# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: Affirmatives must not specify a subset of private entities.

#### Moral statements are generic normative principles – necessitates the generic interpretation

McDonald 09 [Hugh P. McDonald, professor of philosophy at the New York City College of Technology. "Principles: The Principles of Principles." The Pluralist, vol. 4, no. 3, [University of Illinois Press, Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy], 2009, pp. 98–126, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20708996] HWIC

"Principle" has a great many meanings: origin, beginning, cause, rule, axiom, and so on.5 However, we cannot assume any necessary relation of these meanings. They may be distinct meanings without relations. Neverthe less we can trace some common roots and thereby interconnections of the meanings. I will concentrate here on certain meanings relevant to the prin ciple of principles, that principles are actual. One meaning is that principles are the "ultimate source, origin, or cause of something" or the "originating or actuating agency or force." Principles are connected with the origin and cause of any "something." Moreover, principles may cause the actuality of the something. A second meaning of principles is that they regulate change, whether internally, as the "method of operation of a thing," or as an external cause. That is, principles are regulative, especially including rules for opera tions, involving changes. As rules, they are universal for a kind, although there may be exceptions to them in certain modes. A principle, then, is an originating rule that universally regulates the formation, operation, or other changes of any actuality, which as universal applies to that kind of thing. Machines may be built according to a principle and operate on the same or even a different principle. Ships presume the principle of floatation but may be built according to principles of woodworking or those of other materials. The principle can have different modes?whether necessary, as in logical inference; general, as in scientific laws; or actualization of possibilities, as in machines or as in moral principles that we follow, but could do otherwise.6 I will cover modes below.

Principles are also a cause as regulative, combining cause and rule. The principle can be external, as in a chemical catalyst; or internal, as in geneti cally caused changes.7 Both kinds of causes involve relations. Internal prin ciples exhibit "tendencies," to borrow the word used in the dictionary. They continue to operate across time. Actions that come under principles may be of kinds whose causes are separate in time, since we may cease an action for a time and then take it up again; while genetic characteristics are tenden cies whose causes are connected by reproduction. As causal, principles may be originary for a kind. Especially in new technologies, for example, flying machines, the principle that organisms could fly (birds, bats, and insects) preceded the invention of the technology, although the principles of aero dynamics were discovered later. However, flying utilized and actualized the latter principles. In this sense, principles can be constitutive rules as the origin of a kind, whether generic or specific.

External principles are regulative and not attributes. They regulate change, such that change is not chaotic. Principles are not bodies, objects, or entities but are the basis of the judgment or evaluation that the latter will persist, since they follow or are regulated by principles. Moreover, there is another sense in which principles are not attributes, since the relation of bodies, ob jects, or other terms for actualities implies a common principle, an identity that is regulated and constituted by the same actual principle. "Object" is a principle uniting instances normatively, for example, that solids persist unless acted upon by heat, etc.

Scientific, engineering, and practical laws are cases of principles. The "law of gravity" is the principle of gravity. Rules of "right conduct" also exhibit laws. Principles form an identity of different instances that fall under the law, whether generally or invariably. Laws and rules are regulative identities, applicable to different instances, and whether originary, constitutive, or ex ternally regulative. Voluntary adherence to a rule is bringing actions in line with a principle or enacting a principle.

Since principles are general, the statement of a principle includes an abstraction of some identity element of the instance. Principles, then, can constitute the elements in any instance insofar as there are identical ele ments, such as matter, species, and genera. This abstraction both identifies the instance as alike with other instances in some respect and differentiates it from those that do not exhibit the principle. The instance may contain several principles conjointly, matter, the state of the matter, function, aes thetic element, and many others. Thus principles connect like instances in a very complex set of relations. A diamond and a painting may share aesthetic qualities but their material, functional, and cultural principles may be quite different. Since identity and difference are correlative terms, every identity is also a difference and this principle applies to actual principles in the world, one principle of principles. To identify a rock of a certain type as consisting in certain chemical combinations connects it with that kind of mineral in general but also certain chemical elements in general, their physical proper ties (such as consisting of a certain atomic number of protons, electrons, and the like), and other principles. However, it also differentiates the rock from other types with their own specific principles, although some generic prin ciples may overlap, namely, the physical properties of all chemical elements as consisting in protons, electrons, and other principles of atoms. Principles then mark both a difference and an identity. The principles identify a distinc tion, but such identifications differentiate from other identifying principles. The wavelengths for green light are identical at different times of emission from the sun but are not identical with those for red.

#### Violation – they spec Chinese private entities

#### Vote neg for limits – there’s 195 different governments that you could potentially specify, which explodes the number of affs – there’s no universal disad to every government.

#### Drop the debater since drop the arg means they have no plan ext.

#### Use competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### No RVIs – shouldn’t win for being fair or topical.

#### Their failure to specify an agent is a voting issue – makes mechanism counterplans and agent-based disads impossible – it’s a voter for fairness because the 1AR can spike out of DAs and CPs, which kills clash and nuance.

## 2

#### Blaming space militarization on China solidifies space as a site of crisis, which reproduces representations of space as a frontier, dooming it to endless violence and sanitizing biopolitical violence. Only a reimagination of space can solve space conflict.

Bormann ‘9 [Natalie Bormann; teaches at the Department of Politics at Northeastern University, previously she held a position at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University; 2009; Chapter 5: “The lost dimension? A spatial reading of US weaponisation of space”; In “Securing Outer Space”, edited by Natalie Bormann & Michael Sheehan; Routledge Critical Security Studies Series; pp. 76-90] AK

As the contributors in this volume highlight, there is no denying US attempts to codify a strategy of conducting warfare ‘in, from and through’ space. With a new National Space Policy at the ready and plans for space-based missile defence components firmly in place, efforts to understand the recent push for weaponising space seem ever more pressing. Yet, despite the proliferating theoretical and empirical discourses on outer space, most existing theories tend to neglect the concept of spatiality as a category for analysing US practices. In trying to eradicate this shortcoming, this chapter directly links recent US policies to some of the recurring spatial representations of, and narrations about, outer space as a ‘final frontier’. It is suggested here that the imagination of outer space as a ‘place’ of permanent crisis, a ‘battlefield’, tells us something about that which informs the preferences underlying US policies. In so doing, this chapter turns to Paul Virilio’s theorising on the military organisation of the category of space. According to Virilio, and here with an eye on what informs the current space ‘vision’, we must direct our attention to the development of new military technologies as it is these that produce our modes of representation, and that ultimately underpin our relation to, and invention of, space and habitat. For Virilio, hence, any representation of spatiality, such as exposed in the legendary image of another ‘Pearl Harbor’ in space, is necessarily given a priori to it; what we ‘~~see’~~ [perceive] in outer space is not spatially organised in and of itself, rather, the ‘~~seeing’~~ [perceiving] is made possible through the effects of technology in its production of space (or, one reality of it) and its subsequent authorisation of spatially contingent action (the defence of ‘our space’).2 I argue that such connection between technology and space is tantamount for explaining the modalities and limits of, and possibilities for, space weapons in that any spatial production of outer space always-already comprises an exploration of the logic of military technology. In Virilio’s view, the invention of military technology occurs simultaneously with the invention of a space to be defended and secured, invaded and colonised, weaponised and commercialised. In other words, in order to grasp the modes of representation that underpin outer space weaponisation we must turn to the technologies that provide the condition for visualising the need to weaponise, colonise, secure, and so forth. The work of Virilio can thus open some valuable insights, I believe, for understanding the weaponisation of outer space by drawing upon the, mostly overlooked, relationship and interaction of technology, spatiality and outer space as military space. By so doing, a Virilian reading offers not only a stringent critique of the ways in which current space policies are rendered meaningful but it also provides us with a tool for unpacking the very spatial (re)constructions of outer space that are presented to us as seamless and common-sensical.

