# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater must articulate a distinct ROB in the form of a delineated text in the first affirmative speech.

#### Violation:

#### Prefer-

#### 1] Strat Skew – They can read multiple pieces of offense under different ROBs and then read a new one in the 1AR so they never lose under the ROB. it just becomes a 2NR debate about whether the ROB is better than the 1NC’s which moots engagement. That means infinite abuse – All you have to do is dump on the 1N ROB and marginally extend your warrants in the 2AR and the neg can’t do anything about it since there is no 3NR to answer the 2AR weighing or extrapolations

#### 2] Reciprocity – (a) restarting the ROB debate in the 1ar puts you at a 7-6 advantage– putting it in the aff makes it 13-13 (b) you have one more speech to contest my ROB and weigh (c) I can only read a ROB in the 1N so you should read it in your first speech– that’s definitionally an equal burden.

#### Fairness and education are voters – its how judges evaluate rounds and why schools fund debate

#### DTD – it’s key to norm set and deter future abuse

#### Competing interps – Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation – it also collapses since brightlines operate on an offense-defense paradigm

#### No RVIs – A – Encourages theory baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly B – its illogical for you to win for proving you were fair – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for other arguments

#### Evaluate the theory debate after the 2nr – we both get two speeches to resolve theory which means its recirpocal

## 2

#### A. Interpretation: If the affirmative defends a consequentialist framework, they must explicitly delineate which theory of the good they defend in the form of a text in the 1ac – prefer text of the interp.

#### Each nuance of the ethic entails different obligations and would exclude different offense – there are 7 different versions.

**Mastin** [Luke Mastin, Consequentialism, The basics of philosophy <http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_consequentialism.html>] //Massa

Some **consequentialist theories include**: Utilitarianism, which holds that an action is right if it leads to the most happiness for the greatest number of people ("happiness" here is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain). **Hedonism**, **which** is the philosophy **that pleasure** **is** the **most important** pursuit of mankind, **and** that **individuals** **should** strive to **maximise** **their own total** **pleasure** (net of any pain or suffering). **Epicureanism** is a more moderate approach (which still seeks to maximize happiness, but which **defines happiness** more **as a** **state of tranquillity** than pleasure). **Egoism, which holds that an action is right if it maximizes good for the self.** Thus, Egoism may license actions which are good for an individual even if detrimental to the general welfare. **Asceticism**, in some ways, **the opposite of Egoism in that it describes a life characterized by abstinence from egoistic pleasures** especially **to achieve a spiritual goal. Altruism**, which **prescribes that an individual take actions that have the best consequences for everyone except for himself**, according to Auguste Comte's dictum, "Live for others". Thus, individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve or benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of self-interest. **Rule Consequentialism**, which is a theory (sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile Consequentialism and Deontology), **that moral behaviour involves following certain rules**, but that those rules should be **chosen** based **on** the **consequences that** the selection of **those rules have**. Some theorists holds that a certain set of minimal rules are necessary to ensure appropriate actions, while some hold that the rules are not absolute and may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences. **Negative Consequentialism**, which **focuses on minimizing bad consequences rather than promoting good consequences**. This may actually require active intervention (to prevent harm from being done), or may only require passive avoidance of bad outcomes.

#### B. Violation: They don’t and maximizing well-being doesn’t cut it.

**Crisp**, Roger, "Well-Being", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Fall **2017** Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/>. //Massa

Well-being is most commonly used in philosophy to describe what is non-instrumentally or ultimately good *for* a person. **The question of what well-being consists in is of independent interest**, but it is of great importance in moral philosophy, especially **in the case of utilitarianism**, according to which the only moral requirement is that well-being be maximized. Significant challenges to the very notion have been mounted, in particular by G.E. Moore and T.M. Scanlon. **It has become standard to distinguish theories of well-being as either hedonist theories, desire theories, or objective list theories**. According to the view known as welfarism, well-being is the only value. Also important in ethics is the question of how a person’s moral character and actions relate to their well-being.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Shiftiness – They can shift out of my turns based on whatever theory of the good they operate under due to the nature of a vague standard. Especially true because the warrants for their standard could justify different versions of consequentialism as coming first and I wouldn’t know until the 1ar which gives them access to multiple contingent standards.

