## 1NC

### 1NC – OFF

#### Interpretation—the aff may not specify a just government

#### Indefinite singulars imply a “rules reading” where the sentence expresses a generic normative evaluation, especially true in the context of the resolution which is written normatively. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

#### Rules readings are always generalized – specific instances are not consistent. lCohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

In general, as, again, already noted by Aristotle, rules and definitions are not relativized to particular individuals; it is rarely the case that a specific individual¶ forms part of the description of a general rule.¶ Even DPs of the form a certain X or a particular X, which usually receive¶ a wide scope interpretation, cannot, in general, receive such an interpretation in the context of a rule or a definition. This holds of definitions in general, not¶ only of definitions with an IS subject. The following examples from the Cobuild¶ dictionary illustrate this point:¶ (74) a. A fanatic is a person who is very enthusiastic about a particular¶ activity, sport, or way of life.¶ b. Something that is record-breaking is better than the previous¶ record for a particular performance or achievement.¶ c. When a computer outputs something it sorts and produces information as the result of a particular program or operation.¶ d. If something sheers in a particular direction, it suddenly changes¶ direction, for example to avoid hitting something.

#### That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

#### Violation—they specified Egypt

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision – if we win definitions the aff is not topical. The resolution is the only predictable stasis point for dividing ground—any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Predictable limits—specifying a just government offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of just governments in the world depending on their definition of just government. Neg positions like the Economy DA, Advantage CPs, etc. are jettisoned when the aff specifies a country that we don’t have specific ev to. Limits explodes neg prep burden and draws un-reciprocal lines of debate, where the aff is always ahead, turns their pragmatics offense. PICs are a nonstarter – just read 1AR theory and doesn’t justify preemptive abuse

**3] TVA solves – read the aff as advantage – most authors advocate for a change in a strike writ large**

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for—there’s no way for the negative to know what constitutes a “reasonable interpretation” when we do prep – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom, proliferating abuse

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.

#### T before 1ar theory on normsetting – we only have a couple months to set t restrictions but can discuss condo, pics, etc. anytime.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Counterplan text – The [] ought to

#### ---enter a prior, binding, and genuine consultation with the International Court of Justice to issue a binding ruling to guarantee a worker’s unconditional right to strike against the government.

#### ---pass a concurrent resolution that non-compliance with the International Court of Justice’s ruling constitutes an enforceable violation of Charter obligations.

#### ICJ says yes and creates a culture of *acculturation* that socializes acceptance of international law – the aff shreds that.

Brudney 21 [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil>] Justin \*\* Brackets in original

C. FOA and the Right to Strike as Opinio Juris There is also considerable support for the proposition that the general practice of states on FOA and the right to strike stems from acceptance as a matter of legal obligation. Admittedly, while the existence of opinio juris may be inferred from a general practice, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has at times noted the insufficiency or inconclusiveness of such practice, instead seeking confirmation that "[states'] conduct is 'evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. ",149 Trade agreements, for instance, may represent treaty law and may qualify as evidence of general practice, but they are typically entered into by States that have specific economic or political objectives rather than from a desire to embrace obligations arising under international law.15° Further, it is possible that even with respect to ILO conventions, widespread ratification is in part a function of acculturation, insofar as endorsements across a region contribute to socialized acceptance of norms on FOA, reassuring peer countries that protecting rights to association including the right to strike will not place them in an inferior competitive position. 151 That said, the ICJ often does infer the existence of opinio juris from a general practice and/or from determinations by national or international tribunals.152 And there are ample reasons to draw such an inference here. To start, FOA is consciously accepted as an obligation by ILO member states not simply through ratification of Convention 87 (covering more than 80 percent of them) but by virtue of membership itself. The ILO Constitution expressly requires support for FOA principles, and these principles are further imbedded through a tripartite governance structure that allocates power-sharing roles to worker organizations alongside governments and employers. 153 Thus, ILO members understand there is an underlying obligation to respect FOA in law and practice.154 A second reason is that domestic law can provide relevant evidence regarding the presence of opinio juris among states. Commitments to FOA expressed in national constitutions, statutes, and court decisions are not necessarily evidence of a state's belief that the principle is international as opposed to domestic law. Nonetheless, the International Law Commission has made clear that evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) "may take a wide range of forms," including but not limited to "official publications; government legal opinions; [and] decisions of national courts." 155 In this regard, the CEACR in 2012 identified 92 countries where "the right to strike is explicitly recognized, including at the constitutional level"; the list includes six countries that have not ratified Convention 87.156 Recognition in domestic law of a right to strike alongside a conscious decision not to ratify Convention 87 could give rise to an inference that these six countries are rejecting the right as a principle of international law. However, as explained earlier, national courts for two of the six non-ratifying countries (Brazil and Kenya) expressly invoke ILO membership and/or principles as guidance in their domestic law decisions.157 In addition, Canada—a country not listed among the 92 endorsing the right to strike in the 2012 General Survey—has since recognized a constitutional right to strike under national law, relying in part on international law principles including CEACR and CFA determinations.158 The Canadian Supreme Court had previously been explicit in invoking Convention 87, ICESCR, and ICCPR as "documents [that] reflect not only international consensus but also principles that Canada has committed itself to uphold." 159 Further, a third country in the group of six—South Korea—has affirmed in its trade agreements with the United States and the EU its obligation to "adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices" FOA in accordance with the ILO Declaration.16° And in various CFA complaints against South Korea for violating FOA principles, including the right to strike, the Government has disputed the facts of the complaints while at the same time recognizing that such rights are embedded in international law.161 Accordingly, a more relevant reference point in this setting may be that "when States act in conformity with a treaty provision by which they are not bound . . . this may evidence the existence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) in the absence of any explanation to the contrary.3 3162 Stepping back, domestic law on FOA and the right to strike, which for many countries developed after Convention 87 and its initial applications by the CEACR and CFA, may be viewed in part as a window into countries' sense of obligation in law and practice. A state may at times adopt labor provisions of a trade agreement for reasons of comity or relative competitive advantage. These reasons may play a more modest role with respect to adoption of certain human rights treaties or ILO conventions. 163 But evidence of practice and obligation in the domestic law sphere—especially when informed by regard for international instruments—seems almost by definition to be a function of acceptance as law rather than susceptibility to strategic motivations. In this regard, there are numerous instances in recent years where governments have expanded their legislative protections for the right to strike following a period of dialogue with the CEACR, and that committee has recognized and applauded the changes in law. 164 Of particular relevance to the U.S. setting, these expansions have included assuring the right to strike for public sector employees and prohibiting the hiring of replacements for strikers. 165 A third reason to infer opinio juris (in addition to the centrality of FOA principles within the ILO Constitution and the strong evidence of FOA and right-to-strike practice and obligation under domestic law) involves recent statements from high officials in the United Nations indicating that the right to strike is understood by its leaders as CIL. In his 2016 report to the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association explained, "The right to strike has been established in international law for decades, in global and regional instruments, and is also enshrined in the constitutions of at least 90 countries. The right to strike has, in fact, become customary international law.'5166 In 2018, responding to a press briefing on a strike by U.N. employees following announced pay cuts, the Deputy Spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-General reiterated the U.N. view that the right to strike is indeed CIL and did so in the context of the right being asserted by public employees not involved in the administration of the state: Question: Does the Secretary-General believe that U.N. staff have a right to take part in industrial action? Deputy Spokesman: We believe the right to strike is part of customary international law. 167 These statements did not simply materialize in recent times. Two major U.N. Human Rights treaties—the ICESCR and the ICCPR—have been interpreted by their relevant treaty bodies to include a right to strike; these bodies have reaffirmed their joint commitment to the right to strike as part of FOA, and they regularly monitor governments' record of compliance with this right. 168 And as noted earlier, the two treaties—each ratified by over 80 percent of U.N members—include a clause explicitly identifying respect for ILO Convention 87. In sum, the principles of FOA including the right to strike would appear to satisfy both prongs of the CIL test. The widely recognized general practice on strikes has sufficient shape and contours: a basic right, three substantive exceptions (public servants involved in administration of the state, essential services in the strict sense of the term, and acute national emergencies), a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike itself, and certain procedural prerequisites or attached conditions.169 There are variations in national practice and also disagreements at the margins about what the right to strike protects, but these aspects are not different in kind from diversity and contests regarding international rights prohibiting child labor, or for that matter domestic constitutional rights involving freedom of expression or the right to bear arms. As for opinio juris, a broad range of sources combine to establish that the general practice stems from a sense of acceptance and obligation: ILO foundation and structure; two widely endorsed United Nations human rights treaties; national constitutions; government representations; domestic legislative and judicial decisions that expressly refer to or impliedly accept international standards and practices; and contemporary U.N. leadership.

