## 1NC

### 1NC – OFF

#### Interp: The affirmative must specify the jurisdiction the right to strike is recognized within a delineated text in the 1AC.

#### Jurisdiction is flexible and has too many interps– normal means shows no consensus.

Leyton Garcia 17 [Jorge Andrés Leyton García (Postgraduate Research Student / Assistant Teacher en University of Bristol). “THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT: RECOGNITION AND LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW”. Revista Chilena de Derecho, vol. 44, núm. 3, 2017, pp. 781-804. Accessed 6/24/21. <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1770/177054481008.pdf> //Xu]

The fi eld in which these pages will revolve is indeed complex and full of paradoxes. The right to strike has been recognized in diverse forms in different international and national legal systems. In some cases it has been expressly recognized in the text of conventions and treaties (European Social Charter), while in others the recognition has been achieved through the principled work of supervisory or jurisdictional bodies (like it has been the case in the ILO and the ECHR), not without diffi culties and doubts, as we shall see in the following pages. The analysis that follows will show, however, that the form of recognition does not necessary defi ne the scope and extent of the right. 1.1. THE ILO Despite being the most important source of labor standards, there is no defi nition of the right to strike in any of the ILO binding instruments. The right to strike is not mentioned in the ILO Constitution or in the Declaration of Philadelphia, and Convention N°87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise contains no specifi c reference to it. There is no textual recognition and no canonical defi nition in any of the Conventions and Recommendations that constitute the ILO’s body of norms. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that throughout the history of the ILO there has been a wide consensus among its members regarding the existence of a right to strike which emanates from the dispositions of Convention N°87 as a fundamental aspect of Freedom of Association. As Janice Bellace has pointed out: “Over the past 60 years the ILO constituents have recognized that there is a positive right to strike that is inextricably linked to – and an inevitable corollary of – the right to freedom of association”3 .

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement. We lose access to Readiness DA’s, Unions DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Real World – Policy makers will always define the entity that they are recognizing which proves its core topic literature

#### JSpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from recognition policies that require enforcement to function.

#### a] Spec is Drop the Debater – it’s a fundamental baseline for debate-ability and skews the entirety of the 1NC.

#### b] Use Competing Interps – 1] Spec is a yes/no question, you can’t reasonably specify if you haven’t specified and 2] Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### c] No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

#### D] Educations a voter because it’s the reason schools fund debate and fairness is a voter because debate’s a game and needs rules to evaluate it

### 1NC – OFF

#### Transportation Strikes are low now due to Federal Strike Bans.

Bauernschuster et Al 17, Stefan, Timo Hener, and Helmut Rainer. "When labor disputes bring cities to a standstill: The impact of public transit strikes on traffic, accidents, air pollution, and health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9.1 (2017): 1-37. (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Passau, Innstra)//Elmer

New York City's **Taylor Law,** which was put into effect **in response to a transit strike** in 1966, represents an example of a particularly draconian measure. Under Section 210, the law **prohibits** any **strike or** other concerted **stoppage** 01 worn or slowdown by public employees (Division of Local Government Services 2009). Instead, it prescribes binding arbitration by a state agency to resolve bargaining deadlocks between unions and employers. **Violations** against the prohibition on strikes are **punishable with hefty penalties**. The fine for an individual worker is **twice** the striking employee's **salary** **for each** **day** the strike lasts. In addition, union leaders face **imprisonment**. Since its inception in 1967, the Taylor Law has generated a lot of controversy. To proponents, it was **successful in averting several potential transit strikes** that would have imposed significant costs on the city and its inhabitants (OECD 2007). Indeed, New York City has only seen two transit strikes over the past four decades—in 1980 and in 2005. In both cases, harsh monetary penalties were imposed on workers and unions. The 2005 transit strike additionally led to the imprisonment of a union leader, and saw the Transport Workers Union (TWU) filing a formal complaint with the ILO. Since then, the ILO has urged the United States government to restore the right of transit workers to strike, arguing that they do not provide essential services justifying a strike ban (Committee on Freedom of Association 2011, 775). So far, the Taylor Law has not been amended in this direction.

#### Transit Strikes cause mass damage that far outweighs any benefits – specifically causes high Air Pollution by causing shifts to Personal Traffic.

Bauernschuster et Al 17, Stefan, Timo Hener, and Helmut Rainer. "When labor disputes bring cities to a standstill: The impact of public transit strikes on traffic, accidents, air pollution, and health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9.1 (2017): 1-37. (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Passau, Innstra)//Elmer

