# 1NC

## 1

### 1NC – FW

#### Our interpretation is that the aff should specify and defend a specific political demand resulting from the performance of the 1AC.

#### Violation – the aff’s performance is a method but is not committed to specific political demands.

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### Political education – Popular political education requires both dismantling and radical reconstruction – it is not enough to simply critique, we must offer new and challenging political alternatives, opening much needed space for new political parties to emerge that tactically engage with oppressive structures to open material space for new imaginations.

#### Testing – comparing radical grassroots tactics against others opens dialogue about local contexts to interconnections between global conditions – only affs that defend grassroots political demands can generate broad support for linked struggles with the nuance and specificity required to change oppressive environments. Anything else makes it impossible to be negative and incentivizes the aff to wait until the 1AR to clarify their strategy.

Davis ’16 (Angela Davis, 2016, *Freedom is a constant struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the foundations of a movement*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.) [\\EGott](file:///\\EGott)

What can we do? How can we do it? With whom? What tactics should be used? How should we define a strategy that is accessible to everyone, including a general public that has reached levels of depoliticization that can make atrocities seem acceptable? What is our vision? How can we make sure “we” are talking to “everyone”? How can we catalyze and connect sustainable, cross-border, and radical movements? These are the types of questions that many activists ask themselves on a daily basis, questions that are anchored in the present and will shape our future. It is easy to feel discouraged and simply let go. There is no shame in that. We are, after all, engaged in a struggle that seems, if we look at it using a mainstream political framework and through a mass media prism, unwinnable. On the other hand, if we take a step back, look at things from a broader angle, reflecting on what is happening all over the world and the history of struggle, the history of solidarity movements, it becomes clear, sometimes even obvious, that seemingly indestructible forces can be, thanks to people’s willpower, sacrifices, and actions, easily broken. When I first thought of producing a book with Angela Davis, my main goal was to talk about our struggle as activists. To try to define it in real and concrete terms. To try to understand what it means to people engaged in it. Where and how does it start? Does it ever end? What are the essential foundations for building a movement? What does it mean physically, philosophically, and psychologically?

#### Neg Flex – holding the affirmative to the artifact of the 1ac is the only check on unclear or shifty affs – affs get infinite prep, set the stasis point for the debate and get ample opportunities to dictate negative argumentation. Impossible Referendums on our framework make it impossible to be neg and forecloses educational debates over revolutionary tactics.

#### Vote neg on presumption – the affirmative does not propose a change to the status quo. We don’t require the aff to use state action or have a plan text, but they must at least argue that the affirmatives method results in a material change from the status quo

## 2

### 1NC – K

#### Your techno-futurism is settler colonialist – the AFF’s project produces techno-citizenship in which a one humanity is brought under the dream of technological progress rehearses settler colonial violence

Atanasoski & Vora 19 [Neda, Prof. Feminist Studies & Critical, Race, and Ethnic Studies & Legal Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, and Kalindi, Assoc. Prof Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies and Dir., Feminist Research Institute, *Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures*, pp. 60-4//ak47]