#### 2. Strat – I lose 6 minutes of time during the AC to generate a strategy because I don't know what turns or strategy, I can go for during the 1N absent which proves CX doesn’t check since it would occur after the skew.

#### 3. Resolvability – Makes the round irresolvable since we can’t weigh different mechanisms for the good – Benatar would probably link harder under a hedonistic conception of util – weighing ground is key since it ensures we can compare arguments that clash to access the ballot.

## 3

### Framework

#### The meta-ethic is procedural moral realism.

#### This entails that moral facts stem from procedures while substantive realism holds that moral truths exist independently of that in the empirical world. Prefer procedural realism –

#### 1] Collapses – the only way to verify whether something is a moral fact is by using procedures to warrant it.

#### 2] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### 3] Is/Ought Gap – we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. It’s impossible to derive an ought statement from descriptive facts about the world, necessitating a priori premises.

#### Regress – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which is self-justified.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### 2] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### 3] Necessity—my framework is inherent to the way we set ends. Ethics must be necessary and not contingent since otherwise its claims could be escapable. Necessary truths outweigh on probability—if a necessary truth is possible that means it’s true in a possible world, but that implies it’s true in all worlds since that’s what necessity is, so they have to prove there’s 0 risk of my framework.

#### 4] TJFs and they outweigh since it precludes engagement on the framework layer – prefer for Resource disparities- Our framework ensures big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity - their model crowds out small schools because they have to prep for every unique advantage under each aff, every counterplan, and every disad with carded responses to each of them

### Offense

#### 1] The process of strike uses patients or beneficiaries of work as a means to an end

**Howard 20** [Danielle Howard,, Mar 2020, "What Should Physicians Consider Prior to Unionizing?," Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association, [https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03 //](https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03%20//) LEX JB]

* Written in the context of doctors, warrant can be used for all jobs

**The** possible **disadvantage to** patients highlights the crux **of** the moral issue of physician **strikes. In** Immanuel **Kant’s** *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, one formulation of **the categorical imperative is to “Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means**.”24 **When patient care is leveraged** by physicians during strikes, **patients serve as a means to the union’s ends**. Unless physicians act to improve *everyone’s*care, union action—if **it jeopardizes** the **care of some hospitalized patients**, for example—cannot be ethical. It is for this reason that, in the case of **physicians looking to form a new union**, the argument can be made that unionization should be used only as a last resort. Physician union **members must be prepared to utilize collective action and accept its risks to patient care, but every effort should be made to avoid actions that risk harm to patients.**

#### 2] Going on strike isn’t universalizable – a) if everyone leaves work then there will be no concept of a job b) everyone means the employer even leaves which is a contradiction in contraception

#### 3] No aff offense – no unique obligation of the state to give ability to strike – if a workplace is coercive you can use legal means or just find another job

## 4

#### Counterplan Text - A just government ought to request the International Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion over whether they ought to [establish an unconditional right to strike]. A just government ought to abide by the outcome of the advisory opinion.

#### Solves – the ICJ will rule in favor of an unconditional right to strike.

Seifert ’18 (Achim; Professor of Law at the University of Jena, and adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg; December 2018; “The protection of the right to strike in the ILO: some introductory remarks”; CIELO Laboral; http://www.cielolaboral.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/seifert\_noticias\_cielo\_n11\_2018.pdf; Accessed: 11-3-2021; AU)