This paper aims to answer two questions that are at the heart of the Taylor Law controversy and similar debates elsewhere: Do strikes in the public transportation sector cause disruptions that endanger the safety and health of urban populations? And how large are the costs of transit strikes to noninvolved third parties? To get at these questions, our **analysis uses time series and cross-sectional variation** in powerful registry data **to quantify** the **effects of public transit strikes** in five domains: traffic volumes, travel times, accident risk, pollution emissions, and health (see Figure 1). The **context** **for our study** are the five largest cities in **Germany**, which provides us with an ideal setting. In particular, in contrast to countries that have imposed de jure restrictions on public transit strikes, **German courts** de facto **protect the right to strike** in this sector. **As a consequence**, Germany **regularly faces strikes by transit workers.** Our analysis exploits 71 one-day strikes in public transportation over the period from 2002 to 2011. We identify the daily effects of these strikes using both time series and cross-sectional variation in our data. In a first step, we estimate the impact on the total length of time that cars are in operation (henceforth, total car hours operated). To do so, we make use of two data sources. First, we use hourly informa tion from official traffic monitors to estimate the effect of transit strikes on traffic volumes. Second, we use congestion data based on GPS speed measurements from TomTom, a global supplier of navigation and location products and services, to esti mate the effect on travel times. Combining the two estimates allows us to compute the effect on total car hours operated. In a second step, we explore likely knock-on consequences by expanding the analysis in three directions. First, we assess the impact of strikes on the incidence and severity of car accidents using detailed regis ter data, which includes all vehicle crashes recorded by the German police. Second, to investigate the effect on atmospheric pollution, we draw on hourly data from official air monitors. Third, we explore the effect on human health using register data, which includes information about all patients admitted to all German hospi tals. Our identification strategy is based on a generalized difference-in-differences approach. It flexibly captures daytime and day-of-week patterns, seasonality effects, and long-run time trends, which are all allowed to vary by city. What emerges **is a picture of remarkable consistency**. **During** the morning peak of a **strike day**, **total car hours operated** **increase by 11 to 13 percent.** This increase can be decomposed into two separate effects: a 2.5 to 4.3 percent increase in the number of cars on roads and a 8.4 percent increase in travel times. In addition, our results suggest that transit strikes **pose** a **non-negligible threat** **to public safety and public health.** We find a 14 percent increase in the number of vehicle crashes, which is accompanied by a 20 percent increase in accident-related personal injuries. Moreover, we observe that transit strikes have **sizable effects on ambient air pollution**. **Emissions** of particulate matter **increase by 14 percent**, while nitrogen dioxide concentrations in ambient air increase by 4 percent. Finally, analyzing health out comes related to air pollution, we find that young children are subject to negative health effects. Among this subgroup, hospital admissions for respiratory diseases increase by 11 percent on strike days. The costs of strikes—both to the parties directly involved in a dispute and to the public at large—have been the subject of extensive research since the mid-twentieth century. Until the 1990s, the main conclusion of the literature was that strikes impose significant financial costs on the workers and the firm directly involved in walkouts, but only negligible costs in most cases on non-involved third parties (Kaufmann 1992). Our study firmly rejects this conclusion: based on our estimates, **the increase in aggregate travel time caused by a single strike corresponds to 1,550 full-time equivalent work weeks**. This translates into **third-party congestion costs of €3.2 million per strike or €228.9 million for all 71 strikes in our sample.** Our work complements a small but impressive literature in economics analyzing the impact of strikes. Focusing on the hospital sector, Gruber and Kleiner (2012) investigate the effects of nurses' strikes on patient outcomes. After controlling for time and hospital specific heterogeneity, they observe increased mortality and read mission rates, and conclude that strikes in hospitals kill.3 Examining walkouts in the education sector, Belot and Webbink (2010) and Baker (2013) find that teacher strikes had negative effects on student achievement in Belgium and Canada. Finally, there are a few interesting studies of strike impact in the private sector. Krueger and Mas (2004) show that strikes in tire production facilities decreased the quality of tires resulting in an increase of fatal accidents. In a similar vein, Mas (2008) finds that strikes at Caterpillar led to lower product quality. In comparison to other strikes that have been studied in the literature, there is one specific aspect about urban public transport that makes it an intriguing case to study: the population at risk from strikes is potentially very large and likely to be affected along multiple dimensions. This is due to several interrelated facts: (i) in many advanced cities, the two major modes of transportation are private vehicles and public transit; (ii) urban public transport is typically provided under monopoly conditions—either by public sector companies or by operators working under licenses granted by public authorities; (iii) without the availability of a close substitute, public transit strikes are likely to significantly disrupt the normal travel of transit riders and disturb traffic patterns by increasing the use of private vehicles; (iv) two of the main externalities associated with an increase in the usage of private cars are traffic accidents and air pollution, and entire city populations—not just transit users—may be adversely affected in each of these areas when public transport shuts down. Quantifying these potential impacts is not just interesting in itself, but also an important ingredient to meaningful discussions about the regulation of labor relations in sectors providing services regarded as public or essential.4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides the institutional setting and discusses how transit strikes might affect cities and their inhabitants. Section II describes the data. Section III outlines the empirical strategy, followed by the results in Section IV. Section V discusses the size of the effects by monetizing the third party costs of transit strikes and comparing them to the private costs of struck employers. Background A. The Role of Public Transit and the Regulation of Labor Relations The five largest German cities, home to roughly 8.2 million people, are characterized by an intensive use of public transportation. In 2013, Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, and Frankfurt together accounted for a total number of 3.4 billion public transit users in their metropolitan areas.5 This corresponds to an average 9.3 million passengers a day. In Berlin, the German capital, roughly 43 percent of commuters use public transit, while about 38 percent travel by car (Wingerter 2014). Public transportation networks are extensive in all sample cities. In Hamburg, for example, the transportation network comprises 91 subway stations, 68 suburban train stations (S-Bahn), more than 1,300 bus stops connecting a network of nearly 1,200 km in a city with less than 2 million inhabitants. The importance of public transportation in major German cities is comparable to the role it plays in the largest city in the United States. New York City has a population of roughly 8.4 million people. In 2014, its Metropolitan Transportation Authority moved about 9 million riders per day or 3.3 billion passengers a year on subways, buses, and railroads.6 Approximately 56 percent of commuters in New York City use public transit, while about 27 percent travel by car.7 While the use of mass transit in New York City and major German cities is com parable, the regulation of labor relations in the public transportation sector differs markedly. As mentioned above, New York City's Taylor Law prohibits strikes by transit workers under the threat of harsh penalties. Other cities in the United States with no-transit-strike laws include Chicago, Boston, and Washington, DC. For a German, it must come as a surprise that many countries impose de jure restrictions on strikes in the public transportation sector. Indeed, in Germany, the right to strike is a fundamental right based on the Freedom of Association (Koalitionsfreiheit) as laid out in Article 9(3) of the constitution (Grundgesetz). Only civil servants, judges, and soldiers are excluded from the right to strike. Until the 1990s, the big infra structure industries—i.e., telecommunications, postal, and public transportation ser vices—were state monopolies. Workers in these industries had civil servant status and thus were not allowed to strike. However, when these industries were gradually privatized during the 1990s, newly hired workers were no longer given civil servant status and therefore gained the right to strike. Today, public transit workers, whether employed by Germany's rail operator Deutsche Bahn or local public transport providers, are allowed to engage in industrial action. The only de facto restriction on transit workers' right to strike is that the parties of an industrial conflict are responsible for the provision of a minimum service (Klaß et al. 2008). This is intended to act as a balance of their interests with those of non-involved third parties.8 In Germany, industrial action by transit workers is typically announced one day ahead of a strike. However, at that time, there is still substantial uncertainty as to exactly which services will be affected and to what degree. Thus, the actual extent of a strike cannot be clearly assessed prior to the start of a strike. The strikes we exploit in this study have the following feature in common: they do not shutdown the entire transportation system, but there are significant distortions in terms of service frequency. As a rule of thumb, at least one-third and up to two-thirds of all connections in affected cities are canceled or severely delayed on strike days. After the official end of a strike, it usually takes some hours until service is back to normal. Having described the context and setting of our study, we now go on to discuss how urban populations might be affected by public transit strikes. B. Public Transit Strikes and Car Traffic Given the intensive use of public transportation in major German cities, we expect **strikes by transit workers** to **have** **profound** short-run **effects on** the **mode of transport** of commuters. Some might **feel forced to use** their **private car** or motorbike or a taxi on strike days. Others might switch to their bike or just walk. Again others might postpone their journey. Van Exel and Rietveld (2001) summarize the existing evidence as follows: **public transit strikes induce** most **public transit users to switch to the car** (either as driver or passenger) and **as a result traffic density** as well as road congestion **increases**. A similar conclusion is reached by Anderson (2014), who ana lyzes freeway traffic during a 35-day strike by transit workers in Los Angeles. His estimations reveal an increase in delays during peak periods by almost 50 percent due to increased car traffic.9 Finally, Adler and van Ommeren (2015) exploit transit strikes in Rotterdam and also find positive effects of transit shutdowns on congestion. Based on these findings we formulate our first testable prediction. PREDICTION 1: **Public transit strikes increase the number of cars on roads**, especially during peak periods. Travel times increase due to rising traffic congestion. C. Car Traffic and Accidents The frequency and severity of road accidents depends on several traffic characteristics that may be affected by public transit strikes. Examples we have in mind include the number of cars in road systems, driving skills, driver behavior, and speed. First, an often-used specification by transport economists suggests that the expected number of road accidents rises with the number of potential accidents which, in turn, is an increasing function of the number of cars in the system (Shefer and Rietveld 1997). Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006) confirm this prediction by showing that traffic density increases accident costs substantially. Second, the expected number of road accidents is a function of the behavior and skills of drivers. In this regard, we would expect that public transit strikes reduce average driving skills since marginal drivers with less experience appear on road systems. This channel works to increase the frequency of road accidents. In addition, it is well understood that driving in high-density traffic can contribute to stress and therefore lead to behavioral patterns—e.g., tailgating, aggressive driving, braking abruptly—that increase accident risk (Transport Research Center 2007). More accidents are likely to result in additional personal injuries (Shefer and Rietveld 1997). However, the same logic does not necessarily apply to accidents involving severe injuries or fatalities: with an increase in congestion stemming from more cars in the system, average travel speed decreases, thus potentially causing a reduction in the number of severe accidents. Evidence from the United States indeed suggests a substantial reduction in the number of fatal road accidents during morning peak hours, periods in which traffic density is the highest (Farmer and Williams 2005). But there is also evidence, emerging from the United Kingdom, that the picture is more differentiated. In particular, congestion as a mitigator of crash severity is less likely to occur in urban conditions, but may still be a factor on higher speed roads and highways (Noland and Quddus 2005). Our focus will be on accidents in urban conditions. Thus, it remains a priori unclear whether an increase in congestion stemming from public transit strikes affects the incidence of severe accidents, and if so in what direction. Against this background, our second testable prediction is: PREDICTION 2: Public transit strikes increase the frequency of car accidents which, in turn, leads to a rise in accident-related injuries. The effect on accidents involving severe injuries or fatalities is a priori unclear. D. Car Traffic and Air Pollution **Car traffic** is **associated with air pollution** mainly **due to engine exhaust**. The chemical processes in fuel burning thus determine the expected effect of traffic on air pollution. Internal combustion engines powering the vast majority of **cars** in developed countries **emit** oxides of **nitrogen**, **carbon monoxide**, unburned or partially burned organic compounds, and particulate matter with the amounts depending amongst other things on operating conditions (Heywood 1988). In particular, it is well understood that congested stop-and-go traffic is associated with higher emissions than free-flow traffic. There are three reasons for this. First, the efficiency of internal combustion engines, which depends on revolutions per minute (rpm), is highest at medium speed (Davis and Diegel 2007). Acceleration and deceleration episodes decrease the time operated in the optimal rpm range, which in turn increases emissions per minute driven. Second, **congestion** **increases travel times**, and so **leads to a rise in fuel consumption and emissions** per distance driven. Third, particulate matter emissions not only stem from fuel burning process, but also from brake wear and tire wear on tarmac—both high in congested traffic. From an empirical viewpoint, several studies suggest that **high traffic volumes and congestion are causes of ambient air pollution** (see, e.g., Currie and Walker 2011; Knittel, Miller, and Sanders 2011). A pollutant that is not caused by car traffic, and therefore can be used for a placebo test, is sulfur dioxide (Lalive, Luechinger, and Schmutzler 2013). Indeed, sulfur dioxide emissions from cars are close to nonexistent since modern gasoline no longer contains significant amounts of sulfur. From these arguments our third testable prediction arises: PREDICTION 3: Public transit strikes increase road-traffic related air pollution. A pollutant expected to be unaffected is sulfur dioxide.

