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## 1

#### Interpretation: Affs may only generate offense from an action that makes the appropriation of outer space by private entities illegal.

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Outer space means anything above Earth’s Karman line

Dunnett 21 (Oliver Tristan, lecturer in geography at Queen’s University Belfast). Earth, Cosmos and Culture: Geographies of Outer Space in Britain, 1900–2020 (1st ed.). Routledge. 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780815356301> EE

In such ways, this book argues that Britain became a home to rich discourses of outer space, both feeding from and contributing to iconic achievements in space exploration, while also embracing the cosmos in imaginative and philosophical ways.2

INSERT FOOTNOTE 2

2 This book primarily uses the term ‘outer space’ to describe the realm beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, conventionally accepted as beginning at the Kármán line of 100km above sea level. Other terms such as ‘interplanetary space’, ‘interstellar space’, ‘cosmos’, and ‘the heavens’ are used in specific contexts.

END FOOTNOTE 2

Cognisant of this spatial context, a central aim is to demonstrate how contemporary geographical enquiry can provide specific and valuable perspectives from which to understand outer space. This is an argument that was initiated by Denis Cosgrove, and his critique of Alexander von Humboldt’s seminal work Cosmos helped to demonstrate geography’s special relevance to thinking about outer space.3 The key thematic areas which provide the interface for this book’s research, therefore, are the cultural, political and scientific understandings of outer space; the context of the United Kingdom since the start of the last century; and the geographical underpinnings of their relationship.

#### “Appropriation” means to take as property – prefer our definition since it’s contextual to space

Leon 18 (Amanda M., Associate, Caplin & Drysdale, JD UVA Law) "Mining for Meaning: An Examination of the Legality of Property Rights in Space Resources." Virginia Law Review, vol. 104, no. 3, May 2018, p. 497-547. HeinOnline.

Appropriation. The term "appropriation" also remains ambiguous. Webster's defines the verb "appropriate" as "to take to oneself in exclusion of others; to claim or use as by an exclusive or pre-eminent right; as, let no man appropriate a common benefit."16 5 Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary describes "appropriate" as an act "[t]o make a thing one's own; to make a thing the subject of property; to exercise dominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one's own proper use or pleasure."166 Oftentimes, appropriation refers to the setting aside of government funds, the taking of land for public purposes, or a tort of wrongfully taking another's property as one's own. The term appropriation is often used not only with respect to real property but also with water. According to U.S. case law, a person completes an appropriation of water by diversion of the water and an application of the water to beneficial use.167 This common use of the term "appropriation" with respect to water illustrates two key points: (1) the term applies to natural resources-e.g., water or minerals-not just real property, and (2) mining space resources and putting them to beneficial use-e.g., selling or manufacturing the mined resources could reasonably be interpreted as an "appropriation" of outer space. While the ordinary meaning of "appropriation" reasonably includes the taking of natural resources as well as land, whether the drafters and parties to the OST envisioned such a broad meaning of the term remains difficult to determine with any certainty. The prohibition against appropriation "by any other means" supports such a reading, though, by expanding the prohibition to other types not explicitly described.168

As illustrated by this analysis, considerable ambiguity remains after this ordinary-meaning analysis and thus, the question of Treaty obligations and property rights remains unresolved. In order to resolve these ambiguities, an analysis of preparatory materials, historical context, and state practice follows.

2. Preparatory Materials

A review of meeting reports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee regarding the Treaty reveals little to clear up the ambiguities of Articles I and II of the OST. In fact, the reports indicate that, despite several negotiating states expressing concern about the lack of clarity with respect to the meaning of "use" and the scope of the non-appropriation principle, no meaningful discussion occurred and no consensus was reached.16 9 Some commentators still conclude that the preparatory work does in fact confirm the drafters' intent for "use" to include exploitation. 170 These commentators do admit, however, that discussions of the term "exploitation" supporting their conclusion focused on remote sensing and communications satellites rather than on resource extraction.17 1 Further skepticism about such an intent for "use" to include "exploitation" also arises given the uncertainty amongst negotiating states about the meaning of these terms. A mere few months before the Treaty opened for signature in January 1967, negotiators were still asking questions about the meaning of "use" during the last few Legal Sub-Committee meetings. For example, in July 1966, the representative of France inquired: "Did the latter term ["use"] imply use for exploration purposes, such as the launching of satellites, or did it mean use in the sense of exploitation, which would involve far more complex issues?" 172 The representative noted that while some activities such as extraction of minerals were difficult to imagine presently, "[i]t was important for all States, and not only those engaged in space exploration, to know exactly what was meant by the term 'use.'173 In the same meeting, the representative from the USSR offered an interesting response to the question posed by the representative of France:

[A]dequate clarification was to be found in article II of the USSR draft, which specified that outer space and celestial bodies should not be subject to national appropriation by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. In other words no human activity on the moon or any other celestial body could be taken as justification for national appropriation. 174

This response implies that Article II acts as a qualification on Article I's broad provision for free exploration and use of outer space by all. Activity such as resource extraction would be viewed as national appropriation and such activity cannot be justified given Article II's prohibition, not even by falling within the ordinary meaning of "use." Despite this clarification, uncertainty appears to have remained, as lingering concerns were communicated in subsequent meetings by several other states, including Australia, Austria, and France."' Nevertheless, the committee put the Treaty in front of the General Assembly two months later without final resolution of the ambiguities regarding property rights arising from Articles I and II176 The preparatory materials ultimately fail to fully clarify the ambiguities of the meanings of "use" and "appropriation." The statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, one of the two main drafting parties, does, however, help push back on the interpretation of some academics that the nonappropriation principle fails to overcome the presumption of freedom of use.7

3. Historical Context

Two interrelated, major historical events cannot be ignored when considering the meaning of the OST: (1) the Cold War and (2) the Space Race. The success of Sputnik I in 1957 showed space travel and exploration no longer to be a dream, but a reality.7 While exciting, this news also brought fear in light of the world's fragile balance of power and tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. 17 9 What if the Soviet Union managed to launch a nuclear weapon into space? What if the United States greedily claimed the Moon as the fifty-first state? To many, the combination of the Cold War and Space Race made the late 1950s and the 1960s a perilous time.so When viewed as a response to this perilous era, the OST begins to look much more like a nuclear arms treaty and an attempt to ease Cold War tensions than a treaty concerned with the issue of property rights in space."' The Treaty's emphasis on "peaceful purposes" supports this contextual interpretation. 1 82

On the one hand, as many suggest, this context leads to the conclusion that the vague nonappropriation principle of Article II does not prevent private property rights in space resources and the presumption of broad "use" prevails.1 83 Private property rights were simply not a concern of the Treaty drafters and therefore, the Treaty does not address-nor prohibit-such claims. On the other hand, the context surrounding the treaty's drafting does not necessarily lead to this conclusion. In fact, the emphasis on "peaceful purposes" and reducing international tension might instead suggest a stricter reading of Articles I and II. If things were so unstable and tense on Earth, the drafters may have instead intended Article II as a qualification on the general right to explore and use outer space in Article I, recognizing the simple fact that disputes over property, both land and minerals, have sparked some of history's bloodiest conflicts.

The Antarctic treaty experience evidences Cold War concern over potential resource rights disputes. Leading up to the finalization of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,184 seven nations had already made official territorial claims over varying portions of the frozen landscape in hopes of laying claim to the plethora of resources thought to be located within the subsurface."' Although the Treaty itself did not directly address rights to mineral resources in the Antarctic,186 the treaty is interpreted to have frozen these claims in the interest of "[f]reedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end.""' In a manner notably similar to the terms of Articles XI and XII of the OST, the Treaty promotes scientific exploration by encouraging information sharing of scientific program plans, personnel, and observations' and inspection of stations on a reciprocal basis.189 This Treaty along with several later treaties and protocols constitute the "Antarctic Treaty System," which as a whole manages the governance of Antarctica.1 9 0 In 1991, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 91 ("Madrid Protocol") settled the question of property rights for the fifty years following the Protocol's entry into force. 192 The Madrid Protocol provides for "the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment ... [and] designate[s] Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science."193 Article 7 explicitly-and simplystates "[a]ny activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited."1 94 Though Article 25 allows for the creation of a binding legal regime to determine whether and under what conditions mineral resource activity be allowed, no such international legal regime has been created to date. 195 The ban on mineral resource exploitation may only be amended by unanimous consent of the parties. 19 6 The United States signed and ratified both the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Madrid Protocol. 197

The freezing of territorial claims in the Antarctic 98 by the Antarctica Treaty of 1959199 illustrates the existence of true concern over potential resource dispute and conflict during the Cold War, in addition to the major concerns posed by nuclear weapons.2 00 The drafting states also recognized the potential for conflict over property in outer space and drew on the language of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 to draft the OST.2 01 Given these driving concerns, Article II could be reasonably read as qualifying Article I's general rule. Under this reading, Article II serves the same qualifying purpose as Article IV regarding military and nuclear weapon use in space. Some might push back on this interpretation by claiming that the drafters could have used language such as that in the Madrid Protocol to explicitly prohibit mining in space. However, this argument is flawed. The Madrid Protocol was not written until well after both the original Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the OST. Furthermore, the timing of the Madrid Protocol perhaps provides further evidence that resources in space are not to be harvested until a subsequent agreement regarding rights over them can be agreed upon internationally. While the historical context does leave some ambiguity as to whether the OST permits property rights over space resources, the Antarctic experience provides a compelling analogy and suggests that the OST does not allow for property rights in space resources.

