## 1ar

#### Anti-capitalist sentiment is at the heart of the plan. The status quo accedes to intellectual monopoly capitalism.

**Sell 20** (Susan K. Sell, School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University, Acton, ACT Australia. “What COVID-19 Reveals About Twenty-First Century Capitalism: Adversity and Opportunity”. Nov 2020)

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, US-based IP owners lobbied for regulatory and legislative reform to expand IP protection. Pharmaceutical, software, publishing and entertainment producers argued that their industries provided America with competitive advantages in global markets. They sought **the incorporation of IP into the trade regime** to ensure that their IP would be remunerated in global markets and that trading partners would respect and enforce their ‘rights’. By 1994 IP owners had succeed in globalizing their preferences **through** the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (**TRIPs**) **in the W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization (Sell 2003). TRIPs is hard law; it is binding and enforceable. It mandates 20 years of patent protection for pharmaceutical products. Violations result in trade sanctions. The institutionalization of intellectual property protection in the global trade regime **cemented** the shift from Reagan/Thatcher neoliberalism to **intellectual monopoly capitalism**. When we talk about ‘trade’ these days, we are really discussing the role of intangibles such as IP and financial services. The main beneficiaries of contemporary trade agreements are those who control global value chains (GVCs), including international banks, Big Tech, Big Pharma, Big Food and Transnational Corporations. Lead firms in GVCs promote stricter IP requirements in trade agreements to ‘contain the risk of IP appropriation resulting from the international fragmentation of production’ (Durand and Milberg 2018: 21–22). Most of the post-TRIPs trade agreements in which IP-rich nations are involved feature IP provisions that extend well beyond the TRIPs obligations in the WTO. Today, ‘profitability is a function of a firm’s ability to extract monopoly rents from complex value chains using their control over IPRs’ (Schwartz 2017: 197). For example, Apple extracts the lion’s share of value from every iPad sold whereas the manufacturers in China receive only pennies on the dollar. Big Pharma routinely blocks pro-health initiatives aimed at promoting the use of TRIPs’ flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing and parallel importation, that would make essential medicines affordable and accessible; these would threaten their profits and reduce shareholder value (Correa 2006). **The profit imperative of financialized capitalism has meant that Big Pharma has invested far more in lifestyle diseases such as e**rectile **d**ysfunction and baldness **than in diseases of the Global South.** As Feldman argues, ‘our incentive structure is badly misaligned with societal goals’ (Feldman 2018). **Patent protection increases prices and reduces access to medicines**, diagnostics, vaccines, medical devices and PPE. Strategic behaviour aimed at blocking generic competition contributes to rising drug prices. **Pharma firms routinely engage in ‘evergreening’ to extend patent protection terms.** A firm may have a popular drug with an about-to-expire patent, and then offer a ‘new’ formulation—from a tablet to a gel cap—of the same drug and obtain another 20 years of protection. This strategic behaviour does not affect everyone equally. For example, during the HIV/AIDS pandemic of the late 1990s/early 2000s as deaths plummeted in affluent countries an estimated 12 million infected Africans were left to die, ‘waiting for enough life-saving drugs to reach the continent’ (Nkengasong et al. 2020: 198). **India and South Africa have both asked the World Trade Organization to waive TRIPs provisions** to allow them to engage in compulsory licensing and parallel importation of COVID-19 therapies (Reuters 2020). **Their past experiences with HIV/AIDs and the** swine and avian in**flu**enzas **have bred understandable suspicion about the barriers to access that IP can create.** As COVID-19 tests, therapies and vaccines are developed there is legitimate concern that ‘intellectual property rights and reluctance to share related know-how may act as barriers to the rapid scale up for timely supply at affordable prices in all countries’ (Tellez 2020).

Rehighlight of 21 – we take down companies

#### [Vanni 21] Reformism not only fails but also perpetuate global inequality – the aff’s “vaccine diplomacy is key to US spheres of influence” a weaponization of medicines that increases Global South dependency in service of the corporate giants – this takes out their K pre-empt

Vanni 21[(Dr. Vanni obtained both her PhD and LLM degrees in International Economic Law from the University of Warwick, She has BA(Hons) in International Relations Her main area of research is international economic law, with a focus on intellectual property law, international trade law, global economic governance, law and development.  )“On Intellectual Property Rights, Access to Medicines and Vaccine Imperialism.” TWAILR, 23 Mar. 2021, twailr.com/on-intellectual-property-rights-access-to-medicines-and-vaccine-imperialism/. Accessed 6 Sept. 2021.] PW

These events – the corporate capture of the global pharmaceutical IP regime, state complicity and vaccine imperialism – are not new. Recall Article 7 of TRIPS, which states that the objective of the Agreement is the ‘protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights [to] contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology’. In similar vein, Article 66(2) of TRIPS further calls on developed countries to ‘provide incentives to enterprises and institutions within their territories to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed country’. While the language of ‘transfer of technology’ might seem beneficial or benign, in actuality it is not. As I discussed in my book, and as Carmen Gonzalez has also shown, when development objectives are incorporated into international legal instruments and institutions, they become embedded in structures that may constrain their transformative potential and reproduce North-South power imbalances. This is because these development objectives are circumscribed by capitalist imperialist structures, adapted to justify colonial practices and mobilized through racial differences. These structures are the essence of international law and its institutions even in the twenty-first century. They continue to animate broader socio-economic engagement with the global economy even in the present as well as in the legal and regulatory codes that support them. Thus, it is not surprising that even in current global health crisis, calls for this same transfer of technology in the form of a TRIPS waiver to scale up global vaccine production is being thwarted by the hegemony of developed states inevitably influenced by their respective pharmaceutical companies. The ‘emancipatory potential’ of TRIPS cannot be achieved if it was not created to be emancipatory in the first place. It also makes obvious the ways international IP law is not only unsuited to promote structural reform to enable the self-sufficiency and self-determination of the countries in the global south, but also produces asymmetries that perpetuate inequalities. Concluding Remarks What this pandemic makes clear is that the development discourse often touted by developed nations to help countries in the Global South ‘catch up’ is empty when the essential medicines needed to stay alive are deliberately denied and weaponised. Like the free-market reforms designed to produce ‘development’, IP deployed to incentivise innovation is yet another tool in the service of private profits. As this pandemic has shown, the reality of contemporary capitalism – including the IP regime that underpins it – is competition among corporate giants driven by profit and not by human need. The needs of the poor weigh much less than the profits of big business and their home states. However, it is not all doom and gloom. Countries such as India, China and Russia have stepped up in the distribution of vaccines or what many call ‘vaccine diplomacy.’ Further, Cuba’s vaccine candidate Soberana 02, which is currently in final clinical trial stages and does not require extra refrigeration, promises to be a suitable option for many countries in the global South with infrastructural and logistical challenges. Importantly, Cuba’s history of medical diplomacy in other global South countries raises hope that the country will be willing to share the know-how with other manufactures in various non-western countries, which could help address artificial supply problems and control over distribution. In sum, this pandemic provides an opportune moment to overhaul this dysfunctional global IP system. We need not wait for the next crisis to learn the lessons from this crisis.

