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#### CP: The member nations of the World Trade Organization, excluding the United States, should reduce intellectual property protections for anti-malarial medicines

#### Entirely solves while avoiding politics

Siripurapu 21 Anshu Siripurapu covers economics, energy, and geopolitics, BA in political economy from the University of Southern California. "The Debate Over a Patent Waiver for COVID-19 Vaccines: What to Know." Council on Foreign Relations, May 26, 2021, [www.cfr.org/in-brief/debate-over-patent-waiver-covid-19-vaccines-what-know](http://www.cfr.org/in-brief/debate-over-patent-waiver-covid-19-vaccines-what-know).

WTO negotiations are notoriously slow, and it could take months before countries reach an agreement, particularly over the scope and duration of a waiver. Decisions are normally made unanimously, and though a TRIPS waiver could be granted by a three-quarters vote of WTO members, it is unlikely that members would break precedent.

#### Infrastructure and reconciliation are the priority now. they’ll pass by new deadline

Alemany 10/12 [Jacqueline Alemany and Theodoric Meyer, "The new deadline to pass Biden's agenda is coming up fast", 10/12/21, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/13/new-deadline-pass-biden-agenda-is-coming-up-fast/]

New deadline, old problems: Less than two weeks after House Democrats missed a deadline to hold a vote on the infrastructure bill, the party is staring down another one.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer say they’re aiming to pass the $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill and a larger package stuffed full of Democrats’ child care, health care and climate change priorities by Oct. 31, when a short-term extension of highway funding is set to run out.

Coincidentally, Oct. 31 is the day before the much-anticipated United Nations climate summit kicks off in Glasgow, where administration officials are eager to show off legislation that would establish credibility in negotiations with foreign governments. White House press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters last month that Biden expected the reconciliation bill — much of which is focused on fighting climate change — would “move forward in advance of that.”

(Asked about it on Tuesday, Psaki said Biden would tout the administration's commitment to combating climate change in Glasgow “regardless of where the package stands.”)

And two days later, Virginians will head to the polls to elect a new governor in a contest lawmakers and the White House are watching closely. Former Democratic Gov. Terry McAuliffe has implored Democrats in Washington to pass the infrastructure bill by Election Day.

The 18-day sprint

Can Democrats really pass two massive bills in the next 18 days?

“Yes,” Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-Va.) told The Early yesterday evening. “Will it is a different matter. But can it? Yeah. We’re experts at coming right up against the edge and pulling a miracle.”

#### Pushing a WTO treaty takes time, energy, and political capital away from domestic legislation – big pharma and EU allies

**Bhadrakumar 5/9** M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat. "Biden’s talk of vaccine IP waiver is political theater." Asia Times, May 9, 2021, asiatimes.com/2021/05/bidens-talk-of-vaccine-ip-waiver-is-political-theater.

On the other hand, Biden, whose political life of half a century was largely spent in the US Congress, is well aware of the **awesome clout** of the pharmaceutical companies in American politics. From that lobby’s perspective, the patent waiver “amounts to the expropriation of the property of the pharmaceutical companies whose innovation and financial investments made the development of Covid-19 vaccines possible in the first place,” as a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security puts it. The US pharmaceutical industry and congressional Republicans have already **gone on the offensiv**e blasting Biden’s announcement, saying it undermines incentives for American innovation. Besides, the argument goes, even with the patent waiver, vaccine manufacturing is a complex process and is not like simply flipping a switch. Senator Richard Burr, the top Republican on the US Senate Health Committee, denounced Biden’s decision. “Intellectual property protections are part of the reason we have these life-saving products,” he said. “Stripping these protections only ensures we won’t have the vaccines or treatments we need when the next pandemic occurs.” The Republican senators backed by Republican Study Committee chairman Jim Banks propose to introduce legislation to block the move. Clearly, Biden would rather **spend his political capital on getting the necessary legislation through Congress to advance his domestic reform agenda rather than spend time and energy to take on the pharmaceutical industry** to burnish his image as a good Samaritan on the world stage. Conceivably, Biden could be counting on the “text-based negotiations” at the WTO **dragging on for months, if not years**, without reaching anywhere. The US support for the waiver could even be a tactic to persuade pharmaceutical firms to back less drastic steps like sharing technology and expanding joint ventures to boost global production quickly. So far Covid-19 vaccines have been distributed primarily to the wealthy countries that developed them, while the pandemic sweeps through poorer ones such as India, and the real goal is, after all, expanded vaccine distribution. Biden is well aware that there will be **huge opposition** to the TRIPS waiver from the United States’ **European allies as well**. The British press has reported that the UK has been in closed-door talks at the World Trade Organization in recent months along with the likes of Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Singapore, the European Union and the US, who all opposed the idea.

#### Quickly secures the vulnerable grid.

Carney 21 [Chris, August 6; Senior Policy Advisor at Nossaman LLC, former US Representative, Former Professor of Political Science at Penn State University; JD Supra, “The US Senate Infrastructure Bill: Securing Our Electrical Grid Through P3s and Grants,” https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-us-senate-infrastructure-bill-4989100/]

As we begin to better understand the main components of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that the US Senate is working to pass this week, it is clear that public-private partnerships ("P3s") are a favored funding mechanism of lawmakers to help offset high costs associated with major infrastructure projects in communities. And while past infrastructure bills have used P3s for more conventional projects, the current bill also calls for P3s to help pay for protecting the US electric grid from cyberattacks. Responding to the increasing number of cyberattacks on our nation’s infrastructure, and given the fragile physical condition of our electrical grid, the Senate included provisions to help state, local and tribal entities harden electrical grids for which they are responsible.

Section 40121, Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private Partnerships, calls for not only physical protections of electrical grids, but also for enhancing cyber-resilience. This section seeks to encourage the various federal, state and local regulatory authorities, as well as industry participants to engage in a program that audits and assesses the physical security and cybersecurity of utilities, conducts threat assessments to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, and provides cybersecurity training to utilities. Further, the section calls for strengthening supply chain security, protecting “defense critical” electrical infrastructure and buttressing against a constant barrage of cyberattacks on the grid. In determining the nature of the partnership arrangement, the size of the utility and the area served will be considered, with priority going to utilities with fewer available resources.

Section 40122 compliments the previous section as it seeks to incentivize testing of cybersecurity products meant to be used in the energy sector, including SCADA systems, and to find ways to mitigate any vulnerabilities identified by the testing. Intended as a voluntary program, utilities would be offered technical assistance and databases of vulnerabilities and best practices would be created. Section 40123 incentivizes investment in advanced cybersecurity technology to strengthen the security and resiliency of grid systems through rate adjustments that would be studied and approved by the Secretary of Energy and other relevant Commissions, Councils and Associations.

Lastly, Section 40124, a long sought-after package of cybersecurity grants for state, local and tribal entities is included in the bill. This section adds language that would enable state, local and tribal bodies to apply for funds to upgrade aging computer equipment and software, particularly related to utilities, as they face growing threats of ransomware, denial of service and other cyberattacks. However, under Section 40126, cybersecurity grants may be tied to meeting various security standards established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and/or submission of a cybersecurity plan by a grant applicant that shows “maturity” in understanding the cyber threat they face and a sophisticated approach to utilizing the grant.

While the final outcome of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act may still be weeks or months away, inclusion of these provisions not only demonstrates a positive step forward for the application of federal P3s and grants generally, they also show that Congress recognizes the seriousness of the cyber threats our electrical grids face. Hopefully, through judicious application of both public-private partnerships and grants, the nation can quickly secure its infrastructure from cyberattacks.

#### Grid vulnerabilities spark nuclear war.

Klare 19 [Michael; November; Professor Emeritus of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College; Arms Control Association, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation]

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13

The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

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#### Counterplan Text – Member states of the World Trade Organization ought to consult the World Health Organization on whether or not the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to do the plan. The World Health Organization ought to publicly declare that their decision will represent their future decisions on all intellectual property protections on medicines.

#### The Plan’s unilateral action by the WTO on medical IP undermines WHO legitimacy – forcing a perception of WHO action against Patents is key to re-assert it

Rimmer 4, Matthew. "The race to patent the SARS virus: the TRIPS agreement and access to essential medicines." Melbourne Journal of International Law 5.2 (2004): 335-374.

<https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1681117/Rimmer.pdf> (BA (Hons), LLB (Hons) (Australian National University), PhD (New South Wales); Lecturer at ACIPA, the Faculty of Law, The Australian National University)//SidK + Elmer