The coming together of techno-utopic and more cautious approaches to the economic paradigm shift brought about by technological infrastructures is elucidated in the compendium of short essays on technology and the future of work put together by Pacific Standard in 2015. This project assembled speculations on the topic from industry leaders, technologists, social scientists, and journalists. One focus in these debates was the contest between technologies designed to enhance what humans already do and technologies designed to replace humans. In spite of differences, both sides tether techno-futurity to the surrogate human effect of emergent technologies and digital platforms. John Markoff (science writer for the New York Times) describes two primary arguments about the effect of technology on labor: (1) ai and robotics are developing so rapidly that virtually all human labor will be replaceable within three decades (represented for him by Moshe Varde at Rice University); and (2) robotics will lead to new jobs and create immense economic activity (represented by the International Federation of Robotics). In both perspectives, human futures are linked to capitalist-driven technological developments focused on questions of productivity and efficiency. The two philosophies of how to engineer human– robot and human– ai relations in the realm of labor presented by Markoff date back to 1964 and the beginning of interactive computing at Stanford.17 John McCarthy, who coined the phrase “artificial intelligence,” believed he could begin designing an ai that could replicate human capabilities in a single decade. In contrast, Douglas Engelbert set up a lab with the goal of developing technologies that would “augment,” or extend, rather than replace, human capabilities. 18 These evolved into two opposing camps that worked largely in isolation: artificial intelligence research and human– computer interaction design research. Boston Dynamics, the mit Media Lab–derived US military robotics contractor, is the preeminent example of the ai group. Tom Gruber, an Apple engineer who designed Siri speech recognition, has worked to prototype the other. The competition between two models of a future dominated by machines that Markoff sets up brings attention to the way they will materialize existing implicit and explicit social values: “Will a world watched over by what the 1960s poet Richard Brautigan described as ‘machines of loving grace’ be a free world? The best way to answer questions about the shape of a world full of smart machines is by understanding the values of those who are actually building these systems.”19 In short, engineers and designers will build values into the hardware and software constituting the infrastructure that organizes human– machine interaction. Because they are sutured to capitalist demands for faster production to generate more profit, present-day techno-futurities, while claiming to be about technologies that are distinct from the modes of automation in the early and mid-twentieth century we addressed in chapter 1, continue to be haunted by the specter of the obsolescence of the human worker. Thus, a number of scholars and thinkers still fear that this second machine age will drastically reduce the number of available jobs, leading to more and more people without employment. Computer scientist and leader in artificial intelligence development Nils J. Nillson sums up these concerns in his assertion that automation will put wealth in the hands of a small number of “super-managers” worldwide, while leaving the masses jobless and impoverished.20 The question of what will happen to the vast numbers of unemployed people seems to be up for all sorts of dystopic conjecture: working more and more for less and less, perhaps winning more leisure time (but will people start hobbies or will they just do drugs and other socially destructive things? asks Nillson). While Nillson positions techno-dispossession as a thing of the future, it is not difficult to find real-time models for economies that cannot employ their own citizens. Most of the formerly colonized world contends with this problem in different ways because of international lending (Third World debt) and the ongoing struggle to regain self-sufficiency in restructuring infrastructures designed to evacuate resources. A small number of people will gain wealth, as in India and China, but the vast majority will lose quality of life, lose land, and lose employment. There will be massive migration to centers of wealth, and modes of life and self-sustenance will be further destroyed, then rebuilt and managed for the gain of others, elsewhere. For example, in the issue of Pacific Standard on this topic, contributors suggest that one solution to the coming robotics-induced obsolescence of human workers is to institute a universal basic income. As robots take our jobs, the argument goes, the additional wealth created will be enough that the growing number of unnecessary human workers can be supported. Even some longtime labor activists, most prominently Andy Stern, the former president of the largest and one of the most influential unions in the US, the Service Employees International Union (seiu), which represents 1.5 million public service workers, including nurses, care providers, and security workers, have capitulated to the idea that within the next two decades machines will replace over half of US jobs.21 According to Stern, as more tasks are automated and full-time jobs disappear, the role of collective bargaining will become marginalized and dues-paying union members will be fewer and farther between. Stern is a member of the steering committee of one of the foremost organizations pushing for a universal basic income (ubi), the Economic Security Project, which asserts that “In a time of immense wealth, no one should live in poverty, nor should the middle class be consigned to a future of permanent stagnation or anxiety. Automation, globalization, and financialization are changing the nature of work, and these shifts require us to rethink how to create economic opportunity for all.”22 To enable a new American Dream, argues Stern, we need to implement a ubi of at least $12,000 a year so that no one falls into poverty. However, as union educator, activist, and scholar Heidi Hoechst points out, when all that remains of a labor movement is the fight for a ubi, the movement has capitulated to the neoliberal restructuring of the fabric of society.23 With everyone receiving a minimum income, the last vestiges of social support, such as the costs of Medicare and welfare, will be transferred to the individual. What will happen to workers with the increase of robotic automation in manufacturing is a question that news media and technoliberal elites are also rushing to answer.24 Christopher Hughes, the cofounder of Facebook, is also the cofounder of the Economic Security Project. He argues that in a time when the US is more divided than at any other time since the Civil War, and in a time when faith in the opportunity for a good life in the US has waned, it is crucial to use cash in the form of a distributed universal basic income to harness technology for social justice. As he puts it, “Median household incomes in the US haven’t budged in decades even though the price of healthcare, education, and housing have skyrocketed. The old idea that if you work hard and play by the rules, you can get ahead has disappeared. As a handful of people at the top have thrived, the rest of America —urban and rural, white people and people of color, old and young —has nearly uniformly been left behind.” 25 While Hughes acknowledges that historically the myth of opportunity has not applied to people of color in the US, in his formulation of an argument for ubi, precarity has become universal: “Americans of nearly all backgrounds now believe their kids are likely to fare worse than they have. Major forces like automation and globalization have changed the nature of jobs, making nearly half of them piecemeal, part-time, and contingent —Uber drivers, part-time workers, TaskRabbit workers abound.”26 In the technoliberal formulation of ubi, which would allow everyone to, in Hughes’s words, “create a ladder of economic opportunity,” the regressiveness of ubi is justified because what used to be racialized precarity now affects all (including white people who were formerly securely in the middle class because of race privilege). It is thus an appropriation of both the racial histories of devalued labor and a socialist imaginary of distributed wealth. In fact, however, the most that is proposed as part of ubi is $1,000 per month—hardly a subsistence wage in most parts of the United States. Universal basic income is particularly interesting in thinking about how and why socialist ideals are redefined and appropriated as part of technoliberal reimaginings of the common social good. Hughes and others are aware that the increasing wealth disparity and the disproportionate number of young tech billionaires whose wealth accumulation has been unprecedented are unsustainable and unjust. Yet, in articulating a need for ubi, they also assert that technology is a kind of public good tied to US citizenship. In a 2017 article in Wired magazine, two examples are used to explain why ubi can work. The first is a survey of Alaskans who receive $2,000 per person per year from the state’s oil revenues conducted by the Economic Security Project. In this example, the profit from oil, a public good, is distributed among residents of the state (thus membership in the state determines equal distribution). The second example is that of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina, who split 97 percent of casino profits. The model is slightly different from that of Alaska: “In 2016, every tribal member received roughly $12,000. . . . All children in the community, have been accruing payments since the day they were born. The tribe sets the money aside and invests it, so the children cash out a substantial nest egg when they are 18.”27 At the moment, this payout is around $105,000. The article, rather than dwelling on the politics of land, dispossession, settler colonialism, and the politics of tribal casinos in the US, instead asserts that citizenship, rather than need, should be the basis for distributing ubi: The idea is not exactly new—Thomas Paine proposed a form of basic income back in 1797—but in this country, aside from Social Security and Medicare, most government payouts are based on individual need rather than simply citizenship. Lately, however, tech leaders, including Facebook founders Mark Zuckerberg and Chris Hughes, Tesla’s Elon Musk, and Y Combinator president Sam Altman, have begun pushing the concept as a potential solution to the economic anxiety brought on by automation and globalization—anxiety the tech industry has played its own role in creating.28 In the technoliberal imaginary of a just distribution of some of the tech wealth, then, settler citizenship both appropriates and erases the settler colonial violence upon which wealth accumulation is based in the US. Notions of distribution (and of tech as a US national resource) thus also further the project of US imperialism.

