# 1AC

#### “It’s been now almost half a century since humans were last on the moon. That’s too long, we need to get back there and have … a big permanently occupied base on the moon. And then build a city on Mars to become a spacefaring civilization, a multi-planet species.” – Elon Musk

[Michael Sheetz; space reporter @ CNBC; 4-23-2021; “Elon Musk wants SpaceX to reach Mars so humanity is not a ‘single-planet species’”; CNBC; https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/elon-musk-aiming-for-mars-so-humanity-is-not-a-single-planet-species.html; Accessed 2-11-2022] AK

#### Elon Musk has fundamentally misunderstood space colonization – there can be no “spacefaring civilization” without racialized violence on Earth. Private companies can’t appropriate outer space without Earthly infrastructure, creating sacrifice zones in the Global South that render Black and brown bodies disposable. Every rocket and launchpad that’s built disproportionately targets marginalized and racialized bodies, clearing the frontier for colonial violence and ecocide.

Klinger ‘19 [Julie Michelle Klinger; PhD, a geographer at the University of Delaware, formerly Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University; 3-20-2019; “Environmental Geopolitics and Outer Space”; Geopolitics; http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/03/Environmental-Geopolitics-and-Outer-Space.pdf; Accessed 4-9-2022] AK

Reaching outer space requires Earthly infrastructure, which means that space launches have concrete footprints that change according to developments in launch technologies. The placement of outer space related infrastructure on Earth is a question of environmental (in)justice. Which sites are chosen, who is expropriated, and which environments are impacted is subject to strategic geopolitical calculations, which, more often than not, employ classical geopolitical reasoning (Hickman and Dolman 2002; Ingold 2006; Meira Filho, Guimarães Fortes, and Barcelos 2014; NDRI 2006). Launch sites are tightly controlled to reduce the risk of interference or failure, therefore situating launch sites in remote areas is often explained in terms of safety and security (Zapata and Murray 2008). No doubt this is important: rockets are composed of many tonnes of material and combustive fuel, so they must be launched in places where damage from routine as well as potentially catastrophic explosions can be contained. For humans to reach “the final frontier,” they must first find a frontier space on Earth that can be made into an empty space in which controlled explosions can be routine.

Frontiers are seldom as empty as those aiming to conquer them would claim. Where they are not populated by people, they are filled with other sorts of meanings and life forms (Klinger 2017; Tsing 2005). Potential launch sites and testing ranges deemed by government authorities to be simultaneously remote, safe, and suitable to contain the risks of rocket launch must first be made empty of people, with prior land use regimes or territorial claims pushed beyond designated buffer zones (Gorman 2007; Mitchell 2017). Hence the placement of space infrastructure follows colonial geographies of extraction, sacrifice, and risk (Mitchell 2017; Redfield 2001). As Gorman (2007) put it: “because of their distance from the metropole, these places lend themselves to hosting prisons, detention camps, military installations, nuclear weapons, and nuclear waste. All of these establishments, including rocket ranges, have inspired reactions of protest.” These so-called ‘peripheral’ spaces are nevertheless central to their inhabitants and their neighbors, who question the logic of extraglobal conquest in the face of unresolved Earthly injustices.

Consider, for example, the case of the launch site in Alcântara, Brazil, which has been well documented by Araújo and Filho (2006) and Mitchell (2017). Through a close examination of local, national, and international politics, these authors document how the government’s racialized approach to the subsistence communities displaced by space infrastructure deepened structural inequalities. Grassroots opposition to the launch site grew not out of an a priori ideological opposition of poor people to national progress in outer space, as some officials alleged, but rather resulted from the failure to account for the food insecurity generated by state resettlement projects. The resettlement schemes were themselves misinformed by impoverished notions of local livelihoods. Local claims against the deprivations caused by state- sponsored space practices have deepened schisms between the military and civilian space programs at the federal government level.

Through the lens of classical geopolitics, these structural inequalities scarcely register, with the result that the ‘crawling’ progress of Brazil’s space program is pathologized as poor management practices symptomatic of an inadequately implemented national development vision (Amaral 2010). Critical geopolitics helps deconstruct the nationalist performativity of such endeavors by considering the political and economic value placed on the spectacle of spaceflight (Boczkowska 2017; Macdonald 2008, 2010; Sage 2016). Feminist geopolitics draws our attention to the racialized and gendered dispossession advanced by the state, through the construction of space infrastructure and exercised through access to land. The fact that environmental and public health impacts were only considered by the authorities after years of mobilization by Black social movements, religious communities, and scholars highlights the ways in which inattention to the local in the pursuit of space power perpetuates environmental injustice, which in turn interrupts national plans for space progress.

Rocket launches affect local and global environments through the construction of infrastructure, the exposure of local environments to toxic residues, and the dispersal of pollutants in land, air, and sea. Rockets are the only source of direct anthropogenic emissions sources in the stratosphere. Ozone-depleting substances (ODS) such as nitrous oxide, hydrogen chlorine, and aluminum oxide are emitted by rockets, and can destroy 105 ozone molecules before degrading (Voigt et al. 2013). The ozone layer prevents cancer and cataract-causing ultraviolet-b waves from reaching the Earth. As of 2013, rocket launches accounted for less than 1% of ODS emissions. As other ODS are phased out under the Montreal Protocol and the frequency of lower cost space launches increases, the proportion and quantity is likely to increase (Durrieu and Nelson 2013; Ross et al. 2009).