#### Stable Mass Transit solves Transport Emissions which cause Warming.

Ionescu 21 Diana Ionescu 11-5-2021 "To Fight Climate Change, Support Public Transit" <https://www.planetizen.com/news/2021/11/115186-fight-climate-change-support-public-transit> (Diana is a contributing editor to Planetizen.)//Elmer

Andrew J. Hawkins argues in favor of boosting **public transit as** a **crucial way to fight climate change**, warning against the **potential "death spiral**" **caused by declining ridership** which reduces revenue, leading to worse service which discourages riders even further. As Hawkins writes, There’s more at stake than good buses and trains. The recent report from the United Nations **I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **C**limate **C**hange **confirms** that a hotter, wetter, more inhospitable future is all but certain. The **transportation sector** is **responsible for nearly a third of greenhouse gases**, **most** of which **come from tailpipe emissions**. High-quality **mass transit can do a lot to fight climate change**, but only if people are willing to use it. Since the start of the pandemic, transit agencies have struggled against a raft of challenges as some riders abandon their systems while essential workers and other transit-dependent commuters rely on public transportation more than ever. Agencies around the country are implementing major service changes and reducing or eliminating fares in an effort to get riders back on board and expand the reach of their systems, with mixed results. These initiatives will create more benefits than just improved transit service for those who use it, transit supporters argue. As Hawkins concludes, "**high-quality transit is the only real solution to** our vast, seemingly intractable problems with **climate change**, inequality, land use, and housing."

#### Warming causes Extinction

Kareiva 18, Peter, and Valerie Carranza. "Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back." Futures 102 (2018): 39-50. (Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA)//Re-cut by Elmer

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (**climate change**, global **freshwater** cycle, **and** ocean **acidification**) do **pose existential risks**. This is **because of** intrinsic **positive feedback loops**, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all **directly connected to** the provision of **food and water**, and **shortages** of food and water can **create conflict** and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. **Ample clean water** is not a luxury—it **is essential for human survival**. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes **Humans** are remarkably ingenious, and **have adapted** to crises **throughout** their **history**. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). **However**, the many **stories** **of** human ingenuity **successfully** **addressing** **existential risks** such as global famine or extreme air pollution **represent** environmental c**hallenges that are** largely **linear**, have immediate consequences, **and operate without positive feedbacks**. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, **the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops**. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that **very warming can cause more CO2 release** which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that **forest fires will become more frequent** and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This **catastrophic fire** embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that **could catch humanity off-guard and produce a** true **apocalyptic event.** Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that **runaway climate change,** and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks **portends** even greater **existential risks**. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Plan text: Firms should be transformed into worker self-directed enterprises.

Wolff ND - Richard D. Wolff [professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and a visiting professor at the New School in New York City. He has also taught economics at Yale University, the City University of New York, and the University of Paris I (Sorbonne)], “Start with Worker Self-Directed Enterprises,” *The Next System Project*. <https://thenextsystem.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/RickWolff.pdf> AT

We therefore propose reorganizing enterprises such that workers become their own bosses. Specifically, that means placing the workers in the position of their own collective board of directors, rather than having directors be nonworkers selected by major shareholders. This is not primarily a matter of workers as owners of these enterprises (fine, but not required), nor primarily as managers (likewise fine, but not required). It is the tasks of direction—the decision making now assigned usually and primarily to corporate boards of directors and only secondarily to the major shareholders who choose them—that must be transferred to the workers collectively. We call such enterprises worker self-directed enterprises (WSDEs). They embody and concretize what we mean by economic democracy by locating it first and foremost inside the enterprises producing the goods and services upon which society depends. WSDEs represent the goal and their growth and proliferation represent the mechanism to transition from the present capitalist system to a far better next system.

