# 1AC

### 1AC – Framework

**Presumption and permissibility affirm**

**A] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.B] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason. C] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong. D] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.**

#### The Meta-Ethic is Moral Pluralism; Clashing viewpoints does not require the exclusion of one over another but instead the acceptance that both can be valuable ethical tools. Prefer

#### 1] Empirics- Best studies prove pluralistic tendencies are inevitable

Polzler and Wright 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019] Dulles AS

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming.

#### **2] Only a pragmatic deliberative model accepts ongoing confrontation as legitimate rather than oppositional.** Thus, the standard is promoting pragmatic deliberation.

Serra 1 [Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member]

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that ethicsisvaluable as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moralinquiryisperformedin a deliberativeway**,** weighing up argumentations, beliefs andprinciples**,** andcomparingthem either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible experiencesthatcan be forceful or impingeuponthe deliberative subject in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... Suchresponsivenessispartofwhatitistomakea moral decision and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, this same deliberativeactivityimpliesanefforttoacquirehabits**,** beliefs and principles thatcontributeto a truly freedeliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef- forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, theactivitytakes the formofexperimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. The real and living logical conclusionisthat habit (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### 3] Resolvability- Thousands of years of metaethical debates have concluded in indecisiveness so a 45-minute debate would be unable to correctly resolve nebulous ethical disputes and identify the correct theory. Resolvability outweighs on jurisdiction since it’s a meta-constraint on the judge’s final jurisdiction.

#### Prefer additionally -

#### 1] Performativity- Responding to our framework concedes the validity of pragmatism since that in and of itself is a process of contestation that pragmatism would say is valuable and necessary for spaces like debate to function.

#### 2] TJFS- Frameworks should be fair/educational like any other argument.

#### A] Inclusion – Deliberation definitionally is a procedural for allowing almost any argumentation in the debate space which controls the internal link to inclusion which is an impact multiplier

#### B] Resource Disparities- Discursive frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have.

#### 3] Value Pluralism- Other ethical theories rely on minimalistic criteria as their foundation, our framework resolves this by using these criteria to better inform our judgments LaFollete 2K "Pragmatic Ethics" [Hugh LaFollette](http://www.hughlafollette.com/index.htm) In [Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory](http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm) 2000. Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

Employs criteria, but is not criterial The previous discussions enable us to say more precisely why pragmatists reject a criterial view of morality. Pragmatism's core contention that practiceis primary in philosophy rulesoutthe hope of logically prior criteria. Any meaningful criteria evolve from our attempt to live morally – in deciding what is the best action in the circumstances. Criteriaare not discovered by pure reason, and they arenotfixed. As ends of action, they are always revisable. Asweobtainnewevidenceabout ourselves and our world, and as our worlds changes, wefindthat whatwasappropriatefor the old environment maynotbeconduciveto survival in thenew one. A style of teaching that might have been ideal for one kind institution (a progressive liberal arts college) at one time (the 60s) may be wholly ineffective in another institution (a regional state university) at another time (the 80s). But that is exactly what we would expect of an evolutionary ethic. Neither could criteria be complete. Themoralworldiscomplexandchangeable**.** No set of criteriacouldgiveusunivocalanswersabouthowwe should behave in all circumstances**.** If we cannot develop an algorithm for winning at chess, where there are only eighteen first moves, there is no way to develop an algorithm for living, which has a finitely large number of "first moves." Moreover, while the chess environment (the rules) stays constant, our natural and moral environments do not. We must adapt or fail. While there is always one end of chess -- the game ends when one player wins – the ends of life change as we grow, and asour environmentschange. Finally, we cannot resolve practical moral questions simply by applying criteria. We do not make personal or profession decisions by applying fixed, complete criteria. Why should we assume we should make moral decisions that way? Appropriates insights from other ethical theories Nonetheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which a pragmatic ethic employs what we might call criteria, but their nature and role dramatically differ from that in a criterial morality (Dewey 1985/1932) . Pragmaticcriteriaare not external rules we apply, but aretoolsweuseinmakinginformedjudgements. They embody learning from previous action, they express our tentative efforts to isolate morally relevant features of those actions. These emergentcriteriacanbecomeintegratedinto our habits**,** thereby informingthe waysthat wereactto, think about, and imagine ourworldsand our relations to others. This explains why pragmatists think other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally. Standard moral theories err not because they offer silly moral advice, but because they misunderstand that advice. Othermoral theoriescan help us isolate(and habitually focus on) morallyrelevantfeaturesof action. And pragmatists take help wherever they can get it. Utilitarianism does not provide an algorithm for deciding how to act, but it shapes habits to help us "naturally" attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but it sensitizes us to ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractarianism does not resolve all moral issues, but it sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is mistaken to suppose that the pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues, and the collective wisdom of human experience. The pragmatist absorbs these insights into her habits, and thereby shapes how she habitually responds, and how she habitually deliberates when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be minimalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. Pragmatism, on the other hand, like virtue theories, is more concerned to emphasize exemplary behavior – to use morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave, not the minimally tolerable way.

