# Jack Howe R5

## 1

#### Interp: The affirmative may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation of The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### Resolved means a legislative policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. ED

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### We’ve inserted a list of the 164 members of the WTO

WTO ND. Members and Observers. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/org6\_e.htm

Afghanistan — 29 July 2016 Albania — 8 September 2000 Angola — 23 November 1996 Antigua and Barbuda — 1 January 1995 Argentina — 1 January 1995 Armenia — 5 February 2003 Australia — 1 January 1995 Austria — 1 January 1995 B Bahrain, Kingdom of — 1 January 1995 Bangladesh — 1 January 1995 Barbados — 1 January 1995 Belgium — 1 January 1995 Belize — 1 January 1995 Benin — 22 February 1996 Bolivia, Plurinational State of — 12 September 1995 Botswana — 31 May 1995 Brazil — 1 January 1995 Brunei Darussalam — 1 January 1995 Bulgaria — 1 December 1996 Burkina Faso — 3 June 1995 Burundi — 23 July 1995 C Cabo Verde — 23 July 2008 Cambodia — 13 October 2004 Cameroon — 13 December 1995 Canada — 1 January 1995 Central African Republic — 31 May 1995 Chad — 19 October 1996 Chile — 1 January 1995 China — 11 December 2001 Colombia — 30 April 1995 Congo — 27 March 1997 Costa Rica — 1 January 1995 Côte d’Ivoire — 1 January 1995 Croatia — 30 November 2000 Cuba — 20 April 1995 Cyprus — 30 July 1995 Czech Republic — 1 January 1995 D Democratic Republic of the Congo — 1 January 1997 Denmark — 1 January 1995 Djibouti — 31 May 1995 Dominica — 1 January 1995 Dominican Republic — 9 March 1995 E Ecuador — 21 January 1996 Egypt — 30 June 1995 El Salvador — 7 May 1995 Estonia — 13 November 1999 Eswatini — 1 January 1995 European Union (formerly EC) — 1 January 1995 F Fiji — 14 January 1996 Finland — 1 January 1995 France — 1 January 1995 G Gabon — 1 January 1995 Gambia — 23 October 1996 Georgia — 14 June 2000 Germany — 1 January 1995 Ghana — 1 January 1995 Greece — 1 January 1995 Grenada — 22 February 1996 Guatemala — 21 July 1995 Guinea — 25 October 1995 Guinea-Bissau — 31 May 1995 Guyana — 1 January 1995 H Haiti — 30 January 1996 Honduras — 1 January 1995 Hong Kong, China — 1 January 1995 Hungary — 1 January 1995 I Iceland — 1 January 1995 India — 1 January 1995 Indonesia — 1 January 1995 Ireland — 1 January 1995 Israel — 21 April 1995 Italy — 1 January 1995 J Jamaica — 9 March 1995 Japan — 1 January 1995 Jordan — 11 April 2000 K Kazakhstan — 30 November 2015 Kenya — 1 January 1995 Korea, Republic of — 1 January 1995 Kuwait, the State of — 1 January 1995 Kyrgyz Republic — 20 December 1998 L Lao People’s Democratic Republic — 2 February 2013 Latvia — 10 February 1999 Lesotho — 31 May 1995 Liberia — 14 July 2016 Liechtenstein — 1 September 1995 Lithuania — 31 May 2001 Luxembourg — 1 January 1995 M Macao, China — 1 January 1995 Madagascar — 17 November 1995 Malawi — 31 May 1995 Malaysia — 1 January 1995 Maldives — 31 May 1995 Mali — 31 May 1995 Malta — 1 January 1995 Mauritania — 31 May 1995 Mauritius — 1 January 1995 Mexico — 1 January 1995 Moldova, Republic of — 26 July 2001 Mongolia — 29 January 1997 Montenegro — 29 April 2012 Morocco — 1 January 1995 Mozambique — 26 August 1995 Myanmar — 1 January 1995 N Namibia — 1 January 1995 Nepal — 23 April 2004 Netherlands — 1 January 1995 New Zealand — 1 January 1995 Nicaragua — 3 September 1995 Niger — 13 December 1996 Nigeria — 1 January 1995 North Macedonia — 4 April 2003 Norway — 1 January 1995 O Oman — 9 November 2000 P Pakistan — 1 January 1995 Panama — 6 September 1997 Papua New Guinea — 9 June 1996 Paraguay — 1 January 1995 Peru — 1 January 1995 Philippines — 1 January 1995 Poland — 1 July 1995 Portugal — 1 January 1995 Q Qatar — 13 January 1996 R Romania — 1 January 1995 Russian Federation — 22 August 2012 Rwanda — 22 May 1996 S Saint Kitts and Nevis — 21 February 1996 Saint Lucia — 1 January 1995 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines — 1 January 1995 Samoa — 10 May 2012 Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of — 11 December 2005 Senegal — 1 January 1995 Seychelles — 26 April 2015 Sierra Leone — 23 July 1995 Singapore — 1 January 1995 Slovak Republic — 1 January 1995 Slovenia — 30 July 1995 Solomon Islands — 26 July 1996 South Africa — 1 January 1995 Spain — 1 January 1995 Sri Lanka — 1 January 1995 Suriname — 1 January 1995 Sweden — 1 January 1995 Switzerland — 1 July 1995 T Chinese Taipei — 1 January 2002 Tajikistan — 2 March 2013 Tanzania — 1 January 1995 Thailand — 1 January 1995 Togo — 31 May 1995 Tonga — 27 July 2007 Trinidad and Tobago — 1 March 1995 Tunisia — 29 March 1995 Turkey — 26 March 1995 U Uganda — 1 January 1995 Ukraine — 16 May 2008 United Arab Emirates — 10 April 1996 United Kingdom — 1 January 1995 United States — 1 January 1995 Uruguay — 1 January 1995 V Vanuatu — 24 August 2012 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of — 1 January 1995 Viet Nam — 11 January 2007 Y Yemen — 26 June 2014 Z Zambia — 1 January 1995 Zimbabwe — 5 March 1995

#### Intellectual property protections

Yinan Wang.2012 HANDLING THE U.S.-CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTE – THE ROLE OF WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM. https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws\_etd/send\_file/send?accession=miami1336224534&disposition=inline

In short, intellectual property is “information with commercial value.”84 Primo Braga defines intellectual property rights as “a composite of ideas, inventions, and creative expressions and the public willingness to bestow the status of property on them.”85 The WTO has divided intellectual property rights into two broader areas—copyright and rights related to copyright; and industrial property. Copyright protects “[t]he rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films)… for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author.”86 Copyright also covers the rights of performers, such as singers, actors, and musicians, phonograms producers, and broadcasting organizations. Industrial property consists of trademarks (as well as service marks) and patents. Maskus defines trademark as “a symbol or other identifier that conveys information to the consumer about the product.”87 Trademark is the protection of distinctive signs which identify a product, company or service. If consumers believe that the mark is a reliable indicator of desirable characteristics of a good or service, they would be willing to pay a premium for the good or service. Related to trademarks is geographic indications, “which identify a good as originating in a place where a given characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin”.88 Other types of industrial property include primarily patents, but also industrial designs and trade secrets. According to Mertha, “[p]atents provide inventors with the right of exclusion from the use, production, sales, or import of the product or technology in question for a specified period of time”.89 Protection of these types of industrial properties is to “stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology.”90

#### Medicine

Google No Date [Google. “medicine”. No Date. Accessed 8/6/21. <https://www.google.com/search?q=medicines+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=medicines+&aqs=chrome.1.69i59l3j69i60.2379j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu]

the science or practice of the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease (in technical use often taken to exclude surgery).