The strategic focus, then, is not upon the government, as in traditional liberal and socialist thinking; it is rather more microeconomic than macroeconomic. Of course, winning government support of WSDEs and their proliferation would be helpful and sought after—perhaps by political parties rooted in and funded by an emerging WSDE sector within otherwise private or state capitalist economies. But the main emphasis would be on working people who either convert existing enterprises into WSDEs or start new enterprises as WSDEs.

Core Goals

Briefly, what are the principal, core goals your model or system seeks to realize? Our core goal is the development of a major—and, if possible, prevailing—sector of the economy that is comprised of enterprises (offices, factories, farms, and stores) in which the employees democratically perform the following key enterprise activities: (a) divide all the labors to be performed, (b) determine what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and where it is to be produced, and (c) decide on the use and distribution of the output or revenues (if output is monetized) therefrom.

Major Changes

What are the principal changes you envision in the current system—the major differences between what you envision and what we have today? A large portion of existing capitalistically organized enterprises would have to transition out of structures in which owners, top managers, or boards of directors perform the key enterprise activities mentioned above.

Principal Means

What are the principal means (policies, institutions, behaviors, whatever) through which each of your core goals is pursued?

The means to achieve the transition would need to be several. Laws would need to be enacted or changed to facilitate the conversion of capitalistically organized enterprises into WSDEs, the formation of new WSDEs, and the functioning of WSDEs. School curriculums would need to be changed and teachers be trained to explain, explore, and study WSDEs systematically as alternative-enterprise organizations alongside their traditional capitalist counterparts (corporations, partnerships, and family enterprises). Political parties and platforms need to emerge to represent the interests of WSDEs—the WSDE sector—in terms of state policies, much as now the Democrats and Republicans represent the interests of the capitalist sector.

#### Empirics prove prove that self-directed are more democratic and successful.

Jerry **Ashton, 13** - ("The Worker Self-Directed Enterprise: A "Cure" for Capitalism, or a Slippery Slope to Socialism?," HuffPost, 1-2-2013, accessed 11-16-2021, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/worker-self-directed-enterprise\_b\_2385334)//MS

Decidedly so, Wolff responds, providing two financially successful examples of **the workplace being a social activity governed by the norms of community**, one in Spain and one in California. ¶ Wolff offers as his first example, **the Mondragon Cooperative** in the North of Spain. ¶ This co-op took its name from the Mondragan University founded by a local Catholic priest by the name of "Father Arizmendi" as a mechanism to enable the poor in that community to learn how to cooperatively run their own business. ¶ Beginning with six workers producing agrarian goods, some 55 years later **it now employs 120,000** people employed **in some 100 worker-owned enterprises** and affiliated organizations. It is the **10th largest cooperative in Spain** and a bulwark against that country's steep (elsewhere) unemployment rate of 22 percent. ¶ "This is a 'a family of cooperatives' in which the first commitment is to preserve jobs -- not satisfy stockholders." Wolff points out. ¶ That same philosophy infuses **the Arizmendi Bakery** comprising five "sister cooperatives" in the San Francisco Bay Area. Proudly assuming the name of the famous Basque Priest, this group **gets rave reviews** for its pastries and thin-crust pizza **and handily outperforms** its more traditional bakery competitors **in both revenue and employee satisfaction**. ¶ As their website [proudly states](http://arizmendi.coop/), "We are a cooperative -- a worker-owned and operated business. We make decisions democratically, sharing all of the tasks, responsibilities, benefits and risks." ¶

#### Counterplans do negate since they prove an opportunity cost to the resolution which disproves the thesis

### 1NC – OFF

#### Ethics begin a posteriori.

#### 1] Knowledge is based on experience – I wouldn’t know 2+2=4 without experience of objects nor the color red without some experience of color. We can’t obtain evidence of goodness without experience.

#### 2] Indifference – Even if there are apriori moral truths, I can choose to ignore them. Cognition is binding – if I put my hand on a hot stove, I can’t turn off my natural aversion to it.

#### The standard is act hedonistic util. Prefer –

#### 1] Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

Blum et al. 18

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### 2] No intent-foresight distinction – if I foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of my deliberation since its intrinsic to my action

#### 3] Actor spec – governments lack wills or intentions and inevitably deals with tradeoffs – outweighs because agents have differing obligations.

#### 4] No act omission distinction – choosing not to act is an action in of itself since you had to make an active decision to omit. Walking past a drowning baby and choosing not to save it is a cognitive decision you were faced with and you actively decided to keep walking b) warranting a distinction gives agents the permissible choice of omitting from any ethical action since omissions lack culpability.

#### 5] death is bad and outweighs – a) agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b) it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 6] No calc indicts – a) no philosophy actually says that consequences don’t matter at all since otherwise it would indict every theory since they use causal events to understand how their ethics have worked in the past and through the justification of premises

#### 7] Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Plummer 15 (Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

### 1NC – OFF

#### [A just government ought to] request the International Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion over whether they ought to [establish an unconditional worker’s right to strike]. [A just government] ought to abide by the outcome of the advisory opinion.

#### Solves – the ICJ will rule in favor of an unconditional right to strike.

Seifert ’18 (Achim; Professor of Law at the University of Jena, and adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg; December 2018; “The protection of the right to strike in the ILO: some introductory remarks”; CIELO Laboral; http://www.cielolaboral.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/seifert\_noticias\_cielo\_n11\_2018.pdf; Accessed: 11-3-2021; AU)