4. State Practice

In its Frequently Asked Questions released about the SREU Act, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology forcefully asserted that the Act does not violate international law.20 2 in fact, according to the committee, the Act's provision of property rights "is affirmed by State practice and by the U.S. State Department in [c]ongressional testimony and written correspondence."2 03 Proponents of this view base their beliefs on several examples. One, "no serious objection" arose to the United States and the Soviet Union bringing samples of rocks and other materials from the Moon back by manned and robotic missions in the late 1960s, nor to Japan successfully collecting a small asteroid sample in 2010.204 Two, a practice of respecting ownership over such retrieved samples and a terrestrial market for such items exists, as illustrated by the fact that no one doubts that the American Museum of Natural History "owns" three asteroids found in Greenland by arctic explorer Robert E. Peary that are now part of the museum's Arthur Ross Hall of Meteorites. 205 Three, Congressmen also cite to a federal district court case, United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material,2 06 to illustrate state practice in favor of ownership over spaces resources. The case involved an Apollo lunar sample gifted to Honduras by the United States. The sample was stolen and sold to an individual in the United States.2 07 When caught during a sting operation intended to uncover illegal sales of imposter samples, the buyer was forced to forfeit the lunar sample after the court concluded the moon rocks had in fact been stolen, basing its decision in part on its recognition of Honduras having national property ownership over the sample. 208

These examples appear overwhelming, but they are not actually examples of activities of the same "form and content" that the SREU Act approves. 2 09 These examples all involve collection of samples in limited amounts and for scientific purposes, while the SREU Act approves large-scale collection and for commercial exploitation. The OST explicitly emphasizes a "freedom of scientific investigation in outer space," and the collection of scientific samples reasonably fall under this enumerated right. 2 10 Alternatively, the OST says nothing with respect to commercial exploitation, only discussing "benefits" of space in terms of sharing those benefits with all mankind.211 Furthermore, the American Museum of Natural History and Lucite Ball examples relied upon are misleading because they suggest that types of celestial artifacts found or gifted on Earth are subject to the same legal regime as resources mined or collected in space, which may not necessarily be true. The analogy of ownership over fish extracted from the high seas is also often cited in response to this pushback. Much like outer space, the high seas are open to all participants, yet the law of the seas still recognizes the right to title over fish extracted on the high seas by fishermen, who can then sell the fish.212 But again, this analogy has limited import because both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") explicitly recognize the right to fish, while the OST grants no such right to exploit space resources. 2 1 3

Furthermore, state practice relevant to the question of property rights under the OST goes beyond these examples and analogies of ownership of resources taken from commons. State practice regarding property rights in general must be considered. For example, Professor Fabio Tronchetti disagrees with the oft-cited notion that state practice affirms the SREU Act.2 14 According to the professor, "under international law, property rights require a superior authority, a State, entitled to attribute and enforce them." 2 15 By granting property rights in the SREU Act, the United States impliedly claims that it has the authority to confer property rights over space resources-an authority traditionally reserved for the owner of a resource. This notion clashes with the nonappropriation principles of the OST. Though there is no consensus regarding whether the nonappropriation principle prohibits claims of sovereignty over resources, a strong consensus at least exists that the principle prohibits states from claiming sovereignty over real property in space.216 In some traditional systems of mineral ownership, however, ownership over resources ran with ownership over land.217 For example, under Roman law, property rights over subsurface minerals belonged to the landowner. 2 18 Thus, if the United States cannot have title in space lands under the nonappropriation principle, it cannot have title to the space resources in those lands either. Without title to the resources, the United States cannot bestow such title to its citizens under traditional international property law; by claiming that it can bestow such title, the United States is abrogating Article II of the OST. One could also argue that the in situ resources the Act grants rights in are actually still part of the celestial bodies; thus, the resources are real property prior to their removal, and are off limits under the Treaty.2 19 Given the limited import of the cited examples of state practice (limited quantity and scientific versus large-scale and commercial), the traditional practice of property rights being conferred from a sovereign to a citizen become incredibly compelling and suggest the SREU Act may abrogate the United States' treaty obligations.

A final piece of evidence, however, again inserts ambiguity into the interpretation: the sweeping rejection of the Moon Agreement and its limitations on property rights by the international community discussed supra Part JJJ.A.2. On the one hand, the rejection may imply that the international community approved of property rights. On the other hand, however, there were other reasons for the sweeping rejection. For example, Professors Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen claim the "main area of controversy"2 2 0 actually surrounded the Agreement's proclamation of the Moon and celestial bodies and their natural resources as the "common heritage of mankind" in Article 11.1,221 rather than the Agreement's general property-right provisions. Many believed the invocation of the "common heritage of mankind" language would impart actual obligations upon parties to share extracted resources, whereas the "province of all mankind" and "for the benefit and interest of all" language of the OST did not.222 As with ordinary meaning, preparatory materials, and historical context, state practice leaves some ambiguities and state interpretations should also be considered.

5. State Interpretations

Much like the preparatory materials discussed supra Part IV.A.1, subsequent state interpretation of the OST fails to fully address the question of the legality of property rights in space resources. On the one hand, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations found that the drafters intended Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty to be general in nature when reviewing the Treaty,223 which perhaps suggests Article II's nonappropriation principle does not qualify Article I's general right to use or act as an exception. Yet, the committee also found the Treaty to be in response to the "potential for international competition and conflict in outer space." 2 24 To the committee, Articles I, II, and III stressed the importance of free scientific investigation, guaranteed free access to all areas of celestial bodies, and prohibited claims of sovereignty.225 Not only would property rights in natural resources potentially ignite and exacerbate conflict in space, but they also seemed somewhat incompatible with scientific investigation, free access, and the prohibition on sovereignty. During its hearing on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations focused a majority of its discussion of Article I on whether or not the language "province of all mankind" imparted strict obligations, while devoting little to no time to the issue of the meaning of "use." 22 6 Former Justice Arthur Goldberg, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, did note the goal of the article was to "cnot subject space to exclusive appropriation by any particular power." 227 Nevertheless, this statement fails to resolve whether natural resources may be exploited, as such exploitation could be carried out in an inclusive manner.

The committee's review of Article II consumes only eight lines of the hearing transcript, merely adding that the Article is complementary to Article I and that space cannot be claimed for the country (likely referring to land rather than resources).2 28 A different exchange between Ambassador Goldberg, Senator Lausche, and the Chairman leaves further ambiguity regarding the use of natural resources in space: Mr. Goldberg: We wanted to establish our right to explore and use outer space. Senator Lausche: Yes. That is, any one of the signatory nations shall have the right to the use of whatever might be found in one of the space bodies. Mr. Goldberg: No, no. It doesn't mean that. It means that they shall be free on their own to explore outer space. The Chairman: Or to use it. Mr. Goldberg: To use it. The Chairman: But not on an exclusive basis. Mr. Goldberg: Everyone is free.229

At first, Ambassador Goldberg appears to have refuted the notion that a signatory could simply "use" anything found in one of the space bodies, such as a mineral, implying Senator Lausche's example exceeded the scope of Article I. He then went on to emphasize exploratory activities. But then, Ambassador Goldberg backtracked and reasserted the right to use without clarifying his initial qualification.

This sense of ambiguity remains today despite Congress signing off on the SREU Act. While sponsors of the bill and statements from resource extraction companies emphasized the broad scope of the right to "use" outer space and state practice in support of the legality of 230 property rights, several expert witnesses expressed genuine concern that obligations under the Treaty remain unclear and require additional analysis.231

B. Compatibility

Employing the treaty interpretation tools of ordinary meaning, preparatory materials, historical context, state practice, and state interpretation offers many possible understandings of the obligations imparted by Articles I and II of the OST. For example, while the ordinary meaning of "use" could reasonably include the exploitation of materials, the meeting summaries of the Fifth Session of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Sub-Committee make clear that no consensus was ever reached regarding whether "use" includes large-scale exploitation of space resources, let alone fee-simple ownership and the ability to sell commercially. State practice dealing with extraterrestrial samples also sheds little light on the confusion, as the examples cited all deal instead with scientific samples of limited quantity. The international community's rejection of the Moon Agreement also fails to bring clarity. While on the one hand the rejection could be read as a rejection of the idea that the OST prohibits private property rights, it could also be read as a rejection of the common heritage of mankind doctrine. Finally, the prospect of privateventure space mining and extraterrestrial resource extraction remained far off and futuristic at the time of the Treaty's negotiation, making drawing legal conclusions about the legality of these revolutionary activities extremely difficult.

Overall, however, the Treaty's structure and its purposes (preserving peace and avoiding international conflict in outer space) ultimately indicate that private property rights in space resources are prohibited by Article II's non-appropriation principle, at least until future international delegation determines otherwise (like in the Antarctic). The Treaty's structure confirms this interpretation. Article I lays down a general rule for activity in space. Subsequent articles of the Treaty then lay out more specific requirements of and qualifications to this general rule. Much like Article IV restricts the use of nuclear weapons in space, Article II restricts the use of space in ways that might result in potentially controversial property claims. Historically, claims to mineral rights have resulted in just as contentious conflict as those over sovereign lands. Treaty efforts to avoid conflicts in Antarctica and the high seas reflect similar sentiments. The Soviet Union's representative even hinted at this structural relationship between Articles I and II during Treaty S1 232 negotiations.22 In light of the imminent need to ease Cold War tensions, the potential for conflict over property, and the final structure of the Treaty, this Note concludes that the large-scale extraction of space resources is incompatible with the non-appropriation principle of Article II of the OST.23 3 As a result, the United States' provision of property rights to its citizens to possess, own, transport, use, and sell space and asteroid resources extracted through the SREU Act contravenes its international obligations established by the OST.