The WHO has been instrumental in coordinating the international network of research on the SARS virus. It has emphasised the need for collaboration between the network participants. The WHO presented the containment of the SARS virus as ‘one of the biggest success stories in public health in recent years’.206 However, it **was less active in the debate over patent law** and public health epidemics. The 56th World Health Assembly considered the relationship between intellectual property, innovation and public health. It stressed that in order to tackle new public health problems with international impact, such as the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), access to new medicines with potential therapeutic effect, and health innovations and discoveries should be universally available without discrimination.207 However, there was much disagreement amongst the member states as to what measures would be appropriate. The WHO has made a number of aspirational statements about patent law and access to essential medicines. Arguably, though, the organisation could be a much more informed and vocal advocate. Initially, the WHO did not view the patent issues related to SARS as being within its field of activities. The agency didnoteven seem aware of the patent proceedings, leaving individual research institutions without guidance. Spokesman Dick Thompson said: ‘What we care about is [that] the international collaboration continues to function. Patents, they don’t really concern us’.208 The director of WHO’s Global Influenza project, Klaus Stöhr, expressed his opinion that the patent filings would not interfere with the international cooperation on the SARS research: ‘I don’t think this will undermine the collaborative spirit of the network of labs’.209 However, he believed that, after the international network of researchers had identified the coronavirus, it was necessary to rely upon companies to commercialise such research. Klaus Stöhr conceded: ‘At a certain point of time you have to give way for competitive pharmaceutical companies’.210 On a policy front, the WHO remained deferential to the WTO over the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines, observing: Owing to the inconclusive nature of the studies conducted to date, and because of the effect that potentially significant price increases could have on access to drugs in poor countries, WHO is currently monitoring and evaluating the effects of TRIPS on the prices of medicines. It is also monitoring the TRIPS impact on other important issues such as transfer of technology, levels of research and development for drugs for neglected diseases, and the evolution of generic drug markets.211 In such a statement, the WHO appears diffident, unwilling to take on more than a spectator role. Such a position is arguably too timid, given the gravity of national emergencies, such as the SARS virus. The organisation could take a much stronger stance on the impact of the **TRIPS** Agreement on public health concerns. The WHO has since enunciated a position statement on the patenting of the SARS virus. A number of high ranking officials from the organisation have commented on the need to ensure that international research into the SARS virus is not impeded by competition over patents. Arguably though, the WHO **should not be limited to a mere spectator role in such policy discussions. It** needstoplay an active advocacy role in the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines. The WHO released a position statement on ‘Patent Applications for the SARS Virus and Genes’ on 29 May 2003.212 The organisation stressed that it had no per se objection to the patenting of the SARS virus: Some people have objected to the SARS patent applications on the ground that the virus and its genes should not be patentable because they are mere discoveries, not inventions. This distinction no longer prevents the granting of patents; the novel claim rests not with the virus itself but with its isolation, and likewise with the identification of the genetic sequence not its mere occurrence. Many patents have been issued on viruses and genetic sequences, though the appropriate policies to follow in such cases — particularly as genomic sequencing becomes more routine and less ‘inventive’ — remain matters of dispute.213 Furthermore, it recognised that public institutions could legitimately use patents as a defensive means to prevent undue commercial exploitation of the research: The “defensive” use of patents can be a legitimate part of researchers’ efforts to make their discoveries (and further discoveries derived therefrom) widely available to other researchers, in the best collaborative traditions of biomedical science.214 The WHO affirmed the need for further cooperation between research organisations in respect of the SARS virus: ‘For continued progress against SARS, it is essential that we nurture the spirit of the unprecedented, global collaboration that rapidly discovered the novel virus and sequenced its genome’.215 The WHO announced its intention to monitor the effects of patents (and patent applications) on the speed with which SARS diagnostic tests, treatments, and vaccines are developed and made available for use, and on the manner in which prices are set for these technologies. It observed: In the longer term, the manner in which SARS patent rights are pursued could have a profound effect on the willingness of researchers and public health officials to collaborate regarding future outbreaks of new infectious diseases. WHO will therefore examine whether the terms of reference for such collaborations need to be modified to ensure that the credit for any intellectual property developed is appropriately attributed, that revenues derived from licensing such property are devoted to suitable uses, and that legitimate rewards for innovative efforts do not impose undue burdens on efforts to make tests, therapies, and preventive measure available to all.216 It maintained that in order to tackle new public health problems with international impact, such as the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), access to new medicines with potential therapeutic effect, and health innovations and discoveries should be universally available without discrimination.219 The Assembly requested that the Director-General continue to support Member States in the exchange and transfer of technology and research findings, according high priority to access to antiretroviral drugs to combat HIV/AIDS and medicines to control tuberculosis, malaria and other major health problems, in the context of paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration which promotes and encourages technology transfer.220 The WHO also considered a report on the emergence of the SARS virus and the international response to the infectious disease.221 It was ‘deeply concerned that SARS ... poses a serious threat to global health security, the livelihood of populations, the functioning of health systems, and the stability and growth of economies’.222 The Committee on Infectious Diseases requested that the Director-General ‘mobilize global scientific research to improve understanding of the disease and to develop control tools such as diagnostic tests, drugs and vaccines that are accessible to and affordable by Member States’.223 The Director-General of the WHO, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, **told the World Health** Assembly that there was a need to build trust and forge solidarity in the face of public health epidemics: ‘**Ensuring that patent regimes stimulate research and do not hinder international scientific cooperation** is a critical challenge — whether the target is SARS or any other threat to human health’.224 Similarly, Dr Marie-Paule Kieny, Director of the WHO Initiative for Vaccine Research, said: If we are to develop a SARS vaccine more quickly than usual, we have to continue to work together on many fronts at once, on scientific research, intellectual property and patents issues, and accessibility. It is a very complicated process, involving an unprecedented level of international cooperation, which is changing the way we work.225 She emphasised that patents and intellectual property issues and their safeguards can help rather than hinder the rapid development of SARS vaccines and ensure that, once developed, they are available in both industrialised and developing countries.226 C Summary The WHO should play a much more active role in the policy debate over patent law and access to essential medicines. James Love, the director of the Consumer Project on Technology, run by Ralph Nader, is critical of the WHO statement on ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health’.227 He maintains that the Assembly could have addressed ‘practical examples, like SARS’ and cites the report in The Washington Post that notes that a number of commercial companies are investing in SARS research.228 The non-government organisation Médecins Sans Frontières has been critical in the past of the passive role played by the WHO in the debate over access to essential medicines: ‘As the world’s leading health agency, and armed with the clear mandate of recent World Health Assembly resolutions, the WHO can and should **do much more’**.229 The WHO should become a vocal advocate for public health concerns at the WTO and its TRIPS Council — especially in relation to patent law and the SARS virus. It must staunchly defend the rights of member states to incorporate measures in their legislation that protect access to medicines — such as compulsory licensing, parallel imports, and measures to accelerate the introduction of generic pharmaceutical drugs. It needs to develop a clearer vision on global equity pricing for essential medicines. The race to patent the SARS virus seems to be an inefficient means of allocating resources. A number of public research organisations — including the BCCA, the CDC and HKU — were compelled to file patents in respect of the genetic coding of the SARS virus. Such measures were promoted as ‘defensive patenting’ — a means to ensure that public research and communication were not jeopardised by commercial parties seeking exclusive private control. However, there are important drawbacks to such a strategy. The filing of patents by public research organisations may be prohibitively expensive. It will also be difficult to resolve the competing claims between the various parties — especially given that they were involved in an international research network together. Seth Shulman argues that there is a need for international cooperation and communication in dealing with public health emergencies such as the SARS virus: The success of a global research network in identifying the pathogen is an example of the huge payoff that can result when researchers put aside visions of patents and glory for their individual laboratories and let their work behave more like, well, a virus. After all, the hallmark of an opportunistic virus like the one that causes SARS is its ability to spread quickly. Those mounting a response need to disseminate their information and innovation just as rapidly.230 There is a danger that such competition for patent rights may undermine trust and cooperation within the research network. Hopefully, however, such concerns could be resolved through patent pooling or joint ownership of patents. Furthermore, a number of commercial companies have filed patent applications in respect of research and development into the SARS virus. There will be a need for cooperation between the public and private sectors in developing genetic tests, vaccines, and pharmaceutical drugs that deal with the SARS virus. There is also a need to reform the patent system to deal with international collaborative research networks — such as that created to combat the SARS virus. Several proposals have been put forward. There has been a renewed debate over whether patents should be granted in respect of genes and gene sequences. Some commentators have maintained that the SARS virus should fall within the scope of patentable subject matter — to promote research and development in the field. However, a number of critics of genetic technology have argued that the SARS virus should not be patentable because it is a discovery of nature, and a commercialisation of life. There has been a discussion over the lack of harmonisation over the criteria of novelty and inventive step between patent regimes. As Peter Yu comments, ‘[w]hile [the] US system awards patents to those who are the first to invent, the European system awards patents to those who are the first to file an application’.231 There have been calls for the requirement of utility to be raised. There have also been concerns about prior art, secret use and public disclosure. Representative Lamar Smith of Texas has put forward the CREATE Act, which recognises the collaborative nature of research across multiple institutions. Such reforms are intended to ensure that the patent system is better adapted to deal with the global nature of scientific inquiry. The race to patent the SARS virus also raises important questions about international treaties dealing with access to essential medicines. The public health epidemic raises similar issues to other infectious diseases — such as AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, influenza, and so forth. The WHO made a public statement about its position on the patenting of the SARS virus. It has stated that it will continue to monitor developments in this field. Arguably, there is a need for the WHO to play a larger role in the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines. Not only could it mediate legal disputes over patents in respect of essential medicines, it could be a vocal advocate in policy discussions. The WTO has also played an important role in the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines. A number of public interest measures could be utilised to secure access to patents relating to the SARS virus including compulsory licensing, parallel importation and research exceptions. The appearance of the SARS virus shows that there should be an open-ended interpretation of the scope of diseases covered by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Important lessons should be learned from the emergence of the SARS virus, and the threat posed to global health. As the World Health Report 2003 notes: SARS will not be the last new disease to take advantage of modern global conditions. In the last two decades of the 20th century, new diseases emerged at the rate of one per year, and this trend is certain to continue. Not all of these emerging infections will transmit easily from person to person as does SARS. Some will emerge, cause illness in humans and then disappear, perhaps to recur at some time in the future. Others will emerge, cause human illness and transmit for a few generations, become attenuated, and likewise disappear. And still others will emerge, become endemic, and remain important parts of our human infectious disease ecology.232 Already, in 2004, there have been worries that pharmaceutical drug companies and patent rights are impeding efforts to prevent an outbreak of bird flu — avian influenza.233 There is a need to ensure that the patent system is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to cope with the appearance of new infectious diseases.234

#### WHO says yes

Kimball 21 [(Spencer, news editor with CNBC.com) “WHO chief urges world to follow U.S. lead and support waiving Covid vaccine patent protections,” CNBC, 5/7/2021] JL

World Health Organization Director General-Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on Friday urged other countries, particularly the Group of Seven industrialized nations, to follow the U.S. example and support a World Trade Organization motion to temporarily waive Covid-19 vaccine patent protections. “Wednesday’s announcement by the U.S. that it will support a temporary waiver of intellectual property protections for Covid-19 vaccines is a significant statement of solidarity and support for vaccine equity,” Tedros said at a press briefing. “I know that this is not a politically easy thing to do, so I very much appreciate the leadership of the U.S. and we urge other countries to follow their example.”

#### WHO Cred key to Global Right to Health – medicine access is critical.

* Note the Bottom Paragraph is at the bottom of the PDF – I put a paragraph break to indicate it as such – no words are missing.

Bluestone 3, Ken. "Strengthening WHO's position should be a priority for the new Director-General." The Lancet 361.9351 (2003): 2. (Senior Policy Adviser, Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO))//Elmer

To meet these challenges, WHO must strengthen its resolve to maintain its **independence and lead its member states**, **even at the risk of causing controversy**. A meaningful example is the role that WHO can have in **ensuring access to medicines** for the world’s poorest people. WHO is the only global institution that has the **remit to drive this agenda forward**, yet has failed to do so convincingly. The new Director-General must support and reinvigorate the advocacy efforts of the organisation and provide a proper counterbalance to the interests of the pharmaceutical industry and wealthy member states. As the new Director-General takes office, they will face the dual challenge of **seeing that** the broadest possible public health interpretation of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Agreement on Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) **is not lost, and** of seizing an opportunity to bring about an international framework for sustainable and predictable tiered pricing of medicines. Without the active intervention of a public health advocate at the level of WHO, there is a risk that both of these initiatives **could founder.** Some people in positions of power still do not have high expectations of WHO or its new Director-General. But for the world’s poorest people, the overwhelming majority of whom live in developing countries, this person’s legacy could literally make the difference between life and death. Ken Bluestone Senior Policy Adviser, Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO)

New leader should re-establish WHO’s credibility The credibility of WHO’s advocacy of the right to health for all has been eroded in recent years. A large reason is WHO’s **failure to challenge the pharmaceutical** industry on access to medicines for people with HIV/AIDS and other diseases. WHO’s collaboration with the industry in the “Accelerated Access” programme on antiretroviral medicines sounds good. In fact, the programme has served as a cover for the organisation’s frequent acceptance of industry arguments for restricting treatment access. To re-establish WHO’s credibility, the new Director-General must lead the organisation to stand consistently with those most deprived of health services. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch.