#### Ruling on the right to strike secures the legitimacy of the ICJ as an international mediation body.

Hofmann and Schuster 16 [Claudia and Norbert; February 2016; Dr. Claudia Hofmann works as a research associate at the Chair for Public Law and Policy at the University of Regensburg. She specializes in public international law (in particular the field of socio-economic human rights and equality-oriented policies), social law, constitutional and administrative law. Norbert Schuster works as a lawyer in Berlin and teaches at the University of Bremen. He specialises in labour law; “It ain’t over ‘til it’s over: the right to strike and the mandate of the ILO Committee of Experts revisited,” <https://global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/GLU_Working_Papers/GLU_WP_No.40.pdf>] Justin

BASES FOR A POTENTIAL RULING BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE The question of whether the Committee has left the area of interpretation and entered the sphere of standard-setting can only be answered on a case by case basis. As has been indicated before, the primary question for an advisory opinion of the ICJ is whether Convention No. 87 contains a right to strike (see Section IV). What follows is, therefore, a cursory glance at the legal bases for an ICJ opinion, so as to sketch the broad outlines of a possible decision. Under Art 37.1 of the ILO Constitution, taken together with Art 36 of the ICJ Statute, the International Court of Justice is responsible for questions or differences of opinion about the interpretation of the ILO Constitution and the ILO Conventions. This reflects the function of the ICJ as an international mediation body inasmuch as cases are to be referred to the ICJ when the parties to a treaty disagree about the interpretation of a norm within the treaty. Let us assume that such a disagreement exists here as to whether, in particular, Art 3 of ILO Convention No. 87 also accords trade unions a right to strike.85 The Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association have expressed a legal opinion on this. In the current legal situation, i.e. in the absence of concrete rules explicitly granting the Committee of Experts a corresponding interpretative competence, the competence to decide on this issue rests with the ICJ. Upon what sources of law and which principles will the ICJ base its decision? Two provisions are particularly relevant here. One is Art 38 of the ICJ Statute and the other is Art 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).

#### ICJ legitimacy is key to global multilateralism and crisis stability – it’s declining now.

Kornelios Korneliou 18 [Permanent Representative of Cyprus and Vice-President of the 73rd Session of the UN General assembly, "Report of the International Court of Justice," United Nations, 10-25-2018 <https://www.un.org/pga/73/2018/10/25/report-of-the-international-court-of-justice/>] Recut Justin

In the face of the headwinds against the multilateral system and global institutions, including direct attacks on their legitimacy, the International Court of Justice stands as testament to the principles of peace and justice in a multilateral world. Today’s debate builds on fifty years of exchange between the Court and the General Assembly, allowing Member States the opportunity to debate the work of the Court. This historic exchange is particularly pertinent to the 73rd Session of the General Assembly, which aims to ‘make the UN relevant to all’. The court system serves as a bulwark against arbitrariness and provides the mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes, guaranteeing the stability so necessary for international cooperation. For the peoples of the world, the court may be far away but its impact is real. Excellencies, I am encouraged by the continued and enhanced confidence in the International Court of Justice. Not only has the Court’s workload increased over the last 20-years but this trend has continued into the period under review, demonstrating unequivocally that there remains a need and desire for a multilateral mechanism to address legal challenges of international concern. The variety of cases addressed by the court, and the fact that these cases stem from four continents, is also testament to the universality of the Court. In fact, as of today a total of 73 Member States have accepted, as compulsory, the jurisdiction of the Court. In addition to the Court’s role in advancing multilateralism, its judgements and advisory opinion directly influence the development and strengthening of the rule of law in countries the world over. As stated by the report: “everything the court does is aimed at promoting and reinforcing the rule of law, through its judgement and advisory opinions, it contributes to developing and clarifying international law.” Finally, at a time when human rights abuses and conflict devastate the lives of millions, and when tensions simmer in regions throughout the world, the adjudication of disputes between states remains an essential role of the Court in preserving peace and security. We welcome the continued readiness by the Court to intervene when other diplomatic or political means have proven unsuccessful. For Member States, respect for the decisions, judgements, advice, and orders of the Court remains critical for the efficacy and longevity of the international Justice System. The General Assembly has thus called upon States that have not yet done so to consider accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with its Statute. In closing, allow me to reiterate: if we are to preserve the international multilateral system, then adherence and respect for international law remains key.

