear war with a total explosive yield of 440 million tons of explosive yield (far less than current U.S. and Russian arsenals) and estimated global soot2 emissions of 180 Tg. Using a more conservative estimate of 150 Tg of soot, Toon et al. estimated that this emission would be sufficient to reduce global temperatures by about 8 °C and energy flux by 150 W/m2 ; for comparison, the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere since the industrial revolution have increased energy flux by 3 W/m2 (Butler and Montzka, 2017). Robock et al. (2007) modeled a similar 150 Tg smoke emission and found similar results including temperature reduction of about 8 °C lasting for several years. Low temperatures reduced evapotranspiration and weakened the global hydrological cycle and Hadley cells. As a result, precipitation decreased globally by 45% with especially dramatic decreases in the agricultural areas of the United States. In the Northern Hemisphere, growing seasons would be shortened by about 100 days for about 3 years. This would preclude most food production over most of the world for several years. Mills et al. (2014) conducted a detailed analysis of the effects of a small (1.5 million ton) regional exchange lofting just 5 Tg of soot into the atmosphere. This war would be equivalent to an exchange of 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs between, for example, India, Pakistan, or China. Mills et al. found global temperature decreases of 1.6 °C. To our knowledge, no one has studied the effects of a multi-billion ton nuclear exchange using modern atmospheric models. If, as Toon et al. and Robock et al. suggest, a 440 million ton war results in temperature reductions of 8 °C for a decade and a 100 day reduction in the growing season, it is reasonable to assume that a one to five billion ton war would not be survivable for the majority of people on earth. However, as populations and population centers grow, the effects of nuclear wars on the biosphere will also grow. The consequences of nuclear winter increase as the amount of fuel (buildings, cars, biomass, liquid and solid fuels) added to a targeted area increase. As population centers grow and densify over time, the amount of soot added to the stratosphere as the result of any given nuclear exchange may increase (depending in part on building materials). As a result, the nuclear winter resulting from a 400 million ton yield global war in 2020 may be far more severe than if the same war occurred in 2000. Further, there are reasons to believe that the soot emissions from a hypothetical nuclear exchange are conservative because they focus on urban areas and often do not incorporate non-urban energy infrastructure. For example, if ignited and burned completely, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) alone contains about 14.5 Tg of soot emissions.3 Including all crude held in U.S. commercial facilities, the potential soot emissions increase to 24 Tg. Thus, incorporating crude oil storage in the U.S. alone would increase soot generation estimates by about 16%. Similarly, nuclear war planners would be likely to target coal, oil and gas fields in the U.S., Russia, and their allies. This unaccounted for fuel could increase the total soot contribution to the atmosphere, potentially deepening the resulting nuclear winter. 2.2. Acute effects of particulate matter Studies of nuclear winter typically focus on the effects of smoke lofted into the stratosphere during nuclear firestorms. However, a larger proportion of smoke following nuclear war will be trapped in the troposphere where it would have significantly acute impacts on human and non-human species. Crutzen et al. (1984) calculated that following a major nuclear war (about 5 billion tons of explosives, roughly the combined U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear arms as of 2017) smoke would cover about 30–40% of the earth's surface with airborne smoke concentrations on the order of 5 mg/m3 . While initially this smoke would be composed of very small particles (b0.1 μm), the particles would rapidly coalesce into the 0.1 to 3 μm range, roughly consistent with the wellstudied PM2.5. For comparison, the EPA's National Ambient Air Quality standard for PM2.5 is 0.012 mg/m3 and as of 2017, the highest PM2.5 concentrations in Asia are typically around 0.3 to 1 mg/m3 .

#### Thus the plan: The United States of America ought to reduce intellectual property protections for the COVID-19 vaccine. The plan’s implemented through a COVID waiver for the U.S.