#### Right to Health solves Nationalist Populism.

Friedman 17 Eric Friedman March 2017 “New WHO Leader Will Need Human Rights to Counter Nationalistic Populism” <https://www.hhrjournal.org/2017/03/new-who-leader-will-need-human-rights-to-counter-populism/> (JD, Project Leader of the Platform for a Framework Convention on Global Health at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC)//Elmer

The need for WHO leadership on human rights—and for global leadership on health and human rights beyond WHO—has always been present, yet has become ever more pressing. A reactionary, nationalist populism has been gaining momentum, particularly in the United States and parts of Europe, and some of its most disturbing features, such as xenophobia and disregard for international law and institutions, are surfacing elsewhere. Persisting health challenges—such as immense national and global health inequities, with universal health coverage and the Sustainable Development Goals offering some hope of lessening them—and growing threats such as outbreaks of infectious disease, worsening antimicrobial resistance, and climate change demand the type of leadership that the right to health entails. In this immensely challenging environment, WHO needs to become a 21st century institution that has the gravitas and credibility to carve a path through these obstacles towards global health justice. The next WHO Director-General, to be elected in May, must lead the organization there. The right to health can light the way ahead, with reforms to, and driven by, WHO. These reforms must develop an internal governance that is far more welcoming of civil society, with WHO member states significantly increasing contributions so work on the social determinants of health can expand, and with enhanced transparency and accountability. Furthermore, reforms are needed so that WHO leads on global health equity and human rights, including through national health equity strategies and, above all, the Framework Convention on Global Health (FCGH). The FCGH could help bring the right to health to the next level by capturing core aspects of the right to health, such as: 1) participation and accountability, setting clear standards for people’s participation in health policy-making at all levels, and establishing multi-layered health accountability frameworks with standards to which all nations would be held; 2) equity, including by catalyzing national health equity strategies—which must be developed through broad participation, itself a potentially empowering process—and advancing data disaggregation and more equitable financing; 3) financial resources, with global norms on national and international health financing responsibilities; and 4) respecting and promoting the right to health in all policies, from setting standards on health impact assessments—including participatory processes in developing them, human rights standards, an equity focus, and follow-up processes—to firmly ensuring the primacy of the right to health in other legal regimes that may undermine. From an earlier WHO treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, we know the power of international law to significantly advance health, with the transformative power of legally binding global health norms. As a treaty, the FCGH would increase political accountability and accountability through the courts, while helping protect health other treaty-based international regimes, such as trade. It would also be a bold assertion of global solidarity for global justice, as so urgently needed, “demonstrating that the community of nations are indeed stronger together.” One candidate for the WHO Director-General election, David Nabarro, has recognized the value and civil society support that FCGH has already received, and the need to further explore the treaty (mentioned at 1:46:38 mark). A good first step would be establishing a WHO working group on the FCGH, with broad participation, particularly from states, civil society, and representatives of communities most affected by health inequities, along with relevant international agencies. We see signs of resistance of the dangerous nationalist populism, from protests that persist and judicial checks on one of the administration’s vilest acts (an immigration and refugee travel ban, with its effects falling heaviest on Muslims) in the United States to the rejection of the far-right candidate in the elections in the Netherland. Such resistance can prevent some of the worst impacts on the right to health, from discrimination against migrants to cuts to programs vital for health. Meanwhile, let’s construct an edifice for the future of health and human rights, even as we stand against its destruction. WHO, right to health, and FCGH leadership ought to be a core part of that endeavor.

#### Populism is an existential threat.

de Waal 16 Alex de Waal 12-5-2016 “Garrison America and the Threat of Global War” <http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics-global-justice/alex-de-waal-garrison-america-and-threat-global-war> (Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School at Tufts University)//Elmer

Polanyi recounts how economic and financial crisis led to global calamity. Something similar could happen today. In fact we are already in a steady unpicking of the liberal peace that glowed at the turn of the millennium. Since approximately 2008, the historic decline in the number and lethality of wars appears to have been reversed. Today’s wars are not like World War I, with formal declarations of war, clear war zones, rules of engagement, and definite endings. But they are wars nonetheless. What does a world in global, generalized war look like? We have an unwinnable “war on terror” that is metastasizing with every escalation, and which has blurred the boundaries between war and everything else. We have deep states—built on a new oligarchy of generals, spies, and private-sector suppliers—that are strangling liberalism. We have emboldened middle powers (such as Saudi Arabia) and revanchist powers (such as Russia) rearming and taking unilateral military action across borders (Ukraine and Syria). We have massive profiteering from conflicts by the arms industry, as well as through the corruption and organized crime that follow in their wake (Afghanistan). We have impoverishment and starvation through economic warfare, the worst case being Yemen. We have “peacekeeping” forces fighting wars (Somalia). We have regional rivals threatening one another, some with nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan) and others with possibilities of acquiring them (Saudi Arabia and Iran). Above all, today’s generalized war is a conflict of destabilization, with big powers intervening in the domestic politics of others, buying influence in their security establishments, bribing their way to big commercial contracts and thereby corroding respect for government, and manipulating public opinion through the media. Washington, D.C., and Moscow each does this in its own way. Put the pieces together and a global political market of rival plutocracies comes into view. Add virulent reactionary populism to the mix and it resembles a war on democracy. What more might we see? Economic liberalism is a creed of optimism and abundance; reactionary protectionism feeds on pessimistic scarcity. If we see punitive trade wars and national leaders taking preemptive action to secure strategic resources within the walls of their garrison states, then old-fashioned territorial disputes along with accelerated state-commercial grabbing of land and minerals are in prospect. We could see mobilization against immigrants and minorities as a way of enflaming and rewarding a constituency that can police borders, enforce the new political rightness, and even become electoral vigilantes. Liberal multilateralism is a system of seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation; case-by-case power dealing is a zero-sum calculus. We may see regional arms races, nuclear proliferation, and opportunistic power coalitions to exploit the weak. In such a global political marketplace, we would see middle-ranking and junior states rewarded for the toughness of their bargaining, and foreign policy and security strategy delegated to the CEOs of oil companies, defense contractors, bankers, and real estate magnates. The United Nations system appeals to leaders to live up to the highest standards. The fact that they so often conceal their transgressions is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. A cabal of plutocratic populists would revel in the opposite: applauding one another’s readiness to tear up cosmopolitan liberalism and pursue a latter-day mercantilist naked self-interest. Garrison America could opportunistically collude with similarly constituted political-military business regimes in Russia, China, Turkey, and elsewhere for a new realpolitik global concert, redolent of the early nineteenth-century era of the Congress of Vienna, bringing a façade of stability for as long as they collude—and war when they fall out. And there is a danger that, in response to a terrorist outrage or an international political crisis, President Trump will do something stupid, just as Europe’s leaders so unthinkingly strolled into World War I. The multilateral security system is in poor health and may not be able to cope. Underpinning this is a simple truth: the plutocratic populist order is a future that does not work. If illustration were needed of the logic of hiding under the blanket rather than facing difficult realities, look no further than Trump’s readiness to deny climate change. We have been here before, more or less, and from history we can gather important lessons about what we must do now. The importance of defending civility with democratic deliberation, respecting human rights and values, and maintaining a commitment to public goods and the global commons—including the future of the planet—remain evergreen. We need to find our way to a new 1945—and the global political settlement for a tamed and humane capitalism—without having to suffer the catastrophic traumas of trying everything else first.

### 1NC – OFF

#### The World Trade Organization ought to increase intellectual property protections for anti-malarial medicines. The United States ought to designate intellectual property protections on anti-malarial medicines as adversely affecting the international transfer of technology.

#### Member states can waive IP rights if they hamper the international flow of medical technology.

WTO ’21 (World Trade Organization; 2021; “Obligations and exceptions”; World Trade Organization; Accessed: 8-30-2021; exact date not provided, but copyright was updated in 2021)

Article 8 Principles […] 2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, **may be needed** to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or **adversely affect** the **international transfer of technology**. SECTION 8: CONTROL OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN CONTRACTUAL LICENCES Article 40 1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have **adverse effects on trade** and **may impede** the **transfer and dissemination** of technology. 2. Nothing in this Agreement **shall prevent** Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. As provided above, a Member **may adopt**, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, **appropriate measures** to **prevent or control** such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member. […]

#### Designating IP protections as antithetical to the global health system revitalizes info-sharing.

Youde ’16 (Jeremy; writer for World Politics Review; 4-29-2016; “Technology **Transfer** Is a **Weak Link** in the Global Health System”; World Politics Review; <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18639/technology-transfer-is-a-weak-link-in-the-global-health-system>; Accessed: 8-30-2021)

In mid-April, a spokesperson for the Ugandan government admitted that the country’s only functioning cancer treatment machine had broken earlier that month. The radiotherapy machine, donated by China to Uganda in 1995 and housed at Mulago Hospital in Kampala, is now considered beyond repair. While the government did acquire a second radiotherapy machine in 2013, it has not been operational because of delays in allocating 30 billion shillings—just shy of $9 million—to construct a new building to house it. The funding delay has lifted, but the machine won’t be up and running for at least six months. The government has announced plans to airlift some cancer patients to Nairobi for treatment, but that plan will only accommodate 400 of the estimated 17,000 to 33,000 cancer patients who need treatment annually in Uganda. This breakdown of technology is a human tragedy for the cancer patients from Uganda as well as elsewhere in East Africa that the radiotherapy machine helped treat. Beyond the personal level, though, the episode illustrates a larger shortcoming in global health. Total annual development assistance for health is approximately $36 billion, but that funding is overwhelmingly concentrated on specific infectious diseases. Noncommunicable diseases like cancer receive relatively little international funding—only 1.3 percent in 2015, and the dollar amount has declined since 2013. Funds to strengthen health systems, geared toward building and supporting a resilient health care system, are similarly low, making up only 7.3 percent of development assistance in 2015. Noncommunicable diseases kill more people every year than infectious diseases and accidents do, but this balance is not reflected in global health spending. ... These shortcomings also speak to larger problems in global health around issues of **technology transfers** and long-term **commitments** to keep that technology working. It’s one thing to provide necessary medical technologies in the first place; it’s another to ensure that those technologies are accessible and operational going forward. Despite the **importance** of technology transfers, questions of **long-term support** for them have received relatively little attention from the global health regime. As noncommunicable diseases like cancer cause an even-higher proportion of deaths each year, it will become all the more **imperative** that the international community address this gap in **sharing** and funding **crucial health care** technology. This does not mean that there are no efforts to facilitate technology transfers around the world. The Fogarty International Center, a part of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, has had an [Office of Technology Transfer](http://www.fic.nih.gov/News/GlobalHealthMatters/march-april-2014/Pages/technology-transfer-nih-ott.aspx) since 1989 to make medical innovations developed in the United States more widely available. The World Health Organization (WHO) also has a [Technology Transfer Initiative](http://www.who.int/phi/programme_technology_transfer/en/) to improve access to health care technologies in developing countries. These efforts are laudable, but their interpretation of technology transfer is almost entirely rooted in access to pharmaceuticals and vaccines. To be sure, that is a very important issue—but it only deals with one narrow element of technology transfer. The problems of global health technology transfers illustrated in Uganda underscore a larger issue: the need for a so-called fourth industrial revolution, what has been described as “blurring the real world with the technological world.” This idea gained prominence earlier this year when it served as the theme for the World Economic Forum in Davos. For global health, this means embracing technology to find low-cost ways to promote health, spread education, and reach communities whose access to the health care infrastructure is weak. It expands on the notion of telemedicine and eHealth to make it more encompassing. According to health care entrepreneur Jonathan Jackson, the fourth industrial revolution could change global health by encouraging a shift in focus “from healthcare to health promotion.” Moving from high-cost treatment to low-cost prevention, he has argued, will have significant and far-reaching positive economic implications for developing countries around the world. Its inspiring sense of technological optimism notwithstanding, this sort of approach cannot be the sole focus of technology transfers in global health. Prevention is indeed important, but the fact of the matter remains that people will get sick—and those sick people will need treatment. Mobile applications and electronic access to health care providers can be useful, but they cannot replace a radiotherapy machine. Understanding the root causes of noncommunicable diseases goes far beyond individual choices and intersects with the larger political, economic and social context, so we cannot assume that cybertechnology alone can stop cancer. It is also important to remember that the results of greater technological innovation and integration won’t be free. Sub-Saharan African states, on average, spend $200 per person per year on health care. Even if technology allows costs to decline, they are still likely to be out of reach for many people in most of these countries—in the same way that the purchase and maintenance of medical technologies are prohibitively expensive in these same states today. Technology in and of itself is not useful unless it can be maintained over the long term. This, then, is a weak link in the larger global health system: How do we ensure access to life-prolonging medical technologies beyond pharmaceuticals and vaccines in a sustainable way? Consider two ideas. First, development assistance for health must orient more of its resources toward treating noncommunicable diseases and strengthening health systems. These are the areas in which these technologies are likely to be used, but are not currently supported by the international system. The changing nature of health and disease will only make them even more important in the years to come. Second, longer-term funding commitments would provide a greater opportunity to incorporate medical technologies into health care systems sustainably. Machines will break down, and technologies will fail. That is inevitable. But the global health regime, from the WHO and its regional organizations like the Regional Office for Africa to major donors like the **U**nited **S**tates government and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, needs to figure out how to ensure that these problems do not put **lives in peril**. Technology alone will not improve global health unless it is properly supported and funded.