#### Multilateralism solves a laundry list of impacts – even a tiny net benefit is enough to o/w the AFF

Esther Brimmer 14 [Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the United States Department of State from April 2009 to June 2013, “Smart Power” and Multilateral Diplomacy, June, <http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Smarter%20Power/Chapter%204%20brimmer.pdf>] Recut Justin

Over the subsequent decade, the variable definitions of Smart Power have evolved to reflect a rapidly changing foreign affairs landscape – a landscape shaped increasingly by transnational issues and what can only be described as truly global challenges. Nations of the world must now calibrate their foreign policy investments to try to leverage new opportunities while protecting their interests from emerging vulnerabilities. Smart Power is no longer an alternative path; it is a four-lane imperative. ¶ The world in 2014 is fundamentally different from previous periods, growing vastly more interconnected, interdependent, networked, and complex. National economies are in many cases inextricably intertwined, with cross-border imports and exports increasing nearly tenfold over the past forty years, and more than doubling over just the past decade. At the same time, we are all connected – and connected immediately – to news and events that in past generations would have been restricted to their local vicinities.¶ Consider, for example, the 2011 tsunami that devastated parts of Japan. Not only did we know in real time of the earthquake that triggered the tsunami, we had live coverage of some of the tsunami’s most devastating impacts and then round-the-clock coverage of the Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis. Communications technology brings such events to us without delay and in high definition. This communications revolution, headlined by the explosion of social media, carries with it the almost unlimited potential to inform and educate. It also provides people and communities with new ability to influence and advance their causes – both benevolent and otherwise, as the dramatic events of recent years in North Africa and the Middle East have made clear. ¶ At the same time, global power is more diffuse today than in centuries. Although predictions of the nation-state’s demise have gone unrealized, non-state actors – including NGOs, corporations, and international organizations - are more influential today than perhaps at any point in human history. The same might be said for transnational criminal networks and other harmful actors. Concurrently, we are witnessing the rise of new centers of influence – the so-called “emerging” nations – that are seeking and gaining positions of global leadership. These emerging powers bring unique histories and new perspectives to the discussion of current challenges and the future of global governance. Several of these countries are democracies and share many of the core values of the United States; others have sharply different political systems and perspectives. All are gauging how to be more active in the global arena. ¶ It is this new, more diffused global system that must now find means of addressing today’s pressing global challenges – challenges that in many cases demand Smart Power ingenuity. From terrorism to nuclear proliferation, climate change to pandemic disease, transnational crime to cyber attacks, violations of fundamental human rights to natural disasters, today’s most urgent security challenges pay no heed to state borders. ¶ So, just as global power is more diffuse, so too are the opposing threats and challenges, and it is in this new reality that the United States must define and employ its Smart Power resources. That reality demands a definition that must now far exceed the origin parameters of hard and soft. Many of these challenges would be unresponsive to traditional Hard tools (coercion, economic sanctions, military force), while the application of Soft tools (norm advancement, cultural influence, public diplomacy) in customary channels is likely to provide unsatisfactory impact. ¶ Ultimately, the other component necessary in today’s Smart Power alchemy is robust, focused, and sustained international cooperation. In effect, in an increasing number of instances, Smart Power must now feature shared power, and in that context foreign policy choices must follow two related but distinct axes. ¶ First, those policy choices must strengthen a state’s overall stature and influence (rather than diminish it), leaving the state undertaking the action in a position of equal or greater global standing. This is easier said than done. The proliferation in challenges facing all states has created a need for multiple, simultaneous diplomatic transactions among a broadening cast of actors. Given the nature of today’s threats facing states both large and small, those transactions have never been more frequent and at times overlapping – a reality that requires new agility and synchronization within foreign policy hierarchies. States that are less capable of responding to this new reality may experience diminished political capital and international standing by acting on contemporary threats in isolation or without a full appreciation of the reigning international sentiment. Many observers have highlighted U.S. decision-making in advance of the 2003 Iraq invasion as indicative of just this phenomenon. ¶ Alternatively, states applying a new Smart Power approach to their foreign policy recognize the overlapping need to maintain global standing and stature while seeking resolution of individual policy challenges. We see considerable effort on the part of emerging powers to find just that balance, and I would argue that the United States has also made great strides in that regard since 2009. ¶ Second, Smart Power policy choices must contribute to the strength and resilience of the international system. As noted above, the globalization of contemporary challenges and security threats has augmented the need for effective cooperation among states and other international actors, and placed even greater demands on the global network of international institutions, conferences, frameworks, and groupings in which these challenges are more and more frequently addressed. Given this heightened need for structures to facilitate international collaboration, states are more rarely undertaking foreign policy courses of action that entirely lack a multilateral component, or that feature no interaction with or demands upon the international architecture. As recent American history shows, even states with unilateral tendencies have found themselves returning to the multilateral fold to address aspects of a threat or challenge that simply cannot be addressed effectively alone.

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Civil War

#### Oil prices are sliding – two days in a row, dollar strength, Ida, increased production, and tapering asset purchases

Paraskova 9/20/21 [Tsvetana is a writer for Oilprice.com with over a decade of experience writing for news outlets such as iNVEZZ and SeeNews. "Oil Prices Fall As Traders Anxiously Await Fed’s Decision." https://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Oil-Prices-Fall-As-Traders-Anxiously-Await-Feds-Decision.html]

Oil prices dropped early on Monday as the U.S. dollar continues to strengthen ahead of the Fed’s much-anticipated policy meeting this week, which could announce the beginning of stimulus easing.

As of 9:05 a.m. EDT, WTI Crude was losing 1.75% at $70.71 and Brent Crude prices were down 1.49% at $74.21.

The oil market is down for a second consecutive day after Friday’s session settled in the red, as broader markets are anxiously watching whether the Federal Reserve will announce the start of asset purchase tapering at its meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday. The U.S. dollar gains were depressing the oil market as a stronger greenback makes oil buying more expensive for holders of other currencies.

The risk to U.S. oil production in the Gulf of Mexico is now diminishing as more output is being restored in the wake of Hurricane Ida. The return of more production from the U.S. offshore also weighed on oil prices early on Monday.

“As this week starts, much of the US market tightening on account of Ida is already baked into prices, while outages in offshore oil production and Louisiana refining capacity are continuing to ease,” Vanda Insights said in a note early on Monday.

The U.S. dollar and the Fed meeting will be the key external factors that will determine oil’s direction this week, apart from the usual U.S. inventory reports by the API and EIA, ING strategists Warren Patterson and Wenyu Yao say.

“All eyes will be on the FOMC meeting on Wednesday, where some believe we could already see the Fed announce its intentions to start tapering asset purchases, though our US economist is of the view that an announcement is more likely in November. A tapering announcement this week would likely put some downward pressure on oil and the broader commodities complex,” they noted.

#### Oil prices will decline – OPEC will increase production – our ev is predictive

Julia Fanzeres 9-30-21, "Biden renews OPEC outreach as oil prices climb 10% in September," 9-30-2021 https://www.worldoil.com/news/2021/9/30/biden-renews-opec-outreach-as-oil-prices-climb-10-in-september

The rising price of oil “is of concern for the U.S.,” said White House press secretary Jennifer Psaki. The U.S. has been in touch with OPEC about oil prices, she said at a press briefing. Heading into next week’s meeting between OPEC and its partners, there is increased speculation that the organization will consider raising production more than the previously announced hike of 400,000 barrels a day.

“With oil prices at multi-year highs, we think that OPEC will come under increasingly intense pressure from Washington to increase production,” RBC analyst Helima Croft said in report.