#### Private entity = majority nonstate

Warners 20 (Bill, JD Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School) "Patents 254 Miles up: Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station." UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2020, p. 365-380. HeinOnline.

To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS IGA must add an additional clause ("Clause 7") in Article 21 specifically establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7 would define the term "private entity" as an individual, organization, or business which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates. Specifically defining the term "private entity" prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under the agreement and the difference between "public" and "private."99 This definition would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to "Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization." 100 A succinct definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA pushes out Partner State influence. 101 Some in the international community may still point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization. However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have operated in space almostas comprehensively as national organizations. 102

#### Violation: They don’t defend a private entity or the appropriation of something and are not doing a policy action – don’t let them shift in the 1AR because cx proves they aren’t topical

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness – post facto topic adjustment and debates about scholarship breed reactionary generics and allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months – this crushes clash because all neg prep is based on the rez as a stable stasis point and they create a structural disincentive to do research – we lose 90% of negative ground while the aff still gets the perm which makes being neg impossible.

#### 2] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

#### 3] TVA solves – you can read an aff about how the colonization of space represents reproductive futurism since it is backed by motives to keep on keeping people alive

#### Disads to the TVA prove there’s negative ground and that it’s a contestable stasis point, and if their critique is incompatible with the topic reading it on the neg solves and is better because it promotes switch-side debate

#### Winning pessimism doesn’t answer T because only through the process of clash can they refine their defense of it—they need an explanation of why we switch sides and why there’s a winner and loser under their model

#### D] Fairness is an impact – [1] it’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made [2] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews [3] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education [4] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

#### No rvis or impact turns—it’s their burden to prove their topical. Beating back T doesn’t prove their advocacy is good

## 2

#### Text – తెలుగులో సమ్మెలను రద్దు చేయండి

#### The 1AC’s semiotic coherence within the world is sutured through a western model of scriptocentrism that is exclusionary and violent towards black and brown bodies

Conquergood 1, Dwight. Cultural struggles: Performance, ethnography, praxis. University of Michigan Press, 2013. (a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University)//Elmer

In even stronger terms, Raymond Williams challenged the class-based arrogance of scriptocentrism, pointing to the “error” and “delusion” of “highly educated” people who are “so driven in on their reading” that “they fail to notice that there are other forms of skilled, intelligent, creative activity” such as “theatre” and “active politics.” Tis error “resembles that of the narrow reformer who supposes that farm labourers and village crafsmen were once uneducated, merely because they could not read.” He argued that “the contempt” for performance and practical activity, “which is always latent in the highly literate, is a mark of the observer’s limits, not those of the activities themselves” (Williams 1983, 309). Williams critiqued scholars for limiting their sources to written materials; I agree with Burke that scholarship is so skewed toward texts that even when researchers do attend to extralinguistic human action and embodied events they construe them as texts to be read. According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., **green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders**—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including **the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects"** (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). **The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined.** Transcrip- tion is not a **transparent or politically innocent model for** conceptualizing or **engaging the world**. The root metaphor of the text underpins the **supremacy of Western knowledge systems** by **erasing** the vast realm of human **knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered,** "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage **cannot speak at all? Or**, under greater or lesser duress, **opt not to** do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

#### Linguistic scriptocentrism manifests itself into debates competitive nature of language fluency

**DeShields 18**, Inte'a, A. DeShields. Spitfire: Framing White Rage in Response to Black Rhetoric. Diss. University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 2018. //Elmer

**A performance that is highly stylized and reflective of all the components a debater strives to present in competition— a well-organized, compelling set of arguments and evidence that work within the set of rules that govern what is most desirable in a competitive debater. Paroske (2011) suggests that for debaters, language acquisition of the debate style and language is essential to be taken seriously by the debate community, of fellow debaters, coaches, and judges. He posits that language acquisition ensures that only those willing to adopt the new language system become experienced debaters (p. 191). He goes on to explain, that part of the nature of competitive debate is the restriction of what can or cannot be said within the linguistic rules of framing an argument. This process then, in the framework of EoP, may limits the extent to which observation of a participants’ identity as it relates to whom they are outside of the confines of the technical, jargon laden, physically restrictive, debate performance.** The possible limitation of at least observing the poetics of performance, in observation and analysis of debate may be that “agency in a debater’s use of unmarked patterns is used to establish identification and mark identity as a skilled debater “while strategy for political and moral devices may call for the use of marked patterns.” **A debater may be reluctant to utilize marked [linguistic] patterns for fear of judgment that may result in a loss and the subsequent mark of being identified as deviant to the linguistic norms of debate. Paroske, cites Bourdieu (1984 and 1986) and Dimock (2009) to explain the phenomenological function of language and social capital as it relates to the language of debate. To be successful in debate by most standards entails “forcing all thoughts into the official language” (Paroske, 2011, p. 192) [thereby] restricting what can be said. To progress further in the ranks, language fluency is an almost nonnegotiable skill.** The acquisition of and adroit use of debate language and stylistics means a debater uses the language of debate which, in its form as representative of pedagogical ideology, social capital, and politically loaded arguments, a debater strategically chooses which part of her or his pedagogically political linguistic identity will achieve a win. **However, the choice of language will most always be presented in the form of standardized, unmarked English. This strategic act of using unmarked language, limiting a representation of a linguistic identity additional to that of a debater, is likely to be limited in this framework which may also limit the variability of the observable poetics of the performance given that debaters, aside from individual characteristics of voice, strategically utilize a set a rules of jargon that are most likely to garner a win**. There was a time 81 when debate was seen as a game in which the best performance of high academic discourse wins. The idea of high academic discourse reiterates a political inclination toward a standard of whiteness that goes unmarked in the language of debate and thereby making any varied use of language not strategic to an argument or evidence potentially marked as deviant and low academic discourse. For Bauman, performance is meant to highlight an “artful use of language in the conduct of social life-in kinship, politics, economics, and religion-...” rendering performance “socially constitutive and efficacious, not secondary and derivative.” **The stylistic expectations of ICFD [debate] may prove to be a limiting factor in the number of African American participants that use marked varieties of English in competition given that research by Rogers (1996) “reveals a majority of male debaters express the view that minorities are “deficient in the skills necessary for success within the open ranks due to some cultural ‘flaw’ linked to emotion, cognitive process and/or verbal ability**” (Hill, 1998, p. 18). Those who choose to participate and progress through the ranks have in some way mastered the language stylistics and expectations of debate. Many African Americans will even change their communication styles in order to disprove [stereotype] expectations and be successful in forensics competition (Hill, 1998). In this view, the language of debate may prove limiting in its originality of speeches, which, in the case of policy debate, are often, part of a debate teams’ case arguments constructed for them and used throughout a year of competition and language conformity is celebrated and rewarded. For African American debaters the pressure to acquire and efficaciously employ the language of debate is high. Bauman acknowledges the politics present in the utilization of this frame and the issues in the act of such control and the social issues of power that may arise from its application. As an answer to the possible problems that may arise Bauman offers factors of consideration in moving along in the research process are; access, legitimacy, competence, and values. The interrelations of dimensions of analysis provide the following theory developed by Bucholtz and Hall as a boarding point for a more pragmatic performer-centered approach to data collection and analysis of the sociocultural interaction of language and identities of African American ICFD participants. Bucholtz and Hall (2003) view performance from the frame of Hymes and Bauman as well as, performativity from the frame of Austin and Butler (see above) as intelligible concepts in the development of their approach to the study of language and identity and language interaction. Performance in both senses involves stylization, the highlighting and exaggeration of 83 ideological associations (Bucholtz and Hall, 2003). They go on to explain, that [p]performance is therefore a way to bring identities to the fore, often in subversive or resistant ways (Bauman & Briggs, 1990, p. 381) 22 and look to Hymes (1975) Bauman (1978), Bauman and Briggs (1990), and Briggs (1998), who viewed performance as more than a “mere reiteration of an underlying textual structure that was traditionally taken to be primary” (p. 587) but demonstrated that performance is instead emergent in the course of its unfolding in specific encounters as a spring board for developing a framework that sees identity as an emergent phenomenon of social interaction and culture. African Americans, Intercollegiate Competitive Debate, and Language Students across the life span of education experience a system that celebrates standardized English while home varieties have historically faced a stream of efforts to “iron out,” “white-wash,” correct, fix, make proper, and de-culturalize the speech patterns of various linguistic cultural backgrounds. Black English and its speakers have experienced the pressures and stigmatization throughout the course of American history. Black English(es) have been the root of contentious debates in public forums; from the abolitionist movement (Dick, 1973), throughout the Civil Rights and the 22 Pagliai and Farr (2000) 84 Black of Arts Movements, to the Ann Harbor School District Decision of 1979 and Oakland, California Ebonics resolution of 1997, to recent literature centered on race and language politics (Alim & Smitherman, 2012). No aspect of the Black American experience can be explored without consideration of language, culture and identity, and the subsequent intersections. Researchers have begun trying to discover what it is about the activity that turns women and minorities away? (Stepps & Gardner, 2001). The leading perspective stems from the belief of cultural/social bias represented in the demographics of participants, coaches, judges, and forensics and debate program directors. Research on the perspective of women, primarily white women, in pursuing and competing in debate is available at length; however, ethnic minorities, namely African Americans have not been an area of in depth consideration. Loge (1991) and Hill (1998) pursued penetrating the topic of African Americans in collegiate forensics and debate. Other studies have highlighted the numbers of African Americans in debate in lump with women who out number ethnic minorities considerably. These same studies focus on gender related issues in debate and effectively establish evidence of gender bias in language and rewarded delivery style. Loges (1990) recognized the disparity and began to record and quantify the 85 reasons why African American students participate in debate. In a survey of 64 schools “only 22 reported having black debaters on the team…a total of only 40 black debaters, of whom 22 were novice, 10 junior varsity and only 8 varsity.” Even more telling, “only nine schools reported that their black debaters won speaker awards and only two schools reported that their black debaters frequently reached the elimination rounds of large tournaments” (p. 80). **Under-represented debaters must participate in a debate structure and culture formed by the dominant group of white coaches and debaters (Stepps & Gardner, 2001; Stepp, 1997; Loge, 1990). They must also participate and meet the linguistic stylistic satisfaction of judges that reflect the latter population. It is here, in the realm of coaching, competing, and being judged, both in and outside of the activity, that there lies a point of contention that raised the sands of discord in reaction to Black rhetoric by white media. Competitors in ICFD enter the activity fully aware of the language component but minority students quickly find themselves to be few in numbers. This activity allows for a competitive edge that rests in large part, on the effective use of standardized American English or the status quo of American speech. The status quo, however, represents a recycling of ideologies that reflect high value on the skillful use of standardized American English that is steeped in race and class bias.** In consideration of the bias that rests as the foundation of standardized American English it is necessary to investigate the inextricably linked role of language identity and subsequent language attitudes as it relates to these students’ experiences in competing with a language that may not be culturally their own