#### Info- and tech-sharing’s key to stop future pandemics.

Wazir ’21 (Zoya; reporter for U.S. News; 6-11-2021; “Bracing for Future Pandemics”; U.S. News; <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2021-06-11/countries-need-better-collaboration-to-prevent-future-pandemics>; Accessed: 8-30-2021)

Countries need to **better collaborate** to prevent future pandemics and health crises on the scale of COVID-19, especially as health experts warn of a coming global shortage of doctors and nurses, global leaders say. The discussions and warnings come as U.S. President Joe Biden is in Europe to discuss a number of issues, including COVID-19 vaccine supply and global distribution, at the summit of seven leading industrial nations that begins today in the United Kingdom. The leaders of the G-7 countries – which include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the United States – are set to announce sharing at least 1 billion coronavirus shots to nations grappling with COVID-19. The possibility of future health crises coupled with aging and growing populations indicate an increasing need for health workers globally. A 2016 report from the World Health Organization projects that, despite predictions of an estimated 40 million new health sector jobs in the next decade, the world will experience a shortage of up to 18 million physicians, nurses and midwives by 2030. Junaid Bajwa, the chief medical scientist at Microsoft, emphasized the importance of global collaboration in addressing this health care worker shortage during a panel discussion this week about global health security hosted by the GZERO media company and Flagship Pioneering, a life sciences venture capital firm. “We face a huge workforce crisis 10 years from now, at the same time as when we're expecting an aging population, possibly other pandemics,” Bajwa said. “So we have a supply and demand issue here, which actually will just cause increasing pressures unless we do something as a global community to begin to address these from a resilience perspective.” To prevent future health crises, health experts urge governments to **invest** in science research early on and move away from a crisis management approach to disease. During the panel discussion, Stéphane Bancel, the CEO of Moderna, credited capital markets and venture capitalists for providing the funding for Moderna to initially develop mRNA vaccines and criticized countries for **not providing** more support for vaccine development in the early stages of the pandemic. In order to distribute half a billion doses over the course of 2021 and 2022, Bancel said that along with entering into a partnership with COVAX, the international platform supported by the WHO that donates vaccines to countries in need, Moderna is also “investing in basic science to keep increasing the potential” of mRNA vaccines to protect against future viruses. Wealthy countries such as the U.K., which has fully vaccinated 42.8% of its population, and the United States, slightly ahead at 43%, are able to see the close of this pandemic on the horizon and plan for future health crises. But for countries in the developing world such as India, which reported a record high death toll on Thursday, post-pandemic life is far from being a reality – especially without multilateral cooperation. Global collaboration for vaccine distribution remains a **top priority** for countries in the developing world. The United States has committed $4 billion to COVAX and promised to distribute 80 million doses to other countries by the end of June, while China has sent 165 million doses of its own vaccine to countries in Latin America. But experts say some developing countries still feel like they have been forgotten as wealthy nations grow closer to emerging from the pandemic. Agnes Binagwaho, the vice chancellor of the University of Global Health Equity in Rwanda, called **for more “solidarity**” in global vaccine distribution. Speaking at the panel, she noted that while China and India have provided the most vaccines to Africa, the continent still remains the “last served” on the globe. Earlier in June, the BBC reported widespread vaccine shortages across the continent for a second shot and that a small group of countries have not received any vaccines. In the spirit of global collaboration, this year, the G-7 invited India, Australia, South Africa and South Korea as guest countries to the summit for the first time. Matt Hancock, the British secretary of state for health, said he thinks the G-7 gathering will be an opportunity for leaders to discuss both how to bring the world out of this pandemic and better prepare for future health crises. “I think that the timing of the G-7 summit this year is fortuitous because it is at a moment that many of the G-7 countries are coming out of or seeing a more positive domestic picture, and we **have to build** that coalition amongst the like-minded democracies of the world,” Hancock said at the GZERO panel. “A true global effort is necessary, of course. It is **not just about** understanding the origins of **this pandemic**, but to ensure that we have the proper early warning systems and crucially early action for any **future pandemic**.”

#### Extinction – defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Advantage

#### China solves African Poverty

Yuxi 7-12 Liu Yuxi 7-12-2021 "Nation gives a big boost to global poverty fight" <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202107/12/WS60eb99caa310efa1bd66123c.html> (China Daily Reporter)//Elmer

Poverty is a chronic affliction of human society and a significant challenge to Africa's development and governance. Poverty and its associated problems, including hunger, disease and social conflicts, are serious impediments to people's pursuit of a better life. China, the largest developing country in the world, with a population of 1.4 billion, has been plagued by poverty for a long time. The **C**ommunist **P**arty of **C**hina has stayed true to its founding mission and taken on its responsibility of seeking happiness for the people and revival of the nation, uniting and leading people of all ethnic groups, and **carrying** **out** the arduous **struggle against poverty with unswerving faith**. It also has organized and implemented the tough fight against poverty, which is unprecedented in scale and intensity and has benefited the largest population in human history. From the nation's liberation to solving food and clothing issues, from basically well-off to moderately prosperous, China has made great contributions to global poverty reduction through its own development. Since reform and opening-up began, according to current poverty standards, 770 million rural impoverished people in China have been lifted out of poverty. At the important moment of the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, China won a full victory in the fight against poverty, achieving the poverty reduction goal of the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals 10 years ahead of schedule, significantly shrinking the geographical scope of world poverty. In recent years, Africa has been one of the fastest-growing regions in the world and has achieved substantial progress in poverty reduction. But the COVID-19 pandemic has taken a severe toll on the continent's economic development and poses a severe challenge to poverty alleviation in African countries. According to the UN's 2021"Financing for Sustainable Development Report", the pandemic will cause about 120 million people worldwide to fall back into extreme poverty, and risks of a food shortage will rise in Africa. Under this context, it becomes even more important for all countries to strengthen cooperation in the fight against COVID-19 and poverty. As a responsible country, **China** is committed to eliminating its own poverty and **actively participating in international poverty reduction** cooperation **through expert exchanges, cooperative research and technical assistance. In Africa, China has helped countries build water infrastructure, vocational and technical schools, government-subsidized housing and other facilities.** It has also set up demonstration zones for **agricultural cooperation**, carried out **China-Africa cooperation projects** involving a Chinese-invented technology using grass to grow mushrooms, and **established** China-Africa friendship **hospitals** and the headquarters of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, China has set up the International Research and Training Center for Rural Education and other institutions in cooperation with UNESCO, and carried out projects on rural education transformation and teacher training for African countries. Not long ago, China and Africa jointly launched the Initiative on Partnership for Africa's Development, with the aim of converging the strengths of global partnership to help Africa tide over difficulties. China will continue to uphold the concept of community of shared future for mankind, actively carry out international cooperation, fulfill its international responsibility and strive to be a **strong promoter of poverty reduction in Africa.**

#### African poverty kills millions and causes ongoing suffering for more

Stephen 6 (Rwembeho Stephen, “The Complexity of African Poverty,” July 23, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/211/44627.html>)

It seems everyone is at least talking about the poverty that afflicts much of the majority in the world these days. Concerts have raised awareness among the young people, grants have been offered by the wealthy, and debts have been relived by the most powerful, yet the problem of poverty and its associated ills-illiteracy, poor health, oppression, to name a few, still afflict the world. Poverty is destroying individuals and entire societies. There is no international issue that is more pressing or damaging. Poverty is the oldest and the most devastating disease in the third world. Its rate of killing cannot be compared to any disease, right from the genesis of mankind. It is worse than malaria and HIV/AIDS, which are claimed to be the highest killer diseases. HIV/AIDS only attack a few people in a society, which is a negligible portion of the world's population. But poverty, is a pandemic that affects a greater number of people in the society and the whole society at large. "Out of the world's population of more than 6 billion people, nearly 1.3 billion live on less than a dollar a day, and close to 1 billion cannot meet their basic consumption requirement... (World Bank report 2001) A failure to solve the seemingly intractable problem of global poverty in the world offers a grim present and even a worse future, with targets to solve the problems of child mortality not being reached; and if we do not work faster, better, and harder, with more money and greater impact - we will miss most of our targets, on child mortality, primary education and maternal health. This poor rate of progress is unacceptable. It should shame the world. And we have to do something about it. On current forecasts in Sub Saharan Africa, we will not achieve our target for reducing child mortality until 2165. Why? It is not that the knowledge to avoid these infant deaths does not exist; it is not that the drugs do not exist; it is not that the expertise does not exist. What is missing is political will and the capacity to make it happen! According to a recent UNICEF report,1.2 billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa still lack access to clean water, 113 million children have no classrooms, no desks, no textbooks, and no teachers. Millions of children die each year from diseases we know we can prevent. HIV and AIDS is, in some countries, wiping out all the gains in life expectancy of the last 40 years The part of the world that is mostly clearly affected by poverty is Africa. In fact, as the rest of the developing world has seen a steady decline in rates of poverty, the situation in sub-Saharan African is only getting worse. As the Global Policy Forum notes, The World Bank recently reported that Sub-Saharan African countries have the largest share of people living below one dollar a day. The tragedy is that while other countries in Asia and Latin America are slowly but surely pulling themselves out of the poverty club, African countries, are regressing into lower levels of deprivation, with the result that the number of poor people in this region is expected to rise from 315 million in 1999 to about 404 million in 2015. While the rest of the world seemingly slowly pulling itself out of debt and poverty, the situation in Africa remains grim. One of the most important issues related to poverty in Africa is the AIDS epidemic. Currently, 25.4 million people are living with HIV in Africa with over 3 million new infections occurring each year (Avert.org). HIV/AIDS and poverty are linked in a way that makes determining causality difficult. There are other health concerns in addition to AIDS. Measles alone kills over 500,000 African children each year (Red Cross), and 11,000,000 children die before their fifth birthday each year as a result of mostly preventable diseases, including malaria, diarrhea and pneumonia. These deaths can be prevented. We know how to prevent these deaths--we have the biological knowledge and tools to stop this public health travesty--but we are not doing it. Yet. And the current public health system is simply not up to the challenge, with poverty a major obstacle, as Sustainable Development International points out: The record of African countries in dealing with disease is not encouraging. There are major structural and geographical problems to be overcome. Millions of people in Africa simply do not have access to trained medical personnel, and even if they do, essential medical equipment and drugs are either not available or supplies are not sustainable. In addition, there are inadequate data on the incidence and prevalence of illness, which adds to the problem of providing a reliable healthcare service.