#### The failure of the settler subject to come to grips with the death drive dooms their politics to totalitarianism. Force them to confront the reliance of the aff on indigenous genocide. They don’t make society more equitable. They make it more equitable for settlers.

Young ’17 [Bryanne; Ph.D Student, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Communication, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System”; Last Modified 3/22/19; Published August 2017; University of North Carolina Digital Repository; <https://doi.org/10.17615/zkyc-q417>; Accessed 7/24/20; NT]

This racist ideology disguised as Darwinism id driven to a homeostasis that contains difference within it is, to a very large extent, a more viable state project than the attempt to holistically eradicate the difference of the other. In nineteenth and twentieth-century Canada—an epoch shaped by colonial politics and emerging forms of nation-building centered on a collective futurity—the chronopolitical we/other opposition was fundamentally racialized: we indicated whiteness, while other indicated racial difference. Racial difference is here understood as “a class of people” (Scott 55) unified through their morphological similarities and perceived shared traits, and who, together, presumably were unable to stand “outside the body politic” (ibid, emph. added). The metaphor of standing “outside” the body politic is, I point out, as inherently temporal as it is spatial. The temporality of the body politic here convoked is a temporality of the here/now that also claims linear progress towards the future. The temporality of the Indian—whose position is distinctly outside the here/now—is a circular time that, in the colonial imagination, repeats itself in a closed loop. Not only is Indigenous time perceived to be circular and outside the body politic, it is outside of history. The interpellative call to die with which the Canadian Indian Residential School System legitimizes its objectives and ethos, therefore, recapitulates a subjectivity that has been trapped, already, temporally, within the field of signification, and the dense network of intersubjective relations these ideological structures suture and render legible. As a way of elaborating upon this, perhaps abstract, argument, pointing both to the materializing force of language, as well as the structural mechanism(s) whose circularity produces the effect of subject as ideological misrecognition, I offer the following story:

In 1942 government researchers visiting a number of remote reserve communities in northern Manitoba, found people who were hungry, “beggared by a combination of the collapsing fur trade and declining government support” (Mosby 147). They also found a demoralized population marked by, in the words of the researchers, “shiftlessness, indolence, improvidence and inertia” (ibid). In a potentially paradigm shifting moment that must have come close to epiphany, the researchers suggested those problems—“so long regarded as inherent or hereditary traits in the Indian race” (ibid, emph. added)—were in fact the results of malnutrition.”53 Importantly, and vividly illustrative of my argument in this chapter, and the project overall, instead of recommending an immediate increase in support, the researchers determined that isolated, dependent, already malnourished people would be ideal subjects for tests on the effects of different diets and nutritional interventions. Plans were developed for a longitudinal study to be conducted “on a limited number of Indians” (ibid) including Aboriginal children in residential schools in British Columbia, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Alberta—tests which, through large-scale and coordinated efforts, greatly exacerbated already existing conditions of starvation and malnourishment by further withholding much-needed nutrition. Thus, “hereditary traits” in the “Indian race” were, through mechanisms of biopolitics, further inscribed in both bodily and discursive practices—concretized more immutably into Indian-ness with every rotation of the circular reasoning that characterizes ideological misrecognition.

This kind of strategic, repeated exposure to prolonged conditions of near or actual physical death marks the indigenous body for inevitable decline and erasure. Cultural theorist Lauren Berlant describes this as a condition of “slow death,” which she defines as, “the physical wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that population that is very nearly a defining condition of their experience and historical existence” (754). Thus, through material and signifying practices, Indianness is laminated more concretely onto death and finality. Correspondingly, the Indigenous body is marked as anachronistic, a relic, an embodiment out of time whose configuration of experience is slow death. Simultaneously, Indianness is renewed continually in the field of signification, performatively reproduced as “shiftless”, “indolent”, and “inert.” Through biopolitical techniques of control and regulation, the socalled Indian race was trapped simultaneously in two temporalities: slow death and circularity, neither of which afforded it a future—through a strategy of control that is fundamentally chronopolitical.

Whiteness, the Child, and the Logics of Futurity

Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality.

Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension.

The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible.

It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii).

#### Feminist strategizing is parasitic on Indian land and strengthens settler colonial relations – only a decolonization first strategy can liberate oppressive structures

Grande 4 (Sandy, Associate Professor of Education at Connecticut College, Ph.D., Kent State University, Fellow in the Holleran Center for Community Action and Public Policy, member of the EPA’s National Environmental Justice Advisory Council’s Indigenous People’s Work Group, “Red Pedagogy”, pg. 148-150)