#### Middle East war is good—it raises oil prices

Lynch 18 [Michael Lynch spent nearly 30 years at MIT as a student and then researcher at the Energy Laboratory and Center for International Studies. He then spent several years at what is now IHS Global Insight and was chief energy economist. Currently, Lynch serves as the president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, Inc., and lectures MBA students at Vienna University. He’s been president of the US Association for Energy Economics and serves on the editorial boards of three publications. Will Oil Prices Blow Up With The Middle East? April 12, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellynch/2018/04/12/will-the-oil-price-blow-up-with-the-middle-east/#166754c23d19]

It's said that a woman once approached 19th century German Chancellor Bismarck and asked him to explain the controversy over Schleswig-Holstein, to which Bismarck responded, “Madam, only three people have ever understood Schleswig-Holstein. One is dead, the second has gone mad, and I’m the third and I’ve quite forgot.” This summarizes how I feel about the current Middle East situation. The public rhetoric (including tweets) suggests that the U.S. and Russia are both willing to attack each other’s forces -- the U.S. is planning an attack on Syrian forces that might affect Russian personnel and Russia is apparently threatening to shoot down U.S. planes. This is obviously concerning, and while incidental Russia casualties might not lead to a direct military response, if Russia shot down a U.S. plane (as opposed to an unmanned missile), the U.S. would almost certainly respond. Given that the Russians know this, they are unlikely to take such a step. An additional factor is the possibility that Iranian forces in Syria would be hit by any U.S. attack, which might invite retaliation. Iran is unlikely to be able to attack U.S. forces in the Mediterranean directly, but forces in Iraq and Syria might be subject to ‘asymmetrical warfare,’ i.e., small-scale attacks, possibly including suicide bombers. The threat to oil markets come if Iranian actions encourage President Trump to refuse to recertify the Iranian nuclear agreement in mid-May. While many of Iran’s customers in Asia would not be concerned, there might be some drop in sales from companies fearful of U.S. legal action. Sanctions on financial transfers would also deter the more conventional customers, but the Iranians should be able to work around that after a brief pause. Could this also mean an escalation in the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia (or more broadly but less accurately, Shia versus Sunni regimes)? Given that the Saudis have been attacking Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen without direct response by Iran for some time now, any Saudi actions in Syria seem unlikely to be a provocation that would worsen the situation in the Gulf. FDR’s comment that ‘we have nothing to fear but fear itself’ seems appropriate for oil traders. Bombs and missiles flying in the greater Middle East always creates a bullish impetus on prices, even if the oil fields remain distant from the actual violence. The death of Russian personnel would worsen this, as it implies a greater probability of retaliation and continuation of the conflict which, again, would push up oil prices. And naturally, should Iranian personnel be affected, there would be very rational concerns that they might respond with some sort of attack that could affect Gulf oil trade. The worst case scenarios -- ongoing U.S.-Russian combat or direct Saudi-Iranian fighting -- seem very unlikely to happen. But as long as the possibility exists, oil prices will remain elevated, with WTI perhaps hitting $70 or higher, and only coming down when it has become clear that the violence is diminishing and will not spread. Until then, expect a bumpy ride.

#### Lower oil revenue encourages Russia to intervene militarily which causes escalating crisis

Jaffe and Elass 16 [Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Elass, Columbia Journal of International Fails. War and the Oil Price Cycle. January 1, 2016. https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/war-oil-price-cycle]

While low oil prices have forced Moscow to take draconian economic steps, so far it has not fundamentally produced the desired diplomatic capitulation. As predicted by Robert Blackwill and Meghan O’Sullivan, “… a weaker Russia will not necessarily mean a less challenging Russia…Russia could seek to secure its regional influence in more direct ways –even through the projection of military power.”48 Indeed, U.S. summer diplomatic efforts fizzled quickly by autumn, with Russia changing the facts on the ground through direct Russian military intervention. Russia’s motivations are multifold and certainly include protecting its substantial interests in Syria including its preferred outcome that maintains Syria as an Iranian bulwark against Sunni jihadists.49 Some analysts are suggesting that Moscow is overly optimistic about defeating Syrian opposition groups. Instead, it is suggested that Russia’s previous difficulties during its invasion of Afghanistan may prove instructive, with all Syrian opposition forces still focusing in earnest on the Assad camp, and saving energies against each other for a later day.50 However, it is still not clear as this article went to press whether Russia intends to satisfy the Saudis by participating in peace negotiations, or whether the Russian engagement on behalf of Assad is meant to hold Iran and Moscow in a position to use Syria to assert themselves against the kingdom and restore oil prices. While the outcome in Syria is uncertain, the Russian move clearly complicates the landscape in the region, and leaves open the possibility of escalating violence. Pavel Baev and Jeremy Shapiro of Brookings suggest Russia’s increased intervention may simply be designed to “establish a position of strength from which to bring Moscow back into the center of diplomacy over Syria,”51 but they are skeptical that Russia will be able to manage its participation in the conflict to reach a desired goal. Russia may also have broader goals, including intimidating U.S. allies both in the region and in Europe, to influence oil policy over the longer term, as well as to weaken strategic alliances that could be used against Russia, its national interests or the interests of individuals in the current regime. In recent years, Russia has acted to reassert itself on the world stage both through military means and by tapping energy as a weapon for leverage to enhance its geopolitical status.52

#### But, decline causes worse aggression – it’s NoKo 2.0

Fisher 14 [Max Fisher, Vox. The worse Russia's economy gets, the more dangerous Putin becomes. December 17, 2014. https://www.vox.com/2014/12/17/7401681/russia-putin-ruble]

You might reasonably conclude that the destruction of Russia's economy is great news for the United States of America. After all, won't it humble Vladimir Putin, forcing him to finally back out of his disastrous Ukraine invasion, soften his growing hostility toward Europe and the US, and generally ratchet down the brinksmanship and aggression that have made him so troublesome?

Actually, it's the opposite. The odds are that Russia's freefalling economy will make Putin even more aggressive, more unpredictable, and less willing to compromise. The weaker that Russia becomes, the more dangerous it will get, and that's terrible news for everyone, including the US.

It is precisely because the cratering economy is weakening Putin that it will force him to bolster his rule, which he will almost certainly do by drumming up nationalism, foreign confrontations, and state propaganda. Russia, already hostile and isolated, is likely to become even more so, worsening both its behavior abroad and the already-significant economic suffering of regular Russians. The country's propaganda bubble will further seal off Russians from the outside world, telling them that Russia's decline is the fault of Western aggression that they must rally against.

In all, this effect is starting to look something like the North Koreaification of Russia. That does not mean that Russia is about to become or will ever be as isolated, hostile, or aggressive as North Korea, but it only has to edge a little bit in that direction to bring terrible consequences for the world and for Russians themselves.

#### Only instability in the Middle East can prevent Russian economic implosion

Baev 15 (Pavel K. Baev is a Research Director and Professor at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institutions, Washington DC, and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris. 24 April 2015. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/pavel-k-baev/russia-is-spoiling-for-fight-in-middle-east>)

The first is the dramatic (and, for Russia, devastating) decline in oil prices, which has been caused by profound shifts in global energy markets. This trend might only be reversed rapidly by a further spike of instability in the Middle East, which would disrupt supplies coming from the Persian Gulf. The 30-40% price drop that occurred in the second half of 2014 happened while three major suppliers—Iraq, Iran, and Libya—were already performing far below capacity. It is reasonable to assume that a normalisation of production in any of them would push the benchmark price even lower. Russia may thus find it necessary to prevent progress in conflict resolution (and, hence, stabilisation in one or more of these three major producers). It could mean the difference between severe economic crisis and implosion.