#### Chinese Influence solves African Peace

Velthuizen 4-18 Dries Velthuizen 4-18-2021 "Peace and security in Africa: how China can help address weaknesses" <https://theconversation.com/peace-and-security-in-africa-how-china-can-help-address-weaknesses-156219> (Professor, University of South Africa)//Elmer

China’s contribution to peace and security in Africa **China** is already **contributing to the peace and security objectives of the AU**. This, **through capacity building for socio-economic development and education for social transformation**. It also **contributes to peace missions** in Africa. China **can enhance the AU’s military intervention** capacity, too, by using the extensive military knowledge of the Peoples Liberation Army. This is especially so with regards to the non-combatant developmental approach to post-civil war peace-building, including the **implementation of poverty alleviation programmes**. Chinese military assistance to Africa is shaped by the China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021). The plan includes assistance for military, police and counter terrorism activities. It also provides for developing the African Standby Force. The force is supposed to enable the AU to intervene in “grave circumstances” such as genocide. Military cooperation between China and Africa takes the form of intelligence exchange, military personnel training, commercial arms sales, and regular peace and security forums. China also provides law enforcement training. Specific military aid includes support to countries in the Sahel region, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa. China’s development model The “**Chinese Model**” **for development could be a blueprint for modernisation and transformation of African economies**. The model includes “going global” to find multilateral solutions to reduce costs and share the burden of development. China’s new strategy for Africa is to build its soft power. **Peace missions**, **cultural exchanges**, **educational projects** **and financing educational infrastructure** in Africa are integral to this strategy. The strategy serves China’s own interests. Helping create secure investment environments benefit its economy. This, while **promoting** **transparent, accountable and rules-based governance** in Africa. China is heavily invested in Africa. In 2020, despite a challenging global market, trade between China and Africa was nearly US$180 billion. Although less than the US$208.7 billion of 2019, China has been Africa’s biggest trading partner for the last 12 years. Multilateral platforms On a multilateral level, China’s security cooperation with Africa was boosted by the first China-Africa Defence and Security Forum of June 2018. It focuses on peacekeeping and peace-building missions. China is building the capacity of the armed forces of several African states as part of bilateral and multilateral arrangements. It maintains strong bilateral relations with South Africa and Rwanda, for example. It also has strategic ties with several countries in North Africa. China’s current peace and security activities indicate a departure from its erstwhile policy of noninterference, to one that entails **post conflict peace-building**. This includes socio-economic reconstruction, which is vital for Africa’s development. In this, **China’s** vast military and developmental **experience will play a prominent role.** Although China emphasises **a multilateral approach to African peace and stability,** it continues to collaborate with individual African states. For instance, most of its East African projects are bilateral intergovernmental or private sector projects.

#### It's existential---state collapse, refugees, and terror.

Perez ‘18 [Alexandra; 2018; Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy. Masters in Public Policy at Pepperdine. Project Manager, Health Policy at Cato Institute; "Food Security as U.S. National Security: Why Fragile States in Africa Matter." https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=ppr]

The United States’ role in foreign affairs is guided by an interest to keep the general peace around the world while protecting national security and economic interests. Stability in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa is crucial to national security, and one way to keep peace is by supplying the basic human need of food. According to the Fund for Peace, the three most fragile states in 2017 were in Africa— the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Somalia. 1 Several other African countries are fragile, suffering from standard measures of instability, such as widespread corruption, weak institutions, and resource scarcity. Together, these problems create displacement, human-rights violations, and power vacuums where non-state actors can flourish. These issues should concern the United States not only for moral reasons, but also because they negatively affect American interests. Food aid and agricultural systems must be used as a tool to promote peace in Africa to decrease the region’s burden on the United States and to help stabilize a region that is often referred to as a lost continent.

With bipartisan support, the Global Food Security Act became law in July of 2016. It requires the President and appropriate agencies—including USAID, State Department, and the Office of US Trade—to formulate a plan to address food-insecure countries and report on that plan annually.2 The bill cited the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (2014): “[l]ack of adequate food will be a destabilizing factor in countries important to US national security that do not have the financial or technical abilities to solve their internal food security problems.”3 Though it is uncertain whether annual reports will continue under the Trump administration, the US has demonstrated (at least through the Global Food Security Act) that it views food security as a matter of national security. According to the most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment, Africa is among the regions most susceptible to terrorism, especially in Somalia and South Sudan.4 This paper explores the ways in which food insecurity can enable conflict, how the US can improve the ways it offers food aid, and why African food security is in America’s national security interest.

Consequences of Food Insecurity

Enforcing and communicating a universal conception of human rights by any party is difficult. Nevertheless, US national security strategy has placed an emphasis on human rights in recent years. The former Secretary of State under President George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, once remarked that: “[f]or the United States, supporting international development is a vital investment in the free, prosperous, and peaceful international order that fundamentally serves our national interest.”5 Fragile regimes in Africa cannot successfully maintain themselves, let alone pose an immediate threat to the United States. However, these regimes are likely to seek alliances with adversaries that may pose a threat, such as China, creating a region of the world adverse to American interests and values.

Secondly, migrant and refugee flows are concerns for the United States due to their economic and social consequences. While many of the most serious cases of refugee crises today are nowhere near the US, they do affect some of the United States’ key allies around the globe. A clear example of this is Syrian migration into NATO member countries. In addition to military conflict, bipartisan research has shown that climate can also contribute to mass migrations by impacting harvest yields in regions still reliant on subsistence agriculture. For example, the famines in Somalia and Yemen have sparked emigration caused by food insecurity. Such crises may not be front page news compared to violent conflicts in surrounding states, but they present just as real a threat.

The third reason why the US should care about weak states is that terrorist organizations thrive in such environments. Since September 11, 2001, US national security policy has been primarily driven by the war on terror. While the fear of a repeat attack on American soil has calmed since 2001, the threat of terrorism is still present, and the United States must be proactive to stay ahead of terrorist threats. Terrorists thrive in weak state environments because either the lack of rule of law inhibits the host state’s ability to act against them, or because corrupt governments refuse to act, such as when Sudan provided refuge to Osama bin Laden in the 1990s.6 As a developing region, Africa is full of potential, and the United States will have to decide whether it will help it stabilize or allow it to become a refuge and breeding ground for terrorism.

Africa can potentially threaten or support American interests. As stated above, food insecurity in Africa creates problems for the US. The potential to politically align with other major powers, the destabilizing effect of refugees on the US and its allies, and the propensity to breed terrorism are all reasons to take Africa seriously as a national security concern. US interests include promoting international market economies that it can easily access, so to increase economic power at home. If the US ignores stability measures in Africa, this could negatively affect both American security interests and global economic growth, 7 which are both American priorities. The US needs a strategy that promotes food security in fragile states to address these concerns.

Food prices in Africa are expected to rise in the next few years due to famine,8 which means there is a risk that instability will grow, heightening the security concern to the United States. Food insecurity, like any social ailment, does not necessarily cause instability, but the two do reinforce each other. Obviously, American food assistance by itself cannot solve every problem in these fragile states. Success will ultimately depend on these countries establishing and enforcing the rule of law and shoring up government legitimacy. That said, nation building is not a viable option in this region, as the US has already committed itself to this in the Middle East and largely failed. The US can, however, provide developmental aid to help promote stability and provide a foundation for future institutional growth. Therefore, it is important that the US not only maintain food security efforts in weak states but also incentivize recipient behavior that will make such aid more effective.

#### Chinese leadership in the Arctic key to avoid military confrontation.

Lanteigne 17, Marc. "‘Have you entered the storehouses of the snow?’ China as a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic." Polar Record 53.2 (2017): 117-130. (Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo)//Elmer

With Beijing seeking to expand the use of maritime trade both through the belt and road initiative and probably via Arctic routes as they become more practicable, China is seeking to ensure a fait accompli in which **Chinese vessels are permitted peaceful transits** through the waterways in the future. Beijing will, therefore, have to **promote the Arctic as a region of peaceful (and profitable) navigation**, while participating in objectives, such as the Polar Code, which enters into force in January 2017, to regulate and ensure transit safety (Liu 2016). The prospect of greater Arctic militarisation, while remote, is not an impossibility given the deteriorated strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington and its NATO allies. For example, there has been a steady increase in incidents involving Russian military aircraft probing NATO airspace, including in the Arctic, while the USA has expressed concerns about a growing Russian rearmament in the Arctic and north Atlantic. This was evidenced by an agreement between Reykjavík and Washington in early 2016 to reopen military facilities in Keflavík, Iceland, in response to increased air and sea activities by the Russian military, although the Iceland Foreign Ministry stressed the agreement would be more focussed on ensuring civil security (Bittner 2016; Winger and Petursson 2016). Any trend towards regional militarisation would not only affect the future of civilian shipping in the region but would also deprive non-Arctic states, such as China, of the ability to make use of Arctic routes, **a scenario Beijing wishes to avoid as it conducts its norm entrepreneurship in the region.**

#### Unchecked militarization risks global war.

Foizee 16 Bahauddin Foizee 11-22-2016 “Rising militarization in Arctic will bring nothing but war,” <http://www.atimes.com/rising-militarization-arctic-will-bring-nothing-war/> (Bahauddin Foizee is geopolitical analyst and an international affairs columnist)//Elmer

As of yet, the Arctic region is largely untouched by mankind. However, with the ice caps melting, **access to the Arctic oil and gas reserves**, which is estimated to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars, **will become easier** – a prediction that has already **sparked a military competition in the region**. Such militarization of the region is likely to increase with almost all the countries urging for increasing their military deployments and exercises, and there appears little hope & opportunity for any diplomatic resolution (or political agreement) regarding the disputes. It can be well presumed that without any diplomatic resolution (or political agreement), the current non-hostile debate over the Arctic could turn into a violent confrontation. It seems our globe does not lack reasons to engage in chaos. The two world wars began as European conflicts, only to turn gradually into world wars. Likewise, if the disputes over the control of the Arctic resources are not resolved quickly, it could turn into a **larger military conflict** that would not just involve the Arctic countries, but would also drag a larger part of the world into this conflict. And for sure, the start of such war would mean the cold, yet beautiful, Arctic region would become the targets of war machines– destroying the environment and the stability of the region and the globe.