#### 5] Rule Following Paradox- There is nothing inherent to a rule that tells us how we ought to follow it, regardless of how correct the rule is. Only deliberation accounts for the diversity of interpretations of our norms.

#### **6]** Resolves Skepticism-

#### A] Discussion between many bodies means that moral uncertainty can be deliberated and resolved.

#### B] Truth only makes sense in groups of people so only they can prescribe action

#### 7] Quantum superposition proves different ethics can exist simultaneously – prag is the only metric to reconcile them

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### 8] Social relations are dynamic and constantly being decentered from normative systems of knowledge; only pragmatism’s understanding of interactive knowledge production can mitigate entrenched violence.

Kadlec 8, Alison. "Critical pragmatism and deliberative democracy." Theoria 55.117 (2008): 54-80. (doctorate in political science from the University of Minnesota and bachelor's degrees from Michigan State University in political theory, constitutional democracy and English literature.)//Dulles AS

Social Intelligence: The Critical Potential Lived Experience Though human nature is intersubjectively generated on an ongoing basis, we are not merely the products of Platonic conceptions of ourselves. Individuals are cultivated in and by society through experiential processes in which we are acted upon, and act back upon a dynamic environment. For Dewey, 'experience' connotes a very specific process that stands in stark contrast to the traditional conception of experience as a matter of private consciousness. Because Dewey's notion of experience is **social, active, and educative,** what he calls the 'experiential continuum' is the process by which we are best able to develop social intelligence. The 'experiential continuum' is characterised by our enduring and undergoing the consequences of our actions, and intelligence is to be understood as the self-conscious and ongoing process of adjusting our attitudes in light of these consequences.25 In The Public and Its Problems , Dewey gives this view of intelligence a decidedly deliberative spin when he says, 'we lie, as Emerson said, in the lap of an immense intelligence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken, inarticulate and faint until it possesses the local community as its medium'.26 In 'Ethical Principles Underlying Education', Dewey is more explicit in explaining his view of the relationship between social intelligence and the normative commitment to democracy in his declaration that 'ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more nor less than social intelligence the power of observing and comprehending social situations and social power trained capacities of control at work in the service of social interest and aims'.27 Dewey's unflagging faith in the transformative potential of social intelligence intrinsic to democracy as a way of life **is not Utopian**, nor is it based on a belief that all problems are finally solvable. Rather, it expresses a moral commitment that suggests that a working faith in social intelligence is our best shot at crafting habits and institutions that will further encourage us to identify **new opportunities for the expansion of our capacities** moving forward. The upshot here is that democracy as a way of life means, above all, that we stop thinking of democracy as a thing and start thinking about it as a way. Democracy is belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in ordered richness. . . . Democracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that the special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing process. Since the process of experience is capable of being **educative**, faith in democracy is all one with faith in experience and education. All ends and values that are cut off from the ongoing process become arrests and fixations. They strive to fixate what has been gained instead of using it to open the road and point the way to new and better experiences.28 On this account, social intelligence is not a possession, it is a de-centred and educative process of ordering our **experiences** through manifold **communication**. The guiding principles, then, of social intelligence are 1) the protection and expansion of our capacity for free and communicative inquiry and 2) the protection and expansion of our capacity to perceive the shared consequences of our habits and policies. We judge the goodness or badness of these consequences by evaluating the way they act back on and impact our individual capacities for free inquiry that inform the ongoing development of social intelligence In turn, the 'proper conditions' for social intelligence then are those that increase our ability to perceive the complex shared consequences of our choices and practices. Intelligence is social in pragmatism because it requires the development of both firstand second-order attitudes that can only take place in an ongoing process of communication. Free inquiry is not just a matter of having the opportunity to seek information that will allow for the generation of thoughtful attitudes about issues, it is also a matter of appreciating and harnessing the democratic potential of second-order attitudes (attitudes about our attitudes). We are not passive receivers of information, **but dynamic interactors**, and therefore intelligence is intrinsically communicative. Free inquiry is the engine of social intelligence, which is in turn based on our willingness to have our firstorder attitudes adjusted in light of our second-order attitudes.29 The ongoing mutual adjustment of our first-order and second-order attitudes through a back and forth process between the two emerges only to the extent that we have the opportunities to communicate freely with others, and this is none other than the 'method' of social intelligence. The goal of communicative inquiry then is to build an ever richer context for the ongoing development of our ability to perceive the relationship between our beliefs, practices, and institutions. By taking a principal focus on increasing our ability for evermore sophisticated perception of the consequences of our habits of thought and action, we will be better equipped to distinguish between those habits that improve and those that impede our capacities for free inquiry. This is the material of problem-solving, as it is just this capacity for free inquiry that makes it possible to identify common problems in a way that they may be productively addressed. Turning back to the challenges leveled by radical democratic theorists, we can begin to see the opportunities made possible by critical pragmatism. Tapping into the critical potential of lived experience under conditions of unalterable changefulness begins with the therapeutic recognition that there is no such thing as a unified field of power directed entirely by stable and fixed interests. The first implication here is that there are always new opportunities to exploit cracks and fissures in various structurally **entrenched forms of power**. Second, the essentially complexity and flux of our world is always **producing new opportunities for transformative resistance** and for the development of more creative approaches to meaningful deliberation. Critical pragmatism pivots on the notion that under such conditions what we most need are not fixed and static foundations, we need the flexible habits of inquiry and **communication** that make it possible to both identify pernicious obstacles to deliberation and to challenge, circumvent, or neutralise their impact.