#### They’ll use cyberattacks, which cause extinction

Perkovich 18 [George, Olivier and Nomellini chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Really? We’re Gonna Nuke Russia for a Cyberattack?” 1/18, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/18/donald-trump-russia-nuclear-cyberattack-216477>]

For three reasons, the Trump administration would be wise to reconsider and more carefully calibrate the circumstances under which it would initiate nuclear war. The first reason has to do with the fact that nuclear war would be much more devastating to the United States than would any conceivable cyberattack. Russia and China appear to be the most likely adversaries that in the near term might be able to use cyberweapons to disable significant segments of the U.S. electricity system. Indeed, Russian attackers already did so to Ukraine, in a December 2015 operation that shut down power for approximately 230,000 Ukrainians for up to six hours. That attack, Wired magazine reported last June, may have been a dress rehearsal for a future assault on the U.S. power grid. Now imagine it was much worse, and all of Ukraine was without electricity for weeks. If Ukraine possessed nuclear weapons, would any sane person in Washington have recommended that Ukrainian leaders retaliate by nuking Russia, and thereby inviting Russian nuclear attacks on Ukraine? The cure would have been much worse than the disease. The same strategic logic applies to the United States. A cyberattack on U.S. civilian infrastructure could be enormously disruptive and costly. Depending on the scale and durability of outages of electricity, piped water, etc., the effect could be like what Puerto Rico is experiencing due to Hurricane Maria (though without the collapsed roadways and buildings). But, if a U.S. president initiated nuclear war in response to a massive cyberattack*, Russia and China would be expected to retaliate with nuclear weapons.* This could leave the mainland U.S. in the condition of Puerto Rico *minus all the people, buildings and wildlife*. Russia and China would suffer gravely in the process, but the U.S. would lose much more than it would gain by moving from cyberwar to nuclear war. Here’s the second reason it’s crazy to retaliate with nuclear weapons: The United States’ conventional and cyber capabilities combined are greater than its adversaries’. Thus, the United States for decades has wanted to keep conflicts from going nuclear, where it would be harder if not impossible to “win.” The U.S. continues to develop and deploy its own cyber capabilities to disrupt adversaries’ civilian and dual-use infrastructure—energy, water, finance, etc. This helps deter adversaries from initiating cyberwarfare on a large scale, and, if deterrence fails, to enable *countervailing cyberattacks and perhaps conventional warfare*.

#### Oil and gas key to Canadian economy – contributes both directly and indirectly to the rest of the economy

* 8 percent of Canadian GDP & tax revenue
* Direct contributor through employment
* Indirect contributor through links to other industries

Globerman and Emes 19, Steven Globerman is a Resident Scholar and Addington Chair in Measurement, Professor Emeritus, Western Washington University and Joel Emes is a Senior Fellow at Fraser Institute, 5-7-2019, "Investment in the Canadian and U.S. Oil and Gas Sectors: A Tale of Diverging Fortunes," Fraser Institute, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/investment-in-the-canadian-and-us-oil-and-gas-sectors-a-tale-of-diverging-fortunes, HKR-AT

The **oil and gas industry is critically important to Canada’s economy.** **It accounts for almost 8 percent of Canada’s GDP,** as well as for a significant share of the tax revenue collected by governments. The oil and gas sector is particularly important to the provincial economies of Alberta and Saskatchewan. It accounts for almost 30 percent of Alberta’s GDP and slightly over 23 percent of Saskatchewan’s GDP. As such, the economic health of the oil and gas sector is a direct contributor to employment and economic activity in Western Canada and an indirect contributor to the rest of the domestic economy through links to industries that supply inputs to the sector, as well as use the outputs of the sector. The upstream segment of the oil and gas sector encompasses exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas. It is the single largest segment of the oil and gas sector, which also includes midstream gathering and pipeline facilities and downstream refineries. The oil sands account for almost two-thirds of Canada’s oil production. Since activity in the mid and downstream sectors will ultimately reflect the production of crude oil and natural gas in the upstream sector, the willingness of companies to explore for and produce oil and gas in Western Canada dictates the pace of economic activity throughout the industry’s total supply chain. A sharp drop in the world price of crude oil in 2015 and 2016 hurt the profitability of upstream oil and gas companies in both Canada and the US. However, while economic activity in the US upstream segment increased substantially with a modest recovery in crude oil prices in 2017 and 2018, investment in Canada’s upstream segment as a share of total capital expenditures in Canada declined consistently from 2014 through 2018. While total capital expenditures in Canada declined post-2014, the decline in capital expenditures for oil and gas extraction was even more pronounced. Thus, while capital expenditures for oil and gas extraction accounted for approximately 28 percent of total Canadian industrial capital expenditures in 2014, oil and gas extraction accounted for only 14 percent in 2018. Investment analysts and portfolio managers have recently warned that investment in the oil and gas sector is moving increasingly to the US and away from Canada, and that they are reluctant to invest their clients’ savings in Canadian oil and gas companies. An unfavourable business environment for oil and gas exploration and production in Canada is cited as the reason, particularly compared to the business environment in the US. A number of Canadian oil and gas companies have also reallocated their exploration budgets away from Western Canada to the more profitable shale oil producing regions of the United States. In the absence of changes to Canadian government policies affecting the sector, relatively low prices for Western Canada crude oil as well as depressed profitability of Canadian oil and gas companies are likely to continue. As a consequence, the ongoing shift in the location preferences of North American oil and gas companies towards the US might well intensify with drastic consequences for the fiscal health of the Alberta and Saskatchewan governments. While limited pipeline capacity is the major factor depressing the price of Canadian heavy crude oil, more favourable tax and regulatory environments in the US compared to Canada are also contributing to the diversion of upstream oil and gas investments from Canada to the US. By way of illustration, whereas capital expenditures in the upstream segment were around 41 percent higher for the US when comparing 2018 to 2016, they were only about 15 percent higher in Canada. An investment manager in the United Kingdom recently wrote a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau saying that it was hard for her to watch a vibrant Canadian oil and gas industry being strangled by regulation, carbon taxes, and the inability of producers to get their products to world markets. Recent investment patterns in the North American oil and gas sector support this sentiment.