#### Chinese influence in Africa is inevitable, cooperative, and mutually beneficial.

**Ward et al 21** [George Ward, Eric Kiss, and Pat Savage, Ambassador George Ward is an adjunct research staff member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a retired Foreign Service officer and former ambassador to the Republic of Namibia. , Eric Kiss is a research staff member in the Intelligence Analysis Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses and a retired U.S. Army foreign area officer. , Pat Savage is a research associate in the Joint Advanced Warfighting Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He holds a master’s degree in security studies from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. 5-6-2021, accessed on 10-18-2021, War on the Rocks, "The Eagle and the Dragon in Africa: Comparing Data on Chinese and American Influence - War on the Rocks", <https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/the-eagle-and-the-dragon-in-africa-comparing-data-on-chinese-and-american-influence/>] Adam

Pundits and past U.S. policymakers may have gotten it wrong: With its investments in Africa, ranging from infrastructure to student exchanges, China is not canceling the influence of the United States on the continent. What China has done through its investments has been to increase its influence in Africa significantly, to the point that it moderately exceeds that of the United States. But new research indicates that, with careful attention to priorities and targeted programmatic investments, the United States can remain a formidable force on the continent. This observation could be crucial to informing a new U.S. policy toward Africa that, while taking China into account, is focused on the countries of the continent.

In the media, China’s focus on Africa is often portrayed as an ambitious strategy aimed at displacing a waning United States in an African version of the “Great Game.” Many observers view China as seeking to achieve influence and access with governments, institutions, and people on the basis of its liberal lending practices and the construction of roads, railroads, and other infrastructure projects. In October 2019, Forbes characterized China’s infrastructure investments in Africa as a “[winning model](https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2019/10/24/how-china-beats-america-and-europe-in-africa/?sh=732f5a3c6937)” that was “helping China to beat Europe and America.” The same point of view seemed reflected in past U.S. government positions. In a speech on Dec. 13, 2018, when then-National Security Advisor John Bolton presented the [strategy](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/) of the United States toward Africa, he mentioned China 14 times. Bolton made three key assertions about China. First, he said that China is deliberately and aggressively targeting its investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States. Second, he said, “China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands. Its investment ventures are riddled with corruption.” Third, he said that Chinese activities threaten African independence, disadvantage U.S. companies, and pose a “significant threat to U.S. national security interests.” Even in the context of growing global competition between the United States and China, Bolton’s China-centric approach to Africa policy was unusual.

Other sources provide a more detailed and textured picture of the competitive relationship between China and the United States in Africa, and undermine the widespread impression that the money China spends on infrastructure projects is the reason for its influence in Africa. For example, Afrobarometer, the authoritative African survey organization, reported in surveys conducted in 2019 and 2020 in 18 African countries that most respondents placed China and the United States in [roughly equivalent positions](https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/africa-china_relations-3sept20.pdf) as external influencers. Asked about their perceptions of the economic and political influence of various countries, 59 percent of African respondents viewed China somewhat, or very, positively and 15 percent viewed China somewhat or very negatively. The comparable numbers for the United States were similar: 58 percent and 13 percent. The same study reported that, when respondents in 18 African countries were asked to name the best national model for development, 32 percent cited the United States and 23 percent named China. Interestingly, a similar Afrobarometer study of 36 countries in 2014–2015 reported that 30 percent of Africans viewed the United States as the [best model for national development](https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno122_perceptions_of_china_in_africa1.pdf) as against the 24 percent who viewed China that way. Considering the margin of statistical error, the studies suggest no, or minimal, change between 2015 and 2020.

International relations scholars in China anticipate that Africans’ positive perceptions of the United States may continue to increase during the presidency of Joe Biden. Qian Liwei, the deputy director of the Africa Research Institute at the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations, asserts that many African national leaders, media, and scholars expect that the [Biden administration](http://www.cicir.ac.cn/NEW/opinion.html?id=4150e695-90f5-4e52-bfd7-32cf7588cf82) will promote trade and closer cooperation. Yet, Africa will continue to be important to China for a number of reasons, including furnishing resources to fuel China’s growing economy, providing a market for Chinese products, and partnering to “[build a community with a shared future](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1831815.shtml).” Leaders of the People’s Republic of China approach China’s relations with the countries of Africa both bilaterally and through [multilateral coordination mechanisms](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/zfhzlt_682902/jbqk_682904/) such as the Forum on Chinese and African Cooperation to develop relations that “increase understanding, expand consensus, strengthen friendship and promote cooperation.” China’s signature foreign development scheme, the Belt and Road Initiative, funds infrastructure development around the world and, in the case of Africa, is intended to jointly promote “[high quality development](https://www.drc.gov.cn/DocView.aspx?chnid=1&leafid=224&docid=2900111).” The panoply of China’s diplomatic, economic, development, and security efforts will likely ensure that it will continue to possess substantial channels of influence on the continent.

With both the policy context and the data in mind, our research team sought to devise a method to compare the potential influence of the United States and China in key African countries. Looking at a sample of four African countries selected as representative of East and West Africa, we reached the conclusion that both China and the United States possess moderate potential influence in all the African countries studied, with China’s potential influence only narrowly exceeding that of the United States. Importantly, the popular impression that Chinese influence rests mainly on its policies of liberal lending and investment in infrastructure proved only partly true. For example, Chinese influence, in some instances, seemed to rest more on people-to-people factors than on debt, trade, or investment. The results suggest that, with modest investments, particularly in the trade and cultural and information areas, U.S. potential influence could be enhanced. Extending the study methodology to a broader set of African countries might be helpful in formulating a constructive and proactive U.S. approach to the continent in an era of great-power competition.

#### China’s rise is peaceful and won’t escalate – there’s a distinction between war and aggressive talking.

Medin 20, John. Rising Tensions: The Effects of China’s Rise on the United States, China’s Regional Neighbors, and the International System. Diss. Johns Hopkins University, 2020. (Master of Arts in Government at John Hopkins)//Elmer

* Checked

The international system, which can be defined as the western-backed liberal system that has existed since the end of World War II, is being impacted in subtle ways due to China’s rise. China's rise will harm the current western-backed international system because China has utilized its newfound strength the erode the liberal norms and values which the system is based on. China has looked for ways to contribute to the international system while altering the system to suit its ideals of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. China has used its growing influence to curtail and limit attempts by the international system to deal with a variety of issues, including human rights. It has also looked for ways to undermine the Washington Consensus, which advocates for political and economic reforms in nations, for its own Beijing Consensus that only focuses on the economic growth of nations. This new concept has further undermined the norms and values of the international system as other nations can look for aid and funding from an alternative source which is not as concerned about social and political reforms such as environmental protections, anti-corruption measures, and human rights. However, the international system is still principally controlled by the Western powers of the United States and the European Union who maintain a distinct **advantage over China economically, politically, and militarily**. Their extensive system of alliances, which have been cultivated over the last several decades, also means that the international system has a loyal following of supporters committed to its maintenance and continuance. China's rise will allow it greater power and flexibility to allow it to alter the international system along the edges. However, overall, the rise of China will have a limited adverse impact on the international system as China alters the system around the edges by looking for ways to erode the values and norms, such as human rights and democracy, using its influence. However, it will not be a severe threat to the existing global order or its institutions because it has an **interest in maintaining the status quo and does not have the power to alter it** drastically. In conclusion, China’s rise will have a limited negative impact on the United States, China’s regional neighbors, and the international system. These impacts include unfair economic trade practices that hurt the United States and other nations around the world while continuing to fund its rise. This economic growth enables China to increasingly challenge the United States and bully its regional neighbors in pursuit of China’s national interests and the growing ability to withstand diplomatic pressure attempting to China’s bad behavior, such as its aggressive actions in the South China Sea and flagrant violations of human rights. China also uses this economic power to pressure other nations, fearful of economic repercussions, into altering key aspects of the international system to better suit China’s interests and condone bad behavior. However, the United States, China’s neighbors, and the international community have the power to limit and roll back these short-term negative effects. Policymakers and scholars are becoming increasingly aware that China is actively trying to alter the global order to suit its national interests and cannot be ignored. China’s current capabilities may not allow it to pursue its national interests aggressively, but if its capabilities increase, it will most likely change its behavior and show different motives. The United States and international community can continue to work constructively with China on a variety of issues of mutual interest such as counterterrorism and North Korea. However, they can no longer be afraid to push back against China’s actions. The top priorities should target China’s main source of power, its economy, by forcing China to end its long-standing unfair trade practices. It should also enforce the international norms and standards that the international system claims to stand by publicly calling out China for any of its offenses. Working constructively with China should not mean giving in to China’s demands as it so frequently has in the past. Now is the time for the United States and the international community to create a united front to firmly reject when China oversteps while the US and the international community have the upper hand.

#### China is not aiming to displace the US – they’ve openly recognized the need for US cooperation and relations – this just proves NO TRADE-OFF w/ Primacy and no internal link to the Aff’s Heg Impacts.

Han and Yuwei 9-1 Zhan Han and Hu Yuwei 9-1-2021 "'Serious misjudgment' by some in US to say China aims to displace US: ambassador" <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1233102.shtml> (Reporters at the Global Times covering China)//Elmer

**It is a serious misjudgment of China's strategic intention to say China aims to displace the US,** **Chinese Ambassador to the US Qin Gang said,** stressing that China does not bet against the US but is glad to see the US resolve its problems by itself, not by undercutting other countries. Qin made the remarks at a welcome event held for him by the National Committee on US-China Relations Board of Directors on Monday. "We need to return to rationality, take a responsible attitude to history, to the two peoples and to the world, and maintain the right direction of China-US relations," he said. Qin spoke highly of the enduring efforts made by the Committee in promoting China-US relations and noted the elder generations of Chinese and American leaders who showed great strategic wisdom, vision and courage in the Ping Pong diplomacy and normalization of bilateral relations. China-US relations have come to another historic juncture, Qin said, adding that the extreme China policy of the previous US administration has caused serious damage to the relations, and that such a situation has not changed and is even continuing, going against the fundamental interests of Chinese and American people and the wishes of the international community. Some people in the US believe China's goal is to challenge and displace the US, which is a serious misjudgment of China's strategic intention. **China never bets its own future on other countries; we only want to surpass ourselves**. **China and the US are inseparable stakeholders**, and the **success of one** side **is critical to the other, Qin said**. He said China is closely linked to the US and integrated with the world. It would be absurd and dangerous to apply the "Cold War playbook" to today's China-US relations, or to take China as the US' rival and imaginary enemy, just like when Don Quixote tilted at windmills, Qin said. Qin's message delivers two clear points. First, **China and the US are not in a zero-sum game**, but **a win-win situation**; second, in recent years, the US has indulged in the **illusion that China's strategic goal is to surpass the US**, as represented by American scholar Michael Pillsbury in his book Hundred-Year Marathon; this, too**, is downright conspiracy**, Sun Chenghao, adjunct fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University, told the Global Times. China's development is for the benefit of its people, not with the goal of displacing the US in the world, Sun said.

#### The only evidence that they have read in the 1AC about a tradeoff between U.S and Chinese influence is the 1AC Turse evidence which is based off quotes from Africom who have every incentive to exaggerate the Chinese threat and are over 3 years old

#### No liberal order or SOI impact---states won’t risk war, err towards isolation, AND mediate ties economically.

Mueller ’21 [John; February 17; Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies; The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, “The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran,” Ch. 6]

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War

It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938.

Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try.

If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that

The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129

Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy.

However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130

The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment and to support local – or partisan – resistance as it did in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in 1979. 132 Such a response does not require the United States to have, and perpetually to maintain, huge forces in place and at the ready to deal with such improbable eventualities.