Why should this matter? In this chapter I want to point towards two significant arguments in support for a renewed interest in questioning and criticising modes of spatiality – and that which informs them. The first argument is concerned with the logic of spatiality and the practices it claims to render meaningful. The second one has to do with the new military technologies in their role of conducting space warfare and the modes of automated fighting and killing that they appear to evoke. To begin with the first point, it seems clear to me that only by unbundling the processes which lead to the creation of ~~seeing~~ and inventing outer space as a sphere of permanent crisis and its ‘in-built’ logic of the need to weaponise that sphere can we bring back the, hitherto, marginalised possibility of an alternative process of organising outer space (e.g. peacefully). In other words, it must be understood that it is the invention of space as a place of crisis and combat which precludes the peaceful use of space.3 Second, the interrelation of technology and space composes some pressing questions regarding the new modes of destruction and warfighting that it gives possibility to.4 The projection of outer space as a battlefield (‘earth-bound’ albeit in cosmos) is constitutive of certain ‘qualities’. Space-based weapons that are designed to target threats in space as much as on Earth lead first and foremost to a loss of certain known geo-strategic reference points: the possibility of a space-based laser that shoots down targets ‘anywhere’ is such that every place on Earth and in space can be considered a virtual front- line. There is a duality of proximity at work that is puzzling: on the one hand, the placement of weapon systems close to their target is no longer needed. On the other hand, and while the possibility of fighting against threats and engaging in conflicts is therefore brought ‘close to us’, the battlefield on which the fighting takes place remains nonetheless ‘distant from us’; virtual and non- visible in, from and through outer space. Furthermore, and closely related, it is not only the necessity of geographical proximity of combat that is dwindling, so is the proximity of violence and destruction. While the targeting and killing becomes possible at all times and anywhere, the virtual shooting down of enemy missiles and the use of space-based lasers against hostile attack from space removes us – ourselves – from the battlefield, the bodily violence and the experience, pain, and memory thereof. Space technology promises to offer an automated, clean and sanitised mode of destruction and killing.5,6 It is a process that Virilio (1999) sums up in his notion of an ‘aesthetics of disappearance’ by which the author means to suggest the following: in the same way in which technology leads to a destruction of physicality and matter (and all the way to its disappearance), weapon technology leads to a disappearance of our modes of relating and referring to that space.7

#### Images of China as a threat are crafted by the military industrial complex and create a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Pan ’12 Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University, Australia [*Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics*, pg. 85-86]

With his known enemy, the lucky Inman is in good company. In many ways, the military-industrial complex finds itself in a similar situation, but its lucky star is the perceived certain threat of China. Without knowing this threat, the high-level military spending would be difficult to justify, and without that military spending, the political economy of fear could not function properly, nor could military Keynesianism continue to flourish. This is why Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, observes that having survived decades of the Soviet challenge, containment might not be able to survive its own success.4 To the military-industrial complex, the **absence** of a threat/enemy constitutes an ultimate threat.¶ While the lack of an enemy—real or imagined—appears costly indeed for the discursive identity and institutional ‘survival’ of the **m**ilitary**i**ndustrial **c**omplex, I contend that having an enemy, even an imagined one, is by no means cost-free. In fact, in the case of China, it could be very costly in that the construction and treatment of China as a threat could result in China becoming one in reality. In other words, the cost lies in the fact that the ‘China threat’ paradigm could **become self-fulfilling** in practice.¶ A self-fulfilling prophecy, according to American sociologist Robert Merton, means that ‘a false definition of the situation which makes the originally false conception come true’.5 What is ‘false’ in hindsight or in the eyes of a bystander is frequently defined as real by the actor in question; and ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’.6¶ In international relations, fear, often based on ‘false’ images, can have precisely such self-fulfilling consequences. Thucydides, the author of a realist ‘great text’ History of the Peloponnesian War, noted a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear in interstate politics. In his account for the war’s outbreak, Thucydides suggested that ‘What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta’.7 More than two millennia later, another realist scholar-practitioner, George Kennan ascribed the origin of the Cold War to the paranoid ideology of the Soviet Union.8¶ If so, the fear manifested in the ‘China threat’ paradigm could also become confirmed in reality. Two interrelated processes are at play here. First, the ‘China threat’ paradigm, taken as objective truth, would **imply the need for containing China** in practice. Second, such practice, given the logic of mutual responsiveness, is more likely than not to be mirrored back by China in either symmetric or asymmetric ways. As the latter’s hardline mimicry apparently ‘confirms’ the initial fear of the China threat, what we are witnessing is a **classic case of self-fulfilling prophecy**.

#### CCP strategists won’t push to eclipse US hegemony – depictions of losing international dominance are strategically constructed to elicit violent responses.

Nathan et al. ‘18, \*the Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, \*\*Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, “How China Sees America,” September/October 2012, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5

**Despite these views**, mainstream Chinese strategists do not advise China to challenge the United States in the foreseeable future. They expect the United States to remain the global hegemon for several decades, despite what they perceive as initial signs of decline. For the time being, as described by Wang Jisi, dean of Peking University's School of International Studies, "the superpower is more super, and the many great powers less great." Meanwhile, the two countries are increasingly **interdependent economically** and have the military **capability to cause each other harm**. It is this mutual vulnerability that carries the best medium-term hope for **cooperation**. Fear of each other keeps alive the imperative to work together. In the long run, however, the better alternative for both China and the West is to create a new equilibrium of power that maintains the current world system, but with **a larger role for China**. China has good reasons to seek that outcome. Even after it becomes the world's largest economy, its prosperity will remain dependent on the prosperity of its global rivals (and vice versa), including the United States and Japan. The richer China becomes, the greater will be its stake in the security of sea-lanes, the stability of the world trade and financial regimes, nonproliferation, the control of global climate change, and cooperation on public health. China will not get ahead if its rivals do not also prosper. And Chinese strategists must come to understand that core U.S. interests -in the rule of law, regional stability, and open economic competition -**do not threaten China's security**.

#### Their identification of external threats is an attempt to cohere the self in opposition to the demonized enemy – this psychic reconfiguration justifies endless violence.

Byles ‘3 [Joanna Montgomery; Professor of English in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, University of Cyprus; “Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification”; Fall 2003; The Ohio State University Press; Volume 8, Number 2; Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society; <https://doi.org/10.1353/psy.2003.0030>; Accessed 12/7/20; Recut-NT]

The problem of warfare which includes genocide, and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, brings into focus the need to understand how the individual is placed in the social and the social in the individual. Psychoanalytic theories of superego aggression, splitting, projection, and projective identification may be useful in helping us to understand the psychic links involved. It seems vital to me writing in the Middle East in September 2002 that we examine our understanding of what it is we understand about war, including genocide and terrorism.