-- that’s Moderna, Pfizer-BioNTech, Johnson & Johnson/Janssen

#### The plan bolsters the number of vaccines---arguments about supply and logistics are empirically disproven.

Nancy S. **Jecker &** Caesar A. **Atuire 21**. \*Department of Bioethics & Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine, \*\*Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, Gauteng, South Africa, “What’s yours is ours: waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines,” Journal of Medical Ethics, July 6, 2021, <https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/early/2021/07/06/medethics-2021-107555.full.pdf>., RJP, **DebateDrills.**

Since consequentialist justifications treat the value of IP as purely instrumental, they are also vulnerable to counterarguments showing that a sought-after goal is not the sole or most important end. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we submit that the vaccinating the world is an overriding goal. With existing IP protections intact, the world has fallen well short of this goal. Current forecasts show that at the current pace, there will not be enough vaccines to cover the world’s population until 2023 or 2024.15 IP protections further frustrate the goal of universal access to vaccines by limiting who can manufacturer them. The WHO reports that 80% of global sales for COVID-19 vaccines come from five large multinational corporations.16 Increasing the number of manufacturers globally would not only increase supply, but reduce prices, making vaccines more affordable to LMICs. It would stabilise supply, minimising disruptions of the kind that occurred when India halted vaccine exports amidst a surge of COVID-19 cases.

It might be objected that waiving IP protections will not increase supply, because it takes years to establish manufacturing capacity. However, since the pandemic began, we have learnt it takes less time. Repurposing facilities and vetting them for safety and quality can often happen in 6 or 7months, about half the time previously thought.17 Since COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic humanity faces, expanding manufacturing capacity is also necessary preparation for future pandemics. Nkengasong, Director of the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, put the point bluntly, ‘Can a continent of 1.2billion people—projected to be 2.4billion in 30 years, where one in four people in the world will be African—continue to import 99% of its vaccine?’18

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#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1] Actor specificity:

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### C] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### 2] Lexical pre-requisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 4] Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate:

#### A] Substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.

#### B] Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense

#### 5] Reject calc indicts and util triggers permissibility arguments:

#### A] Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### B] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

### Theory Underview

#### 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) reject the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time, e) no 2NR theory – 2-to-1 time tradeoff makes it devastating for the 2AR, f) comes first – it’s a bigger percentage of the 1AR than 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time and only the 2N has time to win multiple layers, g) voters – fairness because debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education since it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

### Method Underview

#### Debate must center existential risk – key to civic engagement and research for risk mitigation

Javorsky 18. Emilia Javorsky is a Boston-based physician-scientist focused on the invention, development and commercialization of new medical therapies. She also leads an Artificial Intelligence in Medicine initiative with The Future Society at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Why Human Extinction Needs a Marketing Department. January 15, 2018. https://www.xconomy.com/boston/2018/01/15/why-human-extinction-needs-a-marketing-department/

Experts at Oxford University and elsewhere have estimated that the risk of a global human extinction event this century—or at least of an event that wipes out 10 percent or more of the world’s population— is around 1 in 10. The most probable culprits sending us the way of the dinosaur are mostly anthropogenic risks, meaning those created by humans. These include climate change, nuclear disaster, and more emerging risks such as artificial intelligence gone wrong (by accident or nefarious intent) and bioterrorism. A recent search of the scientific literature through ScienceDirect for “human extinction” returned a demoralizing 157 results, compared to the 1,627 for “dung beetle.” I don’t know about you, but this concerns me. Why is there so little research and action on existential risks (risks capable of rendering humanity extinct)?

A big part of the problem is a lack of awareness about the real threats we face and what can be done about them. When asked to estimate the chance of an extinction event in the next 50 years, U.S. adults in surveys reported chances ranging from 1 in 10 million to 1 in 100, certainly not 10 percent. The awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community as well, where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks. Developing viable risk mitigation strategies will require widespread civic engagement and concerted research efforts. Consequently, there is an urgent need to improve the communication of the magnitude and importance of existential risks. The first step is getting an audience to pay attention to this issue.

#### criticisms of “futurity” actively do violence to oppressed groups. Futurity helps, and doesn’t ignore, present struggles.