Although affluent economies in the northern hemisphere are responsible for most ODS emissions (Polvani 2011; Rousseaux et al. 1999), the geography of exposure disproportionately affects an overall higher population in remote regions and in the southern hemisphere (Norval et al. 2011; Robinson and Erickson 2015; Thompson et al. 2011) because ozone depletion is most serious in regions where high altitude stratospheric clouds are most likely to form: above the polar regions and major mountain ranges (Carslaw et al. 1998; Perlwitz et al. 2008). This is an example of environmental injustice on a global scale, where the global south bears the environmental burden of actions predominately taken in the global north, rocket launches included. In the process, global power relations are reinscribed through the uneven distribution of harm to peripheral and southern bodies, mediated in this case through the redistribution of gases in the stratosphere that increase exposure to solar radiation.

Coming closer to Earth, environmental geopolitics of outer space are manifest in the dispersal of particulate matter into ecosystems surrounding active launch sites. This is more than a strictly local environmental concern, because which spaces are subject to the hazards of launch sites involves careful calculations weighing financial cost, state power, and multifarious territorial interests. With each launch, surrounding areas are showered with toxins, heavy metals, and acids over a distance that varies widely with wind, weather, and precipitation patterns at the moment of lift-off.3 The most researched of these pollutants are hydrogen chloride, aluminum oxide, and various aerosolized heavy metals. Release of these pollutants from rocket launches results in localized regional acid rain (Madsen 1981), plant death, fish kills, and failed seed germination of native plants in launch sites (Marion, Black, and Zedler 1989; Schmalzer et al. 1992).

These effects, and research on them, are mostly concentrated within one kilometer of the launch site. But they have been recorded several kilometers away under certain weather conditions (Schmalzer et al. 1998). Recent studies on the concentration of trace elements in wildlife in areas near NASA launch activities in Florida, USA, found that more than half of the adults and juvenile alligators had “greater than toxic levels” of trace elements in their liver (Horai et al. 2014). Both the subject, and the vague statement of findings, highlights the lack of research into the impacts on downstream human and non-human communities. In contrast to the precautions taken to protect workers in buildings adjacent to facilities where these technologies are developed (Bolch et al. 1990; Chrostowski, Gan, and Campbell 2010), much less consideration is given to communities within the dynamic pollutant shadow of rocket launches.

In Kazakhstan, Russia, and China, researchers have begun examining the effects of the highly toxic liquid propellant, unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), which has been in use since the dawn of the space age. It has noted carcinogenic, mutagenic, convulsant, teratogenic, and embryotoxic effects (Carlsen, Kenesova, and Batyrbekova 2007), and it has been found to cause DNA damage and chromosomal aberrations in rodents living near the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan (Kolumbayeva et al. 2014). Despite these known hazards, methods to detect UDMH at the trace concentrations at which toxic effects begin to manifest in humans do not yet exist (Kenessov, Bakaikina, and Ormanbekovna 2015), meaning that there is no knowledge of how this circulates in the environment, bioaccumulates up the food chain, or could potentially be sequestered through soil or plant filtration. The lack of technology or methodology to adequately track the dispersal of hazardous pollutants that have been used for decades in the surrounding environment illustrates another aspect of environmental injustice: the preference on the part of political and economic elites to create spaces of waste rather than allocate adequate resources to maintain safe and non-toxic environments.4

The hyper-local politics of basic livelihood security shape long-term access to outer space and space geopolitics at multiple scales. Attending to the local matters is important, not just because it sheds light on broader geopolitical processes, but because failing to do so leaves the substantive matters of human engagement with outer space entirely overlooked, at best. At worst, ignoring local environmental conditions recasts them as places to be “left behind,” casualties in a Darwinian race to the cosmos in which the poor have no place. Attending to the environmental geopolitics of outer space on Earth shows the co-production of Earth and space. Earthly environments and social relations are remade in our evolving relationship with outer space and reconceived alongside evolving deliberations on the prospects for human survival.

#### The geopolitical calculations of space travel terminally outweigh and control the internal link to every impact scenario. Western elites directly benefit from engineering a world that leaves the entire Global South without the means to survive.

Grove ‘19 [Jairus Victor Grove; Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa; 2019; “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World”; Duke University Press; pp. 200-202//ak47]

I want to take up both premises as they make more explicit what is also central to Moore. First, I want to consider the question of capitalism as a failed social system planner, and whether the natural limits of the ecosystem represent an accelerant for capitalism’s contradictions. The claim that capitalism is at odds with social planning is simply unsustainable. After all, geopolitics is a form of global social planning, and maybe the largest ever, as it is a system of planetary management. The problem is that we have a progressive functionalist bias in what constitutes successful social planning. The global networks of surveillance, multicountry military operations, mutual security alliances, and transnational border, seaport, and airport cooperation suggest that capitalism can innovate and implement global-scale social systems with high degrees of efficiency and effectiveness. What is left out by Balakrishnan is that one can have vast and unprecedented social and economic planning without benefiting the majority of the planet. Balakrishnan, to his benefit, makes note of the vast socialization of capital in the form of health care and education for the benefit of industry. However, more importantly, I would add to the cost of educating workers and maintaining the health of workers the huge price tag of the American-led geopolitical order. The cost of the wars in Iraq to maintain access to oil runs in the trillions of dollars alone. Yet even in regard to climate change, clean water, species loss, and migration crises, it is true that vast capitalist social planning is in the works: for instance, ecomodernist proposals for geoengineering that consolidate the hegemony of a few great powers. They do this via climate control and cooling northern countries while devastating subtropical and tropical countries by slowing the rain cycles necessary for agriculture; through capital-intensive desalinization, which ensures water security for those who can afford it; and through synthetic meat and food production, which represents real alternatives to land-based food production but extraordinary capital input. All these strategies for “adapting” to the climate and ecological catastrophe—while currently being pursued—are rejected by academics as seemingly unrealistic because they do not scale for 10 billion people. However, it should be considered that the visions of an ecomodern vanguard are less concerned with the speed and feasibility of scale as long as there is enough for them.