#### The NC embodies the oppressor and weaponizes language to rupture debate – we defend radical mimicry – doing what Larpers do, except in Spanish. This is what the 1ar needs to find solvency defacits to --

**Conquergood 2**, Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research, Dwight Conquergood, TDR (1988-) Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 145-156 (12 pages) Published by: [The MIT Press](https://www.jstor.org/publisher/mitpress) SJDH

Geertz's now classic depiction of the turn toward texts in ethnography and cultural studies needs to be juxtaposed with Zora Neal Hurston's much earlier and more complex rendering of a researcher reading the texts of subordinate others: The theory behind our tactics: "The white man is always trying to know into somebody else's business. All right, I'll set something outside the door of my mind for him to play with and handle. He can read my writ- ing but he sho' can't read my mind. I'll put this play toy in his hand, and he will seize it and go away. Then I'll say my say and sing my song." ([I935] I990:3) Hurston foregrounds the terrain of struggle, the field of power relations on which texts are written, exchanged, and read. Whereas Geertz does not problematize the ethnographer's will-to-know or access to the texts of others, Hurston is sensitive to the reluctance of the subordinate classes "to reveal that which the soul lives by" (2) because they understand from experience the ocular politics that links the powers to see, to search, and to seize. **Aware of the white man's drive to objectify, control, and grasp as a way of knowing, subordinate people cunningly set a text, a decoy, outside the door to lure him away from "homeplace" where subjugated but empowering truths and survival secrets are sheltered** (hooks 1990). In Hurston's brilliant example, vulnerable people actually redeploy the written text as a tactic of evasion and camouflage, performatively turning and tripping the textual fetish against the white person's will-to-know. "So driven in on his reading," as Williams would say, he is blinded by the texts he compulsively seizes: "knowing so little about us, he doesn't know what he is missing" (Hurston [1935] 1990:2). Once provided with something that he can "handle," "seize," in a word, apprehend, he will go away and then space can be cleared for performed truths that remain beyond his reach**: "then I'll say my say and sing my song." By mimicking the reifying textualism of dominant knowledge regimes, subordinate people can deflect its invasive power. This mimicry of textualism is a complex example of "mimetic excess" in which the susceptibility of dominant images, forms, and technologies of power to subversive doublings holds the potential for undermining the power of that which is mimed** (Taussig I993:254-55). Note that in Hurston's account, subordinate people read and write, as well as perform. **With her beautiful example of how a text can perform subversive work, she disrupts any simplistic dichotomy that would align texts with domination and performance with liberation**. In Hurston's example, **the white man researcher is a fool not because he values literacy, but because he valorized it to the exclusion of other media, other modes of knowing.** I want to be very clear about this point: textocentrism-not texts-is the problem. The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as subjugated modes of in- quiry. From her ethnographic fieldwork in the coal camps and "hollers" of West Virginia, Kathleen Stewart documents an especially vivid example of text- performance entanglements: how official signs and local performances play off and with each other in surprising and delightful ways. After a dog bit a neighbor's child, there was much talk and worry throughout the camp about liability and lawsuits: Finally Lacy Forest announced that he had heard that "by law" if you had a NO TRESPASSING sign on your porch you couldn't be sued. So ev- eryone went to the store in Beckley to get the official kind of sign. Neighbors brought back multiple copies and put them up for those too old or sick or poor to get out and get their own. Then everyone called everyone else to explain that the sign did not mean them. In the end, every porch and fence (except for those of the isolated shameless who don't care) had a bright NO TRESPASSING, KEEP OFF sign, and people visited together, sitting underneath the NO TRESPASSING signs, looking out. (1996:141; see also Conquergood I997)4 Through the power of reframing, social performances reclaim, short-circuit, and resignify the citational force of the signed imperatives. Moreover, Ngugi wa Thiong'o's concept of "orature" complicates any easy **separation between speech and writing, performance and print, and reminds us how these channels of communication constantly overlap, penetrate, and mutually produce one another** (1998). The **performance studies project makes its most radical intervention, I believe, by embracing both written scholarship and creative work, papers and performances. We challenge the hegemony of the text best by reconfiguring texts and performances in horizontal, metonymic tension, not by replacing one hierarchy with another, the romance of performance for the authority of the text. The "liminal-norm" that Jon McKenzie identifies as the calling card of performance studies (2001:41) manifests itself most powerfully in the struggle to live betwixt and between theory and theatricality, paradigms and practices, critical reflection and creative accomplishment. Performance studies brings this rare hybridity into the academy, a commingling of analytical and artistic ways of knowing that unsettles the institutional organization of knowledge and disciplines.** The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as sub- jugated modes of inquiry. There is an emergent genre of performance studies scholarship that epitomizes this text-performance hybridity. A number of performance studies-allied scholars create performances as a supplement to, not substitute for, their written research. These performance pieces stand alongside and in metonymic tension with published research. The creative works are developed for multiple professional rea- sons: they deepen experiential and participatory engagement with materials both for the researcher and her audience; they provide a dynamic and rhetorically compelling alternative to conference papers; they offer a more accessible and engaging format for sharing research and reaching communities outside academia; they are a strategy for staging interventions. To borrow Amanda Kemp's apt phrase, they use "performance both as a way of knowing and as a way of showing" (I998: I6). To add another layer to the enfolding convolutions of text and performance, several of these performance pieces have now been written up and published in scholarly journals and books (see Conquergood 1988; Becker, McCall, and Morris 1989; McCall and Becker I990; Paget I990; Pollock 1990; Jackson 1993, 1998; Allen and Garner 1995; Laughlin 1995; Wellin 1996; Jones 1997; Kemp I998). Performance studies is uniquely suited for the challenge of braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing. We can think through performance along three crisscrossing lines of activity and analysis. We can think of performance (I) as a work of imagination, as an object of study; (2) as a pragmatics of inquiry (both as model and method), as an optic and operator of research; (3) as a tactics of intervention, an alternative space of struggle. Speaking from my home department at Northwestern, we often refer to the three a's of performance studies: artistry, analysis, activism. Or to change the alliteration, a commitment to the three c's of performance studies: creativity, critique, citizenship (civic strug- gles for social justice). We struggle to forge a unique and unifying mission around the triangulations of these three pivot points: I. Accomplishment-the making of art and remaking of culture; creativity; embodiment; artistic process and form; knowledge that comes from doing, par- ticipatory understanding, practical consciousness, performing as a way of knowing. 2. Analysis-the interpretation of art and culture; critical reflection; thinking about, through, and with performance; performance as a lens that illuminates the constructed creative, contingent, collaborative dimensions of human com- munication; knowledge that comes from contemplation and comparison; concentrated attention and contextualization as a way of knowing. 3. Articulation-activism, outreach, connection to community; applications and interventions; action research; projects that reach outside the academy and are rooted in an ethic of reciprocity and exchange; knowledge that is tested by practice within a community; social commitment, collaboration, and contri- bution/intervention as a way of knowing: praxis. Notwithstanding the many calls for embracing theory and practice, universities typically institutionalize a hierarchical division of labor between scholars/re- searchers and artists/practitioners. For example, the creative artists in the Department of Fine Arts are separated from the "serious" scholars in the Department of Art History. Even when scholars and practitioners are housed within the same department, there often is internal differentiation and tracking, e.g., the literarytheorists and critics are marked off from those who teach creative and expository writing. This configuration mirrors an entrenched social hierarchy of value based on the fundamental division between intellectual labor and manual labor. In the academy, the position of the artist/practitioner is comparable to people in the larger society who work with their hands, who make things, and who are valued less than the scholars/theorists who work with their minds and are comparable to the more privileged professional-managerial class. Indeed, sometimes one of the reasons for forming schools of fine and performing arts is to protect artists/ practitioners from tenure and promotion committees dominated by the more institutionally powerful scholar/researchers who do not know how to appraise a record of artistic accomplishment as commensurate with traditional criteria of scholarly research and publication. The segregation of faculty and students who make art and perform from those who think about and study art and performance is based on a false dichotomy that represses the critical-intellectual component of any artistic work, and the imaginative-creative dimension of scholarship that makes a difference. A spurious, counterproductive, and mutually denigrating opposition is put into play that pits so-called "mere technique, studio skills, know- how" against so-called "arid knowledge, abstract theory, sterile scholarship." This unfortunate schism is based on gross reductionism and ignorance of "how the other half lives." Students are cheated and disciplines diminished by this academic apartheid. **The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and making, concep- tualizing and creating. A performance studies agenda should collapse this divide and revitalize the connections between artistic accomplishment, analysis, and articulations with communities; between practical knowledge (knowing how), propositional knowledge (knowing that), and political savvy (knowing who, when, and where).** This epistemological connection between creativity, critique, and civic engage- ment is mutually replenishing, and pedagogically powerful. Very bright, talented students are attracted to programs that combine intellectual rigor with artistic excellence that is critically engaged, where they do not have to banish their artistic spirit in order to become a critical thinker, or repress their intellectual self or political passion to explore their artistic side. Particularly at the PhD level, original scholarship in culture and the arts is enhanced, complemented, and complicated in deeply meaningful ways by the participatory understanding and community involvement of the researcher. This experiential and engaged model of inquiry is coextensive with the participant-observation methods of ethnographic research. The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and mak- ing, conceptualizing and creating. The division of labor between theory and practice, abstraction and embodiment, is an arbitrary and rigged choice, and, like all binarisms, it is booby-trapped. It's a Faustian bargain. If we go the one-way street of abstraction, then we cut ourselves off from the nourishing ground ofparticipatory experience. If we go the one-way street of practice, then we drive ourselves into an isolated cul-de-sac, a practitioner's workshop or artist's colony. Our radical move is to turn, and return, insistently, to the crossroads.