#### 9] Materiality- Our framework moves away from abstraction and understands knowledge as changing in order to base social change and revision of ideas. Glaude 7’ Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7) Bracketed for grammer. Dulles AS

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be thefruitof our undertakingsas we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through **the** control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuinga future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker**,** withthe understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidaritycaptures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic **life** andbroadeningtheground of individual self-development**.**14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

#### 10] Motivational Externalism is true-

#### A] Tangibility- it’s the only thing that affects us tangibly and we recognizably prove causal linkages because we see external forces affecting us which O/w on verifiability.

#### B] Actualization- the only way to verify or actualize internal motivation is via action with the external world which means only external forces can guide action

#### C] Pre-requisite- external objects and markers influence internal drives i.e. me seeing ice cream in the external world prompts me to have an internal desire to eat it

#### Ethical theories must have a theory of motivation to function: A] Bindingness- Otherwise individuals could just opt out and ask why we must follow X theory which devolves to skepticism B] Application- If your framework cannot motivate individuals to follow it then it cannot guide action

#### 11] Root cause- The AC framework is the only way that one can recognize and solve the root cause of all violence – an affirmation of ethics which recognize others is key.

Burggraeve [http://www.staff.amu.edu.pl/~ewa/Burggraeve-Violence%20and%20the%20Vulnerable%20Face%20of%20the%20Other.pdf (Roger Burggraeve was born in Passendale, Flanders (Belgium), in 1942. Salesian of Don Bosco (priest). Licentiate in Philosophy (Rome, 1966). Doctorate in Moral Theology (Leuven, 1980). Associate Professor at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, KU Leuven (1980-1988). Professor (Ordinarius) from 1988 till 2007; now Emeritus Professor.]