**Violation: x**

#### [1] Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. It allows someone to specialize in one area 4 years giving an huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched clash.

#### [2] Clash---forfeiting government action sanctions retreat from controversy and forces the negative to concede solvency before winning a link -- clash is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale -- that jumpstarts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement. It’s also key to movement building—no critical testing means

#### [3] Fairness is an impact – [1] it’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made [2] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews [3] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education [4] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### [4] TVA – Read the aff on the neg as a counter methodology – solves their offense because they can engage in psychoanalysis. Defend an aff that claims that reducing IP rights destroys the WTO which is good under feminist psychoanalysis. Defend an aff that says that the member nations themselves implement the plan and not the WTO – solves their offense because their only link ev is about the WTO specifically, not its member nations

#### DTD – it’s key to norm set and deter future abuse

#### Competing interps – Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation – it also collapses since brightlines operate on an offense-defense paradigm

#### No RVIs – A – Encourages theory baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly B – its illogical for you to win for proving you were fair – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for other arguments

#### Evaluate the debate after the 1NC – key to let both of us sleep before the next round outweighs because health is a prerequisite to debating

## 2

#### The 1AC represents the individualist telos of liberal feminism – the turn to gender identity colludes with neoliberal austerity and disconnects itself from material struggles for economic justice.

Fraser ‘13

[Nancy, critical theorist, feminist, and the Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School in New York City. 10/14/2013. “How feminism became capitalism's handmaiden - and how to reclaim it.” <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/feminism-capitalist-handmaiden-neoliberal>] pat

In a cruel twist of fate, I fear that the movement for women's liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would explain how it came to pass that feminist ideas that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly expressed in individualist terms. Where feminists once criticised a society that promoted careerism, they now advise women to "lean in". A movement that once prioritised social solidarity now celebrates female entrepreneurs. A perspective that once valorised "care" and interdependence now encourages individual advancement and meritocracy.

What lies behind this shift is a sea-change in the character of capitalism. The state-managed capitalism of the postwar era has given way to a new form of capitalism – "disorganised", globalising, neoliberal. Second-wave feminism emerged as a critique of the first but has become the handmaiden of the second.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the movement for women's liberation pointed simultaneously to two different possible futures. In a first scenario, it prefigured a world in which gender emancipation went hand in hand with participatory democracy and social solidarity; in a second, it promised a new form of liberalism, able to grant women as well as men the goods of individual autonomy, increased choice, and meritocratic advancement. Second-wave feminism was in this sense ambivalent. Compatible with either of two different visions of society, it was susceptible to two different historical elaborations.

As I see it, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of the second, liberal-individualist scenario – but not because we were passive victims of neoliberal seductions. On the contrary, we ourselves contributed three important ideas to this development.

One contribution was our critique of the "family wage": the ideal of a male breadwinner-female homemaker family that was central to state-organised capitalism. Feminist criticism of that ideal now serves to legitimate "flexible capitalism". After all, this form of capitalism relies heavily on women's waged labour, especially low-waged work in service and manufacturing, performed not only by young single women but also by married women and women with children; not by only racialised women, but by women of virtually all nationalities and ethnicities. As women have poured into labour markets around the globe, state-organised capitalism's ideal of the family wage is being replaced by the newer, more modern norm – apparently sanctioned by feminism – of the two-earner family.

Never mind that the reality that underlies the new ideal is depressed wage levels, decreased job security, declining living standards, a steep rise in the number of hours worked for wages per household, exacerbation of the double shift – now often a triple or quadruple shift – and a rise in poverty, increasingly concentrated in female-headed households. Neoliberalism turns a sow's ear into a silk purse by elaborating a narrative of female empowerment. Invoking the feminist critique of the family wage to justify exploitation, it harnesses the dream of women's emancipation to the engine of capital accumulation.

Feminism has also made a second contribution to the neoliberal ethos. In the era of state-organised capitalism, we rightly criticised a constricted political vision that was so intently focused on class inequality that it could not see such "non-economic" injustices as domestic violence, sexual assault and reproductive oppression. Rejecting "economism" and politicising "the personal", feminists broadened the political agenda to challenge status hierarchies premised on cultural constructions of gender difference. The result should have been to expand the struggle for justice to encompass both culture and economics. But the actual result was a one-sided focus on "gender identity" at the expense of bread and butter issues. Worse still, the feminist turn to identity politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required redoubled attention to the critique of political economy.

Finally, feminism contributed a third idea to neoliberalism: the critique of welfare-state paternalism. Undeniably progressive in the era of state-organised capitalism, that critique has since converged with neoliberalism's war on "the nanny state" and its more recent cynical embrace of NGOs. A telling example is "microcredit", the programme of small bank loans to poor women in the global south. Cast as an empowering, bottom-up alternative to the top-down, bureaucratic red tape of state projects, microcredit is touted as the feminist antidote for women's poverty and subjection. What has been missed, however, is a disturbing coincidence: microcredit has burgeoned just as states have abandoned macro-structural efforts to fight poverty, efforts that small-scale lending cannot possibly replace. In this case too, then, a feminist idea has been recuperated by neoliberalism. A perspective aimed originally at democratising state power in order to empower citizens is now used to legitimise marketisation and state retrenchment.

In all these cases, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in favour of (neo)liberal individualism. But the other, solidaristic scenario may still be alive. The current crisis affords the chance to pick up its thread once more, reconnecting the dream of women's liberation with the vision of a solidary society. To that end, feminists need to break off our dangerous liaison with neoliberalism and reclaim our three "contributions" for our own ends.

First, we might break the spurious link between our critique of the family wage and flexible capitalism by militating for a form of life that de-centres waged work and valorises unwaged activities, including – but not only – carework. Second, we might disrupt the passage from our critique of economism to identity politics by integrating the struggle to transform a status order premised on masculinist cultural values with the struggle for economic justice. Finally, we might sever the bogus bond between our critique of bureaucracy and free-market fundamentalism by reclaiming the mantle of participatory democracy as a means of strengthening the public powers needed to constrain capital for the sake of justice.

#### The system’s terminally unsustainable, it’s the root cause of every impact, and attempting to save it only results in extinction and scapegoating violence.