Manalansan 15 [Martin F. Manalansan IV - Associate Professor of all of the following at The University of Illinois: Gender and Women's Studies, Asian American Studies, Anthropology, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, LAS Global Studies, Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, and Center for Global Studies. The author holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from The University of Rochester and studied philosophy, Asian Studies and anthropology at the University of the Philippines. As part of claims about futurity, the author references lived excahnges with queer trans women of color. The author also references concurring professional exchanges with David L. Eng, Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania; Gayatri Gopinath, who is an associate professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and director of Asian/Pacific/American Studies at New York University.; Roderick Ferguson, who is a professor of African American and Gender and Women's Studies in the African American Studies Department at the University of Illinois, Chicago; Chandan Reddy, who is an Associate Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality Studies at the University of Washington; and the late José Esteban Muñoz, was an American academic in the fields of performance studies, visual culture, queer theory, cultural studies, and critical theory; “A Question from Bruno Latour” This article is part of the series Queer Futures. Fieldsights - Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology Online, July 21, 2015 - https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/703-a-question-from-bruno-latour]

My response to the question of “no future**”** comes from my encounters, engagements, andconversations with colleagues under the aegis of queer-of-color critique, scholars like David Eng, Gayatri Gopinath, Roderick Ferguson, Chandan Reddy, and the late José Esteban Muñoz, among others. We appreciate the renegade antireproductive stance of the “no future” camp**,** which states that we should not subscribe to a future that is entrenched in heteropatriarchal dreams of marriage and procreation. However, there was a general sense among us that the issue of “no future” comes from a vantage point and a comfortable perch of privilege. As a scholar invested and immersed in the plight of queers of color, futurity is not just a possibility but a necessity. To paraphrase my queer-of-color critique colleagues, we cannot not think of a future—it is the very fuel of existence, the pivot that animates and propels energies, performances, feelings, and other bodily capacities. The promise and peril of queer, both as a stance and as a field of study, is precisely in its anticipatory and hopeful dimensions. Queer is constituted by a yearning and a longing for something better than what is here right now. It is, as Muñoz would say, a horizon that we are drawn to and which is not yet here. Consider the group of undocumented immigrant queers of color in New York City whose lives I have been following for years. Dwelling in cramped domiciles and working in contingent jobs, there is very little to witness in their lives that suggests a kind of gay/lesbian triumphalism or the bright markers of the new normal. In fact, they live in precarious conditions but—a very important caveat—they live in moments that showcase fleeting gestures and images of fabulosity set amidst the squalor and mess of their lives. These moments, while fleeting, provide some way for them to think of another day, giving them a brief glimpse of a time and a place where there are sequined gowns, plush salons, and many sparkling things. While this might be called naïve hopefulness, thinking of a future that is an alternative to the present is a potent way to think beyond and against the status quo—to plant the seed for social transformation. In other words, there is a political potential to queer futurity. Or, to put it another way, we need tocomplicate andunravel the negativity inherent in the “no future” stance and to be open to the various alternative ways a future or **futures can be imagined, particularly by those in the margins.** Otherwise, we can all just pack our bags, go back home, put on some makeup, close the door, and hide under the bedcovers.

#### Political hope is good and necessary even if it’s not always successful – it can lead to change and alleviates stale ressentiment.

**Amsler 16** [Sarah, Reader in Education, School of Education, University of Lincoln, “Learning Hope. An Epistemology of Possibility for Advanced Capitalist Society,” Social Sciences for an Other Politics Women Theorizing Without Parachutes, pp. 25-28]