## 3

#### Counterplan text: we endorse the entirety of the aff minus their use of narratives. To clarify, using personal narratives is bad.

#### We endorse the content of thehir message but we rejec ttheir uses of narratives as a means to express it.

#### Narratives are violent – they force the judge to compare between different people’s experiences and stories, which requires the judge to quantify lived experiences and suffering which causes oppression olympics and violence when someone is told that their narratives are not good enough

## 4

#### Their idea that by hacking the resolution and debate they can challenge capitalist capture is false. Capitalism thrives on that narrative of “escape”. Disrupting a logic or social system cannot solve, boring analysis of structures is necessary.

Bluhdorn 07 – (May 2007, Ingolfur, PhD, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology, University of Bath, “Self-description, Self-deception, Simulation: A Systems-theoretical Perspective on Contemporary Discourses of Radical Change,” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1–20, May 2007, google scholar)

Yet the **established patterns of self-construction, which** thus **have to be defended and** further **developed** at any price, **have fundamental problems** attached to them: ﬁrstly, **the attempt to constitute, on the basis of** product choices and acts of **consumption, a Self and identity** that are **distinct from and autonomous vis-a`-vis the market is a contradiction in terms**. Secondly, **late-modern society’s established patterns of consumption are known to be socially exclusive and environmentally destructive**. Despite all hopes for ecological modernization and revolutionary improvements in resource efﬁciency (e.g. Weizsa¨cker et al., 1998; Hawkenet al., 1999; Lomborg, 2001), **physical environmental limits imply that the lifestyles and established patterns of consumption** cherished by advanced modern societies **cannot even be extended to all residents of the richest countries**, let alone to the populations of the developing world. For the sake of the (re)construction of an ever elusive Self, **in their struggle against self-referentiality** and in pursuit of the regeneration of difference, **late-modern societies are** thus **locked into the imperative of maintaining** and further developing the principle of **exclusion** (Blu¨hdorn, 2002, 2003). At any price they have to, and indeed do, defend **a lifestyle that requires ever increasing social inequality, environmental degradation, predatory resource wars, and the tight policing of potential internal and external enemies**.14 For this effort, **military and surveillance technology provide ever more sophisticated and efﬁcient means**. Nevertheless, the principle of **exclusion is ultimately still unsustainable, not only because of spiralling ‘security’ expenses but also because it** directly **contradicts the** modernist **notion of the free and autonomous individual** that late-modern society desperately aims to sustain. For this reason, late-modern society is confronted with the task of having to sustain both the late-modern principle of exclusion as well as its opposite, i.e. the modernist principle of inclusion. Very importantly, the conﬂict between the principles of exclusion and inclusion is not simply one between different individuals, political actors or sections of society. Instead, it is a politically irresolvable conﬂict that resides right within the late-modern individual, the late-modern economy and late-modern politics. And if, as Touraine notes, late-modern society no longer believes in nor even desires political transcendence, the particular challenge is that the two principles can also no longer be attributed to different dimensions of time, i.e. the former to the present, and the latter to some future society. Instead, late-modern society needs to represent and reproduce itself and its opposite at the same time. If considered **within this framework** of this analysis, the function of Luhmann’s system of protest communication, or in the terms of this article, **the signiﬁcance of** late-modern societies’ **discourses of radical change becomes immediately evident**. **At a stage when the possibility** and desirability **of transcending** the principle of **exclusion has been pulled into** radical **doubt but when**, at the same time, the principle of **inclusion is vitally important**, **these discourses simulate the validity of the latter as a social ideal**. In other words, **latemodern society reconciles the tension between the** cherished but exclusive **status quo** – for which there is no alternative – **and the non-existent** inclusive **alternative** – on whose existence it depends – **by means of simulation**. The analysis of Luhmann’s work has demonstrated how the societal self-descriptions produced by the system of protest communication, or late-modern society’s discourses of radical change, fulﬁl this function exactly. **They are** an **indispensable** function system not so much because they help to resolve late-modern society’s problems of mal-coordination, but because by performing the possibility of the alternative they help to cope with the fundamental problem of self-referentiality. In this sense, late-modern society’s discourses of sustainability, democratic renewal, social inclusion or global justice, to name but a few, suggest that advanced modern society is working towards an environmentally and socially inclusive alternative – genuinely modern – society, but they do not deny the fact that the big utopia and project of late-modern society is the reproduction and further enhancement of the status quo, i.e. the sustainability of the principle of exclusion. Protest movements as networks of physical actors and actions complement the purely communicative **discourses of radical change** in that they bring their narrative and societal selfdescription to life. Whilst the declarations of institutionalized mainstream politics cannot escape the generalized suspicion that they are purely rhetorical, social movements **provide an arena for** the physical expression and **experience of the authenticity and reality of the alternative**

#### Their model of queer activism through transgression replicates neoliberalism by refusing the promise of collective transformation

Drucker 15 [Peter Drucker (Peter has emerged in the 21st century as a leading Marxist scholar in queer studies. His special contributions concern the roots of 'homonormativity' in neoliberalism, the impact of neoliberal globalization on same-sex sexualities in dependent countries, and links between queer and anti-capitalist resistance. He is also working on a series of studies on gender and sexual dimensions of Islamophobia, in both Europe and the Middle East. Finally, he continues his long-term work on the history of US and European socialism, connecting it to the left's record on feminist and LGBTIQ issues.); 2015; “Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism”; <https://books.google.com/books?id=_ByoBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA301> //BWSWJ]