In fact, the most common critique by Marxists like Andreas Malm and neo-Keynesian ecologists like Naomi Klein is that such design schemes for cooler weather, clean water, and food security will leave potentially billions without the means to survive. From the ecomodernist perspective of elite blocks, that is, contemporary capitalism, so be it. Unlike Balakrishnan, Klein, and to a lesser degree Malm, the crisis of “failure” is just the next stage of what Klein calls elsewhere “disaster capitalism.”35 The fact that these solutions do not provide for everyone, or might create periods of tumultuous transition, are not critiqued within the standards of the narrow few pursuing them. Instead, the limited applications of industrial adaptation models are a virtuous form of managed scarcity and opportunity for the reconfiguration of governance. This transformation, while incipient, is for me a significant transformation between labor, contradiction, and political crisis. It envisions a world, and then engineers a world that can live, and even thrive, without the majority of people currently alive on the planet. The limited survival and making of a new fully manageable planet is precisely a “system-wide economic renewal.”36 The reconfiguration of the planet such that labor and resources play a significantly different role than previously experienced may not exactly be capitalism as we have understood it, but neither is it Balakrishnan’s vision of a future created by Marx’s understanding of contradictions.

Even the presumption of Foucault’s schema of biopolitical capitalism is that somehow capital cannot live without labor, and therefore contradictions, that is, immiseration, will create turbulence for revolt, even if not revolutionary change.37 In the biopolitical logic of labor, the threat of extermination is limited by the necessity of a population or mass to protect and to make live.38 However, in the schema developing among the futurists of Silicon Valley, this presumption is simply false. Mass death at scales comparable and even exceeding the bubonic plague are no longer a problem for capital functioning. In fact, it is quite the opposite: losing one-half or more of the global population if sufficiently contained by drones, space weapons, and other long-range autonomous weapons systems provides a great benefit to a certain class of an increasingly cosmopolitan elite who look forward to automated forms of labor that make human exploitation instrumentally even if not morally obsolete. The limit of Balakrishnan’s and for that matter Marx’s vision is and was the presumption that there are limits to what humans can bear materially and morally. Like Moore, Balakrishnan is simultaneously too optimistic and too pessimistic. These thinkers are too pessimistic about the creativity of the Eurocene, which historically has departed from classical capitalist logic and structure in important ways, while maintaining the consistency necessary to continue. Furthermore, they are too optimistic about the ways that consciousness and political action change under increasingly sadistic material conditions.

#### Private control in outer space is grounded in cosmobiopolitics, operating through informatic control. By constructing a security apparatus around the globe, tech in outer space domesticates the universe, imprinting the human onto a living milieu to govern life itself.

Damjanov ‘15 [Katarina Damjanov; PhD, a Senior Lecturer and the Discipline Lead in Media and Communication at the University of Western Australia; 2015; “The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics”; Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2015, Vol. 33(5) 889–906; Accessed 02-02-2022] AK

Media technologies occupy the earth’s exterior as extraterrestrial footprints of global capitalism and its contemporary ‘high-tech’ grasp over vital material and social processes. Their presence in space is at once a result and a resource of the technological evolution of politico-economic regimes grounded in exploitative control of the productive and reproductive ambits of life – what Michel Foucault introduced in contemporary intellectual thought as the order of biopolitics. Foucault’s (1990, 2004, 2007, 2008) work on the genealogy of power over life traced the advancement of its conceptual and operative framework from the principle of sovereign rule over a territory and subjects into a complex governmental platform of biopower whose twofold agenda strives to harness the conduct of human individuals and the life-processes of human populations. While the former, discipline, prescribes and enforces behavioural standards for maximising individual productivities, the latter, biopolitics, regulates the biological and social registers of life to strategically increase the overall productive potential of human living space by seizing, as Foucault (2004: 245) summarised it, ‘control over relations between the human race. . . and their environment, the milieu in which they live’. The unfolding of the biopolitical episteme in the era of techno- centred capitalism subsumed the bounty of ‘life itself’ under the calculative procedures of informatics, logistics and strategic management – and media, communication and information technologies have come to play a fundamental role in its current practices. As works which extended Foucault’s thesis to contemporary techno-logic culture such as Gilles Deleuze’s (1992) ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ and Alexander Galloway’s (2004) Protocol have demonstrated, these technologies now determine the conditions in which any human action can occur. Media devices that reside in outer space are necessarily bound up with the question of biopolitics in its ‘high-tech’ era – what commenced with Sputnik as a military contest to secure states’ territorial and geopolitical interests now extends to an extra-territorial edifice of technical media mobilised to fortify global biopolitical regimes. From satellites sent to orbit the earth and collect and relay data to global communication networks, spatial positioning and navigation systems, weather and climate monitoring centres and surveillance grids, to spacecraft dispatched to measure, evaluate and report on other celestial environments and events, these technologies have become a decisive constituent of the security apparatus that underpins contemporary biopolitics.