The current wariness about, and hostility toward, Russia and China is sometimes said to constitute “a new Cold War.”133 There are, of course, considerable differences. In particular, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union – indeed the whole international Communist movement – was under the sway of a Marxist theory that explicitly and determinedly advocated the destruction of capitalism and probably of democracy, and by violence to the degree required. Neither Russia nor China today sports such cosmic goals or is enamored of such destructive methods. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States was strongly inclined during the Cold War massively to inflate the threat that it imagined the Communist adversary to present. The current “new Cold War” is thus in an important respect quite a bit like the old one: it is an expensive, substantially militarized, and often hysterical campaign to deal with threats that do not exist or are likely to selfdestruct.134

It may also be useful to evaluate terms that are often bandied about in considerations within foreign policy circles about the rise of China, the assertiveness of Russia, and the antics of Iran. High among these is “hegemony.” Sorting through various definitions, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow array several that seem to capture the essence of the concept: domination, controlling leadership, or the ability to shape international rules according to the hegemon’s own interests. Hegemony, then, is an extreme word suggesting supremacy, mastery, preponderant influence, and full control. Hegemons force others to bend to their will whether they like it or not. Reich and Lebow also include a mellower designation applied by John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan in which a hegemon is defined as an entity that has the ability to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace.135 But this really seems to constitute an extreme watering-down of the word and suggests opinion leadership or entrepreneurship and success at persuasion, not hegemony.

Moreover, insofar as they carry meaning, the militarized application of American primacy and hegemony to order the world has often been a fiasco.136 Indeed, it is impressive that the hegemon, endowed by definition by what Reich and Lebow aptly call a grossly disproportionate military capacity, has had such a miserable record of military achievement since 1945 – an issue discussed frequently in this book.137 Reich and Lebow argue that it is incumbent on IR scholars to cut themselves loose from the concept of hegemony.138 It seems even more important for the foreign policy establishment to do so.

There is also absurdity in getting up tight over something as vacuous as the venerable “sphere of influence” concept (or conceit). The notion that world affairs are a process in which countries scamper around the world seeking to establish spheres of influence is at best decidedly unhelpful and at worst utterly misguided. But the concept continues to be embraced in some quarters as if it had some palpable meaning. For example, in early 2017, the august National Intelligence Council opined that “Geopolitical competition is on the rise as China and Russia seek to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which US influence does not dominate.”139 Setting aside the issue of the degree to which American “influence” could be said to “dominate” anywhere (we still wait, for example, for dominated Mexico supinely to pay for a wall to seal off its self-infatuated neighbor’s southern border), it doesn’t bloody well matter whether China or Russia has, or seems to have, a “sphere of influence” someplace or other.

More importantly, the whole notion is vapid and essentially meaningless. Except perhaps in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe. When members of the House of Lords fail to pay sufficient respect to a group of women they take to be members of a ladies’ seminary who are actually fairies, their queen, outraged at the Lords’ collected effrontery, steps forward, proclaims that she happens to be an “influential fairy,” and then, with a few passes of her wand, brushes past the Lords’ pleas (“no!” “mercy!” “spare us!” and “horror!”), and summarily issues several edicts: a young man of her acquaintance shall be inducted into their House, every bill that gratifies his pleasure shall be passed, members shall be required to sit through the grouse and salmon season, and high office shall be obtainable by competitive examination. Now, that’s influence. In contrast, on December 21, 2017, when the United States sought to alter the status of Jerusalem, the United Nations General Assembly voted to repudiate the US stand in a nearly unanimous vote that included many US allies. Now, that’s not influence.

In fact, to push this point perhaps to an extreme, if we are entering an era in which economic motivations became paramount and in which military force is not deemed a sensible method for pursuing wealth, the idea of “influence” would become obsolete because, in principle, pure economic actors do not care much about influence. They care about getting rich. (As Japan and Germany have found, however, influence, status, and prestige tend to accompany the accumulation of wealth, but this is just an ancillary effect.) Suppose the president of a company could choose between two stories to tell the stockholders. One message would be, “We enjoy great influence in the industry. When we talk everybody listens. Our profits are nil.” The other would be, “No one in the industry pays the slightest attention to us or ever asks our advice. We are, in fact, the butt of jokes in the trade. We are making money hand over fist.” There is no doubt about which story would most thoroughly warm the stockholders’ hearts.

#### Every practice they are accusing China of, the West does *two-fold*

Singh 20 (Ajit Singh, Lawyer and postgraduate student in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, “The myth of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ and realities of Chinese development finance”, Third World Quarterly, 5 August 2020, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2020.1807318)

In the preceding two sections, I have demonstrated that both components of the debt-trap diplomacy narrative – first, that Chinese lending is driving debt distress in developing countries and second, that it is characterised by predatory practices – do not accurately describe Chinese finance. In this section, I will explore how, in contrast to notions of debt traps, Chinese lending can provide policy space to developing countries, particularly those whose governments are facing hostility from the US and its allies. First, comparing Chinese and Western financial relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), I will illustrate the unconditional character which distinguishes China from Western lenders. Second, I will examine how non-interventionist Chinese lending has increased policy space for governments seeking to pursue an alternative to the neoliberal Washington Consensus. LAC is particularly revealing as it likely receives the largest share of China’s global policy bank lending, and the region’s ‘Pink Tide’ has increased the diversity of ideologies and political and economic projects being pursued relative to other regions of the Global South.

In recent decades, China has emerged as a major source of financing for LAC. Since 2005, China has lent more than US$137 billion to LAC governments and state-owned firms according to the China–Latin American Finance Database, a collaboration between Inter-American Dialogue and Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center (Gallagher and Myers 2020).5

To understand the appeal of Chinese financing for these states, it is important to first look at the qualities and historical impact of traditional lenders to the region. The US and the West, along with the international financial institutions that they dominate, such as the IMF and World Bank, notoriously have required recipient countries to implement harsh policy reforms as a precondition for access to financing, often requiring nations to slash social spending, privatise public institutions and liberalise the economy in order to meet those conditions (Ugarteche 2007). These neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which would come to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, have been heavily criticised for leading to the erosion of LAC countries’ national sovereignty, falling living standards for ordinary people and soaring income inequality. Furthermore, in contrast to the claims made by proponents that the reforms were necessary to stimulate economic growth, these policies had a dismal economic impact, with the Washington Consensus era characterised by gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 0.5% per year and per capita GDP growth of 1.1% per year, ‘the lowest on record’ in the region (Gallagher 2016, 27). The rise of the left-of-centre, anti-neoliberal governments at the turn of the century, known as the Pink Tide, was largely a response to this untenable situation.

Given this context, we can now examine Chinese lending and why it has been an attractive option to many countries in the region. In contrast to traditional US and Western lenders, Chinese finance does not impose policy reform conditionalities on borrowing governments, in accordance with China’s general foreign policy principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries (Gallagher 2016; Kaplan 2016, 2018). Unconditional Chinese lending has made financing more accessible to states that do not wish to follow the dictates of the Washington Consensus and has been particularly appealing to the region’s Pink Tide governments. Kaplan (2018, 3) finds that in LAC, ‘left governments are more likely to seize China's state-to-state funding opportunity compared to their center and right counterparts who are more likely to book loans through private procurement in the marketplace’.

An important factor in this trend is that these left-wing governments have often faced aggression and enforced isolation by way of financial sanctions imposed by the US and its allies. An illustrative example is the case of Venezuela, which since 2015 has been under US sanctions that are estimated to have caused more than 40,000 deaths (Weisbrot and Sachs 2019). Even amid the coronavirus crisis, the US has refused to lift its unilateral coercive measures from Venezuela and has made the resignation of the Venezuelan government a precondition for sanctions relief and, thus, financial relations (BBC News 2020). Further, the US, which holds an effective right of veto in the IMF, reportedly pressured the international lending agency to reject Venezuela’s request for US$5 billion in emergency financing to address the pandemic (Beeton and Duarte 2020). Facing such intense hostility from the US and international lending agencies, Venezuela has made extensive use of Chinese financing which does not come with these political conditions, and it is, in fact, the largest recipient of Chinese lending in the world (Gallagher and Myers 2020).

China’s non-interventionist approach to finance has provided borrowers with greater policy autonomy than traditional US and Western creditors have. As Gallagher (2016, 65) puts it:

China’s billions in finance are more in line with what Latin American nations want, rather than what Western development experts say they need. Whereas the US and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalization, health, and education, Chinese loans tend to go into energy, infrastructure, and industry projects in a region that has an infrastructure gap of $260 billion per year. Latin America’s roads, ports, telecommunications networks, and energy systems are severely lacking.

Not sharing the US and the West’s hostile predisposition against state intervention and deficit spending, increased Chinese state-to-state lending has been found to positively correlate with budgetary expansion amongst LAC recipients, which may provide more flexibility to developing countries that wish to avoid the imposition of austerity (Kaplan 2016). Examining government spending in Venezuela following the 2008 global financial crisis and negative oil price shock, Kaplan (2016, 659) argues that Chinese lending was ‘instrumental’ in allowing the Chávez administration to avoid austerity and continue ‘massive state spending on social projects, known as misiones programs’:

Without Chinese financing, it is hard to imagine that state intervention on such a scale would have been possible on the heels of the commodity correction. The availability of a non-market financing stream without traditional conditionality appears to have given Venezuela greater policy autonomy. Perhaps, the late Venezuela president, Hugo Chávez, most aptly describes this policy latitude, when he lauded Chinese lending after being able to spend countercyclically during the global financial crisis: it differs from other multilateral loans because it comes with no strings attached, unlike the scrutiny of international finance.

Had Chinese lending been unavailable, and Venezuela needed to turn to traditional lenders, Kaplan (2016, 659) contends that the government would have likely had to implement austerity and abandon its popular, socially inclusive policies:

Without Chinese lending, the central government would have, thus, had to borrow more in global capital markets. In 2010, the major credit rating agencies – S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch – had already rated Venezuela’s sovereign debt below investment grade, meaning new funding would not have come cheap. Incurring more debt would have likely subjected Venezuela to greater investor scrutiny and thus austerity.

This is not to suggest that Chinese finance is a cure-all of some sort for developing countries. Indeed, there are important challenges and concerns associated with Chinese finance and the projects that it funds, including their social and environmental impact. The point here is that China’s non-interventionist approach can create space for recipients, a fact which undermines the debt-trap narrative and is an important reason why Chinese finance is an appealing option for many developing countries.

Conclusion

In this article I have assessed the debt-trap diplomacy narrative that has emerged in recent years to characterise Chinese international finance. First, I examined China–Africa financial relations to demonstrate that Chinese lending is not a significant driver of debt distress in the region. Second, focussing on the oft-cited Hambantota port case, I demonstrated that Chinese finance is not predatory, in terms of takeovers of strategic assets and natural resources, or military expansion. Finally, I compared Chinese and Western lending in Latin America and the Caribbean, to illustrate how, far from being a trap, China’s non-interventionist lending approach can provide greater policy autonomy for developing countries, a feature that has been particularly appealing for left-wing governments.

There are several significant implications of such an understanding of Chinese financial relations with developing countries. First, it suggests that the debt-trap diplomacy accusations levelled against China not only lack rigour and sophistication, but are unfounded. Second, it lends support to the notion that such claims are rooted in the anxieties of the US about China’s rising international role, rather than any genuine concern about the welfare of developing countries. Third, for developing countries facing hostility from the US and its allies, Chinese financing may provide breathing room and flexibility. As such it is important and necessary to reject notions of Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, not only due to their inaccuracy and to promote an honest understanding of China, but to support greater diversity and leverage for developing countries.