## 1ac

### adv

#### US primacy is hurt by blocking the vaccine

PC 5-3 – Public Citizen is a non-profit, progressive consumer rights advocacy group and think tank based in Washington, D.C., United States) “Don’t Buy Pharma’s Latest Distraction: A Temporary WTO IP Waiver for COVID Meds Would Not Hand “U.S. mRNA Technology” to China,” May 3, 2021. <https://www.citizen.org/article/dont-buy-pharmas-latest-distraction-a-temporary-wto-ip-waiver-for-covid-meds-would-not-hand-u-s-mrna-technology-to-china/> //advay

Real Geopolitical Threat for U.S. Is in Blocking 100+ Countries’ WTO Initiative While China and Russia Share Vaccine Technology Worldwide Russia’s Sputnik-5 vaccine and the Chinese Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines have become the go-to options for countries in the developing world. The Chinese and Russian companies, probably compelled by their governments who seek to leverage the vaccines for geopolitical gain, have engaged in significant tech and know-how transfer and partnerships with firms all over the world. Meanwhile, the U.S. and EU have pre-ordered vaccines for their populations while blocking the vast majority of WTO countries’ efforts to even negotiate the text of a waiver these countries consider necessary for their populations to also obtain vaccines.

#### Vaccine diplomacy is key to US spheres of influence – the aff creates incentives for other countries to align with US primacy

**Smith 21**, “Russia and China are beating the U.S. at vaccine diplomacy, experts say”, NBC News, 4/2, Alexander Smith: He is a senior reporter at NBC News Digital, where he has worked since 2013. He won an Emmy in 2015 as part of the team that covered the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. In 2017 he won the Society of Professional Journalists' Sigma Delta Chi Award as part of the NBC News Digital team covering the Brussels terror attacks, URL: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-china-are-beating-u-s-vaccine-diplomacy-experts-say-n1262742>, KR

Soon after Moscow sold 5.2 million doses of its Sputnik V vaccine, President Vladimir Putin was on the phone with his Bolivian counterpart, Luis Arce, in late January, discussing topics as varied as building a nuclear power plant to lithium mining and gas reserves.

In North Africa, Algeria didn't pay a dime for the Chinese vaccines that arrived in March. What it did offer was to support Beijing's "core interests" and oppose interference in its "internal affairs" — language China has used to defend against criticism over Hong Kong's autonomy and allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, which it denies.

Although China and Russia deny it, experts say they are beginning to see how Beijing's and Moscow's strategy of selling or donating their vaccines abroad is greasing the wheels of their international relationships and allowing them to expand their influence throughout the world.

It's a development that should cause grave concern for the United States and other democracies, according to former U.S. ambassadors and other ex-diplomats.

What rankles these observers is not that China and Russia are winning at vaccine diplomacy, it's that the U.S. and others aren't even in the game yet. Washington and its allies have instead chosen to prioritize their domestic populations, keeping most doses at home and causing resentment abroad.

"The United States, until recently, was the go-to country for any major health disaster," said Thomas Shannon, the former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, the third-highest-ranking role in the State Department. "So to pull itself off the playing field is very disconcerting."

Shannon, who served in the administrations of presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump and was ambassador to Brazil from 2010 to 2013, said Trump's decision to step back from the international Covid-19 response has sent a "chilling and worrisome message to many countries that find themselves at a very vulnerable moment."

Unless that changes under President Joe Biden and into the future, "the world will realize we're not a reliable partner, and that would be dangerous for us," he said. "I believe it's something that will be remembered."

'Extremely narrow-minded'

Few would argue that sending lifesaving vaccines around the world is a bad thing.

"We're not talking arms sales here," said John Campbell, who was the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria from 2004 to 2007. "We're talking about something citizens around the world want and desperately need."

Indeed both countries deny exporting vaccines for diplomatic gain.

This idea is "extremely narrow-minded," Guo Weimin, spokesman for the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, said at its annual meeting last month. President Xi Jinping has vowed to make vaccines a "global public good."

Similarly, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said that Russia merely believes "there should be as many doses of vaccines as possible" so "all countries, including the poorest, have the opportunity to stop the pandemic."

After a cloud of skepticism, recent studies suggest that the state-made vaccines, China's Sinopharm and Russia's Sputnik V program, are as effective as others. They have been approved by dozens of regulators.

Of the near 250 million vaccine doses it had produced so far, China has sent 118 million to 49 countries, according to Airfinity, a pharmaceuticals analytics company based in London.

Russia has sent vaccines to 22 different countries, and India has exported or donated 64 million of the nearly 150 million shots it has produced, according to Airfinity, which some experts interpret as New Delhi's attempt to counterbalance the vaccine diplomacy overtures of its regional rival, Beijing.

By contrast, the U.S. has delivered just over 200 million vaccine doses to is own population, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It has agreed to share only a tiny number — around 4 million AstraZeneca-Oxford University shots that it wasn't using anyway — with Mexico and Canada.

The West's own vaccine nationalism has created a vacuum in which lower-and middle-income countries have been unable to get access to shots. And Beijing and Moscow have been only too happy to step in.

'Political suicide'

The majority of Chinese and Russian vaccine doses have gone "where Western powers and Russia and China have been competing for years for more influence," said Agathe Demarais the global forecasting director at the Economist Intelligence Unit, a research group based in London.

One key battleground is Egypt, which gets $1.3 billion in U.S. aid every year but whose human rights situation has led to strained ties with the West. It ordered tens of millions of doses from Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Sinopharm and Russia's Sputnik V program. But the first to arrive in Cairo in January were from China.

"For the man on the street" in African countries using the vaccines, "Russia and China become somewhat more attractive as possible models for going forward," said Campbell, the former ambassador to Nigeria. "Arguably, it will help increase the attractiveness of authoritarian forms of government at the expense of more democratic forms of government."

The pandemic has also allowed Russia to build relationships in Latin America beyond its traditional foothold of Venezuela, Shannon said, while the call between the Russian and Bolivian presidents was clearly linked to their vaccine deal, Demarais said. The Bolivian presidency didn't respond to a request for comment.