Today, when space-based media lie at the crux of global mechanisms of control, their extraterrestrial position requires us to reconsider the scale at which the currents of biopolitics assume their evolutionary course. The ever-increasing obsessions with advancing mediatic devices with which to inspect and direct the routes of life, from its molecular minutiae to the complex ecologies of the living, facilitate a continuous rescaling of the spectrum of the biopolitical: to govern ‘life itself’ involves, as Eugene Thacker (2009) suggests, encountering and overcoming a multiplicity of scalar restraints. With the possibility of media technologies in outer space, aspirations to strategically interfere with, and capitalise upon, life and the living are presented with a distinct window of opportunity: terrestrial constraints can be circumvented. While providing the essential means for sustaining biopolitical regimes, extraterrestrially situated media apparatus expedites both the micro and macro-scale of their implementation, permitting both their intensive, ubiquitous, terrestrially oriented assertion, and their potentially unlimited spatial expansion outwards. The extraterrestrial presence of media technologies thus impose the need to uncover global topologies of power and governance not only at their planetary level, but also to ‘un-earth’ them within the scale of their cosmic prospects. I describe this extra-planetary capacity of biopolitical progress conveyed by human media advances in space as a nascent order of what I call ‘cosmobiopolitcs’. I use the term in an attempt to both affirm its continuity with a research trajectory established by Foucault, but also to emphasise the radical transformations engendered by the extraterrestrial. I approach media technologies in outer space as a symptomatic register of this cosmobiopolitical leap, suggesting that they not only enable biopolitical gestures to be replicated off-world, but themselves have a decisive impact upon ways in which ‘life itself’ is conceptualised and subjected to techno- logic forms of control. Increasingly inflecting the human drive to be more and have more, they have become critical to the unfolding of biopolitical regimes.

Media technologies that reside in outer space demand site-specific analysis – unlike terrestrially bound devices, they inhabit what is external to earth. Both as a physical and as a discursive site, the location of outer space conditions their mediatic capacity to sculpt human societies. In 1967, the international law declared that outer space was a domain of global commons, placing it outside territorial and property rights and under international regimes of governance. Yet, while this legal provision framed outer space as a ‘common heritage’ of humanity, it remained essentially an inhuman environment; all our encounters with it are always mediated – from the astronaut suit that keeps the human body alive to the Hubble Telescope images of faraway galaxies that once existed before the dawn of our time. Positioned in outer space to overcome its fundamental incompatibility with humans, these devices perform their primary function of technical media, acting as ‘mediators between man and nature’ (Simondon, 1980: 1) and domesticating the unforgiving expanses of the extraterrestrial as a ‘living milieu’ onto which the human and its vital processes could be imprinted and subsequently governed. However, except for a few astronauts currently on roster in the International Space Station, outer space is generally empty of humans, and this absence brings our biopolitical bonds with media technologies into sharp relief: claiming and retaining outer space as a part of the human milieu entirely relies upon our ability to create, manage and control these objects. The biological imperatives of securing the desired modes of relationship between humans and their milieu necessarily involve governance of objects (Thacker, 2009), in particular those of a technical kind, which are, as Gilbert Simondon (1980) and Bernard Stiegler (1998) invite us to consider, historically inseparable from human life. But in the inhuman milieu of outer space, technologies are no longer only a means, or a side concern of governance, but its primary and central objects. Supported by an earth- bound pyramid of elite scientific labour and sophisticated equipment, the human relationship with these remotely positioned technologies is indicative of the readjustment of the scope of the biopolitical. It necessitates shifting the governmental focus from living humans towards inanimate objects and their own life in space, and acknowledging the complexities produced in this interweaving of the human and the technological.

#### Outer space is a living milieu, inseparable from the sociotechnical conditions of human relations.

Damjanov ‘15 [Katarina Damjanov; PhD, a Senior Lecturer and the Discipline Lead in Media and Communication at the University of Western Australia; 2015; “The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics”; Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2015, Vol. 33(5) 889–906; Accessed 02-02-2022] AK

Sputnik and all media devices that followed it have been gradually converting outer space into a living milieu, reinforcing it as a material–social setting of human circumstances and relations. The concept of ‘milieu’ is important for understanding the complexities involved in the cosmobiopolitical transformation of outer space. In Foucault’s work and in other influential texts such as those of his mentor Georges Canguilhem (2008) and Simondon (1980) and Stiegler (1998), although employed in different contexts, the term ‘milieu’ essentially designates a site which simultaneously conditions and is itself conditioned by the productive forces of human life – whether biological, social or technical. Courses of medianature in outer space sharpen such perspectives on mutually transforming relations between humans and their milieu, providing biopolitical focus to Simondon’s and Stiegler’s perspectives on technology as fundamental in constituting human life. Stiegler’s view of progress as human technological evolution frames technical objects as a prosthesis in whose creation humans embed their ‘interiors’ and through which they further exteriorise and mould their living milieu, a process which has been changing the idea of what it is to be human (Stiegler, 1998: 17). In the Stieglerian sense, the human ‘exteriorisation’ in technical media that are sent into space not only imbues the earth’s exterior with a reflection of the human, but itself reconstitutes the human and reconfigures human ways of life. These technologies thus radically enhance the capacity for species-being, becoming a vital part of our biopolitical capital: while altering our apparently otherwise lifeless planetary exterior into a malleable and thus governable locus of life, their mediatic operations assist humans to overcome their biological and geographical limitations and proceed as a collective towards becoming more-than-human.

#### Thus, I affirm negativity, a return to the crypt. The 1AC is a conspiracy against private entities, against the state, against capitalism. It’s time to abandon hope in favor of pessimism, the start of a rebellion in the catacombs of society.