Some psychoanalysts argue that war is a necessary defence against psychotic anxiety (Fornari xx; Volkan), and Freud himself first advanced the idea that war provided an outlet for repressed impulses. (“Why War?” 197). The problematic of these views is the individual’s need to translate internal psychotic anxieties into real external dangers so as to control them. It suggests that culturally warfare and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism and the so-called “war on terrorism,” may be a necessary object for internal aggression and not a pathology.

Indeed, Fornari suggests that “war could be seen as an attempt at therapy, carried out by a social institution which, precisely by institutionalizing war, increases to gigantic proportions what is initially an elementary defensive mechanism of the ego in the schizo-paranoid phase” (xvii-xviii). In other words, the history of war might represent the externalization and articulation of shared unconscious fantasies. This idea would suggest that the culture of war, genocide, and international terrorism provides objects of psychic need. If this is so, with what can we replace them? If cultural formations and historical events have their sources in our psychic functioning—that is to say, in our unconscious fears and desires,—and culture itself provides a framework for expressing, articulating, and coming to terms with these fears and desires, then psychoanalysis may help to reveal why war seems to be an inevitable and ineradicable part of human history.

SUPEREGO AS AN AGENT OF AGGRESSION

In “The Ego and the Id,” Freud formulated a seemingly insoluble dilemma in the very essence of the human psyche: the eternal conflict between the dual instincts of eros, the civilizing life instinct, and the indomitable death instinct (thanatos). He also identified some aspects of the death instinct with superego aggression, suggesting that the superego was the agent of the death instinct in its cruel and aggressive need for punishment and that its operative feeling was frequently a punitive hatred, while other aspects of the superego were protective. As we know, Freud thought the source of the superego was the internalization of the castrating Oedipal father. In chapter seven of Civilization and its Discontents, he theorized that when defusion or separation of the dual instincts occurred, aspects of aggression frequently dominated and that it was the purpose of the ego to find objects for eros and/or aggression either in fantasy or reality. The role phantasy plays in projective identification is something to which I shall return.

Other theorists, such as Melanie Klein, trace the beginning of the superego back to early (infant) oral phantasies of self-destruction, which is a direct manifestation of the death instinct. Klein transformed the oedipal drama by making the mother its central figure and thus playing a vital role in object-relations theory, about which I shall say more later in this essay. Although Klein’s work relied on the dual instinct theory postulated by Freud, she re-defined the drives by emphasizing the way in which the destructive instincts attached themselves to the object, in particular the good-bad breast. Thus for Klein, the site of the superego is derived from oral incorporation of the good/bad breast, contrary to Freud, for whom the site of the superego is the paternal law.

Although the formation of the superego is grounded on the renunciation of loving and hostile Oedipal wishes, it is subsequently refined, by the contributions of social and cultural requirements (education, religion, morality). My argument in this paper is three-fold: (1) These social and cultural requirements in which the superego is grounded may be used by the superego of the state and/or its leader to mobilize aspects of the individual’s aggression during war-time in a way that does not happen in peace-time. (2) Klein’s theory of splitting and projective identification plays an important role in the concept of difference and otherness as enemy. (3) Bion’s development of Klein’s theory into what he called the “container” and the “contained” may offer some way out of the psychic dangers of projective identification by suggesting that we may be able to access our internal psychic world as a transformative power to combat violence both internal and external.

In an early attempt to define war neuroses, or how war mentally traumatizes the psyche, Freud wrote of the conflict “between the soldier’s old peaceful ego and his new warlike one“ becoming acute as soon as the peace-ego realizes what danger it runs in losing its own life to the rashness of its newly formed parasitic double” (SE 17 209). Accepting the violence that is within ourselves as well as in the other, the so-called enemy, is a difficult lesson to learn, and learning to displace our instinctual destructive aggression peacefully is enormously more difficult. To the extent the individual superego is connected to society, which assumes its functions particularly in wartime, the problem of war brings into focus the psychoanalytic problem of the partial defusion (separation) of eros and psychic aggression brought about by war through specifically social processes. These social processes involve the mechanisms by which aspects of the violent and aggressive social superego of the State mobilizes and appropriates some of the dynamic aspects of the individual’s superego aggression: the need to hate, and to punish, for its own purposes, such as genocide or so-called “ethnic cleansing,” and for territorial and economic reasons. Many of these actions are often masked as defending civilization, or an idealized State and/or its leader. This is also true of the ”holy jihads” that are rapidly becoming an enormous threat to the world.

In his book Enemies and Allies, Vamik Volkan suggests that the individual may see the superego of the State as his/her own idealized superego. And indeed, this may in turn help to explain how during war-time the social superego is placed in the individual and how in turn the individual is positioned in the social. In Civilization and its Discontents, to which I have already referred, Freud wrote about the ways in which the regulations and demands of a civilized society harbor the risk of the death instinct (aggression) being released at any favorable opportunity, especially when combined with Eros—i. e., under the pretext of idealism and patriotism. This is especially true when there is a leader who elicits strong emotional attachments from a group or nation.

Of course, I am not arguing that there are not some important aspects of the social superego that are beneficial, for example the ethical and moral laws which shape society and protect its citizens; nevertheless, in wartime and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, it is precisely these civilizing aspects of the social superego that are ignored or repressed. It seems to me that the failure of civilization historically to control the aggression, cruelty, and hatred that characterize war urgently requires a psychoanalytic explanation. Of course, I am speaking of psychic, not biological (survival of the fittest), aggression. In wartime the externalized superego of the state sanctions killing and violence that is not allowed in peacetime (in fact, such violence against others during peacetime would be considered criminal)—sanctions, in fact, the gratification of warring aggression, thus ensuring that acts of violence need not incur guilt. Why do we accept this? Psychoanalysis posits the idea that aggression is not behavioral but instinctual; not social but psychological. To quote Volkan, who follows Freud, “It is man’s very nature itself.” Obviously, it is vital that humanity find more mature, less primitive ways of dealing with our hatred and aggression than war, genocide, and international terrorism.

The most characteristic thing about this kind of violence and cruelty is its collective mentality: war requires group co-operation, organization, and approval. Some theorists argue that one of the primary cohesive elements binding individuals into institutionalized human association is defence against psychotic anxiety. In Group Psychology Freud writes that “in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The apparently new characteristics he then displays are in fact the manifestation of this unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition” (74). Later in the same essay, when speaking of the individual and the group mind, Freud quotes Le Bon : “Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct. He posseses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings” (77).

War is a collective phenomenon that mobilizes our anxieties and allows our original sadistic fantasies of destructive omnipotence to be re-activated and projected onto “the enemy.” Some critics have argued that we “need” enemies as external stabilizers of our sense of identity and inner control. It has also been argued that the militancy a particular group shows toward its enemies may partly mask the personal internal conflicts of each member of the group, and that they may therefore have an emotional investment in the maintenance of the enmity. In other words, they need the enemy and are unconsciously afraid to lose it. This fits in with the well known phenomenon of inventing an enemy when there is not one readily available. The individual suicide bomber, or suicide pilot, is just as much part of this group psychology—each bomber, each terrorist, is acting for her/his group, or even more immediately his or her family, from whom she/he derives enormous psychic strength and support. Just as importantly, she/he is acting in the name of her/his leader. All of these identifications require strong emotional attachments. Freud writes, “The mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification, based upon an important emotional common quality. . . . This common quality lies in the nature of the tie to the leader” (Group 107–8).