The **recognition of a right to strike** in the legal order of the **International Labour Organization** (ILO) is probably one of the most controversial questions in international labor law. Since the foundation of the ILO in the aftermath of World War I, the recognition of the right to strike as a **core element** of the principle of freedom of association has been discussed in the International Labour Conference (ILC) as well as in the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. As is well known, the ILO, in its long history spanning almost one century, has not explicitly recognized a right to strike: neither Article 427 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Constitution of the ILO, including the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), nor the Conventions and Recommendations in the field of freedom of association - namely Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) - have explicitly enshrined this right. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), established in 1951 by the Governing Body, recognized in 1952 that Convention No. 87 guarantees also the **right to strike** as an **essential element of trade** union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests1. It is worthwhile to note that it was a complaint of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at that time the Communist Union Federation on international level and front organization of the Soviet Union2, against the United Kingdom for having dissolved a strike in Jamaica by a police operation; since that time the controversy on the right to strike in the legal order of the ILO was also embedded in the wider context of the Cold War. In the complaint procedure initiated by the WFTU, the CFA **recognized** a **right to strike** under Convention No. 87 but considered that the police operation in question was lawful. In the more than six following decades, the CFA has elaborated a **very detailed case law** on the right to strike dealing with many concrete questions of this right and its limits (e.g. in essential services) and manifesting an even more complex structure than the national rules on industrial action in many a Member State. This case law of the CFA has been compiled in the “Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO”3. In 1959, i.e. seven years after case No. 28 of the CFA, the Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) also recognized the right to strike as **a core element of freedom** of association under Article 3 of Convention No. 874. Since then, the CEACR has **reconfirmed** its view on many occasions. Both CFA and CEACR coordinate their interpretation of Article 3 of Convention No. 875. Hence there is one single corpus of rules on the right to strike developed by both supervisory Committees of the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILC also has made clear in various Resolutions adopted since the 1950s that it considers the **right to strike** as an **essential element of freedom of association6**. On the whole, the recognition of the right to strike resulted therefore from the interpretative work of CFA and CEACR as well as of the understanding of the principle of freedom of association the ILC has expressed on various occasions. It should not be underestimated the wider political context of the Cold War had in this constant recognition of a right to strike under ILO Law. Although the very first recognition of the right to strike -as mentioned above- went back to a complaint procedure before the CFA, initiated by the Communist dominated WFTU, it was the Western world that particularly emphasized on the right to strike in order to blame the Communist Regimes of the Warsaw Pact that did not explicitly recognize a right to strike in their national law or, if they legally recognized it, made its exercise factually impossible; to this end, unions, employers’ associations but also Governments of the Western World built up an alliance in the bodies of the ILO7. In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8. This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding”9. As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the **competence of the International Court of Justice** to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the **interpretation of this Constitution** or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11. However, it **cannot be denied** that this constant interpretative work of CFA and CEACR possesses an **authoritative character** given the high esteem the twenty members of the CEACR -they are all internationally renowned experts in the field of labor law and social security law- and the nine members of the CFA with their specific expertise have. As the CEACR reiterates in its Reports, “[the opinions and recommendations of the Committee] derive their persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its impartiality, experience and expertise”12. Already this interpretative authority of both Committees justifies that **national legislators or courts take into consideration** the views of these supervisory bodies of the ILO when implementing ILO law. Furthermore, the long-standing and uncontradicted interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by CFA and CEACR as well as its recognition by the Member States may be considered as a **subsequent practice** in the application of the ILO Constitution under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1968): such subsequent practices shall be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement. Their constant supervisory practice probably reflects a volonté ultérieure, since other bodies of the ILO also have **recognized a right to strike** as the two above-mentioned Resolutions of the ILC of 1957 and 1970 as well as the constant practice of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to examine **cases of violation** of the right to strike as **examples for breaches of the principle of freedom of association** demonstrate. As this constant practice of the organs of the ILO has not been contradicted by Member States, there is a **strong presumption** for recognition of a right to strike as a subsequent practice of the ILO under Article 31(3)(b) of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties.

#### US compliance ensures faith in global democratic institutions – solves nuclear war.

Hawksley ’16 [Humphrey; formerly the BBC’s Beijing Bureau Chief and author of The Third World War: A Novel of Global Conflict and Asian Waters: American, China, and the Global Paradox; 11-19-2016; "Trump makes International Law Crucial for Peace"; Humphrey Hawksley; https://www.humphreyhawksley.com/trump-makes-international-law-crucial-for-peace/; Accessed 4-1-2020; AH]