The **recognition of a right to strike** in the legal order of the **International Labour Organization** (ILO) is probably one of the most controversial questions in international labor law. Since the foundation of the ILO in the aftermath of World War I, the recognition of the right to strike as a **core element** of the principle of freedom of association has been discussed in the International Labour Conference (ILC) as well as in the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. As is well known, the ILO, in its long history spanning almost one century, has not explicitly recognized a right to strike: neither Article 427 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Constitution of the ILO, including the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), nor the Conventions and Recommendations in the field of freedom of association - namely Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) - have explicitly enshrined this right. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), established in 1951 by the Governing Body, recognized in 1952 that Convention No. 87 guarantees also the **right to strike** as an **essential element of trade** union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests1. It is worthwhile to note that it was a complaint of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at that time the Communist Union Federation on international level and front organization of the Soviet Union2, against the United Kingdom for having dissolved a strike in Jamaica by a police operation; since that time the controversy on the right to strike in the legal order of the ILO was also embedded in the wider context of the Cold War. In the complaint procedure initiated by the WFTU, the CFA **recognized** a **right to strike** under Convention No. 87 but considered that the police operation in question was lawful. In the more than six following decades, the CFA has elaborated a **very detailed case law** on the right to strike dealing with many concrete questions of this right and its limits (e.g. in essential services) and manifesting an even more complex structure than the national rules on industrial action in many a Member State. This case law of the CFA has been compiled in the “Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO”3. In 1959, i.e. seven years after case No. 28 of the CFA, the Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) also recognized the right to strike as **a core element of freedom** of association under Article 3 of Convention No. 874. Since then, the CEACR has **reconfirmed** its view on many occasions. Both CFA and CEACR coordinate their interpretation of Article 3 of Convention No. 875. Hence there is one single corpus of rules on the right to strike developed by both supervisory Committees of the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILC also has made clear in various Resolutions adopted since the 1950s that it considers the **right to strike** as an **essential element of freedom of association6**. On the whole, the recognition of the right to strike resulted therefore from the interpretative work of CFA and CEACR as well as of the understanding of the principle of freedom of association the ILC has expressed on various occasions. It should not be underestimated the wider political context of the Cold War had in this constant recognition of a right to strike under ILO Law. Although the very first recognition of the right to strike -as mentioned above- went back to a complaint procedure before the CFA, initiated by the Communist dominated WFTU, it was the Western world that particularly emphasized on the right to strike in order to blame the Communist Regimes of the Warsaw Pact that did not explicitly recognize a right to strike in their national law or, if they legally recognized it, made its exercise factually impossible; to this end, unions, employers’ associations but also Governments of the Western World built up an alliance in the bodies of the ILO7. In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8. This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding”9. As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the **competence of the International Court of Justice** to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the **interpretation of this Constitution** or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11. However, it **cannot be denied** that this constant interpretative work of CFA and CEACR possesses an **authoritative character** given the high esteem the twenty members of the CEACR -they are all internationally renowned experts in the field of labor law and social security law- and the nine members of the CFA with their specific expertise have. As the CEACR reiterates in its Reports, “[the opinions and recommendations of the Committee] derive their persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its impartiality, experience and expertise”12. Already this interpretative authority of both Committees justifies that **national legislators or courts take into consideration** the views of these supervisory bodies of the ILO when implementing ILO law. Furthermore, the long-standing and uncontradicted interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by CFA and CEACR as well as its recognition by the Member States may be considered as a **subsequent practice** in the application of the ILO Constitution under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1968): such subsequent practices shall be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement. Their constant supervisory practice probably reflects a volonté ultérieure, since other bodies of the ILO also have **recognized a right to strike** as the two above-mentioned Resolutions of the ILC of 1957 and 1970 as well as the constant practice of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to examine **cases of violation** of the right to strike as **examples for breaches of the principle of freedom of association** demonstrate. As this constant practice of the organs of the ILO has not been contradicted by Member States, there is a **strong presumption** for recognition of a right to strike as a subsequent practice of the ILO under Article 31(3)(b) of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties.

#### Compliance ensures faith in global democratic institutions – solves global conflict.

Hawksley ’16 [Humphrey; formerly the BBC’s Beijing Bureau Chief and author of The Third World War: A Novel of Global Conflict and Asian Waters: American, China, and the Global Paradox; 11-19-2016; "Trump makes International Law Crucial for Peace"; Humphrey Hawksley; https://www.humphreyhawksley.com/trump-makes-international-law-crucial-for-peace/; Accessed 4-1-2020; AH]

Major powers tend to reject international law when rulings run counter to their interests insisting that the distant courts carry no jurisdiction. China rejected a Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in July and clings to expansive claims in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines. China’s response mirrored US rejection of a 1986 International Court of Justice ruling against US support for rebels in Nicaragua. “With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties,” writes journalist Humphrey Hawksley for YaleGlobal Online. Disregard for the rule of law weakens the legal system for all. Hawksley offers two recommendations for renewing respect for international law: intuitional overhaul so that the all parties recognize the courts, rejecting decisions only as last resort, and governments accepting the concept, taking a long-term view on balance of power even when rulings go against short-term strategic interests. Reforms may be too late as China organizes its own parallel systems for legal reviews and global governance, Hawksley notes, but international law, if respected, remains a mechanism for ensuring peace. – YaleGlobal LONDON: Flutter over the surprise visit to China by Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte may soon fade. But his abrupt and public dismissal of the United States in favor of China has weakened the argument that international rule of law could underpin a changing world order. The issue in question was the long-running dispute between China and the Philippines over sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal, situated 800 kilometers southeast of China and 160 kilometers west of the Philippines mainland, well inside the United Nations–defined Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite a court ruling and Duterte’s cap in hand during his October mission to Beijing, Philippine fishing vessels still only enter the waters around Scarborough Shoal at China’s mercy. The dispute erupted in April 2012, when China sent ships to expel Filipino fishing crews and took control of the area. The standoff became a symbol of Beijing’s policy to lay claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea where where it continues to build military outposts on remote reefs and artificially created islands in waters claimed by other nations. Lacking military, diplomatic or economic muscle, the Philippines turned to the rule of law and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. A panel of maritime judges ruled China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal invalid in July this year. China refused to recognize the tribunal from the start and declared the decision “null and void,” highlighting the complex balance in the current world order between national power and the rule of law. Beijing’s response mirrored a 1986 US response to Nicaragua’s challenge in the International Court of Justice. The court ruled against the United States for mining Nicaragua’s harbors and supporting right-wing Contra rebels. The United States claimed the court had no jurisdiction. China’s response on the South China Sea ruling mirrors a 1986 US response.With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties. The Western liberal democratic system is being challenged, and confrontations in Asia and Europe, as in Crimea and Ukraine, replicate the lead-up to the global conflicts of last century’s Cold War. As Nicaragua and Central America were a flashpoint in the 1980s, so Scarborough Shoal and South China Sea are one now. Other flashpoints are likely to emerge as China and Russia push to expand influence. Western democracies being challenged by rising powers have a troubled history. The 1930s rise of Germany and Japan; the Cold War’s proxy theaters in Vietnam, Nicaragua and elsewhere; and the current US-Russian deadlock over Syria are evidence that far more thought must be given in the deployment of international law as a mechanism for keeping the peace The view is supported, on the surface at least, by Russia and China who issued a joint statement in June arguing that the concept of “strategic stability” being assured through nuclear weapons was outdated and that all countries should abide by principles stipulated in the “UN Charter and international law.” Emerging power India, with its mixed loyalties, shares that view. “The structures for international peace and security are being tested as never before,” says former Indian ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, author of Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos. “It is everyone’s interest to re-establish the authority of the Security Council and reassert the primacy of law.”