**The circulation of myths – about the impossibility** or never-having-happened **of fundamental social change, the insignificance of individual and collective action,** the revolutionary power of critical consciousness and of radical love and so on – **form the basis of** a political ontology which Bloch called **a ‘world without Front’**. In this mode of being, there is no space of or location from which to enunciate or engage in responses to ‘badly existing’ realities in order to alter them because these realities do not include ‘unfinished mate- rial’ or ‘open dimensions’ in people or things (Bloch 1995, p. 148). **Within these parameters** of possibility, **the only** legitimate epistemological **position is to adapt to things ‘as they are** and as they stand’ by **producing knowledge ‘of what can be contemplated, namely of the past’, as realised in the forms of social life appearing in the lived moment as faits accomplish** (Bloch 1995, p. 6). Bloch distinguished this from the ‘ontology of Not-Yet-Being’, which opens onto a world ‘with Front’. This reality includes open dimensions, spaces of ideas, materials and relationships that are understood to be unfixed and unfinished, and in which knowledge production must therefore aim ‘towards changing the world and informing the desire to change it’ (Bloch 1995, pp. 8, 13). **The Front is not a physical location, but a contingent co-ordinate for the always-already possible but not-always-yet actualised situation** in which established parameters of possibility are unsettled such that we can work with the ‘undecided material’ of the present; it is where (and when) ‘the Unbecome is located and seeks to articulate itself’ (Bloch 1995, pp. 148, 199). While Bloch clearly sensed the importance of the Front as a critical theoretical category with relevance for real-world prac- tice (what he called a ‘living-theory practice of comprehended tendency’), he does not define it well in his work. He refers to it as being the place of becoming of ‘the world, of world process’ (Bloch 1995, p. 246) where ‘affairs can still be conducted’ (p. 288), and of the ‘occurrence of reality’ (p. 237); it is also a name for situations in which there is a dynamic movement of ‘that part of reality which is coming onto being on the horizon of the real’ (p. 68), and more specifically where ‘man [and woman] and process, or rather subject and object in dialectically materi- alist process’ come into relation with one another (p. 200). The last definition is the crux as it replaces a metaphorical place of possibility with the embodied activity of refusing dominant rationalities – one which means in its most basic form that people ‘throw themselves actively into what is becoming, to which they themselves belong’ (p. 3). Where are the ‘fronts’ of anti-capitalist, counter-capitalist and post-capitalist possibility in education today? There is now much interest in the diverse experiments that have emerged within the autonomous movements in the global South as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, which together constitute **a ‘multifarious hope landscape’** that epitomises Bloch’s frontier politics.1 Deeply embedded in local histories and cosmologies, these collectively self-organised, militantly optimistic and socially ingrained experi- ences **have become global points of reference for how to pedagogise politics and politicise pedagogy**; for articulating critical epistemologies of possibility and practical methodologies for learning hope. In England, the hope landscape in education – and thus the forms of possibility ‘fronts’ here – has a different political terrain, formed through imperial hegemony, traditions of struggle for a socialist state (including for systems of public education) and movements against gender, race and class injustices; the exploitation and destruction of labour; nuclear pro- liferation; and neo-liberal structural adjustment, particularly New Public Management and privatisation. It has also been shaped more recently by nearly two decades of Thatcherite policies and their extension in subse- quent New Labour, Liberal and Conservative neo-liberalism (Hall 2003), which have not only stifled political organisation and democratic autonomy but also penetrated the organising principles and technologies of social institutions, relations of social production; educator and learner subjectivities, and structures of knowledge production and common sense (Ball 2008; Torres and Jones 2013). Here, attempts to ‘acquire a practical sense that another way of “doing education” is possible’ are less about preserving or reclaiming oppressed space, knowledge and institu- tions and more about learning autonomy, experimenting at the edges of non-capitalist ways of working and being and reimagining education beyond the imperial-capitalist (and in some cases the state-socialist) form. There is no definitive map of the dozens of new ‘alternative education’ or ‘free university’ projects that grew across the UK after a Conservative political victory in 2010, partly because some are ephemeral and nomadic and partly because they tend to move in their own locations and through international networks but do not constitute an organised ‘movement’.2 There is no map at all of the unknown number of even less visible efforts to defy the logics of capital within the educational institutions, including schools, through action research, direct action, radical curricular reform, space-making and other mediations of reality. These hope projects fulfil immediate needs and desires for autonomous existence and are experiments in generating possibilities for a counter-capitalist movement that is not yet articulate. Locally rooted and globally inspired, they wrest out of hegemonic time and space situations in which, as Bloch wrote, ‘affairs can still be conducted’ (1995, p. 288). What emerges are context-specific methods for delinking from dominating forms of recognition and security, for learning skills of self-authorship and practices of co-operation which are marginalised and suppressed in neo-liberal institu- tions, for tending rather than scorning ‘what was made invisible or worthless in our cultures’ (Fasheh 2006), and for attending to the ‘embodied attach- ments, affective commitments and spiritual practices that are valued and devalued in hegemonic politics of knowledge but which become central in the creation of an emancipatory politics of knowledge’ (Motta and Esteves 2014, p. 15) – as well as to the unlearning of affective investments in practices and institutions which colonise hope (Berlant 2010; Brown 1999). AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF POSSIBILITY FOR ADVANCED CAPITALIST SOCIETY Do such projects meet the need for change ‘of another sort, on another scale’ in ‘acquiring a practical sense that another way of “doing education” is possible’ (Jones 2014, p. 191) in England today? I argue they do when viewed from a critical epistemological perspective that translates the sense of Nothingness into an appreciation of all that strives towards what is Not-Yet possible, discloses ‘fronts’ of possibility within landscapes of political depression at many different scales, ‘eludidat[es] what in the local is not reducible to the impact of hegemonic globalization’ and comprehends ‘what in it is or may become a seed of resistance against the unequal power relations produced or favored by such globalization’ (Santos 2014, p. 179). **Educators who attempt to think, feel, live and work in counter-capitalist ways within the teeth of neo-liberal hopelessness** in this context **do so outside articulated movement**, often in a lacunae of epistemological and material resources, at the edges of epistemic and social possibility. **It is an important politico-pedagogical act** to recognise these more marginal, ephemeral, fumbling, flawed and fragile projects for autonomy in Patti Lather’s terms as forms of a praxis based on ‘ontological stammering, concepts with a lower ontological weight . . . without guaranteed subjects or objects, oriented toward the as-yet-incompletely thinkable conditions and potentials of given arrangements’ (2002, p. 189); or in Blochian terms as significant ‘phenomena in which Unbecome is located and seeks to articulate itself’ (1995, pp. 11–12). **Only in this way can their specific credibilities be ‘discussed and argued for and their relations taken as an object of political dispute**’, and thusly can they be recognised as students and interlocutors of hope within a pluriversal global politics of post-capitalist possibility (Santos 2014, p. 17).