Major powers tend to reject international law when rulings run counter to their interests insisting that the distant courts carry no jurisdiction. China rejected a Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in July and clings to expansive claims in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines. China’s response mirrored US rejection of a 1986 International Court of Justice ruling against US support for rebels in Nicaragua. “With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties,” writes journalist Humphrey Hawksley for YaleGlobal Online. Disregard for the rule of law weakens the legal system for all. Hawksley offers two recommendations for renewing respect for international law: intuitional overhaul so that the all parties recognize the courts, rejecting decisions only as last resort, and governments accepting the concept, taking a long-term view on balance of power even when rulings go against short-term strategic interests. Reforms may be too late as China organizes its own parallel systems for legal reviews and global governance, Hawksley notes, but international law, if respected, remains a mechanism for ensuring peace. – YaleGlobal LONDON: Flutter over the surprise visit to China by Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte may soon fade. But his abrupt and public dismissal of the United States in favor of China has weakened the argument that international rule of law could underpin a changing world order. The issue in question was the long-running dispute between China and the Philippines over sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal, situated 800 kilometers southeast of China and 160 kilometers west of the Philippines mainland, well inside the United Nations–defined Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite a court ruling and Duterte’s cap in hand during his October mission to Beijing, Philippine fishing vessels still only enter the waters around Scarborough Shoal at China’s mercy. The dispute erupted in April 2012, when China sent ships to expel Filipino fishing crews and took control of the area. The standoff became a symbol of Beijing’s policy to lay claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea where where it continues to build military outposts on remote reefs and artificially created islands in waters claimed by other nations. Lacking military, diplomatic or economic muscle, the Philippines turned to the rule of law and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. A panel of maritime judges ruled China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal invalid in July this year. China refused to recognize the tribunal from the start and declared the decision “null and void,” highlighting the complex balance in the current world order between national power and the rule of law. Beijing’s response mirrored a 1986 US response to Nicaragua’s challenge in the International Court of Justice. The court ruled against the United States for mining Nicaragua’s harbors and supporting right-wing Contra rebels. The United States claimed the court had no jurisdiction. China’s response on the South China Sea ruling mirrors a 1986 US response.With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties. The Western liberal democratic system is being challenged, and confrontations in Asia and Europe, as in Crimea and Ukraine, replicate the lead-up to the global conflicts of last century’s Cold War. As Nicaragua and Central America were a flashpoint in the 1980s, so Scarborough Shoal and South China Sea are one now. Other flashpoints are likely to emerge as China and Russia push to expand influence. Western democracies being challenged by rising powers have a troubled history. The 1930s rise of Germany and Japan; the Cold War’s proxy theaters in Vietnam, Nicaragua and elsewhere; and the current US-Russian deadlock over Syria are evidence that far more thought must be given in the deployment of international law as a mechanism for keeping the peace The view is supported, on the surface at least, by Russia and China who issued a joint statement in June arguing that the concept of “strategic stability” being assured through nuclear weapons was outdated and that all countries should abide by principles stipulated in the “UN Charter and international law.” Emerging power India, with its mixed loyalties, shares that view. “The structures for international peace and security are being tested as never before,” says former Indian ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, author of Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos. “It is everyone’s interest to re-establish the authority of the Security Council and reassert the primacy of law.”

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] New 1ar paradigms moot any 1NC theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested

## Case

### Framework

#### Permissibility and presumption negate

#### 1] Obligations- the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation

#### 2] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 1] Induction Fails- We can’t use the past to justify actions since it assumes those exact past events will happen the same way

#### 2] Culpability- There’s no cutoff for when a consequence ends which leads to endless causal chains i.e. me dropping a pen could cause several consequences down the line, I’m not culpable for

#### 3] Action Guidance- we only know a consequence will occur after it happens which means util can’t guide prior action

#### 4] Util is a voting issue- it excludes small school debaters because util relies on prep which allows big schools to prep out small schools- it’s the reason why Harvard Westlake only LARPs- bc the large amount of prep allows them to force out small schools. Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### 5] An infinite universe takes out util.

Bostrom 09, Staff at philosophy oxford school

Nick [Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School]. "Infinite Ethics." Nick Bostrom's Home Page. 2009. Web. <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.html> “Recent cosmological evidence…this one is.”

“Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, If the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it **contains an infinite number of galaxies**, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets **then there is,** with probability one, **an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy.** Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations葉here are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.Suppose the world [does] contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. **Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that** a canonically **infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive** value **and** an infinite quantity of **negative value.** This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good **or bad. Yet** in cardinal arithmetic, **adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours** therefore **has** the same **net effect on the total amount of good and bad** in a canonically infinite world:none whatsoever. **Aggregative consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they** seem to **imply that** if the world is canonically infinite then **it is always ethically indifferent what we do**. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent **whether we cause another holocaust** or prevent one from occurring. If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.

#### 6] This triggers presumption- They don’t have a theory of pleasure and pain so we don’t know which consequences matter or why death is bad so vote negative on presumption

#### AT Weighabiity

#### 1] Commits the is-ought fallacy. Just because governments use util doesn’t mean that’s how it ought to be

#### 2] Empirically Disproven- governments have acted non-utilitarian in the past like the Iraq war or libertarian taxes

#### 3] Our framework is more actor specific since it questions the individual subjectivities of individuals which is intrinsic to calculation

#### AT Extinction outweighs

#### 1] assumes they win consequentialism otherwise its not offense for them, don’t let them leverage it as an external impact bc getting the impact assumes they win consequence weighing is coherent

#### 2] Infinite existential risks, and weighing between them is arbitrary you cant use calculation to conclude the risk me dying from my chair is less likely than that of a nuclear war

#### 3] Non unique, suns will blow up and proves we should prioritize autonomy that makes current life more valuable

#### 4] Value to life only possible with the NC framework proves we’re a prereq

#### AT Aggregation

#### 1] Aggregation fails – how many headaches equal a migrane?

#### AT Phenomenal Introspection

#### 1] Just because I like video games doesn’t mean you do

#### 2] Hijack – we use practical reason which standardizes everything meaning we resolve people coming to different conclusions about ethics.

#### AT Intuitions

#### 1]

### Advantage 1

#### 1] Top-Level – this card is horribly warranted, under-highlighted, and making a laundry list of internal links with zero external impacts – the actual line about democratic peace is one-line long with no extrapolation – hold the 1AR explanation to the 1AC warrants.

#### 2] DPT either empirically disproven or not statistically significant

Rosato 11, Sebastian. "On the democratic peace." Chapters (2011). (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame)//Elmer

Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Laync(2001, p. 801) notes, 'The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do - yields three inter-dcmocratic wars: the American Civil War. the Spanish American War and the Boer War/' This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory's defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United Stales was not a stale but a union of stales, and thai this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of (he democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc currently coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle\*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up lo scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to Ihe finding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one another**.** Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray\*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States - from the democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable." A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars arc distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic-democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I. If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the difference between three and zero wars is barely statistically significant." Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight - a score that would make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies - makes a dramatic difference. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171. and the expected number of wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is to be expected. In short, by adopting restrictive definitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter-democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive definitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the definition of democracy and thereby save the finding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial.

#### 3] Autocratic Peace Theory is true – reject your cognitive bias to think otherwise

Gartzke and Wesiger 13, Erik, and Alex Weisiger. "Permanent friends? Dynamic difference and the democratic peace." International Studies Quarterly 57.1 (2013): 171-185. (Professor at UPenn in Political Science)//Elmer

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether demo- cratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several stud- ies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recog- nize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reci- procal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990). 6 How- ever, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggres- sively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic – autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evalu- ate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war prone than democracy – autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized econ- omies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002) goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifi able democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that simi- larity of both political and economic institutions encour- ages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace

, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in con- trast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for demo- cratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or conse- quences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical ele- gance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical argu- ments that spring from regime similarity in general.

### Advantage 2

#### 4] No Extinction from Warming – new studies prove over-hype and tech solves.

* Extinction Tipping Point is implausible – we’re on track for 3 degrees, not 4-5 degrees
* Tech and Energy Modernization Solve – Renewable Energy is replacing Fossil Fuels which reduces Climate Mortality by a rate of 5.

Nordhaus 20 Ted Nordhaus 1-23-2020 “Ignore the Fake Climate Debate” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816>, found by BPS, (American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts)//Re-cut by Elmer

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the **greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations.** In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas **has** displaced coal **as the primary source of new fossil energy**. The falling cost of wind and solar energy has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy has made a modest comeback in Asia.