Strictly speaking, racism takes the view that one group of people is morally or culturally superior to another group, based on a hereditary difference in race. Racism considers the racial origin of an individual or a community as the factor determining not only the appearance but also the way of thinking and acting. Moreover, racism accords value to one race above all others, and one who is racist usually reckons himself among the superior race. According to racist thinking, people are considered in the ﬁrst place or even exclusively in terms of their belongingness to a different race, most often visible in color of skin and other physical features (ﬁgure, nose, eyes, and so forth). On the basis of these features, they are then judged and above all condemned. And these condemnations are in turn nourished and strengthened by all sorts of "images of the enemy” cast against the "other" race. For Levinas, it is clear that racism was incarnated in an "exceptional" way in the persecution of the Jews by the National Socialism of Hitler and his followers (AS 60), which he therefore designates as "the diabolical criminality of absolute evil” (CCH 82). In his work Mein Kampf, Hitler argued for the superiority of the so-called Aryan race, the race of the (Iber-mensch ["Superman”]. Only those who belonged to the "pure" Aryan race, who all the more so embodied this race purely, had the right to live and reproduce. The Nazis therefore not only developed ingenious, scientiﬁcally designed programs to "solve" the Jewish question (the Endlb’sung, or Shoah) by means of concentration camps and gas chambers (of which Auschwitz in Poland was only one, but the most famous). They also developed and enacted complex, extensive sterilization programs aimed speciﬁcally at the physically and mentally handicapped so that the Aryan race would not be stained by begetting "impure" children. And there were also the infamous euthanasia programs established in order to remove "gently" the incurably ill and mentally handicapped, who were thus less valuable and unnecessary members of the Aryan race. Because homosexuals did not contribute to the furthering of the pure Aryan race they were severely persecuted, and the gypsies were eradicated because they did not belong to the Aryan race and therefore represented a threat to its purity. In a Wider sense, one also speaks of racism when one recognizes and relates to others on the basis of their belonging to another culture, language group, or religion. As contemporary examples of this, we can point to the manner in which people today reject immigrants from the Arab world and wish to expel them because of their origin in another religion, speciﬁcally Islam and its related traditions. Or think of the long-standing suppression and discrimination against African Americans in the United States, many of whose ancestors were brought over from Africa as slaves. According to Levinas, the core of racism consists not in the denial of, or failure to appreciate, similarities between people, but in the denial of, or better said, failure to appreciate and value, people’s differences, or better still, the fundamental and irreducible otherness by which they fall outside of every genre and are thus “unique”: "Alterity ﬂows in no sense out of difference, to the contrary difference goes back to alterity” (VA 92). A racist relation wants to recognize and value only the "same," or one’s “own” [het eigene], and therefore excludes the "foreign." Out of self-defense, we are easily inclined to accept and consider positively only that which agrees with, or is "similar" to, ourselves. One finds the other embarrassing, threatening, and frightening. One therefore tries to expel him from oneself, to place him outside so that he can be considered as the "enemy" from whom one "may" defend oneself, and whom one may even "destroy" as what brings life and well-being under pressure, unless one can reduce him to oneself or make him a part of oneself. One wants to accept ”others” (or "strangers," or ”foreigners”) only to the extent that they belong to one’s own “genre” or “kind,” which is to say to one’s own blood and soil, to the same family, tribe, sex, clan, nation, church, club, or community, do the same work, have the same birthplace and date. One’s ”own” is praised and even divinized at the price of the "other," which is vilified. The “stranger” becomes the scapegoat on whom we blame all of our problems and worries. One accepts differences only insofar as they are a matter of accidental particularities or specificities within a same genre or basic design, in which individuals differ from one another within a same “sort” only very relatively (for example, character, taste, intellectual level), and in which their deeper afﬁnity is not at all tested (VA 97). Against this background, it is clear that for Levinas anti-Semitism, as a specific and advanced form of racism, takes aim at the Jew as the intolerable other. For anti-Semitic thinking and sentiment, the Jew is simply the enemy, just as for every racism the other is the enemy as such, that is to say not on the basis of personality, one or another character trait, or a specific act considered morally troublesome or objectionable, but due only to his very otherness. In anti-Semitism, the Jew, as "other," is always the guilty one. It is never "oneself," the embodiment of the "same" that not only arranges everything around itself but also profiles itself as principle of meaning and value (CAJ 77—79).From this perspective on racism as rejection of the other, it appears, according to Levinas, that racism is not a rare and improbable phenomenon existing in the heart and thought of only some "perverse" people that has nothing to do with us. Insofar as one is, according to the spontaneous dynamic of existing, or conatus essendi, directed toward the "same," toward maintaining and fortifying one’s ”own”—all such as I have just sketched it—one must be considered "by nature” potentially racist, though of course without being "predestined" for it. In itself, this admits no question of psychological or pathological deviation. According to Levinas, this implies that one cannot simply dispense with the racism of Hitler and the Nazis, in contrast to something instead occurring only once, as a wholly distinct and incomparable phenomenon, at least if one views it not quantitatively but qualitatively, which is to say in terms of its roots and basic inspiration. In an attempt to hold open a pure—in fact, Manichean—distinction between "good" (us) and "bad" (the ”others”), thus keeping oneself out of range of the difficulties in question, it happens all too often that Hitlerism is described as something completely unique that has nothing in common with the aims and affairs of the common mortal. The perspective of Levinas shows that Hitlerism, with its genocide and other programs of eradication, is only a quantitative extension, that is to say a consistent, systematic, and inexorably reﬁned outgrowth of racism in its pure form, one that, in its turn, represents a concretization of the effort of existing, which, as the reduction of the other to the same, is the nature of our existence (without,on the other hand, our being abandoned to this nature as a fatality, since as ethical beings we can overcome it). No one is invulnerable; any of us is a potential racist, and at least sometimes a real racist. Racism, like Hitlerism, does not occur by chance, or by an accidental turn. Nor is it an exceptional perversion occurring in a group of psychologically disturbed people. It is a permanent possibility woven into the dynamic of our very being, so that Whoever accedes to and lives out the dynamic of his own being inevitably extends racism in one or another form (AS 60—61). We can no longer blame racism and anti-Semitism on "others," for both their possibility and the temptation to them are borne in the dynamic of our ohm being: as "non-reciprocal determination of the other” (T I 99), which is precisely the kernel of our freedom (TI 97). It is specifically to unmask this racist violence, and all forms of violence as modalities of denial of the other as other, that Levinas discerns the basic ethical norm in the commandment mentioned and explicated above, “Thou shall not kill,” which is to say in the commandment to ;respect the otherness of the other. In committing to the possible overcoming of evil, and of racism in particular, through the ethical choice for the good, Levinas certainly realizes how vulnerable this "overcoming" of evil is. By rejecting the idea that every objective system, through its ironclad, mechanistic laws and coerciveness, might be able to render evil impossible forever, and instead basing everything on the ethical call to the good, he makes clear that abuse, violence, and the racist exclusion and elimination of the other are constantly possible and can never be definitively overcome. In ethics, there is no eschatology, in the sense of a guaranteed "better world” or "world without evil.” There is only the ”good will” that must always prove itself in a choice against evil that is neither evident nor easy. Only in this way can there be a good future and justice for the other: only through ethical vigilance with respect to all forms of violence, tyranny, hate, and racism, and a society that nurtures in both our upbringing and education a “sensibility” for the other as “stranger.” Such a sensitivity takes in full seriousness the ethical essence of the human person, and serves always to put us back on the path to a culture "where the other counts more than I do,” and where the most foreign enjoys our complete hospitality.