In Learning from Experience, Bion theorizes that a social group functions to establish a fixed social order of things (the establishment), and that the individual has to be contained by the establishment of the group. Sometimes the rigidity of the system crushes the individual’s creativity; alternatively, certain special individuals erupt in the group, which goes to pieces under their influence (Bion cites Jesus within the constraints of Israel). A final possibility is the mutual adaptation of one to the other, with a development of both the individual and the group. The development of a sense of self, its integration, its separation, and its protection all begin, of course, in early childhood. Psychoanalysts like Klein, Winnicott, and Bion have explored these ideas in what is known as object relations theory. Volkan writes that the concepts of enemy and ally and the senses of ethnicity and nationality are largely bound up with the individual’s sense of self, and that individuals within an ethnic or national group tend to see their group as a privileged “pseudo-species“ (Erikson) and enemy groups as subhuman (262).

Of course enemies are threatening and do generate a reactive need for defenses; however, a basic psychoanalytic question might be to what extent the degree of defensiveness characteristic of war behavior represents personal, emotional needs of individuals for an enemy to hate, so that they can keep their conflicted selves together, and to what extent the State superego plays a role here.

Our capacity for splitting and projection plays an important part in how we see others and feel about others, and through the process of projective identification, how we make others feel about ourselves and themselves. Projective identification involves a deep split, displacing onto and into others the hateful, bad parts of ourselves, and frequently making them feel hateful to themselves through their own introjection of our hatred. This hatred is often racial or religious, frequently both. Moreover, in the process of projective identification, parts of the self are put into the other, thus depleting the ego. (This process can be a vicious circle, and it is a profoundly disturbing and characteristic pathology, often involving envy and/or rivalry, both corrosive, poisonous forces.) These Kleinian ideas, developed by other theorists, such as Winnicott and Bion, are hugely relevant to the problem of war and genocide, and most recently, of terrorism. Klein argues that in the paranoid schizoid position there is a splitting of good and bad objects, with the good being introjected and the bad being externalized and projected out into someone or onto something else. As with the infant and child, so with the adult, mechanisms of splitting and projection play upon negative and feared connotations of the other, of the enemy, and of difference; projection prevents warring nations from exploring and thus understanding what it is that actually divides them; it prevents mutual response and recognition by promoting exclusivity.

As already mentioned, analysts such as Volkan and Erikson have written about the processes by which an enemy is dehumanized so as to provide the distance a group needs from its perceived enemy. First the group becomes preoccupied with the enemy according to the psychology of minor differences. Then mass regression occurs to permit the group to recover and reactivate more primitive methods. What they then use in this regressed state tends to contain aspects of childish (preoedipal) fury. The enemy is perceived more and more as a stereotype of bad and negative qualities. The use of denial allows a group to ignore the fact that its own externalizations and projections are involved in this process. The stereotyped enemy may be so despised as to be no longer human, and it will then be referred to in non-human terms. History teaches us that it was in this way that the Nazis perceived the Jews as vermin to be exterminated. As I write, Al Qaeda terrorist groups view all Americans as demons and infidels to be annihilated, and many Americans are comforted by demonizing all of bearded Islam. Many Israelis consider most Palestinians as dirt beneath their feet—subhuman—and most Palestinians think of most Israelis as despoilers of the land they are supposed to share.

#### The alt is ecological imagination—

#### Bearing down on every decision in modern policy, the Anthropocene provides a space of affective excess. The alt theorizes a new geographical imagination centered on current apocalypse instead of deferring it to the future. It decenters securitized hierarchies to materially address the tensions inherent to space policy.

Gergan et al ‘20 M., Smith, S., & Vasudevan, P. (2020). Earth beyond repair: Race and apocalypse in collective imagination. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 38(1), 91-110.