**Robinson ’16** (William; 2016; professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara; Truthout; “Sadistic Capitalism: Six Urgent Matters for Humanity in Global Crisis”; robinson 16<http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis>)

In these mean streets of **globalized capitalism in crisis**, it has become profitable to **turn poverty** and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. **Escalating inequalities** fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a **stagnant global economy**, elites have managed to turn **war**, **structural violence** and **inequality** into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a **source of aesthetic pleasure**, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached **explosive dimensions**. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is **fast becoming systemic**. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a **descent into chaos** and uncertainty. 1) The level of **global** social polarization and **inequality is unprecedented** in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just **62 billionaires** -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the **top 1% owns more wealth** than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some **95 percent of the world's wealth**, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with **just 5 percent**. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the **new global social** **apartheid**. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the **downward mobility**, "precariatization," destabilization and **expulsion of majorities**. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class **cannot find productive outlets** to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to **stagnation in the world economy**. The signs ofan **impending depression** are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, **co-opting** some **into a hegemonic bloc** and **repressing the rest**. Alongside the spread of frightening **new systems of social control** and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that **depoliticize through consumerist fantasies** and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the **manipulation of fear** and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward **scapegoated communities**. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the **structural destabilization** of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism **hinges on** such manipulation of **social anxiety** at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality **requires extreme violence** and repression that lend to projects of **21st century fascism**. 2) The system is **fast reaching** the **ecological limits** to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as **nine** crucial "**planetary boundaries**." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- **climate change**, the **nitrogen cycle** and **diversity loss**. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and **fundamentally altering the earth** system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have **transformed** up to half of **the world's surface**. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that **undermines the conditions for life**. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "**No** other **creature has ever managed this** ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to **determine the course of life** long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated **commodification of nature**, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "**Green capitalism" appears** as **an oxymoron**, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the **concentrated control over** the means of global communications and **the production** and circulation **of knowledge**, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the **panoptical surveillance society** and the **age of thought control**. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be **force obedience** even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where **elites are insulated** through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through **gentrification**, **gated communities**, surveillance systems, and state and **private violence**. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of **privatized social services**, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are **accessible only by helicopter** and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals **rows of mansions** that appear as military compounds, **with** **private armed towers** and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could **live out their** aspirations and **fantasies**. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an **express lane reserved for** those that can pay **an exorbitant toll**. On this lane, the privileged **speed by**, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is **instantly recorded by** this **surveillance** system and a **heavy fine is imposed** on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, **warfare** and **police containment** have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even **glamorizing war and violence** as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are **prison industrial complexes**, **immigrant** and refugee **repression** and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and **capitalist schooling**. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to **colonize the mind** -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through **militarism**, extreme **masculinization**, racism and **racist mobilizations** against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and **faces collapse**. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are **no longer** any **new territories** to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. **What is there left to commodify?** Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a **turn toward militarized accumulation** -- **making wars** of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to **generate new opportunities** for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "**planet of slums**," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has **no** direct **use for surplus humanity**. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of **21st century slavery** possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "**precariatization**." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a **rising** reserve **army of immigrant labor**. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is **how to** **contain the real** and potential **rebellion** of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the **battlegrounds between mass resistance** movements **and** the new systems of **mass repression**. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of **genocide**, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do **not wield enough power** and authority **to** organize and **stabilize the system**, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were **unable to impose transnational regulation** on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has **broken free from** the **constraints** imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the **anarchy of the system** in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from **radical challenges from below**. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is **not enough**. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and **transformation toward a system** in which social need trumps private profit. A **global rebellion** against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is **popular**, **grassroots** and leftist **struggle**, and the rise of **new cultures of resistance**: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must **strive to influence**, from this vantage point, **the discourse and practice of movements** for a more just distribution of wealth and power. **Our survival** may depend on it.

#### We call for a break from the cynicism of pragmatism in exchange for experimentation through a Benjamian red-green process of minor utopia that refigures social relations and sparks creativity, thought and feeling

Featherstone 17 Mark, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University. “Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation.” Series: Routledge studies in social and political thought. February 17, 2017.