#### Strong economy key to Canada’s global influence

Tilson 14 , MP, Ottawa Journal

(David, “Federal government promotes Canada’s global leadership,” 7-9-14, DOA: 12-29-14, <http://www.newspapers-online.com/caledon/?p=8477>, ava)

Canada is positioned to be a strong and credible voice on key issues in our global community. Our prominence and global influence on the world stage continues to grow under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. In a time of global economic uncertainty, our government has prioritized Canada’s economic recovery and resulted in significant measures of economic success. With the creation of more than one million net new jobs since the depth of the global recession, we have the best job growth record among all G7 members. Our government’s investment in jobs, growth and long-term prosperity has enhanced the resilience of the Canadian economy, our economic credibility and in turn demonstrated to the international community that Canada is a great place to invest. Our government has remained focused on pursuing an ambitious and balanced trade agenda that will help Canada’s economic recovery and ensure long-term prosperity. In October, our government reached a free trade agreement with the European Union, a historic accomplishment for Canada’s trade relations. It will boost Canada’s economy by $12 billion annually — the equivalent of 80,000 jobs — and Canadian businesses will have preferential market access to the EU’s half a billion consumers. We also reached an agreement for free trade with South Korea, which is expected to help grow our economy by $1.7 billion per year. In addition to increased jobs and economic activity, expanding Canada’s free trade agreements also provides hard-working families more choice at a lower cost for everyday household goods. We are also working to maintain and build on all of Canada’s bilateral relationships. While in Malaysia, Prime Minister Harper signed a declaration of intent to conclude a new tax agreement between Canada and Malaysia to help promote trade and investment between the two countries. In an increasingly global community with shared concerns, our government is also committed to helping ensure the safety and security of Canadians and our interests abroad. While in Malaysia, Prime Minister Harper renewed our commitment to enhance security cooperation between the two countries for the safety of all our citizens. Prime Minister Harper also announced Canadian support for four projects that will strengthen Malaysia’s ability to counter international crime, human smuggling, and organized crimes. These projects build on what we’ve already done in the global community to help combat money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption, tax evasion and other crimes. Canada’s growing prominence on the world stage has also afforded us the opportunity to take a leadership role within the international community to address issues of human rights and equality, while promoting Canadian values of freedom, democracy, and rule of law. Our government introduced the Office of Religious Freedom to promote Canadian values of pluralism and tolerance in our global community. The Office is working with like-minded partners to raise awareness and develop policies and programs to protect religious minorities under threat, to oppose religious hatred and to promote tolerance. Prime Minister Harper has also demonstrated real leadership in addressing the health challenges and disadvantages faced by women, infants, and children in the poorest of countries, in launching the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health with G8 countries in 2010. Thanks to the Muskoka Initiative and subsequent global action, maternal and child mortality rates are declining. However, there is still more work to be done. Canada hosted the Summit on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health. Through this Summit, we are accelerating our health initiatives and continuing to push this issue into the forefront. Indeed, our government announced that Canada will be providing an additional $3.5 billion in funding for various projects to help children and mothers in the developing world. As we strengthen ties and promote economic prosperity, Canada is positioned to lead on the world stage and promote Canadian values. Our government is delivering on the priorities of Canadians.

#### Only Canadian soft power can solve international threats

Malik 20 Malik, Sadia Mariam. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, York University, Canada "Canada must use its 'soft power' to champion global human rights." Conversation, 25 Feb. 2020, theconversation.com/canada-must-use-its-soft-power-to-champion-global-human-rights-132177. [HKR QC]

As the world enters the third decade of the 21st century, it is waking up to a new reality, facing threats to international solidarity and human security that are not necessarily economic in nature. Climate change, inequality, populist movements, ethnic nationalism and global epidemics are posing major challenges to international development and human security. Disenchantment with the neoliberal economic system and unregulated capitalism is growing. And on the political front, the global balance of power is shifting as we move away from a unipolar world, dominated largely by the United States, to a bipolar world where China is emerging as the major counterpart to the U.S. Read more: What exactly is neoliberalism? These turbulent times pose challenges and call for collective action since many threats to human security can no longer be contained within the geographical boundaries of nation states. Although Canada has reduced its foreign aid commitments recently, it has great potential to make up for it by using its soft power to address issues of international development and security. Soft power is defined as a persuasive approach to international relations and diplomacy that doesn’t involve coercion and trades on a country’s cultural and economic influence. Since the world and the nature of threats to human security and solidarity have changed, our approach to international solidarity and development must also change. In many ways, Canada is well-prepared to lead that change. No longer all about income The notion of international development, as historically understood in light of an income-centred approach, is now being increasingly contested. For too long, we have measured progress and well-being in terms of expansion in GDP alone and framed issues of international development predominantly in terms of lack of income. Read more: Why our obsession with GDP ignores harm done to welfare and the world There are growing calls to question this approach. Economic growth is of little use if it doesn’t promote broad-based human well-being, leads to climate change and threatens the very survival of the human race. What the world needs today, more than ever, is a model of international development that is decolonized, humane and centred on human rights and freedoms. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen is seen at an event at Harvard University in May 2015. (Gretchen Ertl/AP Images for FXB) The United Nations — under the intellectual guidance of scholars like Amartya Sen and development practitioners like Mahbub ul Haq — has made significant headway in popularizing a more humane model of international development through the publication of its Annual Human Development Reports and the Human Development Index. It has also influenced global security discourse by popularizing a concept of human security that transcends the traditional focus on territorial security and encompasses health, food and environmental safety. That concept recognizes the geographic and spatial connectivity of threats. It’s based on the realization that the battle for human survival in the future will be fought not by defending national borders but by understanding the interconnectedness of the fate of human race — and by evoking the compassion that unites us as fellow human beings. The intellectual foundations of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also rest on the concept of human security. Canada has been at the forefront of promoting this concept. Through the formation of the Human Security Network with like-minded countries, Canada was successful, to an extent, in influencing global institutions to promote a human security agenda. New threats Canada needs to continue its efforts in this direction, especially in light of new or heightened threats to human security that the world faces today in the form of climate change, polarization, ethnic nationalism, intolerance and the global spread of disease. Canada’s efforts in promoting a human rights-based approach to international solidarity are commendable. Whether it’s an issue of freedom of speech violations in repressive regimes or assisting international refugees, Canada has adopted a humane approach and has set high moral standards. Read more: Syrian refugees in Canada: Four years after the welcome Given the current shift in the global balance of power from U.S. dominance to the one that includes China and other emerging economies, middle-power countries like Canada, France and Germany will be in a better position to use their soft power to influence global institutions on human rights-based development and to promote much-needed human rights around the world. Although Canada’s recent reduction in foreign aid has been harshly criticized, it can be seen in a positive light as it signals a move away from problem-solving approach that is based on short-term humanitarian assistance. What’s really needed for long-term sustainable development is to address the root causes of underdevelopment, which include unaccountable governments, corruption, concentration of political power in the hands of the few without proper checks and balances or rule of law, weak property rights and contract enforcement, and lack of opportunities for the vast majority of citizens. Genuine global leadership needed But whether Canada’s decision to reduce foreign aid signals the need to address the root causes of underdevelopment isn’t clear. Too often, the Global North has supported repressive, dictatorial regimes in the Global South to promote its own economic and geopolitical interests. It’s time to realize that sustainable and people-centred development is not possible as long as unequal structures of power and repressive political regimes remain intact in developing countries. The world is ready for a new vision that defines human progress in a profound way and recognizes the interconnectedness of the fate of humanity. But to achieve this, we need a genuine and credible global leadership. Given Canada’s global image and its historical record in promoting ethical norms and freedoms around the world, it commands greater legitimacy. However, to bring about genuine change, middle-power countries like Canada must adopt a leadership role in pursuing an ethical agenda to ensure the security and survival of humanity.