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Framing

#### Intervention is good and necessary

Fontaine 19 (Richard, CEO of center for New American Security, former fopo advisor to McCain, MA in International Affairs, November/December 2019 issue, "The Nonintervention Delusion," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-15/nonintervention-delusion?utm_medium=newsletters&amp;utm_source=fatoday&amp;utm_content=20191106)> AG

* Interventions are inevitable – it’s just a question of how successful they are – only intellectual engagement can generate the nuanced and rigorous policy proposals that guarantee they work.
* Even the most committed anti-interventionists come up with exceptions which proves their politics is disingenuous and their method is bad
* Terrorism is a threat and turns civil liberties
* Interventionism is empirically successful – laundry list
* US is key, our allies are ineffective
* Interventionism key to hedge back against Russia and China

Faced with such a sweeping political consensus, one might conclude that Washington should simply get on with it and embrace **restraint**. The problem is that such a strategy **overlooks the interests and values** that have prompted U.S. action in the first place and that may for good reasons give rise to it in the future. The consensus also neglects the fact that, despite the well-known failures of recent large-scale interventions, there is also **a record of more successful ones**—including the effort underway today in Syria.

To assume that nonintervention will become a central tenet of future U.S. foreign policy will, if anything, induce Americans to think less seriously about the country’s military operations abroad and thus **generate** **not only less successful intervention but possibly even more of it**. Instead of settling into wishful thinking, policymakers should accept that the use of military force will remain an **essential tool of U.S. strategy**. That, in turn, requires applying the right lessons from recent decades.

GOODBYE TO ALL THAT?

The first sign that the sweeping consensus around “ending endless war” is more problematic than it first appears is the telling set of caveats that emerges even among its most ardent advocates. Consider the many qualifications that Democratic presidential candidates are applying to [a withdrawal from Afghanistan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-15/lessons-vietnam-leaving-afghanistan). Biden has said that he would bring U.S. combat troops home during his first term but that he remains open to a “residual presence” to conduct counterterrorism operations—roughly the same approach as Trump’s. Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey has promised that as president he would immediately begin a “process” to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, while somehow ensuring that the country does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. Pete Buttigieg, the mayor of South Bend, Indiana, who served as a naval officer in Afghanistan, has agreed that “it’s time to end this endless war,” and yet he envisions a peace agreement that keeps U.S. special operations forces and intelligence operatives there. Such concessions, responsible policy though they are, stop well short of terminating the United States’ longest war.

Even the most committed anti-interventionists continue to come up with exceptions. The foreign policy manifesto of Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, [published](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-24/ending-americas-endless-war) in Foreign Affairs in June, is titled “Ending America’s Endless War,” and yet he has acknowledged that “military force is sometimes necessary, but always—always—as the last resort.” His foreign policy adviser has emphasized Sanders’ commitment to collective defense among NATO allies and has said that genocide and mass atrocities would “weigh heavily” on Sanders when contemplating military action. Advocates of offshore balancing, such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, favor using force if a regional balance of power is breaking down, and Mearsheimer has written that his approach would not preclude operations to halt genocides like the one that befell [Rwanda](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/rwanda/2017-12-12/rwandas-recovery) in 1994.

Even at a rhetorical and intellectual level, then, the end of intervention is **not** nearly as **clear-cut** as today’s politicians suggest. The reality of being commander in chief complicates things further: on the campaign trail, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Trump each pledged to engage in fewer foreign military adventures and redirect resources toward needs at home. In office, each reluctantly proceeded to not only continue existing wars but also launch new offensives.

The result is that, according to a Congressional Research Service estimate, the United States has employed military force over 200 times since the end of the Cold War. Many of these operations have taken place in or around the Middle East, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. But other, less frequently recalled interventions have occurred elsewhere, as in Bosnia, Colombia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and the Philippines. What’s more, the tendency to intervene is not simply the product of the United States’ emergence as an unbridled superpower after the Cold War. Between 1948 and 1991, during a time of supposedly stabilizing bipolar competition, the United States sent its military to fight abroad more than 50 times. American military action is not, as many believe, a feature of post–Cold War overstretch; it has been a central element of the United States’ approach to the world for decades.

THE CASE AGAINST

Just because the United States has intervened so frequently over its history does not mean that it will continue to do so or that it should. The case against intervention generally takes five forms. And although there are elements of truth to each, they also threaten to obscure other, more complicated realities.

The first argument holds that the United States need not employ military means in response to terrorism, civil wars, mass atrocities, and other problems that are not its business. Washington has used force against terrorists in countries ranging from Niger to Pakistan, with massive human and financial expenditures. And yet if more Americans die in their bathtubs each year than in terrorist attacks, why no war on porcelain? The [post-9/11 overreach](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/long-shadow-911), this camp contends, endures some 18 years later, having stretched well beyond eradicating the original al Qaeda perpetrators and their Afghan base. In this view, as the threats have diminished, so should American attention. The civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen may be tragic, but they do not demand a U.S. military response any more than did the atrocities in Rwanda, eastern Congo, or Darfur.

Adopting such a **cramped view** of American interests, however, carries its own costs. **Terrorism remains a threat**, and the effect of successful attacks on Americans goes **beyond their immediate casualties** to include increased pressure to restrict civil liberties at home and wage impromptu operations abroad—operations that end up being **costlier and less effective** than longer-term, better-planned ones would be. After the Islamic State (or ISIS) took hold in Iraq and Syria and footage of terrorists decapitating American hostages horrified the public, Obama undertook a far larger operation than would have likely been necessary had he left a residual force in Iraq after 2011. As for genocide and civil war, certain cases can pose such serious threats to U.S. interests, or be so offensive to American values, as to merit intervention. Successive presidents have used military might to prevent, halt, or punish mass atrocities—Clinton to cease the genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the Balkans, Obama to protect the [Yezidi minority](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2016-03-29/yezidis-vs-isis-icc) in Iraq, and Trump after Bashar al-Assad’s chemical attacks against his own people in Syria. There is every reason to believe that similar cases will arise in the future.

The second argument against intervention highlights its supposedly poor track record. For all of the United States’ good intentions—stopping terrorists, ending genocide, stabilizing countries, spreading democracy—Washington simply is not very successful in its attempts. Iraq and Libya look worse today than when the wars against Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi began, and the Taliban currently control more of Afghanistan than at any time since 2001. Long gone are U.S. aspirations to turn these countries into democracies that would radiate liberalism beyond their borders.

Yet this argument ignores the many other times in which **the use of American force worked**. It ejected Saddam from Kuwait, it ended a war in Bosnia, it stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it paved the way for a democratic transition in Liberia, and it helped defeat narcoterrorists and bring temporary peace to Colombia. Even in Afghanistan, it should not be forgotten that Washington denied al Qaeda a safe haven, and in Iraq and Syria, it eliminated ISIS’ physical presence, limited the flow of foreign fighters, and liberated cities from depravity. Then there are other, harder-to-measure effects of U.S. intervention, such as **enforcing** **norms** against ethnic cleansing and deterring countries from offering terrorists sanctuary or engaging in wars of aggression. To get an accurate picture of intervention’s mixed track record, one cannot **cherry-pick the disastrous cases** or the successful ones.