The aim of this analysis was to determine the state and prevalence of¶ whitestream feminism in the contemporary feminist terrain. As it turns out, it not¶ only appears to be alive and well but also thriving as the dominant discourse. Indeed,¶ the voice of whitestream feminism and its resistance to theorize at the intersection¶ of economics, labor, production, and exploitation is so predominant¶ that it raises the question: Who gains from abandoning the problems of labor?¶ One possibility is that it allows white middle-class women to deny that¶ their increased power and access has come at the expense of poor women and¶ women of color. This reality compels Ebert to draw a distinction between¶ emancipatory pedagogies, which explain how exploitative relations operate¶ in the everyday lives of people so that they can be changed, and liberatory¶ pedagogies, which privilege the desiring subject at the center of their politics,¶ protecting the material interests of the powerful and propertied classes.¶ In this light, Lather's resistance to "totalizing" and "universal" categories (and¶ her subsequent assertions of indeterminacy) is revealed as a "legitimization of¶ the class politics of an upper-middle-class Euroamerican feminism obsessed¶ with the freedom of the entrepreneurial subject" (Ebert 1996b, 31). Driven by¶ the capriciousness of postmodern and post-structural theories, such feminisms¶ ultimately dismiss the political imperatives of radical critique and its commitment¶ to the collective emancipation of all peoples, privileging instead the desires¶ of the white, bourgeois, female subject. As an indigenous woman, I understand¶ this discourse as a "theory of property holders" and until whitestream feminists¶ "come clean" about their participation in the forces of domination, indigenous¶ and other colonized women will continue to resist its premises.¶ AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN'S RESISTANCE:¶ TOWARD A THEORY OF INDIGENTSTA¶ Since most indigenous women link their subjugation to colonization and recognize¶ the integral participation of white women in this project, they have¶ consistently voiced their misgivings about the feminist movement. Their resistance¶ is also buttressed by the "widely shared belief that American Indian¶ women do not need feminism" (Bataille and Sands 1984). Indeed, while patriarchy¶ may be a salient feature in the structural oppression of women in¶ Western societies, many indigenous societies reveal an overall de-emphasis¶ on virtually all relations of domination and submission (Klein and Ackerman¶ 1995). As Maltz and Archambault (1995, 247) note, in societies where relations¶ of prestige and hierarchy are virtually absent, "the ability to dominate¶ others does not tend to be a major basis for determining status," and "the¶ (more specific) control of men over women is not a major theme." On the¶ contrary, matrilineal, matrilocal, and matriarchal structures tend to be the historical¶ norm for many indigenous societies.1 4 In addition to the differences in¶ social and political structures, indigenous societies differ in their religious¶ and cosmological systems. Specifically, in contrast to the patriarchal structures¶ of Christianity dominant in Western societies, indigenous belief systems¶ demonstrate clear patterns of gender balance and female empowerment.¶ As a result of the above social and political structures, many indigenous¶ women share historical memories and contemporary experiences of women¶ as warriors, healers, spiritual leaders, clan mothers, tribal leaders, council¶ members, political activists, and cultural proprietors, and thus, already live¶ with a sense of their own traditional "feminist" agency. Thus, while such¶ women may occupy a marginalized space in the whitestream distortions of¶ U.S. history, they have always held prominence in the histories, collective¶ memories, oral traditions, and ceremonial spaces of their own tribal nations.¶ This historical legacy of reciprocity, shared governance, and female spiritual¶ empowerment fuels the belief among indigenous women that they do not¶ need "liberation" since they have always been "liberated" within their own¶ tribal structures (Bataille and Sands 1984).¶ In addition to the historically situated and shared presumption that they do¶ not need feminism, indigenous women experience an inherent disjuncture between¶ the contemporary feminist and indigenous political projects. Lorelei¶ DeCora Means, a Minneconjou Lakota, AIM activist, and cofounder of the¶ Women of All Red Nations (WARN), articulated the roots of this disjuncture¶ in a speech delivered during International Women's Week at the University of¶ Colorado at Boulder:¶ We are American Indian women, in that order. We are oppressed first and foremost¶ as American Indians, as peoples colonized by the United States of America,¶ not as women. As Indians we can never forget that. Our survival, the survival¶ of every one of us—man, woman, child—as Indians depends on it.¶ Decolonization is the agenda, the whole agenda, and until it is accomplished,¶ it is the only agenda that counts for American Indians. It will take every one¶ of us—every single one of us—to get the job done. We haven't got the time, energy or resources for anything else while our lands are being destroyed and¶ our children are dying of avoidable diseases and malnutrition. So we tend to¶ view those who come to us wanting to form alliances on the basis of new and¶ different or broader or more important issues to be a little less than friends, especially¶ since most of them come from the Euroamerican population which¶ benefits most directly from our ongoing colonization, (cited in Jaimes 1992,¶ 314)¶ Means's powerful words not only assert the primacy of the decolonization¶ agenda but also allude to the ways other social agendas —whitestream feminism—¶ depend upon and benefit from the continuation of the colonialist¶ project.¶ Indigenous Hawaiian activist Haunani-Kay Trask (1996) similarly speaks¶ of the inherent tensions between the feminist and indigenous political projects,¶ recounting her foray in women's studies as a graduate student. After¶ leaving academia and resuming her role as an Indian activist, Trask reports¶ how the deep contradictions between indigenous struggles for land, language,¶ self-determination, and the feminist political project compelled her to abandon¶ feminism. She writes:¶ [Als I decolonized my mind . . . feminism appeared as just another haole [Western]¶ intrusion into a besieged Hawaiian world. . . . Their language revolved¶ around First World "rights" talk, that Enlightenment individualism that takes for¶ granted "individual" primacy. . . . It viewed the liberal state as the proper arbiter¶ of rights and privileges. It accepted capitalism as the despised but inevitable¶ economic force. And finally it insisted on the predicable racist assumption that¶ all peoples are alike in their common "humanity"—a humanity imbued with Enlightenment¶ values and best found in Euro-American states. . . . We are the colonized;¶ they are the beneficiaries of colonialism. That some feminists are oblivious¶ to this historical reality does not lessen their power in the colonial equation.¶ (Trask 1996,909,911)¶ Trask positions the concerns of "haole" feminism as not only different from¶ those of Native Hawaiian women but also as contradictory, noting (like¶ Means) that haole feminists don't just benefit from the colonization of Native¶ peoples, but depend on it.¶ American Indian scholar and activist Janet McCloud (cited in Jaimes 1992,¶ 314) similarly calls attention to "progressive" feminist's failure to account for¶ the benefits accrued by the continued occupation of indigenous lands. She¶ writes:¶ [S]o let me toss out a different kind of progression to all you . . . feminists out¶ there. You join us in liberating our land and lives. Lose the privilege you acquire¶ at our expense by occupying our land. Make that your first priority for as long¶ as it takes to make it happen . . . but if you're not willing to do that then don't¶ presume to tell us how we should go about our own liberation, what priorities¶ and values we should have. Since you're standing on our land, we've got to¶ view you as another oppressor trying to hang onto what's ours.¶ McCloud goes on to suggest that calls for American Indian women to "join"¶ the feminist movement are tantamount to asking them to participate as¶ "equals" in their own colonization.