Here, we have interrogated how reversal, hordes, and elision mark the white supremacy politics of the apocalypse. But do film and art also have the power to dismantle such tropes and inspire new worlds not premised on the present? For Ginn (2015), the Anthropocene as apocalypse is hopeful, containing affective excesses or reserves beyond anxiety that are necessary to fuel transformation, a kind of political knowledge he calls “earth dreaming.” Robbins and Moore (2013: 11) identify an “ecological anxiety disorder,” which emerges when ecological questions cannot be answered without the “positing of political questions.” In our conditions of imperial ruination (Stoler, 2013), the earth’s climate system is “an experiment promulgated by the world’s wealthy and powerful, largely at the peril of the world’s poor” (Robbins and Moore, 2013: 14). It is omnipresent, bearing down on every decision and making each further experiment both urgent and impossible. For Houston (2013), environmental storytelling is “world making” that emerges from communities dwelling in crisis – apocalypse as here, now, already in process, rather than deferred future. Recent work by Derickson and MacKinnon (2015) suggests a “politics of resourcefulness,” while Haraway (2016) encourages us to “stay with the trouble,” and Collard et al. (2015) encourage abundant futures with “more diverse and autonomous forms of life and ways of living together.” Responses to these calls must be premised upon a radical unraveling of the “human” center of Anthropocene imagining, and produce imaginings that render clear how the lexicon of humanity has always been based on exclusionary racial violence and logics (Spillers, 2003; Weheliye, 2014; Wolfe, 2006). Ghosh (2016) implores us to grapple through fiction with the unimaginable challenges wrought by climate change. Movements like Fighting Not Drowning, the People’s Climate March, and Idle No More make explicit connections to history, while also refusing to be contained by it. In this conjuncture, we witness how political articulations grounded in place-based movements are generating a “new planetary geographical imagination” that are challenging “the violent normalizations of a universal claiming to speak for the particular” (Jazeel, 2011: 87, 88). These movements also demonstrate a refusal to accept the fundamentally racialized nature of the human/non-human distinction that Afro-pessimists and other critical race theorists have demonstrated is fundamentally rooted in a violent bounding of humanity. Internal politics notwithstanding, the ongoing refusal by the Standing Rock Sioux, the broader Sioux nation, and the coalition of water protectors to allow the Dakota Access Pipeline to be built at Standing Rock disrupts colonial timelines of inevitability through insistence on both sovereignty (Curley, 2016; Dhillon and Estes, 2016; Whyte, 2017) and on the future as an insistently radical break. In closing, we consider a few examples of cultural productions that reveal the failures of apocalyptic thinking and address our warnings in novel and promising ways. Rupturing the anemic and iterative apocalyptic futurities we analyze above, these examples suggest a “collective sub-text” (Jameson, 1982: 148): a rising popular consciousness that rejects the master-narrative of racialized humanity in search of alternate and abundant futurities. We hope that these flashpoints of rupture will stir scholars of the Anthropocene to narrate apocalypse with greater attention to the revelatory warning signs outlined above, and inspire greater capacity for utopian imagination. Janelle Mona´ e’s Q.U.E.E.N. music video (the acronym stands for Queers Untouchables Emigrants Excommunicated and Negroid), part of her larger conceptual project in which she is Cindi Mayweather, a messianic android, both relies upon and disrupts the aesthetics of the imagined future. Portraying herself and others as museum pieces, she uses the white voice of a captor to describe her work as a “musical weapons program” and her productions as freedom movements “disguised as songs, motion pictures, and works of art.” Mona´ e builds on the narratives generated by Sun Ra and by George Clinton and Parliament- Funkadelic, to create time-traveling Black rebels sent back to disrupt the present (English and Kim, 2013). Despite stating, as part of the Wondaland collective, “We believe songs are spaceships. We believe music is the weapon of the future. We believe books are stars” (Wondaland, n.d.; cited in English and Kim, 2013: 218), Mona´ e escapes the “science is magic” and “teeming hordes” tropes through lyrics that “suggest that pure optimism regarding technoculture understates its vulnerability to being shaped by commodity culture and by regressive notions of human subjectivity and categories of identity” (English and Kim, 2013: 218). In a different register, Frazier (2016: 40) turns to Octavia Butler and Wangechi Mutu, to “move beyond the limited correctives made available through the standards and conventions of Western formal politics,” and to “aesthetically reconstitute the (un)limits of humanity and construct alternative conceptions of ecological ethics within our present world and beyond it.” Frazier analyzes Butler’s Parable of the Sower (1993) and Mutu’s (2013) A Fantastic Journey, noting that despite differences of nationality and culture, both trouble ecology in promising ways. Parable’s apocalypse draws continuities to the past rather than rather than presenting a break; indeed, “the most jarring element of Butler’s future California is its similarities in aesthetics and patterns to the world we inhabit presently” (Frazier, 2016: 48). We are inspired by such work that reveals a different sense of temporality, displaying continuity between the past and ongoing injustice (the present past) or futurities that require fundamental breaks with the present. Such imaginings are freed from the trap of the “epic reversal”: by addressing temporal continuity, white panic over the oppressed gaining power does not drive the narrative. We find an illustration of this in the recent Netflix series Cleverman, which grapples with Australian settler-colonialism through a potent blend of aboriginal history and mythology, sci-fi fantasy, and allegory-heavy social commentary. The series emerged from indigenous writer and producer Ryan Griffen’s desire to give his young son a comic-book style indigenous superhero (Baum, 2016). Set in a dystopian near-future Australia, the series has been interpreted as commentary on ongoing mistreatment of aboriginal groups and other people of color. The show also redresses the erasure of indigenous artists and culture in mainstream media, with a mostly indigenous cast, soundtracks from an indigenous hip-hop artist, and dialogue by key characters in Gumbaynhggir, an aboriginal language whose use was discouraged until recently. Noting that eradication of cultures is also at the heart of the Anthropocene, Tolia-Kelly (2016: 790) implores geographers, “to be mindful of our grammars, vocabularies, genealogies, and versions of historical space-time, through which are we articulating redress.” We have argued that cultural production and scientific production are entangled in the language and intent of social movements and the working of geopolitics. As Davis and Todd (2017: 767) suggest, “The stories we will tell about the origins of the Anthropocene implicate how we understand the relations we have with our surrounds. . .this understanding will have material implications not just for how we understand the world, but this understanding will have material consequences, consequences that affect bodies and land.” How do we respond to Baldwin’s (2016: 86) observation that “white affect pre-conditions population survival by repressing. . . affirmative, nomadic imagination”? One starting point is to engage with visions emerging from movements that are grappling with ongoing apocalypse: their narratives do not succumb easily to a dystopian future, calling instead upon powerful themes of endurance and refusal. This is very much a literary decision: what point of the Apocalyptic narrative are we in? The films we have critiqued here take place during or in the immediate aftermath of apocalyptic events. We argue for a more extended time-frame, a refusal to start with “secondly” (Adichie, 2009). If we begin from the premise that whiteness emerges through and creates affective registers that prompt, enable, and predispose certain people to particular political responses: how can we intervene? What imaginaries of the future both enable a political reckoning with the past and an embodied refusal of surrender to a white eco-apocalyptic future?

#### The judge is the analyst – your refusal to affirm their politics forces them to confront the fantasy of the 1AC.

Dean ‘6 [Jodi; Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva, New York.; “Introduction”; 2006; Routledge; *Žižek’s Politics*; Accessed 12/7/20; Recut-NT]

Žižek emphasizes that Lacan conceptualized this excessive place, this place without guarantees, in his formula for “the discourse of the analyst” (which I set out in Chapter Two). In psychoanalysis, the analyst just sits there, asking questions from time to time. She is some kind of object or cipher onto which the analysand transfers love, desire, aggression, and knowledge. The analysand, in other words, proceeds through analysis by positing the analyst as someone who knows exactly what is wrong with him and exactly what he should do to get rid of his symptom and get better. But, really, the analyst does not know. Moreover, the analyst steadfastly refuses to provide the analysand with any answers whatsoever. No ideals, no moral certainty, no goals, no choices. Nothing. This is what makes the analyst so traumatic, Žižek explains, the fact that she refuses to establish a law or set a limit, that she does not function as some kind of new master.7 Analysis is over when the analysand accepts that the analyst does not know, that there is not any secret meaning or explanation, and then takes responsibility for getting on with his life. The challenge for the analysand, then, is freedom, autonomously determining his own limits, directly assuming his own enjoyment. So, again, the position of the analyst is in this excessive place as an object through which the analysand works through the analytical process.

Why is the analyst necessary in the first place? If she is not going to tell the analysand what to do, how he should be living, then why does he not save his money, skip the whole process, and figure out things for himself? There are two basic answers. First, the analysand is not self-transparent. He is a stranger to himself, a decentered agent “struggling with a foreign kernel.”8 What is more likely than self-understanding, is self-misunderstanding, that is, one’s fundamental misperception of one’s own condition. Becoming aware of this misperception, grappling with it, is the work of analysis. Accordingly, second, the analyst is that external agent or position that gives a new form to our activity. Saying things out loud, presenting them to another, and confronting them in front of this external position concretizes and arranges our thoughts and activities in a different way, a way that is more difficult to escape or avoid. The analyst then provides a form through which we acquire a perspective on and a relation to our selves.

Paul’s Christian collectives and Lenin’s revolutionary Party are, for Žižek, similarly formal arrangements, forms “for a new type of knowledge linked to a collective political subject.”9 Each provides an external perspective on our activities, a way to concretize and organize our spontaneous experiences. More strongly put, a political Party is necessary precisely because politics is not given; it does not arise naturally or organically out of the multiplicity of immanent flows and affects but has to be produced, arranged, and constructed out of these flows in light of something larger.