In Benjamin’s (2009) work on the trauerspiel, early modern German tragedy captures the image of tyranny in a state of collapse. The tyrant seeks to exert control, but continually fails, because fate dictates that his efforts to shore up his empire must always miss their mark. Realising his terminal situation, the tyrant falls into an abyss of melancholia, characterised by a sense of paralysis and a perception of the end: the end of his reign, the end of his meaning, the end of his-tory. Surveying his world, the sovereign sees nothing but failure, ruination, and decay everywhere. It is in this dystopian vision of collapse that Benjamin finds utopian possibility and the space of the new. In a world devoid of meaning and significance, he explains that the exposed thing, or what he calls the creaturely, offers hope for the future, because it affords the opportunity to begin again. As Susan Buck-Morss (1991) shows, Benjamin saw the same situation played out in the Paris arcades of the late 19th century, where the ruined objects of early consumer capitalism shone with utopian possibility. Perhaps this perspective is still appropriate, or even more appropriate, for the contemporary world, where consumer capitalism has become a global form, what Benjamin might call a global ur-landscape, a kind of natural background or fate which seems absolutely inescapable. Frozen in this natural system, there is nowhere to go, and we collapse into repetition, compulsion, and routine in order to dull the pain caused by our lack of future. However, descent into the dark underworld of the contemporary addictogenic society offers no real escape, because immersion in the compulsion to repeat simply emphasises our profane objectivity—unless, of course, it produces reflexive recognition and the determination to engineer change. There is, therefore, value in ruins. There is ruin value in the debased worker who is simply a meaningless cog in a machine, ruin value in the prostitute who is little more than a piece of meat bought and sold like any other commodity, ruin value in the addict who is a slave to junk, ruin value in the slum dweller who must struggle to survive on a daily basis. In these ruined bodies living in dystopia we confront Benjamin’s (2009) creaturely life, the blank people Catherine Malabou (2012) calls the new wounded, the waste products of late capitalism who open up the possibility of the kind of catastrophic and post-catastrophic subjectivity Wilfred Bion explored through his work. For Bion (1993) these subjects come face to face with bare life, or the thing in itself he captured through his use of the symbol O, and must find some way forward into the future. In other words, O represents the lived experience of dystopia, a world catastrophe for a destroyed subject which is also a blank canvas, an island of hope that points towards an infinite number of possible futures. Although Bion was centrally concerned with catastrophic subjectivity, Benjamin’s (1999) utopians were not only destroyed subjects-cum-objects—the prostitutes, the beggars, and scum of the capitalist system—but also children, who always exist on the edge of the world, because they are in the process of being socialised into normal ways of living. Benjamin (2006) found utopian hope in kids, whose naïve questions—Where did I come from? What is this, that, and the other? Why is the world the way it is? and so on—suggest distance from orthodoxy and the accepted order of things, because their way of being suggests a model of imaginative, ludic thought and practice which might enable everybody else to escape the closure of modern, capitalist society. Against the hard pragmatism of the capitalist, who is only interested in costs and benefits, Benjamin wanted to wake the capitalist subject up to the dream-world of the child who invents the future through everyday play. For Benjamin, the human future is hidden within these small utopias (Stewart, 2010). Even in the contemporary situation, where the child has become a key source of value production for capitalists, Benjamin would resist despair on the basis that children will always find the new in their play with even the most profane objects. In his work, capitalism evolves through different conceptions of value, where use value becomes exchange value becomes symbolic value becomes ruin value becomes utopian value, which results in the transition of the object from a useful object to a commodity to be bought and sold to a symbol to be exchanged and finally a ruined piece of waste that signals the closure of one way of thinking and the possibility of some other path into the future (Featherstone, 2005). This is how Benjamin finds utopia in dystopia, infinity in the finite and the profane, and suggests we might escape the nihilism of the always the same of capitalism. Ž ižek (2008, 2010) makes a similar point in his recent works on catastrophe and utopia. In his In Defence of Lost Causes (2008), he argues that we must exploit the current global situation in the name of the lost cause of the eternal idea. However, whereas Ž ižek’s eternal idea reflects a Platonic notion of justice, I would argue that this concept has little value today, simply because of its inherent authoritarianism, and must instead be taken to represent a kind of empty signifier, which we need to fill out through creative practice. Thus, my view is that what the pursuit of the eternal idea of justice calls for is less some transcendental imperative around division of resources imposed from above and more the creation of a space of immanence to enable experimentation about what it is people value in life. Although this call may appear to be based in utopian idealism, I would argue that such activity is absolutely practical and rooted in the immanent idealism of the child at play. Absorbed in play, this utopian child exemplifies the idea of fixation, which reflects deep immersion in the objective world, where profane things become magical signs of the future to come. Utopian play is purposeful, and characterised by practice organised around an imagined goal, but centrally a goal which is open to adaptation on the basis of creative interaction with changing circumstance. Thus it becomes clear why culture is so important politically—culture is the space of interaction between the subject and the objective world, where the subject simultaneously makes meaning in the world and in doing so creates his own identity. In my view, this is what utopian practice means today, and how we can develop a mode of concrete utopianism to oppose the global capitalist system that seems devoid of spirit, significance, and human meaning. As Žižek points out in his apocalyptic Living in the End Times (2010), the generalised crisis of late capitalism, which takes in looming ecological catastrophe and intractable social division, means that we must find a way to move beyond the neoliberal utopia-cum-dystopia in the creation of a human world. In my view, culture must play a central role in this task, because culture is communication, and the basis upon which humans form worlds. Culture is also the medium of human imagination, creativity, and fantasy, what Winnicott called our little madnesses (Kuhn, 2013). I would argue that we need more little madnesses in the contemporary world, simply because neoliberal capitalism has created a worldless world where meaning is reduced to economic equations around value. There is no humanity in this mode of thinking. Thus, my objective in this book is to consider the concepts of dystopia and utopia from the vantage point of the seashore where children play and imagine possible worlds very different from our own. Following this introductory chapter, where I have sought to read global politics through the lens of the psychoanalysis of D. W. Winnicott, in the next chapter I move on to focus on the situation of contemporary Greece. Wrecked by EU austerity measures caused by fantastical attempts to build a new neoliberal utopia on the back of unsustainable debt and credit, I compare and contrast the Greece of the early 21st century with the Greece of the original utopians, the ancient Greek philosophers Plato (1991) and Socrates, in order to try to articulate a vision of a more socially just, economically sustainable society. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the book, which comprise the centre of the first part of the work, I move on from this exploration of Greece, which re-reads Plato’s Republic (1991) through the lens of Alain Badiou’s philosophy, in order to try to understand how the contemporary global capitalist model emerged and whether it is possible to read this history through concepts of utopia and dystopia. On the basis that there is no sustained study of the utopian vision of capitalism, which is supposed to be the realist mode of social and economic organisation par excellence, in these three chapters I track the evolution of capitalism and capitalist thought back through the work of Adam Smith (1982, 1999), John Locke (1988), and Thomas Hobbes (2008) before leaping forward into the works of Milton Friedman (2002) and finally the key theories of contemporary financialisation. In order to kick-start this history, I begin with a discussion of the difference between the capitalist vision of economy and the archaic, primitive view of economy found in Plato (1991), but also anthropologists such as Marshall Sahlins (1974) and Marcel Mauss (2000). Where the latter primitivists regard economy in terms of the need to sustain life, the capitalists, perhaps starting with Bernard Mandeville (1989) and John Locke, take economy as a means of ever-increasing productivity and profitability. Tracing the development of this history, in Chapter 3 of the book I explore the development of capitalism in America, and particularly across the post-World War II period when Milton Friedman (2002) and the neoliberal thinkers read economics through the cold war cybernetic theory of early computational thinkers such as Norbert Wiener and John Von Neumann, who, with John Nash, was instrumental in the development of game theory (Mirowski, 2002). In order to extend this work, which shows how economy evolved from a system for the distribution of scarce goods necessary to sustain life to a technoscientific cybernetic model concerned with the production of profit removed from any concern with human or environmental sustainability, I move on to look at the ultimate form of capitalist, economic abstraction, financialisation, where money makes money without the need for human production. Against this theory of the non- or post-human dimensions of contemporary economy, where human and world are subordinate to the needs of the financial system that abolishes the future in the name of debt repayment, in Chapter 5 of the book I take up an alternative vision of economy, organised around the irreducible sociality of people and the necessary relationship between human and world explored in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (1969) and Deleuze and Guattari (1994). The aim of this chapter, then, is to suggest a leftist, red-green model of what I call the minor utopia, where work and productivity are understood in terms of natural productivity and the satisfaction of need, rather than abstract profit making that harms humanity both in itself and through the destruction of its biospheric life support system. In this chapter I connect Merleau-Ponty (1969) to Marx (1988), and recall my earlier reference to Winnicott (2005) on infant creativity, in order to argue that humans are infinitely creative and imaginative and defined by the need to express themselves and that the capitalist model of economy has progressively subjugated this potential and reduced humans to profit-making machines. Inspired by Marcuse’s (1987) work, I suggest that under this utilitarian model there is no room for life or human imagination that transgresses the current order of things, which is by definition beyond utility. In Chapter 6, I return to the issue of utopian potential through an exploration of the dystopian dimensions of the ur-space of sociality, the city, in the cinema of the Danish director Nicolas Winding Refn, and particularly the ways in which he situates his characters within an autistic space where social relations never hold and continually break apart. The space of the city is, of course, key here because the history of the ideas of utopia, dystopia, identity, society, economy, politics, and culture can be traced back to the invention of the urban form that creates a space for the articulation of everything human. Akin to a variety of contemporary utopias, which envision the city in terms of dystopian collapse, Winding Refn’s films, but particularly his most recent works Drive (2011) and Only God Forgives (2013), imagine the globalised city (his cities span the globe, from LA in the West to Bangkok in the East, to create a nightmarish vision of the global city) saturated with asociality, suspicion, mistrust, and ultra-violence. At the heart of both films I consider, the main character is explained in terms of destroyed masculinity rooted in lost childhood and the kind of abandonment one might imagine Winnicott’s children suffer in the mechanised world where alienated work in the name of profitability is more important than human development. It is on the basis of this work on cultural expressions of global dystopia linked to ideas of the collapse of social and particularly familial relations that I turn, in Chapter 7, to a consideration of the situation of youth in contemporary Britain. In this chapter, entitled Dis-United Kingdom, I move back into straight sociological critique and take up a discussion of the riots of 2011.

## Case

### Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the better team. Anything is self serving, arbitrarily limits the scope of engagement, and begs the question of the rest of the debate.

#### Reject framing arguments that parametricize content – debate should be an open forum to attack ideas from different directions – anything else staticizes knowledge which their ev would obviously disagree w/.

#### The rob –

#### [1] Competition- The competitive nature of debate wrecks the interactive nature of debate – the judge must decide between two competing speech acts and the debaters are trying to beat each other – this is the wrong forum for interaction

#### [2] Spillover- How does educational orientations spill over beyond this space? Empirically denied – judges vote on this on this time and nothing ever happens.

#### [3] Prescription- certain interactions are prescripted – eg subjectivity– can’t be reformulated so easily

#### [4] Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### [5] No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

#### [6] Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

### Advantage

#### Our Model of Fiat is Productive EVEN if they’re right about it being illusory – generates momentum for change that overwhelms repetition compulsion.