#### The alternative is to adopt an ethic of incommensurability. You must reject compromise and coalitions in favor of positing material decolonization as prior.

Tuck & Yang ‘12 [Eve Tuck, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities, William T Grant Scholar and former Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow, is Unangax and an enrolled member of the Aleut Community of St. Paul Island, Alaska, and K. Wayne Yang, University of California, San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 2012, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/download/18630/15554>]

Conclusion An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

#### Your role is to center Indigenous voices and scholarship – academia is built on colonial violence.

Carlson 16

(Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213, JKS)

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

## 3

### 1NC – P

#### New, undisclosed advantages are a voting issue – they moot pre-round prep and force the neg into generics. The advocacy isn’t good enough – it could be anything from a Kant aff to a K aff to a policy aff. Nuanced pre-round prep is key to clash and testing the aff – you should be skeptical of aff offense because I couldn’t thoroughly test it.

## Case

### Framework

#### The structure of debate is foreclosed to individual social change.

Bryant ’13 (Levi; 5/31/13; Professor of Philosophy at Collin College; “The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory”; http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has **pretensions of being emancipatory**. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in **academic journals** that few have access to, in a **jargon** that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at **conferences** that only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that **isn’t aimed at political change** or intervention **at all**, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing **autopoiesis of academia**. That is, it functions as another line on the CV and is one strategy through which the university system carries out its autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a **commodity within the academic system**. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities). Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to **reach outside the academy**, but this is precisely what academic political theory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a **different platform of communication**. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse.

### Advantage

#### Cyborgs are a fantasy of escape that rely on the same genocidal tropes of *terra nullius* that underwrite settler colonialism

Byrd, Associate Professor, 15

(Jodi A., Chickasaw Nation citizen and Associate Professor of English and Gender & Women’s Studies at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, April 2015; “Mind the Gap: Indigenous Sovereignty and the Antinomies of Empire,” Accessed: 4-13-2019; The Anomie of the Earth: Philosophy, Politics, and Autonomy in Europe and the Americas, p. 119 – 124, jwm)