#### Heg is ineffective and causes instability---no causal relationship with peace

Fettweis 17 – Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University (Christopher, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” *Security Studies*, 26:3, 423-451, 5-8-2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394)//Elmer

Conflict and Hegemony by Region Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### No transition wars---Cross-sectional datasets prove retrenchment is peaceful---only we have non-theoretical support for our argument

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Exploring the link between shifting power and variation in a state’s foreign policy has long been central to the study of international relations. However, it has also become a question of increased political importance as policy-makers in the United States grapple with fears of decreasing international influence caused by the economic and military growth of great power competitors. Scholarship exploring this topic has been deeply divided, with prominent scholars such as Brooks et al. (2013), Copeland (2000), and Gilpin (1983) suggesting that a strategy of retrenchment will leave declining states less safe and less prosperous and Copeland (2000) and Gilpin (1983) contending that retrenchment will open a declining state up to predation and imperil their security. On the other hand, scholars such as Layne (2009, 2012), MacDonald and Parent (2011), and Posen (2013) suggest that retrenchment will lead to a more secure and prosperous America. Although there has been intense theoretical debate regarding the benefits and costs of retrenchment, these theories have only been tested on a handful of cases with various degrees of methodological rigor. Work by MacDonald and Parent (2011) represents one notable exception as they base their findings on a cross-case analysis of all major powers over the same time span that we analyze. However, their analysis is limited in its ability to control for confounding factors that may affect the success of strategies of retrenchment. We build on this work by testing these arguments on a time-series crosssectional dataset of all major powers that stretches from 1870 to the present. Scholars have often pointed to the United Kingdom’s successful policy of retrenchment following World War II as a rare exception to an otherwise bleak record (Gilpin, 1983). Our findings suggest that retrenchment is generally effective, making states more likely to recover their previous power and less likely to experience the most dangerous interstate conflicts. We propose two hypotheses that directly test two of the most contentious claims in the literature.H1: When in a period of decline, a state that chooses to retrench will be more likely to recover their previous position than a state that does not.H2: A great power experiencing a period of decline will be less likely to be the target of predation at the hands of fellow states than a great power that does not.Research designWe test our argument on a sample comprising all states identified as great powers by the Correlates of War (COW) project from 1870 to 2007. This specific time-span is analyzed due to data availability.1 States enter the dataset in 1870 or the first year thereafter in which they achieve great power status and exit the dataset when they lose their great power status for the last time. The full list of countries and years included in the data is provided in Table 1.To operationalize relative power, we follow MacDonald and Parent (2011) in constructing an ordinal ranking of all great powers in a given year. States are ranked according to their overall share of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita among great powers. This is preferable to measures of absolute power, such as overall capabilities, that do not allow us to capture the relational nature of our theory. States can experience relative decline because their own economic performance is poor, or because other states are simply advancing faster than they are.2States are coded as entering a period of relative decline when they lose at least one rank in a given year. States exit a period of decline, or recover, when they regain at least one ordinal rank after they enter a period of decline. In our view, partial recoveries that reverse the process of decline without restoring a state to its full previous rank still indicate successful retrenchment. We also believe that states should maintain their improved ranking for some minimum period of time. States that regain a rank but immediately lose it again have not successfully recovered. Since we have no strong theoretical priors regarding how long this period should be, we use two different thresholds and present results for both. One requires a state to maintain their improved ranking for at least one year after recovery, and the other requires states to maintain their ranking for five years. Once states recover, they become “at risk” of experiencing another period of decline.To operationalize retrenchment, we use the percentage change in a state’s military expenditures over the previous year as a proxy for its military posture. Whether they are drawing down foreign commitments or decreasing military investment at home, states engaged in a strategy of retrenchment should display declining military expenditures. This provides a continuous measure that allows us to capture both whether a state retrenches and the degree to which it does so. Data on military expenditures come from the COW project’s National Military Capabilities Dataset and are measured in nominal values (Lemke and Reed, 1998).3 Because we do not have reliable data on the inflation rate for military capabilities, we choose not to adjust these values for inflation. This decision should be inconsequential for our results, since we care more about yearly changes in military expenditures rather than their absolute level.4We include several control variables to ensure that our models capture the effects of adopting a strategy of retrenchment rather than changes in latent military capabilities. To control for the effects of a state’s absolute power, independent of its position relative to other states, we include the absolute level of GDP per capita. We also include the change in GDP per capita over the previous year to control for abrupt changes in absolute power. We also control for factors that may affect a state’s ability to retrench effectively. First, states with strong alliance portfolios should have an easier time retrenching by relying on allies to take up the slack in managing international security threats. We control for this using the S alliance score measure, which provides a measure of alliance portfolio strength relative to the system leader (Small and Singer, 1969). Second, states capable of nuclear deterrence may be able to reduce military spending more easily by cutting conventional capabilities. We control for this using data on nuclear weapons status from Jo and Gartzke (2007). Third, regime type may have an effect on a state’s ability to retrench. Because autocracies possess less veto players, we expect that they may be able to adjust their spending priorities more easily. In addition, since well-consolidated regimes of either type may be more capable of adjusting state policy than anocracies, regime type may have a curvilinear effect on our variables. To account for this, we include both the state’s Polity2 score and its square using data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).5 To avoid the possibility of simultaneity bias, we lag our independent variables and the control variables accounting for power by one year in all models.Recovery modelsH1 predicts that states in periods of decline are more likely to recover their previous status if they retrench. To test this, we use discrete time duration models to estimate the probability that a state in a period of decline recovers in a given year. The dependent variable for these models is our binary indicator of Recovery. For each version of our Recovery variable (1 year and 5 year), we estimate binomial logit models on the subset of the data for all years in which a state is coded as in decline. We model the change in the probability of failure as a function of time using cubic polynomials of the time since the beginning of the period of decline (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Because some countries never experience decline, both sets of models omit observations on some countries.We begin by discussing the results of our models that employ the one year recovery threshold (see Table 2). Model 1 estimates the probability of recovery solely as a function of a state’s change in military expenditures. Model 2 introduces the control variables discussed above, and Model 3 introduces fixed effects for each country (i.e., unit-specific intercepts) to control for unobserved heterogeneity induced by including repeated measures on the same units. Taken together, these results provide modest support for the argument that retrenchment helps a state recover their previous standing during periods of decline. Although the coefficient on changes in military expenditures is insignificant in Model 1 and 2, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in Model 3 reveals that increases in military expenditures have a negative and significant effect (at the 0.1 level) on the probability of recovery. Put otherwise, states that decrease their military spending in a given year are less likely to experience recovery in the following year.To illustrate the substantive significance of this effect, Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of recovery as a function of changes in military expenditures with all other variables held at their observed values. The probability of recovery is highest after states make significant cuts in their military spending. This probability steadily decreases from 0.239 to 0.018 at the high end of military expenditures, indicating that states which make sharp increases in their military spending have almost no chance of recovery. Table 3 presents the results of our models using the five year recovery threshold. Although the coefficients are in the predicted direction, our military expenditures variable is not significant in any of the three models. In addition, including fixed effects in the model requires dropping a number of cases, since several states never experience our more restrictive coding of recovery. As such, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the basis of these models. In sum, we find some evidence that retrenchment facilitates recovery, although this is sensitive to both measurement and model specification.Predation modelsH2 predicts that states in periods of decline may be subject to increased attacks by enemy states. To test this argument, we use binomial logistic regression to model the probability that a great power is attacked by another state. Our dependent variable is a measure of whether another state initiated a militarized interstate dispute (MID) against a state in a given year (Palmer et al., 2015). Because we care about whether other states actually attack declining great powers, we restrict our analysis to MIDs that involve fatalities. Our primary independent variables are our indicator of whether a state is in decline and our measure of retrenchment. Since the choice of recovery threshold determines how long a state is coded as in decline, we run models using both our one year and five year coding schemes. We present the models using our one year threshold here. Models using the five year threshold are included in the Supplementary Online Appendix. These models include the same control variables discussed in the previous section as well as cubic polynomials of the number of years since the last MID initiation.Table 4 presents the results of these models. Model 1 includes only our measures of decline and retrenchment, Model 2 introduces control variables, and Model 3 introduces fixed effects for each country year. Our results provide modest support for the argument that states experiencing relative decline are subject to opportunistic attacks by challengers. Although this effect does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 1, it becomes significant after introducing control variables (Model 2) and fixed effects (Model 3). Holding all other variables constant at their observed values, the predicted probability of fatal MID onset in a given year is 0.063 for states in periods of decline and 0.031 for states that are not. As such, great powers in periods of decline are effectively twice as likely to be attacked by another state in a given year. This provides support for the argument that great powers may be subject to opportunistic attacks by challengers during periods of weakness.We also find modest support for the proposition that great powers that retrench may be able to avoid predatory attacks by challengers. The coefficient for change in military expenditures is positive and significant at the 0.1 level in two of our three models. This indicates that increases in military spending are associated with an increased risk of predatory attacks. This effect is also substantively significant. To provide some intuition of the size of the effect, Figure 2 plots the predicted probability of fatal MID onset using Model 3 across the observed range of our Retrenchment variable with all other variables held at their observed values. The predicted probability of fatal MID onset increases from 0.008 at the minimum to 0.146 at its maximum. This provides modest support for the position of retrenchment optimists. Although great powers do appear to be subject to attack during periods of relative decline, our results suggest that states that decrease their military expenditures may be less prone to this type of behavior. On the whole, our results are relatively robust. In general, the predicted values of both sets of models track well with the observed data.6 Both our models of recovery and predation are robust to changes in the coding of our decline variable using both one and five year thresholds for our recovery variable. However, our results are somewhat sensitive to measurement and model specification, which points to the need for further testing before drawing firm conclusions. In particular, the fixed effects model performs well in all of our analyses. We believe this is the theoretically most appropriate model, since it controls for unit effects and corrects for the violations of the assumption that observations are measured independently. Nonetheless, this speaks to the need for further testing before drawing firm conclusions on the basis of our results. Additional studies that employ alternate measures of power and retrenchment would be especially useful in this regard.ConclusionIn this paper, we have assessed the outcomes of great power retrenchment using a dataset of all great powers from 1870–2007. Counter to the expectations of the skeptics, we have found that retrenchment has led to relatively successful outcomes. Declining states that choose to retrench experience shorter periods of relative economic decline and are less likely to be the targets of predation than declining states that choose not to retrench. While these findings are suggestive, more research needs to be done to fully assess the outcomes of retrenchment. Among other topics, future work should explore the impact that retrenchment has on the credibility of the international commitments that the declining state chooses to maintain. Additionally, our data contain a number of instances of declining states that chose not to retrench and subsequently experienced prolonged economic problems and predation. Our findings suggest that retrenchment would have mitigated some of the negative effects of decline. Of these cases, post-World War II France represents and interesting instance of a declining power that chose not to retrench (Spruyt, 2005). Future research should employ quantitative counterfactual analyses, such as synthetic control, to explore how retrenchment could have changed France’s fortunes.

#### They have little to no way to solve for the brands evidence – the 1ac hasn’t read an il as to why Chinese primacy in Africa is key to overall primacy which the U.S still maintains