In my view, when Žižek draws on popular culture and inserts himself into this culture, he is taking the position of an object of enjoyment, an excessive object that cannot easily be recuperated or assimilated. This excessive position is that of the analyst as well as that of the Party. Reading Žižek as occupying the position of the analyst tells us that it is wrong to expect Žižek to tell us what to do, to provide an ultimate solution or direction through which to solve all the world’s problems. The analyst does not provide the analysand with ideals and goals; instead, he occupies the place of an object in relation to which we work these out for ourselves. In adopting the position of the analyst, Žižek is also practicing what he refers to as “Bartleby politics,” a politics rooted in a kind of refusal wherein the subject turns itself into a disruptive (of our peace of mind!) violently passive object who says, “I would prefer not to.”10 Thus, to my mind, becoming preoccupied with Žižek’s style is like becoming preoccupied with what one’s analyst is wearing. Why such a preoccupation? How is this preoccupation enabling us to avoid confronting the truth of our desire, our own investments in enjoyment? How is complaining that Žižek (or the analyst) will not tell us what to do a way that we avoid trying to figure this out for ourselves?11

Reading Žižek in terms of an excessive object also means seeing his position as analogous to the formal position of the Party. Here it tells us that rather than a set of answers or dictates, Žižek is providing an intervention that cuts through the multiplicity of affects and experiences in which we find ourselves and organizes them from a specific perspective. As we shall see, for Žižek, this perspective is anchored in class struggle as the fundamental antagonism rupturing and constituting the social. So again, he does not give us an answer; he does not know what we should do, but his thought provides an external point in relation to which we can organize, consider, and formalize our experiences as ideological subjects.

## Case

### Solvency

#### The plan has no effect—Chinese private space ventures are inextricable from public interest.

Goswami '19 (Dr. Namrata Goswami; author, strategic analyst and consultant on counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, alternate futures, and great power politics, worked at IDSA, selected as a Jennings-Randolph Senior Fellow, won MINERVA grant and contract with JSOU; 4-5-2019; "Misplaced Confidence? The US Private Space Sector vs. China"; https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/misplaced-confidence-the-us-private-space-sector-vs-china/, The Diplomat, accessed 1-14-2022; JPark)

Over the past three years, nearly 60 private space startups have entered the private launch industry, supported by the Chinese state. Spokesperson of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), Li Guoping, specified: The output value of the satellite application sector makes up over 80 percent of the whole satellite industry chain. So we encourage private companies and social capital to invest in the application of satellite communication, remote sensing and navigation…When we make a top-level plan for China’s aerospace development, we will consider the development of commercial space activity. The government will open space programs that can be carried out in a commercial way, and buy services from commercial companies… Since 2014, Xi has urged China’s private space sector to emerge as the leader in the “implementation of **civil-military integration** strategy.” Xi’s policy guidance has been followed up by the PLA, which opened its Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (China’s primary launch facility) in the northwestern Gobi Desert for private rocket launches. This civil-military integration has been identified as a priority by Xi for China’s **overall national strategy** with regard to outer space. The planning chief of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, Jia Lide, stated that “favorable policies and targeted measures have been created for the benefit of private space enterprises.” The latter point is particularly important. The U.S. private sector does very well with strong government support, through programs like Commercial Orbital Transportation System (COTS), Commercial Crew Program, and now the Commercial Lunar Payload Service (CLPS). Most U.S. space industries still rely to a significant degree on the government market either to get started or to stay solvent.

#### Their authors agree.

1AC Fernandez 21 — (Ray Fernandez, Writer at ScreenRant, “Hundreds Chinese Companies Called To Boost Space “, ScreenRant, 11-27-2021, Available Online at https://screenrant.com/chinese-companies-boost-space-development/, accessed 1-11-2022, HKR-AR)

In a new move to boost space development, China has opened up space to private companies. China's space program is heavily linked with the military and wrapped up in secrecy. However, recent Chinese space accomplishments, rovers on the Moon and Mars, new satellites and new space stations were primarily developed by government efforts. The U.S. brought in the private sector as a strategy to boost its space program and develop expensive and ambitious new projects. Now China is doing the same. The last time China used national private companies to increase development was when it declared Artificial Intelligence a national priority. Fast forward a few years, Chinese AI dominates globally. At the 7th China (International) Commercial Aerospace Forum, national private companies presented many new and ambitious projects, including spaceplanes, space resources, a massive constellation of satellites and more. One of the companies at the event was the space giant China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC). The Ministry of Science and Technology, China National Space Administration, and other government arms sponsored and supervised the event. CASIC said that the Xingyun constellation — made up of 80 satellites is moving full speed ahead. The corporation announced that the intelligent space satellite production factory was operating. They are now launching rockets from their own rocket park in the city of Wuhan. Today the rocket park and smart sat factory produce 20 solid-fuel launches and 100 satellites per year but plans to increase capacities are on their way. CASIC is also working on the Tengyun spaceplane, recently flight-testing an advanced turbine-based combined cycle engine in the Gobi desert. CASIC is not the only private company developing space planes in China. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. and iSpace also presented their plans for space planes and space crafts. iSpace has designed two missions to the Moon, which they assure will be the first commercial missions to the natural satellite. China is getting some **inspiration from U.S. companies**. Local companies in China are looking into space tourism with suborbital and orbital flights. And Deep Blue Aerospace is developing a reusable launcher that looks very much like the Heavy Falcon of SpaceX. The event's **main themes** were IoT space networks, multi-purpose satellite constellations, **space** resources (mining) and taking the Chinese space sector to a new level with private participation. While the U.S. has its eye on Chinese military space vehicles, it may have overlooked and underestimated the impact that the Chinese private sector will have. Hundreds of new companies have responded to the government's call to "start a new journey for commercial aerospace" in China. It is only a matter of time until their full power and capabilities are unleashed into space.

### Advantage

#### They can’t solve mining – it’s largely the US’s fault but they just scapegoat China.

1AC Jamasmie 21 — (Cecilia Jamasmie, Cecilia has covered mining for more than a decade. She is particularly interested in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Diamonds and Latin America. Cecilia has been interviewed by BBC News and CBC among others and has been a guest speaker at mining conventions, including MINExpo 2016 and the World’s Copper Conference 2018. She is also member of the expert panel on Social License to Operate (SLO) at the European project MIREU (Mining and Metallurgic Regions EU). She holds a Master of Journalism from the University of British Columbia, and is based in Nova Scotia., “Experts warn of brewing space mining war among US, China and Russia“, MINING, 4-29-21, Available Online at https://www.mining.com/experts-warn-of-brewing-space-mining-war-among-us-china-and-russia/, accessed 1-11-2022, HKR-AR)

A brewing war to set a mining base in space is likely to see China and Russia joining forces to keep the US increasing attempts to dominate extra-terrestrial commerce at bay, experts warn. The Trump Administration took an active interest in space, announcing that America would return astronauts to the moon by 2024 and creating the Space Force as the newest branch of the US military. It also proposed global legal framework for mining on the moon, called the Artemis Accords, encouraging citizens to mine the Earth’s natural satellite and other celestial bodies with commercial purposes. The directive classified outer space as a “legally and physically unique domain of human activity” instead of a “global commons,” paving the way for mining the moon without any sort of international treaty. Spearheaded by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Artemis Accords were signed in October by Australia, Canada, England, Japan, Luxembourg, Italy and the United Emirates. “Unfortunately, the Trump Administration exacerbated a national security threat and risked the economic opportunity it hoped to secure in outer space by failing to engage Russia or China as potential partners,” says Elya Taichman, former legislative director for then-Republican Michelle Lujan Grisham. “Instead, the Artemis Accords have driven China and Russia toward increased cooperation in space out of fear and necessity,” he writes. Russia’s space agency Roscosmos was the first to speak up, likening the policy to colonialism “There have already been examples in history when one country decided to start seizing territories in its interest — everyone remembers what came of it,” Roscosmos’ deputy general director for international cooperation, Sergey Saveliev, said at the time. China, which made history in 2019 by becoming the first country to land a probe on the far side of the Moon, chose a different approach. Since the Artemis Accords were first announced, Beijing has approached Russia to jointly build a lunar research base. President Xi Jinping has also he made sure China planted its flag on the Moon, which happened in December 2020, more than 50 years after the US reached the lunar surface.