The third argument against intervention points to the slippery slope involved in such efforts: start a military campaign, and the United States will never get out. After the 1995 [Dayton peace accords](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/2009-08-17/death-dayton) formally ended the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, U.S. troops stayed in the area for ten years, and NATO retains a presence in Kosovo to this day. The United States seems to be stuck in Afghanistan, too, because without a peace deal with the Taliban, the U.S.-backed government could fall. In Iraq, Obama removed all U.S. troops, only to send them back in when ISIS established a vast presence there. Check in to a military intervention, and it often seems like you can never leave.

Once deployed, American troops often do stay a long time. But staying is not the same as fighting, and it is wrong to think of troops who are largely advising local forces the same way as one thinks about those who are actively engaged in combat. There is a stark difference between what it meant to have U.S. forces in Iraq during the peak of the war and what it means to have U.S. troops there now to train Iraqi forces—just as there is a massive gulf between deploying troops to Afghanistan during the troop surge there and keeping a residual presence to strengthen the government and its security forces. Some American interests are worth the price of continued military deployments, and the aim should be to diminish those costs in blood and treasure as the conditions stabilize. Even once they do, there may remain a case for an enduring role, particularly when the U.S. troop presence is the only thing maintaining the domestic political equilibrium, as was the case in Iraq before the 2011 withdrawal and as is true in Afghanistan today.

The fourth argument can be boiled down to the plea, **“Why us?”** Why must the United States always run to the sound of the guns, especially when other countries are capable of taking on such burdens and may have more skin in the game? Europe is geographically closer to Libya and Syria, at far greater risk from terrorism and refugee flows, and possesses capable military forces of its own. Middle Eastern allies have their own resources, too. The American role might not be so indispensable after all.

For all the contributions of U.S. partners, however, more often than not, only the United States has the will and the capability to lead successful military operations. France led a successful operation in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 and in Mali in 2013, and the United Kingdom led one in Sierra Leone in 2000, but those were exceptions. Iraq would not have left Kuwait in 1991 had the United States not led the effort; mass slaughter in the Balkans during the 1990s would not have ended without a dominant U.S. role, even though it took place on European soil. In Afghanistan and Syria, U.S. allies have made it clear that they will stay as long as the United States does but will head for the exit otherwise. U.S. friends in Europe have proved decidedly uninterested in taking matters into their own hands, and when Washington has declined to meaningfully intervene itself, they have often stood idly by. In Libya after Qaddafi’s fall, the Europeans failed to impose security even as growing numbers of refugees and migrants set sail across the Mediterranean. In Syria before U.S. bombing began, they undertook no military campaign against ISIS, even as the arrival of Syrian refugees destabilized European politics. When U.S. allies do take matters into their own hands, they can make a bad situation worse. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates decided to intervene in [Yemen’s civil war](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2019-05-02/real-plan-end-war-yemen), but their brutal and indiscriminate campaign led to a humanitarian disaster and strengthened the very Iranian role it sought to eliminate.

American intervention might not be so indispensable after all.

The final reason most frequently offered for getting out of the intervention business relates to its costs, both direct ones—the lives lost and damaged, the dollars borrowed and spent—and opportunity costs. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia represent the foremost challenge to the United States over the long term and that the competition with them has begun in earnest. If that’s the case, why tie up scarce resources in less important military interventions?

Here, too, a dose of subtlety is in order. The prospect of [great-power competition](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-09/great-power-competition-washingtons-top-priority-not-publics) should indeed structure the United States’ coming approach to national security, but a focus on counterterrorism is required, as well. After all, the George W. Bush administration entered office hoping to focus on China, only to see its best-laid plans upended by the 9/11 attacks. **Withdrawing prematurely** from terrorist safe havens such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria would **threaten the great-power emphasis** necessary in the next phase of the United States’ global life. A major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, for instance, would likely cause Washington to once again embrace counterterrorism as its chief national security priority, leaving it more vulnerable to threats from China and Russia. Unless the United States chooses to give up its global role and instead focus only on Asia and Europe, it must engage in great-power competition while attending to other security challenges in other areas.

#### Make them indict our internal links---if the 1AR didn’t identify an internal link, don’t let the 2AR say its low probability---their interp justifies arbitrarily lowering the risk of dropped args, which breaks the game and collapses into endless judge intervention based on how likely you think the DA is

### 1NC – AT: Advantage

#### COVID crushed employer leverage.

Ro 7-31-2021, reporter @ Axios. (Sam, "1 big thing: The worker's job market", *Axios*, <https://www.axios.com/workers-job-market-openings-hirings-firings-quits-wages-62461df6-116c-4b0c-8c8d-b0a22e53f7ba.html>)

The unprecedented upheaval of a year-plus of pandemic life is playing out in the job market. Why it matters: The unemployment rate remains stubbornly high. At the same time, the Great Resignation has companies across the country trying desperately to hold on to staff as employees act on pent-up demand for job changes. The pandemic also led some people to relocate, and to rethink their careers and what they want out of life — contributing to a mismatch of available jobs to available workers. The result? Chaos. By the numbers: There are 6.7 million fewer Americans working now than there were before the pandemic. The unemployment rate is 5.9%, compared to 3.5% in February 2020. On the plus side, about 16 million net jobs have been filled since April 2020. Four metrics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey help paint the picture. Job openings are at a record high of 9.2 million. For every one opening, there is one unemployed American. This is a considerable improvement from April 2020 when there were five unemployed per opening. In response, businesses across all industries have been raising wages. A growing percentage of companies are advertising hiring incentives like cash signing bonuses. Hirings aren't even close to keeping pace with new job openings. In May, the ratio of hires to job openings fell to an all-time low of 0.64. Numerous factors are holding workers back, including concerns about the coronavirus, child care issues, comfortable financial safety nets, and the enhanced unemployment benefits that are currently rolling off on a state-by-state basis. There are also an estimated 1.7 million people who retired early during the pandemic. Layoffs and firings are at an all-time low. The more that companies struggle to hire, the less they are letting go of the workers they do have. In fact, it may be the case that workers are underestimating how much leverage they have with their employers. Quits are at record highs as workers seek out better opportunities. The share of departing workers (layoffs, firings, retirements, deaths) who quit is 67.8%, the second-highest ever. Quit rates are particularly high in lower-wage service jobs like those in the leisure and hospitality industries, which likely reflects some trading up to better positions. Between the lines: This optimism toward the labor market may seem to be in conflict with the fact that 9.5 million Americans identify as being unemployed. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell addressed the topic during a press conference on Wednesday. Few people follow the labor market as closely as Powell, since one of the Fed's jobs is to help the economy achieve maximum employment. He said the real-world process for securing a job is a "time intensive, labor intensive process, and there may be a bit of a speed limit on that." The big picture: The balance of power in the labor market is unusually slanted in favor of workers, who are asking for raises, who are getting poached by competitors, who are switching careers, and in many cases who are just leaving the labor force altogether. The bottom line: The labor market wouldn’t be this favorable for workers if not for an economy that’s growing at such a high clip that there are shortages. As companies increasingly hire and continue to raise wages, that’s more money in the pockets of consumers who can spend it, perpetuating a virtuous cycle of economic growth.