Shove and Walker 7 Shove, Elizabeth, and Gordon Walker. "CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management." Environment and planning A 39.4 (2007): 763-770. (Lancaster University sociology professor and Lancaster University geography professor)//Elmer

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multilevel model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion. However, we are with Rip (2006) in **recognising the value**, productivity **and everyday necessity of an ‘illusion of agency’**, and of the working expectation that a **difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary**. **The outcomes** of actions **are unknowable**, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, **ironically**, **it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management**. As Rip argues ‘**illusions are productive because they motivate action** and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are **part of the dynamics of change**: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are necessary to processes within. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

#### No Links their Offense – our argument is our Model is about Scenario Planning and Clash – it’s not an assertion that voting Aff will do anything but that the model of Scenario Analysis breaks down implicit bias which is good.

#### It’s also non-falsifiable – impossible to test universal drives in everyone since we all are different identities and experiences – that’s a basis for using your theory as a heuristic.

#### Psychoanalytic lack presumes femininity is inferior and asserts normative sexuality

Sprengnether, 7

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STORI ES OF ORIGIN The story of psychoanalysis, insofar as it may be said to begin with Freud’s co-authored Studies on Hysteria (1895/1986), may also be said to begin with a woman – referred to as Anna O. in the case history reported by Freud and his mentor Josef Breuer. Anna O., who suffered from partial paralysis and aphasia (an inability to speak in her native German, though she was capable of speaking English, French and Italian), is described by Freud and Breuer as effecting her own cure by freely associating each of her symptoms to their point of origin in her conflicted feelings about nursing her father in his last illness. It was Breuer who stumbled on this method – which Anna termed ‘chimney sweeping’ – by visiting her on a daily basis and allowing her to talk in an uninhibited way.1 But if a woman’s speech provided Freud with his model of the ‘talking cure’, it also helped to set the boundaries of his thinking about women and gender. There is a clear hierarchy in this story. The woman babbles; her physician interprets. He may learn from her, but the implication is clear. He knows her better than she knows herself.2 The story of (Euro-American) feminism has a different point of origin. This is a story in which women argue for their own rights. Consider the following figures on both sides of the Atlantic: Harriet Taylor, Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Tubman, Angelina Grimke, Susan B. Anthony, Fanny Wright. In this narrative, even Anna O. appears – under her true name Bertha Pappenheim – as a woman who spent the majority of her life (after her encounter with Breuer) opposing white slavery and advocating for abused women and neglected children.3 In this story, women speak for themselves and are clear about what they need and want. There is no question that the gains of feminism in the socio-political realm could not have been (and cannot be) achieved without a strong political organisation and a cogently argued agenda. Yet it is intriguing to speculate that Anna O.’s experience with Breuer did actually relieve her internal conflicts, freeing her to live a richly self-determined life in the world. Such a story might suggest possibilities for alliance between feminism and psychoanalysis, although a story of this kind would not become available (in theoretical terms at least) until something close to our own era. FREUDIAN AMBIVALENCE( S ) Although Freud’s early studies in hysteria and his monumental work The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1986) do not depend on a gender-marked narrative, his later drive theory does. As he elaborated his concept of an oedipal stage of development, his thinking tilted in the direction of a necessary correlation between the achievement of masculine identity (in men) and the patriarchal organisation of culture and civilisation. Less varied and flexible than his inquiry into the mind’s capacity to deceive itself in dreams or symptomatic behaviour, this aspect of Freud’s thought created a ‘problem’ for many of his early women followers, while constituting a direct challenge to second-wave feminists seeking to deconstruct the post-Second World War ideology of woman as wife, mother and homemaker. Taken together, Freud’s oedipal paradigm of civilisation and corresponding theories of feminine development, emphasising women’s condition of lack, or ‘castration’, seemed to authorise the conservatism of the 1950s regarding women’s roles and capabilities.4 Ironically, Freud’s own writings give evidence of his ambivalence about what it means to be a woman, but the signs of this ambivalence would not become fully ‘readable’ until new strategies of feminist literary interpretation became available. A brief review of Freud’s ‘Ur’ dream in The Interpretation of Dreams, the work that he expected to launch his career in the field of psychoanalysis, demonstrates the degree to which Freud’s own texts offer themselves to feminist deconstruction. In this dream, Freud inspects the mouth of a woman he calls Irma and finds curly structures therein.5 He also palpates her chest through her clothes and concludes that her symptoms are physiological (rather than neurotic or psychological), caused by a contaminated injection administered by a colleague. Freud explains in detail how the dream is meant to deliver the following message: I am not responsible for Irma’s pains; rather, someone else is. Freud uses this dream to illustrate his thesis: that dreams give expression to a secret or repressed wish. Once Freud has elucidated this wish – to exonerate himself from responsibility for Irma’s symptoms – he feels satisfied that he has plumbed the dream. In the story of Irma, we may discern the real-life ordeal of Emma Eckstein, a young patient of Freud’s, whom he referred to his friend Wilhelm Fliess for nasal surgery to cure her sexual neurosis. The surgery was bungled by Fliess, who left gauze packing in Emma’s nose, causing infection. When the gauze was removed, Emma haemorrhaged so severely that she nearly died. Freud, who could not stand the sight of blood, fainted during this scene, perhaps also regretting his own nasal surgery at the hands of Fliess. Initially horrified by the outcome of Emma’s surgery, Freud wrote anxious reports to Fliess on her slow progress toward recovery, which included several more bleeding episodes. Gradually, however, Freud began to convince himself that Emma’s bleeding was hysterically motivated, hence exonerating Fliess from charges of wrongdoing. In the end, Freud managed not only to dissociate himself from Emma and her vulnerabilities, but also to persuade himself that her sufferings were neurotic in origin.6 While many have commented on the elements of Emma’s story that are encoded in Freud’s Irma dream, and some have perceived a homoerotic subtext in the relationship between Freud and Fliess, no one has fully appreciated the implications of Freud’s unconscious identification with Emma/Irma in the light of his later construction of femininity as a condition of violation.7 Freud’s interpretation of the Irma dream, which locates him firmly in the role of physician, effectively conceals the degree to which he also sees himself as a victim, thus paving the way for his hierarchical construction of the relationship between masculinity and femininity. Ironically, the instability of Freud’s dream interpretation opens the possibility of deconstructing this relationship. If, in the short run, Freud’s oedipal paradigm achieved supremacy, over time, it has worn thin, if not actually dissolved. Interestingly, many of Freud’s women patients – including the indomitable Emma Eckstein – later became psychoanalysts. Many of them made theoretical contributions of their own, participating in scientific meetings and publishing psychoanalytic papers. Evidently, they saw no contradiction between Freud’s conservative pronouncements on woman’s role in society (including the second-class nature of femininity) and the professional lives they led in the world. However, while women such as Loe Kann, Sabina Spielrein, Marie Bonaparte and Lou-Andreas Salome´ remained loyal to Freud and his theories of femininity, others began to chafe. These women, who did not necessarily break with Freud, offered modifications of his theories of feminine development, which contained subversive possibilities.8 Helene Deutsch, for instance, who published a seemingly conservative study of female masochism, also wrote about the significance of the mother-infant relationship, a topic that Freud failed to explore. Melanie Klein, who considered