Culp ‘16 [Andrew Culp; Professor of Media History and Theory @ California Institute of the Arts; PhD, 2013, The Ohio State University; 2016; “Dark Deleuze”; The Anarchist Library; https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/andrew-culp-dark-deleuze; Accessed 4-6-2022] AK

A more modern story begins in 1609, when, upon hearing news of the Dutch invention of the telescope, Galileo created his own. Almost immediately, Galileo was peering into the dark quadrants of the moon and illustrating its angle of illumination. These discoveries would lead him to loudly endorse heliocentrism—replacing God with a new light at the center of the universe. Galileo curiously flaunts the rules of astronomy in his lunar record, as he does not date each ink wash according to its time of observation, nor does he make a photorealistic reproduction of the moon’s landscape (Gingrich and van Helden, “From Occhiale to Printed Page,” 258–62). Centuries of critics have tried to determine the source of Galileo’s inaccuracy. Johannis Hevelii, the father of stenography, wondered if Galileo’s instruments were too crude (Selenographia sive Lunae Descriptio, 205). Others suggest that he may have been too overtaken by the excitement of discovery (Kopal, The Moon, 225). But what if Galileo chose not to view the moon mathematically but philosophically? He was less concerned about its angles of illumination as an astronomical object than about what his telescopic perspicillum revealed about it as a cosmological concept. His styling of the moon reveals a way of seeing far more appropriate to baroque visual argument than to geographic measure. Galileo’s ink washes demonstrate the baroque’s beautiful convergences. Referring “not to an essence but rather to an operative function,” Galileo’s moon unfurls in the collision of multiple points of view as darkness and landscape meet in its leaping shadows (L, 3). More importantly, he marks a transition driven by “the force of divergences, impossibilities, discords, dissonances” (81). In a world no longer illuminated by the light of God, Galileo paints “many possible borders between worlds” in a chromatic scale so as to be irresolvable from the lens of any one camera set to a single angle (81). How, then, does one continue Galileo’s journey to the far side of the moon? By refusing divine harmony and instead conspiring with divergent underground worlds.

The most immediate instance of lightness, connectivism, is the realization of the techno-affirmationist dream of complete transparency. The fate of such transparency is depicted in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis. In it, the drive for complete communicability elevates transparency in the false transcendence of a New Tower of Babel. Deep in the shadows of the Lower City labors the working class, enslaved to the machines that automation promised to eliminate. Only in the catacombs does the secret rebellion commence. But instead of ending in Lang’s grand Hegelian mediation, it would be better to listen to the Whore of Babylon in Metropolis, who says, “Let’s watch the world go to hell.” Such an untimely descent into darkness begins with a protest: lightness has far too long been the dominant model of thought. The road there descends from the chapel to the crypt.

Crypts are by their very nature places of seclusion. Early Christians facing public persecution fled to the underground catacombs below Rome, where they could worship in secret (“Essay upon Crypts,” 73–77). Early basilicas contain crypts as a “second church” under their choirs, featuring a vaulted ceiling, many columns, several aisles, and an altar (Lübke, Ecclesiastical Art, 24–25). Some great churches even included a second crypt dedicated to a particular saint (26). At times, when sacred objects are of special interest, crypts of especially renowned saints have inspired mass pilgrimages (Spence-Jones, Early Christianity and Paganism, 269). Deleuze notes that these spaces fold in on themselves, simultaneously expressing the “autonomy of the inside” and the “independence of the façade” as an inside without an outside or an outside without an inside, depending on how you approach it (L, 28). Looking at El Greco’s great baroque mannerist painting The Burial of Count Orgaz, we are given the choice. Above the great horizontal line, a gathering of saints ascends to the height of Jesus, whose own ascension grants the heavens eternal lightness. Below, a communion of cloaked, pale men crowd together to lay the count to rest under a dark background illuminated only by torchlight. The painting reveals the baroque truth of knowledge: “for ages there have been places where what is seen is inside: a cell, a sacristy, a crypt, a church, a theater, a study, or a print room” (L, 27–28). So beyond the association of crypts with rot and death, it is a projection of subterranean architectural power.

From the crypt, Dark Deleuze launches a conspiracy. It is fueled by negativity, but not one of antimonies. Following Freud, negation is not a necessary by-product of consciousness. The lesson to be drawn from him is that negation is finding a way to say “no” to those who tell us to take the world as it is. To this end, the path forward is Deleuze’s nondialectical negation, the “contrary,” which operates as the distance between two exclusive paths (LS, 172–80). Klossowski identifies the goal of the conspiracy as breaking the collusion between institutionalized morality, capitalism, and the state (“Circulus Vitiosus”). He then shows how Nietzsche’s laughter can be used as an experimental instrument to dissolve all identities into phantasms. A number of commentators have tried to rehabilitate the conspiracy on the basis of an esoteric/exoteric distinction, whereby exoteric discourses are the mere public face to a deeper paranoia whose desire is concealed in an esoteric code. To the extent that it is true, in his book Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, Klossowski warns that the esoteric tradition must be avoided because it “demystifies only in order to mystify better” (131). The point is not to replace angelic messages with arcane ones. This raises an important question: what is an appropriately cryptic language? Deleuze and Guattari note that “the man of war brings the secret: he thinks, eats, loves, judges, arrives in secret, while the man of the state proceeds publicly” (TP, 543–44). Fortunately, in our conspiratorial world of phantasms, one does not hold a secret but instead becomes a secret. Even if she ends up spilling everything, it turns out to be nothing. Why? The secret first hides within dominant forms to limit exposure, yet what it smuggles inside is not any specific thing that needs to evade discovery. Rather, it is a perception of the secret that spreads under the shroud of secrecy: perception + secret = the secret as secretion. Conspiracies do not remain limited to a few furtive missives; their creeping insinuations are part of a universal project to permeate all of society (TP, 286–89). The best conspiracy is when it has nothing left to hide.