#### Absent the plan we risk great power war with China – transition to multipolarity is unstable and collapses deterrence

**Forsyth 19** [Jim Forsyth currently serves as dean of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD from the University of Denver, Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He has written and published extensively on great power war, intervention, and nuclear issues. “Through the Glass—Darker”, Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 4 (WINTER 2019), pp. 18-36, JSTOR]//recut SLC PK

As the article argued in 2007, “technological shifts have continuously altered the methods of war,” but in the end, “political arrangements matter, and the deterrent effect of any weapon should be evaluated within the context of the structure of the international system.”20 This claim is as true now as it was then. Indeed, one might conclude that structure matters even more now than it did 10 years ago, given the shift to multipolarity.21 Under “lopsided” multipolarity—where the United States outweighs both China and Russia militarily—it will maintain power advantages on some fronts, but at smaller margins than it did during the unipolar moment when it reigned supreme. Power diffusion, and related great power competition concerns, will be governed by the continued growth of Asian economic and military clout predominantly from China and India and the relative decline of Western economic influence.22 As China continues to translate economic gains into military modernization, the US will “focus mainly on countering China.”23 Avoiding the perils of security competition will require that the US be more cautious about exercising its power abroad.24

Yet exercising diplomacy and restraint could prove to be challenging. Even scholars who adopt a more circumspect view of emerging multipolarity, and the implications of growing military-technological parity, acknowledge its underlying risks. Barry Posen, who questions the assumption that multipolarity is inherently unstable, nonetheless acknowledges that growing parity will only “mute” great power competition. The diffusion of power will not eradicate “great power adventures.”25 China’s rise is apt to entail alliance reconfigurations and temptations to employ conventional military power.26 In fact, just as the original article predicted, the United States and India, Russia and China, and France and Germany have taken steps toward tightening their security relationships. China’s progress toward narrowing its power gap with the US has already met with a return to US defense budget growth and the establishment of new US defense cooperation commitments—notably with India. In parallel, China and Russia have grown closer, with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meeting three times in 2018 and China sending a “strong supporting contingent” to Russia’s Vostok-2018 military exercises.27

Given the complexities and uncertainties of multipolarity, the US arsenal of advanced conventional weapons (and those of other great powers) may not only prove ill suited to deterring great power war but also provide occasion for its inadvertent onset. The stealth, speed, and lethality of advanced conventional technologies—allowing for quick and decisive US victories in the Persian Gulf (1991), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001)—have proven increasingly enticing to other great powers. Russia and China drew similar lessons from these conflicts, each embarking on military modernization programs geared toward antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and grey zone strategies.28 Advanced conventional weapons already undergird Russia’s and China’s respective salami-slicing campaigns in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea. Russia began modernizing its military following its 2008 war with Georgia, enhancing its ground force readiness and updating its integrated air defense system. The improvements have allowed for significant defensive and force-projection gains (against border states).29 Though Russia has since dialed back modernization efforts in the wake of its economic downturn, China continues to seek avenues for undermining the United States’ conventional weapons edge. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still trails the United States in the areas of innovation and operational proficiency. Its modernization achievements, though—especially the development of intermediate-range missiles that threaten US forward bases and carrier strike groups—have substantially augmented China’s “advantage of proximity in most plausible conflict scenarios.”30

As great power rivals continue to chip away at the United States’ once considerable smart-weapons advantage, national security experts are reevaluating the viability of deterrence. On this front, the diffusion of capabilities, as well as the expansion of competition to the space and cyber domains, do more than complicate appraisals of the balance of power; they threaten to upend the foundations of deterrence.31 The arrival of dualcapable hypersonic weapons (and delivery systems)—currently being designed and tested by the US, China, and Russia—will arguably risk jeopardizing strategic stability. Their ultrahigh velocity could reduce warning time to the extent that “a response would be required on first signal of attack”; likewise, their deployment in ready-to-launch mode could trigger preemptive strikes, as others might perceive it as a sign of impending attack.32 Further, cyber weapons’ potential for disabling an opponent’s “early warning and command systems” may diminish the expected costs of first strike under crisis conditions.33 Autonomous weapons also have the potential to fundamentally alter the psychological underpinnings of strategy And, as Kenneth Payne notes, there is no “a priori reason” to expect that substituting artificial intelligence (AI) for human intelligence—that rapid, accurate, and unbiased information processing and responses—“will necessarily be safer.” Because AI limits the risks of using force, it could make conflict more acceptable to risk-averse states; because its speed and precision favor the offense, it could prove more conducive to aggression than deterrence; and because it shapes a host of processes and technologies rather than a single weapon or system, its effects on strategy (and the challenges of its regulation) could prove counter to deterrence.34

As noted in the original article, nuclear weapons helped sustain the “cold peace” during the Cold War—not because of their awesome destructive power but because that awesome destructive power helped buttress bipolarity.35 The simplicity of bipolarity and superpower balancing, in turn, limited “the dangers of miscalculation and overreaction.”36 Multipolarity, though, makes for complexity; additional great power players provide additional opportunities for miscalculation and overreaction. Given these conditions and the perceived “usability” of advanced conventional weapons relative to nuclear weapons, it seems likely that they will fall short of yielding “the kinds of political structures necessary to enhance deterrence.”37 To counter Posen, the diffusion of advanced conventional technology may well have cheapened the near-term costs and risks of going to war, and particularly engaging in hybrid warfare. Even if the US manages to avoid a direct confrontation with Russia or China, it seems increasingly plausible that it could be dragged into a conflict involving one or more of their allies.

#### US-China war goes nuclear.

[Caitlin Talmadge (10-15-2018), PhD in Political Science from MIT, BA in Government from Harvard, Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option]//recut](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option%5d//recut) SLC PK

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

#### Extinction – nuclear winter, crude oil amplifies, smoke covers the world

Snydera and Ruyle 17 (Brian F.Snydera and Leslie E. Ruyle, 12-15-2017, [Brian F. Snyder. Department of Environmental Science, Louisiana State University, United States. Leslie E. Ruyle. Center on Conflict and Development, Texas A&M University, United States]"The abolition of war as a goal of environmental policy," No Publication, [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969717316431?via%3Dihub)//SLC](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969717316431?via%3Dihub)//CHS) PK