Since 2011, and in the time since the Occupy movement’s demonstrations around the United States and world, it is now somewhat passé if not naïve to evoke the protest mobilizations as some sort of optimistic shift toward global transformation of debt, biofinancialization, and conspicuous consumption. After Michael Taussig observed angry signs, James C. Scott gave two cheers for anarchy, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri declared the end to manifestos, the outcomes and impacts of the Occupy movement continue to circulate within leftist critique to ambivalent ends.1 What has emerged, however, has been a sustained and attentive engagement with the entanglement such notions as value, accumulation, crisis, and financialization have with and to the processes of enclosure that conscripted the New World into productive value, a process that served to reworld lands and reciprocal relationships into property and conscripted labor. “In the beginning,” John Locke announced in his Second Treatise, “all the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was anywhere known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbors, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.”2 Locke’s predictive common sense of human nature, articulated here in the voice of god, is the sine qua non of colonial capitalism, and use, value, and possessive enlargement have been the operative modes of colonization and genocide, indentureship and slavery, enlightenment and democracy since Europeans first imagined natural man and civil society. Over three hundred years later, and as we find ourselves now managed and managing (barely) within the systems of governmentality that Foucault defined as biopolitics, the gap between use, value, and possession continues to collapse as neoliberal institutions consolidate control over our lives at the same time that they entrench our investments in notions of some outside, alternative escape from all this to a more judicious, less indebted, more equal space of the commons, the space beyond. To enter such an outside, one must steal away, become fugitive, stop the theft by thieving; as Fred Moten and Stefano Harney write, “to enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons.”3 Their notion of the commons, or in fact the undercommons, attached to fugitive planning and black intellectual thought, seeks to recover the surround of the fort, to reframe the notion of surround as the act of surrounding toward a politics from below the below. But what does it mean to delineate such notions of the wilderness, the wild, and the surround within the larger trajectories of U.S. frontier expansion? How might a notion such as indigeneity function within the calls for the redistribution of sense and sensibility at the site of stealing away? How does one begin to access and activate the “indigenous” within systems of subjectifications and objectifications that formed themselves in relation to what Elizabeth Povinelli apprehends as those prior presences necessary to render liberalism and the human intelligible at the horizon of governance?4 And finally, how does the embracing and jettisoning of the idea of the “native” and “tribal” function within reiterations of states of nature that often underwrite calls for redistribution, access, justice, and the commons? Often such calls for the commons arise within the context of certain governmental norms and givens that are predicated upon Enlightenment investments in the human and the individual—fugitive and stolen back though they might be. As Carl Schmitt argues, the geopolitical logics of Enlightenment humanism arose within the originary moment of the New World discovery. The state of nature, he asserts in The Nomos of the Earth, “is a *no man’s land*, but this does not mean it exists nowhere. It can be located, and Hobbes locates it, among other places, in the New World.”5 Within the context of the Americas, freedom, equality, and liberty were hewn in a crucible of violence, subjugation, enslavement, extermination, and expropriation that made such promissory ideals intelligible, desirable, and enforceable. Savage, animal, and female were differentiated in order to cohere civilized, human, and male into the normative structures through which power, politics, and livability could be structured. Indigenous peoples and lands became recognizable as they were conscripted into Western law and territoriality and then disavowed from the space of actor into that space which is acted upon within the systems of colonial governmentality that continue to underwrite the settler empires that have emerged through the direct benefit of lands stolen from peoples who could not maintain territoriality or humanity in the face of the grinding appropriations of modernity. In order to begin to answer some of the questions I have posed, and here I would like to add a question Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright have asked of indigenous critique—“What are the consequences of naturalizing an ethnicized, racialized, and nationalized relationship between people and with land?”—the first thing we should do is consider how people and land function and are naturalized within the concepts of the political that reside within sovereignty and territoriality and the commons.6 That the concept of the political, which includes the biopolitical, the exception of bare life, and even the possible alternatives that might emerge to transform sociality and relationality into “new world orders,” is tied to the order of the New World and the conquest of indigenous peoples matters within considerations of the commons, particularly as they deconfigure and reconfigure the concepts of property, territoriality, and sovereignty. Certain philosophical antecedents—including the origins of “natural man,” “human rights,” and “freedom and equality,” derived from and through the colonization of indigenous peoples in the Americas—have been disavowed within the realms of the political and biopolitical. Those realms, according to Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, transformed