There is an affective dimension to our conspiracy. Pessimism becomes a necessity when writing in an era of generalized precarity, extreme class stratification, and summary executions of people of color. The trouble with the metaphysics of difference is that it does not immediately suggest a positive conception of alienation, exploitation, or social death. To the extent that those who affirm difference and its intensifications do make such violence thinkable, it appears as the consequence of deprivation. As a result, they cannot explain the simultaneous connection–separation of a body alienated from their own powers. Such joyousness makes no place for Marx’s theory of exploitation in which one class systematically extracts profit by expanding the capacities of another. The conspiracy offers a way out. On the affective level, it takes the ambivalence of hatred to grasp how one’s own capacities are the yoke of his oppression. On the level of strategy, it takes deep, labyrinthine paths to develop a cryptography. To do so myself, I reenact Winston’s trips to the shallow alcove of his apartment in 1984 to keep our own illicit diary of slogans. This is how I learned to find my own way to say “DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER” and “If there is hope, it lies with the proles” (181). This is because the ultimate task of Dark Deleuze is but a modest one: to keep the dream of revolution alive in counterrevolutionary times.

The conspiracy Dark Deleuze is a series of contraries. Contraries are not poles, which are dialectical opposites that ultimately complement each other. To distill a central argument from Deleuze’s magnum opus Difference and Repetition, philosophy has (to its detriment) taken the nature of thinking to be the establishment of equivalence or logical identity between two terms (59). As such, contrasts must avoid relating terms on the basis of “a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition, or a perceived similitude” (138). Deleuze summarizes this argument in an interview: “It was Lévi-Strauss, I think, who showed you had to distinguish the following two propositions: that only similar things can differ [dialectics—presupposing a primordial identity behind differences], and only different things can be similar [contraries—difference primary to identity]” (N 156). There is a second reason for avoiding opposites: opposites imply a “golden mean” whereby the optimal place is found somewhere in between each extreme. Such middling compromise is the greatest tragedy of Deleuze and Guattari’s rhetorical presentation of what appear to be dualisms (smooth/striated, molar/molecular, arborescent/rhizomatic) in A Thousand Plateaus. The unfortunate effect is a legion of noncommittal commentators who preach the moderation of the middle. In response, we must contaminate every last one of those conceptual pairs with a third term that arrives from the outside. Deleuze and Guattari set the example in how they reimagine Dumézil’s tripartite state as two opposing poles besieged by a third term that arrives from the outside. Such a reformulation would more closely follow Deleuze’s atomism of two terms relating through the production of an independent third term. To make the stakes clear: we are told in A Thousand Plateaus that the state is made of two opposing poles, one liberal and one authoritarian, that in fact work in a “complementarity” not dissimilar from the dialectical logic of determinate negation—this is the model of relation that must be avoided at all costs (for more, see the section “Difference: Exclusive Disjunction, Not Inclusive Disjunction”) (Dumézil, Mitra-Varuna). This is why Dark Deleuze contrasts dark to joyous and not dark to light or joyous to sad. Each contrary is a forking path, an alternate route for every instance one is tempted by affirmation.

Listed in what follows are the contrasting terms. In the column on the left, I list a series of tasks. Across each column I have placed two contrary approaches, one joyous and one dark. The association each term has to its contrary is purely incidental. Each term’s contrariness is not given, as if one implied the other—I propose dark terms simply on their ability to unexpectedly usurp the operations of their contraries. Contrary approaches should be taken as mutually exclusive, as they are independent processes each meant to fulfill the given task without recourse to the other. What makes them dark is the position of exteriority from which the irregular forces of darkness attack the joy of state thought. The foreignness of relation is why each pair of contrasting terms is notably imbalanced.

My ultimate purpose is to convince readers to completely abandon all the joyous paths for their dark alternatives. The best scenario would be that these contraries fade into irrelevance after Dark Deleuze achieves its ostensible goal: the end of this world, the final defeat of the state, and full communism. It is far more likely that various aspects of darkness will be captured along the way. Like any other war machine, a dark term is defeated when it isomorphically takes on relations or forms of its joyous counterpart. So it is worth uttering a cautionary note from A Thousand Plateaus: even when contrary, never believe that darkness will suffice to save us.

#### The 1AC is an abolition of outer space as we know it. The cosmos is not something for Elon Musk to conquer, not something we can make transparent. It’s time to accept that we’re going to die on this rock, not build cities in the stars.

Kriss ‘15 [Sam Kriss; a writer and dilettante surviving in London; 02-02-2015; “Manifesto of the Committee to Abolish Outer Space”; The New Inquiry; https://thenewinquiry.com/manifesto-of-the-committee-to-abolish-outer-space/; Accessed 02-02-2022] AK

The Committee to Abolish Outer Space has existed for a long time—possibly forever. The movements we founded over the centuries had different names and different leaders, but all of them were in some way part of our war against the stars. Only now are we making ourselves public—behind frail masks—because the danger is almost upon us. For all our great age and our knowledge of certain secrets, we are not powerful. We are few, and hunted, and scared, but in our weakness we will conquer. C.A.O.S. sets out these five guiding principles:

1 Humanity will never colonize Mars, never build moon bases, never rearrange the asteroids, never build a sphere around the sun.

2 There will never be faster-than-light travel. We will not roam across the galaxy. We will not escape our star.

3 Life is probably an entirely unexceptional phenomenon; the universe probably teems with it. We will never make contact. We will never fuck green-skinned alien babes.

4 The human race will live and die on this rock, and after we are gone something else will take our place. Maybe it already has, without our even noticing.