While the precise impacts of a hypothetical nuclear war are difficult to predict, the detonation of the world's nuclear weapons would plausibly kill all or nearly all humans on Earth and initiate a mass extinction event. There are a total of about 9400 nuclear warheads in active service around the world, with approximately 8300 of these weapons in U.S. and Russian arsenals (Kristensen and Norris, 2017a). Because of government secrecy, it is difficult to reliably estimate the total explosive power contained in these warheads, but in most cases, each warhead ranges between 100 and 1200 kt of TNT equivalent (for comparison, the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of approximately 15–20 kt). The combined arsenals of the U.S. and Russia likely have a yield of at least 2–3 billion tons of TNT equivalent (Kristensen and Norris, 2017b,c). 2.1. Nuclear winter In the 1980s climate scientists used simple and early climate models to estimate the effects of large-scale nuclear wars on climate. The estimates they derived were catastrophic. For example, Turco et al. (1983) reported temperature reductions of 43 °C for 4 months in the Northern Hemisphere following nuclear war using the explosive power of 10 billion tons of TNT.1 As the cold war ended, interest in modelling the climate effects of nuclear war declined and some policy-makers considered the threat of nuclear winter to be either disproved or exaggerated (Martin, 1988). Toon et al. (2007) and Robock et al. (2007) reignited interest in the climate effects of nuclear war. Toon et al. (2008) modeled the effects of a medium scale nuclear war with a total explosive yield of 440 million tons of explosive yield (far less than current U.S. and Russian arsenals) and estimated global soot2 emissions of 180 Tg. Using a more conservative estimate of 150 Tg of soot, Toon et al. estimated that this emission would be sufficient to reduce global temperatures by about 8 °C and energy flux by 150 W/m2 ; for comparison, the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere since the industrial revolution have increased energy flux by 3 W/m2 (Butler and Montzka, 2017). Robock et al. (2007) modeled a similar 150 Tg smoke emission and found similar results including temperature reduction of about 8 °C lasting for several years. Low temperatures reduced evapotranspiration and weakened the global hydrological cycle and Hadley cells. As a result, precipitation decreased globally by 45% with especially dramatic decreases in the agricultural areas of the United States. In the Northern Hemisphere, growing seasons would be shortened by about 100 days for about 3 years. This would preclude most food production over most of the world for several years. Mills et al. (2014) conducted a detailed analysis of the effects of a small (1.5 million ton) regional exchange lofting just 5 Tg of soot into the atmosphere. This war would be equivalent to an exchange of 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs between, for example, India, Pakistan, or China. Mills et al. found global temperature decreases of 1.6 °C. To our knowledge, no one has studied the effects of a multi-billion ton nuclear exchange using modern atmospheric models. If, as Toon et al. and Robock et al. suggest, a 440 million ton war results in temperature reductions of 8 °C for a decade and a 100 day reduction in the growing season, it is reasonable to assume that a one to five billion ton war would not be survivable for the majority of people on earth. However, as populations and population centers grow, the effects of nuclear wars on the biosphere will also grow. The consequences of nuclear winter increase as the amount of fuel (buildings, cars, biomass, liquid and solid fuels) added to a targeted area increase. As population centers grow and densify over time, the amount of soot added to the stratosphere as the result of any given nuclear exchange may increase (depending in part on building materials). As a result, the nuclear winter resulting from a 400 million ton yield global war in 2020 may be far more severe than if the same war occurred in 2000. Further, there are reasons to believe that the soot emissions from a hypothetical nuclear exchange are conservative because they focus on urban areas and often do not incorporate non-urban energy infrastructure. For example, if ignited and burned completely, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) alone contains about 14.5 Tg of soot emissions.3 Including all crude held in U.S. commercial facilities, the potential soot emissions increase to 24 Tg. Thus, incorporating crude oil storage in the U.S. alone would increase soot generation estimates by about 16%. Similarly, nuclear war planners would be likely to target coal, oil and gas fields in the U.S., Russia, and their allies. This unaccounted for fuel could increase the total soot contribution to the atmosphere, potentially deepening the resulting nuclear winter. 2.2. Acute effects of particulate matter Studies of nuclear winter typically focus on the effects of smoke lofted into the stratosphere during nuclear firestorms. However, a larger proportion of smoke following nuclear war will be trapped in the troposphere where it would have significantly acute impacts on human and non-human species. Crutzen et al. (1984) calculated that following a major nuclear war (about 5 billion tons of explosives, roughly the combined U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear arms as of 2017) smoke would cover about 30–40% of the earth's surface with airborne smoke concentrations on the order of 5 mg/m3 . While initially this smoke would be composed of very small particles (b0.1 μm), the particles would rapidly coalesce into the 0.1 to 3 μm range, roughly consistent with the wellstudied PM2.5. For comparison, the EPA's National Ambient Air Quality standard for PM2.5 is 0.012 mg/m3 and as of 2017, the highest PM2.5 concentrations in Asia are typically around 0.3 to 1 mg/m3 .

#### Thus the plan: The United States of America ought to reduce intellectual property protections for the COVID-19 vaccine. The plan’s implemented through a COVID waiver for the U.S.

-- that’s Moderna, Pfizer-BioNTech, Johnson & Johnson/Janssen

#### The plan bolsters the number of vaccines---arguments about supply and logistics are empirically disproven.

Nancy S. **Jecker &** Caesar A. **Atuire 21**. \*Department of Bioethics & Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine, \*\*Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, Gauteng, South Africa, “What’s yours is ours: waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines,” Journal of Medical Ethics, July 6, 2021, <https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/early/2021/07/06/medethics-2021-107555.full.pdf>., RJP, **DebateDrills.**

Since consequentialist justifications treat the value of IP as purely instrumental, they are also vulnerable to counterarguments showing that a sought-after goal is not the sole or most important end. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we submit that the vaccinating the world is an overriding goal. With existing IP protections intact, the world has fallen well short of this goal. Current forecasts show that at the current pace, there will not be enough vaccines to cover the world’s population until 2023 or 2024.15 IP protections further frustrate the goal of universal access to vaccines by limiting who can manufacturer them. The WHO reports that 80% of global sales for COVID-19 vaccines come from five large multinational corporations.16 Increasing the number of manufacturers globally would not only increase supply, but reduce prices, making vaccines more affordable to LMICs. It would stabilise supply, minimising disruptions of the kind that occurred when India halted vaccine exports amidst a surge of COVID-19 cases.

It might be objected that waiving IP protections will not increase supply, because it takes years to establish manufacturing capacity. However, since the pandemic began, we have learnt it takes less time. Repurposing facilities and vetting them for safety and quality can often happen in 6 or 7months, about half the time previously thought.17 Since COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic humanity faces, expanding manufacturing capacity is also necessary preparation for future pandemics. Nkengasong, Director of the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, put the point bluntly, ‘Can a continent of 1.2billion people—projected to be 2.4billion in 30 years, where one in four people in the world will be African—continue to import 99% of its vaccine?’18

### fw

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1] Actor specificity:

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### C] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### 2] Lexical pre-requisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 4] Extinction comes first!

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 5] Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate:

#### A] Substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.

#### B] Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense

#### 6] Reject calc indicts and util triggers permissibility arguments:

#### A] Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### B] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

### theory

#### 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) reject the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time, e) no 2NR theory – 2-to-1 time tradeoff makes it devastating for the 2AR, f) comes first – it’s a bigger percentage of the 1AR than 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time and only the 2N has time to win multiple layers

### method

#### Extinction isn’t white paranoia and apocalyptic reps are good

Thompson 18 [Nicole Akoukou. Chicago-based creative writer. 4-6-2018. "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed." RaceBaitR. http://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#]

I couldn’t spare empathy for a white woman whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion: women and men dying in cells after being wrongly imprisoned, choked out for peddling cigarettes, or shot to death during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself. As a woman of color, I am aware of the multiple types of violence that threaten me currently—not theoretically. Street harassment, excessively affecting me as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant being catcalled before I’d discussed the birds and the bees. It meant being followed, whistled at, or groped. As an adult, while navigating through neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population. I move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse. A majority of my 50-minute bus ride from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit. I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit.” Sadly, that thought would not last long. I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals. North Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive liberals of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded klansmen of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: Black populations. This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country. Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard. The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.” In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide. America has always worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but nuclear war on American soil would be swift. And for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false. “The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas. Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats, anxieties, and worries. Jacqui Patterson, Director of the Environmental and Climate Justice Initiative, once stated: African American communities are disproportionately vulnerable to and impacted by natural (and unnatural) catastrophes. Our socio-economic vulnerability is based on multiple factors including our lack of wealth to cushion us, our disproportionate representation in lower quality housing stock, and our relative lack of mobility, etc.