### 1NC – AT: US Aid

#### Russia isn’t even close to threating US dominance

Doug Bandow 17, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, a Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution with the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, "What Russian Threat? Americans Shouldn't Be Running Scared Of Moscow", Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/03/06/what-russian-threat-americans-shouldnt-be-running-scared-of-moscow/

Listen to folks in Washington talk about the supposed Russian threat and you’d think America was a small, third-rate country—friendless, stuck in Moscow’s shadow, possessing a tiny, obsolete military. The paranoia seems strongest from Neoconservatives who otherwise demand that the U.S. dominate the globe, bombing, invading, and occupying other nations at will. In 2012, Mitt Romney charged Russia with being America’s number one “geopolitical foe,” causing some to later hold him up as a prophet. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense James Mattis testified before the Senate that Moscow is the “principal threat” to the U.S., which should be “ready to confront Russia.” Yet the fear-mongering is nonsense. Russia’s presumed attempt to influence America’s election was more smoke than fire. Moscow is accused of a private hack which released emails detailing the sleaze afflicting one of the presidential candidates. Although illegal like other cyber-attacks, that’s pretty mild, especially compared to Washington’s routine interference in other nations’ political affairs, including their elections. Although American officials proclaim their commitment to democracy, their activities almost always promote parties, leaders, and movements friendly to the U.S. More serious are claims that Moscow poses a security threat. Military capabilities are more than formal military budgets, but the spending disparity between the U.S. and Russia is vast: Washington’s outlays are almost ten times as much as Moscow’s. President Donald Trump just proposed an annual jump in outlays, $54 billion, which is nearly as much as Russia will spend all year. Russia lacks the global reach to challenge America. As Putin noted in an interview with an Italian journalist: “Publish a world map and mark all the U.S. military bases on it. You will see the difference between Russia and the U.S.” Moscow also lacks the economic foundation to match the U.S. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “One effect of the country’s deteriorating economic situation has been the delay in concluding the next State Armament Program; originally intended to have been started in 2016, this has now been pushed back to 2018.” Russia possesses the world’s second most powerful nuclear arsenal, capable of destroying America many times over. But even Moscow’s sharpest critics don’t believe Vladimir Putin plans to commit suicide. That nuclear threat acts more as Russia’s guarantee against U.S. coercion. Neither side can allow the stakes of any conflict to race out of control. Beyond inaugurating nuclear Armageddon, how does Moscow threaten America? An invasion seems unlikely, since the two countries don’t share a land boundary. An attack across the Bering Strait to retake Alaska is more than a little unlikely. Which means there is no direct threat to the U.S. How about isolating America by controlling sea and air and interdicting commerce? That’s almost as implausible. The vaunted Red Navy is gone. Moscow deploys one decrepit aircraft carrier, no match for Washington’s multiple carrier groups. And the U.S. is allied with European nations which also possess capable if smaller fleets. Russia is upgrading its forces, but it lacks the resources to equal America. Moscow is no more likely to dominate the air above or around the U.S. Russia’s air force is capable and has gained valuable combat experience over Syria, but remains no match for America’s globe-spanning force. More dangerous may be Russian air defenses, which would ensure that hostile U.S. air operations were not the cakewalk like in Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Nor is there any obvious reason why Moscow would inaugurate war with the U.S. Russia’s critics notwithstanding, the Cold War is over. There is only one aggressive ideological power, and that is America. Putinism is a simpler, practical authoritarian nationalism. That’s obviously not a congenial home for anyone who believes in America’s classical liberal heritage. The vision of a limited government dedicated to protecting individual rights has few takers in the Russian Federation. The real problem posed by Vladimir Putin is not that he’s an unpleasant thug, but that he seems to represent a substantial number—a strong majority if polls are to be believed—of Russians. Still, Moscow’s policy reflects much more a defensive than aggressive stance. Its role in the world looks a lot like that of pre-1914 imperial Russia. The Putin government wants its interests to be respected and its borders to be secure. It especially doesn’t like seeing its friends, such as Serbia, dismembered without so much as a nod in Moscow’s direction. Russia also opposes a potentially hostile alliance pushing ever eastward, absorbing lands such as Ukraine that once were integral to the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet Union. The U.S. (and Moscow’s neighbors) might wish that Russia would accept America’s not always so benevolent hegemony. However, Boris Yeltsen’s rule proved to be but a brief interregnum until age-old Russian nationalism reasserted itself. That Moscow now stands up for what it considers to be its interests is no cause for alarm in Washington unless the latter has aggressive designs on Russia itself. The belief that such a nation and people would voluntarily, even enthusiastically, submit to American “leadership” always was a fantasy. Of course, Moscow’s policies sometimes run contrary to Washington’s desires, but that doesn’t mean Russia poses a threat. Moscow generally has been helpful in Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, all significant concerns of the U.S. Russia has moved closer to China, despite major differences between the two, but largely in response to Washington’s hostile policies toward both great powers. In this way the Obama administration inadvertently reversed Richard Nixon’s geopolitical masterstroke of 45 years ago.

#### Hegemony incentivizes rapid escalation - competitive decline creates incentives to wait and de-escalate

Hal Brands 18, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10/24/18, “Danger: Falling Powers,” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/24/danger-falling-powers/>

There is, then, no disputing that rising powers can have profoundly disruptive effects. Yet such powers might not actually be the most aggressive or risk-prone type of revisionist state. After all, if a country’s position is steadily improving over time, why risk messing it all up through reckless policies that precipitate a premature showdown? Why not lay low until the geopolitical balance has become still more favorable? Why not wait until one has surpassed the reigning hegemon altogether and other countries defer to one’s wishes without a shot being fired? So while a rising revisionist power may be tempted to assert itself, it should also have good reason to avoid going for broke.

Now imagine an alternative scenario. A revisionist power—perhaps an authoritarian power—has been gaining influence and ratcheting its ambitions upward. Its leaders have cultivated intense nationalism as a pillar of their domestic legitimacy; they have promised the populace that past insults will be avenged and sacrifices will be rewarded with geopolitical greatness and global prestige. Yet then the country’s potential peaks, either because it has reached its natural limit or because of some unforeseen development, and the balance of power starts to shift in unfavorable ways. It becomes clear to the country’s leadership that it may not be able to accomplish the goals it has set and fulfill the promises it has made, and that the situation will only further worsen with time. A roll of the iron dice now seems more attractive: It may be the only chance the nation has to claim geopolitical spoils before it is too late.

In this scenario, it is not rising power that makes the revisionist state so dangerous, but the temptation to act before decline sets in. In this sense, the dynamic bears a resemblance to the famous Davies J-Curve theory of revolution, wherein a populace is held to be more inclined to revolt not when it is maximally oppressed but rather when raised expectations are shown to be in vain.