5 All this is good. This is a good thing.

We have a program, closely guarded through the centuries. At one time it was the hidden book of the Sumerian heresiarchs, later the mystics of Europe were dimly aware of it as the Holy Grail:

1 First we will abolish the moon, that smug sack of shit in the sky, our constant condescending stalker. This should be the easiest step: People have set foot on its surface, and come back, and eventually they stopped going there; they realized how utterly dull it is.

2 Next we will overthrow the fascist institution of the sun, finally achieving the dream of all great revolutionary movements in history.

3 We will disestablish the planets, one by one, leaving them to vanish with Pluto into death. We will sweep up the dusty nebulae, plug up the black holes, drink up the Milky Way, tear down the Great Wall brick by brick.

4 Comets, asteroids, space dust, quantum foam: no more.

5 Finally, when our victory is almost complete, we will abolish low earth orbit, the black depths of the oceans, the wildernesses of the poles, the pulsing core of the human psyche.

We said earlier that for us to abolish something does not mean to destroy it. Once the cosmos was thought to be painted on the veil of the firmament, or to be some kind of divine metaphor, a flatness inscribed with thousands of meaningful stories. Since then it’s become outer space, a grotesque emptiness. Space is a site of desecration, an emptiness in which one moves, and moving into space means closing down any chances for Earth. C.A.O.S. is not interested in setting up limits. We want to create a future, not one of tin cans dodging rocks in a void, but a future for human life. To do this we must abolish outer space with all its death and idiocy, and return the cosmos to its proper domain, which is mythology, so that when we look up it will be in fear and wonder, and the knowledge that we live in a world that is not possible.

#### The end of the world is coming – the West’s endless expansion has made collapse inevitable. It’s too late to change this – all that matters is how we orient ourselves towards the apocalypse.

Grove ‘19 [Jairus Victor Grove; Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa; 2019; “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World”; Duke University Press; pp. 10-11] AK

While there is no global history of industrialized war, capitalism, and ecological destruction, the politics of homogenization as an elite-driven Euro-American geopolitics of industrialized war and capitalism made ecocide that is now a global historical fact. To put it simply, our shared experience of planetary life has a definitively parochial beginning and present. No anthropogenic, planetary-scale threat faced today—be it nuclear weapons, plastic, climate change, or global war—originated outside the Euro-American circuit of expansion, extractivism, and settlement. As Sylvia Wynter has stated, “we must now collectively undertake a rewriting of knowledge as we know it . . . because the West did change the world, totally.”12 To do this means exiting the Anthropocene as an idea, and collectively—even if not equally—exiting the Eurocene as a failed epoch. I think we should relish Wynter’s invitation to consider other “genres of the human.”13 She explains she will not miss the Anthropos because, among so many others, she was never considered human to begin with. We should affirm her lack of nostalgia for the human. To invent a new species is the task that must be undertaken before there can be a “we,” an “our,” or a “cene” that is more than a requiem for the end.

Unfortunately, for those who want definitive answers, there is no theory provided in this book that puts everything in its right place, predicts the outcome of the next presidential election, or can save us from the now inevitable collapse and reorganization of planetary life. Instead, Savage Ecology is a speculative reflection on the depths, nay, fathoms of shit we are in as a community of species. I am certainly not alone in wanting to open up to the sheer magnitude of what confronts the planet. And yet I want to do so without losing sight of the real differences in politics, geography, history, meaning, and cosmology that modulate how each one of us will confront the end of this epoch. In so doing, I hope to emphasize a refrain throughout the book that the end of the world is never the end of everything. An apocalypse is always more and less than an extinction, and whatever makes a life out of the mess we are currently in will depend in some ways on how we come to understand the contemporary condition. Ideas matter even if they cannot save us. Stories, explanations, and philosophical adventures are, in my estimation, the best of what the human estate has to offer. No matter how desperate things get, someone will still ask why this is happening, and we will share in that question the possibility of thinking together. As Bill Connolly often says, “we are not unique; we are merely distinctive,” and that distinctiveness is connected to a sense of wonder—even when it is a dark wonder.14 I want to connect this sense of wonder to a plea for a feral reason. This is a renewed sense of adventure and creativity in pursuit only of itself. Feral is not a way out of all this but rather a way through.

#### But what does the affirmative do? How is the affirmative fair or educational? These questions should not and cannot be answered. Instead, we affirm debate as a site of failed scholarship. Defending a “topical” plan isn’t the solution to the problems inherent to the academy – instead, we embrace debate as a site of refuge and deviancy.

Grove ‘19 [Jairus Victor Grove; Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa; 2019; “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World”; Duke University Press; pp. 25-27] AK

In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. Affirming negativity, inspired by Achille Mbembe, is grounds for freedom, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake.

That the pursuit of knowledge without immediate application is so thoroughly useless, even profane, is a diagnosis of our current moment. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions.

What would failed scholarship do? Learn to die, learn to live, learn to listen, learn to be together, and learn to be generous. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. But how will these ideas seek extramural grants, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, or become a policy recommendation? They will not, and that is part of their virtue.

Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, I think we should get over the idea that somehow the U.S. project of liberal empire is conflicted, or “more right than it is wrong,” or pragmatically preferable to the alternatives. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. Demolition may be an affirmative act if it means insurgents and others can be better heard. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.”52 Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not crazy. Things really are as bad as we think.

If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred-year-old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about.

The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. We are, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, the deviants who should revel in what Harney and Moten have called the undercommons.53

#### Space-based tech is geopolitical by nature – it only exists to help the Global North and to provide an escape ticket for the wealthiest, leaving everyone else behind.