#### Private sector cooperation defuses tensions and the military is an alt cause.

1AC Curcio 21 — (Blaine Curcio, Blaine Curcio is an Affiliate Senior Consultant for Euroconsult, based in Hong Kong. Since joining Euroconsult in 2018, he has contributed to a wide range of consulting missions and research reports, primarily covering the satcom sector globally and the broader space industry in China., “Developments in China's Commercial Space Sector“, National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), 8-24-2021, Available Online at https://www.nbr.org/publication/developments-in-chinas-commercial-space-sector/, accessed 1-12-2022, HKR-AR) //Blaine Curcio is the interviewee; the interviewer is lura Winfrey, an intern with the Center for Innovation, Trade, and Strategy at NBR.

The Russian and U.S. space industries are the two oldest. They have a lot of space programs, experts, and related intellectual property and have been integrated into the space ecosystem. The Chinese space sector has developed primarily independently from the U.S.-Russia system. There has been some collaboration between China and Europe since the Wolf Amendment, but the absence of any kind of commercial space companies until recently, combined with the sensitivity around the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (a U.S. export-control regime), has forced the Chinese space ecosystem to develop pretty much independently. Russia, though a nation in decline, still likes projects involving space to bolster national pride. As a result, there has been a broader trend over the last five to ten years of a gradual realignment of the Russian space sector toward China in terms of both the government and the industrial base **More Russian companies are looking to China to buy products.** Historically these companies have bought material from Europe, but they have recently turned more to China because of how weak the Russian ruble is, making imports more expensive. At the same time, Chinese companies are looking to Russia as an export market as well as to Russia and former Soviet states as investment opportunities. There is synergy, for example, between a Chinese rocket company that sees a relatively cheap Ukrainian rocket company with specific technology that it wants and a Ukrainian company that has all the technology, intellectual property, and “know-how,” but does not have that much money. The international lunar research station is beneficial to the commercial space sector to the extent that the national team would be occupied with the space station. As the national team gets bigger and takes on more sophisticated projects, this may help free up the kind of lower-end work companies were doing before and create more room for commercial competition.

Moving forward, if there are massive lunar projects and a large Chinese space station, these developments are all things that will occupy a lot of top engineers and SOEs. There will be a need for a bigger commercial sector to contribute to emerging projects and complete the technological development of the more commercial, as opposed to institutional or national-level, projects in the space sector. What is the relationship between China’s space industry development and its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, and how is this affecting the commercial space sector? There are two main types of impact: the technological impact and the broader policy impact. As part of the Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the Chinese government wants to develop specific capabilities and emphasize specific technologies, which produce the technological impact. From that perspective, this strategy dictates what the commercial space sector does in terms of R&D, and the technological direction it takes. Zhuhai satellite is an example of this strategy. Since Zhuhai satellite was a spinoff from the Harbin Institute of Technology, which has a military link, there is a possibility that it is pursuing more space technologies that are related to Military-Civil Fusion. The second type is the broader policy impact. Because the central government makes Military-Civil Fusion a significant policy objective, there will be industrial bases that are built to support related technologies. More money and resources will be available for a startup that will support China’s strategic and tech ambitions. Because of the money and resources that are available, the development of the space industry will change as companies adapt their activities to what the government is emphasizing and to what kind of support they can get from different stakeholders in order to survive.

#### Choo proves the link – militarized discourse about space is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Jaewoo 1AC Choo 21(Professor of Chinese foreign policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University, Korea. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for East Asian Studies Program, the Brooking Institution and a Visiting Associate Professor at Georgia Institute of Technology. He graduated from Wesleyan University (BA in Government) and Peking University (MA & Ph.D. in International Relations). His research areas are Chinese foreign policy, multilateral security cooperation, and China-North Korea relations. He was a contributor to Asia Times on the Korean peninsula affairs), “The United States and China: Competition for superiority in space to protect resources and weapon systems,” OpenAsia, 03/11/2021, https://www.openasia.asia/the-united-states-and-china-competition-for-superiority-in-space-to-protect-resources-and-weapon-systems/