### 1AC – Offense

#### I affirm Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### The appropriation of space by private entities isn’t value neutral but is sutured in a discourse of the cosmic elite and unequal IR.

Stockwell 20 [Samuel Stockwell (Research Project Manager, the Annenberg Institute at Brown University). “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”. E-International Relations. Jul 20 2020. Accessed 12/7/21. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> //Xu]

The US government’s support for private space companies is also likely to lead to the reinforcement of Earth-bound wealth inequalities in space. Many NewSpace actors frame their long-term ambitions in space with strong anthropogenic undertones, by offering the salvation of the human race from impending extinction through off-world colonial developments (Kearnes & Dooren: 2017: 182). Yet, this type of discourse disguises the highly exclusive nature of these missions. Whilst they seem to suggest that there is a stake for ordinary citizens in the vast space frontier, the reality is that these self-described space pioneers are a member of a narrow ‘cosmic elite’ – “founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal… and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates” (Parker, 2009: 91). Indeed, private space enterprises have themselves suggested that they have no obligation to share mineral resources extracted in space with the global community (Klinger, 2017: 208). This is reflected in the speeches of individuals such as Nathan Ingraham, a senior editor at the tech site EngadAsteroid mining, who claimed that asteroid mining was “how [America is] going to move into space and develop the next Vegas Strip” (Shaer, 2016: 50). Such comments highlight a form of what Beery (2016) defines as ‘scalar politics’. In similar ways to the ‘scaling’ of unequal international relations that has constituted our relationship with outer space under the guise of the ‘global commons’ (Beery, 2016: 99), private companies – through their anthropogenic discourse – are scaling existing Earth-bound wealth inequalities and social relations into space by siphoning off extra-terrestrial resources. By constructing their endeavours in ways that appeal to the common good, NewSpace actors are therefore concealing the reality of how commercial resource extraction serves the exclusive interests of their private shareholders at the expense of the vast majority of the global population.