#### Capitalism is self-correcting and sustainable – war and environmental destruction are not profitable and innovation solves their impacts

Kaletsky ’11 (Anatole, editor-at-large of *The Times* of London, where he writes weekly columns on economics, politics, and international relationsand on the governing board of the New York-based Institute for New Economic Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007-2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, p. 19-21)

Democratic capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism has been able to do this because, unlike communism or socialism or feudalism, it has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment. And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. In the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct. The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands, even if these demands sometimes create unwelcome by-products. Because voters generally reward politicians for making their lives better and safer, rather than worse and more dangerous, democratic competition directs political institutions toward solving rather than aggravating society’s problems, even if these solutions sometimes create new problems of their own. Political competition is slower and less decisive than market competition, so its self-stabilizing qualities play out over decades or even generations, not months or years. But regardless of the difference in timescale, capitalism and democracy have one crucial feature in common: Both are mechanisms that encourage individuals to channel their creativity, efforts, and competitive spirit into finding solutions for material and social problems. And in the long run, these mechanisms work very well. If we consider democratic capitalism as a successful problem-solving machine, the implications of this view are very relevant to the 2007-09 economic crisis, but diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom that prevailed in its aftermath. Governments all over the world were ridiculed for trying to resolve a crisis caused by too much borrowing by borrowing even more. Alan Greenspan was accused of trying to delay an inevitable "day of reckoning” by creating ever-bigger financial bubbles. Regulators were attacked for letting half-dead, “zombie” banks stagger on instead of putting them to death. But these charges missed the point of what the democratic capitalist system is designed to achieve. In a capitalist democracy whose raison d’etre is to devise new solutions to long-standing social and material demands, a problem postponed is effectively a problem solved. To be more exact, a problem whose solution can be deferred long enough is a problem that is likely to be solved in ways that are hardly imaginable today. Once the self-healing nature of the capitalist system is recognized, the charge of “passing on our problems to our grand-children”—whether made about budget deficits by conservatives or about global warming by liberals—becomes morally unconvincing. Our grand-children will almost certainly be much richer than we are and will have more powerful technologies at their disposal. It is far from obvious, therefore, why we should make economic sacrifices on their behalf. Sounder morality, as well as economics, than the Victorians ever imagined is in the wistful refrain of the proverbially optimistic Mr. Micawber: "Something will turn up."

#### Cap inevitable - evolution means we are all selfish

Thayer 2k Bradley A., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense & Strategic Study, Missouri State University, International Security, 01622889, Fall2000, Vol. 25, Issue 2 “"Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics"

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.[41] In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life its survival--before that of other members of its group, be it pack, herd, or tribe. For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness. Evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory provides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. A conceptual shift is required here because Dawkins's level of analysis is the gene, not the organism. As Dawkins explains, at one time there were no organisms, just chemicals in a primordial "soup."[42] At first, different types of molecules started forming by accident, including some that could reproduce by using the constituents of the soup--carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. Because these constituents were in limited supply, molecules competed for them as they replicated. From this competition, the most efficient copy makers emerged. The process, however, was never perfect. Sometimes mistakes were made during replication, and occasionally these accidents resulted in more efficient replication or made some other contribution to fitness. One such mistake might have been the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together--a primitive cell. A second might have involved the division of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "survival machines." He explains, "The first survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But making a living got steadily harder as new rivals arose with better and more effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive."[43] From a genetic perspective, there is no intentionality in this process, but it continued nonetheless because of evolution. Dawkins makes clear, however, that the interests of the gene and the organism need not coincide at different stages in an organism's life, particularly after reproduction.[44] In general, however, the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

--- didn’t read

#### Methodological pluralism is a necessary aspect of critique.

Bleiker ’14 [Roland, professor of international relations at the university of Queensland. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014]

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

**No mindset shift---cap’s internalized and regrowth movements overwhelm---empirics.**

**Milanovic ’17.** (Branko; 11/21/2017; Visiting Presidential Professor, Graduate Center - CUNY, leading scholar on income inequality, joined the Graduate Center as Visiting Presidential Professor and LIS Senior Scholar, former Lead Economist in the World Bank's research department; “The illusion of degrowth: Part II,” http://glineq.blogspot.co.uk/2017/11/the-illusion-of-degrowth-part-ii.html)

I do not think that this program is illogical. It is just so enormous, outside of anything that we normally can expect to implement, that it verges, I am afraid, on **absurdity**. It is simply impossible to put in practice, not only in democracies, but probably in North Korea either. I do not want to be impolite or insulting, but I think that only Kampuchea came up with anything similar. Many countries have lost **large fractions** of their overall income through wars or civil strife, but **none has impoverished itself voluntarily**. If put to test in real life, rather than at conferences and blogs, Jason’s program would receive support from almost no one.

Capitalist societies, after several centuries of exposure to market ideology and way of life, are structured in such a way that populations have fully accepted, and reaffirm in their daily lives, the objectives **that make capitalism thrive**. We want more and newer “stuff” every year. The ideology of commodification and commercialization has never been stronger: it is as present in the UK and the United States as in China, Nigeria, Congo, Russia or Brazil. We are not only working for a wage, we are cheerfully renting our homes and cars for money, networking at our children’s birthdays, and having kids who beat each other to grab a new model of smart phone or shoes. In other words, we have global capitalism with a population that has internalized the objectives needed for capitalism to reproduce itself and to expand, by requiring an ever greater amount of saving, investment and output.

It is irrelevant whether I like or dislike this situation (as Jason seems to believe). It is just that I observe how the world functions while Jason appears to me to live in an unreal world. If he looked at the real world he would have seen that up to 50 immigrants from Sudan are often found squeezed in the tiny electric compartments of French trains while crossing the border in order to live better lives and buy more “stuff”; he would have noticed that people, as they will doubtlessly do on this Thanksgiving too, get up at 4 in the morning to line up in front of Walmart’s and engage in fistfights so that they can buy the new model of “stuff”; he would have noticed that professors at many, and probably his own, universities fight endless battles over 1 or 2 percent salary increases; he would have noticed that families go into debt just to show off with a new model of a car etc. etc.

So his program may in words be accepted by those who would have travelled 10,000 miles to attend the conference where the program is presented; who would use AC while sitting in the conference hall and eat meat during the conferences meals, but they too **would not vote for it**.

For if the proponents of such a program really believed in it, they should start (or **should have already started**) a political movement that would promise to implement it and save the planet. They should explicitly promise continuous annual income declines of several percentage points, lower wages, pensions and social transfers, a work week of 20 hours or fewer, closure of most gas stations and many airports, home production of key food items, picketing of factories that work longer hours or supermarkets that sell meat. They should put this program on their flag and see how many people will vote for it.