The strategic competition between the U.S. and China is fierce even in space outside of the earth. What do the two countries compete for in space? What are their objectives and what strategic calculations did they start from? Will the space race between the two countries lead to competition over space hegemony? This is one of the most interesting issues for U.S.-China observers in recent days. The space race between the U.S. and China is not just a number fight. How many satellites and spaceships have been launched and how many space stations have been established are the questions that mattered in the past. These mattered for the convenience and benefit for mankind. It could also make possible for some of the curiosity about the universe to be solved. However, starting the 21st century, the space race between the U.S. and China has progressed into an intense, high-level strategic battle. Whoever rules space rules the future There is one reason why the two countries' space strategy competition will inevitably lead to a hegemony competition. This is because they try to conquer the space order. Conquering the space order is to define and establish the space order. Those who dominate space will dominate almost all sectors of the future world, including economy, technology, environment, cyberspace, transportation and energy. That's why the United States is considered as a hegemonic country on Earth today. The U.S. is recognized as a hegemonic country because it establishes and leads the economic, financial, trade, political, and diplomatic order. There are two areas in the world today where international order has not been established. One is virtual space, which is the cyber world. The other is the space. Since the international order of these two areas is closely correlated with each other, it is likely that the establishment of the order in these two areas will be pursued simultaneously. This means that cyber order cannot be discussed without discussing satellite issues. The Communist Party of China recognized this early on. At the 19th National Communist Party Congress in 2017, it expressed its justification for establishing space order. President Xi Jinping declared that China's diplomatic stage in the 21st century has expanded beyond the Earth into space and virtual space. It was the moment when China defined the concept of diplomatic space as the "universe" beyond the Earth. He then explained that the establishment of a system that can even manage the order of the universe and the virtual world eventually means the establishment of practical governance. Therefore, he justified that China's diplomatic horizon has no choice but to expand into space. Furthermore, he stressed that he is confident that the ideation of building such governance serves as the foundation for the community of common destiny for mankind which China pursues. In other words, he publicly urged China to have the capabilities and means to become a key country in building governance in these two areas. This led the Trump administration to spare no effort to develop space science and technology and space projects, which are the basis of space order. Since President George W. Bush, the maintenance work for supremacy in space has been carried out. President Obama also introduced a policy to encourage U.S. private companies to participate in space projects to expand the foundation for supremacy in space. It was President Trump who actualized all these. He was the one who legalized private companies' space development projects under the Space Policy Directive-I. He also thoroughly reflected his “America First” principle in the space business. For example, all the substances obtained in space, including minerals, were no longer defined as "common goods." He also promised that space activities by private companies in the United States would be free from restrictions such as the Outer Space Treaty and the 1979 resolution by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Space and the moon were known as repositories of resources. As it became known that the resources that are scarce or will be depleted on Earth are very abundant outside the Earth in space, the space race has gotten intense. This is why the space race has been promoted on a geoeconomic level. However, in order to secure these benefits of geoeconomic strategies, geopolitical strategies must be accompanied. In other words, military defenses should be backed up to protect the resource acquisition process. Fearing this, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space strictly regulates the military use of space. However, the fact that the logic of developing naval power to protect long-range foreign interests on Earth is reflected in the strategic thinking of securing space profits is the decisive factor that has driven the space race today. The repositories of resources and future energy sources There are three strategic benefits that drive the U.S.-China competition for supremacy in space. The first is the infinite resource in space. There are endless resources buried in more than 10,000 asteroids orbiting the Earth. They are known to have an abundance of resources such as carbon, zinc, cobalt, platinum, gold, silver and titanium, in which platinum and titanium, for example, can be sold for $30,000 to $50,000 per kilogram. Second, the future energy source lies in space. Power supply using solar energy will be possible by establishing a space power plant that concentrates solar energy in the Earth-Moon area and transmitting it to Earth through laser beams. Here, the supplied solar power is known to be 35 to 70% more powerful than the solar energy on Earth. By 2100, 70 terawatts of energy will be needed, and it is expected that 332 terawatts can be supplied through the development of space solar power plants in a geostationary orbit. Third, the desire to dominate space for hegemony has established the space competition relationship between the U.S. and China. Although each started from different strategic interests, in the end, they have one common goal. First of all, China wants to be free from the U.S. GPS system. This is because only through the freedom China can prevent its future weapons system from becoming vulnerable to U.S. control and restrictions. It is planning to achieve its goal of establishing a so-called "Space Silk Road" by expanding China's "BeiDou" navigation system to the regions within One Belt One Road and the national satellite and communication systems. The U.S. also plans to spend $25 billion to develop GPS3 systems with stronger defense capabilities against Chinese space and cyberattacks, by 2025. The competition between the U.S. and China to establish a space station in order to secure the benefits from space strategies is inevitable. This is because a space station is the foundation for establishing space order. As the space station has the purpose of protecting and defending from enemies, militarization is inevitable in the process. It is clear that the outcome will lead to a space arms race. This is why the competition over supremacy in space between the U.S. and China has the aspects of the New Cold War outside the Earth. Space is a blue ocean. It is a world without order. Preemption is therefore important. In order to prepare space order and accompanying laws, norms, and systems, the U.S. and China have been engaged in a fierce battle through space projects. This is because space is the decisive factor in the operation of energy, resources, environment, communication, and advanced military weapons systems in the future. Space is no longer a dream world. Of course, it takes a lot of time for these strategic benefits to become a reality. However, the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the development of AI (Artificial Intelligence) technology will speed up the pace. This is because economic problems can be solved if spacecraft recycling is made possible with the participation of private companies and facilities related to space stations and mineral mining equipment are set up with 3D printers.

#### Multipolarity is inevitable – the affs cling to hegemony ensures violent transition wars and failure of global cooperation.

Marchetti ‘17 (Raffaele Marchetti, \*senior assistant professor in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and the School of Government of LUISS, external expert for the European Commission, “End of the American hegemonic cycle,” Feb 14, https://www.opendemocracy.net/raffaele-marchetti/end-of-american-hegemonic-cycle)//cmr

Trump’s election marks the end of the long phase of American world hegemony. Despite the electoral slogan “Make America Great Again” and the great expectations this may have generated, his presidency will presumably be characterized by an overall retrenchment. Many different interpretations have been provided on the reasons of Trump’s success ranging from populist framing to FBI support. Contrary to the mainstream debate, I see a more fundamental reason underpinning his victory: the changed costs/benefits balance in the US role in the world. The theory of hegemonic stability holds that at some point the hegemon will start to decline due to the increased costs of the management of the system which outbalance the benefits the hegemon gains out of it. The costs of the management of the system have in fact been accumulating in the last 4 presidencies. During the Bush administrations, security costs due to the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have, among other damage, impacted negatively on the US government. Equally, during the Obama presidencies costs due to economic stimuli have increased the overall debt of the country. As predicted by hegemonic theory, we finally come to a point in which the costs became too heavy for the citizens, or rather their perception of this becomes more evident, so that they start to protest and demand a change. This was intercepted by Trump much more than by Clinton, with Trump stepping back to decrease the costs of international projection. So-called “**imperial overstretch**”, formed much earlier, led Trump’s electorate to seek less international costs (and possibly, but less likely, more domestic benefits). Hence, the promised withdrawal from a number of Free Trade Agreements, the discussion of the terms of NATO participation, cancellation of the environmental deals etc. From this perspective Trump’s election has to do with a much longer trend of international order rather than the specific time-lapse of the electoral campaign, a trend of dis-engagement that had already begun during the Obama administration and will now be more clearly visible with Trump. The system in which we have been living in the last 70 years was created in large part by the US leadership. The UN system, Bretton Woods Institutions, NATO, and WTO are all institutional arrangements that have been strongly promoted by the post WWII hegemon and that have been preserved in life thanks to continuous support by the USA. Now all of this is put into question by the resistance of the newly elected president to engage in and with these multilateral organizations. Trump will most likely have a more unpredictable, possibly turbulent behaviour vis a vis all of these institutions and this will lead to their transformation and perhaps for some, to their marginalization. Other significant elements in this jigsaw puzzle have to do with the phenomenon of globalization. It is because of global transformation in production chains, the relocation of multinational corporation abroad coupled with the possibility of (re-)importing goods, and the subsequent loss of jobs that a component of the middle class has been badly affected by unemployment. But it is also thanks to globalization that China is rising fast and challenging the US leadership in economic, but also increasingly in political and military terms. It is clear by now that the policy choice for globalization taken by the US leadership in the ‘80s (republican) and ‘90s (democratic) was beneficial only at the beginning, but later turned out to be detrimental to the power position of the USA in the world economy. It is widely recognised that India and especially China are the real winners in the game of globalization, hence closing the gap with the west. Russia is an additional element in this calculation. This new would-be multipolar system, deprived of the overall western master plan, is left to pure bargaining, pure transactionalism played with ad hoc games, which is very much in line with Trump’s overall attitude to socio-economic engagement. And yet, this might have a de-polarizing effect, a de-escalating consequence in terms of the current world tensions that have grown in the last few years. Here I am thinking especially of the west-Russia split. Without a hegemonic power pushing for a specific world order, a more balanced system might emerge. We might end up with a Trump presidency that has polarizing effects domestically and depolarizing effects internationally. The line of march is clear: either new competition based on multipolar rivalry which might possibly escalate into conflicts, or the opening of new channels for dialogue, might lead to a foundational phase in which innovative rules of the international games are written by western and non-western powers together. It will be up to Trump and the other leaders to steer the way and to take a decision on which way to go.

**Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision.**

Alexander William **Salter**, **Economics Professor at Texas Tech**, **’16**, “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words

The probability of a collision is currently **low**. Bradley and Wein estimate that the **maximum probability** in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains **below one in one thousand**, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.