from the territorial state into the state of population during the nineteenth century as sovereignty came to enact itself through the exception and the threshold between life and death.7 Indigenous peoples, as neither fully alive nor completely eradicated, remain spectral within the settler colonies of the global North, even as the transition from territorial expansion that made settler colonialism a spectacle of triumph over the savage and the wilderness sublimated into the biopower of the welfare state that redefined sovereignty as “the right to make live and to let die.”8 That transition, fueled as it was through capitalism, populism, and possessive whiteness that demanded the outside as expansive liberty, structured itself through the zones of indistinction that were constitutive of the genocidal dispossession of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Agamben argues that “the ‘ordering of space’ that is, according to Schmitt, constitutive of the sovereign nomos is not only a ‘taking of land’ (Landesnahme)—the determination of a juridical and a territorial ordering (of an Ordnung and an Ortung)—but above all a ‘taking of the outside,’ and exception (Ausnahme).”9 Within the settler colonies of the global North, the transition from territorial expansion to contemporary biopolitics exposed everyone to the precarities of bare life. The sovereign nomos was, from the start, predicated upon indigenous precarity that existed alongside land- and seaappropriations. New World Nomos The discovery of the New World marked a fundamental and radical shift within the historical trajectory of European epistemology, engendering in its wake the notion of the human and mobilizing the concepts of property, money, and life as possessions that would come to stand as the boundaries between civilization, savagery, and the nonhuman. The resultant worlding of the globe into four continents that met in the contest to civilize and make that new land productive, as Lisa Lowe has suggested, structured and formalized humanism into geographical and temporal scales in which “freedom was constituted through a narrative dialectic that rested simultaneously on a spatialization of the unfree as exteriority and a temporal subsuming of enslavement as internal difference or contradiction.”10 The significance of this event cannot be overstated; but in the meantime, post- Enlightenment liberal humanism has striven to obscure, divert, and forget that the New World’s state of nature was produced by processes of racialization, conquest, colonization, and genocide. Perhaps it is with some irony, then, that political theorist Carl Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth is one of the few philosophical tomes of its era that takes as its premise the foundational role of the New World for the inauguration of a world order. That old order of the earth is foundering, Schmitt concludes at the end of his introduction, though it “arose from a legendary and unforeseen discovery of a New World, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth.”11 In the absence of such a possibility, according to Schmitt, it is now incumbent upon those who remaingrounded on earth to reconfigure a new nomos responsive to the terrestrial planetarity of a unified globe, to restore balance to the current foundering nomos through appeals to tradition and e pluribus unum, or finally, to create an equilibrium of balanced Großräume, large rooms or blocs, a rational new nomos to restore the jus publicum Europaeum.12 Schmitt’s evocation of the New World as an implied parallel planet that “could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles” speaks to the colonial foundational pathology that continues to inflect also the contours of liberalism, postautonomia, and anarchist resistances. These political philosophies rely upon and project an imagined Americas as a future perfect new world order that will traverse a successive path toward the fulfillment of political promise and the restoration of the state of nature. Even within the fierce urgency of post-Fordist economic production and capitalist consumption, the hoped-for narratives of liberation depend upon the Americas as an already emptied, infinitely exploitable new territory and new site of a transfigured commons, a multicultural asylum that will utilize effectively the remaining resources of the here and now as the violent disenfranchisements of what Achelle Mbembe has defined as the necropolitical costs of keeping alive will be leveled and shared more equally by everyone.13 Certainly there is a nostalgic turn to the native and to the primitive within a range of political and cultural theories that attempt to grapple with the historical consequences of capitalism and the biofinancialization of dispossession that have defined the twenty-first century. To imagine a world of redistribution from whatever political ideology is to grasp for the reins of an empire that depend upon a simultaneous absenting of any prior presence and the suturing of that New World to that prior as already given. Jean M. O’Brien has described that process as one that requires “a stark break with the past” in which colonizers rely upon elaborate replacement narratives to define “their own present against what they constructed as the backdrop of a past symbolized by Indian peoples and their cultures.”14 Indians, O’Brien concludes, “can never be modern”; yet European modernity hinges upon Indians as the necessary antinomy through which the New World—along with civilization, freedom, sovereignty, and humanity—comes to have meaning, structure, and presence.15 Concomitantly, and with its implied claim to being original and antecedent, indigeneity is simultaneously deferred and negated, essential and required for sovereignty and territoriality to cohere at the site of settler legitimacy, power, and precedence. In other words, indigeneity and the “native” who claims it are naturalized to land precisely because sovereignty and territoriality require the condition and being of the native to be intelligible within the processes of recognition.