As long as alliances with broader forces of the anti-capitalist left remain few and limited, radical queer activists face the task themselves of working out positions for queer anti-capitalist politics and translating them into public organ-ising and activism. Self-identified radical queer groups have existed, at least intermittently, for the past quarter-century, as a `punky, anti-assimilationist, transgressive movement on the fringe of lesbian and gay culture',7' and a milieu that is 'disgusted by marriage and military and that longs to return' to a radical vision.72 Politically, a wave of Queer Nation groups, following on the 1987 March on Washington and the rise of ACT UP, originated in the us as part of the largest and most militant wave of LGBT activism since the 197os. The different forms of AIDS activism and queer activism that emerged initially in the us and Britain in the late 198os and early 199os posed a radical challenge to established lesbian/gay rights organisations. Self-defined queer activist groups have also appeared more recently in a number of countries in continental Europe. The Pink Panthers in Paris and Lisbon73 have forged a dynamic, Latin European variant of international queer radicalism. Queer-identified groups are also beginning to spring up here and there in dependent countries. But queer radicals' ability to contend for influence in LGBT movements or to set the agenda of sexual politics more generally has been held in check by a number of factors. Queer radicalism emerged in an overall context of societal reaction, in which LGBT militancy was largely isolated from and unsupported by its logical allies. This led to some disturbing ambiguities. Queer ideology has been hard to pin down. In the imperialist countries that have so far been radical queers' main base, the predominant ideological current among them has been a fairly diffuse anarchism. Queer groups have yet to show much of an orientation towards large-scale mobilisation, to take root among the racially and nationally oppressed, or to prove their lasting adaptability to the dependent world.74 While large anti-capitalist parties have rarely made links with Queer radicalism, queer radicals have rarely found their way to a broad political audience. In this sense, the limits of anti-capitalist parties and of small radical queer groups mirror each other. The early Queer Nation groups reflected a certain break in the movement's memory. Although many of the practical stands and philosophical or theoretical points they made had originally been made by an earlier generation of the lesbian/gay liberation movement, young queers were often unaware of this. The emergence of Queer Nation as a distinctive, insurgent current thus showed the failure of lesbian/gay liberation to transmit its history, to make its values prevail in actually existing LGBT communities, or to sustain a vibrant left wing in the LGBT movement. By comparison with early lesbian/gay liberationists, early Queer Nation groups had an even more voluntarist or even idealist mind-set. They tended to see queer identity as consciously chosen and crafted. Many LGBT identities have in fact had a voluntary dimension. In some cases, this has distinguished LGBT oppression from oppression based on race, gender or disability, which are generally not chosen but visible, material and unavoidable. But this is only one aspect of LGBT oppression. The fact that women living apart from men have lower living standards is not chosen; the fact that even the most closeted LGBT people could for generations lose their jobs or homes was not chosen; the fact that the great majority of LGBT people still grow up in straight families is not chosen. Many trans people, however well they fit into a queer milieu as 'gender queers, also do not feel that they have chosen their identities. As early as 1992, failure to tackle trans issues effectively in Queer Nation San Francisco led to the formation of a separate Transgender Nation, though overall the queer milieu proved more supportive than lesbian/gay and feminist milieus had been in the 1970s. The intersex community, which began organising politically with the founding in 1993 of the Intersex Society of North America,75 seems less easy to include under a queer umbrella, largely because intersex people usually have no choice at all about being intersex. Despite its implicit and increasingly explicit opposition to neoliberalism, queer radicalism has also had an ambivalent relationship to the commercial gay scene. It has resisted the assimilationism that it sees the commercial scene as promoting. But a whole series of Queer Nation actions in the 199os focused on invading shopping malls and modifying logos on t-shirts — a tac-tic that risked replacing critiques of consumerism with alternative forms of consumption.76 This contrasted with more frontal rejections of consumerism that were also present in queer direct action groups, like the chant We're here, we're queer, we're not going shopping!' used by ACT UP San Francisco a few years earlier. The sexual radicalism of queer politics has had a complex and contradic-tory relationship to the realities of gender, race and class. Initially, ACT UP reflected the manifest need to respond to AIDS with 'a new kind of alliance politics ...across the dividing lines of race and gender, class and national-ity, citizenship and sexual orientation'.77 Yet queer activism has sometimes obscured rather than highlighted these realities, with an exclusive focus on sex that can erase its intersections with gender, class and race. This erasure can be facilitated by queer politics' slippage from radical anti-separatism to one more form of identity politics, which can rest on 'an unspoken appeal' to a white middle-class model.78 For women in particular, the emphasis on sexual agency that has always been central to queer, while avoiding seeing women exclusively as victims, risks divorcing 'pleasure and sexuality ... from the social structures that organize them'.79 Although the name Queer Nation and its angry separatist spirit were reminiscent of Lesbian Nation, only 20 percent of the original group was lesbian. Its lesbian, working-class and black members began reproaching it early on for being oblivious to their concerns.80 Barbara Smith complained that for Queer Nation 'racism, sexual oppression and economic exploitation [did] not qualify' as queer issues.81 Queer politics in the late 198os and early 1990s largely failed to appeal to alternative scenes and identities rooted among people of colour and women; a number of Queer Nation groups split amid charges of racism and sexism. Nor did the queer contingents and groups that emerged within or joined in the global justice movement, particularly after the 1999 Seattle protests — a promising component of the queer left — succeed to any great extent in linking up with or contributing to shaping alternative queer identities. Clearly there is no straightforward correlation between queer radicalism and working-class politics as such. On the contrary, LGBT working people and particularly non-whites have sometimes reacted against queer radicalism when it demanded visibility of them that would make their lives more difficult in their communities, families or unions. The problem arises when the alternative to assimilation or homonormativity is defined not as organised resistance in forms compatible with long-term survival, but as 'transgression' or 'freedom from norms. This implies the exclusion of those who are 'positioned as not free in the same way'.82 Even when queer anti-capitalists work inside existing queer radical groups, they need to put forward a distinctive approach that challenges the limitations of these groups' politics. Resisting the retreat from class in LGBT activism, queer anti-capitalists should challenge not only heterosexism among straights and gay normality, but also blanket hostility to straights and non-queer-iden-tified gays where it exists among some self-identified queers. When directed against gay men, this hostility risks selectively reproducing traditional homophobic stereotypes of gays as privileged and powerful: images that are seduc-tive in a time of rising homonormativity, but problematic if they do not reflect the ongoing reality of gay oppression. Avoiding all these pitfalls will require seeking new tactics and forms of organising within queer groups.

#### The aff’s rejection of the specific details of political engagement is not radical but continues the prevailing mode of leftist cynicism that eviscerates our ability to construct alternatives to political domination

Burgum ‘15 (Samuel, PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Warwick and has been conducting research with Occupy London since 2012, “The branding of the left: between spectacle and passivity in an era of cynicism,” *Journal for Cultural Research*, Volume 19, Issue 3)

Rather than the Situationist spectacle, then, I argue that the reason those on the left are rendered post-politically impotent to bring about change is not because we are deceived, but because we enact apathy despite ourselves. In other words, the relationship between the resistive subject and ideology is not one of false consciousness, but one of cynicism: we are not misdirected by shallow spectacles, but instead somehow distracted by our cynical belief that we are being “distracted”. In this section, I begin by outlining the concept of cynicism as it has been theorised by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek. This then leads us to an analysis of the cynical position adopted by Brand’s critics, which I argue actually demonstrates more political problems on the part of the left than those suggested by Brand himself. For Sloterdijk, cynicism is an attitude that emerges right at the centre of the enlightenment project, where, in contrast to a modernist illumination of truth, “a twilight arises, a deep ambivalence” (1987, p. 22). Rather than the promised heightened consciousness of science that would allow us to see the hidden essential truths behind appearances, the very conception of truth as unconcealedness (aletheia)3 instead creates a widespread mistrust and suspicion of every appearance. Subsequently, “a new form of realism bursts forth, a form that is driven by the fear of becoming deceived or overpowered … everything that appears to us could be a deceptive manoeuvre of an overpowering evil enemy” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 330). The surface becomes suspect and the subject therefore retreats from all appearances: judging them to be spectacles that are seeking to oppress through falsity. The result is cynicism. Subsequently, this leads Sloterdijk to his well-known paradoxical definition of cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness” which he describes as a “modernized, unhappy consciousness on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain … it has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, probably was not able to, put them into practice” (1987, p. 5). In other words, in the search for a higher consciousness behind appearances, the subject is paradoxically “duped” by their very suspicion of being duped. Furthermore, because the subject thinks they “know” that appearances are just a mask, they disbelieve the truth when it does appear. Like the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, they fancy themselves to know what is right in front of their eyes (that the emperor is nude and vulnerable) yet they choose “not to know” and don’t act upon it (they still act as if the emperor is all-powerful). As such, cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular hidden interest hidden behind the ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it. (Žižek, 1989, p. 23) The audience to the parade of power can see that the emperor is not divine – just a fragile human body like the rest of us – yet they cynically choose not to know and objectively retain his aura. They congratulate themselves on “knowing” that Brand is a trivial spectacle, yet they choose to remain apathetic towards his calls for action. As such, the dismissive reaction to Brand reveals a regressive interpassive tendency of the left to subjectively treat ourselves as “enlightened” to authentic politics and yet objectively render ourselves passive. In a kind of defence mechanism, the left believes that it can avoid becoming the dupe of the latest fashion or advertising trend by treating everything as a matter of fashion and advertising, reassuring ourselves as we flip through television channels or browse through the shopping mall that at least we know what’s really going on. (Stanley, 2007, p. 399) The critics disbelieve Brand, distrusting his motives and seeing him as inauthentic, yet they continue to “believe” objectively in their own marginalisation. As such, the cynical left believe they are dismissing shallow spectacle in the direction of a stronger authentic radicalism, yet what their “doing believes” is the maintenance of their apathetic position. More precisely, it maintains the attitudes of left melancholy and anti-populism. The problem of “left melancholy” points towards the forever-delayed search for authenticity on the part of a cynical left that is in mourning. Coined by Walter Benjamin (1998), the concept points towards “the revolutionary who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present” (Brown, 1999, p. 19). Suffering from a history of defeat and embarrassment, the left persist in a narcissistic identification with failure, fetishising the “good old days” and remaining faithful to lost causes. As Benjamin himself points out, the cynical kernel of this attitude is clear, as “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge … but in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead objects in its consumption in order to redeem them” (1998, p. 157). In other words, the sentiment is a deliberate self-sabotage that takes place even before politics proper has a chance to begin or “the paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates the loss of the object” (Žižek, 2001, p. 146). This then leads us to the second problem of leftist cynicism: anti-populism. As a result of melancholia, the left has developed the bad habit of prejudging all instances of popular radical expression (such as Brand’s) as necessarily flawed. However, to return to Dean again, she points out that this aversion to being popular and successful is a defining feature of a contemporary left, who prefer to adopt an “authentic” underdog position in advance than take risks towards political power. As she argues, “we” on the left see “ourselves” as “always morally correct but never politically responsible” (Dean, 2009, p. 6) prepositioned as righteous victims and proud political losers from the outset. What this cynicism towards instances of popular radicalism ultimately means, therefore, is that any concern for authenticity is ultimately a regressive one, a defence mechanism for a left that “as long as it sees itself as defeated victims, can refrain from having to admit is short on ideas” (Dean, 2009, p. 5). Such an attitude means never risking potential failure and residing in the safety of marginal righteousness. It is the contention here, therefore, that both melancholia and anti-populism can be seen in the cynical reaction to Brand’s radicalism. Somewhat ironically, Brand (2013) even recognised these problems himself when he wrote in his New Statesman piece that the right seeks converts while the left seeks traitors … this moral superiority that is peculiar to the left is a great impediment towards momentum … for an ideology that is defined by inclusiveness, socialism has become in practice quite exclusive. Automatically, then, the left denounce Brand and self-proclaimed “radical left-wing thinkers and organisers” bitterly complain how he is getting so much attention for the arguments they have been making for years (for example, Park & Nastasia, 2013). The left maintain distance and label Brand trivial, yet such a distance only renders these critiques even more marginal and prevents them from becoming popular, effective or counter-hegemonic. As Žižek has pointed out, the political issue of cynicism is “not that people ‘do not know what they want’ but rather that cynical resignation prevents them from acting upon it, with the result that a weird gap opens up between what people think and how they act”, adding that “today’s post-political silent majority is not stupid, but it is cynical and resigned” (2011, p. 390). In terms of Brand, this blanket cynical melancholy is typical of the left’s distrust of anything popular, rendering them “like the last men” whose “immediate reaction to idealism is mocking cynicism” (Winlow & Hall, 2012, p. 13). Proponents of a radical alternative immediately adopt caution with the effect of forever delaying change, holding out for that real and authentic (unbranded) struggle and therefore denying it indefinitely.