herself Freud’s true heir, undermined his emphasis on the primacy of the phallus through her theorisation of the child’s relationship to the breast. Anna Freud, the youngest of Freud’s six children and self-appointed keeper of the flame, not only pioneered the field of child analysis, but also introduced empirical study as an important component of its development.9 Such women, though clearly deferential to Freud, also had minds of their own. One early woman follower, Karen Horney, even had the temerity to break with him and found her own school.10 The post-First World War ‘new woman’ not only embraced Freud’s implicit message of liberation from Victorian models of repression, but she took them one step further – into an implicit critique of the patriarchal order that upheld the normative construction of the relationship between the sexes. F A S T FORWARD Fast forward to 1950s America, where Freud’s ideas flourished in an atmosphere far removed from their origin. Freud’s understanding of the relationship between the sexes, as based in his concepts of female castration, penis envy and the Oedipus complex, offered a means of rationalising a desire to re-establish order and stability in a society whose internal workings had been profoundly disrupted. In the aftermath of the Second World War, women left their wartime jobs, compelled to return to husbands and children to cultivate the ‘feminine’ arts of housekeeping and child-rearing. The ideal of the nuclear family – father, mother and one or two children raised in a single-family home, apart from grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins – prevailed, finding representation in visions of suburban tract housing, commercial advertising and television. In this new kind of ‘bunker’ mentality, Freud’s theorisation of women as fundamentally lacking and hence vulnerable to ‘envy’ of male physical endowment and achievement seemed plausible. Women, in this view, should learn to accept their inferior physical status and fate. In these years, the history of Freud’s early women followers – including their unconventional ideas and life choices – went missing, and it was not until the early 1960s, with a new generation of activist women, that another level of questioning began to arise. Two benchmark books, Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1953) and Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963), presented cogent arguments against the philosophical and cultural ideologies that relegated women to inferior status in society and in the home. Suddenly there was an outpouring of books interrogating received wisdom about women, and the (retrospectively named) second wave of feminism was born. In this heady moment, two more influential books appeared, each of which helped to jump-start feminist literary criticism through a targeted critique of Freud: Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics (1971) and Germaine Greer’s The Female Eunuch (1971). While Millett offered an analysis of phallocentrism as represented in the works of male authors such as D. H. Lawrence and Norman Mailer, Greer went for the jugular of Freud’s failure to imagine an independent and robust form of female sexuality. Both books authorised new forms of interpretation, using psychoanalysis (with its subtextual method of interrogation) to undermine assumptions about women’s inferiority. In the wake of de Beauvoir, Friedan, Millett and Greer, critiques of male-authored literature in terms of its gender biases and sexist portrayals of women abounded.11 Suddenly, the characterisation of women as virgins, mothers or whores became visible and subject to analysis, as women gleefully attacked the bases of Freud’s assumptions about women. Once again, Freud himself provided fuel for the fire, as feminists scrutinised his texts for evidence of gender bias, making use of his own hermeneutic assumptions. A celebrated case in point is Freud’s first extended narrative of analysis, that of a young woman (referred to him by her father) whom he named Dora. Published in 1905, ‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’ was designed to demonstrate Freud’s theory of the sexual origins of female hysteria, although it is also widely regarded among psychoanalysts as the moment when he began to formulate his idea of transference. The richly polysemic nature of Freud’s writing, however, lends itself to multiple levels of interpretation. Steven Marcus was among the first to remark on the similarity between Freud’s manner of case history writing and that of the novelists and short story writers of his time. Freud himself commented on the degree to which his case histories resemble the form of the short story (without seeming to comprehend the implications of his admission). For Marcus, Freud is an ‘unreliable narrator’ (1976: 70) familiar to critics like himself as a manifestation of literary modernism. Feminists have adopted Marcus’ insight and extended it. The Dora case history may be the most closely read text by feminists seeking to deconstruct and transform Freud’s assumptions about women.12 In Freud’s narrative, a young woman undergoes a brief treatment by him for a number of troubling symptoms, including nervous cough, catarrh and vaginal discharge of unknown origin. As her tale unfolds, many storylines begin to develop and proliferate. Her father, who has suffered from syphilis, is impotent (Freud claims), yet is having an affair with the wife of a friend. The friend, known as Herr K., focuses his erotic attentions on the adolescent Dora, who rebuffs him. Dora’s mother, who may or may not be aware of what is happening, occupies herself with obsessive housekeeping. In this hot-house atmosphere, Dora is also called upon to nurse her father in his many episodes of illness. Freud concludes: that Dora fantasises fellatio with her impotent father (because he is incapable of intercourse); that she resents his relationship with Frau K. (towards whom she also feels erotically inclined); that she feels aroused by the attentions of Herr K. (a supposedly virile male); but also repudiates her arousal, hence succumbing to hysteria. Dora’s problem, according to Freud, derives from her unwillingness to admit her sexual fantasies regarding her father and her desire to have intercourse with his friend, Herr K. The upshot of this story is that Dora, a reluctant subject from the beginning, not only did not accept Freud’s interpretation, but also took matters into her own hands, leaving treatment. Freud’s reconstruction of their interaction occurred in the charged atmosphere of her rejection. We do not know what Anna O. thought about her involvement with Breuer, nor do we have any record of Emma Eckstein’s response to the mishandling of her nasal surgery. Freud’s Dora (subsequently identified as Ida Bauer) also remains something of a mystery.13 Yet we do have Freud’s extended interpretation of what happened between them. In this light, it seems apparent that he imposed his views of normative femininity and heterosexuality on a young woman who had good reason to resist his interpretation of her desire(s). Feminist readers of this case history easily find fault with Freud’s inappropriate treatment of Dora, who appears as something of a heroine – not unlike Ibsen’s Nora – for walking out on him. In Dora’s silent resistance, they find authorisation for their own vocal scepticism. Why should a fourteen-year-old girl respond with enthusiasm to the sexual advances of an older man? Even granting that Dora actively fantasises her father’s sex life with Frau K., why should she assume that they practise fellatio? How might we construe the following: the position of Dora’s mother, the role of the governess seduced and dismissed by Herr K., Dora’s relationship with Frau K., and her attraction to the painting of the Madonna in the Dresden museum? Like the Dream of Irma’s injection, the Dora case history yields a number of intriguing narrative subtexts, in the light of which Freud’s oedipal construction of Dora’s desire (for her father and for Herr K.) appears highly questionable. Freud focuses on Herr K.’s natural attractiveness as a man, rather than the sordid situation in which he presses his courtship, thus deflecting our attention from Dora’s father, a decidedly unvirile male. By insisting on Dora’s desire for Herr K., Freud produces a normative heterosexual scenario that acts as a screen for the impotence of her father. Here, as elsewhere in Freud’s body of work, the emphasis on masculine aggression barely conceals another layer of anxiety about helplessness and passivity. Beginning with Irma/Emma, Freud both exhibits and denies this anxiety, which he associates with the damaged condition he regards as ‘feminine’. As Freud demonstrates in his dream analyses, however, his own texts may be read for what they displace and repress as much as for what they explicitly reveal. There are multiple ‘Freuds’ who inhabit the works we assign to him as author. At least one of these is a man who regards himself as wounded or lacking.14

#### Meaning is possible and participation in politics is inevitable—the alt naturalizes oppression by conflating existing conditions with meaning per se—the neg can’t withdraw from, or collapse the system