**Capitalism disintegration causes transition wars --- three distinct scenarios**

**Ahmed 19**, Nafeez Ahmed, Dr. Nafeez Ahmed is a bestselling author, investigative journalist, international security scholar, policy expert, film-maker, strategy & communications consultant, and change activist., 2-22-2019, "The “Disintegration” of Global Capitalism Could Unleash World War 3, Warns Top EU Economist," Resilience, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2019-02-22/the-disintegration-of-global-capitalism-could-unleash-world-war-3-warns-top-eu-economist/ /AH

A senior European Commission economist has warned that a Third World War is an extremely “high probability” in coming years due to the disintegration of global capitalism. In a working paper published last month, Professor Gerhard Hanappi argued that since the 2008 financial crash, the global economy has moved away from “integrated” capitalism into a “disintegrating” shift marked by the same sorts of trends which preceded previous world wars. Professor Hanappi is Jean Monnet Chair for Political Economy of European Integration — an European Commission appointment — at the Institute for Mathematical Models in Economics at the Vienna University of Technology. He also sits on the management committee of the Systemic Risks expert group in the EU-funded European Cooperation in Science and Technology research network. In his new paper, Hanappi concludes that global conditions bear unnerving parallels with trends before the outbreak of the first and second world wars. Key red flags that the world is on a slippery slope to a global war, he finds, include: the inexorable growth of military spending; democracies transitioning into increasingly authoritarian police states; heightening geopolitical tensions between great powers; the resurgence of populism across the left and right; the breakdown and weakening of established global institutions that govern transnational capitalism; and the relentless widening of global inequalities. These trends, some of which were visible before the previous world wars, are reappearing in new forms. Hanappi argues that the defining feature of the current period is a transition from an older form of “integrating capitalism” to a new form of “disintegrating capitalism”, whose features most clearly emerged after the 2008 financial crisis. For most of the twentieth century, he says, global capitalism was on an “integrating” pathway toward higher concentrations of transnational wealth. This was interrupted by the outbreaks of violent nationalism involving the two world wars. After that, a new form of “integrated capitalism” emerged based on an institutional framework that has allowed industrialised countries to avoid a world war for 70 years. This system is now entering a period of disintegration. Previously, fractures within the system between rich and poor were overcome “by distributing a bit of the gains of the tremendous increase of the fruits of the global division of labour to the richer working classes in these nations.” Similarly, international tensions were diffused through transnational governance frameworks and agreements for the regulation of capitalism. But since the 2008 financial crisis, wealth distribution has worsened, with purchasing power for the middle and working classes declining as wealth becomes even more greatly concentrated. Growth in the Western centres of transnational capital has slowed, while formerly sacrosanct international trade agreements are being torn to shreds. This has fuelled a reversion to nationalism in which global and transnational structures have been rejected, and ‘foreigners’ have been demonised. As global capital thus continues to disintegrate, these pressures escalate, particularly as its internal justification depends increasingly on intensifying competition with external rivals. While integrated capitalism depended on a transnational institutional framework that permitted “stable exploitation on a national level”, Hanappi argues that “disintegrating capitalism” sees this framework become disaggregated between the USA, Europe, Russia and China, each of which pursues new forms of hierarchical subordination of workers. Disintegrating capitalism, he explains, will resort increasingly to “direct coercive powers supplemented by new information technologies” to suppress internal tensions, as well as a greater propensity for international hostilities: “The new authoritarian empires need confrontation with each other to justify their own internal, inflexible command structure.” Great power conflict Hanappi explores three potential scenarios for how a new global conflict could unfold. In his first scenario, he explores the prospect of a war between the three most prominent military powers: the US, Russia and China. All three have experienced large increases in military spending since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite a dip for the US since 2011, President Trump has ushered in a new spike, while Russian spending has plateaued and Chinese expenditures are rapidly increasing. All three countries have also experienced an authoritarian turn. Drawing on game theory, Hanappi argues that the calculus that none of these countries would be capable of ‘winning’ a world war may be changing in the perceptions of the leaderships of these countries. By one estimate, China has the highest probability of survival at 52 per cent, followed by the US at 30 per cent, and Russia at 18 per cent. This calculus suggests that of all the three powers, China might be the most inclined to escalate direct hostile military activities that challenge its rivals if it perceives a direct threat to what it sees as its legitimate interests. The US and Russia in contrast might transfer the focus of their military activities on more covert, indirect and proxy mechanisms. In the US case, Hanappi points out: “… the military strategy of Trump seems to include the possibility to delegate part of local operational responsibility to close vassals, which receive massive weapon support from the US, e.g. Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Middle East. Turkey, one of the strongest NATO branches in the area is a special case. It seems to have been allowed to destroy an emergent state of the Kurdish population, which would have been closer to the European style of governance.” There are growing signs of heightened great power tensions which could erupt entirely by accident or unanticipated provocation into a global conflict that nobody wants. The US-China trade war is escalating, while both powers tussle over technology secrets and argue over China’s growing military footprint in the South China Sea. Meanwhile Trump’s massive expansion of the US Navy and Air Force point to preparations for a major potential conflict with either China or Russsia. Both the US and Russia have jettisoned a critical nuclear treaty established since the Cold War opening the way to a nuclear arms race. North Korea remains unrepentant about its ongoing nuclear weapons programme while Trump’s tearing up of the nuclear agreement with Iran disincentivises that country from complying with disarmament and reporting terms. Early last year, a statistical study of the frequency of major wars in human history found that the so-called 70 years of ‘long peace’ is simply not an unusual phenomenon indicating an unprecedented period of peace. The study concluded that there was no reason to believe that the 70 year period so far would not give way to another major war. Small wars, global contagion Hanappi’s second scenario explores the prospect of a series of “small civil wars in many countries”. The ingredients for such a scenario are rooted in the resurgence of both right-wing and left-wing populism. “Both variants — sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly — refer to a past historical national state form that they propose to return to,” explains Hanappi. While right-wing populism harks back to the authoritarian, racist regimes established in Germany and Italy in the 1930s, left-wing populism yearns to return to the model of “integrated capitalism” that was in place during the first three decades after the Second World War, and which reacted to the unequalising effects of capitalism through the ‘social net’ of the so-called ‘welfare state’ as well as various forms of state intervention in the economy alongside private industry. But the challenge is that “integrated capitalism” is already engulfed with its own internal contradictions, propelling the shift toward disintegration. This puts left-wing populism in a systematically weaker position, as right-wing populism can point to the multiple failures of “integrated capitalism”: the failure to “overcome class antagonisms”, and the failure to “fulfil the promise of a substantially better life for the majority of people.” According to Hanappi: “The representatives of Integrated Capitalism are discredited and cannot act as leaders, the movement therefore is forced to experiment with new forms of national organization. More participatory forms of democratic organization take more time, and with multiple social groups involved this weakens this movements strength vis-à-vis right-wing populism. Furthermore, its vision of an improved national Integrated Capitalism is handicapped by the fact that many people still remember its failures, while the song of national glory that right-wing populism sings refers to an imagined far-away past that no one ever had seen.” In this context, he argues, the potential exists for outbreaks of national civil war between emerging paramilitary branches of right-wing and left-wing populist movements, in the context of either movement adopting state power and coming into conflict with the opposition. Hanappi warns of the possibility of a regional or global “contagion” effect, if these breakdowns occur within a similar time-scale. In that scenario: “The fluid mobility of national ideological political entrepreneurs, the creators of populist movements, meets the rigidity of dire global economic constraints. This is the crash that provokes local wars.” This