#### Strikes fail and spark countermobilization.

Grant and Wallace 91 [Don Sherman Grant; Ohio State University; Michael Wallace; Indiana University; “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?” University of Chicago Press; March 1991; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781338.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca3144a9ae9e4ac65e285f2c67451ffb>] Justin

\*\*RM = Resource-Mobilization, or Strikes

3. Violent tactics.-Violent tactics are viewed by RM theorists exclu- sively as purposeful strategies by challengers for inciting social change with little recognition of how countermobilization strategies of elites also create violence. The role of elite counterstrategies has been virtually ig- nored in research on collective violence. Of course, history is replete with examples of elites' inflicting violence on challenging groups with the full sanction of the state. Typically, elite-sponsored violence occurs when the power resources and legal apparatus are so one-sidedly in the elites' favor that the outcome is never in doubt. In conflicts with weak insiders, elites may not act so openly unless weak insiders flaunt the law. Typically, elite strategies do not overtly promote violence but rather provoke violence by the other side in hopes of eliciting public condemnation or more vigorous state repression of challenger initiatives. This is a critical dynamic in struggles involving weak insiders such as unions. In these cases, worker violence, even when it appears justified, erodes public support for the workers' cause and damages the union's insider status.

4. Homogeneity and similarity.-Many RM theorists incorrectly as- sume that members of aggrieved groups are homogeneous in their inter- ests and share similar positions in the social structure. This (assumed) homogeneity of interests is rare for members of outsider groups and even more suspect for members of weak-insider groups. Indeed, groups are rarely uniform and often include relatively advantaged persons who have other, more peaceful channels in which to pursue their goals. Internal stratification processes mean that different persons have varying invest- ments in current structural arrangements, in addition to their collective interest in affecting social change. Again, these forces are especially prev- alent for weak insiders: even the group's lowest-status members are likely to have a marginal stake in the system; high-status members are likely to have a larger stake and, therefore, less commitment to dramatic change in the status quo.

Internal differences may lead to fragmentation of interests and lack of consensus about tactics, especially tactics suggesting violent confronta- tion. While group members share common grievances, individual mem- bers may be differentially aggrieved by the current state of affairs or differentially exposed to elite repression. White's (1989) research on the violent tactics of the Irish Republican Army shows that working-class members and student activists, when compared with middle-class partici- pants, are more vulnerable to state-sponsored repression, more likely to be available for protest activities, and reap more benefits from political violence. When we apply them to our study of strike violence, we find that differences in skill levels are known to coincide with major intraclass 1120 Strikes divisions in material interests (Form 1985) and are likely to coincide with the tendency for violent action. For instance, skilled-craft workers, who are more socially and politically conservative than unskilled workers, are less likely to view relations with employers as inherently antagonistic and are prone to separate themselves from unskilled workers, factors that should decrease their participation in violence.

#### Concentration of power is good---anything else collapses unions---empirics.

Magner 20 [Brandon; Deputy Prosecutor at Marion County Prosecutor's Office; “Labor Law and Corporate Concentration,” 11/22/20; LaborLawLite; <https://brandonmagner.substack.com/p/labor-law-and-corporate-concentration>] Justin

On the side favoring increased centralization in the labor market is usually Matt Bruenig. Bruenig argues that dispersing corporate power also disperses union leverage, as unions can only exert maximum pressure on an industry when strikes affect the core of production. This is harder to do when the labor market is spread out across a series of smaller and less powerful firms. Organizing thus becomes a game of whack-a-mole under the National Labor Relations Act’s model of facility-specific [enterprise bargaining](https://americancompass.org/discussions/the-wagner-acts-original-sin/).

There is a historic attractiveness to Bruenig’s argument. Arguably the most famous concerted job action in American history, the Flint Sit-Down Strike at General Motors, involved a few thousand workers bringing the largest and most powerful employer in the world to a grinding halt by ceasing production in merely one of the company’s several hundred plants. GM eventually capitulated and signed a labor agreement that officially birthed the UAW. (Ironically, this act of union recognition by GM would likely be considered illegal under [today’s interpretations](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/366/731/) of the NLRA, as there was never any showing by the UAW that it actually represented anything close to a majority of GM’s 136,000 workers.)

#### Increased strikes sabotage the economy – they cause major disruptions and lower income for workers.

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Labor strikes can cause major disruptions to industry, commerce and the lives of many people who aren't even connected to the strike itself. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association strike in 1981 resulted in the firing of thousands of air traffic controllers, and the New York City transit strike in late 2005 affected millions of people. The history of strikes and labor unions is a key chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution.

While the reasons behind strikes can be complex, they all boil down to two key elements: money and power. In this article, we'll find out how labor strikes have affected the balance of power between corporations and workers, what laws regulate strikes and learn about some important strikes in history.

It's difficult to say when the first real labor strike occurred. The word "strike" was first used in the 1700s, and probably comes from to notion of dealing a blow to the employer [ref]. In 1786, a group of printers in Philadelphia requested a raise and the company rejected it. They stopped working in protest and eventually received their raise. Other professionals followed suit in the next few decades. Everyone in a city who practiced the same profession agreed to set prices and wages at the same rate. Members would shun anyone who diverged from the agreement, refusing to work in the same shop and forcing employers to fire them. By the 1800s, formal trade societies and guilds began to emerge.

To have a strike today, you must have a union (though not necessarily an official union) -- an organization of workers that bargain collectively with an employer. Workers form unions because an individual worker is powerless compared to an employer, who can set low wages and long working hours as long as it adheres to labor laws. When workers combine to form a union, they collectively have enough power to negotiate with the employer. The main weapon the union has against the employer is the threat of a strike action.

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when all the workers in the union stop coming to work. With no workers, the business shuts down. The employer stops making money, though it is still spending money on taxes, rent, electricity and maintenance.

The longer the strike lasts, the more money the employer loses. Of course, the workers aren't getting paid either, so they're losing money as well. Some unions build up "war chests" -- funds to pay striking workers. But it isn't usually very much, and it's often not enough for a prolonged strike.

Strikes help explain why unions are more powerful than individuals. Imagine if an employer refuses to give a raise to an individual worker. She then decides to stop coming to work in protest. The employer simply fires her for not coming to work. That one worker has no power to influence the employer. However, it can be very costly for an employer to fire every single worker when a union goes on strike (though it has happened).