#### Psychoanalysis is infinitely regressive, not falsifiable, and too abstract

Gordon 1 – Paul Gordon, accomplished psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34.

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But, in marrying psychoanalysis and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it degrades scholarship and undermines action, and ends in discourse analysis a language in which metaphor passes for reality. Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Nevertheless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem with the application of psychoanalysis to social institutions is that there can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? The pioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, all derived their ideas in the context of their work with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient. Outside of the consulting room, there can be no such verification process, and the further one moves from the individual patient, the less purchase psychoanalytic ideas can have. Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. But if everything is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

---- didn’t read ---

#### The death drive doesn’t exist, but their continued use of it to mimetically explain all violence means they link more

Jonathan Dollimore 13, Professor in the School of English and American Studies at the University of Sussex, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, googlebooks

**The death-drive** theory has not found wide acceptance among Freud's followers. With significant exceptions like Melanie Klein, it **has been explicitly denounced as** misconceived biology, unsubstantiated speculation, logically incoherent and/or without evidence. It has also been attributed to Freud's own painful personal circumstances: the death of his daughter, the death of a grandson, his own illness (cancer), and his lifelong preoccupation with death. Of **those** who have been **sympathetic to the idea**, most have tended to tame it - as indeed did Freud himself. One move was to **rewrite the instinct as** largely an instinct of **aggression**. But for Freud the aggressive aspect of the death drive had been secondary; the instinct was primarily self-destructive. Sadism derives from a more primordial masochism, which means in effect that human aggression is, originally, self destructiveness. Of all subsequent theorists of psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan takes the death drive most seriously, and most contemporary psychoanalytic attention to it comes via him. To his credit, Lacan does not underplay or tame the death drive, and he locates Freud firmly within the Western tradition when he remarks that Freud questioned life as to its meaning and his answer was not that it had none 'which is a convenient way of washing one's hands of the whole business' - but that life has 'only one meaning, that in which desire is borne by death' (Ecrits, p. 277). According to Lacan, the Freudian world is one not of things, nor even of being, but rather of desire. More so even than Freud, Lacan finds in desire 'the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous character by which it is distinguished from need'. Although this distinction has been 'always obvious to moralists worthy of the name', psychoanalysis nevertheless misses the point by pursuing an obscurantist reduction of desire to need (p. 286). And that, for Lacan, is a cardinal error. This distinction belween desire and need leads him to dwell on something else in both Freud and earlier writers, moralists and otherwise: the relation between desire and lack. In modern psychoanalysis we find a secularized, intensified version of an existential perception that goes back a long way, even though the immediate influences here are Heidegger and Kojeve: Desire is a relation of being to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly speaking. It isn't the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being exists. (Lacan, Seminar, 11.222-3) For Lacan, death is the name for a primordial absence intrinsic to presence; as John Forrester puts it, 'presence includes as its very condition the limit beyond which is its absence' (p. 176).16 To bind desire so resolutely into lack and absence means that it inevitably becomes a kind of essential negativity (Lacan, Seminar, 1.146)\*' - something premised on an initial failure of satisfaction and which, as such, comes to exist only by virtue of its own alienation; as Juliet Mitchell puts it, 'Desire persists as an effect of a primordial absence and it therefore indicates that, in this area, there is something fundamentally impossible about satisfaction itself (Lacan. Feminine Sexuality, p. 6). One consequence of this is a radical fragmentation of the human subject.18 In one respect Lacan recasts the familiar metaphysical idea that life is rooted in death: 'it is death that sustains existence' (Ecrits, p. 300). In his development of this idea he combines diverse