Klinger ‘19 [Julie Michelle Klinger; PhD, a geographer at the University of Delaware, formerly Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University; 3-20-2019; “Environmental Geopolitics and Outer Space”; Geopolitics; http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/03/Environmental-Geopolitics-and-Outer-Space.pdf; Accessed 4-9-2022] AK

Yet, the international scientific community has been unequivocal in its consensus that climate-induced disasters can be avoided if we implement appropriate policies supported by ongoing scientific research (IPCC 2014). Space-based technologies are crucial in this effort, but they can be selectively ignored if the data undermines the interests of power (Kreutzer et al. 2016). The 2017 decision by the White House to order NASA to stop collecting climate change and Earth observation data undermines the capacity of the US to formulate and implement science-based policy (Milman 2016; Thompson 2017). This complements a series of decisions by the same administration to accelerate greenhouse gas emissions through expanding fossil-based energy production while cutting public programs that maintain social resilience (Greshko, Parker, and Howard 2018). Implementing these policies undermines strategies for human survival, granting eschatological predictions a greater degree of likelihood (Latour 2015; Plumer and Popovich 2017; Sengupta 2018). This creates greater investment opportunities for those private space enterprises promising to provide an ‘exit strategy’ to paying customers with the means to escape a violent and ruined planet. Even if they never achieve lift-off, there are tremendous sums to be raised simply by allowing people to reserve a seat on a hypothetical voyage (Collard 1989; Farwell 2017; Harris 2009).

Examining the use of outer space-based technologies from the perspective of environmental geopolitics troubles simplistic characterizations of these technologies as either constructive or destructive. Setting aside the debate on the military uses of satellite technologies, it is possible to see this dual character of space-based and space-linked technologies with respect to Earthly environments and climate change. This preliminary survey of environmental geopolitics of outer space on Earth illustrates three primary valences of the concept. First, the territorial politics of space launch infrastructure construction – which share important characteristics with the creation of other sorts of sacrifice zones to construct prisons, military bases, and missile ranges – reinscribe existing spatial inequalities. Second, the differentially distributed environmental (in)justices that result from space launch emissions – whether through ozone depletion a hemisphere away, or soil and water contamination within a few kilometers of the launch site – ground even the most top-down efforts to achieve spaceflight in local struggles for livelihood security. Third, the selective use of space-based and space- linked technology to generate data can lead to the creation of policies and institutions that alter land use regimes for or against the survival of certain groups of humans. These three valences of environmental geopolitics of space on Earth are linked to outer space through multiscalar processes unfolding within and across our atmosphere.

#### Utilitarian calculus doesn’t account for the geopolitical structure of aggregate conceptions of the good – that makes it incapable of grappling with the causes of apocalypse.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Rather than see these two career trajectories as opposed, I think Crutzen’s thinking displays a continuous concern for the Northern Hemisphere and a particular cartography, rather than a geography, of human survival. Crutzen, as well as the concept of the Anthropocene itself, cannot escape preceding geopolitical conceptions of the Earth. Crutzen and others who rush so quickly to the necessity to transition efforts from climate abatement to climate modification are unsurprisingly not moved by claims that artificial cooling will likely cause droughts and famines in the tropics and subtropical zones of the global south; nor are they moved by how such plans may accelerate ocean acidification. The utilitarian risk calculus that favors the greatest good for the greatest number has no geographical or historical sensibility of how unequally aggregate conceptions of the good are distributed around the planet.

Global thinking, even in its scientific and seemingly universalist claims to an atmosphere that “we” all share, belies the geopolitics that enlivens scientific concern, as well as the global public policy agenda of geoengineering that seeks to act on behalf of it. Saving humanity as an aggregate, whether from nuclear war, Styrofoam, or climate turbulence, has never meant an egalitarian distribution of survivors and sacrifices. Instead, our new cosmopolitanism—the global environment—follows almost exactly the drawn lines, that is, the cartography or racialized and selective solidarities and zones of indifference that characterize economic development, the selective application of combat, and, before that, the zones of settlement and colonization. More than a result of contemporary white supremacy or lingering white privilege, the territorialization of who lives and who dies, who matters and who must be left behind for the sake of humanity, represents a five-hundred-year geopolitical tradition of conquest, colonization, extraction, and the martial forms of life that made them all possible through war and through more subtle and languid forms of organized killing.

I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others have called the longue durée, and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity.

Departing from Sloterdijk, I am hesitant to so easily locate modernity or explication as the root or cause of the global catastrophe. No single strategy, war, act of colonization, technological breakthrough, or worldview fully explains the apocalypse before us. However, there is something like what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call a refrain that holds the vast assemblage together, a geopolitical melody hummed along with the global expansion of a form of life characterized by homogenization rather than diversification. Accordingly, if we are to make some sense of such a vast world that is, even for Crutzen and Birks, “quite complex and difficult to model,” I think we must consider the particular refrain of geopolitics that is capable of, by scientific as well as more humbly embodied standards, destroying worlds along with the world. To eschew geopolitics simply because, as a refrain, it is too big, too grand, or too universal would ignore the conditions of possibility for nuclear weapons, power politics, and carbon-based globalization, and would greatly impoverish the explanatory capability of even the best climate models. So maybe it is not so strange that Crutzen and others’ attention to the nuclear threat of great powers has all but disappeared despite the fact that Russia and the United States still possess thousands of nuclear weapons, and as of late have been all too vocal about using them. Instead, the Anthropocene, as envisioned by Crutzen as a universal concern, requires with it a depoliticization of the causes of that concern.