Andy Robinson 4, Zizek hater, Baudrillard, Zizek and Laclau on "common sense" - a critique, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html

Baudrillard thinks his account of the masses is confirmed by disinterest in politics and "public" debates (12-13), and that this is a resistance to political manipulation (SSM 39). He is wrong. This disinterest is relative: at the time of The Consumer Society, Baudrillard still recognised that this disinterest can be shattered by sudden uprisings. Further, it is quite possible to explain such disinterest without falling back on the crude kind of theories of mystification Baudrillard cites as the only alternative to his view (SSM 12-13). Brinton, and Albert and Hahnel, for instance, have analysed disinterest as an insulation built into authoritarian character-structures which enables people to cope with capitalism. Baudrillard's earlier work similarly involves a model of how the consumer society produces disinterest. Furthermore, political manipulation is, as Gramsci and others show, closely intertwined with the supposedly "meaningless", "apolitical" discourses of everyday life. It is simply not possible to withdraw from politics; one always participates in practices which influence social outcomes and others' actions, so that the illusion of withdrawal from politics is actually a naturalisation of a particular kind of political system. Baudrillard's explicitly stated view that everyday practice is beyond representation and the politics (SSM 39) is therefore wholly mistaken and leads him to effectively endorse the naturalisation of politics (even though he tries to avoid ENDORSING something he sees as meaningless and therefore not endorsable - 40-1. Actually he does endorse indirectly via loaded language). He also misses the dimension of political INTRUSION into everyday life - for instance, the aggressive police presence which blights so many inner-city communities, and the linked phenomenon of a politicised fear of "crime". At this point, in contradiction to Vaneigem, Reich and Foucault as well as his earlier work, Baudrillard also wants to deny a liberatory potential to resistance in everyday life (SSM 40-1).¶ Baudrillard sometimes substitutes his own views for evidence, as when he discusses what "we" the audience experience (GW 39). ¶ Baudrillard's claim that the masses are "dumb", silent and conduct any and all beliefs (SSM 28) and "the reversion of any social" (SSM 49) is problematised by the persistence of subcultures and countercultures, while his claim that any remark could be attributed to the masses (SSM 29) hardly proves that it lacks its own demands or beliefs. He is leaping far too quickly from the confused and contradictory nature of mass beliefs to the idea that the masses lack - or even reject - meaning per se. He wants to portray the masses as disinterested in meaning, instinctual and "above and beyond all meaning" (SSM 11), lacking even conformist beliefs (87-8) and without a language of their own (22). This is contradicted by extensive evidence on the construction of meaning in everyday life, from Hoggart on working class culture to Becker, Lemert, Goffman and others on deviance. Even in the sphere of media effects, the evidence from research on audiences, such as Ang on Dallas viewers and Morley on the Nationwide audience, suggests an active construction of meaning by members of the masses, negotiating with or even opposing dominant codes of meaning. This may well show a decline of that kind of meaning promoted by the status quo - but it hardly shows a rejection of meaning per se. When the masses act stupid, it may well be due to what radical education theorists term "reactive stupidity" - an adaptive response to avoid being falsified and "beaten" by acting stupid. Baudrillard again wrongly conflates the dominant system with meaning as such. Indeed, Baudrillard seems to have changed his mind AGAIN by the time of the Gulf War essays, when he refers to the MEDIA, not the masses, as in control (GW 75), and to stupidity as a result of "mental deterrence" (GW 67-8), which produces a "suffocating atmosphere of deception and stupidity" (GW 68) and a control through the violence of consensus (GW 84).

Discourse is contingent –

#### [1] Material realities subsume prior questions

Jones & Spicer ‘9 (Campbell, Senior Lecturer in the School of Management at U of Leicester, Andre, Associate Professor in the Dept of Industrial Relations @ Warwick Business School U of Warwick, Unmasking the Entrepreneur, pgs. 22-23)

An analysis of **discourse** cannot alone account for the **enduring social structures** such as the state or capitalism. Mike Reed has argued that a **discursive approach** to power relations effectively blinds critical theorists to [obscures] issues of social structures: Foucauldian discourse analysis is largely restricted to a tactical and localised view of power, as constituted and expressed through **situational-specific** 'negotiated orders', which seriously **underestimates the structural reality** of more permanent and hierarchal power relations. It finds it difficult, if not impossible, to deal with **institutionalised stabilities** and continuities in power relations because it cannot get at the higher levels of social organisation in which micro-level processes and practices are embedded. (Reed, 2000: 526-7) These institutional stabilities may include market relations, the power of the state, relations like colonialism, kinship and patriarchy. These are the **'generative properties'** that Reed (1998: 210) understands as 'mak(ing) social practices and forms - such as discursive formations - what they are and equip(ing) them with what they do'. Equally Thompson and Ackroyd also argue that in discourse analysis 'workers are not disciplined by the market, or sanctions actually or potentially invoked by capital, but their own subjectivities' (1995: 627). The inability to **examine structures** such as capitalism means that some **basic forms of power** are thus uninvestigated. Focusing solely on entrepreneurship discourse within organisations and the workplace would lead to a situation where pertinent relations that do not enter into discourse are **taken to not exist**. Such oversights in discursive analyses are that often structural relations such as class and the state have become so reified in social and mental worlds that they disappear. An ironic outcome indeed. Even when this structural context is considered, it is often examined in broad, oversimplified, and underspecified manners. This attention to social structure can be an important part of developing a critical theory of entrepreneurship, as we remember that the existing structural arrangements at any point are **not inevitable**, but can be subjected to **criticism and change**. In order to deal with these problems, we need to **revive the concept of** social **structure**. Thus we are arguing that 'there exist in the social world itself and **not only within symbolic systems** (language, myths, etc.) objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations' (Bourdieu, 1990: 122). Objective still means socially constructed, but social constructions that have become **solidified as structures** external to individual subjects. Examples of these structures may include basic 'organising principals' which are relatively stable and spatially and historically situated such as capitalism, kinship, patriarchy and the state. Some entrepreneurship researchers, particularly those drawing on sociology and political science, have shown the importance of social structure for understanding entrepreneurship (see for example Swedberg, 2000).