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, no rvis– 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs and no 2NR theory and paradigm issues– 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time. Aff theory first – it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time. Evaluate the theory debate after the 1ar so we both get one speech which is most reciprocal

#### 2] AFF fairness issues come prior to NC arguments since the 1ar can’t engage on multiple layers if there is a skew since the speech is already time-crunched. All your arguments concede the importance of fairness since you assume your arguments will be evaluated fairly when you enter the round – even fairness impact turns.

#### 3] All K’s must defend a concrete policy alternative A]Critical ed: Policy alts are better for your kritik, it allows us the ability to engage in productive discussions rather than endless critic of each other’s reps without solutions B] Engagement: There are a million different reps or things I can do that someone disagrees with C] otherwise mental gymnastics which reifies oppression since we don't acknowledge the states inevitability which promotes false hope.

#### 4] Interpretation: The negative must concede the affirmative framework if it is not morally repugnant and the advocacy is topical and disclosed

#### Violation: they didn’t

#### Prefer-

#### A] Time skew- Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense – that outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse

#### B] Topic Ed- Every debate would just be a framework debate which means we never get access to core topic lit – that outweighs on time frame – we only have 2 months

### 1AC – Advantage

#### Advantage one is mining.

#### Space mining coming now – lack of regulations makes conflicts likely.

Zeisl 19 [Yasemin Zeisl, MSc in International Relations and Affairs from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), “Three Salient Risks of Mining in Space,” 05/03/19, *GlobalRiskIntel*, https://www.globalriskintel.com/insights/three-salient-risks-mining-space, EA]

The harvesting of natural resources from space objects is the goal of numerous companies such as Planetary Resources or Deep Space Industries in the United States, Asteroid Mining Corporation in Scotland, or iSpace in Japan. While some companies such as iSpace are focusing on resources inside the Moon, others are developing strategies to identify and extract resources from asteroids and extinct comets. Given that calculations evaluate space mining as a highly lucrative business with potential profits amounting to trillions in U.S.-dollars, it is unsurprising that investment into space mining rose from 534 million USD in 2014 to 3.1 billion USD in 2018.

Research institutions such as the Center for Near-Earth Object Studies (CNEOS) — which cooperates with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) — detects, traces, and assesses risks of objects moving close to the Earth. Such calculations are relevant for future ventures into space mining, which will focus on metals such as platinum, gold, iron, rhodium, zinc, cobalt, and nickel, as well as water and carbon found in asteroids and extinct comets. Celestial ice would be particularly useful for generating rocket fuel by splitting it into hydrogen and oxygen. This may facilitate long space travel to destinations such as Mars. The usage of extinct comets as gas stations may bring engineers and scientists one step closer to the goal of colonizing Mars. While rocket fuel extraction may be a relatively feasible project for the near future, it is expected that harvesting metals from space may require several more decades to realize.

Spotting the potential profitability of space mining, the United States passed the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act in 2015 to grant U.S. citizens the right to harvest natural resources from celestial bodies. Similarly, Luxembourg established a space mining law and provided investment opportunities in August 2017. In January 2019, Russia started negotiating a bilateral cooperation arrangement with Luxembourg.

The fact that there is no clearly defined international treaty on space mining poses a major risk. Although the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1984 may provide some detail on the issue by asserting that no state, organization, or natural person can lay claim to any object in space, the fact that only 18 countries have committed to this multilateral treaty leaves the majority of states unbound by this regulation. An inconsistent legal landscape in regard to resource extraction of celestial bodies could lead to legal clashes between different countries and potential disadvantages for companies or organizations from certain countries. Mining in space could turn into a fierce competition among various private businesses and states. Therefore, licensing regulations will also have to be clearly defined. Licenses will help to clarify both ownership of yields and the relationships among miners, investors, and governments in order to avoid conflict in the future.

#### Mining solves defo, erosion, chemicals, and resource wars.

Aziz 15 [John Aziz, Economics and Business correspondent at The Week, “How asteroid mining could add trillions to the world economy,” 01/11/15, *The Week*, https://theweek.com/articles/462830/how-asteroid-mining-could-add-trillions-world-economy, EA]

The potential benefits to asteroid mining reach far beyond just profit, economic growth, and expanding Earth's resource base. While mining on Earth can be highly destructive to natural habitats — resulting in deforestation, soil erosion, chemical contamination, and the pollution of groundwater — mining in space doesn't damage any natural habitats. Even more significantly, less resource bottlenecks means less potential for future resource wars between competing countries — a frightening scenario which the Pentagon has begun planning to address if need be.