scenario is also backed by statistical data. In 2016, a study by Lloyds Insurers found that since 1960 there has been an increasing frequency in “pandemics” of “political violence contagion” involving regional and transnational outbreaks of civil unrest within and among states. The report said that social protest and dissent against government policies of militarism abroad and neoliberal austerity at home could act as potential precursors to “contagions” of violence, along with other risk factors, including “an increase in the share of internet users”, greater urban concentration, increases in infant mortality, and a growing young population. Global insurgency of the poor Hanappi’s third scenario parallels the Lloyds study’s finding that in coming years, the world is likely to face a series of “super strain pandemics” in the form of “anti-imperialist” and “independence movements”, “mass pro-reform protests against national government”, and “armed insurrection” or “insurgency” associated with two particular ideologies, “Marxism” and “Islamism.” According to Hanappi, the plausibility of this scenario can be found in the “profoundly divergent trajectories of welfare of poor parts and rich parts of the world economy.” While GDP has continued to grow overall, in the last three decades income and wealth inequalities within almost every country have widened, and look set to sharpen further. If this cycle continues, a coalescence of grievances among the poorest three billion, spurred on by the interconnectivity of communications in the smartphone era, is plausible. Hanappi argues that in reality, global conditions make a combination of these three scenarios more likely than just one of them. “Disintegrating capitalism is not a prediction. It already has arrived and shapes everyday life. The vanishing of integrated capitalism is not a forecast either. Disintegrating capitalism dissolves capitalism but to do so it first has to destroy integrated capitalism, its immediate predecessor.” The distinguishing feature of disintegrating capitalism is its tendency to establish “nationalist and racist restrictions” designed to exclude “what its leaders define as an inferior minority” in order to protect capital accumulation for a parochially-defined narrow national identity. Old integrated capitalist institutions are abandoned, and new more coercive governance structures are introduced. In this context, Hanappi concludes that a third world war will “not necessarily” take place, but carries “a frightening high probability.” To avert it, he suggests, requires the adoption of effective counter-strategies, such as a global peace movement. Beyond disintegration: what comes next? Hanappi’s diagnosis is insightful, but is ultimately limited due to his narrow focus on economics. Missing from his analysis is any acknowledgement of the biophysical crises driving the disintegration of global capitalism: the ecological and energy flows by which capitalist economies function — and thus the natural limits (or planetary boundaries) they are breaching. However, his concept of “disintegrating capitalism” — bringing with it a heightened propensity for violent conflict — coheres well with a broader ecological concept of civilisational decline explored in a recent paper by American geographer Dr Stephanie Wakefield published in the peer-reviewed journal, Resilience. Wakefield draws on the pioneering work of systems ecologist CS Holling, who argued that natural ecosystems tend to follow an “adaptive cycle” consisting of two phases, “a front loop of growth and stability and a back loop of release and reorganisation.” She points out that while Holling’s work focused on the study of local and regional ecosystems, there remained the question of whether the idea of the “back loop” could be applied on a planetary scale to understand the dynamics of civilisational transition: “Are we in a ‘deep back loop’ that presents the same opportunities and crises as the regional back-loop studies that we have described?” he asked in 2004. Wakefield explores the idea of the “back loop” of the Anthropocene, signalling a phase shift in which a particular order, structure and value system encompassing humanity’s relationship with the earth is experiencing a deep rupture and decline: “The claims to human mastery over the world are being literally washed away by rising seas and unprecedentedly powerful storms, while terminal diagnoses of western civilisation proliferate as quickly as fantasies of the end.” In this new phase, there is a parallel between the escalation of environmental crises and intensifying political disruption. “The list of anthropogenic-induced tipping points crossed or neared grows: fisheries collapse; biodiversity loss; the melting of the ice caps and rising seas; 350 ppm and now 400 ppm CO2; anthropogenic nitrogen inputs; ocean acidification and coral reef bleaching; deforestation… But equally and together with these processes, since 2011 we are also in an era of riots, revolutions, local experiments and social movements from left to right that, to the front loop mind, may look insane, but that are very real.” But the parallel between environmental and political disruption is no accident. Rather, it is a fundamental feature of what Wakefield calls the “Anthropocene back loop”, a phase of systemic decline which sees the old order unravelling — but which simultaneously opens up new possibilities for the emergence of a new system. “In short one thing would seem clear: we are not in the front loop anymore,” writes Wakefield. “If the front loop was the ‘safe operating space’ of the Anthropocene… this complex, nonlinear ‘post-truth’ world of fragmentation, fracture, dissolution, and transfiguration is what I propose we call the Anthropocene back loop.” The front loop, then, is equivalent to the apex of Hanapper’s “integrated capitalism” that emerged after the Second World War and continued to evolve through a ‘golden age’ of neoliberal growth from the 1980s to the early 2000s. Since then, we have increasingly witnessed the eruption of internal contradictions with this ‘front loop’ of integrated capitalism, in the form of a trajectory of disintegration which manifests the “back loop” of systemic-civilisational decline: “The back loop is our present, the moment of the naming of the Anthropocene (as a failure), in which the past (front loop) has not disappeared, like points trailing behind on a line, but is erupting in unpredictable ways in the present.” The phase of disintegrating capitalism, then, is part of a wider “adaptive cycle” of global capital which now finds itself on the cusp of protracted collapse. And yet, adopting this systems lens beyond econometric thinking in a deeper ecological framework allows us to see more than just the destruction of the old order at play, but within that very process, the real emergence of unprecedented possibilities for the emergence of a new ‘front loop’: “Viewing the Anthropocene through the adaptive cycle lens, and in particular our threshold ‘now’ of scrambled grounds, discombobulated modes of knowing and being as a back loop, has a number of benefits,” suggests Wakefield. “Chief amongst these is the ability to see the Anthropocene not as a tragic End or world of ruins, but a scrambling where possibility is present and the future more open than typically imagined.” Wakefield’s repositioning of the human condition within the framework of the ‘back loop’ opens up space to envisage this as part of a longer historical series of civilisational cycles of decline and renewal, in which the task before us is to embrace our role in activating and enhancing the possibilities for renewal. This means moving far beyond conventional ‘front loop’ models of resilience — adapting stale, broken, extant political and economic structures to a world of intensifying crisis; into models of resilience aiming to reinvent and redesign ourselves and our structures from the ground up: “Instead of accepting the end of human agency except that of managing crisis — and rather than imagining ourselves as victims or managers of the back loop — I argue that another possibility exists: deciding for ourselves, locally and in diverse ways, where and how to inhabit the back loop.” Inhabiting requires more than “fighting against or living in fear” of the back loop. It requires a degree of acceptance of it, finding one’s own place in it: “to be familiar, comfortable, and involved with it… A habitual, everyday act of free creation and building.” And that requires recognising that we are moving into fundamentally and literally unknown terrain, which can only be done by dispensing with the old “modes of thinking and acting from the fore loop.” In the back loop, everything is up for grabs — not just old infrastructures, but also political ideologies and assumed philosophical realities. And so, to respond to the phase of disintegrating capitalism and the threat of a global war, more is required of us than old models like the idea of a ‘global peace movement’ — we need an entirely new ethos and practice committed to the ushering in of a new world: “What the back loop suggests to us is that the Anthropocene is now a time to explore, to let go — of foundations for thinking and acting — and open ourselves to the possibilities offered to us here and now. This is an ‘unsafe’ operating space because we have passed thresholds already, but also because there are no blueprints, no transcendents, no guarantees, and no assurances: the only thing to do is become creators of new values and new answers.” Wakefield’s work reminds us that while the dangers of a third world war are escalating in the Anthropocene back loop of disintegrating capitalism, the opportunities for renewal, reorganisation and revival are rapidly emerging. These need to be grasped and activated whether or not war breaks out. Further, we need to work to sound the alarm, relentlessly, at all levels to raise awareness of the true nature of the phase shift we now find ourselves in as a species. Whatever ultimately emerges, the end is not nigh – rather, we stand at the unknown dawn of a new beginning.