#### [2] No collective unconscious

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Lyotard and Baudrillard put forth a strong case for conceiving of postmodern capitalist culture as an economy of image-making. They both contend that the postmodern epoch transcends industrial production via the **commodification** of images and the “depthlessness” of the surface of postmodern human relationships. 33 But such a portrayal is too stark; the production of images has **not supplanted** the **production of material** use-values as the dominant form of capitalist production (and images themselves are “material” forms of production sold in the capitalist market). No doubt video games, “virtual reality,” and cyberspace are new forms of experience that compress and dislocate linear, physical conceptions of time and space. But while late capitalist “infotainment” production, at times, radically disjoins design and marketing (“symbolic manipulation”) from actual physical production (microchips designed in Silicon Valley while produced in Malaysia and the Philippines), the **outsourcing** of symbolic manipulation to software engineers in India and South Korea is rapidly **breaking down this distinction**. But Lyotard’s and Derrida’s aestheticization of all reality equates not only philosophical texts with literary texts, but also treats material phenomenon as strictly texts read by the human mind. This tendency among post-structuralist influenced theorists leads them to downplay the **structural constraints** that systems of production—not only material, but also cultural and ideological— place upon human subjects. It also downplays the **possibility for human communication**, inter-subjectivity, and collective action. For Lyotard, the only social bond is linguistic; inter-subjective language does not yield a shared linguistic community, but an indeterminate number of language games. Yet, if reality consists solely of perpetually shifting fragments of failed representations, how can there be any communication, yet alone the comprehension of commands?34 If inter-subjective communication is impossible, then **why and how** do we write journal articles for our (admittedly small) intellectual communities? One need not be a Weberian to realize that “legitimate rule” depends more on the power to command—authority—than it does brute force. Such rules are rarely constructed in a truly democratic manner, as the unequal access to educational, social, and cultural capital decreases the possibility of democratic discourse among relatively well-informed equals. Yet much of the **social glue** that coheres contemporary societies **remains conscious**, shared human belief in **communal norms and values**—often ones that are as pre-modern (religious and ethnic conceptions of solidarity), as they are postmodern. The role of ideology as a form of communicative coherence has not withered away—nor has the material and ideological power of the state and of educational and legal systems. The social world in which we live is simply **not as fragmented** and de-situated as poststructural- influenced academics believe. In fact, the **tight knit and cohesive nature** of post-structural-influenced academic communities implicitly affirms philosophically “pragmatic” and communitarian conceptions of **meaning more than** they do **post-structuralist theories** of communicative fragmentation.

#### The world is *more peaceful than ever* – hegemony collapse guarantees nuclear annihilation

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It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably **the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured**, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the **guardian of globalization**, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But the world did not keep sliding down that **path of perpetual war**. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by **ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the **international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a **profound and persistent reduction in** battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw **a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars**. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

#### The United States has been the largest cause of the decline of empire internationally---any other reading interprets singular actions NOT structural system effects.

Daniel **Deudney &** John **Ikenberry 15**. Deudney, Johns Hopkins University; Ikenberry, Princeton University “America’s Impact: The End of Empire and the Globalization of the Westphalian System”, August 2015, http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf

Over the last two and a half centuries, the most important change in the international political system has been the decline of empire, and the simultaneous spread of the Westphalian system of sovereign states, from Europe to universal global scope. Empire – the direct coercive rule of one people over another – has almost vanished from world politics. 1 Where once the world was made up of regional systems – most of which were empires – the contemporary world is marked by a large number of sovereign states, now nearly two hundred. 2 Over these centuries, one state – the United States – initially at the periphery of the European imperial system, has become the most powerful and influential state in the system. There are many debates about America in the international system. One prominent argument developed extensively, particularly by recent historians, is that the United States is, and has been throughout its history, imperial and an empire. This view is widely held by many, both inside and outside the United States. In this view, the United States continued the Western imperial project as European empires faltered in the 20th century, and in the second half of the 20th century created the last and most extensive empire with global reach.3 Arguments along these lines are of more than just of academic interest because they connect to national identity narratives in many parts of the world, including the rising states of China and India, which emphasize anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, as well as grievances against Western imperialism.4 In this paper, we challenge this view and offer a different account of the American impact on the world which emphasizes that the United States has played a key role in the decline of empire and the globalization of the Westphalian system. In contrast to those who view the United States as an empire, and thus as essentially antagonistic to the Westphalian sovereign state system, we argue that the United States, in an overall ledger sheet of impacts, has been influential against imperialism and colonialism, and has been powerfully supportive of the spread of the Westphalian system. We argue that contemporary views of the United States as imperial profoundly misrepresent the overall impact the United States has had on the international system over the last two and a half centuries. In this paper, we lay out the evidence for how the United States has played a major and often decisive role as an anti-imperial and anti-colonial force. More than any other state in the system, we argue, the United States has undermined empire and spread of the Westphalian system. Of course, the decline of empire and the spread of the Westphalian system are the result of many forces, including the diffusion of military capabilities, the growth of the international trading system, the rise of nationalism, and the spread of anti-colonial and human rights norms have all played powerful roles in diminishing the effectiveness of imperialism and the attractiveness and longevity of empires.5 But efforts to create empires continued well into the 20th century, and their lack of success stemmed not just from these broader trends in ideas and power but also from the grand strategies of the leading states – most notably the United States – in directly opposing the creation and perpetuation of empires. To be sure, the United States has been imperial and briefly had an empire in some times and places. But these episodes, we argue, are greatly overshadowed in their overall impact by American anti-imperialism and anticolonialism. And the global spread of the Westphalian system, by no means solely resulting from American actions, has been more advanced by American foreign policies than of any other state in the system. There are four broad reasons why the American role as anti-imperial and pro Westphalian have been underappreciated. First, many view the liberal international order, which the United States has played such a pivotal role in creating over the 20th century, as a challenge to the Westphalian system and a replacement for it, rather than an addition to it. Second, America’s centrality in the globalization of the Westphalian system through the thwarting and dismantlement of empire has been obscured by the widespread tendency to conceive of Europe and the United States as together making up “the West.”6 This makes it all too easy to see Europe’s centuries of imperialism being continued by the United States. In contrast, we argue that a major dynamic in world politics has pitted an “old West” of European imperialisms against the anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism of a “new West” in America. Third, the historical literature on modern empire building widely identifies two waves of activity (the first from the 16th century to the early 19th century, and the second from the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th). We identify two additional waves of empire building, in the World Wars and then in the Cold War. When these two additional waves are brought back into the picture, the case for seeing the United States as anti-imperial and anti-colonial is significantly strengthened, since the United States played such a prominent role in thwarting and dismantling these late-empire building efforts. Fourth, many contemporary observers of America’s impact on the world focus on infamous moments when the United States did exercise crude imperial behavior: in the many military interventions and covert actions in Latin America and the Middle East over the last century and, most saliently, the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. We do not seek to ignore or justify these episodes and patterns of behavior. The United States has been imperial in some ways and in some instances. But we seek to place them in the context of what we argue is America’s more significant impact on the organization of the global system.

#### Toplevel- each and every one of their cards are tagged with nonsense buzzwords that make claims NOT in the evidence. Read the evidence before you believe a word of the 1ac.

#### Leeb- Nowhere does this card warrant that fem psycho comes first, or that it should be a framework, or that it comes before the resolution. It just says that feminist political theorists need to know what domain they’re in. It doesn’t even advocate a particular framework.

#### Grosz- c/a discourse is contingent. Second, this says nothing about debate, and is a claim about what demand is. It doesn’t say anything about how debate resolutions force people to do things either.

#### Stravrakakis- The resolution isn’t remotely utopian- in fact, you could just specify a small reduction of IP that is easily attainable by any competent body. Look at the infra bills being passed now- the rez is way easier than that. Second, this evidence is about large-scale political promises, which you don’t have to make the aff as.

#### Zietsma- 1. You don’t have to defend the WTO, the rez is about the WTO member states, 2. There are arguments about how reducing IP would deck US heg, 3. Where does the card warrant that the WTO upholds U.S. heg, literally china is in the WTO.

#### Sayers- The rez is a departure from the squo which means that you can try to solve systems of oppression- proven by all the soft left affs read. 2. This card is a 1987 card about how aggression by men is bad, but we’ve had multiple waves of feminism that have reduced the wage gap and made things way better.

#### Wolff- this card is heavily anti LGBTQ by making it so that people have to conform to gender roles and doesn’t embrace fluidity

#### Stravrakakis- this movement will be obviously coopted- working within the system is key for actual change