elements of the Western tradition of desire's impossibility: a theology of desire as death, crossed with something more romantic if no less severe - desire as annihilating excess, a primordial discord. The two elements are fused in those places where, for example, he speaks of 'that desperate affirmation of life that is the purest form in which we recognize the death instinct' (p. 104). These ideas then get reworked according to structuralist and linguistic preoccupations, as when he speaks of the 'frenzy' of desire 'mocking Ihe abyss of Ihe infinite', and of how this amounts to 'no other derangement of instinct than that of being caught in the rails - eternally stretching forth towards the desire for something else - of metonymy. Hence its "perverse" fixation at the very suspension-point of the signifying chain where the memory-screen is immobilized and the fascinating image of the fetish is petrified' (p. 167). In the same vein Lacan suggests that it is from death that existence takes on all the meaning it has; the lack which is at the heart of desire is also the price that human beings pay for their admission to language and culture. Death makes life possible in that it makes meaning and representation possible; it is not only before speech but 'primordial to the birth of symbols' (pp. 104-5, 300). Hence Lacan's most well-known formulation, that the unconscious is structured like a language, and his claim to have demonstrated 'the profound relationship uniting the notion of the death instinct to the problems of speech' (Four Fundamental Concepts, p. 20; Merits, p. 101). Richard Boothby regards this as the most radical and innovative aspect of Lacan. I remain unconvinced.19 Lacan's invocations of death's centrality to life are more derivative than their complex, often obscure, formulations suggest.20 When he declares that All that life is concerned with is seeking repose as much as possible while awaiting death. This is what devours the time of the suckling baby at the beginning of its existence... Life is concerned solely with dying {Seminar. 11.233) we can hear Freud and Schopenhauer most closely, but also Montaigne (especially in that last assertion - 'Life is concerned solely with dying'), who also, incidentally, consolidated his own perception of this truth with extensive citation of classical sources. In the giving over of the newborn child to death we might hear too the early Christian Fathers. Lacan does not exactly disguise his precedents; the passage just cited continues with a reference to Hamlet's 'to die, to sleep, perchance to dream' and to the idea developed by philosophers in antiquity that it would have been better not to have been born. But (and this recalls Freud's own evasive acknowledgment of his influences) in Lacan these allusions to the past are fleeting, in passing, almost secretive; the implication is that these past **writers anticipate something which can only** properly, and only now, **be understood through the lens of** Lacanian **psychoanalysis**, **whose complexity is**, at the same time, almost **guaranteed to defeat the attempt**. Some at least of **that** complexity **is** obscurantist. In the wake of contemporary cultural developments, including the perceived failure of sexual radicalism and the trauma of AIDS, there are those who have turned to Lacan for a more honest view of desire, and, via him, are reconsidering a severe account of human desire. I should not speak for them; **what I find** in Lacan **is an** overtheorized **expression** of something more significantly and relevantly expressed elsewhere (in Freud and before). It this respect I believe he is symptomatic of a much wider tendency in (post-) modern theory. But in terms of his influence alone Lacan remains significant for this study. By crossing Freud's death drive with the philosophy of lack and nothingness derived from Kojeve's version of Hegel (itself influenced by Heidegger), he continues to drive death ever further into being; now, perhaps more inexorably than ever before, death is the lack which drives desire. In doing that he also exemplifies another significant tendency in modern thought which I have already remarked, namely the antihumanist wish **to decentre** 'man' in the name of a philosophy which is truly adequate to the complexity of **being**, **yet** **which seeks to** retain a residual human mastery in the very effort of articulating this complexity. As we have seen, the philosophical bid to comprehend the truth of being was always a form of intellectual empowerment - even, or rather especially, when issuing in the declaration that life, desire and the world have to be renounced. But modern theory, having lost faith in older philosophical notions of truth, now half-settles for the mastery of a new kind of complexity which it partly produces in order to enable this performance of mastery. Phoenix-like, the omniscient, masterful and above all complex analytic of **the** modern **theorist** rises above **his sacrifice of 'man' to death**.