#### The alternative is to theorize through Marxist Materialism – only collective action focused on a unified front can produce a queer anti-capitalism

Drucker 11 [Peter Drucker; “The Fracturing of LGBT Identities under Neoliberal Capitalism”; Historical Materialism 19.4 (2011) 3–32; <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1000.69&rep=rep1&type=pdf> //BWSWJ]

Recognising the deep roots of the fracturing of same-sex identities necessarily puts in question any universalism that ignores class, gender, sexual, cultural, racial/ethnic and other differences within LGBT communities. These communities and identities are being fractured in large part by fundamental changes in the productive and reproductive order of gendered capitalism. Young queers, working-class and poor LGBTs, transgendered people and other marginalised groups have increasingly found themselves in objectively different situations from people in the consolidating gay mainstream. It is thus no surprise that they have tended to some extent to define distinct identities. The forms taken by alternative, non-homonormative sexual identities do not necessarily win them easy acceptance among feminists or socialists. The lesbian/gay identity that emerged by the 1970s had much to commend it from the broad-Left’s point of view (once the Left had largely overcome its initial homophobia). By contrast, transgendered and other queers can raise the hackles of many on the Left, since their sexuality strikes many as at variance with the mores to be expected and hoped for in an egalitarian, peaceful, rational future. One may doubt, however, whether any sexuality existing under capitalism can serve as a model for sexualities to be forecast or desired under socialism. Nor is it useful to privilege any particular existing form of sexuality in present-day struggles for sexual liberation. Socialists’ aim should not be to replace the traditional ‘hierarchical system of sexual value’85 with a new hierarchy of our own. As Amber Hollibaugh pointed out many years ago, sexual history has first of all to be ‘able to talk realistically about what people are sexually’.86 And in radical struggles over sexuality, as in radical struggles over production, the basic imperative is to welcome and stimulate self-organisation and resistance by people subjected to exploitation, exclusion, marginalisation or oppression, in the forms that oppressed people’s own experience proves to be most effective. This is not to say that Marxists should simply adopt a liberal attitude of unthinking approval of sexual diversity in general, in a spirit of ‘anything goes’. Our central concern must be to advance the sexual liberation of the working class and its allies, who today include straights, LGBs and – particularly among its most oppressed layers – transgendered and other queers. Resisting the retreat from class in LGBT activism and queer studies, Marxists should combat heterosexism and bourgeois hegemony among straights, homonormativity and bourgeois hegemony among LGBs, and blanket hostility to straights and non-queer-identified gays where it exists among self-identified queers. This will require seeking new tactics and forms of organising within LGBT movements. The post-Stonewall lesbian/gay movement waged an effective fight against discrimination and won many victories on the basis of an identity widely shared by those engaged in same-sex erotic or emotional relationships. But this classic lesbian/gay identity has not been the only basis in history for movements for sexual emancipation. In the German homophile-struggle from 1897 to 1933, for example, Magnus Hirschfeld’s Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, the wing of the movement closer to the social-democratic Left, tended to put forward polarised ‘third sex’-theories.87 This is what one might predict on the basis of the evidence that egalitarian gay identities were at first primarily a middle-class phenomenon, while transgender and gender-polarised patterns persisted longer in the working class and among the poor.88 Today in the dependent world as well, transgender identities seem to be more common among the less prosperous and less Westernised.89 Rather than privileging same-sex sexualities more common among the less oppressed, however superficially egalitarian, the Left should be particularly supportive of those same-sex sexualities more common among the most oppressed, however polarised. Another important consideration is the challenge that alternative, nonhomonormative sexualities can sometimes pose to the reification of sexual desire that the categories of lesbian, gay, bisexual and straight embody. Marxists question the fantasy of consumers under neoliberalism that obtaining the ‘right’ commodities will define them as unique individuals and secure their happiness; we should not uncritically accept an ideology that defines individuals and their happiness on the basis of a quest for a partner of the ‘right’ gender.90 How will LGBT communities and movements be structured in a time of increasingly divergent identities? Self-defined queer activist-groups, which emerged initially in the US and Britain in the early 1990s, have also appeared in recent years in a number of countries in continental Europe. They pose a radical challenge to mainstream lesbian/gay organisations, although they have yet to show much of an orientation towards large-scale mobilisation, to take root among the racially and nationally oppressed, or to prove their adaptability to the dependent world.91 In countries where civil rights and same-sex marriage have been won, the process of seeking new horizons and finding appropriate forms of organising seems likely to be a prolonged one – especially since the LGBT social and political landscape seems likely to remain more fragmented and conflict-ridden than it was in the immediate post-Stonewall period. While lesbian/gay identity has lost the central place it occupied in the LGBT world of the 1970s and ’80s, it is still far from marginalised; on the contrary, the new homonormativity shows no signs of succumbing to queer assaults in the foreseeable future. In the dependent world particularly, the diversity of LGBT communities has resulted in an alliance-model of organising as an alternative or a supplement to the model of a single, broad, unified organisation. The broadest possible unity across different identities remains desirable in basic fights against violence, criminalisation and discrimination as well as more ambitious struggles for equality, for example in parenting. On other issues, LGBT rights can be best defended by working and demanding space within broader movements, such as trade-unions, the women’s movement and the global justice movement.92 At the same time, an alliance-model has in some cases facilitated the process of negotiating unity among constituencies – such as transgendered people on the one hand and lesbian/gay people on the other93 – who are unlikely to feel fully included in any one unitary structure. It can constitute a united front between those whose identities fit the basic parameters of the gay-straight divide and those whose identities do not, fostering the development of a truly queer conception of sexuality that, in Gloria Wekker’s words, is ‘multiple, malleable, dynamic, and possessing male and female elements’.94 In a more visionary perspective, developing an inclusive, queer conception of sexuality can be seen as a way to move towards that ‘truly free civilization’ that Herbert Marcuse described a half-century ago in Eros and Civilization, in which ‘all laws are self-given by the individuals’, the values of ‘play and display’ triumph over those of ‘productiveness and performance’, the entire human personality is eroticised, and the ‘instinctual substance’ of ‘the perversions . . . may well express itself in other forms’.95

## Case

### Framework

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### A] Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### B] Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### Ballot paradox – either they don’t care about winning and you should vote negative, or they want to win which proves that debate is competitive, and fairness is an impact

#### Their forwarding of the resolution solely to evidence its violent qualities is an affective investment in the violent norms of debate that they’ve critiqued---turning the case.

Lundberg 12 – Dr. Christian Lundberg, Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies and Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina, PhD in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, MA in Divinity from Emory University, BA from the University of Redlands, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, p. 174-177

Thus, "as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!" At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a *relation of address* the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students' call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire.

Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gerard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the "hysteric ... cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own .... [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge .... [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition-being put under pressure to answer a question.T'" Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes nanling in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation betweenjouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics. On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One's Demands The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. "Danger" functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors' imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand's rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus's interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state's love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject's marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state's actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the "politics of policy and public debate.":" Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of "theory" and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state's refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal "no." Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds, Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: "demand in itself ... is demand of a presence or of an absence ... pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied."46

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Extinction outweighs – magnitude, irreversibility, uncertainty.

MacAskill 14 [William MacAskill, Associate Professor in Philosophy and Research Fellow at the Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford, “Normative Uncertainty,” 2014, University of Oxford PhD Thesis, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.677.4121&rep=rep1&type=pdf]

However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. 188 On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the future, given that we don’t go extinct anytime soon, would be 2×10^14. 189 So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction.

Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date.

Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have.

### ToP

#### 1] One day I was in an airport as a 10 year old child and the TSA conducted “random” security checks on both of my parents – I spent 2 hours apart from both of them and wandered off – it took them 6 hours to find me again. We’ve been the subject of random security checks almost every time we’ve been to an airport since. This is offense under their model.

#### 2] The ROB is To Vote for the better debater: anything else is arbitrary and self serving which is a voter for fairness because its impossible to predict – just because the ballot can create norms doesn’t mean their norm is good.

#### 3] Forced inclusivity – terrible model – it creates an oppression Olympics between different debaters – i.e. the brown debate community and the black debate community shouldn’t be forced to compete over who’s more oppressed.

#### 4] Inclusion first is false – prefer fairness – their aff doesn’t actually have a spillover effect which means it’s the only impact u solve. 5] A] Not the case – assumes ur winning a theory of power or the ontology debate but the 1ac has no ink on that. B] Programs exist – i.e. mentorship projects and resources for trans debaters that prevent violence in the space.

#### Queerness as ontology is ahistorical.

Norton 8, LQBT Historian, 2008 (Rictor, “Against Queer Theory,” <http://rictornorton.co.uk/theoroea.htm)//Elmer>

Queer theorists often assert that "Exclusive homosexuality is a conceptually necessary marginalia to any notion of compulsory heterosexuality. It is the culturally necessary "other", it exists as a site of resistance in the power relationships which produce both itself and heterosexuality." This sounds very fine and theoretical, but I don't think this has ever been true. The psycho/sociological position that the "self" creates the "other" in order to define itself might be true in a general sort of way, but exactly how this works in relation to "the homosexual" is problematical. The view that heterosexual people define themselves in relation to queer people is a theoretical assertion without historical evidence. Although George Chauncey in Gay New York (1994) claims that "in its policing of the gay subculture the dominant culture sought above all to police its own boundaries", in fact his whole book is ample testimony to the fact that the vast majority of ordinary people were either indifferent to or merely curious about queers. Most of the policing he cites had hardly any effect upon queers, much less upon straights. The vast majority of ordinary people in the past (and even today) were either indifferent to or merely curious about queers: they certainly did not require them to create their own sexual identities. In the case of women, there are physiological realities such as menstruation and pregnancy which many have used as a basis for defining their sexuality without having recourse to the existence of lesbians in order to define themselves. Court records and the early medical literature demonstrate time and time again that the existence of queers comes as a great revelation to most people, most of whom had never heard of such things, and not even thought about the possibility of such things. Straight society for most of history would know hardly anything about queer society were it not for occasional scandals exposed by newspapers and courts — and yet they managed to live happily (or unhappily) married lives and have families without such knowledge of "the other". In fact, **rather than exploit** the "other"-defining potential of queer scandals, the **authorities** often **attempted to hush** them up when they realize how many people, some prominent, will be implicated in them. The "policing of the boundaries" consists mainly of sporadic crackdowns on vice when it threatens to get out of hand or to tarnish the public image of a city when it prepares to sponsor international athletic games or fairs. Throughout history queer people and subcultures have been actively hidden from view so as not to jeopardize the definition of normal people and cultures. **Mechanisms of social control and structures of power have existed** quite happily throughout history **without** the **model of a strict** heterosexual/homosexual **dichotomy** or binary. The adult/child and male/female binaries, not to mention master/slave and class binaries, are quite sufficient power relationships for constructing heterosexuality without bringing in the concept of homosexuality. The simple-minded **notion** that **one must create homosexuals** in order **to have a boundary** which is integral for the construction of heterosexuals completely **ignores** the long **history of** the **suppression and censorship of knowledge** concerning the crimen nefandum or peccatum mutum, the mute sin. The legal practice in early eighteenth-century Amsterdam is typical of many periods and cultures: trials for sodomites were secret affairs; when sodomites were executed the trial documents were sometimes destroyed so that no record would remain; most sodomites were executed in secret, rather than in public, as with other criminals; sodomites who were imprisoned were kept hidden in solitary confinement in the cellars of prisons, and were not allowed to mix with other prisoners or to take part in prison labour. For example, Jan Jansz, convicted in 1741 at the age of seventeen, spent his remaining fifty-seven years alone in his cell, his existence virtually unknown except to modern scholars. How did Jan Jansz serve as a "negative example" to define or enforce normality?

#### Yes Reform - the US DOE’s decision in Chicago to teach about Queer History and the 2nd circuit court of appeals challenging Jeff Session’s sex discrimination prove progress possible – they have to win 100%, 1% they’re wrong dooms millions to death.

#### Homon-nationalism is too essentialist and cedes levers of power to the right.

Brown 12 Gavin Brown, Leicester Professor, 2012 “Homonormativity: A Metropolitan Concept that Denigrates “Ordinary” Gay Lives”, Journal of Homosexuality, 59.7, Taylor and Francis – BS //re-cut by Elmer

I recognize and accept that many of these changes (and their negative consequences) have occurred in specific contexts. That's where my problem with homonormativity lies. My problem with Homonormativity (the theory) rests on the fact that over the last decade, as this analysis has gained popularity, **homonormativity** (and, even worse, the homonormative) has increasingly come to be **represented** in both academic and activist writings **as** a **homogeneous**, global external entity that exists outside all of us and exerts its terrifying, normative power on gay lives everywhere. There is a parallel here with Latour's (2005 Latour, B. 2005. Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network theory, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ) critique of sociologists of the social who externalize society and ascribe all sorts of powers to the social without attending to the heterogeneous associations that effect transformations in the ways people relate to each other. Gibson-Graham (1996 Gibson-Graham, J.-K. 1996. The end of capitalism (as we knew it): A feminist critique of political economy, Oxford, UK: Blackwell. ) has argued in a similar vein about the negative consequences of theorizations that present capitalism or globalization as external, all-encompassing entities that exert their powerful, structuring influence over almost everything. For Gibson-Graham (2006 Gibson-Graham, J.-K. 2006. A post-capitalist politics, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. ) such forms of paranoid thinking always already know the answer before they begin any research investigation—nothing new is learned. More problematically, these all-encompassing representations have dangerous performative effects. First, they **overlook** how (far from being external to everyday life) these social relations—**capitalism, neoliberalism, homonormativity**—are **reproduced through** the **everyday practices** of millions of people. Second, by presenting capitalism (or homonormativity) as all-encompassing, such theorizations tend to overlook the many other practices that exist that foster alternative ways of relating. Together these approaches fail to adequately identify where change might happen and produce a representation of the world that appears as if change is too difficult to enact. This is my problem with Homonormativity—it has come to present homonormativity as all-encompassing and unassailable. I believe there are five key dangers in the way that this trend in how homonormativity has come to be understood and theorized. First, it overlooks the specific conditions in which homonormative policy discourses and practices occur and are (re)produced. Ten years on, too many discussions of homonormativity focus on policy initiatives developed at the national scale, and gay life as it is lived in the centers of major metropolitan global cities. Little work has yet been undertaken to examine how these discourses are translated into practice in other locations. Second, it overlooks the specific geographies of knowledge production about homonormativity. The development of theories of Homonormativity has primarily occurred in the same limited range of global cities that it studies – critical thought about homonormativity is largely the product of exactly the same spaces and social networks that it critiques. Stryker (2006 Stryker, S. 2006. “(De)subjugated knowledges: an introduction to transgender studies”. In The transgender studies reader, Edited by: Stryker, S. and Whittle, S. 1–17. London, UK: Routledge. ) suggests that queer studies can perpetuate homonormativity by privileging “homosexual ways of differing from heterosocial norms” (p. 7) to the detriment of trans people. Third, Homonormativity overlooks the lived experience of many lesbians and gay men outside of the metropolitan milieu in which these theoretical debates circulate. Fourth, it overlooks how the lives of those intellectuals and activists who are most vocal in critiquing homonormativity are complicit in the performative reproduction of these practices. The very presentation of homonormativity as all-encompassing, external force serves to strengthen it and overlooks how even the most self-consciously radical queer spaces can serve homonormative ends (Oswin, 2008 Oswin, N. 2008. Critical geographies and the uses of sexuality: deconstructing queer space. Progress in Human Geography, 32: 89–103.). I do not state this out of pessimism for the possibilities of overcoming homonormativity, but from a perspective that acknowledges that critical **queer scholars** and activists **need to be more reflexive** about their own complicity in reproducing form of privilege, if they are to help foster more just social relations. Finally, the **shift to** externalizing and globalizing **homonormativity** **leaves little space** for **seeing practices that operate outside** of, or counter to **its logics** (except the vanguardism of queer critique). In the rest of this commentary, I want to do two things: first, to suggest that queer critiques of homonormativity are frequently and problematically at odds with the lives and aspirations of many lesbians and gay men and second, to propose a corrective to strong theorizations of Homonormativity. THE POWER OF THE ORDINARY One of the problems with Homonormativity is that it **cedes too much power** and influence **to** **state and corporate actors**. Although extraordinary individuals have catalyzed key social and political changes in attitudes to lesbians and gay men over the last 40 years, the really profound changes in the people's intimate lives have been the result of the cumulative changes in the everyday practices of millions of people, gay and straight. To lead an openly gay life is now more mundane than transgressive. There are costs associated with these changes, and these are disproportionately carried by trans people and queers of color, however as Weeks (2007 Weeks, J. 2007. The world we have won, London, UK: Routledge.