#### It's more unstable – our evidence is comparative.

Christopher Preble 16, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. PhD in History from Temple University. With William Ruger. 2016. “The Problem With Primacy.” In “Our Foreign Policy Choices, Rethinking America’s Global Role” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=741072022102024090075118113101083026016056000029024069069123111076082080009064093108016120111006027011049007074022115108007102123042042011081092085100005025006088070001052041101115092080116097001012108114029011071004086091092118120095090091004096029029&EXT=pdf

Another key problem is that primacy inadvertently increases the risk of conflict. Allies are more willing to confront powerful rivals, because they are confident that the United States will rescue them if the confrontation turns ugly, a classic case of moral hazard, or what Barry Posen calls "reckless driving." Restraining our impulse to intervene militarily or diplomatically when Our vital national interests are not threatened would reduce the likelihood that Our friends and allies will engage in such reckless behavior in the first place. Libya and Georgia are only two cases of this problem. Plus, a more restrained U.S. foreign policy would provide a powerful incentive for allies to share the burden of defense. Primacy has not stopped rivals from challenging U.S. power. Russia and China, for example, have resisted the U.S. government's efforts to expand its influence in Europe and Asia. Indeed, by provoking security fears, primacy exacerbates the very sorts of problems that it claims to prevent, including nuclear proliferation. U.S. efforts at regime change and talk of an "axis of evil" that needed to be eliminated certainly provided additional incentives for States to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. actions (e.g„ North Korea). Meanwhile, efforts intended to smother security competition or hostile ideologies have destabilized vast regions, undermined Our counter- terrorism efforts, and even harmed those we were ostensibly trying to help. After U S. forces deposed the tyrant Saddam Hussein in 211)3, Iraq descended into chaos and has never recovered. The situation in Libya is not much better; the United States helped Overthrow Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011, but violence still rages. The Islamic State, which Originated in Iraq, has now established a presence in Libya as well. It is clear that those interventions were counterproductive and have failed to make America safer and more secure.

#### Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### B. A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### AT Brands and Edel No liberal order or SOI impact---states won’t risk war, err towards isolation, AND mediate ties economically.

Mueller ’21 [John; February 17; Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies; The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, “The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran,” Ch. 6]

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938. Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try. If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129 Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy. However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130 The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment and to support local – or partisan – resistance as it did in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in 1979. 132 Such a response does not require the United States to have, and perpetually to maintain, huge forces in place and at the ready to deal with such improbable eventualities. The current wariness about, and hostility toward, Russia and China is sometimes said to constitute “a new Cold War.”133 There are, of course, considerable differences. In particular, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union – indeed the whole international Communist movement – was under the sway of a Marxist theory that explicitly and determinedly advocated the destruction of capitalism and probably of democracy, and by violence to the degree required. Neither Russia nor China today sports such cosmic goals or is enamored of such destructive methods. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States was strongly inclined during the Cold War massively to inflate the threat that it imagined the Communist adversary to present. The current “new Cold War” is thus in an important respect quite a bit like the old one: it is an expensive, substantially militarized, and often hysterical campaign to deal with threats that do not exist or are likely to selfdestruct.134 It may also be useful to evaluate terms that are often bandied about in considerations within foreign policy circles about the rise of China, the assertiveness of Russia, and the antics of Iran. High among these is “hegemony.” Sorting through various definitions, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow array several that seem to capture the essence of the concept: domination, controlling leadership, or the ability to shape international rules according to the hegemon’s own interests. Hegemony, then, is an extreme word suggesting supremacy, mastery, preponderant influence, and full control. Hegemons force others to bend to their will whether they like it or not. Reich and Lebow also include a mellower designation applied by John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan in which a hegemon is defined as an entity that has the ability to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace.135 But this really seems to constitute an extreme watering-down of the word and suggests opinion leadership or entrepreneurship and success at persuasion, not hegemony. Moreover, insofar as they carry meaning, the militarized application of American primacy and hegemony to order the world has often been a fiasco.136 Indeed, it is impressive that the hegemon, endowed by definition by what Reich and Lebow aptly call a grossly disproportionate military capacity, has had such a miserable record of military achievement since 1945 – an issue discussed frequently in this book.137 Reich and Lebow argue that it is incumbent on IR scholars to cut themselves loose from the concept of hegemony.138 It seems even more important for the foreign policy establishment to do so. There is also absurdity in getting up tight over something as vacuous as the venerable “sphere of influence” concept (or conceit). The notion that world affairs are a process in which countries scamper around the world seeking to establish spheres of influence is at best decidedly unhelpful and at worst utterly misguided. But the concept continues to be embraced in some quarters as if it had some palpable meaning. For example, in early 2017, the august National Intelligence Council opined that “Geopolitical competition is on the rise as China and Russia seek to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which US influence does not dominate.”139 Setting aside the issue of the degree to which American “influence” could be said to “dominate” anywhere (we still wait, for example, for dominated Mexico supinely to pay for a wall to seal off its self-infatuated neighbor’s southern border), it doesn’t bloody well matter whether China or Russia has, or seems to have, a “sphere of influence” someplace or other. More importantly, the whole notion is vapid and essentially meaningless. Except perhaps in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe. When members of the House of Lords fail to pay sufficient respect to a group of women they take to be members of a ladies’ seminary who are actually fairies, their queen, outraged at the Lords’ collected effrontery, steps forward, proclaims that she happens to be an “influential fairy,” and then, with a few passes of her wand, brushes past the Lords’ pleas (“no!” “mercy!” “spare us!” and “horror!”), and summarily issues several edicts: a young man of her acquaintance shall be inducted into their House, every bill that gratifies his pleasure shall be passed, members shall be required to sit through the grouse and salmon season, and high office shall be obtainable by competitive examination. Now, that’s influence. In contrast, on December 21, 2017, when the United States sought to alter the status of Jerusalem, the United Nations General Assembly voted to repudiate the US stand in a nearly unanimous vote that included many US allies. Now, that’s not influence. In fact, to push this point perhaps to an extreme, if we are entering an era in which economic motivations became paramount and in which military force is not deemed a sensible method for pursuing wealth, the idea of “influence” would become obsolete because, in principle, pure economic actors do not care much about influence. They care about getting rich. (As Japan and Germany have found, however, influence, status, and prestige tend to accompany the accumulation of wealth, but this is just an ancillary effect.) Suppose the president of a company could choose between two stories to tell the stockholders. One message would be, “We enjoy great influence in the industry. When we talk everybody listens. Our profits are nil.” The other would be, “No one in the industry pays the slightest attention to us or ever asks our advice. We are, in fact, the butt of jokes in the trade. We are making money hand over fist.” There is no doubt about which story would most thoroughly warm the stockholders’ hearts.

#### Russia and China Expansion is regional and economic not aggressive for hegemonic power – your quote about Xi is from 2017 and has heavy translation issues since it’s to the CCP – prefer our evidence form the Chinese Ambassador