#### Psychological evidence proves we don’t identify with our future selves.

Opar 14. Alisa Opar (articles editor at Audubon magazine; cites Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business; and Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton) “Why We Procrastinate” Nautilus January 2014

“The British philosopher Derek Parfit espoused a severely reductionist view of personal identity in his seminal book, Reasons and Persons: It does not exist, at least not in the way we usually consider it. We humans, Parfit argued, are not a consistent identity moving through time, but a chain of successive selves, each tangentially linked to, and yet distinct from, the previous and subsequent ones. The boy who begins to smoke despite knowing that he may suffer from the habit decades later should not be judged harshly: “This boy does not identify with his future self,” Parfit wrote. “His attitude towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude to other people.” Parfit’s view was controversial even among philosophers. But psychologists are beginning to understand that it may accurately describe our attitudes towards our own decision-making: It turns out that we see our future selves as strangers. Though we will inevitably share their fates, the people we will become in a decade, quarter century, or more, are unknown to us. This impedes our ability to make good choices on their—which of course is our own—behalf. That bright, shiny New Year’s resolution? If you feel perfectly justified in breaking it, it may be because it feels like it was a promise someone else made. “It’s kind of a weird notion,” says Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “On a psychological and emotional level we really consider that future self as if it’s another person.” Using MRI, Hershfield and colleagues studied brain activity changes when people imagine their future and consider their present. They homed in on two areas of the brain called the medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, which are more active when a subject thinks about himself than when he thinks of someone else. They found these same areas were more strongly activated when subjects thought of themselves today, than of themselves in the future. Their future self “felt” like somebody else. In fact, their neural activity when they described themselves in a decade was similar to that when they described Matt Damon or Natalie Portman. And subjects whose brain activity changed the most when they spoke about their future selves were the least likely to favor large long-term financial gains over small immediate ones. Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton, has come to similar conclusions in her research. In a 2008 study, Pronin and her team told college students that they were taking part in an experiment on disgust that required drinking a concoction made of ketchup and soy sauce. The more they, their future selves, or other students consumed, they were told, the greater the benefit to science. Students who were told they’d have to down the distasteful quaff that day committed to consuming two tablespoons. But those that were committing their future selves (the following semester) or other students to participate agreed to guzzle an average of half a cup. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person.