#### Deforestation causes extinction.

Cross 20 [Daniel T Cross, citing Mauro Bologna, professor @ the University of Tarapacá, “Continued deforestation will doom us all, experts warn,” 07/30/20, *Sustainability Times*, https://www.sustainability-times.com/environmental-protection/continued-deforestation-will-doom-us-all-experts-warn/, Accessed: 04/20/21, EA]

Even as the planet’s population continues to grow apace, its forests are being cut down to make way for more grazing land, more farmland and more development. Forests are finite resources and once they are gone they are gone for good. That is why halting deforestation worldwide is a high priority.

Earth’s forest cover is at slightly over 4 billion hectares and continues to decrease, according to a new report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rampant deforestation has led to the loss of 420 million hectares in just four decades, mainly in Africa and South America.

“The top countries for average annual net losses of forest area over the last 10 years are Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Angola, Tanzania, Paraguay, Myanmar, Cambodia, Bolivia and Mozambique,” FAO notes.

“However, there is good news as the rate of forest loss has declined substantially over the past three decades,” the UN agency adds. “The annual rate of deforestation was estimated at 10 million hectares between 2015-2020, compared with 12 million during 2010-2015. The area of forest under protection has also reached roughly 726 million hectares: nearly 200 million more than in 1990.”

Yet unless we stop cutting down forests at anything like current rates, our entire global civilization could well be doomed within just a few decades, warn other experts. In a new study two theoretical physicists who specialize in complex systems argue that with diminished forests the planet will not be able to support billions of people, which will be the death knell of human life as we have known it.

“Based on the current resource consumption rates and best estimate of technological rate growth our study shows that we have very low probability, less than 10% in [the] most optimistic estimate, to survive without facing a catastrophic collapse,” explain the two experts, Dr. Gerardo Aquino and Prof. Mauro Bologna.

At current rates of deforestation almost all the planet’s forests will have been felled within one or two centuries, they point out. Before human civilizations came on the scene the planet was covered in 60 million square kilometers of forest, yet that rate has plummeted to 40 million square kilometers. And many of the remaining forests have been badly thinned and fragmented.

“Calculations show that, maintaining the actual rate of population growth and resource consumption, in particular forest consumption, we have a few decades left before an irreversible collapse of our civilization,” warn Aquino and Bologna.

Because forests play key roles in biodiversity, oxygen production, soil conservation, water cycle regulation and food systems, significant losses in them will trigger a cascade of environmental effects that will lead to civilizational collapse and the possible extinction of humanity, at least in its current form.

“[I]t is highly unlikely to imagine the survival of many species, including ours, on Earth without [forests],” the the physicists argue. “The progressive degradation of the environment due to deforestation would heavily affect human society and consequently the human collapse would start much earlier” than the final disappearance of forests.

#### So do chemical emissions.

Cribb 17 [Julian Cribb, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, “Surviving the 21st Century,” 2017, Springer, pp. 116-117, EA]

Chemical Extinction

Two billion years ago, excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the extermination of all life. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. This event was known as the ‘oxygen holocaust’, and is probably the nearest life on Earth has ever come to complete disaster before the present (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that it is possible for living creatures to pollute themselves into oblivion, if they don’t take care to avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment. It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder.

While it is unlikely that human chemical emissions alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilization, it is likely they will emerge as a serious contributing factor during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown. Credible ways in which man-made chemicals might imperil the human future include:

• Undermining the immune systems, physical and mental health of the population through growing exposure to toxins

• Reducing the intelligence of current and future generations through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, rendering humanity less able to solve its problems and adapt to major changes; and by increasing the level of violent crime and conflict in society, which is closely linked to lower IQ.

• Bringing down the economy through the massive healthcare costs of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure.