#### The 1AC isn’t reformism – it doesn’t conflate change with progress or validate legal institutions – it’s a tactical intervention that reduces violence while exposing the contradictions within law.

Spade 13 Dean Spade, associate professor of law @ Seattle University, “Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform” *Signs* Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013

What intersectional politics demands¶ Social movements using critical intersectional tools are making demandsthat are often difficult for legal scholars to comprehend because of the ways that they throw US law and the nation-state form into crisis. Because they recognize the fact that legal equality contains and neutralizes resistance and perpetuates intersectional violence and because they identify purportedly neutral administrative systems as key vectors of that violence, critical scholars and activists are making demands that include ending immigration enforcement and abolishing policing and prisons. These demands suggest that the technologies of gendered racialization that form the nation cannot be reformed into fair and neutral systems. These systems are technologies of racialized-gendered population control that cannot operate otherwise—they are built to extinguish perceived threats and drains in order to protect and enhance the livelihood of the national population. These kinds of demands and the analysis they represent produce a different relation to law reform strategies than the national narrative about law reform suggests, and different than what is often assumed by legal scholars interested in the field of “equality law.” Because legal equality “victories” are being exposed as primarily symbolic declarations that stabilize the status quo of violence, declarations from courts or legislatures become undesirable goals. Instead, law reform, in this view, might be used as a tactic of transformation focused on interventions that materially reduce violence or maldistribution without inadvertently expanding harmful systems in the name of reform. One recent example is the campaign against gang injunctions in Oakland, California. A broad coalition—comprising organizations focused on police violence, economic justice, imprisonment, youth development, immigration, gentrification, and violence against queer and trans people—succeeded in recent years in bringing significant attention to the efforts of John Russo, Oakland’s city attorney, to introduce gang injunctions (Critical Resistance 2011). The organizations in this coalition are prioritizing anticriminalization work that might usually be cast as irrelevant or marginal to organizations focused on the single axis of women’s or LGBT equality. The campaign has a law reform target in that it seeks to prevent the enactment of certain law enforcement mechanisms that are harmful to vulnerable communities. However, it is not a legal-equality campaign. Rather than aiming to change a law or policy that explicitly excludes a category of people, it aims to expose the fact that a facially neutral policy is administered in a racially targeted manner (Davis 2011; Stop the Injunctions 2011).¶ Furthermore, the coalition frames its campaign within a larger set of demands not limited to what can be won within the current structure of American law but focused on population-level conditions of maldistribution. The demands of the coalition include stopping all gang injunctions and police violence; putting resources toward reentry support and services for people returning from prison, including fully funded and immediate access to identity documents, housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and education; banning employers from asking about prior convictions on job applications; ending curfews for people on parole and probation; repealing California’s three-strikes law; reallocating funds from prison construction to education; ending all collaborations between Oakland’s government and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); providing affordable and low-income housing; making Oakland’s Planning Commission accountable regarding environmental impacts of development; ending gentrification; and increasing the accountability of Oakland’s city government while augmenting decision-making power for Oakland residents (Stop the Injunctions 2011). These demands evince an analysis of conditions facing vulnerable communities in Oakland (and beyond) that cannot be resolved solely through legal reform since they include the significant harm inflicted when administrative bodies like ICE and the Planning Commission implement violent programs under the guise of neutral rationales. These demands also demonstrate an intersectional analysis of harm and refuse logics of deservingness that have pushed many social movements to distance themselves from criminalized populations. Instead, people caught up in criminal and immigration systems are portrayed as those in need of resources and support, and the national fervor for law and order that has gripped the country for decades, emptying public coffers and expanding imprisonment, is criticized.¶ Another example of intersectional activism utilizing law reform without falling into the traps of legal equality is activism against the immigration enforcement program Secure Communities**.** Secure Communities is a federal program in which participating jurisdictions submit the fingerprints of arrestees to federal databases for an immigration check. As of October 2010, 686 jurisdictions in thirty-three states were participating.12 Diverse coalitions of activists and organizations around the United States launched organizing campaigns to push their jurisdictions to refuse to participate. Organizations focused on domestic violence, trans and queer issues, racial and economic justice, and police accountability, along with many others, have joined this effort and committed resources to stopping the devolution of criminal and immigration enforcement. Their advocacy has rejected deservingness narratives that push the conversation toward reform for “good, noncriminal” immigrants. These advocates have won significant victories, convincing certain jurisdictions to refuse to participate and increasing understanding of the intersecting violences of criminal punishment and immigration enforcement.13 This work also avoids the danger of expanding and legitimizing harmful systems that other legal reform work can present. It is focused on reducing, dismantling, and preventing the expansion of harmful systems.14¶ I offer these examples not because they are perfect—certainly a significant range of tactics and strategies are part of each of these campaigns, and, with detailed analysis, we might find instances of co-optation, deservingness divides, and other dangers of legal reform work occurring even as some are avoided and rejected. However, these examples are indicative of resistance to limitations of legal equality or rights strategies. These demands exceed what the law recognizes as viable claims. These campaigns suggest that those who argue that a politics based on intersectional analysis is too broad, idealistic, complex, or impossible—or that it eliminates effective immediate avenues for resistance—are mistaken. Critical political engagements are resisting the pitfalls of rights discourse and seeking to build broad-based resistance formations made up of constituencies that come from a variety of vulnerable subpopulations but find common cause in concerns about criminalization, immigration, poverty, colonialism, militarism, and other urgent conditions.Their targets are administrative systems and law enforcement mechanisms that are nodes of distribution for racialized-gendered harm and violence, and their tactics seek material change in the lives of vulnerable populations rather than recognition and formal inclusion. Their organizing methods mobilize directly affected communities and value horizontal structures, leadership development, mutual aid, democratic participation, and community solutions rather than top-down, elite-imposed approaches to political transformation. These analytical and practical methods owe a great deal to women-of-color feminist formations that have innovated and continue to lead inquiry and experimentation into transformative social justice theory and practice.15