• By poisoning the ecosystem services—clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—on which humanity depends for its own survival and thereby contributing to potential global ecosystem breakdown

#### And soil erosion.

Monbiot 15 [George Monbiot, Guardian columnist and the author of Feral, The Age of Consent and Out of the Wreckage: a New Politics for an Age of Crisis, “We’re treating soil like dirt. It’s a fatal mistake, because all human life depends on it,” 03/25/15, *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/treating-soil-like-dirt-fatal-mistake-human-life]

Imagine a wonderful world, a planet on which there was no threat of climate breakdown, no loss of freshwater, no antibiotic resistance, no obesity crisis, no terrorism, no war. Surely, then, we would be out of major danger? Sorry. Even if everything else were miraculously fixed, we’re finished if we don’t address an issue considered so marginal and irrelevant that you can go for months without seeing it in a newspaper.¶ It’s literally and – it seems – metaphorically, beneath us. To judge by its absence from the media, most journalists consider it unworthy of consideration. But all human life depends on it. We knew this long ago, but somehow it has been forgotten. As a Sanskrit text written in about 1500BC noted: “Upon this handful of soil our survival depends. Husband it and it will grow our food, our fuel and our shelter and surround us with beauty. Abuse it and the soil will collapse and die, taking humanity with it.”¶ The issue hasn’t changed, but we have. Landowners around the world are now engaged in an orgy of soil destruction so intense that, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, the world on average has just 60 more years of growing crops. Even in Britain, which is spared the tropical downpours that so quickly strip exposed soil from the land, Farmers Weekly reports, we have “only 100 harvests left”.¶ To keep up with global food demand, the UN estimates, 6m hectares (14.8m acres) of new farmland will be needed every year. Instead, 12m hectares a year are lost through soil degradation. We wreck it, then move on, trashing rainforests and other precious habitats as we go. Soil is an almost magical substance, a living system that transforms the materials it encounters, making them available to plants. That handful the Vedic master showed his disciples contains more micro-organisms than all the people who have ever lived on Earth. Yet we treat it like, well, dirt.¶ The techniques that were supposed to feed the world threaten us with starvation. A paper just published in the journal Anthropocene analyses the undisturbed sediments in an 11th-century French lake. It reveals that the intensification of farming over the past century has increased the rate of soil erosion sixtyfold.¶ Another paper, by researchers in the UK, shows that soil in allotments – the small patches in towns and cities that people cultivate by hand – contains a third more organic carbon than agricultural soil and 25% more nitrogen. This is one of the reasons why allotment holders produce between four and 11 times more food per hectare than do farmers.¶ Whenever I mention this issue, people ask: “But surely farmers have an interest in looking after their soil?” They do, and there are many excellent cultivators who seek to keep their soil on the land. There are also some terrible farmers, often absentees, who allow contractors to rip their fields to shreds for the sake of a quick profit. Even the good ones are hampered by an economic and political system that could scarcely be better designed to frustrate them.¶ This is the International Year of Soils, but you wouldn’t know it. In January, the Westminster government published a new set of soil standards, marginally better than those they replaced, but wholly unmatched to the scale of the problem. There are no penalities for compromising our survival except a partial withholding of public subsidies. Yet even this pathetic guidance is considered intolerable by the National Farmers’ Union, which greeted them with bitter complaints. Sometimes the NFU seems to me to exist to champion bad practice and block any possibility of positive change.¶ Few sights are as gruesome as the glee with which the NFU celebrated the death last year of the European soil framework directive, the only measure with the potential to arrest our soil-erosion crisis. The NFU, supported by successive British governments, fought for eight years to destroy it, then crowed like a shedful of cockerels when it won. Looking back on this episode, we will see it as a parable of our times.¶ Soon after that, the business minister, Matthew Hancock, announced that he was putting “business in charge of driving reform”: trade associations would be able “to review enforcement of regulation in their sectors.” The NFU was one the first two bodies granted this privilege. Hancock explained that this “is all part of our unambiguously pro-business agenda to increase the financial security of the British people.” But it doesn’t increase our security, financial or otherwise. It undermines it.¶ The government’s deregulation bill, which has now almost completed its passage through parliament, will force regulators – including those charged with protecting the fabric of the land – to “have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth”. But short-term growth at the expense of public protection compromises long-term survival. This “unambiguously pro-business agenda” is deregulating us to death.¶ There’s no longer even an appetite for studying the problem. Just one university – Aberdeen – now offers a degree in soil science. All the rest have been closed down.¶ This is what topples civilisations. War and pestilence might kill large numbers of people, but in most cases the population recovers. But lose the soil and everything goes with it.¶ Now, globalisation ensures that this disaster is reproduced everywhere. In its early stages, globalisation enhances resilience: people are no longer dependent on the vagaries of local production. But as it proceeds, spreading the same destructive processes to all corners of the Earth, it undermines resilience, as it threatens to bring down systems everywhere.¶ Almost all other issues are superficial by comparison. What appear to be great crises are slight and evanescent when held up against the steady trickling away of our subsistence.